1 Revival of shame

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Jun 28, 2008 - Revival of shame: a way to create pro-people role models as opposed to ... The article proposes the revival of the sense of shame when.
Revival of shame: a way to create pro-people role models as opposed to decisively antipeople role models for the youths     (Cite  as:  Kamanzi,  A.  &  N  Ishengoma,  (2009),  “Revival  of  shame:  a  way  to  create  pro-­‐people   role  models  as  opposed  to  decisively  anti-­‐people  role  models  for  the  youths,  in  Journal  of   Education  and  Development,  Dodoma:  UDOM)     Abstract   Education  of  the  youth  is  one  of  the  key  aspects  for  any  society  because  it  inculcates  in  the   youths   those   valuable   things   that   the   society   needs   for   its   future   survival.   The   article   argues   that  the  current  society  is  being  faced  with  a  critical  situation  of  “decisively  anti-­‐people”  role   models   for   the   youths.   Such   models   are   fruit   of   the   modernity,   which   has   exalted   reason   over  and  above  anything  else.  The  article  proposes  the  revival  of  the  sense  of  shame  when   educating  the  youths  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  “pro-­‐people”  role  models.   Key   words:   Modernity,   postmodernism,   otherisation   sin,   pro-­‐people   role   models,   anti-­‐ people  role  models,  shame.   Introductory  note   Speaking  about  a  youth  is  always  exciting,  especially  in  the  “modern”  times  when  youths  are   faced   with   so   many   challenges,   among   which   anti-­‐people   role   models.   The   World   Bank   (2006)   in   the   World   Development   Report,   Development   and   the   Next   Generation,   has   recognised   the   centrality   of   youths   and   education   for   in   development.   Addressing   issues   about   the   youths   is   very   exciting   because   of   the   feeling   and   real   fact   of   contributing   to   what   should  be  taken  as  the  most  serious  responsibility  of  adults:  catering  for  the  sustainability  of   the  human  race.  Among  the  Haya  people  of  the  North  Western  part  of  Tanzania,  there  is  a   saying  that  obuyo  butaina  nyana  tibuliwo,  that  is:  do  not  count  on  a  herd  of  cattle  without   calves  because  it  will  be  extinct  in  no  time.  This  saying  means  that  if  any  species  does  not   have  young  ones,  extinction  is  at  the  doorsteps.  So,  human  race  without  youths  is  bound  to   get   extinct   and   catering   for   the   sustainability   of   the   human   race   means   promoting   young   men  and  women  because  they  are  potentially  the  future  adults  and  elderly.  

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In  the  words  of  George  Orwel  (1945)  in  his  Animal  Farm,  he  writes:  “all  animals  are   equal,   but   some   animals   are   more   equal   than   others”.   Similarly,   it   can   be   argued   that   all   youths   are   equal,   but   some   youths   are   more   equal   than   others.   To   put   it   more   dramatically,   it  can  be  said  that  all  youths  are  equal,  but  some  are  less  equal  than  others!  All  youths  do   not   have   the   same   good   opportunities   of   having   good   role   models   so   that   they   can   learn   from  them  in  order  to  grow  into  responsible  adults.  Much  as  all  youths  have  potentialities  to   grow  up  as  full  human  beings,  therefore,  some  youths  cannot  actualise  these  potentialities   because   of   the   structural   challenges   which   the   adults   have   cherished,   are   cherishing,   and   might   continue   cherishing.   The   sufferings   and   disorientations   of   young   men   and   women   anywhere   is   no   good   news   for   the   human   race.   This   is   an   unfortunate   situation   of   which   we   are  living  with.   Modernity,   postmodernism,   otherisation   sin,   pro-­‐people,   and   anti-­‐people   role   models   are   key   words   in   this   article.   While   modernity   refers   to   the   ethos   of   celebrating   reason   and   its   products,   postmodernism   refers   to   the   ethos   critical   to   modernity   where   deconstruction  and  pluralism  is  celebrated.  The  otherisation  sin  refers  to  the  universalising   character  of  modernity  that  looks  at  the  Western  reason  and  all  the  rationalities  stemming   from  it  as  what  should  be  reason  for  the  whole  of  humanity.  While  pro-­‐people  role  models   are  people  who  mind  and  respect  others  and  have  a  sense  of  promotion  of  their  lives,  anti-­‐ people  role  models  are  people  who  do  not  mind  and  respect  others  and  do  not  have  a  sense   of   promotion   of   the   other,   but   exploitation.   Shame   is   consciousness   or   awareness   of   dishonour,  disgrace,  or  condemnation,  a  painful  emotion  caused  by  a  strong  sense  of  guilt,   embarrassment,  or  unworthiness.   This   article   brings   forward   an   argument   that   the   plight   of   the   youth   lies   in   the   curtailed   right   to   have   pro-­‐people   role   models,   as   a   result   of   an   “otherising   sin”   of   modernity;   with   post-­‐modernism,   however,   there   is   chance   to   forge   a   way   for   pro-­‐people   role   models.   The   article   begins   with   a   description   of   what   modernity   and   postmodernism   are,   after   which   it   presents   the   “otherisation   sin”   of   modernity.   The   article   continues   with   the   presentation   of   the   weird   role   models   who   are   a   result   of   the   modernity-­‐shaped   education  system.  The  article  winds  up  with  a  discussion  on  the  revival  of  shame,  an  element   played   down   in   modernity,   as   a   way   to   instruct   the   young   people   in   universities   for   creation   of  pro-­‐people  role  models.     2

Modernity  and  post-­‐modernism   Any   University   that   has   to   do   with   social   sciences   in   this   era   is   faced   with   an   obvious   snag   in   the   transmission   of   education:   being   caught   up   between   modernity   and   postmodernism.   While   in   modernity   the   university   celebrates   reason,   in   postmodernism,   the   university   questions  reason!     The  characteristic  expression  for  modernity  is  reason.  Its  high  point  in  the  history  of   western   ideas   was   the   epoch   following   the   Middle   Ages   in   Europe,   the   “Enlightenment”   period.  This  was  the  age  of  glorification  of  reason.  According  to  Kant  (1971:54),  “the  motto   of  enlightenment  is  therefore  sapere  aude!  Have  courage  to  use  your  own  understanding!”   By   then,   a   “mature   person”   meant   an   “enlightened   person”.   Modernity,   opposing   itself   to   other   traditions   anterior   to   it   and   to   other   cultures   and   confronting   the   geographic   and   symbolic   diversity   of   other   cultures,   assumes   a   universalizing   and   totalising   character.   It,   actually,  “imposes  itself  throughout  the  world  as  a  homogeneous  unity,  irradiating  from  the   occident”  (Baudrillard  1987:63).  It  is     …  a  maelstrom  that  promises  adventure,  joy  and  growth,  transformation  of   ourselves  and  the  world,  but  also  threatens  to  destroy  cherished  traditions   and  securities;  it  unites  by  cutting  across  class,  region  and  ideology  and  yet   disintegrates   through   incessant   change,   contradiction   and   ambiguity…   (Boyne  &  Rattansi  1990:2)  

Generally,  modernity  can  be  said  to  have  the  following  characteristics  that  feature  regularly:   rationalism,  domination,  and  universality.   Modernity  could  not  go  without  any  criticism.  Whereas  Fredrick  Nietzsche  described   it   as   an   advanced   state   of   decadence   in   which   “higher   types”   are   levelled   by   rationalism,   liberalism,   democracy,   and   socialism,   and   where   instincts   go   into   steep   decline,   Martin   Heidegger   saw   it   as   the   triumph   of   humanism   and   a   project   of   a   rational   domination   of   nature  and  human  beings,  the  culmination  of  a  process  of  “forgetting  Being”;  Deleuze  and   Guattari   saw   modernity   as   “oppressive   territorialisation   of   desire   into   constrictive   social   structures   and   repressed   personalities   that   nevertheless   multiplies   rhizomatic   lines   of   escape”  (Best  &  Kellner  1991:112).  

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Modernity,   however,   can   be   said   to   be   fundamentally   an   ethos:   a   way   of   thinking,   doing,   reacting,   and   relating   with   things.   In   this   line,   Foucault   (1991:31)   argues   that   modernity  is:   …  a  mode  of  relating  to  contemporary  reality;  a  voluntary  choice  made  by   certain   people;   in   the   end,   a   way   of   thinking   and   feeling;   a   way,   too,   of   acting   and   behaving   that   at   once   and   the   same   time   marks   a   relation   of   belonging   and   presents   itself   as   a   task.   A   bit,   no   doubt   like   what   the   Greeks   called  an  ethos  (1991:31).  

A  good  checkpoint  for  modernity  has  been  modernism  which  has  always  been  preoccupied   “with   highlighting   the   means   of   representation,   the   disruption   of   narrative,   and   the   contradiction  and  fragmentation  in  subjectivity  and  identity”  (Boyne  &  Rattansi  1990:8).  This   implies  that  modernism  has  always  acted  as  a  checkpoint  for  modernity  so  as  not  to  take  for   granted  any  simplistic  beliefs  in  the  progressive  capacity  of  science  and  technology.  It  is  in   this  sense  that  modernism  has  acted  as  a  precursor  to  postmodernism.   Postmodernism   is   a   complex   term,   dialectically   positioned   against   modernity.   Postmodernism  stands  for  “the  incredulity  towards  meta-­‐narratives”  (Lyotard  1984).  Losing   credibility  of  the  grand  narratives,  essentially  a  loss  of  belief  in  progress/becoming,  which  is   the   essence   of   Western   history,   postmodernism   becomes   a   challenge   to   the   whole   Western   tradition.  Thus,  postmodernism  being  a  mood  and  challenge  to  progress  is  characterised  by   its   menu   of   opposition,   which   it   claims   to   be   neither   relativism,   nor   scepticism,   nor   nihilism.   What  postmodernism  does  is  the  rejection  of  the  traditional  dream  of  a  complete,  unique,   and  closed  episteme,  implying  that  it  reacts  to  modern  philosophy  and  its  presuppositions  of   foundationalism,   essentialism,   and   realism   (Audi   1995:634),   as   key   elements   in   the   Enlightenment  rationale.   It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  philosophical  postmodernism  does  not  express  a  single   point   of   view.   For   example,   it   is   possible   to   talk   of   progressive   post-­‐moderns   and   conservative   ones   (Hutcheon   1989:1)   and   post-­‐moderns   of   resistance   and   reaction   (Aronowitz  &  Giroux  1991:19  &  59).  In  fact,  a  constant  debate  is  going  on  as  to  how  a  true   post-­‐modern  should  approach  life,  even  though  a  debate  like  this  is  problematic  because  it  is   most   unpostmodern:   it   wants   to   cage   and   categorise   people,   something   taboo   to   postmodernism!  

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As   a   way   to   see   these   two   perspectives   of   modernity   and   postmodernism   in   universities,   an   example   that   has   to   do   with   research   could   do.   A   thinking   and   practice   that,   for  example,  a  quantitative  approach  in  doing  research  is  more  “scientific”  than  a  qualitative   approach   is   still   dominant   in   universities.   The   dominance   is   because,   it   is   thought   that   a   quantitative   approach   is   more   objective   compared   to   a   qualitative   approach   which   is   subjective.   Objectivity   is   typical   expression   of   modernity   because   it   has   to   do   with   reason   versus   subjectivity   which   has   to   do   with   emotions.   The   objectivity-­‐oriented   mode   of   enquiry   leads  to  preference  to  hypotheses-­‐testing  researches  with  the  use  and  application  of  existing   theories,   frameworks,   and   models   at   an   expense   of   dynamic   approaches   that   have,   for   example,  grounded  theory  as  a  preferred  condiment.  This  is  a  kind  of  modernity  hangover  in   research,   a   situation   that   facilitates   in   the   failure   to   capture   the   emotional   elements   that   influence   a   lot   of   people’s   actions   in   everyday   life.   Qualitative   approaches   with   their   openness  to  enquiry  would  well  capture  such  emotional  elements.   “Otherisation  sin”  of  modernity   Modernity  in  its  celebration  of  reason  promised  adventure,  joy,  and  growth,  transformation   of   humans   and   the   world   by   uniting   all   people   across   classes,   regions,   ideologies,   and   religions.  Modernity,  therefore,  was  the  thing!  And  why  not:  who  does  not  cherish  reason?   Who   does   not   see   the   importance   of   reason?   Who   does   not   want   promises   of   transformations?  Modernity  sounded  like  heaven  on  earth!   The   “otherisation   sin”   of   modernity   lies   exactly   in   the   universalising   character   of   modernity,  that  is:  looking  at  the  Western  reason  and  all  the  rationalities  stemming  from  it   as   what   should   be   reason   for   the   whole   of   humanity.   The   “others’”   reasons   and   rationalities   are  not  reasonable.  The  otherisation  sin  has  been  translated  in  our  universities  through,  for   example,  the  content  of  what  is  being  taught  in  social  sciences.  A  typical  example  is  what  is   commonly   called   Development   Studies.   In   some   universities,   this   course   is   compulsory   to   all   students   across   the   university.   With   its   different   perspectives,   however,   it   is   a   course   that   has  had  as  a  starting  and  end  points  development  from  the  Western  discourse  or  rationality.   This  is  development  understood  in  terms  of  modernity.   It  is  this  “otherisation  sin”  that  leads  to  the  ignorance  of  all  other  reasons  and  their   consequent  rationalities:   5

I  am  apt  to  suspect  the  negroes,  and  in  general  all  other  species  of  men  (for   there   are   four   or   five   different   kinds)   to   be   naturally   inferior   to   whites.   There  never  was  a  civilised  nation  of  any  other  complexion  than  white,  nor   even   any   individual   eminent   either   in   action   or   speculation.   No   ingenious   manufactures  amongst  them,  no  arts,  no  sciences.  …  In  Jamaica  indeed  they   talk  of  one  negro  as  a  man  of  parts  and  learning;  but  ‘tis  likely  he  is  admired   for   very   slender   accomplishments,   like   a   parrot,   who   speaks   a   few   words   plainly  (Gardner  2007:73,  quoting  David  Hume).  

It   is   due   to   the   “lack   of”   the   Western   reason   that,   for   instance,   Africa’s   peculiar   character   cannot  be  comprehended,  as  Hegel  (1956:92)  points  out:   The   peculiarly   African   character   is   difficult   to   comprehend,   for   the   very   reason   that   in   reference   to   it,   we   must   quite   give   up   the   principle   which   naturally  accompanies  all  our  ideas—the  category  of  Universality.  In  Negro   life   the   characteristic   point   is   the   fact   that   consciousness   has   not   yet   attained   to   the   realization   of   any   substantial   objective   existence—as   for   example,   God,   or   Law—in   which   the   interest   of   man’s   volition   is   involved   and  in  which  he  realizes  his  own  being.  This  distinction  between  himself  as   an   individual   and   the   universality   of   his   essential   being,   the   African   in   the   uniform,  undeveloped  oneness  of  his  existence  has  not  yet  attained;  so  that   the   Knowledge   of   an   absolute   Being,   an   Other   and   a   Higher   than   his   individual  self,  is  entirely  wanting.  The  Negro,  as  already  observed,  exhibits   the   natural   man   in   his   completely   wild   and   untamed   state.   We   must   lay   aside  all  thought  of  reverence  and  morality—all  that  we  call  feeling—if  we   would   rightly   comprehend   him;   there   is   nothing   harmonious   with   humanity   to   be   found   in   this   type   of   character.   The   copious   and   circumstantial   accounts   of   Missionaries   completely   confirm   this,   and   Mahommedanism   appears  to  be  the  only  thing  which  in  any  way  brings  the  Negroes  within  the   range  of  culture  

Still,  for  Hegel  (1956:99),  Africa  does  not  have  history:     ...  At  this  point  we  leave  Africa,  not  to  mention  it  again.  For  it  is  no  historical   part  of  the  World;  it  has  no  movement  or  development  to  exhibit.  Historical   movements   in   it—that   is   in   its   northern   part—belong   to   the   Asiatic   or   European  World.  Carthage  displayed  there  an  important  transitionary  phase   of  civilization;  but,  as  a  Phoenician  colony,  it  belongs  to  Asia.  Egypt  will  be   considered  in  reference  to  the  passage  of  the  human  mind  from  its  Eastern   to  its  Western  phase,  but  it  does  not  belong  to  the  African  Spirit.  What  we   properly  understand  by  Africa,  is  the  Unhistorical,  Undeveloped  Spirit,  still   involved  in  the  conditions  of  mere  nature,  and  which  had  to  be  presented   here  only  as  on  the  threshold  of  the  World’s  History.  

Not   only   Hegel   thinks   so,   but   some   contemporary   philosophers,   as   well.   Take   an   example   of   an   Oxford   University   professor   Hugh   Trevor-­‐Roper   who   echoed   Hegel   over   a   century   later   when  he  stated   Perhaps  in   the  future   there   will  be  some  African  history  to   teach.  But  at  the   present  there  is  none;  there  is  only  the  history  of  Europeans  in  Africa.  The   rest   is   darkness,   and   darkness   is   not   the   subject   of   history   (Trevor-­‐Roper   1964:9).  

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This  «otherisation  sin»  is  exactly  what  Rosemann  (1998)  refers  to  in  his  Africa  as  the  Other  of   the  West.  Due  to  the  “otherisation  sin”,  there  is  little  room  that  education  takes  into  serious   consideration  the  context  of  the  people,  on  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  little   room   to   make   comparisons   for   searching   for   what   is   proper   and/or   improper   for   the   people   in   which   it   is   transmitted.   For   instance,   a   comparison   like   this   one   below   about   African   education  and  Western  can  hardly  be  done  with  the  “otherisation  sin”  in  action.     Philosophy   Content   Objectives   Costs   Dispensers   Duration   Context   Approach   Methodology   Place  

African  Education   Communitarian   Relevant/integral   For  life   Free   Community/members   Through  out  life   Natural  and  social   Inclusive   Flexible   Where  need  arises  

Western  School  Education   Rather  individualistic   Often  irrelevant   Often  for  jobs   Too  expensive   “Special”  people   For  periods   Artificial   Discriminatory   Not  very  flexible   Buildings  

Source:  Kanyandago  1998:145   In   actual   fact,   those   who   try   to   make   such   comparisons   are   considered   poor   in   thinking.   The   comparison  cannot  be  done  simply  because  the  Western  school  education,  which  is  result  of   the   western   rationales,   babies   of   the   western   reason   from   the   Enlightenment,   is   what   education  is;  what  is  not  that  is  not  education!  Such  comparison  and  discussions  for  policy   orientation   would   be   very   crucial   for   contextualising   education   for   the   African   young   man   and  woman,  for  instance.   Weird  role  models   Due  to  lack  of  contextualisation  of  education,  given  the  universalising  character  of  modernity   leading   to   the   “otherisation   sin”,   the   African   youth   has   been   condemned   to   looking   at,   admiring,   working   with,   and   collaborating   with   weird   models   who   have   come   from   this   western   school   of   education,   with   pretence   of   neutrality.   Such   weird   role   models   do   not   mind  and  respect  others;  they  do  not  have  a  sense  of  promotion  of  the  other,  but  his/her   exploitation.   According   to   Mataze   (1998:154),   this   kind   of   education   has   promoted   weird   role  models  who  are  decisively  anti-­‐people:   …   civil   servants   who   do   not   serve   civil   society   but   serve   their   own   needs   first;   politicians   who   speak,   but   say   nothing;   voters   who   vote   but   do   not   elect;  a  media  which  misinforms;  schools  where  they  teach  how  to  ignore;  

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members  of  the  judiciary  who  sentence  victims  and  take  bribes;  a  military   that  is  always  at  war  with  the  citizens  it  is  meant  to  protect;  a  police  force   that  cannot  fight  crime  because  it  is  busy  committing  crime;  …  money  which   happens  to  be  freer  than  people,  and  people  who  serve  things.  

The  list  of  such  weird  role  models  could  be  longer:  religious  people  who  instead  of  preaching   God  for  heaven,  preach  God  for  their  appetites;  doctors  who  instead  of  saving  life,  destroy  it;   engineers   who   construct   collapsing   buildings   and   pothole-­‐friendly   roads;   business   people   who   sell   junk   instead   of   goods,   and;   ethicists   without   ethics.   And   all   these   are   the   role   models  for  the  youths!   These   weird   role   models   respond   to   the   unquenchable   desire   to   accumulate   and   consume.   In   such   role   models,   there   is   realisation   of   commodification   tendencies,   among   others  (Deleuze  &  Guattari  1983:88),  with  mobile,  unmappable,  and  excessive  demands  over   and   above   appetites   for   satisfaction.   There   is   no   wonder   that   such   role   models   are   not   needed  because  they  are  decisively  anti-­‐people  and  therefore  there  is  a  need  to  engage  in   processes  to  get  pro-­‐people  role  models.   Revival  of  shame   One   of   the   factors   behind   the   formation   of   the   anti-­‐people   role   models   is   linked   to   the   methodological   orientation   in   the   transmission   of   education   in   universities,   which   is   modernity-­‐oriented:   rational-­‐based,   ignoring   as   much   as   it   can   the   emotional   elements   in   the   human   being.   Such   methodological   orientation   leads   to   giving   students   existing   knowledge   of   intellectuals   from   the   modernity   frameworks,   intellectuals   who   generate   ready-­‐made   knowledges   to   be   assumed   and   consumed   by   the   young   people,   knowledges   which  become  part  of  the  off-­‐the-­‐shelf  solutions  geared  towards  addressing  already  defined-­‐ problems   by   modernity   (Kamanzi   2007).   More   still,   this   methodological   orientation   has   ignored   a   critical   moment   related   to   postmodernism:   the   deconstructionist   methodology   that   has   resulted   into   pluralistic   epistemologies,   with   the   biggest   tools   of   questioning   and   deconstructing   the   established   truths   of   modernity.   The   giving   of   ready-­‐made   knowledges   and   off-­‐the-­‐shelf   solutions   for   consumption   and   the   lack   of   critical   approaches   to   open   spaces   for   pluralistic   epistemologies   stifle   methodological   approaches   that   promote   creativity  by  teachers  and  students  in  universities.  The  tendency  and  practice,  thus,  becomes  

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that   of   repeatedly   thinking   and   applying   in   terms   of   what   is   there   already.   Little   or   no   effort   is  directed  towards  getting  new  approaches  in  problematising  and  solution  seeking.   An  important  dimension  to  mention  with  regard  to  modernity  is  the  moral  question.   The   problem   of   moral   principles   stemming   from   modernity   is   on   the   development   of   universally  binding  ethical  rules  and  principles,  which  in  most  cases  ignore  the  centrality  to   morality   of   the   varieties   of   human   character,   the   situated   and   social   human   self.   In   this   kind   of  situation,  the  modern  morality  misinterprets  human  morality  by  arguing  that  that  there   are  discoverable  and  trans-­‐cultural  universal  rules  for  guiding  conduct,  on  the  one  hand,  and   that   the   greatest   human   good   is   his/her   perfect   autonomy,   on   the   other   hand   (Williams   1981;  1985).  It  is  within  this  kind  of  conception  of  morality  by  modernity  that,  for  instance,   emotions   are   ignored   and   the   related   aspects   such   as   shame.   According   to   Hutchinson   (2008),   shame   is   linked   to   the   reductionist   accounts   of   emotion,   leading   to   a   poor   understanding  of  our  world  and  ourselves.     Shame  can  be  described  as  the  consciousness  or  awareness  of  dishonour,  disgrace,  or   condemnation;  it  is  a  painful  emotion  caused  by  a  strong  sense  of  guilt,  embarrassment,  or   unworthiness.  To  put  it  in  the  words  of  Bradshaw  (1988),  shame  is  an  emotion  that  would   lead  each  one  to  knowing  his/her  finiteness,  that  is,  not  perfect.     With  modernity,  shame  gets  a  negative  connotation,  being  part  of  the  inheritance  of   the   Greek   thinking.   According   to   Sokolon   (2004),   in   the   Greek   understanding   of   shame,   if   someone   wanted   to   be   an   expert   concerning   justice,   the   person   was   supposed   to   act   without  the  constraint  of  shame  and  concern  for  his/her  reputation  with  the  people  because   if   one   remained   constrained   by   shame   and   reputation,   this   person   would   equally   remain   constrained   by   notions   of   customs.   Tarnopolsky   (2007),   even   though   from   another   perspective   of   aesthetics,   argues   that   the   analysis   of   shame   in   Plato   shows   how   the   psychological  forces  at  the  heart  of  shame  make   the  outcome  of  our  political  engagements   with   others   uncertain   and   unsettling,   even   while   they   make   possible   the   kind   of   self-­‐ reflexivity  necessary  to  foster  the  deliberative  virtue  of  sincerity  or  truthfulness.   In   a   very   postmodern   manner,   Williams   (1992)   demonstrates   how   modern   moral   consciousness   itself   is   inconsistent   and   based   on   illusions   about   human   action:   he   shows  

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how   if   the   conception   of   morality   of   the   Greek   is   considered   collectively,   there   is   an   imminent   conclusion   that   urges   us   to   reject   our   inclination   to   look   at   shame   as   a   childish,   pre-­‐moral  emotion,  and  the  thinking  that  moral  freedom  and  responsibility  require  complete   overcoming  of  all  necessity.  According  to  him,  if  shame  is  properly  understood,  it  is  a  very   good  thing  because  there  is  a  possibility  of  accepting  a  degree  of  necessity  without  bowing   to  fate.     While   being   critical   of   modern   morality,   however,   the   process   of   looking   for   alternatives   should   not   be   like   throwing   the   dirty   water   together   with   the   washed   baby   in   the   basin:   what   appears   good   from   modernity   can   always   be   carried   along;   what   appears   improvable,   can   always   be   improved,   and   what   appears   bad   should   be   thrown   away.   This   implies   that   questioning   and   deconstructing   should   go   hand   in   hand   with   other   constructions,   a   typical   post-­‐postmodern   mood   which   is   an   expression   of   recognition   and   acknowledgement  of  the  positives  and  the  negatives  of  modernity  and  postmodernism,  but   more  thrusted  towards  constructing  something  from  deconstructed  realities.   It  is  for  this  reason  that  within  the  post-­‐postmodern  perspective  whereby  the  ethos  is   that   one   of   handling   “deconstructions”   and   “constructions”   simultaneously   this   article   argues   for   the   revival   of   shame   from   having   a   negative   modern   connotation   to   a   positive   connotation.   This   revival   deals,   more   specifically,   with   the   affective   that   gives   growth   in   feelings   or   emotional   areas   (attitude),   as   one   of   the   three   basic   areas   of   learning,   others   being   the   cognitive,   and   the   psychomotor,   according   to   Bloom   (1956).   The   revival   is   necessary   because   much   as   most   African   universities   have   been   embedded   in   straight   jackets   of   modernity   for   a   long   time,   they   are,   as   well,   uncomfortable   with   the   oversized   jackets   of   postmodernism,   and   now   more   troubled   with   the   new   constructions   of   post-­‐ postmodernism  in  trying  to  educate  the  young  people.     The  question  is  how  shame  can  methodologically  be  incorporated  in  the  education  of   the  youths  at  University  level,  for  instance.  Among  the  Haya  people,  there  is  an  expression:   bakaw’enshoni,   literally   meaning,   “they   no   more   have   shame”.   This   expression   is   used   in   cases  when  someone  does  something  that  he/she  is  not  supposed  to  do  and  does  not  feel   ashamed  or  has  no  guilt.  Shame,  in  this  respect,  is  positive  because  it  assists  someone  into  a   reflection   of   his/her   conduct.   The   argument   is,   therefore,   that   the   role   models   that   are  

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decisively  anti-­‐people  have  lost  this  kind  of  shame;  they  have  lost  a  point  to  trigger  reflection   on   their   lives   and   that   is   why   they   simply   act   never   minding   about   their   actions   in   themselves  and  their  general  and  specific  effects.   The   revival   of   the   sense   of   shame   in   the   young   people   in   universities   can   be   done   during  the  teaching  interfaces.  Not  only  should  a  facilitator  give  dry  notions  from  academic   books  about  the  concepts  on  the  subject  matter,  but  also  a  facilitator  should  always  get  life   stories   that   give   accounts   of   “shameful/unshameful”   people.   In   Williams’   (1992:95),   words   there   is   need   to   distinguish   between   “a   shame   that   merely   followed   public   opinion   and   a   shame  that  expressed  inner  personal  conviction".  This  implies  that  such  accounts  of  shame   should   be   able   to   assist   the   young   people   to   distinguish   between   the   idea   of   shame   as   mere   social  conformity  and  shame  as  self-­‐respect.  

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Conclusion   Youths   are   human   beings   whose   imaginations   and   the   real   world   are   constructions   in   progress.   And   this   is   the   basic   reason   as   to   why   a   youth   needs   a   role   model.   Due   to   the   “otherisation   sin”   of   modernity,   there   has   been   a   formation   of   weird   role   models   for   the   youths.   These   are   shameless   role   models   who   have   been   decisively   anti-­‐people   because   modernity  praised  the  role  of  reason  over  and  above  emotions.   In   order   to   have   the   pro-­‐people   role   models,   it   is   necessary   to   revive   the   sense   of   shame  so  that  one’s  personal  character  can  develop  with  the  social  values.  The  process  of   facilitation   of   young   people   to   become   pro-­‐people   role   models   should   be   done   through   incorporation  of  life  stories  and  events  that  stimulate  the  youths  into  thinking  about  shame   in   the   line   of   self-­‐respect   other   than   shame   as   mere   social   conformity.   The   facilitator   should   give   notions   from   academic,   but   also   life   stories   that   give   accounts   that   can   have   interpretations  that  have  to  do  with  shame.   Not   only   should   students   be   given   notions   from   books   and   accounts   leading   to   interpretations   to   do   with   shame,   but   students   should   also   be   introduced   into   self-­‐ confronting   methodologies   to   pull   out   their   imaginations   and   emotions,   elements   that   would  lead  to  the  flourishing  of  their  potentialities  and  creativities.  For  example,  it  is  time   that  students  are  given  life  situations  to  view  and  are  asked  to  compose  their  own  questions   and  respond  to  them;  it  is  time  for  students  to  be  asked  to  give  informed  value  judgements   on  life  situations.      

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Orwel,  G.  (1945),  Animal  Farm.   Rosemann,   P.W.   (1998),   Africa   as   the   “Other”   of   the   West:   Problems,   Challenges   and   Chances,   Nkozi:   ARDC.Kanyandago,   P.   (1998),   “Africa   Marginalised   in   Development:   Summary   from   Articles   on   the   UNDP   Report   of   1998”,   (Unpublished   paper,   UMU,   1999)   Sokolon,  M.  (2004,  Apr)  "The  Role  of  Shame  in  Plato's  Dialogues:  Understanding  Platonic   Philosophy  Through  the  Lens  of  Aristotle's  Rhetoric".  Paper  presented  at  the  annual   meeting  of  the  Midwest  Political  Science  Association,  Palmer  House  Hilton,  Chicago,   Illinois  Online.  Accesses  on  the  28th  June  2008  at   http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84009_index.html     Tarnopolsky,   C.   (2007),   “Platonic   reflections   on   the   aesthetic   dimension   of   deliberative   justice”,  in  Political  Theory,  35  (3),  pp.  288-­‐312.   Trevor-­‐Roper,  H.  (1964),  Rise  of  Christian  Europe,  London:  Thames  and  Hudson   Williams,  B.  (1981),  Moral  Luck,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press.   Williams,   B.   (1985),   Ethics   and   the   Limits   of   Philosophy,   Cambridge,   Mass.:   Harvard   University  Press)   World  Bank,  (2006),  Development  and  the  Next  Generation,  Washington  DC:  World  Bank.    

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