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“Major educational reforms” have been a catchphrase in the media and in politicians' discourse in the last three decades in Japan. The public was repeatedly ...


“Major educational reforms” have been a catchphrase in the media and in politicians’ discourse in the last three decades in Japan. The public was repeatedly told by all political parties at every election that their schools had problems, and that the nation needed largescale “education reform”. Indeed, the national government has produced a large number of reports on education. Over the period of 1984 to 1999 seven policy deliberation councils within the Ministry of Education were asked to produce 39 reports with recommendations. On top of all of these, the Ad-Hoc Council of Education (directly under the auspices of then prime minister), issued four reports between 1984 and 1987. Several major changes were subsequently introduced since the late-1990s. The public is starting to wonder how long these “reforms” will continue and if any positive consequences will result from them. Academic debates over Japan’s recent education reforms have resulted in wide range of conclusions (e.g., Cave 2001; Goodman 2003). A feature in these public debates is an almost exclusive focus on the national government initiatives. ______________________________________________________________________ th

This paper was presented to the 17 Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Melbourne 1-3 July 2008. It has been peer reviewed via a double blind referee process and appears on the Conference Proceedings Website by the permission of the author who retains copyright. This paper may be downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant legislation.

2 Perhaps, this is a reflection of high expectations that the public maintains of the centralised system of education. The modern system of education, since its establishment in the late 19th century, has always played a transformative role in Japan. A centralised system of mass schooling was established by the imperial state in the mid-19th century to act as an engine for transforming a feudal society into a modern and industrialised state that could resist Western colonisation (Amano, 1995). Following the Second World War, the allied occupation authorities established a new system of schooling with the aim of affecting another social transformation, from ultranationalist state to a democratic society, and to underpin economic growth. By late 1970s, Japan became a successful liberal democracy and the world’s second largest economy, characterised by a relatively even wealth distribution. Current debates on educational reforms are a continuation of those that started in the mid-1980s when the public felt that Japan had “caught up” with the West. Both the government and the public started exploring new directions. On one hand, this exploration was influenced by various theses on the “uniqueness of Japan” (nihonjinron) (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986; Befu 2001) which tried to explain supposedly unique features of Japanese society (e.g., Japan Inc., trade practices, corporate human resource practices, high academic achievement with low standard deviation). On the other hand, it was prompted by external pressures to respond to globalisation, and a marked slowing of economic growth in the 1990s after the bursting of the economic bubble. We saw a general climate of uncertainty, with the public no longer sharing a consensus regarding social goals. This paper is an attempt to understand educational reforms during the last three decades from a perspective which departs from the existing focus on the national initiatives. I shall examine “reforms” and changes, not only in terms of the national government initiatives, but also examine initiatives of local government and education boards, and those outside the mainstream system of schooling. What changes have been implemented? Who are pushing them, and with what agenda? In what ways were proposed changes resisted, with what consequence? I suggest that the national government is not the only player in education reforms; and that discussion on educational reforms requires consideration of initiatives by both local governments and players outside the mainstream system. I shall also explore how the changes compare with so called global trends observed in Anglophone countries, and how specific local circumstances might have guided the development of change in Japan.

3 I start with the national government-initiated education reforms. I will then turn to reforms initiated by local governments and education boards, which have addressed one of the major issues overlooked by the national government, that is, the increasingly diverse student populations. Thirdly I shall turn to initiatives observed outside the mainstream school system. This paper is a result of research based on primary and secondary sources, as well as my regular fieldwork on schools in Japan, the most recent being a yearlong sabbatical in 2006. The National Government Reform Initiatives Major directions of the national government initiatives are as follows: (1) “the slimming of schooling” whereby Saturday schooling was phased out, and roles once performed by schools are transferred to community and families; (2) curriculum reform (introduction of compulsory interdisciplinary studies, reduction of content covered, and more teacher autonomy in curriculum design); (3) diversification of upper secondary schooling; (4) greater parental choice and relaxed zoning (although still considerably limited); (5) recruitment of principals from non-teaching force; (6) official promotion of “love of Japan” e.g.,the national anthem, the national flag and patriotism at school (although its implementation varies across the country). These national government reforms are best understood as constituting a pragmatic package in response to demands from neo-liberals, neo-conservatives and progressive educationalists (Okano 2008). The reforms policies reflect the on-going struggles amongst these camps, each of whom sees globalisation’s significance in different ways. First, neoliberal advocates represent the interests of big business, which is eager to see Japan follow “global norms”. Concerns of the neo-liberal camp are most clearly represented in a report prepared by a think-tank, Shakai Seisanbu. The report called on schools to produce human resources for a competitive international market, and for individual families to be more accountable for their children’s education. It proposed radical reforms, such as abolishing school zones, greater powers for principals in the management of their schools, the establishment of school councils as self-managing bodies, abolition of entrance examinations, and the introduction of strict requirements to graduate from senior high school and university (Tsutsumi and Hashizume 1999) Second, neo-conservative advocates, including rural farmers and urban small business operators, are on the political right. They had been the dominant source of votes for the conservative Liberal Democratic Party which governed post-war Japan until 1993.

4 They can be seen as so called traditionalists who view the past with a kind of nostalgia, and lament the present state of young people, which they blame on an education system (where, they contend is staffed with unionised and idealistic leftist teachers). The neo-conservative nostalgia for the past has not been shared by neo-liberals, in wanting to pursue competitive edge in the global market, advocate global norms. The neo-liberal business establishment, for instance, opposes the prime minister’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (where leading Japanese war criminals are enshrined) and his controversial comments on historical events of the Second World War, which they see as constraining Japan’s relationships with Asian neighbours. Third, self-categorised “progressive educators” represent a section of the left in in the political spectrum (consisting of intellectuals, teachers, trade unions, and human rights organizations) who are variously concerned with social justice and social inequalities. They pursue student-centred and problem solving educational practices which nurture creativity and exploration, as opposed to what they see as rigid, structured teaching and learning which they claim stifles students. However, those in the left who are more concerned with structural inequality do not feel comfortable with the progressive educators’ focus on micro-classroom level practice, without due reference to factors external to schools (Kariya 2002; Fujita 2000). In addition, the bureaucrats in the central MEXT have been reluctant, at least in comparison to their counterparts in Anglophone countries, to initiate and implement changes that would weaken their power, and where there was not some assurance of unopposed implementation at local level. In between these interest camps remain the vast majority of people, including employees, some teachers and parents, who are undecided and prepared to listen to different views. In this context, the national government found itself needing to accommodate these distinctive interest groups, and persuade reluctant bureaucrats, as well as being seen to be responding to the public’s general dissatisfaction with schooling. Toning down particular lines of argument was one strategy. The result is a series of changes framed in language which has appeal to different groups and to the general public. Vague language concerning major initiatives included: diversification of learning, internationalisation, meeting individual needs, giving more autonomy to teachers and more choice to parents and students, reducing the role played by institutionalised schooling so that students can be engaged in more creative activities, and making schools more socially relevant. The neoliberal camp would endorse the moves to enhance diversity, parental choice, individual decision making power, accountability to stake holders, and competition amongst education

5 providers. It would also support student-centred and problem solving learning so that schools produce innovative elites for the knowledge-based economy. The neo-conservative camp would be happy with a focus on promotion of national anthem and flag, and an emphasis on instilling “love of Japan”, and an introduction of nation-wide achievement tests (in 2007). Progressive educators are pleased to see introduction of inter-disciplinary studies (sôgô gakushû) at compulsory school levels which individual teachers are encouraged to innovate according to the needs of their students, and the addition of new types of senior secondary schools which offer a large number of elective subjects. These initiatives, they would believe, promote student-centred learning based on individual needs. Local Government Initiatives: Multicultural Education Policies There has been an absence of national government’s interest in responding to challenges posed by the increasing ethnic diversity of the student population, in stark contrast with Anglophone nations’ recent reforms. It is the local governments and education boards that have taken initiatives to manage and benefit from a diverse polulace, in particular, in the areas where large minority populations exist. Prefectural, metropolitan and municipal government policies regarding the education of minority groups attest to this (Okano, 2006).Currently there are more than 80 local governments which have issued local multicultural education policies (Zenkoku Zainichi Gaikokujin Kyôikukenkyû Kyôgikai 2007: 26-8). While not extensively discussed in the media, their impacts are significant. The national government does not possess a publicly announced national policy on multicultural education as is the case in Australia and Canada. It adopts a passive approach and multiculturalism is framed in the language of human rights. Until recently, a simple equality principle (“identical treatment of everyone regardless of ethnic background”) had been the cornerstone of the central government policy regarding education of Korean permanent residents as seen in its 1953 statement (11/2/1953). Many teachers, in particular at schools with a large number of Korean students, soon defied this simple equality principle and have long supported such activities as after-school ethnic classes (where students learn the Korean language and culture) and Korean cultural study clubs. The majority (about 90%) of ethnic Korean children now attend local Japanese schools (Sugitani 1993: 43). The remaining students attend ethnic Korean schools that are run by the Association of North Koreans in Japan. In most Japanese school grounds Korean students are not discernible, even to average Japanese people, although many urban schools would have some Korean students (Okano 1997; Rohlen 1981). The subculture at an

6 individual school exerts a significant effect on the nature and degree of comfort of these interactions (Okano 2004). In comparison with the Koreans’ experiences, the national government’s response to the special needs of new immigrant and guest workers’ children in Japanese schools was relatively swift and concrete, but not necessarily effective. The Ministry of Education’s first response in 1991 was to start conducting surveys on “foreign students who require JSL (Japanese as a Second Language)”. It has instituted various “measures to respond to the special needs of foreign students and returnee students from China” (Japan, Monbukagakusho, 2004b). For example, it has funded JSL teacher positions, and conducted specialised counsellor dispatching programs. However, a large number of unenrolled school-aged children testifies to the fact that measures to date have been inadequate. This is where ethnic schools outside the mainstream school system have taken initiatives, as I shall discuss later. Local government multicultural education policies resulted from teacher and ethnic community concerns for the education of Koreans initially, and since the 1990s, for the plight of newcomer children. Forced closure of Korean ethnic schools did not steer Korean families’ desire for some form of ethnic education. Extensive opposition to it in the Osaka region resulted in an agreement between the Osaka prefectural governor and an ethnic Korean organization in 1948. This agreement allowed government schools with Korean students representing 30 percent or more of the school population to employ fulltime or fractionally appointed teachers funded by the prefecture to teach Korean ethnic languages and culture as well as other mainstream subjects. In later years, ignoring the Ministry’s policy of identical treatment, Korean parents and organizations and professional groups of sympathetic teachers initiated local activism and after-school ethnic education classes (minzoku gakkyu). The first local government policy for the education of foreign children in government schools (with special reference made to Korean nationals) (“Zainichi Gaikokujin Kyôiku Hôshin Shishin”) was issued by the Osaka Metropolitan Education Board in 1970. The policy has been revised several times since then to respond to changing needs. Approximately 80 local governments have followed with similar policies by 2007 (Zenkoku Zainichi Gaikokujin Kyôikukenkyû Kyôgikai 2007: 26-8). An Analysis of these policies suggests that there exist shared elements (i.e., provision of accurate knowledge of the causes for marginalisation of Koreans, acknowledgement of the prevailing Japanese view of Asians, respect for cultural differences, the sacred nature of human rights,

7 promotion of ethnic language and cultural maintenance, teaching and guidance to address the specific needs of foreign nationals, and professional development of teachers to implement these elements). These elements are widely observed in multicultural education policies elsewhere in the world (e.g., Banks 2004: 5). Described as multicultural education policies, these Japanese local policies display two distinctive features. One is the adoption of human rights as the framework, according respect for, and celebration of, other ethnic cultures, only marginal attention. The predominant concern in human rights, I suspect, derives partly from the fact that many Koreans have long chosen not to assert difference in order to “pass” as Japanese. It also derived from the strong influence that activism for the education of Koreans received from the pre-existing activism for the education of buraku people. Many voluntary ethnic classes were created in the context of Dowa education. Teachers involved in Dôwa education became advocates of the cause of education for Koreans. When formulating policies for education of Korean and foreign nationals, participants looked to Dôwa education policies for reference. Implementation of these policies was undertaken though institutional mechanisms which had already been established for Dôwa education at local government and individual school levels. The second distinctive feature is the continuing official use of the terms, “foreign nationals in Japan” or “Korean nationals in Japan” in the title of these policies. This reflects a prevailing assumption that Japanese citizenship is mono-ethnic rather than being conceived independently of one’s ethnic descent. The earlier policies tended to refer only to Korean nationals; and in the 1980s we started seeing “foreign nationals (mainly Koreans)”, a shift from reference to Koreans only to foreigners in general. The use of this term is however problematic. It excludes Japanese citizens of non-Japanese descent (i.e., those who have taken up Japanese citizenship, and children of Koreans and/or foreigners who are granted Japanese citizenship at birth), a sector of the population which is growing. After remaining silent on the education of Koreans in Japanese for 25 years, in 1991 the Ministry formally acknowledged that ethnic classes for Koreans had existed at government schools under local government discretion and approved their continuation, stating that “ethnic classes during extra-curricular hours are exempt from the no special treatment clause in the 1965 circular”. It also stipulated that this approach include other foreign nationals. This change in central government policy was a belated adjustment to acknowledge what was already occurring at the school level.


Changes outside Mainstream Schooling: Ethnic Schools While local governments with relatively large numbers of ethnic minority children responded to the special needs in their schools by issuing local multicultural education policies, there remained families who were unsatisfied with mainstream schooling and opted for ethnic schools, collectively named “schools for foreigners” (gaikokujin gakkô). Some old-timer Koreans and Chinese have customarily sent their children to ethnic schools. Since 1990s a large number of South American schools have sprang up after many children found difficulties at Japanese schools. While individual schools operate independently (except for the North Korean schools managed by a national peak body), there has recently been a collaboration amongst ethnic schools with diverse missions and enrolments in order to enhance their lobbying power. In 2006 there were 231 ethnic schools, which are collectively designated as “schools for foreigners” (gaikokujin gakkô) in the official discourse. Total of at least 24,000 students learn in eight languages at these schools. The schools are also diverse in terms of legal status, level of resources and missions. They include: (1) schools for long-existing ethnic minorities (whose existence originates from Japan’s colonialism and predates the end of the Second World War), like North Korean schools (which are most numerous), South Korean schools, and ethnic Chinese schools that have existed for almost 100 years and now enrol substantial numbers of Japanese children of non-Chinese descent (due to a reputation for high academic standards); (2) schools for new migrants (Brazilian, other South Americans, Indonesians, and children of over-stayers); (3) Anglophone international schools (including, for example, American, Canadian, British, and missionary schools); (4) French and German schools; and (5) the Amerasian School in Okinawa, which caters for children of American GIs and local women. The officially used collective term, “schools for foreigners”, itself suggests both the dominant categorisation of “others” based on nationality, and the reluctance on the part of official discourse to acknowledge the diverse ethnicities of Japanese nationals. There are a large number of Japanese nationals of diverse ethnic heritage attending “schools for “foreigners”. The schools occupy various legal statues, which determine their eligibility for government subsidies and tax exemption. The most privileged status (identical to mainstream schools) is granted only to three South Korean schools, while the “miscellaneous school” status (kakushu gakkô) is granted to other Korean schools, Chinese schools, and some Anglophone international schools. A large number of small schools for

9 Brazilians have not yet been granted even this status and operate as private tutoring schools; while currently attempting to gain miscellaneous school status. Ethnic schools (which had been predominantly North Korean schools until in the 1990s) have over a long period had little contact with mainstream schools, since their legal status did not allow them to participate in major inter-school events and competitions. While ethnic schools have existed for the last 100 years and their number increased rapidly with migrants’ influences since the 1980s, they have had only limited interactions. The most effective trigger for these diverse ethnic schools to network and act collectively was the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. This was in order to obtain central government assistance to urgently rebuild or repair heavily damaged school buildings, which under the existing legislation was not available to them due to their legal status. Nineteen schools (including 14 North Korean schools, a Chinese school, three Anglophone international schools, and a German school), formed the Hyogo Prefecture Association of Schools for Foreigners in July 1995 and lobbied local and central governments collectively for funding assistance; which resulted in the central government making an exception and providing a half of the necessary funding. The Association also persuaded Hyogo prefectural government to increase its regular annual funding to their members for the following years. The Association has been active since then, for example, in sending its representatives to UN related meetings regarding children’s rights to education. Following the Kobe initiative, other events have encouraged informal networking amongst schools for foreigners (Gekkan Io 2006: 161-2). The first formal event to demonstrate nationwide interaction amongst ethnic schools was the first Forum on Education for Multiethnic Co-existence (Tabunka kyosei forum) held in Kobe in 2005. A large number of ethnic schools participated in the event, including international schools, Korean schools, Chinese schools and schools for South Americans, a school for children of overstayers, and the Amerasian School in Okinawa. Representatives of these schools presented their situations and discussed problems and concerns specific to their schools. All acknowledged the disadvantages that the schools faced; and resolved to work and collectively lobby the government to accept that all children, regardless of nationality, are entitled to receive an education. The subsequent forum was held in Nagoya in November 2006. It was a success in that it attracted a large number of schools; but the absence of Anglophone international schools at this forum disappointed many. It reminded us that the nature of interaction and networking amongst these schools is contingent on specific local circumstances. Local

10 circumstances in Kobe were conducive to the emergence of the kind of networking that followed the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. The city has strong ethnic communities of oldtimer Chinese and Koreans (which had long run ethnic schools), several Anglophone international schools, and two European schools. It also had teachers and local governments with long experience of the culture of human rights (from buraku civil movements). I suspect that the Hyogo Prefectural Association of Schools for Foreigners will play an important role in mobilising ethnic schools across the country. Such nationwide collective actions are necessary for negotiation with the national education authorities. The forum is currently lobbying the national government to replace the term kokumin (Japanese nationals) with jinmin (people) or jûmin (residents) in the existing Fundamental Education Law so that the entitlements apply all children in Japan. The process is still in their early stages and I watch with great interest how it will unfold. Conclusions Going beyond an exclusive focus on the national government, this paper has examined other agents of education reforms. They include local governments and other players outside the formal school system. Their role has been to initiate changes in the areas which the national government fails to address (i.e., diverse student population), and/or contexualise and mediate the national directives at lower levels of implementation to suit their immediate environments. The potential scope for re-contextualisation varies, influenced by specific political and institutional circumstances. Within Japan the Kansai metropolitan region seems to possess the greater opportunity for re-contexualisation than the Tokyo metropolitan region that is currently governed by a conservative governor. While media concerns regarding the reforms have centred on patriotism, the most significant impact of recent reforms has been a widening gap in children’s educational experiences and opportunities, based on family background. This derives, on one hand, from the “slimming of schooling”, which has provided children with a greater amount of time to explore their interests outside schools, and on the other from greater parental choice in selecting schools. How children spend outside-school hours and develop interests in varying pursuits are influenced by place of residence and their family resources (Bourdieu, 1984). This trend has been reinforced as schools have gradually transferred their tasks to parents, in terms of both children’s academic activities and their sports and cultural pursuits. The impact of greater parental choice varied across the country. The effect of the relaxation of zoning for compulsory schools, for example, has been felt only in a limited

11 number of local areas, such as in the Tokyo metropolitan area, where the most radical changes were implemented. In contrast, the Osaka metropolitan area remains a stronghold of resistance (Shimizu, 2005). The introduction of horizontal diversity, as seen in a flexible curriculum and new types of high schools affected changes in learning practice at the school level and benefited some students (e.g., newcomer ethnic minorities); but the existing school hierarchy still remains unchallenged. Regarding the “patriotism” to be nurtured at school, schools and teachers remain unsure as to what exactly it means. Multicultural education has gained a legitimate place in schools in the localities which have adopted local multicultural education policies. This was assisted by the introduction of “integrated studies” for which individual schools (or teachers) develop their own curricula --intercultural understanding is a popular topic in the unit. Certain features of the Japanese reforms stand out when compared with reforms in Anglophone countries (e.g., Davies and Gumpy 1997; Whitty et al. 1998). First, the national curriculum reform was directed towards progressive education, rather than national standardisation. Second, decision making power was not moved from the local government level to the national government or individual schools. Third, increasing ethnic diversity of the student population was not addressed by the national government reform agenda. Individual local governments have taken initiatives in developing multicultural education policies in the face of an increasing number of immigrants (Okano 2006). Ethnic schools (operating outside the formal schooling system) accommodate those who opt out of the mainstream schooling; and have only recently started to collaborate in lobbying national and local governments. And lastly, educational reforms have been moderate and implemented slowly in Japan, despite all the hype in the media. The incremental nature of the nationally initiated reforms derive, at least partially, from the central Ministry’s deliberate reluctance to excise fully the executive power that it possesses, and its willingness to leave substantial room for discretion in implementation to lower levels of the education system. The Ministry is not willing to implement a policy when it sees a lack of support at the lower levels of implementation; and has therefore tried to consult with these levels through local committees and workshops. When the Ministry subsequently decides to adopt a policy or reject one (e.g., multicultural education policies), it deliberately leaves room for a wide range of interpretations and further negotiation amongst the different lower level parties, by for example, framing the policies in vague language open to diverse interpretation. This whole process slows down reforms. Perhaps,

12 the Ministry has learned from its past experience that coercive use of directive power without due support at lower levels of implementation is not only ineffective (since they were sabotaged by, and further alienated, participants in the implementation), but also undermines the Ministry’s authority and reputation amongst the wider public. How effective these reforms will be is a subjective judgement. At one end of the continuum are those who argue that incremental developments will not lead to radical changes in the system as a whole (e.g., Sanuki 2003). The reforms have not touched the basic structure of entrance examinations; and they remain a driving force in guiding schooling and parental choice, at least beyond middle school level. At the other end are those who argue that these incremental changes may have significant long-term consequences although they look unsubstantial in a short term (e.g. LeTendre 2002; Rohlen 2002). The judgement of success or otherwise will also depend on what kind of society the public wants in the future, which continues to be a source of debate. References Amano, Ikuo. 1995. Kyoiku kaikaku no yukue: Jiyuka to koseika o motomete. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shppan. Banks, J. 2004. "Multicultural education: historical development, dimensions and practices." Pp. 1-29 in Handbook of research on multicultural education (2nd edition), edited by J. Banks and C.A. McGee. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Befu, Harumi. 2001. Hegemony of homogeneity: an anthropological analysis of Nihonjinron. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction. Mass.: Harvard University Press. Cave, Peter. 2001. "Educational reform in Japan in the 1990s: 'Individuality' and other uncertainties." Comparative Education 37:173-191. Davies, Scott, and Neil Guppy. 1997. "Globalization and educational reforms in AngloAmerican democracies." Comparative Education Review 41:435-460. Fujita, Hidenori. 2000. Shimin shakai to kyôîku: Shinjidai no kyôiku kaikaku shian. Yokohama: Seo Shobô. Gekkan-Io. 2006. Nihon no nakano gaikokujin gakkô. Tokyo: Akashi shoten. Goodman, Roger, and David Phillips (Eds.). 2003. Can the Japanese change thdir education system? Oxford: Symposium Books.

13 Japan-Monbukagaku-sho. 2004b. "Kikoku gaikojin jidô seito kyôiku ni kansuru sasaku (Measures for the education of returnees and foreign students) ". Tokyo: Mongukagaku-sho. Kariya, Takehiko. 2002. Kyôiku kaikaku no gensô. Tokyo: Chikuma shinsho. LeTendre, Gerald K. 2002. "Setting national standards: Educational reform, social change, and political conflict." Pp. 19-32 in National standards and schhool reform in Japan and the United States, edited by Gary DeCoker. New York: Teachers College Press. Mouer, Ross, and Yoshio Sugimoto. 1986. Images of Japanese Society. London: Kegan Paul International. Okano, Kaori. 1997. "Third-generation Koreans' entry into the workforce in Japan." Anthropology and Education Quarterly 28:524-49. —. 2004. "Minority's changing relationship with schools." International Review of Education 49:1-22. —. 2006. "The global-local interface in multicultural education policies in Japan." Comparative Education 42:473-491. —. 2008. "Education reforms in Japan: Neo-liberal, Neo-conservative, and “progressive education” directions." in The rich world and the impoverishment of education. (Volume 4 of Global Neo-liberalism and education and its consequences), edited by David Hill. New York: Routledge. Rohlen, Thomas. 1981. "Education: Policies and prospects." Pp. 182-222 in Koreans in Japan, edited by C. Lee and G. De Vos. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rohlen, Thomas P. 2002. "Epilogue. Concluding observations: Wider contexts and future issues." Pp. 177-205 in National standards and school reform in Japan and the United States, edited by Gary DeCoker. New York: Teachers College Press. Sanuki, Hiroshi. 2003. Shin-jiyûshugi to kyôiku kaikaku. Tokyo: Junposha. Shimizu, Kokichi. 2005. Gakuryoku o sodateru. Tokyo: Iwanami shinsho. Tsutsumi, Seiji, and Daisaburô Hashizume. 1999. Sentaku Sekinin no rentai no kyôiku kaikaku (kanzenban). Tokyo: Keiso Shobo. Whitty, Geoff, Sally Power, and David Halpin. 1998. Devolution and choice in education: The school, the state and the market. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Zenkoku-Zainichigaikokujin-Kyôiku-Kenkyûkyôgikai. 2007. Dai 28-kai Zenkoku zainichi gaikokujin kyoiku kenkyukyIogikai Kyoto taikai shiryôshû. Kyoto: ZenkokuZainichigaikokujin-Kyôiku-Kenkyûkyôgikai.

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