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Nov 29, 2014 - So since we know Truth is objective, what definition of Truth then is objective? ..... (which is what the second and third assumptions cover, the second being .... or hell), a rational person should live as though a god exists and .... Humans also fall under physical existence with limited knowledge, power, and.
Written by The Dean of Jesters 11/29/14 - 8/20/16 || Draft 0.7.23 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30597.96485


Science/Religion 5 Epistemology


Metaphilosophy 6 Logic & Cuil


Metaphysics 7 Fallacies



Ethics Governance

Metaphysics as Physical Comedy and the Derivation of Logic & Ethics from Humor

Comedy is the purest form of expression, with such brevity it can express things with the most complex intellectual depths. This treatise asserts that the highest form of comedy is that which can, "know itself," meaning it be self-referential, that it be meta. From this and through metahumor, pataphysics, and cuil theory, we derive a unique understanding of metalogic, metaethics, and metaphysics, as well as other areas of interest. Pataphysics paired with cuil theory gives way to a systematic derivation of base reality, showing that the world functions in relation to sense of humor and that reality itself is cosmic farce.

:: Introduction :: "You hesitate momentarily before allowing yourself to assume the locus of all knowledge." - RedDyeNumber4 Despite Meta-Physical being a work on comedy, it isn't very funny. If people read things like the Bible in an attempt to have their questions answered, then appositionally people should read Meta-Physical in an attempt to have their answers questioned, and this work will indeed call into question most answers. Too many of the dilettante philosophers in the contemporary generation, in their pseudointellectual misinformationist sophistry state, "Truth is subjective," and that, "my Truth is different than your Truth." Most do this for the sake of intellectual dishonesty, for the sake of diminishing conversation, to be sanctimonious contrarians; we must repudiate their cantankerous ways. The sequitur implications of objectivity being subjective are often overlooked by these philosophasters of the obrazovanshchina. The first statement that Truth is subjective asserts that it is true that Truth is subjective, which would follow that it's subjective that Truth is subjective, which would follow that it's true that Truth isn't subjective. Saying Truth is subjective is self-defeating as just shown through transitive casing. So since we know Truth is objective, what definition of Truth then is objective? The not-too-narrow and not-too-broad definition of Truth is, "what is," as in what is the case. A common objection to this is, "That is not what Truth is." The self-defeating nature of this objection is its use of the initial definition, "That is not WHAT Truth IS." 1 And now that we have a selfactuating definition, let us go further to say that because we have a universal defined for Truth, the latter of the two initially quoted statements, that perception changes Truth, we can know to be false thanks to the apodictic definition we just established. "Meaningless word-play!" Cry the contrarians, nihilists, and anti-cognitivists, as they tergiversarily claim that any meaning they ascribe to subjectivity wouldn't feature subjective word-play itself. Such a world Truth deniers live in, where married bachelors are commonplace. But maybe it's truly unfair to assume objectivity exists in the first place, so let's engage in subjective prestidigitation and denounce objectivity to see where it takes us.


Mather, Lucas J.; lecture in the month of September, 2014.


If you are then to assert that objectivity itself is subjective, as we can only know things through sensory data which can be inaccurate, or even further that perception is all you experience and therefore all you can know, then surely it would follow that there is nothing objective we could ever know. Ignoring the objective they create by saying perception is all we could ever know (and thus ignoring the initial self-defeating natures of such assertions), the problem that arises with the claim is that it denies the possibility of intersubjectively accessible knowledge. Intersubjectively accessible knowledge builds off agreement among subjects, acknowledging that agreement (group consensus) isn't itself objectivity, but posits regardless, that in a completely subjective pool you can aggregate enough subjective things to create objectivity.2 Maybe it's still unfair to assume that objectivity can come from subjectivity in the first place, as surely the contrarian, whilst trying to instantiate conscription of obsequious polemics for his sophist army, would argue that it be subjective. I ask then whence cometh subjectivity? Further, whence cometh 'perspective'? One understands that it's erroneous to say objectivity comes from a pool of subjectivity, as again it would surely be subjective and therefore it's yet been said how objectivity can exist, but if objectivity didn't exist then how could the reverse come to be? How can you have subjectivity if not from a pool of objectivity? You can derive one from the other but not the other from the one, as subjectivity itself could not be said to exist unless there was something by which to define subjectivity, something by which to say isn't objective; nota bene this is not to suppose imagining an opposite to something makes the opposite exist, this is instead to say that subjectivity could not come to exist without an objective basis for the subject. And for the perspectivists, how can perception be all that exists if there was nothing external to perceive in the first place?3 In this we can know Objectivity exists, and therefore know Truth must also exist. Now we let the contrarians gently weep. This initial exercise is to demonstrate that many of the perennial issues in philosophy need not be disregarded as 'unanswerable' or, "beyond our comprehension," as the dilettantes would have you believe, but rather that there is a framework that already exists in formal philosophy that lets us work these issues out like we just did with Truth and objectivity. That being said, let's get a little Philosophy 101 in this bitch. Philosophy is not just about asking questions. This implies a sort of uselessness and triviality to philosophy that unsubstantially debases all the participants of, and commentators on, the field. Philosophy is about trying to find fundamental Truths about reality and existence (send your dissent to the Metaphilosophy chapter), which means the answers are more important than the questions. Many people object to this without realizing that if the answers weren't more important, then there wouldn't be a need to ask the questions to begin with. Asking questions is important to philosophy, sure, but only as a means to find answers since the goal is to find Truth, and as such the answers hold significantly more weight. Questions are not True or False, only answers can hold that quality. We don't study Descartes' Meditations because he asked what he could ultimately know about reality, plenty of people have asked that; we study his Meditations because of how he answered. Failure to understand this will mean the discussion ends. Failure to understand this will also mean you've failed to recognize that this treatise itself answers a small few questions (including but not limited to why you started reading it in the first place). If you're having trouble with the read so far or you're not used to reading philosophical texts, don't worry because much like Derrida on a good day it only gets significantly more obfuscated from here. The rest of Meta-Physical is going to delve into how sense of humor relates to intelligence and being cultured, how humor itself is an awareness of logic, how jokes play on empathy and ethics, and how they all support a metaphysic entirely existent in comedy. In order to do this, we need to start by defining some terms so as to not confuse what we're discussing, and this will all be done without any regard for the anodyne as the anodyne is easily the most boring and useless part of society. You should note that refusing to read the definition list would be the correct course of action if you intend to fantastically misunderstand the entirety of this treatise, cheers. *** 2 3

http://www.iep.utm.edu/objectiv/ http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/berk.htm


Humor (and sense of) - an idea or action that provokes laughter or amusement in/from one's self. 4 Comedy - the intentional acts done to provoke laughter or amusement. 5 Joke - A specific action or iteration of comedy; a specific action done with humorous intent.6 Farce - comedy that entertains through exaggeration and improbability. 7 Funny - an event or concept, with or without intent, found to cause amusement.8 Intention - determined or predicted actions or results from a capable system (doesn't require mentality). Amusement - the state of being amused; pleased (both as having satisfied conditions for such).9 Metahumor (aka 'Meta') - a joke that is self-referential or a joke scenario aware that it is in a joke. 10 11 Cuil Theory (and Cuil) [represented by an interrobang '‽'] - Levels of abstraction from reality, can be used to rate the world on a scale of strangeness and surrealism.12 13 Poe's Law - without clear indication of a speaker's intent, it's difficult to tell the difference between sincere extremism and farcical sarcasm (parody) of said extremism.14 15 The Dichotomy of Action - schema that shows that a separation exists between verbal action and physical action, that a bridge exists between the gap when one references the other, and that when they aren't bridged, verbal action holds no power whatsoever.16 The Three Shows - the idea that comedians simultaneously perform three shows, one for all involved, one for the perceivers (viewers of the events who are not directly involved), and one solely for the amusement of the comedian (the Third Show).17 The Three Base Assumptions - the three assumptions all people make in order to say things exist, that knowledge is possible, and that justification is possible.18 --Some of the terms used in this paper don't have proper formal definitions yet, so let's clear those up. --Pretzeling - intertwining two ends of a schema or conversation to show their interplay without directly connecting the ends; not the same as, or to be confused with, circular reasoning.19 Bastard - something that cannot be defeated with reason nor physicality. Hydrogenical Awareness - "Given enough time, Hydrogen starts to wonder where it came from, and where it is going." - Edward R. Harrison20 21 Fuckery - the testing of one's self or of other's selves in relation to theory of mind and hold on reality, which ultimately boils down to what may appear to be nonsense, for the intent of amusement. 22 Fuckard - one who initiates or actively participates in fuckery. Master Comedian - one so committed to a bit that Poe's Law is the only effect known to others about the bit; the Master Comedian is one whose actions are entirely committed under the Third Show.


http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/humor http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/comedy 6 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/joke 7 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/farce 8 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/funny 9 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/amusement 10 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta-joke 11 http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=meta 12 http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/what-is-cuil-theory 13 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuil 14 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poe%27s_law 15 http://www.christianforums.com/threads/big-contradictions-in-the-evolution-theory.1962980 16 http://www.scienceforums.com/topic/27401-the-dichotomy-of-action/ 17 http://brianhowardcomedy.com/the-brian-howard-show-podcast/ 18 http://www.goddiscussion.com/95139/thunderf00t-an-atheist-versus-eric-hovind-a-christian-at-reason-rally/ 19 Larue, Dennis; lectures through the months of September to December, 2014. 20 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Robert_Harrison 21 http://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php/1123:_The_Universal_Label 22 http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Fuckery 5


As a caveat to you, the reader, throughout your read be not wholly serious as this is nonfiguratively a literal joke. That doesn't mean literal as in the literary sense, it means literally, as in the opposite of figuratively. This whole work was started as a joke, and while it may seem to have serious implications, note that it explicates those implications only in jest. So no matter how convincing or truthful the arguments you find here, know that this is more a parody of formal philosophy than it is formal philosophy. While I'll try to be more overt from here and make this treatise as accessible as possible, true to the month of my birth I must be august about it, which means that hopefully some respect for this work will be gained after a truly impressive performance of such is given. In order for a lot of this treatise to be intelligible, an understanding of cuil theory and the dichotomy of action will need to be acquired (although a better writer would have also helped). Quick re-iterations of those concepts, as well as some of the informally defined terms, will be given as they are used in the treatise. And as a final side note, all references to 'MECH' in this work are to its acronymic expansion of "Metaphysics Existent as Comedy and Humor." Okay, so this may all seem well and good but you might be asking what bearing this has on formal logic, ethics, metaphilosophy, ontology, epistemology, metaphysics, etcetera. You're about to see it asserted that Metaphysics Existent as Comedy is the only possible option that follows if there is no external creator force for the universe. Some gut reactions tend to kick in for people after hearing that, making them feel like they disagree despite not yet hearing the argument. It might be said that no argument could be presented that would definitively show one way or another on something of this nature. I understand that this is the going view, but that's precisely what is to be destroyed with the postceding schema. So worry not, most everything schema-wise in this treatise is to give bastard framework- framework that must be accepted, else you perverse formal logic and otherwise good reasoning, as shown by the apodictic definition of Truth set up earlier. Keeping that in mind, I'm going to present a schema now, as has just been said, that definitively shows that there is no external creator force for the universe, that it's not possible that there was ever an external creator force for the universe, and existence as comedy is the only option that reasonably follows, enjoy.





Chapter 1 - Science and religion :: Anti-Creation Schema :: "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?" - Epicurus Of creators, one might open or conclude with, "We can't ever truly know if creation occurred, we can't know if there's ultimately a creator or not." This is nonsense, as it denies two of the Three Base Assumptions of philosophy, the assumptions necessary for any positive or negative assertion. The three base philosophical assumptions everyone makes follow that the universe exists, you can learn things about reality, & systems with predictive power are better than systems without predictive power.24 25 In order to say you know something you must first assume you exist (which is what the first assumption covers as you cannot exist if a universe does not exist for you to exist within, even if the universe is limited to only your own existence) and you must assume that it is possible to know things (which is what the second and third assumptions cover, the second being that knowledge is possible and third being that justification for knowledge can exist). If you try to deny the first assumption then you have denied your own existence which is to deny that your denial also exists, which self-defeats. If you try to deny the second assumption then you have denied that it is possible to know things about reality and thus you cannot know that it would be valid to deny the second assumption, which self-defeats. If you try to deny the third assumption then you have denied that justification (which is required for knowledge as knowledge is defined as a Justified True Belief 26) is possible, which means you cannot justify your denial and thus cannot know your denial to be valid, which self-defeats. To deny any of these three base assumptions is to admit you are no longer participating in philosophy, which means the discussion ends (send dissent to the Metaphilosophy section). But again, everyone makes those three assumptions (if they are people of logical consistency), as any valid worldview hinges on those three assumptions being true, as just shown. These assumptions are necessary because a system of knowledge is greater than a system of baseless belief. They help defeat the you cannot prove or disprove arguments by showing there are plenty of things you cannot prove or disprove and they are all nonsensical. For example, you cannot prove or disprove that the universe was created fifteen seconds ago and that we were all created in it with memories of it existing longer than fifteen seconds. You know why you cannot prove or disprove it? Because it's nonsense. These kinds of agnostic arguments are intellectually dishonest in this sense, as they only serve to say that there are things we cannot know. We can know this is wrong due to the second base assumption. Some people take issue with the second base assumption by noting the displayed referential ambiguity of "being able to learn" about reality. The assumption, to clarify the issue, does mean ALL aspects about reality, not just some aspects. An objection I received was to deny this reference outright, to say that it is not possible to learn about all aspects of reality. To say that we can only learn some things about the nature of reality & being is to say that there are things we will never be able to learn, 24

http://www.goddiscussion.com/95139/thunderf00t-an-atheist-versus-eric-hovind-a-christian-at-reason-rally/ directly related - http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/6526/what-are-the-most-basic-assumptionsone-has-to-make-in-order-to-conduct-science 26 http://documents.routledgeinteractive.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A2/Epistemologyandmetaphysics/JustifiedTrueBelief.pdf 25


which means it's possible that there will be something we cannot learn about that will show that it is not possible to learn things about reality to begin with, which is a contradiction. In a completely opaque aspect of reality that can hold any data, there might be data that contradicts other things we have learned about reality, and as such, it defeats the purpose of the second base assumption to say we can't learn about some aspects of reality. It must be possible to learn about all aspects of reality, otherwise we run the risk of not knowing whether or not reality is legitimate to begin with, as just illustrated, and as such there would be nothing to legitimately learn. For these reasons, the second base assumption is indeed the assumption that we can learn about all aspects of reality. How can we ultimately know these base assumptions to be true before first assuming knowledge is possible? We can't, which is why they're called assumptions. Failure to understand this will also mean the discussion ends. An attempt to reconcile the presupposition of knowledge and thereby release the Three Base Assumptions from assumption-hood is made in the Epistemology chapter if you're truly concerned. That being said, claiming we can't know if there was a creator denies two of the three base assumptions. It denies the second base assumption in saying that we cannot learn about the nature of reality and it denies the third base assumption in saying it's better to not know than to know (because you wouldn't need justification for anything if it wasn't important to know things). The assertion that we can't know if there was a creator also makes it so that the one asserting is okay to assert positive claims without evidence but denies it is okay to dismiss the positive claims without evidence (based on denial of the third base assumption and the burden of proof). This is erroneous as we know that which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence 27 28, as Bertrand Russell said, "It is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatsoever for supposing it is true."29 Furthermore, to the atheists that make the initially quoted claim, saying they don't believe in a creator but that it's possible one exists, I claim myself that you are not an atheist but rather an agnostic. If you think it is possible a creator exists, then Pascal's Wager defeats your disbelief. Pascal's Wager posits that humans all bet with their lives either that God exists or not. Given the possibility that a god (in his case it was specific to the Christian God) actually does exist and assuming an infinite gain or loss associated with belief or disbelief in said god (represented by an eternity in heaven or hell), a rational person should live as though a god exists and seek to believe in said god. If a god does not actually exist, such a person will have only a finite loss (some pleasures, luxury, etcetera).30 As an atheist you can't claim that there is no creator and simultaneously claim that you can't know, as that is parallel to saying it's better to not know, and this breaks two of the three base assumptions leaving Pascal's Wager to take over. A noted point on Pascal's Wager was that it was in a Christian framework, and the infinite gain/loss was specific to the Christian afterlife. You could pick any other religion and the infinite gain/loss would be under different contexts, some religions making it so the gain/loss was not infinite (bringing about valid "plausible but not probable" arguments). Some religions posit that you are not rewarded/punished for an infinite amount of time (or rewarded/punished at all for any amount of time), and as such, the gain/loss would be finite or null. The problem here is in assuming that there needs to be spiritual reward or suffering in order for the issue to exist. You can remove religious framework entirely from Pascal's Wager and leave the infinite gain/loss as a representation of perma-death being satisfied or dissatisfied by the Truth of the matter. Philosophy is about trying to discover Truth and so death puts a finality to your discoveries. Under the stripped framework, in which we are left with nothing but physicalism (since we want to have as unspecific a wager as possible), when you are dead you are dead eternally, which means infinite gain or loss if you were right or wrong. It doesn't matter what kind of creator god you posit or what consequences follow from that god's rules, the matter of Truth still remains. If you die correct, then you will have died correct for an infinite amount of time, and if you die incorrect on the matter, then you will have died incorrect for an infinite amount of time. In this sense, Pascal's Wager is still a valid concern for 27

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hitchens's_razor http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2003/10/mommie_dearest.html 29 http://www.philosophybasics.com/philosophers_russell.html 30 http://www.iep.utm.edu/pasc-wag/ 28


the atheist that asserts s/he cannot know if there was a creator god, no matter what religious framework backs the wager. But, fortunately for many, this is not a defense of theism, this is a defense of Truth, and even though I have just attempted to gut most self-proclaimed atheists, I will proceed to try to gut all the theists as well. I posit that we can definitely know if there was an external creator force or not, as the base assumptions say we can, and that we can know that it's impossible for an external creator force to have existed, as self-defeat follows should there have been an external creator force. So how is an external creator force for the universe defined? If you believe it to be godly then there are two options, deistic and non-deistic, which means an imperfect and perfect god, respectively. If we start with the idea of a perfect god, the standing objection is with the logical conflictions of how perfection is defined. Perfection is defined as having all three characteristics- omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. 31 The common standing objection is that you cannot be both omniscient and omnipotent at the same time. This is due to the fact that either you are all-knowing and thus know the future, meaning the future is predetermined and you are powerless to change it; OR you are all-powerful and have the power to change the future, meaning the future is not predetermined and you do not know what will happen.32 So you cannot be both omnipotent and omniscient at the same time. The recourse to this is limiting their definition of god to that of an imperfect one, even though they'd still claim perfection. This limited version is one who is capable of "all possible" knowledge, "all possible" power, etcetera, which is dangerously close to the original definition but is intended to disallow for logical inconsistencies. At least that's the intent, but it fails, because it would still be possible to know the future due to the second and third base philosophical assumptions within an "all-possible" framework. Nothing says it's impossible for an all-knowing (all possible knowledge) being to know all possible futures and thus accurately predict outcomes; similarly, having all physical power is still possible as changing the future would still be possible due to the laws of physics' manipulation, as discussed two paragraphs down. So despite their try at claiming god cannot know the future or change it, only "all-possible" futures and changes, the illogicism still stands. An objection to omnipresence that I have not seen others make, but still serves to show the fallacy of perfection, is the self-defeating nature of an in-practice omnipresence. The definition of omnipresence as being all-present is too broad and the better definition (as the theists retract into their 'possibilities' word-play) would mean to be in all possible places at once. So let's take a look at what omnipresence would be like so we can expose the erroneous nature of it. Omnipresence is one and the same with the Infinite Parallel. 33 The Infinite Parallel is the idea that for every possible action that could happen in the universe, there are an infinite number of parallel universes where the alternate possible actions did occur.34 This would mean that there are an infinite number of parallel universes where they figured out how to jump between parallel universes (as we know leaving our universe is possible35 36 37), and from each of those another set of infinite parallel universes where they've made a travel & expedition business out of it and have sought out and recruited people from every parallel that wants to join them in exploring the infinite. Now I don't know about you, but I'm definitely interested in joining them and yet no one has come to recruit me even though it should have happened an infinite number of times already. You know why no one has come to recruit me? It's because the Infinite Parallel doesn't exist. The infinite parallel is nonsensical, and yet it would have to exist in order for omnipresence to exist, as all possible places would have to exist in order for it to be possible to exist in all possible places (existence in all possible places is the definition for omnipresence, after all 38). The recourse even still is to say that the physical universe is not the only possible universe-type, but that then opens the argument for saying there is no non-physical universe. 31

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/god https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cfn-9NdniPw#t=827 33 http://www.universetoday.com/113900/parallel-universes-and-the-many-worlds-theory/ 34 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/ 35 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5orcCuprG4 36 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RZ5dj-Ozwm0 37 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hmXrHvmwOM 38 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/omnipresent 32


Before getting into non-physical shenanigans, it would be wise to conclude the initial argument, that all three components of perfection can never be fully met and thus we are left with the other option- a deistic god. Deistic gods will ultimately face truth over time as to whether or not they exist as testification is possible for them and our methods for testification only become more robust. 39 Until then, the retreat of the theist to deistic gods is an admission that there is no non-physical universe, as deistic gods physically exist. The way we can know no non-physical universe exists is to simply ask someone to describe a non-physical universe. There are two things people do in answering that prompt, as there are only two ways to answer (hold your false dichotomy accusations). The first is to describe it using physical terms, which is self-defeating as physical terms describe physical things and the nonphysical is of course not physical by definition; the second is to claim it can't be described, which is also self-defeating as that shows that only things that exist can be described, otherwise part of the description would be that it exists, and thus can be described. You may now say, "I'm holding my false dichotomy accusation no longer, this is surely a false dichotomy as someone can say a non-physical universe exists and in that assertion existence is part of the description!" But unfortunately positive assertions without evidence can be dismissed without evidence, and as such falls deaf as there is no evidence for the non-physical (as again this would require physical means), so the assertion selfdetonates. What then if you describe it as not existing? Well something that doesn't exist has no attribute to describe beyond the attribute of non-existence. Be wary to travel down that route, as the indescribable and the non-existent are, at exception, one attribute apart and often referenced just the same. For this purpose we can know the indescribable is always connected to the non-existent as an admission that 'indescribability' itself is an attribute that is a descriptor, but only serves to describe itself in the way of it being, and is thusly recursive. As a caveat, some people ask, "If there's no non-physical universe, then what then about the mind?" The quick and dirty answer is that the mind is a consequence of the brain, not the other way around.40 41 People with psychosis have a problem with their brain, the drugs we give them don't target their mind, but rather their brain. 42 We know the brain is what spawns the mind, it's erroneous to think otherwise. There is a lot already written on this topic however, and Monism wins outright in modern philosophy in regards to philosophy of mind, so let us move onward-ho. Since we can know that no non-physical universe exists, that leaves only physical gods with limited knowledge, power, and presence. The problem with these deistic gods is that they share similar definition to humans. Humans also fall under physical existence with limited knowledge, power, and presence. Granted, it's fallacious to say we'd be equivalent as the argument is that while limited, the deistic god would have more knowledge, more power, and more presence. This doesn't however make it fallacious to say biological organisms can never reach the same level as the god, nor that the deistic god is probably a biological organism itself. Regardless, it physically exists and is severely limited in relation to control over the universe, which makes it sound hardly god-like nor like an external creator force for the universe. We know it is not truly external as it must physically exist (and thus must exist within the confines of the physical universe), and it's creation powers are limited to physical things and only after the physical universe existed itself (as base assumption number one would mean the physical universe preceded the deistic god's existence). "What if god is the universe, or the universe is god?" Fair enough, but again that would most certainly not be an external creator force for the universe. The physical universe is not besides itself in terms of existence. If the universe was god, then god creating the universe means the universe created itself, which is still not an external creation force but rather an internal, self-actuating one. But fair point to the Deist, as the universe creating itself is indeed the reasonable view, explained shortly. "So then what created the universe?" This is a malformed question and I'll explain why. Without getting too much into some Aristotelian first-mover43 antics, the basis of the question, "What created the universe?" ultimately plays on cause-effect understanding. If we support the idea that every effect 39

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deism http://books.google.com/books?id=-sBoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA58#v=onepage&q&f=false 41 http://www.iep.utm.edu/supermin/ 42 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychosis 43 http://www.mycrandall.ca/courses/grphil/philrel/aristotle.htm 40


has a cause and that every cause is an after-affect of some other effect or event, then surely the aftereffect of the universe existing is from some cause. This prompts, "What caused the universe, what caused the first cause?" You are then led through infinite recursion as you find that asserting every event having a cause, and every cause being an event, follows that the first event had a cause, and that first cause was caused by an even firstier event, and that firstier event by an even firstier event still. It appears to be then, against intuition, that every event does not have a cause, and thus the universe was caused by nothing. Something from nothing, the universe existing without creation is thusly concluded. How can we know something came from nothing? All the physical evidence suggests the physical universe came from nothing, based on contemporary theoretical physics (refer to Krauss). If physical objects can come from non-physical objects (or non-objects, w/e), then it's possible these nonphysical objects came from some third object type and so on and so on until you're left with an explanation that's turtles all the way down. To avoid infinite recursion it's more sensical to say that instead of one thing spawning another to infinite regress, that it's just the one type of thing that exists (physical objects) and it wasn't spawned from anything, but rather that nothing existed before it. Even if it's the case that all the physical objects we observe now didn't exist at a certain point and past that point other things existed, there's no reason to jump to saying the things that existed before weren't also physical objects. In all my readings and conversations on the subject, there has not been a sound rebuttal to the proposed schema. Further, the only decent explanation for the existence of the physical universe to come out is of course from those who specialize in it- physicists. Physicists commonly inquire as to why people assume there was a point in time when the universe didn't exist. 44 Most people never consider that there may have never been a point in time that the universe didn't exist in. This still does not satisfy most, as with limited and mostly misrepresented concepts of time they still desire to know when there became something instead of nothing. The 'when' would be the malformed part of that question as again it's fallacious to assume there's a point in time when the universe didn't exist. They then move to "How?" and as to how, there is a good book called A Universe from Nothing45 by Lawrence Krauss that deals explicitly with how it is possible that the physical universe could come to be from nothing and through no volition except its own. So let's say you accept that the universe has no external creator force, as that we can most definitely know as shown by the schema presented so far, and you also accept that the universe created itself; this has still left many asking why the universe exists at all. "Sure we know HOW it can exist from nothing, but WHY?" Why does the universe exist? Because we wouldn't be here to ask if it didn't. This is also Lawrence's preferred response, but has been criticized as erroneous and leaving much to be desired. Fortunately, those criticisms only stand valid if the response wasn't true and had no justification. Now while I haven't heard any proper justification from Dr. Krauss himself, Cosmic Comedy does offer a reasonable schema for metaphysics that can serve to justify the response, as the stage of hydrogenical awareness is one set so consistently for actors to perform upon. As clearly I think that no better worldview exists in regard to the universe (something from nothing), and I acknowledge that a gaping hole is still left in the metaphysics of said worldview, Cosmic Comedy is still an ideology that reasonably follows from said worldview and Metaphysics Existent as Comedy (MECH) is that which is to be exposed from further delving into the gaping hole that is the metaphysic behind "something from nothing". Even if it is intentionally a joke, "we wouldn't be here to ask about it if it didn't exist," while superficially unintuitive, is an adequate defense that MECH justifies. On the surface it appears self-defeating, but chronologically the universe would indeed first have to exist in order for us to question its existence. So while Cosmic Comedy may not be a great metaphysical view to most, it's the strongest view that's left-over after you chisel away all the other fluff-ideology surrounding creation of the universe. In this way we can view the nature of reality as one of Physicalism,

44 45

http://www.amazon.com/The-Universe-Nutshell-Stephen-Hawking/dp/055371449X Krauss, Lawrence Maxwell. A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather than Nothing.


where Monistic views win-out. It helps solve questions like, "Where does my spirit go after I die?" As they are akin to asking, "When snow melts, where does the white go?" 46 On the topic of a creator many conclude with, "We just can't know if there's ultimately a creator or not," but now we know we can as the HOW is answered through Physicalism and more importantly that the WHY of it can be answered by Metaphysics Existent as Comedy.

*** :: A Case Against The Multiverse Specific to Infinite Multiplicity ::

ABSTRACT: A truly infinite number of parallel universes spawned from notions of contemporary theoretical physics is in principle impossible. This claim is substantiated by four arguments, the argument from multiplicity, the travel agency argument, the limited actor argument, and the impossibility of identity distinction. This means the infinite parallel is not possible, which is to say no more than one similar universe could possibly exist, and that if there are other universes, that there is a finite number of them, and that they must all be dissimilar from each other, from a significantly relevant practical and logical sense.

A multiverse capable of infinite multiplicity with respects to fully paralleled universes (from here on called the "Infinite Parallel") is in principle impossible, both practically and logically. This is to say that it's not impossible for us to understand, but that it's impossible (in any possible universe) for this to be the case, apodictically. There are four reasons the infinite parallel cannot be the case, the first being the argument from multiplicity, the second being the travel agency argument, the third being the limited actor argument, and the fourth being the impossibility of identity distinction. From this follows that if there are other universes, that they must all be significantly dissimilar from each other. To start, we should define 'multiverse' so as to not confuse what possible simulacrum is to be invectively annihilated here. We are not to say that an anthropic universe must be the only kind, or that there can only be one universe (as Ross and Turner showcase that the multiverse could be physically detectable47), but that of the multiverse, the other spawned universes must be significantly relevantly different, either in properties or outcomes, in order to claim said universes are distinct from our own.


https://twitter.com/2existential/status/530848336803528704 Ross, Peter W., and Dale Turner. "Existence Problems in Philosophy and Science." Synthese 190, no. 18 (2013): 4254-4256. 47


This means we are critiquing the components of both "level 1" and "level 2" multiverse theories (proposed by Max Tegmark that George Ellis speaks on48) that suppose infinite numbers of universes. Specific to "level 1" multiverse theory, which says that the universe does not end at the observable edge about 42 billion light-years out and that there is no reason to think matter doesn't extend indefinitely out just like space does (as Ellis noted that the universe is found to be a flat plane, and flat planes don't have ends), the notion is that infinite matter means infinite combinations of matter, even infinite repeated combinations. Specific to "level 2" multiverse theory, which says that the universe creates pocket universes, either by way of micro-level quantum dimensions, or by black holes creating (or segmenting) new universes with properties derived from their parent universes, the notion is that an infinite set of universes with an infinite number of galaxies, etcetera, also creates infinite combinations of matter and even infinite repeated combinations spawned from the parent universe. Both "level 1" and "level 2" multiverse theories fall under what I call the infinite parallel, as they both suppose an infinite multiplicity with regards to number of possible parallel universes and number of possible combinations of matter and spatial relations. But let's start with the principle of infinite multiplicity itself. You might say that the definition of infinite multiplicity with relation to the multiverse is that all possible universes are already spawned and lying in wait. The problem with this definition is that a parallel universe whose distinction is derived from one possible event's dissimilarity is only possible granted that the universe wasn't dissimilar before the possible event's options came to play, which means there would have to be a set of completely similar, but potentially dissimilar, universes at wait for every number of events that has or will occur in our universe (or whatever base universe), which leads to the logical contradiction of a universe being both exactly similar and also dissimilar, but also supposes that these universes somehow know or account for what the outcomes of events are in order to know where they will deviate, and therefore for each specific universe there is no such thing a different possible outcome, which self-defeats the notion of different possible outcomes, as they are apparently already outcome'd, so there cannot be a universe lying in wait for each different potential outcome of a given base universe. So instead we find that infinite multiplicity is the notion that a new universe is spawned for every possible outcome to every event, and there are an infinite series of universes spawned per each event in the parent universe and every subsequent universe. This is problematic for what I term as the Argument From Multiplicity, which states that for every possible outcome of something, nothing changing at all is a possible outcome, and therefore there must be exactly the same number of dissimilar universes as there are similar universes. The negation of an act is still an act in the opposite, so to exemplify all this, if we have a parent universe where Peter walks through a door, then a universe must be spawned to counter that event, where Peter did not walk through the door. On top of this, another universe would then have to be spawned from that one (where Peter didn't walk through the door) where Peter has now indeed walked through the door, and this is turtles all the way down, as an infinite number of universes must then spawn from each other to counter the action that did or did not occur. The problem here is that the initial universe didn't stop or cease to exist, but has now moved to the next event where Peter closed the door behind him, which means an infinite sequence of universes must now be spawned off of whether or not Peter actually closed the door behind him, but only half as many of these infinitely exist, as the event prior has had twice as much time to populate infinitely many more universes. So Surely then there are at least doubly infinite number of universes now that are dissimilar, as they are a full event behind, than there are universes similar, and yet we know it must be the case that for every dissimilar universe, there must be an equal number of similar universes, which means this is not logically consistent. Because we are utilizing time in our understanding of universes, it is clearly not possible that infinite multiplicity of parallel universes can in principle be true (at least without breaking the law of non-contradiction). But people still argue for "level 1" and "level 2" multiverse theory as some form of infinite parallel due to different notions of what infinite multiplicity is under these theories. So onward we push, to justify repudiating these cantankerous dilettantes. More formally the Argument from Multiplicity can be written as:


Ellis, George F. R. "Does the Multiverse Really Exist?" Scientific American 305, no. 2 (August 2011): 38-43.


P1: Given the infinite parallel, for every possible dissimilar universe spawned, a similar universe must also be spawned. P2: Given the infinite parallel, an equally infinite number of dissimilar universes exist as do similar. P3: Given the infinite parallel, for each smallest division of time, an infinite amount of universes is spawned. P4: The infinite parallel is given. P5: An infinite multiplicity of universes is spawned from the event of the initial smallest division of time. P6: A second set of infinites is spawned from the event of the next smallest division of time. P7: The first set of infinites has also now spawned a new set of infinites in the next smallest division of time. P8: The initial event now has twice as many universes as the next event, both sides of the initial infinite being dissimilar to the current universes, and half of the current universes being dissimilar to the current parent. .`. There are three times as many dissimilar universes as there are similar. -> This means infinite multiplicity of parallel universes is internally inconsistent.

As to the "level 1" multiverse, which says that the universe doesn't end at the observable edge and that infinite matter outside the observable edge means infinite combinations of matter (and even infinite repeated combinations), this runs into what I term the Travel Agency Argument. But to clarify first, the notion of "level 1" multiverse in more detail is that there is a grid of separately observable universes stringed together, all next to each other, all being different combinations of matter, until all possible combinations of said limited matter (and space) run out and a repeat set of these all possible combinatory universes is then also laid out on a grid of separately combinatory universes stringed together, all next to each other. Think of this as a procedurally generated video game environment, where there are a thousand different map-layouts that can possibly be generated, and so the game feels new and different every time you play until you play for the thousandth time, where you come across the same map again. This is how "level 1" multiverse theory is supposed to pan out, where there is every possible combination of matter across all the sectioned off areas of space, that if you were to travel in a straight line indefinitely through space, you would eventually come across a 'universe' that was exactly the same as your original observable universe, and further that you would come across an infinite number of these exactly similar universes. The problem then arises that, in principle, since you can travel through space, that you can then travel to these other universes, and not only can you travel between universes, but because there are an infinite amount of universes that have realized this, there are also an infinite amount of universes that have started a travel agency that allow people in their universe to travel to other universes, and further, there are an infinite number of universes whose travel agencies are recruiting people from other universes to join their travel agency. The problem more transparently now is that here I am, wanting to leave my universe, and even though in principle an infinite number of persons from these travel agencies should have come to recruit me already, not a single one of them has shown up yet. Therefore, it is in principle impossible for this kind of "level 1" multiverse to exist. More formally the Travel Agency Argument can be written as: P1: If a flat universe with matter and space extending infinitely exists, then every possible combination of matter eventually occurs in the same contiguous space. P2: If a flat universe with matter and space extending infinitely exists, then every possible universe occurs an infinite number of times in the same contiguous space. P3: In principle, since you can travel through space, and all space is contiguous, you can travel to other separate observable universes in this infinite space where these other possible universes occur. P4: One of the possible combinations of matter in one of these universes is a travel agency recruiting people from other universes that want to leave their universe. P5: If a flat universe with matter and space extending infinitely exists, then there are an infinite number of universes where travel agencies are recruiting universe jumpers. P6: An infinite number of recruiters should have come to recruit me already, but none have. .`. A flat universe with matter and space extending infinitely doesn't exist. -> In principle, A "level 1" multiverse is not possible.

As to the "level 2" multiverse, which says that the universe creates pocket universes, an infinite set of universes with an infinite number of galaxies in a fractal-like generate, that this runs into what I term the Limited Actor Argument. As "level 2" multiverse theory may be supposed as a counter to the travel agency argument, whereby we now say a multiverse is in principle possible but travel is not in principle possible between the universes contained within said multiverse, the problem still arises that if


infinitely many, relevantly different, combinatory systems of matter and spatial relations are still asserted, meaning "all possible worlds," then this is in principle impossible. Take for example, Dale, who is constituted by some object-relation in space where we say he has such-and-such organs, and each organ is constituted by such-and-such quantities and relations of atoms, this still does not account for what we call Dale. Typically the only organ of concern when the metaphysical notion of 'person' is invoked, is the brain. Let us extend personhood to types, where Dale's brain over time is considered multiple tokens of the type 'Dale'. This means that across these infinitely spawned "level 2" universes, that there are an infinite number of tokens of the 'Dale' type. The problem here isn't a metaphysical one spawned from personhood, where we question how many augmentations to Dale's constitution are possible before we cease to be able to call the tokens as part of a type (although I do concede that this may be a serious metaphysical issue for multiverse theory), but rather that there is a more fundamental issue. The limited actor argument follows that given any token actor of any type, there is a limitation in physical constitution that accounts for limitations in spatial relations. So given the notion of infinitely many universes spawning infinitely many combinations of matter, there would have to be an infinite number of universes where a Dale who is constituted exactly like he is in our universe has a different spatial relation than in our universe, which means that not only is there an exactly similarly constituted Dale out there who is on a similarly constituted Earth pondering the multiverse, but that there is an exactly similarly constituted Dale out there who has cured cancer, ended world hunger, dissolved all worldly borders, and then also built a device that blew up his similarly constituted Earth (all possible worlds, right?). The problem here is that while Dale is fairly intelligent, pondering the multiverse and such, he isn't that intelligent, where he cures cancer, ends world hunger, dissolves all worldly borders, and then also blows up the planet that all of it took place on. The reason being, that Dale, as he's currently constituted, isn't intelligent enough to achieve this, so there are some combinations of matter that simply aren't capable of certain actions (or most possible actions, actually) and therefore are not capable of certain spatial relations (or most possible spatial relations, actually). So it is in principle impossible for a "level 2" multiverse, or any infinite parallel, to be a generate of "all possible worlds," as not all combinations of matter and spatial relations are possible. More formally the Limited Actor Argument can be written as: P1: If infinite universes are seated in ours, then at least some inherited similar properties. P2: If infinite universes are seated in ours, then an infinite number of token actors of any type from the parent universe exist. P3: If infinite token actors of a type exist, in infinitely seated universes with similar properties, then there is an infinite number of universes with different arrangements of token actors. P4: If a "possible world" is one where any token actor can be in any situation (spatial relation), then in principle all possible worlds include all token actors in all situations (spatial relations). P5: It is in principle impossible for most token actors to be in most situations. .`. Not all possible worlds exist. -> This means that in principle no definition of multiverse or infinite parallel can rationally include all possible worlds.

This is not to rule out the spawning of pocket universes that are significantly different than ours in practically possible ways, meaning some dissimilar universes are still possible, but it does rule out the possibility of drastically dissimilar universes. However, of more interesting note, this can also leave us with infinitely many universes that are dangerously similar to our own. This is to say the fourth argument is to now be invoked, where the impossibility of identity distinction becomes a relevant issue, as we could not in principle rule out an infinite number of similar universes, which means that potentially there are an infinite number of exactly similar universes, meaning without distinction whatsoever. This runs into a version of Leibniz's Law 49 where we are to say that no two objects have exactly the same properties, but that akin to Max Black's spheres 50, there is no way to distinguish 49

Forrest, Peter. "The Identity of Indiscernibles." Stanford University. 1996. Accessed March 15, 2016. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/. 50 Black, Max. "The Identity of Indiscernibles." 156-158. Accessed March 15, 2016. http://home.sandiego.edu/~baber/analytic/blacksballs.pdf.


between our universe and other exactly similar universes. To make impossible distinction between objects is to make possible the distinction that they are the same object. You might say there is some spatio-temporal relation whereby we can distinguish the universes, that there may be dissimilar "pocket universes" in between our universe and the exactly similar one, so by way of that relation, we are distinct, but how do we know which is distinct from the other given this relationship? What I mean is how would it even be possible to know our universe is the one that relates down through the pocket universes and not the other universe that relates up to ours? Sure there may be dissimilar universes in-between, but that doesn't mean we haven't just looped back to our same universe again. Without some internal distinction of universes, there is no external distinction that justifies the universes as actually being relevantly distinct. So the impossibility of making significantly relevant identity distinctions between these similar universes (an infinite number of them mind you) makes it seem much more likely, especially if we were to stay in line with Ockham's razor, that there is simply one universe similar to ours, which is the one we inhabit, and any other similar universes are simply loops back into our own, or pockets that collapse into the same fold. More formally the Impossibility of Identity Distinction can be written as: P1: If infinitely many universes are seated in ours, then there are infinitely many similar universes. P2: If infinitely many similar universes exist, then there are infinitely many exactly similar universes. P3: If the only distinction of exactly similar universes is by external relation, then there is no relevantly distinct differentiation that can be made between these exactly similar universes. P4: If there is no relevant distinction between exactly similar universes, then they are the same universe. P5: There is no relevant distinction that can be made between these exactly similar universes. .`. There are not infinitely many universes seated in ours. -> This means "level 2" multiverse theory in principle cannot contain an infinite set of universes.

So for the first and second reasons given, the argument from multiplicity, and the travel agency argument, we know it's in principle impossible for there to be a "level 1" multiverse, and for the third and forth reasons given, the limited actor argument, and the impossibility of identity distinction, we know it's in principle impossible for the "level 2" multiverse to contain an infinite number of parallel universes. Given both of those conclusions, we can know that the infinite parallel's existence is in principle impossible, and therefore that if the multiverse exists, it is a "level 2" multiverse, with a finite number of spawned universes, and each one is significantly relevantly dissimilar from one another. *** :: On Intelligence Tied to Genetics & Its Gendered and Racial Implications :: P1: The average genetic dissimilarity between humans and chimps is ~1.5%-2.2% (males to males and females to females). 51 52 P2: The average genetic dissimilarity between human males and human females is ~2.4% (1/42=0.0238), but of the 20,000-ish genes on the human germline (genes only comprise ~3% of our 600,000 base pairs)53 only 231 genes are unique between the sexes (from the Y chromosome) 54, and taking that into consideration as a very charitable reduction of our differences, there is only a ~1.2% genetic difference between human males and females (231/20,000=0.0115). P3: This means the high-ball estimate is that there is more genetic variance between human males and females than human males to male chimps and human females to female chimps (2.4% HM:HF versus 1.5% HM:MC or HF:FC), and a low-ball estimate that there is substantial variance between human males and females akin to the variance of humans to chimps (1.2% HM:HF versus 2.2% HM:MC or HF:FC). 51

https://skeptics.stackexchange.com/questions/10579/is-there-more-genetic-difference-between-men-andwomen-than-men-and-monkeys 52 http://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/permanent-exhibitions/human-origins-and-cultural-halls/anne-and-bernardspitzer-hall-of-human-origins/understanding-our-past/dna-comparing-humans-and-chimps 53 http://web.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/info.shtml#basics 54 https://skeptics.stackexchange.com/questions/10579/is-there-more-genetic-difference-between-men-andwomen-than-men-and-monkeys


.`. Even with extremely charitable estimates, there is at least half as much genetic deviance between human males and females as there is between humans and chimps (as 1.2 is more than half of 2.2). Granting that, of that percentage (1.2%), the entirety is not focused on cognitive development, it is still the case that to think the cognitive development endowed in that 2.2% genetic deviance of humans and chimps cannot in principle seep into the 1.2% genetic deviance of human males and human females is folly, modulo that we understand genes involved in cognitive development are given in both deviances.55 This means there are cognitive aspects of gender that are objective, and not socialized. I want to shift from this brief setup of gendered differences in genetics to the racial divide in genetics and the cognitive deficits/proficiencies genetics merits, as you will see acknowledging this divide is actually a good thing for everyone involved. While the differences between human races is small genetically, there is still a difference, and that difference explains and predicts psychometric test scores accurately. This does not mean different treatment of people should follow, it means that genetics effects cognitive development and therefore a race realist approach is not inherently racist, just scientific. Acknowledging race realism as being legitimate can then lead to egalitarian treatment that would otherwise have not been possible, namely in the practice of editing the human germline to allow for genetic modification in a population that brings everyone up to the same cognitive starting point, as they would otherwise have certain cognitive capacities limited on average when compared to any other racial groups. Despite the common view in academia that race is wholly divorced from genetics, race can be completely accounted for genetically (with what is called Lewontin's Fallacy) and genetics effects cognitive development, therefore race realism is a valid understanding of human existence, an understanding that can lead to a better human condition by acknowledging the differences in cognition as derived by racial factors. To start, a distinction between race realism and racism should be made, which is that race realism, as the acknowledgement of race as a physical instantiate and not a social construction, is not itself a racist thing. Racism necessitates unfair treatment based on racial preferences. 56 Acknowledging race tied to genetics and showcasing that certain genes are better or worse for certain things is not itself a racist thing, even if we show objectively that certain genes are 'superior' or 'inferior' to each other, as these are merely factual statements and do not allow for open questions regarding the treatment of persons (or other questions regarding ethics). Nota bene, that whatever talents an individual has, cognitive or otherwise, is not an indication of that person's rights, as rights are extended to all persons by default. So an understanding of race tied to genetics is not racist, and an understanding of race tied to the cognitive differences those genetics bestow is also not racist. This is all merely a scientific approach to race, indifferent to emotive values. Getting into it now, on the history of genetics tied to race, Francis Galton was one of the primary scientists to probe into race in 1883 and received much opprobrium for his ideas regarding eugenics since it spawned an incredibly racist regime in Germany shortly after. We must not allow ourselves to fall into the mindset that because eugenics was used improperly in the past that it is never to be properly used at all. Since then people like Philippe Rushton have become known for their further research into general phenotypical differences between races regarding temperament and intelligence. Rushton even found a general difference in both brain size and average number of cortical neurons between the races that accurately predicts differences in psychometric test scores (like IQ), where blacks are lowest, whites are in the middle, and Asians are the highest scoring.57 His studies showed other things regarding emotive values and developmental times of the human musculature and skeletal systems, hormone levels, life-span, etcetera, but the cognitive link here is what I want to focus on. Rushton has been somewhat dismissed in contemporary literature as racist, but there is good contemporary literature that supports the notion of race tied to intelligence that people like Galton and Rushton have supplied the 55

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2854822/ Blum, Lawrence. I'm Not a Racist, But... (Cornell Univ. Press, 2002) page 8. 57 Rushton, J. Philippe. Ethnic Differences in Temperament. Personality and Person Perception Across Cultures, pages 45-63, 1999. 56


framework for. I think the move from calling it 'race-science' to outright 'racism' is dubious, even if the science leads to legitimate racism, because the scientific study of the matter is in itself valuable, unless you don't believe race is tied to biology at all, in which case we should remind ourselves that denying hard science is usually a futile task. This is where A.W.F. Edwards comes in, who is famous for Lewontin's Fallacy which showcases that while the genetic variation between races is very small (of the 0.1% of DNA that varies between individuals, 85% is from within a population and 15% is from differences between populations, meaning races), that it is actually well accounted for if you use a larger correlation structure instead of looking at individual nodes of data. 58 Richard Lewontin, whom Edwards is critiquing, argued that after he looked at his individual points of data, that this 85% variation inside a group greatly outweighed the notion that racial classification predicated on genetics was justified as such. However, Edwards showed that 100% of people can have their races identified by their genetics, which means racial classifications of humans by genetics rather than social construct is a valid frame to work out of here. This becomes more interesting during the next fifty years since the paper by Edwards was written, as genetic research has advanced quite a bit and SNPs (single nucleotide polymorphism) have become more mainstream. In A Review of Intelligence GWAS Hit: Their Relationship to Country IQ and the Issue of Spatial Autocorrelation by Davide Piffer, it is demonstrated incredibly clearly that several specific genes (more prominently several specific SNPs) are shown to directly influence IQ, correlated with national IQ at 91% accuracy. 59 The average relevant SNP frequency by race was 36% for blacks, 53% for whites, and 60% for Asians, meaning it directly mirrored the racial IQ hierarchy. The paper goes over seven main other papers researching SNPs, but the general consensus regarding all SNPs related to psychometric tests is that these specific nucleotides accurately predict differences in IQ across all races. There are very few SNPs currently known to effect cognitive development, but it is estimated that there are around 10,000 alleles overall where this would apply,60 meaning that one of the research papers Piffer reviewed, by Cornelius A. Reitvald et al demonstrating about 0.3 IQ points of difference per SNP, 61 could be extended 10,000 times over to account for a 3,000 point difference in IQ, if IQ even scaled that high. Returning to Piffer's paper, I'd like to be clear that on average, IQ-related SNPs were found to be 17.4% more common with Whites than blacks, 23.7% more common with Asians than with blacks, and 6.2% more common with Asians than they were with whites, which again, accurately accounts for and predicts racial IQ differences as well as most other psychometric test differences. This strongly suggests that there is a genetic divide not only for IQ test-taking, but for all spatial reasoning and higher cognition amongst the races of humans. Another interesting thing to note of Piffer's research is that he looked at natural selection as the cause of this difference in IQ-related SNP association, where IQ-related SNPs were found most in Asians, then whites, and then blacks. The reasoning here is that random genetic drift would generate a given amount of genetic variance between populations and a given gene specifically favored qua natural selection would generate a variation greater than average, so when Piffer amalgamated the data, he found the height-related SNP frequencies across races had an average standard deviation of 0.06, which 58

Edwards, A.W.F. Human Genetic Diversity: Lewontin's Fallacy. BioEssays, Volume 25, Issue 8, pages 798–801, August 2003. 59 Piffer, Davide. A Review of Intelligence GWAS Hits: Their Relationship to Country IQ and the Issue of Spatial Autocorrelation. Intelligence 53 (2015): 43-50. doi:10.1016/j.intell.2015.08.008. 60 Hsu, S.D.H. On the genetic architecture of intelligence and other quantitative traits. Preprint arXiv:1408.3421 (2014). 61 Rietveld, C. A., T. Esko, G. Davies, T. H. Pers, P. Turley, B. Benyamin, C. F. Chabris, V. Emilsson, A. D. Johnson, J. J. Lee, C. D. Leeuw, R. E. Marioni, S. E. Medland, M. B. Miller, O. Rostapshova, S. J. Van Der Lee, A. A. E. Vinkhuyzen, N. Amin, D. Conley, J. Derringer, C. M. Van Duijn, R. Fehrmann, L. Franke, E. L. Glaeser, N. K. Hansell, C. Hayward, W. G. Iacono, C. Ibrahim-Verbaas, V. Jaddoe, J. Karjalainen, D. Laibson, P. Lichtenstein, D. C. Liewald, P. K. E. Magnusson, N. G. Martin, M. Mcgue, G. Mcmahon, N. L. Pedersen, S. Pinker, D. J. Porteous, D. Posthuma, F. Rivadeneira, B. H. Smith, J. M. Starr, H. Tiemeier, N. J. Timpson, M. Trzaskowski, A. G. Uitterlinden, F. C. Verhulst, M. E. Ward, M. J. Wright, G. Davey Smith, I. J. Deary, M. Johannesson, R. Plomin, P. M. Visscher, D. J. Benjamin, D. Cesarini, and P. D. Koellinger. Common Genetic Variants Associated with Cognitive Performance Identified Using the Proxy-phenotype Method. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, no. 38 (2014): 13790-3794. doi:10.1073/pnas.1404623111.


is significantly higher than the average standard deviation of 0.046 he found from random sets of SNPs, confirming that natural selection of height genes was genuine and not due to random drift. He further found that the IQ-related SNPs had an average standard deviation of 0.088, which is significantly higher still.62 So these IQ-related genetics are naturally selected and favored moreso than traits like height are favored in a given population. This is important to note because it means humans have been naturally practicing eugenics to enhance intelligence for a very long time already. The fact that the differences in IQ can be accurately predicted by genetics (and the races tied to those genetics) is of great value here and shouldn't be looked away from simply because many would think it leads to mistreatment of races or outright hatred of races due to cognitive tier-ing associated with said races. We can use this information to bring about egalitarian policies that would in principle not be possible without accepting race realism in this form. For example, if we as a society said that race was socially constructed, and genetics had nothing to do with it, and the cognitive differences of races were environmentally determined and not genetically determined, then editing the human germline (making direct edits to our genetics) could be limited to the wealthy elite (who are primarily white) and they would become disproportionately superior cognitively (because they alone would have access to augmenting the IQ-related SNPs and therefore have direct access to shaping their intelligence profoundly and at will), to the point where 'natural' or 'unmodified' humans could never compete. This means that in order to stop an elite few from having access to this technology, we would have to, as a society, admit that race and cognitive ability is determined by genetics in order to secure the choice of germline editing for all humans, to create an equal playing field in terms of cognitive development. I imagine this will not sit well with people who don't believe in the science or transhumanist doctrines, but this is not some fantasy, this is a very probable world we will be living inside of come a few decades. I obviously have a bias for transhumanism and the futurists that speculate on biotechnology, but I have yet to hear of one that argues humans will not have this technology in the near future (especially since we already have things like CRISPR and the Cas system for genetic editing), so it seems pertinent to discuss the problems before they happen as a means to avoid them. There are other outcomes that we should consider as well, like the potential ethical imperative of erasing race altogether, which would occur from identifying all relevant racial genes tied to cognition and turning them all on (or off depending on their effect) to eliminate the racial divide in cognition. We would also consider turning on/off all genes related to internal organ development that differentiates races. This would mean that there simply would not be any racial distinction between humans besides, potentially, skin color and height or facial features, and that race would be purely an aesthetic choice rather than something associated with some abstract identity. The reason I say that there may be ethical imperative to do this is because the elimination of race through passive means has already been proposed by many via interbreeding, but could be done virtually overnight by simply eliminating the distinction between race-specific genes, qua germline editing, which would also have the benefit of solving all racism ever because there would be no basis for unfair treatment of races as 'races' would stop being a meaningful concept. If racism is wrong, evil, bad, of negative ethical import, why then would anyone believe it to be anything but good to eliminate the root cause of it? Race is the ultimate or first cause of racism, as without race there cannot be racism, and so it directly follows that enacting a eugenics plan like this would solve the problem. The only irony being that eugenics is what previously spawned all kinds of racism in society. With respects to traditional eugenics, consider that the heritability of cognitive ability is very plausible, as Robert Plomin argued that, "The case for substantial genetic influence on g is stronger than for any other human characteristic."63 G is in reference to 'g-factor', which is a general measure of cognitive ability along an average line between two psychometric axis's. G-factor is what gets you the single number score of an IQ test that measures multiple forms of cognition, for example spatial reasoning as well as verbal reasoning. Plomin is saying here that because of how many genes are tied to brain development, and because it is this brain development that sets us aside from other animals, that genetic influence on g is genetic influence on our most human trait. From the rest of the framework set 62

Piffer, Davide. A Review of Intelligence GWAS Hits: Their Relationship to Country IQ and the Issue of Spatial Autocorrelation. Intelligence 53 (2015): 43-50. doi:10.1016/j.intell.2015.08.008. 63 Plomin, R. IQ and Human Intelligence. The American Journal of Human Genetics 65, 1476-1477 (1999).


up in this paper, we know cognitive development is most definitely tied to genetics, which means gfactor, or overall intelligence, is heritable. This means alterations to the human germline would have permanent effects on human progeny with regards to cognition. This also means we can accurately explain why races have the IQ-hierarchy that they do, because intelligence was favored more strongly in some societies than in others, and over time the stronger average breeding of this trait resulted in a race of humans with a greater average intelligence. To conclude, while older forms of racial science were crude and did in fact lead to justification for all kinds of racism, newer science under stricter framework has led to a better understanding of the objective nature of race as it is tied to genetics, and further that this understanding does not make worse the distinctions between races, but simply makes accurate the distinctions. Having a genetic understanding of race also explains differences in cognitive abilities and therefore academic test scores, an understanding of which will help alleviate racial tensions rather than deepen them. Finally, I'd like to reiterate the distinction between race realism and racism I drew at the beginning and showcase that race realism here, paired with overt notions of superiority/inferiority and eugenics, is actually being used to combat racism. It is only through the acknowledgement of race realism and racial superiority/inferiority, with utilization of eugenics, that we can completely remove the unfair treatment of races in our society by completely removing race itself. ***

:: Left Behind: The Social Sphere Isn't Advancing as Quickly as Computational Technologies :: Every 16 months-ish, computational power is supposed to double. cite Really what we end up seeing is a 20%-30% increase in computational power. cite Lots of shit has been written about people no longer understanding the technology they use. cite In this sense the singularity has already occurred, as 95% of the populous can't keep up with basic devices, understanding-wise or computation-wise. cite Society as an amalgamated intelligence and as a cultural progression only moves 1% on average per generation with each generation being 10 years. cite That means a 50% increase per year for synthetic computational systems and a 0.1% increase per year for organic computational systems, making man outpaced by machine by a factor of 500 times. They will catch up soon (cite) and continue to move past us. If we want human society as an organic component to civilization to persist, we will need to start catching up to the rate of advancement as a means to understand what we're competing against. I don't think we can attain 50% a year outright, but we can jump to 30% a generation through several drastic restructurings of the diasporas of knowledge and the way the public sphere operates. This puts us at a 3% increase per year, 30 times greater than what we're currently at, and reduces the machine outpacing to a factor of 16.66 times. How do we achieve this? They say collective human knowledge doubles every ~11 months (every year) due to advancements in various academic fields. cite This means we are solid on the understanding end of things, as currently we grow our collective knowledge database by 100% every year, the issue is in how this knowledge is disseminated. The way people learn things (in bulk) currently is solely through schooling, the internet is not where the majority (or even a significant minority) of people learn things in-depth. cite Schooling no longer has standards for civics, objective ethics, formal logic, critical thinking, or daily lifestyle (home economics), which are all things needed for 'intelligence' (philosophical understanding) paired with computational power. cite There is also no standard for being code-literate or hardware-literate. cite These should all be added back or newly introduced. There is no standard of any sort for educational extension over biological development. cite This means that the neurological developmental years of humans is not accounted for, stunting the effectiveness of our educational system. From birth to three years of age, where 80% of cognitive development occurs (cite), toys and children's books should be readily available and interactive as we know this jumpstarts cognitive maturity. cite The education system should extend not from this budding point of mental development to half way through mental fruition at 17 years of age, but rather till the human brain is fully matured at 25 years of age. cite


A distinction between higher education and work education can be made at 21 years of age. All academic works (or all books & information in general) should be freely available and easily accessed. This will double the amount of knowledge the average person has (as well as strengthen culture and formalunderstanding frameworks). The bottom 30% of the population, as determined by objective tests of cognitive power, should not be allowed to procreate. This does not mean they are not allowed partners or sexual interactions, they just aren't allowed to breed, they can still raise children, just not ones that are biologically tied to them. This can be on an honor system incentivized by tax breaks or it can be forced through sterilization. Every generation, after the first, on this program will see ~30% increases in average cognitive prowess. This 3% per year increase in amalgamated cognition paired with doubling of amalgamated knowledge will give an intellectual boost across society that may allow for us to catch up enough for it to be socially accepted to start integrating cybernetic implants as cognitive enhancements. cite This man-machine fusion will allow for both acceleration components to stack, so neither will surpass the other. cite Artilect war and background reasons for cybernetic advancement - http://agi-conf.org/2008/artilectwar.pdf


Chapter 2 - Metaphilosophy :: Metaphilosophy As A Non-Twice-Millennial Architecture :: "Goethe's doctrine of colours, which are so clear and simple, are still denied by the physicists; and thus Goethe himself has had to learn what a much harder position one has if one promises men instruction than if one promises them amusement. Hence it is much more fortunate to be born a poet than a philosopher." - Arthur Schopenhauer, from The World as Will and Idea The notion that there are questions whose answers we will never have, either because more questions will arise, or because the answers are beyond our comprehension, is a false notion. As the Witty proverb goes, we find that to place a limit on thought is to think both sides of the limit. We have hit the cognitive threshold, whereby we are just capable enough to formalize our thoughts and tap into a universal reason (read: formal logic). We see there is nothing beyond that which we can think of. A distinction between Philosophy and other disciplines should be made. Philosophy is of the study of Truth, not of any truths, but of fundamental truths of the nature of reality. Philosophy concerns itself with the broadest and most general of questions. Philosophers do not study how rocks be or how living organisms be, no, those are what Geologists and Biologists study, respectively. Instead the philosopher studies the nature of being itself, without specificity. In this sense the philosopher studies the non-limited, as any specificity of study limits the nature of the studying itself. It's unwise to limit the nature of studying in regards to philosophy as it is the most unlimited, free-form involvements that allow the greatest and most unique advances in the field. This means 'philosophy' is not directly the love of wisdom, as that's a twenty-three hundred year-old understanding that is no longer accurately applicable to the field, neither by form nor function of the study. It would be fair to divide Philosophy here from all other disciplines by the single study of 'being' alone, as to study the nature of being itself requires one to look into 'nature' itself and its varying modes of existence, which means that on top of Ontology the philosopher also deals with Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Logic, as those three disciplines are necessary to support the Ontology of any philosophical architecture. In order to study being itself, one must be able to comprehend the nature of how being is; Metaphysics. In order to study being itself, one must be able to know things about how being is; Epistemology. In order to study being itself, one must be able to weigh reasoning against itself so as to validate the studies; Logic. In this respect the philosopher has three base areas of interest. Ethics does not fall into the same sphere, however, as ethics is the study of mind-interactions (less curtly, of "good and evil" between those conducting it). 64 There is no ethic where there is no mind, and as such Ethics is not a concern of philosophy. Similarly, what has been labeled, "Philosophy of Mind," is also relegated to "non-philosophy" under this Metaphilosophical framework. Mind-works would be expected to be taken under the wings of psychology or neurosciences, so while yes, psychology and neurosciences will probably consume the entirety of the study of mind, ethics may yet fall back into our philosophical graces for comedic reasons. If it is true that Cosmic Comedy is what Metaphysics is existent as, then fuckery, and the subsequent modes of testing hold on reality that follow, allows ethics to be in direct play with philosophy once again. In fact, I posit that it is impossible for ethics to be philosophical if not concerned with the nature of being itself, and as such only holds ties to philosophy when the nature of being is 64



itself one of fuckery. In this sense, all things aware of it can actively participate in philosophy and thus in the nature of being itself as long as they participate in the fuckery. The mind interaction that spawns fuckery is then what we call ethics, as it is the study of how things aware of fuckery participate in the fuckery. The fuckards are then considered to all have minds, as they must all be aware of fuckery, and as such the study of ethics is once again re-admitted into philosophy. The ethics chapter delves deeper into this framework for ethics, so we'll save that for then. Since we are so keen on saying Philosophy is mainly concerned with Ontology, the study of the nature of being, I suppose a quick descriptor of the nature of being itself is necessary. I posit that Ontology is a joke, in both the literal and figurative sense. Metaphysics Existent as Comedy justifies this, as you will see in the later section named as such, as well as the Ontology section. Those sections will give allowance for a lengthier description. "You can always ask questions, if you spend time with a five year old you know people can always keep asking, 'why?' So philosophy just seems pedantic and ultimately useless and never provides real answers." Bruh, five year olds also aren't people. They don't have secondary theory of mind and don't understand that they may be asking a malformed question, meaning that you can't keep asking why and have why still be sensical to ask.

*** :: The Postmodernist Fallacy and the Victory of the Outrospicere :: Of the six books we had to read in my Political Theory 2: Early Modern to Contemporary class as an undergrad, I noticed that never has one so pictorially diagramed a philosopher fellating another philosopher as Maurice Merleau-Ponty did of himself to Max Weber in Adventures of the Dialectic.65 The very first two words in the body of the book are "Max Weber". You could almost feel his veins throbbing as Merleau-Ponty slowly stroked Weber's schwanz. This is not uncommon in postmodern philosophical texts, and certainly of any journal or work in contemporary academia. The majority of contemporary philosophers write large volumes of sweet nothings dedicated to other philosophers as if they were meant to write love notes and romantic poetry instead, masking it under the guise of 'critique'. This is almost considered necessary in order to be noticed in any sort of academic sense nowadays, because if you can't "critically analyze" pre-existing works, then of what use are you to the field, right? The problem that arises here is of a continental flavor, the idea that history is more important than what history has spawned, that a man is greater than his ideas despite Socrates' warning from Plato's Republic that, "a man is not to be reverenced more than the truth." I do not posit that persons not be great or that you shouldn't study philosophers, but simply that to be a philosopher you must focus your study on the philosophy itself. In Merleau-Ponty's defense, he does develop a somewhat unique (but only somewhat) culturally-relative idea in that first chapter he dedicated to fellating Weber in Adventures of the Dialectic. The basic idea is that to accurately (or more appropriately) study history you must be of the mindset and context of the persons who lived it, as people are a part of history and history is a part of us, as well as being able to take a removed outsider approach, creating the dialectic. His main critique of Weber is that Weber doesn't really understand history because he is of a completely removed context; Weber is an outsider to the area he studies, he lacks the right perspective, and so with limited historical data Weber cannot paint a truly representative picture of history. Ignoring the caveat that MerleauPonty falls into the same fallacy by following his own premise with four more chapters of critiques on history all while he himself is entirely removed from it, the problem with the work is that it was utterly unnecessary to involve Weber in the initial thesis to begin with. Merleau-Ponty spends the entire first chapter of his book setting up this perspectivist framework, a whole twenty pages dedicated to this 'critique', that you must be in the history to understand the history, all while agreeing with everything Weber says. All references to Weber were never directly refuted and almost all of them were even affirmed by Merleau-Ponty. Whence really cometh the 'critique' then, you may ask? The 'critique' ultimately comes from his post-hoc perspectivist 65



framework used to say that Weber's approach to history is fallacious, but Merleau-Ponty could have replaced Weber with a plethora of other philosophers and his argument would have held the same weight. It seems then that the only reason he so closely involved the work of another philosopher, and with such specificity as Weber, was to generate interest in his own work, to pander to the audience that would read such texts. This is fuckery, and I'll explain why. 66 In what other contexts do people agree with everything someone else has said, but then assert that the base framework used was fundamentally flawed and as such an underhanded insult is given by making the person that was agreed with waste breath on making assertions that you ultimately believe led to nothing in the first place? Only when you're fucking with people does this occur. Only when you want a war of attrition, to make the other party feel as if they're accomplishing something, all-the-while knowing they are exerting energy for nothing, does this occur. However, Merleau-Ponty is not in a direct dialogue with Weber, he is merely 'critiquing' Weber, and as such, there is no direct insult, no direct fuckery. Why then all the French finery 67 from Merleau-Ponty dumped on Weber? Why then all the affirmation from Merleau-Ponty about Weber's work, all the schwanz stroking, to then persistently return with, "no, no, no, I'm actually disagreeing because he lacks the correct perspective"? This contrarian approach is what spawns the postmodern fallacy of thinking that texts need be in relation to other texts in order to get a point across. Merleau-Ponty does his own initial framework a disservice by constantly relating it to Weber in Adventures of the Dialectic; this postmodern fallacy is itself the fuckery- that the only way for the postmodernists to feel like they've said anything is to show how others considered to be intelligent were not so. It's no surprise then to find that many contemporary texts are over-abundantly obfuscated to the point that only the Intelligentsia has a chance at following the text (which people like Foucault and Derrida made comments on regarding their own work in this manner). There is also a derivation of the postmodernist fallacy here, in thinking that if your text is only intelligible to the Intelligentsia that it then means your text is worth spending the intelligence on. This is how postmodernists fuck themselves, meaning this is whence the fuckery is spawned. This postmodernist practice itself is almost a testing of the philosopher's hold on reality by simply tricking the philosopher into reading the postmodernist texts and being convinced the text was really all that philosophical to begin with. A truly meta fuckeryactivation by the universe if there ever was one. Surely then I myself have fallen into this fallacy by relating an argument so closely to another's work and by intentionally conflagrating the ease of which this very treatise is to be read at, but in my defense I never claimed this was a first-show paper nor that it was worth spending the time on. Maybe then this serves as more evidence for the outrospicere, not only that Merleau-Ponty be so trivially instantiated in his assertion that one must be submersed in the context of what's being studied (the other side of the dialectic saying that you need to be in the perspective of those being studied- his initial thesis), but that Merleau-Ponty was probably also aware himself that his work was not easily accessible (and probably intentionally so, as again Foucault and Derrida famously remarked on the necessity of this in order to become popular in academia). Surely then Merleau-Ponty does not write first-show papers, but rather second and third-show papers, making it so he is closer to the outrospicerian master comedian ideal and in favor of this outside perspective (a non-immersed one) despite his own words. If this is the case then Merleau-Ponty is evidence for metaphysics existent as comedy, as he is supposedly a philosopher (opposed to a rhetorician) and philosophers study ethics and hold themselves to the values they find (as outlined in the first section of the metaphilosophy chapter). If Merleau-Ponty and the majority of postmodernists intentionally fuck with their readers, then they are fuckards, ones who participate in the fuckery, and as such support MECH through their ethics. If it is not the case that Merleau-Ponty and the majority of postmodernists intentionally fuck with their readers, then the postmodernist fallacy outlined above in this section still holds and these postmodernists are no longer to be considered philosophers as they perverse their own ethical findings- exemplified by MerleauPonty's view that to understand a work you must be immersed in it only to then make it difficult to be immersed in anything he wrote, making him perverse his own ethics- and a philosopher must maintain their ethics. The postmodernist approach to philosophy under the latter option is still unintentionally 66 67

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_cHafSg6dw0&t=2099 Liu, Ming-Han; lectures on the finesse of insult in the month of April, 2015.


one of fuckery, as again it fundamentally undermines the reader's hold on reality. Thus is the postmodernist circle jerk, and no one even asked for it, how pretentious of them. Outrospicere opposed to introspicere would be appropriately discussed now. The introspicere, or that which is introspective, has long been considered the key driving force of philosophy and the main motivator for advances in the field. The introspicere in this sense aligns directly with what MerleauPonty and many contemporaries, perspectivists, and subjectivists alike, value and prefer in that it is the in-the-moment experience; the present absorption of data as being your own direct source without removal from the situation. This is offensive; it shows a clear misunderstanding that philosophy and philosopher are two separate and distinct things. Philosophy is the study of unspecific being, of 'being' itself, but philosophers do not solely study 'being' itself, they also follow other studies of things found to be of concern with 'being' itself. This means that the history of the study, of other philosophers & their frameworks, and subsequently of one's own being, is necessary for one to be a philosopher in the academic sense. Many have praised (and mocked) the existentialists and continentals for their focuses on all other things found to be of concern with said study of philosophy, as the existentialists have asked about their own being in relation to being itself; this is surely a service to the academic philosopher as the existentialist has made it so that introspection has functionality- comparing your internal framework with others from a thirdperson view. To be clear, the existentialist introspection focus only works as a introspection-versusoutrospection framework, as a third-person comparative, otherwise why introspect if you have nothing to compare it to (similar to the dialectic Merleau-Ponty described)? How would you even know it's introspective if not by bouncing it against things you consider to be outside yourself? Existentialism is not solipsism, so why then be a contrarian and say that this third-person comparative view, this removal to an unbiased perspective, be the incorrect approach (like Merleau-Ponty and existentialism in general argues)? It seems quite clearly hypocritical to do such a thing and yet they continue to do so. We must admit introspection is surely what commits the philosopher to initially ask questions, but as discussed in the introduction to this treatise, the answers are more important than the questions and we find the answers to come more readily from an outrospection of the frameworks developed in philosophy. This means the existentialists, perspectivists, and subjectivists alike are misled in their assertions that you must be totally immersed in yourself and your own moment in order to understand the reality of a situation. With the previously covered things combined we see that the outrospicere, not the introspicere, is the facilitator of the study of philosophy, so Merleau-Ponty and many of these postmodernists who claim that a submersed perspective be necessary only hold weight to the claims against themselves. The views of introspection being superior to outrospection are the views of one who has done little of either. *** A caveat- in saying that if persons not following the framework asserted here are not philosophers, it is the same as saying the rules they live by, that is, the rules they conduct their existence by, are incorrect. This means, as we know from the Ad Hominem section, that this is an attack on the characters of those who claim themselves philosophers without following the framework asserted here. The validation of the use of Ad Hominem presented in the previous section is actuated thusly. All that being said, Metaphilosophy, the study of the study of philosophy, does not fall under the definition of Philosophy, as Metaphilosophy is a study of a specific nature of being, namely the nature of Philosophy's being. However, that does not mean the one who studies Metaphilosophy is anything but a philosopher, as we have just delineated the difference between philosophy and philosopher. Succinctly, to be a philosopher one must know what it is to study philosophy, and as such, Metaphilosophy is a discipline the philosopher studies, if only briefly. And finally, as a very last note, I think an amusing way to judge the weight of philosophical texts would be to standardize an unpacking system, where in order to make a text accessible it be re-written in simple language for the layman. The texts that end up being reduced the most after the re-writes would be the flufferies, the weaker texts from the weaker philosophers; conversely the texts that end up being expanded the most after the re-writes would be the deepest and most 'philosophical'.


However, there are plenty of packages that are mostly packing peanuts, so the fluffery may yet persist. It'd be amusing nonetheless to see which philosophers and which texts rate as the most packaged.


Chapter 3 Metaphysics Existent as Comedy "An empiricist walks into a bar, substance abuse follows." - Matthew Garon The odd inclination some have to swearing metaphysics be nonsense be the ones inclined to swearing by nonsense in the first place, as the stance that metaphysics is nonsense is a claim that requires metaphysical justification68; so truly by their own inclinations these persons are ones of nonsensical statements and ought to have their statements and personhood dismissed as such. To say something like only the physical universe exists and therefore all inquiry of its nature is the domain of physicists is to misunderstand that physicists can only ever answer how things exist, not why. Even in a physicalist framework where you assume nothing beyond a monistic nature of reality, it emerges that our understanding of such become divided categorically, where scientific positivism may never be substantiated due to its disability to validate its own methodology 69, and so yet the philosopher rules over this domain in which the physicist may never tread. The argument then turns to saying what sophists like Richard Dawkins purport, "the 'why' question is just a silly question."70 But as we know from the first sentence of this paragraph, saying things like that are in themselves metaphysical claims. This is what the kids call, "gg no re." 71 This incursion of noetic principles many bring to the metaphysical table is defended only by the contradictory sides the invaders themselves ordered. As such the table is of a timeless wood whose surface has become heavily scratched by since-dulled utensils. Let this treatise be a pause in the courses being served, as to allow for digestion of the gourmet principles, before we settle ourselves into the sweeter things of the eve. Getting back to the topic, Alfred North Whitehead is known for saying, "The safest general characterization of the philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." All modern philosophy being footnotes to Plato (and a good deal more to Aristotle) just means something from left field (a sport they probably would have both enjoyed) needs to come about, otherwise all the ancient philosophical questions have already been answered by either Plato or Aristotle and yet this does not seem to be the case as many philosophers still disagree that either got it completely right. So we must now go about understanding reality, the nature of being, knowledge, and all their interplay through something completely new and separate from the ancient philosophers, and by extension, something that stands on its own even from the rest of popular philosophy in modernity. For this reason much is asserted and given justification without citation to any pre-existing works in this treatise. Much must be self-actuated as Truth itself must be, so the philosophy of its understanding must also be. Noting that, the lackadaisical citation form and poor writing in general in this treatise is itself an iteration of the three-show comic standard. One would do disservice to dismiss such formatting as improper as the proper only exists through the pre-established things we wish to work around here.


Busby, Matthew. A Debate on the Existence of God. November 24, 2014. http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_11/v2_11.htm 70 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p6tIee8FwX8&t=1938 71 http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=GG+no+re 69


I understand there might seem now a human in the elephant cage at the zoo, as opposed to an elephant in the human's room; you think creating a new framework aside the pre-established ones is to work against my own efforts (I've noted that interjecting a new framework into a pre-established one is what leads to both failing), as opposed to a realization that a new framework altogether is not the same as mixing two that already existed. The wise will note the pretzeling of wordplay is itself an iteration of the new framework here. The self-actuation is present thusly and we now have our first truth of the schema. *** :: Ontology Is A Joke ::

ABSTRACT: Ontology as not the study of existence but rather existence itself is a joke extended from humor. This notion is extracted from pataphysical framework and recognized 'absurdities' in the nature of the universe, as well as a meta-abstraction method utilized when analyzing the surreal versus real/factual layers of reality. A war of attrition is fought against the invocation of time as a means to frame existence, as the intent is to not speak around existence but of existence itself. It is ultimately argued that since existence itself is a joke, that not only all ontological instantiations of existence be humorous, but that 'existence' is a poor framework for discussing reality.

"Ontology being a joke is self-explanatory."72 - VivaCaligula This essay's entire architecture and utilized frameworks are built around the quoted, as the quoted is an instance of the 'meta', both as a joke and as a recursively self-actuatory instantiate utilizing the metareification process discussed in the logic chapter. They say if you have to explain a joke then it isn't funny, but then we might worry that no one would ever be aware of the joke and its marvel would fall on deaf ears as the joke is in and of existence itself and so this failure in recognition may be the failure in recognition of existence itself. This means it's being said that we should explain the joke after all as ontology being a joke would explicate that such a thing is objectively so and hereby makes its explanation an instantiate of the joke (read: existence itself), the description of which I just gave being its own instantiation, meaning the joke has just been self-actuated through its own meta-reification. Given that ontological items tend to exist and the base item of this category may exist out of its own volition, making it self-actuatory, we might say the self-actuation would validate any real-world or reified instantiate of it its own meta-instantiate, or versa vice (which is the vice versa of vice versa, wholly applicable here). This means we can go back to the non-figurative and say a literal form of the joke was just invoked to prove that the joke exists, making existence as a joke its own joke about existence and its own validation outright, further justifying that the base item (or rather most fundamental aspect) of ontology is literally a joke. I'll be less verbally tergiversatory now, but note that ontology as a humorous function would play into our recognition of failed logical systems as such; it could overtly be the case that existence is a joke, which we know because jokes are specific instantiates of humor and humor is any specific instantiate of amusement, which is known not just for it now being stipulated but also because otherwise it would not be amusing and as such would not be anything to muse about. So surely ontology being a joke would be a decent joke as it would subtly play into its own humor, and further that this manner of speaking about it would not be circumlocution but rather a proper full explanatory framework necessary for showing the absurdity of itself. So with that said, let us continue now to explain the joke in full and push forward to cases of absurdity and argumentative pretzeling to showcase


'VivaCaligula'. Online interview by author on Rizon's IRC network. November 29, 2014.


that humor instantiated as such is demonstration that it is only through such instantiation that things 'exist'. A substantial amount of work has been written on the subject of existence being nonsensical, with Thomas Nagel being the primary example of metaphysical framework hinging on an ontologically absurd pin. Most notably his work, The Absurd, exemplifies where the notion may even come from by relating the sense of the ill-comprehension of time back onto itself when saying, "It is often remarked that nothing we do now will matter in a million years. But if that is true, then by the same token, nothing that will be the case in a million years matters now. In particular, it does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now will matter."73 Nothing mattering doesn't matter, which is an absurdity in itself as it's clearly a paradoxical statement, is what Nagel uses as an argument that nothing mattering in a million years is not a valid absurdity. But this is only the opening statements of the work and as Gallow notes in his summarizing of The Absurd, the argument is not that nothing mattering doesn't matter, but rather that it does not matter now that our lives will not matter in a million years. 74 A further absurdity of the nature of existence to showcase that our existence must not be absurd? Both Nagel and Gallow note that the absurdity itself stems from the recognition of our existence as being contingent and yet we persist taking it (our existence) seriously even though any justification for our commitments can only be circularly reasoned past that contingency, as our commitments' legitimacy can be pulled into doubt by said contingency of our existence. This failure in logical consistency on the part of the human is the labeled absurdity, and as a more nuanced case, where existence becomes humorous. Humor being defined as a recognition of a failure in logic (in any form) and the sense of humor being the amusements of a perceived or expected (or even self-invoked) failure in/of a logical system, leads us to say that human existence is inherently humorous, especially after considering that we place value in something inherently valueless. Now this is not to say that things inherently valueless necessarily be incapable of attaining value after their existent creation, as things that are arbitrary before their existence are not necessarily arbitrary after the fact, but this is merely to say that we recognize our contingency and no further than that do we still feel apt to assume a meaningfulness in our lives. This is a rather baseless assumption when no further justification is presented, which is why Nagel correctly attributes this as the source of absurdity when discussing our existence. The recognition of this absurdity is then itself the recognition that existence in a contingent state is the failure to place justification for existence in a mode that bestows meaning or actuates a logical consistency beyond simply that something exists. This is to say that all things that exist contingently do so for 'absurd' reasons and therefore are humorous as we've just defined. But of course this is not about our own existence, rather existence itself, and so why would existence itself be a joke? If all things that exist, that is to say all existence, is contingent, then all things existing do so as instantiations of jokes, which is to invoke our other definition and to say all things that exist are jokes- making this cosmic jest an amusement when its logical inconsistence is realized. But why would we say all things that exist fall into that framework, right? We would have to prove that all existence is contingent in order to prove that existence itself is absurd, that it be some kind of joke. But what if this task is not as difficult as ones so humble as ourselves may think it to be? Late to the game but already in uniform a definition for existence itself is now given, taking Wittgensteinian form, the category of real objects- that is to say existence is things that make up what the case is, as the constituent parts of reality. So starting with some common fundamental principles regarding existence, we should see if anything amusing arises. Creation of reality itself is the first place to start, literally, as nothing could be said to exist before it. If you're of the inclination to suppose that time existed forever then you might risk the metaphysical hypothesis that there was no creation to the universe (or rather, reality). Starting then with this metaphysical risk that time is infinite, we would risk no further our careers as philosophers in understanding that time being infinite is a malformed worldview as surely the universe existing for an infinite amount of time before now would give rise, not only to the issue of there not being a first state 73

Nagel, Thomas. "The Absurd." The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 20 (1971): 716. Accessed October 30, 2015. https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/The Absurd - Thomas Nagel.pdf 74 Gallow, J. Dmitri. Umich.edu. Accessed October 30, 2015. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jdmitrig/1 Meaning - Nagel.pdf


of affairs and therefore no second state of affairs etcetera, but also to the issue of an infinite amount of time needing to have passed before our current instantiate. To word it more clearly, we would have to say an infinite amount of time needed to pass before this specific moment, which is to say that since it would be infinite, the end of it has yet to come, which would mean this moment is yet to exist, which would mean not only this moment but the current universe has yet to come about, as an infinite amount of time is still in the process of occurring beforehand. So to say time is infinite is to submit that the universe doesn't exist, or more charitably, that it has yet to exist. This is clearly self-defeating as an argument for time's infinite parameter would disallow you the state of affairs where you've currently come about existence to argue for its infinite parameter. If we were to then take the argument that time is finite, we would be led down the path of arguing that there was a definite start to reality, to all of existence, and therefore there is a point wherefrom nothing existed beforehand. But if nothing existed beforehand, then whence cometh existence? Especially if there was a point when time didn't exist, as nothing at all was yet to exist, then how could it be the case that there was a point in time that time began to exist? The self-defeating nature of the notion of finite time becomes apparent in these malformed questions, all being akin to other nonsensicalities like, "Where does the white go when snow melts?" And yet this is no false dichotomy, time is either finite or infinite, both cases of which lead us into paradoxical understanding of our universe, and both of which without being logically inconsistent result in it being the case that the universe cannot exist. If you are to make further attempts at approaching existence within the framework of time by saying things like time is a flat circle then you will also make futile attempts at justifying how this flat circle of time came to be in the first place much like the previous two frames we worked in. To construct another counter to time being used to frame existence and thereby showcase existence should not be framed by it, note no future object can be demonstrated to exist in the present, and that no past object can be shown to exist in the present, as only objects existing presently can be shown presently, and so it can therefore be said that no objects exist outside of the present, or rather that the only 'time' is current, and as such any abstractions from the present give rise to false reality (a form of presentism). A distinction between 'false' and 'true' in relation to its use as a modifier of reality here should be made, a distinction in which we are saying reality is 'false' when our descriptions of it do not conform to the truth; truth being defined as, "what is," as in what is the case. Common objections to this definition of truth run along the lines of, "That is not what truth is," but the self-defeating nature of this objection is made explicit in their use of the initial definition by saying, "That is not WHAT truth IS." Any further definition given for truth is to invoke the semantic that truth is what the suggested further definition be. So now that we have a self-actuating definition for truth, we will say our descriptions of reality are true when our descriptions conform to what is the case. Our definition for reality then would follow that reality is the category of all truths. We would say anything that is not the case also is not, so anything that is not the case cannot be said to exist, and more acutely would be said to not exist, thus actuating our definition that reality is the category of all things that are the case (Wittgenstein's version of reality75), necessarily meaning that reality is all current instantiates of cases. This demonstrates that anything non-current or anything not presently instantiated does not exist and that the framework of time is an invalid and malformed mode of understanding existence. - Thing about space also being bad here -

Should we deny however that either it's the case that reality exists or it's the case that reality doesn't exist? You may recall works regarding Gorgias which have famously toyed with these particular paradoxical issues of existence stating, "More specifically, the nonexistent does not exist; for if the nonexistent exists, it will both exist and not exist at the same time, for insofar as it is understood as nonexistent, it will not exist, but insofar as it is nonexistent it will, on the other hand, exist. It would, however, be entirely absurd for something to exist and at the same time not to exist. The nonexistent,




therefore, does not exist."76 So without violating the law of non-contradiction, we must take the strong stance and say that things that exist, exist, and things that don't, don't. But Gorgias also argued that things simply don't exist77, so we might note that when saying it is absurd for something to exist and not exist that this is a nuanced way of accepting a failure of logic, as it was stated that insofar as something is nonexistent it will exist as such. I would like to make the case now that this failure is not in our invocation of language but in our very framing of existence. Logical inconsistencies froth up from the crashing tides of existence no matter how many times philosophers set out to surf them. The only thing consistent about these metaphysical frameworks is their inconsistencies, an absurdity which serves as nothing other than to be another drop in the bucket of cosmic farce. This is not to say we can never understand reality, but simply that framing it under the architecture of things like 'existence' are erroneous. We should also say that this is not to denounce the law of non-contradiction, as abandoning logical framework do us as much disservice as relinquishing our pursuit for the truth of the matter would do. So while accepting logical framework in our architecture, we must repudiate the cantankerous ways these previous philosophers have gone by setting us up with faulty ontological equipment such as 'time' and 'existence'. An aside: time may still be a valid framework when considering human cognition and our general framing of day-to-day interactions, as Kant indeed described time as being a base component for our understanding of things78, but unlike Kant I don't believe the correct understanding of reality independent of time's invocation is outside our comprehension. If nothing exists, then how do we go about discussing the nature of existence, as surely it has yet been said to whence cometh existence? It seems that without invoking creation (as we've discussed that creation would require a starting point, meaning time), and without invoking existence from nonexistence, we can maintain logical consistency by saying nothing exists. Again, we shouldn't throw out the law of non-contradiction, and so to stay contradictorily safe, we would not say that existing things don't exist, rather to make this intelligible we would simply say that what appears to exist does so only as an aspect of non-existence. If it is the case that nothing exists, it would non-contradictorily be the case that nothing exists, and so reality would be nonexistent as reality is the set of all current truths, meaning all things that are the case, and verily it would be the case that nothing exists. This is not to then say non-existence exists, as that would be harkening back to Gorgias, so clearly it is the case that non-existence is simply non-existence and further that non-existence is what we are loosely existent as. Half-seriously now, we would only be allowed to say we 'exist' as an aspect of non-existence, making 'existence' just a malformed way to frame reality. It should seem now that things that exist do so in reality as reality is the category of all present instantiates (and our definition of existence was the constituent parts of reality), but we must not confuse this with the notion that 'existence' is a super-structure of reality, rather a structure inside reality, and to reiterate our previous definition, reality is simply all current truths (all present instantiates) and so in this architecture we simply do not need 'existence' to frame reality itself. You might argue then that we're saying truths don't exist, as reality doesn't exist and reality is the set of all truths. However again, in the same fashion that it is malformed to ask how much time passed before time existed it would be malformed to ask if things exist in a non-existent architecture, meaning it is not being said that truth doesn't exist as the question is inherently nonsensical. I hope the absurdities around the framework of existence are more overtly apparent now. You must admit at this point that existence itself is slightly absurd, as it is contingent to reality, due to it being unnecessary to invoke reality existing making 'existence' humorous within this architecture. Given the definitions presented in this work, we know that a joke is a specific iteration of humor, and humor is of the category of amusement, the broad categorization of which we are to say allows us to muse about things and the narrow categorization of which we are to say is a recognition (or possible self-invocation) of the failure in a logical system. So if we were to try to salvage a traditional view of ontology and say that a reworked definition of ontology as the study of 'being' itself is that 76

Jowett, Benjamin. Gorgias: line 67. Champaign, Ill.: Project Gutenberg, 2008. "Gorgias." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed October 30, 2015. http://www.iep.utm.edu/gorgias/#SH2a. 78 Janiak, Andrew. "Kant's Views on Space and Time." Stanford University. September 14, 2009. 77


which all philosophy hinges, and if 'being' itself is what's most important here, then the study of it, and of the modes of being, must be somewhat self-referential, as being itself is what the ontological does. That is to say, 'being' itself must be a meta-abstraction, as being itself is what a being does, and so out of its own volition, it is. However, we are not speaking of a being, but of 'being' itself, and so it seems that only by its own meta-invocations does it be. A bad phrasing, as 'it' is 'being' itself, and thus any modes of it being is an abstraction from the 'being' itself, so allow me a rephrase then to say that 'being' itself is amusement, as it would follow 'being' can only be said to be due to its meta-reification which could itself only be as a recognition of such, meaning a meta-invocation of a failure of logic had to be had, making being itself, ontology, a joke. So even by shifting ontology from existence to being we still return to the same semantic driving ontology, that all instantiates of it be humorous in nature. I realize that last paragraph may have just won me the word-games championship. I may have also asserted quite a lot while failing to properly justify much of it throughout this work, but this could easily be said is the case for any other basket-chosen framework for understanding the nature of existence as most if not all other frameworks are either properly unjustified or outright fallacious; this work itself then would be a meta-abstraction from the case that all framework for understanding the nature of existence is erroneous, meaning this meta-abstraction is itself a framework for understanding our understanding of the nature of existence but only through recognition that it be properly unjustified or fallaciously so. Would this not then be an instantiate of the case that ontology is a joke? Without further pretzeling us back through the arguments of this work I state that at no less it must be admitted, "Ontology being a joke is self-explanatory," is non-figuratively the most meta joke of all time. *** :: What The Fuck Did I Just Read? :: This section is dedicated to explaining the joke about explaining the joke. A breakdown of the Ontology section will be given here as a formal unpackaging of said section. We're going to really beat off this dead horse here, so buckle your beatselts. The notation used will be as follows- "P" for paragraph number, "S" for sentence number, and "Z" for pretzel demarcations. Z1a| The Quote: "Ontology being a joke is self-explanatory." The nature of being itself as described to be a joke would mean describing the study of the nature of being itself would be a joke, meaning it is self-explanatory. Not sure if I clarified it or made it more obfuscated, but hey you chose to read this, not me. Z2a|P1-S1:


"So, why is Nietzsche such a fucc boi?" I'm glad you asked, and let me start by saying I want it to be clear that Metaphysics Existent as Comedy is not a case for the aesthetic. I acknowledge there is an aesthetic side to comedy, but in order to derive formal logic and objective ethics from comedy, it must be understood that comedy has a formal and objective nature. The existentialists like comedy for its aesthetics, but existentialism itself is false philosophy, and I imagine that much like existentialism's failure to be true to philosophy, that a fixation on the aesthetic side of comedy will prove failure to be true to metaphysics existent as such. To quickly quell your qualms about my claims of existentialism not being true to philosophy - the nature of Truth does not revolve around humanity (as Truth is; see definition of Truth in the intro.) and thus the existentialist's criticism of exclusion of human nature in philosophy falls deaf. If you are truly concerned about specific natures of being, there are scientific fields of study you'd much better spend your time on, however, for the general nature of being (a.k.a.


philosophy), humanity is inconsequential. Ethics is not a focus of human nature, but an understanding of proper relations between minds. Understanding of knowledge and reality is also not focused on human nature, but on the truth of the nature of knowledge and reality in themselves. Metaphysics Existent as Comedy deals with philosophy, not with human nature or aesthetics. A good example of this would be how Nietzsche asserts much but justifies little and concludes nothing in Birth of Tragedy. I imagine this is why many claim rhetoric over philosophy in the case of Nietzsche. The general assertions he makes are that the aesthetic is a necessary component of philosophy, that it is opposite and separate from logic, and that good philosophy cannot be done without the aesthetic. These claims are fallacious. He asserts that lots of aesthetic (he focuses on musical tragedy) is needed for good philosophy, for virtue, and he uses the Fijian tribes who cannibalize themselves as justification, for they have 'low' aesthetic. Similarly, you could assert that one needs a stomach in order to have good psychological health, likened to how one needs aesthetics for a healthy mind, as having a stomach also helps keep us entertained and never-endingly so (it is not possible to be full for all eternity unless you remove your stomach). He says logicians fail to see everything and that the aesthetic exposes Truth as its own system. He fundamentally confuses inspiration with discovery here. The first assertion that aesthetics are necessary to philosophy is a try at justification through equating art and dreams to illusion. I will spare the fallacy of equivocation from illusion (that which does not actually exist outside the mind) to dreams and art as not being real. He ultimately rests on the illusion as being what drives people to exist, not desire for Truth, which is an assertion about psychology, not philosophy. It's misinformation to assert that philosophy is about desire for Truth, as philosophy is simply about Truth itself. Just because most philosophers desire Truth does not mean the study is about the desire. You might say, "well he is not ultimately making claims about philosophy then," to which I would agree because rhetoric is not philosophy. The assertion that you desire Truth or you live for illusion, illusion being art and dreams, is a false dichotomy as many people enjoy both or desire neither. Aside from that, he asserts that the aesthetic is where Truth can come from, meaning as he desires the aesthetic, so he desires Truth, and any claim for the aesthetic becomes self-defeating. Gotta recap everything here, demonstrate that all the stuff that seems unrelated or like tied-together lesser works are actually comically inspired. Go through the universe not existing from the science section (as that would be comical), not all things happening for a reason in the determinism section (because without random factors it's not very funny), cuil theory from the logic section (that logic is derived from hamburgers), the Not Fallacious section being a joke, that philosophers are comedians from the metaphilosophy section, that ethics is derived from humor and biological imperative is funny, that dictatorships inherently funny from the government section (and why the first world is still under one is funny), that social justice is inherently humorous because it's nonsense from the social cancer section, that we can't know anything from the epistemology section meaning we don't know that it's not a joke, a reiteration of the ontology section lol, and then the rest of the shit I was going to put in the metaphysics section here. Time doesn't exist. Write a whole thing about that... Space doesn't exist, following the same Kantian framework of predefined thought structures. Demetri Martin's question of, "How long is the present?" is a malformed question, as the present even in a timepositive framework does not have extension into time. https://twitter.com/DemetriMartin/status/309024797944332290 Objects as containers, we think of intrinsic properties as 'inside' a substance, which could mean objects are merely the architecture by which classes or functions get invoked. Extension is infinitely divisible only because current mathematical framework is based on logic instead of empiricism. Categories? > Framework > Classes or Sets > Objects or Functions > Properties or Attributes /> ----Existentialists point out flaw in "all-encompassing" systems as they do not explain what it is to be human. Comedy not derived from suffering, fuck Nietzsche.


From Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter I, section 5; translation by Helen Zimmern " That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are—how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are,—but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"), whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion," which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub "truths,"—and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule. 6. It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of—namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher have been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask oneself: "What morality do they (or does he) aim at?" Accordingly, I do not believe that an "impulse to knowledge" is the father of philosophy; but that another impulse, here as elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken knowledge!) as an instrument. But whoever considers the fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far they may have here acted as INSPIRING GENII (or as demons and cobolds), will find that they have all practiced philosophy at one time or another, and that each one of them would have been only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence and the legitimate LORD over all the other impulses. For every impulse is imperious, and as SUCH, attempts to philosophize." In none of Nietzsche's works does he fail to follow his stereotype of asserting much, justifying little, and concluding nothing; yet many people are convinced by these baseless assertions, or rather, in honesty and charity, it's more like these are maxims or general observations about society that many side with out of reclined observation. This goes to show that Nietzsche was a rhetorician, not a philosopher, as he has clearly stated here (and a few other places) that he does not have direct impulse for Truth. This is, as the kids say, "gg no re." ----In a metaphysical sense time-travel is not possible as Kant has quite clearly explained that time has yet to be demonstrated as actually existing (surprise, it doesn't). Time is a construct we come pre-equipped with by which to frame motion through space, time in itself doesn't actually exist. In a scientific sense time-travel is also not possible, don't let the dilettantes of physics here fool you. If you could actually go back into the 'past' and change something, that would then overwrite the future, meaning you possibly never went back to change anything, and it's turtles all the way down from there. All kinds of logical and physicalist contradictions appear when you try to justify time-travel in a scientific framework. An argument could be made about time dilation and the 'stretching' of time that astronauts experience when they whip around the Earth. But the physics issue here is an ignorance of the metaphysical framing, as time itself is not actually going faster or slower, the objects are just moving fast or slower, and so clocks aboard spaceships will register as losing a few seconds the faster the ships go, because the faster you move an object externally, the less energy that object is expending as internal motion, making it 'move' slower and giving it the appearance of experiencing less time. This is the illusion of time dilation that they claim is proof for time-travel. Time dilation proportionate to zoom scale of a 3-dimensional fractal can create a "forever jail" of infinite exploration because you'll never be able to get to the center, and can only get out by going back the exact way you came. Example - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E91yxk_pT_A "Meta-physical" can be expanded to "Meta Physical Comedy" meaning physical comedy abstracted or selfreferential, which would be the nature of reality under MECH. Explain theory of mind and the ethic required for it. if A is and not is, then A does not equal A. ----Logic puzzle: There are two kinds of things- things that can be categorized and things that can't. But what thing can't be categorized as all things are categorized as "things"? That which can't be categorized is clearly the thing that can't be categorized. These things we call uncategorizacal. And yet these uncategorizacal things are things; are categorized as "things" and as such have category. Are not all things of the same kind, then? So, are there two kinds of things or just one? Retelling of Russell's Paradox - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_paradox Reconciled by the Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/set-theory/ZF.html Refitted by Grelling-Nelson paradox - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grelling%E2%80%93Nelson_paradox Category-hood and Set-hood are not the same. Set is the itemization of like-things, and category is a property of things. In this sense, Russell's Paradox does not adequately represent Garon's Paradox (they cannot be categorized under the same set of paradoxes). ----Cuil Theory applied to jokes of an ethical nature; it's funny when someone falls down the stairs (shadenfreude) but it's funnier when it's a fat person, as it's literally more logical- they were more apt to experience gravity and gravity was more apt to effect their actions. ----6/7/15, Silicon Valley; Binding Arbitration (Schrodinger's Cat episode). Gilfoyle invokes Schrodinger's Cat, the example used to help understand quantum states, as a means to say that a Condor egg on a webcam whose mother hasn't returned for two weeks is in an unknowable state of being either dead or alive, and that by contacting the preservation organization alerting them to the issue would mean further investigation would reveal if the egg was really dead or not, meaning the person who reports the issue is effectively responsible for killing the egg (if it's found to be dead) as it would otherwise continue existing in a state of being both dead and alive. Jared Dunn later points out that the same reasoning would make everyone at an open casket funeral a murderer. This illustrates the failing of Schrodinger's schema in that discovery of Truth doesn't actuate the Truth after the fact, otherwise archaeologists actually birth into existence the artifacts they find when digging, meaning the ground when un-dug would have to exist in a state of both having and not-having artifacts and only after digging do any artifacts start to exist. ----The Atlantic's article on college campus pc comedy culture http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/thats-not-funny/399335/ Humor is not derived from suffering, it is derived from an awareness of illogicism. "I mean, maybe." -> the bastard axiom Cuil Mathematics - http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/mathematics-of-cuil Theorized levels - http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/theorized-levels-of-cuil Zero Cuil - http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/zero-cuil


Chapter 7 - not So fallacious :: Anti-Anti-Ad Hominem, Ad Nauseam :: "If you can't ignore an insult, top it; if you can't top it, laugh it off; and if you can't laugh it off, it's probably deserved." - Russell Lynes Some common fallacies that occur in formal logic are not, despite popular belief, universally fallacious. There seems a trend of people pushing towards the ill-regard of all the commonly (formal and informal) named fallacies in the logic sphere, to which only survives in the pursuit of the pseudo-intellectual armchair philosophizings. Let's take a look at some of these fallacies that many are so eager to spout the Latin names of, firstly Ad Hominem. Ad Hominem is the formal fallacy of attacking someone's character instead of their arguments.117 This is a common occurrence amongst casual conversation, especially on the internet. Against reason, it's more common amongst intellectual debates. The word 'intellectual' should really be in quotations, and not just because it's hard to call those kinds of debates intellectual, but because intellectual debate doesn't really happen when there is more than three acting parties, much less in public venues on the internet (like facebook). What is meant by this is that the more actors or mindedpersons are involved in a discussion, the greater the reality for straw men, red-herrings, and ad hominem to pop-up becomes. We can view the negative impacts of these regular interruptions and asides from discussion as a function, 'D', as it relates to the reality of a situation, '‽', with the model, " D(x) = (x*A:T)‽ ", where 'A' represents the actors in the discussion, where 'x' is the variable number of said actors, and where 'T' represents the number of interruptive tangents or asides as a proportionate ratio to the number of actors in the system (assuming all dialogue, even internal, would be given to the discussion). The model can be linguistically read as, "The discussion of the reality of a situation measured by cuil abstraction is equal to the number of actors in the discussion proportionate to the same number of interruptive tangents following each of the actors." At D(0) we return 0‽, meaning there is no discussion because there are no actors and are left with nothing but base reality (the situation exists independent of discussion about it). At D(1) we return 1‽, meaning the reality of the situation exists (0‽), and there is a discussion about the reality of the situation (1‽). At D(2) we return 2‽, meaning there is a reality about a situation (0‽), there is discussion about the reality of the situation (1‽), and the discussion is occurring externally between two actors (2‽). This is still easily manageable as we only have two abstractions from base reality and both are related to the reality of the situation. At D(3) we observe an issue, returning 3‽, meaning the reality of a situation exists (0‽), there is discussion about the situation (1‽), the discussion is occurring externally between three actors (2‽), and interruptions are coming from one source other than the last actor the discussion heard from (3‽). You cannot abstract further, as only four lines maintain despite there being more actors in the system. In this way we can use this model to show that past 3 actors, discussion no longer consistently relates back to the reality of the situation because the interruptions are coming from more sources than the last actor the discussion itself heard from. In simple terms, it becomes difficult for one person to address multiple people asking questions or tangentializing all at the same time. A mastication of an aside I've just made about something that's probably not true anywaysmastication meaning an intellectual exertion done under false means or to useless ends, derived from 117



the fusion of the primary formal definition of 'mastication' itself with "mental masturbation," as being the equivocation of chewing food to talking without saying anything. Yes, I suppose we masticated quite a bit here, didn't we? Regardless, it serves to show that the more people you have standing in a circle talking about something, the quicker the conversation switches to something off the original topic. I mean, for example, I've gone pretty far from the original topic myself and I'm the only person discussing it here. So back to the original topic, Ad Hominem is the formal fallacy of attacking someone's character instead of their arguments. People take this as meaning that making personal attacks is always logically fallacious, as personal attacks about one's character do not directly hold affect on the validity of the arguments that person makes. But what then if the argument is about one's character? Any counters would be considered attacks on character, so we now see that Ad Hominem must be permitted in these cases. In this way we can know that Ad Hominem is not universally fallacious, and furthermore that there are probably many scenarios, especially given the situation just presented (about large, dynamically moving discussions), in which Ad Hominem is a valid and strong tactic for argumentation. Living philosophical comedy admittedly gives way to rhetoric, and thus walks the dangerous path of sophistry. To mitigate the sophist problem, one must always pursue the gadfly. This may sound like the common ailment of my generation- to be a contrarian for the sake of being a contrarian, but this is not what is meant. Being the gadfly is to be that which awakens the horse of Athens, to awaken the beast that is society. You must whip their mores and standard practices into shape, make them aware of their state. The awareness is what becomes. An example of this is the common practice of calling vague (or even finessed) group rules into question, whilst arguably breaking the rules to then show the rules hold no power. When rules of conduct are what's brought into question, when the rules of how someone must be have their validity questioned, it is the same as attacking the character of those who live by said rules (as the rules of how they be are descriptors of their character and as such attacks on their rules are attacks on their characters). Hopefully it is apparent not only as to how Ad Hominem is a valid tactic, but to why it must be so now. Even to counter this argument, that living philosophical comedy means one must pursue the gadfly, you must attack the rule of living that was just asserted, which is to attack the character of the one living by such rules. Questioning rules to live by (attacking the character of an individual or the character of the society the rules come from) is what thee Gadfly did (meaning Socrates). To question if living philosophical comedy means pursuing the gadfly is to pursue the gadfly itself, as questioning the mode of living is what pursuing the gadfly itself is. The pretzeling of wordplay here also serves to show that denying this be the nature of living philosophical comedy is self-defeating. I will leave you with an example of the gadflian pursuit in philosophical comedy by showing some valid Ad Hominem work that was done in the "NO" secret group on facebook, with "NO" admins being treated as Euthyphro:


*** :: Appeal to Definition is Always Usually Never Fallacious :: "" You may be one of those subjectivist linguistic relativists that has noticed that our alphabet doesn't have to be in the order we've put it in. Congratulations, you understand that the initial assignments of values in human-constructed systems is arbitrary. This does not mean however, that arbitrary assignment of values beforehand means the values stay arbitrary afterhand. Thinking that it does mean that however, is a common misunderstanding of how conceptual systems work. While yes, in English (and it's various dialect sub-languages), our alphabet could have been in a different order, it is not the case that it any longer can. Certainly not in the current standard that's globally regulated by Oxford. This means, following Wittgenstein's argument that there are no private languages (a bit in itself which should show you that language is objectively tied to reality in some manner), we find that words are no longer arbitrary. If you said that the public definition of a word that someone used was not the same definition you use, that someone else's meaning is not what a word means to yourself, you could only do so while simultaneously conceding that what the word means to you is not English. Since English is the public standardized and agreed upon dictionary set that English-speaking people use, if we are to be intellectually honest in saying we are speaking English, then we have agreed upon a dictionary set that is by virtue of our agreement an objective method by which to communicate. The objectivity is not simply gained from our agreement (correspondence theory) but by the standardized protocol that allows words to mutually map to the same concepts in two separate individual's minds, as that is what public definition is by the Wittgensteinian sense. In regards to the issue of arbitrary assignment, now that language itself is established in our framework, I'm saying it's no longer a social construct. This is akin to saying that Euclidean geometry was started as a system of measurement by Euclid arbitrarily, but now we use it as an objective methodology within geometric framework. You might say however that geometry is thought to measure an external reality outside ourselves and so it is not identical to language, making it a bad analogy. But this presupposes that language isn't the same thing. If you are to say we aren't assessing external reality with language, that is to say if we aren't measuring and probing and evaluating our environments, then you are also to say you have a malformed concept of language, because when you speak to people you are communicating information. Does a Geiger counter not also communicate information to its listener? It wouldn't be fair to view language any differently than maths or programmed input-output devices in this sense, meaning that language, just like Geometry, is to measure an external reality outside ourselves. Language is more robust than pure maths however, in that it can also measure internal systems. Language has the capacity to transmit both the introspicere and the outrospicere in this regard. It is the umbrella of the dialectic of communication itself. This affirms even more so now that language is not arbitrary after the fact, that it be objective in its methodology, and that language is tied to reality as it is intended to inform on such. So why then be a contrarian and say your truth is different than mine, that your definition is different than mine, when we know definitions not to be personal but to be public and made so by standardized sets? It seems this contrarian tendency only occurs when people lack this


understanding of what language is and how it is intended to function. This lack of understanding is where the majority of the accusations that appeal to definition 118 be fallacious come from. That being said, there is still a valid frame in which you could say that appeal to definition is fallacious; that frame being when a public definition has been implemented correctly by virtue of its own public semantic and yet still misrepresents reality. Socrates showed us that these types of definitions are either too broad or too narrow, and that these definitions ought to change in attempts to better map them to reality which can be done via the Socratic method. So while there is a valid way to change a definition, and that the methodology for such be valid when the definition ought to change to conform to reality, this is not a submission that language be subjective after the fact, as we find that when it does conform to reality it does objectively so. If anything this demonstrates that language is dynamically robust and capable of adapting as needed, while still showing that from a pool of subjectivity, objectivity is reached, that from arbitrary assignment beforehand you do not get arbitrary assignment afterhand. Dreckarian framework is trash framework - http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dreck Fallacy of the Stolen Concept rights the wrongs of definitions, "You would be using a concept while denying knowledge that is needed to understand that concept in the first place." http://www.johnmccaskey.com/joomla/index.php/blog/64-attacking-rand

*** :: The Diogenesis Fallacy :: "" I want to point out a new formal fallacy that people use as a common tactic in argumentation, a fallacy I've taken to calling the Diogenesis Tactic, and the counter to which I am now calling the Diogenesis Counter whose phraseology would be akin to "A little makes a lot" or "little turned to much". This fallacy, and subsequent counter, occurs where people think that they can have a stronger position in an argument, or ultimately win an argument, by conceding that what they're saying is not a universal or blanket statement, as if that makes it a stronger statement, and this can actually be turned around on them by a sort of reductio mixed with ad ignorantiam. More clearly, I want to showcase here that principle arguments should stay principled and to shift them into evidential arguments is not only fallacious but doesn't actually advance their principle. For example, if someone is arguing that closing borders in Europe (or the American-Mexican border) would be racist against some given racial or ethnic category, and they grant part of their opponents counter, that /some/ of the immigrants commit crimes (even though the opponents to this argument usually showcase that immigrants commit /disproportionate/ levels of crime), but not /all/ or /most/ of the immigrants, then all you have to do is ask them for evidence of their small concession and your question then serves as a counter to the fallacy. What I mean by this is, that if they concede their opponents point that /some/ immigrants commit crimes in an attempt to argue that /most/ don't commit crimes, ask them for evidence that even /some/ of them do. They often (or in my experience, always) cannot provide any evidence because they do not actually believe their opponent's view, they only pretended that the opponent was right in a small, easily measured way (read: evidential) for the sake of getting their opponent to agree with their blanket (read: principle) statement that immigrants should be allowed across some border. They concede some evidential point to try to advance their principled point that the borders should stay open, but this is ultimately nonsensical through-andthrough as an argumentative tactic because if you concede the counter-point that immigrants commit crimes, even disproportionately, and even if you provide evidence for it, after you've proved it, then what? Couldn't we also prove that non-immigrants commit disproportionate levels of crime without any 118



immigrants in their country because they would then make up 100% of the crime without any immigrants there to offset their percentage? You see how making this an evidential argument doesn't accomplish anything with regards to whether borders should stay open or closed in principle? Let's take the opponents view that borders should be closed to some group. It still doesn't make sense to argue the evidence that immigrants commit disproportionate levels of crime. For example, granting that immigrants do commit disproportionate levels of crime (in Europe they most certainly do), then what? They commit more crime, okay, that in principle has more to do with culture or internal governance than it does with borders, so it's not a point in favor of borders, it's a point against culture. The argument is supposed to be about borders, right? So here's the principled argument- borders are by definition designed to keep people systematically separated, that is their function, so what is a border if not closed? You see how this principled argument I just made is not only stronger but makes the point clearer and easier to directly address? There's less room for sophistry here, so why even bother trying to make these arguments evidential? It doesn't go anywhere, principled arguments should stay principled. The aftereffect of this tactic is interesting because when they fail to justify their small concession, what happens in the formal logic side of it, is the universal statements on both sides become more justified again because neither side believes there is a small concession to really be had, either all immigration should be allowed for that given group, or all of it cut off, because if both sides concede now that the entire group at large is being discussed, then the entire group must suffer the consequences of their actions and not just the /few/ that commit crimes, disproportionately or otherwise. It forces people to make responsibility democratic, a shared burden, at least in this example (in general this argumentative tactic just forces universal statements). Another aftereffect is making your moiety in argumentation aware that they are not being charitable or even open to criticism about their own view, as showcasing that they can't provide an example of the point they just conceded means they cannot conceive of anything in principle that would make them disagree with their own view. Even if they could provide evidence counter to their view (which I have never seen done) it would still be the case that evidence either way doesn't actually advance a principled argument. I have never seen this counter-tactic against this fallacy used outside of when me and one other friend have employed it, and it has always worked perfectly in forcing universal statements (it even forced the universal statement in this sentence right now because otherwise my tactic could be used against me, which means the Diogenesis Counter is a self-actuatory logical function), and always turns arguments from evidential to principled in nature, which is nice as it forces people to stay more consistent with their views. I don't know what else to say lol, but if you want to further understand what this tactic is and how powerfully effective it is, I guess try arguing against either of those things by using evidential arguments and I'll use the Diogenesis Counter as a counter-counter against your counter to showcase its effectiveness lol.


Chapter 8 - Governance :: On Our Current Governmental Instantiate :: "Where harmony and love reign, no longer do we live in a society bent on its own destruction. Children of every race, creed, and religion frolic through fields of golden dandelions." - El-P 119 We don't have pure democracy (not to be confused with true Scotsmen) in America or any other currently instantiated country, as "pure democracy" is defined as democracy in which the power is exercised directly by the people rather than through representatives.120 Instead of a pure democracy we have an electoral college and a separated group of individuals that rule over us (around 2% of 1% of 1% of our total population) that we throw into a room in hopes they will vote on laws and make decisions in favor of how we'd vote and make them. This grates some of the core ideas of democracy, as illustrated within Federalist Number 10, James Madison points out there's a clear indication that breaking and controlling factions be one of the premier functions of our government, stating right off the bat: Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. 121

It's no secret that this was not only addressed to the pre-existing government system of his time, but to any superstructure in which a minority of the populous held the majority of power. This would mean that the framers of our country would be opposed to the current party system we exercise in modern America. Of course, Charles and Mary Beard argue in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution that Madison was mainly worried that the majority of non-wealthy Americans might rise up and use the vote to tax the rich and redistribute wealth, the "menace of a leveling democracy."122 But if we took the same principle discussed by Madison's excerpt and expanded on it, it would be fair to say that any superstructure in which a minority of the populous holds the majority of power is one in which an unfair balance of power and an unjust system exists, one where the violence of faction reigns. David Hume was on a similar wavelength, saying, "Nothing appears more surprising... than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few." 123 So what is this government of America that calls itself democracy? It surely isn't pure democracy, but rather a weak republic. This is confirmed by the definition of republic as being a representative system rather than a system in which people have direct say, as well as Cicero's warning that, "In a republic this rule ought to be observed: that the majority should not have the predominant power," for we know the majority of citizens are not the ones voting on our laws, but rather a select few of them. This is similar to what many other 'democracies' in the world look like, but this kind of system maintains a disproportionment of power. In order to deal with globalization, if we want to lift the imaginary lines in the ground that we use to divide ourselves 119

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZptOs8Gu9k http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pure%20democracy 121 http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm 122 Stone, James R., notes. 123 http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/hume/firstpri.hme 120


with and pretend make us different peoples, if we want to be able to explore and expand into space and not fight over who owns the territory, if we want to lift up the 99.9998% of society that has little to no political power, and if we want to be able to gradually and peacefully transition society into a singular government standard, we will need a system of governance fundamentally different from what is currently instantiated in America and elsewhere. But why would we want any of those things, right? It's not simply a matter of desiring a perceived progression for society by eliminating the described issues; a different kind of governance is necessary if a fundamental good can be done by making changes about the issues themselves. This means that there is something ethically wrong with the issues at hand, that a part of human nature needs to be addressed in order to show the proper way humans ought to act. Exposing such fundamental errors in society would demonstrate that the systems that produce the errors need to be reworked or removed entirely in order to fix the errors. On what basis are we going to say things are ethical or unethical, what framework should we use if we are to say anything objective about ethics? One might say that a system of equality would be the way to go in terms of the human condition and governance, but would that actually be the case? Egalitarianism seems like a unicorned utopian framework, but much like the false equivocation of its semantic into 'progressive' ideals, the system itself doesn't actually hold weight in reality. What we are dealing with is as I quote: Egalitarianism is a trend of thought in political philosophy. An egalitarian favors equality of some sort: People should get the same, or be treated the same, or be treated as equals, in some respect. An alternative view expands on this last-mentioned option: People should be treated as equals, should treat one another as equals, should relate as equals, or enjoy an equality of social status of some sort. Egalitarian doctrines tend to rest on a background idea that all human persons are equal in fundamental worth or moral status.124

The major issue with egalitarianism under this framework is lexiconical, with the lexicality pivoting on 'equality'. Egalitarianism on paper views all humans as equals, but in practice we find this is hardly the case as any proper investigation of the situation quickly lends evidence showing that there are no two humans on the planet who are equal, let alone all humans. As the Roman poet Virgil once said, "None but himself can be his parallel." A replacement of 'equal' with 'fair' and 'equality' with "systems of fairness" would provide a stronger basis for any ethical assertions made about governance with the frame we're working in here. That being said, a system of fairness would be greater than a system of equality. Fair opportunity, fair wealth distribution, fair public sphere access, etcetera. Such a system would lead to true meritocracy, instead of feigning it with "equal opportunity for all" whose erroneous nature stabs out from the inside when systems that take less qualified workers and force them to be hired over superior workers is the main mode of purveying 'equality'. This is most notably demonstrated by affirmative action. Thomas Sowell makes several strong counter-arguments to affirmative action being a force for good, showing that taking the more qualified out of the industry they would otherwise be a part of leads to unemployment more than it does to the affect intended. 125 These massive government programs that conflagrate societal comfort are the result of egalitarian rhetoric. I mean after all, you wouldn't want to treat people unequally, right? And no matter how sarcastically that question is asked, the answer from the bourgeois is a fervent and resounding 'no'. The proposition of unequal treatment in an overt manner in any discussion is easily dismissed without conscious care or regard, and unjustly so. Despite this, the same class of people participates in disproportionately unequal treatment of others all the day long. I mean after all, capitalism is a system of equality, right? And no matter how hard I pretzel the argument, the bourgeois will continue to salt their mouths with it and then complain that it wasn't what they ordered. Such is the hypocrisy of a poorly educated society. A more overt explanation of the framework so far would be that humans are surely not equal. This can be known by observing the different confidence in skill all humans maintain, among other things like physical build and culture. However, the skill requirement for useful contribution is the focus in governance and it'd be fair to posit intellect as the main differentiator between skill confidence in humans. I know few who deny humans are not on equal grounds when it comes to intellect delineated 124 125

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tNJwy3c_oQs


amongst them. The notion that they are on equal grounds is what we must repudiate if we want an ethical governance. For further convincing, the best example of the egalitarian fallacy is given in the Harrison Bergeron story.126 To those unfamiliar, social enforcement of egalitarianism through the practice of 'leveling' (handicapping those who are better-off in any regard) is the situation instantiated by the government in the Bergeron story. This practice of leveling, putting weights on the legs of faster people, for example, is required if we want people to perform and function equally. This idea that society is only allowed to move as fast as their slowest person (figuratively as well as literally) is the mindset used in real world governmental programs like No Child Left Behind. The abstracted ideology behind these massive programs make it seem as if people aren't allowed to be good at anything. I mean after all, why should the rest of the class get to move ahead to chapter two when little Jimmy is still struggling with chapter one, right? And even through the sarcasm you get the clear and distinct notion that such programs couldn't exist unless there was some inequality that inherently persisted through the human continuum. If there are no two humans perfectly equal, let alone all humans, then this means when it comes to placement in society it is fair to grant the better the better's position, as it is the better that more aptly fills it, but only after opportunity has been presented to the lesser. Only when all interested can have their try at a position can you say the position is available through fair means. While this may seem all well and good to you, you might be asking why does it matter if it's fair or not? If it doesn't matter if people are treated equally, as surely they can't be because they aren't actually equal and thus even in reception of treatment some receive better or worse than others, setting an inherent imbalance to equality in every aspect, then why not toss fairness out the window as well? Systems of fairness are the only governance techniques that can be justified through objective ethics under cuil theory. Cuil theory is the formalized symbolic approach to measuring reality on a scale of abstraction and surrealness.127 Much like in formal logic when a proposition is reduced to P or Q, in cuil theory the reality of a situation can be reduced to symbolic logics as well, meaning you can have an objective basis by which to say, "something is the case." If something is not the case when related back to the reality of a situation, you get negative cuils. Negative cuils denote a nonsensical reality. If something is the case for one person in relation to an opportunity's existence, but not the case for another (negative cuil), then the one lacking the existence of an opportunity is existent in a false reality. While we have the capacity to conceive of negation and to imagine what reality isn't, reality itself still is, independent of our perception of it, and as such it's nonsensical for false reality to exist. So under this framework we have an objective basis for saying unfair situations are ethically wrong, as they are nonsensical abstractions from reality. Another way to view this is through virtue ethics. If you set one extreme of human power as absolute power over society by an individual and the other extreme as absolutely no power over society by an individual, then you rule out dictatorships and oligarchies as both are inherently extreme (viceful). The virtue then lies in the middle (per Aristotelian framework), were all individuals have moderate power over society. What then of representative systems like America? Representative systems are only slightly less extreme than the absolute vice, as having minimal political power (the power to vote for someone who votes for you) is only slightly greater than no power as an individual, and having all the direct voting and law enforcement power (our three top branches of government) is only limited by the initial minimal powers the bourgeois exercises. Takis Fotopoulos illustrates this in The Multidimensional Crisis and Inclusive Democracy, where he states: First, that all other forms of so-called democracy (“representative”, “parliamentary” etc.) are merely various forms of “oligarchy”, that is, rule by the few and that the only adjectives that are permissible to precede democracy are those which are used to extend the classical meaning of it to take into account democracy at the economic, or broader social domains. This is why in this book, to denote the extension of the classical conception of democracy to the social, economic and ecological realms, the adjective “inclusive” precedes the word democracy.

126 127

http://www.tnellen.com/cybereng/harrison.html http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/what-is-cuil-theory


Second, that the arguments advanced by the “civil societarian” “Left” in favour of “deepening” democracy are nonsensical since they implicitly assume that the present representative “democracy” is a democracy and the difference with classical democracy is just quantitative, whereas, in fact, liberal “democracy” is not a democracy at all but what Castoriadis aptly called a “liberal oligarchy.” In other words, civil societarians confuse the present “statist” democracy in which polity is separate from society with the classical conception of democracy in which polity was identified with the citizens. 128

Systems of fairness reaffirm the case in a universal way amongst the participants in reality according to both cuil theory and virtue ethics. This paired framework is the strongest ethically backed form of an objective view of governance to-date and it validates systems of fairness over systems of equality with ease. But in the egalitarian's defense, a system of fairness is usually what most of them describe when you hard press them for their societal fixes, which is why I opened with the caveat that the major issue with egalitarianism is lexiconical. If they stop calling what isn't equal, 'equal', and instead called what they strived for as being a system of fairness, then there would be less to critique amongst egalitarians. All that being said, it's a good thing we aren't all equal because if we were all truly equal, we'd all like the same music and movies, meaning culture would come to a grinding halt. It's good that we have unequal skill specializations, as it allows us to divide and conquer tasks more fluidly. For this understanding of human nature, fairness over equality will always be the winning case in any successful civilization due to the points just outlined. A system of fairness rather than a system of equality is the definition of a pure democracy under this framework. So is a pure democracy really the best way to go when given the option? Many compare it to direct democracies like the Athenians had and use examples of such to try and show flaws with their equivocation to pure democracy. Direct democracy is a system in which the people being governed have direct voter control over how the government functions, but a notable difference between direct democracy and pure democracy is that in a pure democracy there are no elected officials that control the majority of voteflow within the government, the system sustains itself in this sense, and any governmental decisions that needed to be made would be collaborated on by any or all people within the system, all having a directly proportionate say in it as far as voting goes. This means the two systems are not the same, and trying to point out flaws in one by showcasing flaws in the other makes a lot of the arguments against pure democracy fall short. This even extends to equating pure democracy to any other system of 'democracy', especially a representative one, or by supposing the purpose of a pure democracy be for anything other than ethical reasons, as Hans Kochler points out in A Theoretical Examination of the Dichotomy Between Democratic Constitutions and Political Reality where he says: "Democracy" is equated with a system of mere efficiency, i.e. with effective oligarchic mechanisms of decision-making. This political theory has been particularly influential in post-war Germany and Austria (based on the earlier writings of Carl Schmitt and on Gerhard Leibholz's doctrine of parliamentary representation). The whole theory is based on the fictitious assumption that an individual citizen can ideally represent the whole of the society (the people) and thereby is authorized to make decisions on its behalf. As Hans Kelsen points out clearly, this theory is in no way compatible with the concept of popular sovereignty, the fundamentum inconcussum of all democratic constitutions. (Apart from the false ideological assumptions contained in the doctrine of representation, one should, as a rule, always try to describe a given system in appropriate terms, not in a misleading manner. One should therefore reconsider the traditional terminology of "representative democracy"). 129

With the myriad retorts placed on pure democracy, many fall deaf as the void of ignorance they're hurled from often be the same void they return. But what are some of the valid criticisms of a system of pure democracy? Surely there are some that transfer over from other systems that we've seen instantiated in the past, and surely those criticisms hold true due to the strong similarities democratic systems share, and surely still those criticisms are problems that would arise if a system of pure democracy was instantiated today, correct? What are the criticisms then of a pure democracy? There's four major concerns that arise when a system of pure democracy is proposed, those four being pre-existing power structures, bourgeois intelligence, bourgeois motivation, and 128 129

http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/fotopoulos/english/brbooks/multi_crisis_id/ch11.htm Ch. 11 http://hanskoechler.com/DEM-CON.HTM


congregation. But I asked just a moment ago if these proposed issues held validity if the system were instantiated in modernity, and the answer is that this is not the case. Each one is debased through the means described subsequently. It is said that the problem with a pure democracy is that pre-existing power structures would require people to step down from their already prescribed positions of rule. The principles of a pure democracy would suggest that a new system would start off with no one holding government power over any of the other citizens. This means that it's actually the case that no one has to step down from their rule and so current world leaders don't lose power, but rather that current world citizens gain power. This is achieved through a true push of pure democracy- by having all who are concerned be a part of the decision, through vote, on whether or not a new government should be instantiated. While this may not seem adequate to those already in power, the truth of the matter is that such a purely democratic push would result in a passive overthrow of the old government, as again, all concerned would simply hold to a vote which system be preferred. With that being said, non-passive pushes become self-contradictory; a pure democracy cannot be legitimate if it is instantiated through violent revolution, military coup d'etat, or any means outside the voting actions it stands for. Pure democracy holds most directly as a core principle consent over coercion, and so any coercive actions bringing the system to power nullify the legitimacy of a pure democracy. Another concern of power structures be that those who previously hold power need only say the new system be invalid, and that the old power structures continue to hold to power despite the majority will of the people saying otherwise. David Hume notes a peculiar aspect of government however that would defeat such a push against new systems from old rulers: When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular.130

From this notion it is fair to say that once a strong majority of opinion (strong majority meaning a disproportionate or clearly unwavering majority) in a population is decidedly inclined towards a new system of pure democracy, that the opinions of how law should be enforced also fall into majority favor of pure democracy and military powers also favor majority decisions, that at this point any other system would become a rebel faction against the majority, which instead of being called majority would then take on the title of legitimate rule. A quick and last point to show how a passive and gradual transition into pure democracy is inherently a part of the system itself would be to demonstrate how a new pure democracy would come about in a pre-existing first-world society currently. For example, if a framework like this is run over a distributed cryptographic network like Bitcoin's system, there would be no way to ever fully destroy the government system; it would persist for about as long as the internet does, as being distributed means there is no central system the government framework rests on.131 A gradual and passive integration of a new governance is possible and inevitable (once instantiated) this way, as long as a majority of citizens take up or integrate the new system under or over their pre-existing government systems. The second main concern is of bourgeois intellect. A pure democracy would require people to take the time to presciently design a constitutional system that is governed by the whole of a people, not an isolated group of them, as well as an intelligentsia capable of proposing decent laws and a strong bourgeois intelligence to vote on said proposed laws. As far as the prescient design issue goes, despite popular belief, there is an intelligentsia out there that is capable of formulating a self-sustaining system that would make this governmental framework possible, as well as more practical over other currently instantiated systems. Having this type of government function off the backbone of a cryptocurrency network would not only mean high security and a smooth transition of governmental systems, but it also allows for democratically agreed upon changes to the system to occur in an automated fashion, where the network could issue commands to have the clients polymorphically adapt to the agreed upon changes to the government 130 131

http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/hume/firstpri.hme https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7oIwqaAZzRTYzE0cU9vdFhXbU0/edit


system itself (the distributed clients). A less technical wordage would be that the entire process of governmental change can be automated, so the prescience needed to design the system would not have to be that grand, as the system can change on-the-fly and completely at the will of the populous. To stop a large flow of poorly-written or deeply flawed laws being presented, there could be a system of registration put in place where in order to be a law-creator you would have to pass a legality test, scientific literacy test, mathematics literacy test, formal logic test, objective ethics test, or what have you. However, this would make the creation of laws severely limited. The laws then made could go through an initial phase of being up-voted or down-voted by other law makers in order to be presented in the next major voting phase in which everyone in the nation has a choice of deciding whether or not the law is passed. The problem with that proposed solution is that it does not follow the principles of pure democracy very closely as you could suppose that law-creation necessarily be open to all participants within a purely democratic system, and a way to mitigate a large flow of poorly-written or deeply flawed laws from being presented would be instead to have laws meet a threshold of interest before being put out as referendum. Think of liking a post on facebook for this example, in that you could 'like' your friends' proposed laws, and when a certain number of likes are reached, the law is presented formally for the entire populous to vote on within the system. In discussing the issue with friends, the first position was formulated and critiqued within minutes, and the second position offers a means of solving the issue directly. It may not be a full-proof working of the law-creation process, but it still goes to show that the concern presented is easily dealt with and is not necessarily wholly applicable to a purely democratic framework to begin with, as again, a dynamically adapting system (as described by the prescient design) would allow different law-making processes to be swapped out at will by the populous. The bourgeois voting (and thus worries of a lower intellect average for voters) can be dealt with via a multi-pool delegation system that acts as a decentralized voter pool. This mitigates supermajorities and vote-throwing by splitting where votes go and who holds vote privileges over periods of time. Low intelligence, laziness, or lack of time to spend on law-reviewing and voting is a major potential issue with this kind of government, so to mitigate the problem, a delegation system can (and should) be utilized, as well as making the primary social focus of the government system to be higher education of the entire populous. The control of information by academia is ridiculous, and the democratization of power under this framework would also require a democratization of information where all academic journals and studies be freely available to the public132 (more on this later). Open information and an impulse for knowledge is essential not only for the individual to be good, but for society to be good, as it's only through destruction of the obrazovanshchina (that is the destruction of the class of society that has higher education without higher ethics) do we find the majority can be sure to do the right thing, otherwise we worry how aware society is of Tolstoy's warnings that, "Wrong does not cease to be wrong because the majority share in it." Voting can be incentivized through tax breaks, like how some of the European countries incentivize their citizens (or the inverse being fines placed on citizens that don't vote, like how Australia does it), but voting is essential in a system like a pure democracy and a simple tax break may not be enough. The bourgeois may find themselves uninterested or without time to make educated votes; a delegation system fixes this. If you have two people you know to have political and governance intellect as your delegates in a pure democracy, then whatever they vote on, your vote gets tacked on to; they vote for you essentially. This is akin to representative 'democracies', however, a major difference is that centralization and power of influence over the vote cannot be maintained by delegates. If the two or more (up to whatever arbitrarily set limit) people you have as your delegates vote differently on a law, then your vote is not cast either way unless you manually choose to vote on that law. All your listed delegates must agree on their vote for a law, or have not voted on that law in order for your vote to be tacked on. Having this multi-pool system of delegates will remove the "mob rule" and supermajority effects from systems of pure democracy as well as the factionalizing of democracies that occur through parties, as parties cannot cull votes if you set a max-tack to a thousand votes (or another arbitrarily assigned 132



number) making it so delegates never hold power for longer than a certain amount of direct votes. This is fundamentally different than a representative system where even if you don't like or want a representative, there is one assigned for your geographic area that makes decisions in your name that you do not agree with and who has the power of continuing to do so despite continually rebuking the idea that your vote be placed under their domain. A delegation structure like this is not explicitly required by a pure democracy, but following the principles of fair distribution of power and votes, it resolves the issue of bourgeois laziness and lack of intellect. As a side note, it was just mentioned that in representative systems, if your representative (be it for American congress, or a member of parliament, etcetera) is elected to power and you personally did not vote for that person (or party) to represent you, then that person is not representing you out of your consent to have him cast your vote in governmental framework, but rather out of their coercion of your votes into policy. By the very definition of legitimate governance 133 this means representative systems are not legitimate, meaning the American government (and other representative systems) are by definition illegitimate. You might then argue that consent was still given by participating in the system to begin with, giving legitimacy to whoever takes your vote, regardless if you voted directly for them or not because you consented to the rules of the system from go. The fallacy here is misunderstanding that in reality consent is never directly given. You are forced to be a citizen upon birth in America and most other countries, making citizenship 100% coercion and 0% consent. You are forced to inherit a system that does not give you the option to live under it and it's social programs without also giving it control of your vote and further consent (meaning people that move and acquire citizenship after birth fall into the same problem). I look forward to the emails of nationalists crying about how their governments are, "Totally not illegitimate bruh." One could suppose a further concern would be the same principle applied to the majority in a pure democracy, as laws that are passed by the majority when you were a minority voter against the laws are laws that take effect not out of your consent, but rather out of the majority's coercion. The difference here however is that the majority is not the one who enforces the laws, but rather law enforcement agencies. A representative is someone who forces an aspect of your being under government, your vote, to do things against your will and without your consent (if you did not vote for them to vote for you), making the representative nothing but a coercive agent similar to a police officer (except it is intellectual coercion rather than physical coercion). This is not the same as the 'majority' in pure democracy, as the majority (and rest of citizenship) is not forcing you to do anything, it is only the law enforcement agencies that force you to comply to the laws, setting a clear divide between government and law enforcement. This means pure democracies maintain legitimacy were representative systems cannot. But back to the original issues- the third listed concern was that pure democracy requires people to keep up with what their government is doing on a regular basis and to be actively involved in it. The motivation issue is dealt with by utilizing the delegation structure described earlier, but it's not wholly necessary as most people in a government framework like a pure democracy would be motivated enough to take part in it, because becoming a full citizen under this governmental framework would imply you want to take part in its affairs. Why join a governmental framework that gives you such a magnitude of control over it only to let it control you back through your inactivity? You'd be defeating the purpose (unless you want the benefits without the involvement, which is understandable). Direct democracies assume citizens are free of time and inclined to participate, but keep in mind pure democracy is not a derivation of direct democracy, and again, a delegation system could easily fix this. The fourth listed concern would be that much like in Athenian democracy it would normally require everyone to meet up at the forum to discuss the month's topics, which is hard to do with 350 million people. Fortunately these are all small problems easily fixed through new technologies (a recurring theme here, one which I'm sure you've noticed). Congregation offers the strongest push against pure democracy, as it would be impossible to fly everyone over to D.C. every month for an open debate-and-vote on our politics. Up until the last few decades there wasn't really an infrastructure in which large volumes of people could communicate instantaneously and simultaneously with each other,




but now we have the internet, and as Douglas Rushkoff says in Open Source Democracy about the globalized interactive aspects of the internet: They began to study new models of interconnectivity and group mind, such as James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis and Rupert Sheldrakes theory of morphogenesis, to explain and confirm their growing sense of non-local community. By the mid 1990s many internet users began to see the entire planet as a single organism, with human beings as the neurons in a global brain. The internet, according to this scheme, was the neural network being used to wire up this brain so that it could function in a coordinated fashion... This is why it appeared that the decision to grant the public open access to the internet in the early 1990s would herald a new era of teledemocracy, political activism and a reinstatement of the collective will into public affairs. The emergence of a networked culture, accompanied by an ethic of media literacy, open discussion and direct action held the promise of a more responsive political system wherever it spread. 134

This means that now we do in fact have an infrastructure that could support a pure democracy. But as Rushkoff also notes, nothing has yet come to properly utilize this infrastructure. Things like www.vote.com and www.moveon.org have had some success but they essentially act merely as public opinion polls, not as legitimate means for direct voting on policy. Another site, www.represent.us135, has tried the approach of manipulating our government directly through their own form of coercion 136, but it doesn't make sense to try to superficially fix broken aspects of something that's inherently broken. 137 The only way to 'fix' something that's inherently broken is to fundamentally change aspects of the system or supplant the system with something else altogether. The good news is that nothing but potential is present with this concern of having an open market in regards to instantiating a government online. So while there are valid flaws to be exposed with Athenian and small city-state Rousseauian democracies, our current systems and technologies (and there is indeed a heavy emphasis on new technologies) make these showcased flaws inconsequential. Clarke and Foweraker discuss currently existing direct democracies like Switzerland in Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, pointing out that very different systems of democracy currently exist. The case of Switzerland is worth noting because they are a highly mediated pluralist and party-based system and they don't face any of the problems people commonly tout against direct democracies.138 Clarke and Foweraker note that almost all the valid criticisms against traditional direct democracies like the Athenian system don't really hold for direct democracy in modernity. This is important for our own understanding in illustrating that there are few, in regards to valid criticisms, against modern systems of direct democracy, shedding a nice light on democracy in general and lending high hopes for pure democracy, especially one that would be so inclined to be based on a decentralized internet framework. What should be gleaned from this reading is that there is an objective basis for governance, that it ought to be enacted on that merit alone, and that other merits like efficiency and legitimacy follow. If nothing else is to be learned here, at least an admittance of the illegitimacy of the currently instantiated rules of 'democracies' around the world would be deserved by both me the writer and you the reader, lest you decide to be dishonest to both. With all that being said, rejoice, as we now have a basis by which to design a new, ethical, efficient, and legitimate system. Onward ho, comrades! *** :: Sovernance :: " The invention of the internet marked the first time in history that information could flow frictionlessly. The internet is the democratization of information. The invention of bitcoin marked the first time in history that currency could flow frictionlessly. Bitcoin is the democratization of currency. An 134

http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/10753 ch. 4 https://represent.us/ 136 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tu32CCA_Ig 137 Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens." Perspectives on Politics: 564-81. 138 https://books.google.com/books?id=srzDCqnZkfUC&pg=PA224&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false pg. 224 135


online nation will mark the first time in history that power can flow frictionlessly. An online nation is the democratization of power." - VivaCaligula on RizonIRC The failure of realpolitik is evidenced by its self-defeating definitional usage. The idea that realistic or practical politics be based solely on practical and material factors rather than ideological or ethical predispositions is an ideological (and some argue ethically necessary) predisposition that politics be based solely on practical and material factors. When you can use something's definition as its own proof for the concept being self-contradictory, it becomes pretty disappointing to converse on such a concept as being valid with other persons. By definition you could even say that to push such a self-defeated concept would be nonsensical and dangerously close to unethical as crowding communication lines with misinformation is the work of sophistry. So realpolitik does not stand on its own. What ideology then stands as a valid ideology while maintaining strong ties to practical and material matters where we would see the direct effects of that ideology in a positively ethical manner? Talk about the government system itself, and the matters of efficiency. no property taxes, the state doesn't own land no military, "a government without a military is like a fish without a bicycle." no opaque actions, code is open-source and gov actions are publicly listed crowd-sourced constitution -

We don't have Pure Democracy in America, we don't even have normal democracy, instead we have an electoral college and a separated group of individuals that rule over us (around 2% of 1% of 1% of our total population) that we throw into a room in hopes that they will vote on laws and make decisions in favor of how we'd vote and make them. This isn't democracy, this is a weak Representative Republic. This is similar to what most other "democracies" in the world have, and this huge disproportionment in power needs to change. For the sake of one day lifting the imaginary lines in the ground that we use to divide ourselves with and pretend make us different, for the sake of being able to explore and expand into space and not fight over who owns the territory, for the sake of lifting up the 99.9998% of society that has little to no political power, and for the sake of being able to gradually and peacefully transition the human race into a singular government system, this change needs to happen soon. So What Is A "Pure Democracy"?

Pure Democracy Example on Wikipedia

It's a system in which the people being governed have direct control over what the government does. In an absolute pure democracy, there would be no elected officials within the government, the system would sustain itself, and any decisions that needed to be made would be collaborated on by any and all people within the system, all having an equal say in it (as far as voting goes). To stop a large flow of poorly-written or deeply flawed bills being presented, there would be a system of registration put in place where in order to be a law-writer you would have to pass a legality test, a scientific literacy, history literacy, and a mathematics literacy test. The laws then made would go through an initial phase of being up-voted or down-voted to be presented in the next major voting phase in which everyone in the nation has a choice of deciding whether or not the bill is passed. Why Isn't A Pure Democracy Already In Place? Power - It requires people to step down from their already prescribed positions of rule. Intelligence - It requires people to take the time to intelligently and presciently design a system governed by the whole of the people, not an isolated group of them; as well as intelligence to propose decent laws and intelligence to vote on them. Motivation - It requires people to keep up with what their country is doing on a regular basis, and to be actively involved in it. Congregation - It would normally require everyone to meet up at the ol' Greek forum to discuss the


month's topics, which is hard to do with 300 million people. Solutions To Each Problem, Why The System Can Be Implemented Now, And Why It Should Be Power - This new system will start off with no one holding government power over any of the other citizens, making it so no one has to step down from their rule, and so current world leaders don't lose power but so that current world citizens gain power. Intelligence - There are, despite popular belief, an Intelligencia out there that is capable of formulating a self-sustaining system that would make this possible, as well as more practical over other currently instantiated systems. Having this type of government function off the backbone of a cryptocurrency network would mean high security and an easy, smooth transition of systems. The voting can be dealt with via a multi-pool delegation system that acts as a decentralized voter pool. Motivation - Me and almost everyone else reading this is motivated enough to take part in it, as is everyone who applies to be a citizen, and anyone who uses cryptocurrency or arguably even the internet. Becoming a citizen under this government would imply you want to take part in its affairs, otherwise why join a nation that gives you such a magnitude of control over it only to let it control you through your inactivity? You'd be defeating the purpose. Congregation - The only non-ego aspect of the reasons these systems of Pure Democracy aren't in place as current major world governments is the congregation aspect. Not everyone in the country can fly over to D.C. every month for a meet-and-greet over the war politics, and up until the last couple decades, there wasn't really a system in which large volumes of people could communicate simultaneously with each other. But you're reading this now, and you're reading this from a system that would allow a Pure Democracy to take place. The flaws in my list are human flaws, stopping us from advancing socially, so I guess they'll just be a human-hump to get over in terms of implementing a Purely Democratic system. So aside from those, why don't we try to start implementing a more democratic system like this now? After discussing this with many people, the most common objection to the idea, the only one really, is that voting over the internet can be hacked, rigged, and easily corrupted, and while this is true, voting via paper is more easily rigged than any of the major voting engines on the web. By utilizing a distributed cryptographic network, we could design a totally fortified system. There are ways to stop hacking cold in its tracks, the Bitcoin network or other cryptocurrency networks would provide an easy fix for any potential hacking. Much like you can't double-spend transactions on the Bitcoin network, you won't be able to double-vote. It would be practically impossible to poison Bitcoin's network, making this an incredibly secure system. If we use the Bitcoin network and a 51% attack is a possible threat, then using a cryptocurrency based on the x11 algo or a PoW/PoS hybrid would provide a higher degree of security. Keep in mind security only gets better and we're starting with a system that hasn't been hacked at any point in history so far. The Delegation System Low intelligence, laziness, or lack of time to spend on law-reviewing and voting is a major potential issue with this kind of government. To mitigate this problem, the delegation system will be used. Voting can be incentivized through tax breaks, but voting is essential in a system like this and many people (Americans especially) aren't interested or don't have the time to make educated votes, so a delegation system fixes this. If you list two people you know to have political and governance intellect as your delegates in the client, then whatever they vote on, your vote gets tacked on to; they vote for you essentially. This is like how America's representative republic currently works, however, a major difference is that centralization and power of influence over the vote cannot be maintained by delegates. If the two or more (up to an infinite amount) people you have as your delegate vote differently on a law, then your vote is not cast either way unless you manually choose to vote on that law. All your listed delegates must agree on their vote for a law, or have not voted on that law in order


for your vote to be tacked on. Having this multi-pool system of delegates will remove the "mob rule" effect from systems of pure democracy. Using Cryptocurrency To Power This Kind Of System The changing environment of the crypto world can potentially pose a threat to the security of this government system's network. We will need to have a platform that can variably change major aspects out without invoking a hard fork; this is critical to this kind of government being successful. For example, if the government starts off using Bitcoin as the backbone, and both the SHA-256 algo and Bitcoin blockchain become less than desirable, then the network must be able to dynamically switch algorithms and blockchains. The algo aspect currently seems impossible to do but debate on this is still open (discussion on polymorphic code has been proposed but I'm not too sure about it). An easy way to do the blockchain aspect is to have the government platform use its own blockchain as an intermediary blockchain, relaying all blockchain info from the Bitcoin network blockchain that the citizens of the government platform conduct back through the government blockchain on top of any transactions/voting/etcetera that they do on the government network. Having everyone on the government system use the x11 algos but still relay the information from the Bitcoin blockchain could be a way to allow for network meshing. This would essentially act as a mirror or latent archive system on the government networks part, but a huge advantage it would contain is being able to adopt many other crypto's blockchains into its own. Because of this nature, I propose we call this intermediaryamalgamation-blockchain the Borg Blockchain. I realize this will not be so easy to implement, but it's dynamic & variable modules like this that need to be implemented if a government system like the one proposed is to work effectively. A huge advantage having such a variable system would also offer is that any duplicated government systems that spawn from this (like the hundreds of altcoins from Bitcoin) will be able to intercommunicate, much like how all Etherium applications can intercommunicate. Talk has been had about just using the Etherium platform as the base of this government system but it seems that there may not be enough variable change allowed. Talks about this are still open for discussion. Further Specifics Of The Software That Will Need To Be Met Fair Client Distribution: The client that runs this government and its network must be a "fair" client, meaning all users with the client must have the same options available to them (view all local/province/national laws that can be voted on, view news feed, etc). In order to use the client with its normal functionality, you must be registered as a citizen within the network. This can be automated like the registration & verification process of crypto exchange markets. If a citizen has rights stripped, then the client registered to them becomes non-functional. This means that yes, there will be a solid tie between your identity and your client. The only practical way I can think of to make this work with all the other aspects of the system is to have your wallet double as your client so that your wallet is your client. Losing your wallet will then mean losing your identity in the network. There are probably other ways to fix this that I am not currently thinking of, feel free to propose better ideas. In-Client Registration: In-client registration for citizenship will be required for this to work, registering on a webpage will make the government system too centralized and weak to attacks. In-client registration for voting and law-making will also be necessary to make this system work. The client must be able to dynamically update the registration processes for all these tasks based on the criteria the network agrees to standardize for registration. This means that if literacy tests become a requirement to register to vote, the client must display the literacy tests as part of the voter registration by pulling the registration process off the network. A way to make this implementation easy is to have these modules be part of the blockchain, and the most recent agreed-upon version of the module is what is loaded when attempting to register. Which version of the registration process that becomes the "most recent agreed-upon version" will be based on the version adopted via law during the voting cycles. This means the registration process will initially start with no requirements besides citizenship to the network.


Code Spliced Into Client by Laws Passed Through the Network: This brings about another potential implementation issue. Laws that effect the code of the network must be marked as such, and what module of the software they target must be included in the law (in special parameters to be parsed by the clients later). If a law that says a change to the client code is required, then the proposed change in code must be attached, and upon passing the law, the clients must be able to understand a change has been made and must allow the users to update their clients to a newer compile of the code via in-client alerts or notifications. Doing this, paired with yearly client blackouts, will create a version of a "softfork". What I mean by yearly client blackout, is that the client software must disallow users the normal functionality after a year has passed since the software's installation. After a year, when you open the client, a window should come up saying that it's been a year and that you have to update your client to the most recent compile. By forcing client updates, it's possible to force a switch of major software aspects like from SHA to Scrypt without worrying about people not adopting the new software after the fork. This would only really come into play if a major change is made to the network or client functionality by citizen-defined law. Self-Sustaining System Through Polymorphic Code: That last paragraph made me think about something. While crypto touts being decentralized and trustless, everyone must still rely on the developers for the client in order to access the network. This would become problematic if laws affecting the code of the client or functionality of the network are passed, because the developers of this system will be the ones responsible for implementing that change for others. There's two ways to make this problem go away, the first being some government-affiliated organization is kept responsible for constant compiles and distributions of the system's code, or the initial client comes with a built-in compiler and polymorphically updates and adapts with the network. I don't think either of these options is satisfactory. If a law is passed saying a change needs to be made to the client code or the network functionality, the network in its entirety and all individual clients must be able to sense the change and know if a client isn't updated, automatically blocking the out-of-date clients so no hard forks happen. Self-blocking and self-updating clients would be necessary for this system to work. A "current network state" and "current client state" would have to match in order for your client to connect to the network, not like most crypto where you can have their oldest client and still connect. GUI/In-Client Chat: The client must be incredibly clean and easy to use even with its high amount of functionality. GUI designers will have no problem with this. If the proposed three area-types for laws is agreed upon when building this system, then the client must be able to show local-area, provincial, and national laws as clearly delineated separate categories. The window displaying a selected individual law must display two comment sections with it, one where the commenters voted for the selected law, the other where the commenters voted against the selected law. The comments will be able to be up-voted or down-voted, so citizens can see the top arguments for or against a proposed law. This type of stuff is not essential to the system, but it will certainly make the system more enjoyable to use and thus strengthen the system. Smart Contracting: Smart contracting and any other automated legal processes that can be built into the network are good, to allow for the most legal automation possible (as this is the only way to currently make an online government effective). Real-world implementation and upholding of contracts of this nature will require participants to honor the contracts, or local law-enforcement to consider this government a legitimate form of law, and to have the local law-enforcement honor the contract in place of those who don't (i.e. punish those who break the law). This also means that proposed laws must have a menu or some direct functional controls to tie parts of their proposed laws to the smart contracts of the network (if a law passes or some condition in the law is met after it's passed, then the condition for the named smart contract in the law gets met). Smart contracts must be open to "unforeseen government conditions". If a bunch of contracts are made, and a law is passed saying the contracts are invalid, the network must be able to nullify the contracts via command of the passed law.


Blockchain Size: Issues about the size of the blockchain have been discussed. A network that carries currency transactions as well as voting, smart contracting, and other features will have a large blockchain. Proof hybrids seem to minimize this problem, as well as having "Light Blocks". The Light Block concept goes that if after a day you have around 20,000 blocks, you can generate a hash of that day's blocks and you are left with only one block for that day. This would make it feasible for people to use the client on a mass scale. Downloading the full blockchain can be incentivized either through allowing Staking only on full nodes, or through other methods. I am not too worried about the size of the blockchain though, let me know if I should be. Public vs. Anonymous Presence: By default, you will be fully anonymous to other users on the network, however, you can broadcast your identity, and any or all votes you make. This means your name and identity on the network can be public and also show how you voted on any law in the system. You can also be anonymous and still show how you voted on any or all laws passed through the system. This is handy for delegates to display what they represent in order to get people to tack their votes onto said delegates. The transparency of your identity on the network is entirely up to the user, the user can even make their financial transactions fully public as well if they truly wanted (like how it currently is for Bitcoin). Delegation System: When someone adds a network identity (person) to their delegate list, the delegate should get a notification showing that someone added them, and who that person is if that person's identity is public. Removal notifications should also appear. Being able to turn these notifications on and off is important. By default, you will be an available delegate, others can list your client address in their delegation pool list. An option to turn off delegation should be available if you don't want others listing you in their pool. Law-Writing System: There needs to be a tripcode or some script-proof human-input requirement when submitting a law into the system, so law-writers can't spam laws. There should also be a limitation on the number of laws a person can submit per-day and the number of laws the entire network can submit per-day so the network isn't flooded with new laws all the time beyond the point of human management. *** :: A System of Crediting is Superior to a System of Currencies :: Blarg. Shit about governance being regulatory interactions, and thereby politics is not necessary, but social statuatation qua currency is regulatory in the same sense, making economics a governmental function.


If you've sat through this entire read only to find yourself thinking it a load of horseshit, then you are whom the paper most definitely applies. A paper designed for nothing other than to show the universe functions as fuckery has wasted your time? Then you accept the validity to the metaphysical worldview. If not, then continue reading, do what you consider to be wasteful as that will surely not self-defeat any counter-arguments you have to said worldview. However, if you thought the paper not akin to shit of a horse, but unfortunately you now realize none of this was meant to be taken seriously, then you are also whom the paper most definitely applies. Taking a paper designed for nothing other than to show the universe functions as fuckery, seriously, has wasted your time. Surely this metaphysical worldview can't be true as Truth is a serious matter. If so, then continue reading, do what you consider to not be wasteful as surely that won't self-defeat any arguments you have for said worldview. Do we now see? Any disagreement with the metaphysical view of Cosmic Comedy self-defeats as just shown. To deny it is to accept that it was in play in the first place. To accept it is to deny it should be taken seriously. But what good would taking that which portrays the universe non-seriously, seriously, do? That would defeat the purpose quite a bit now, wouldn't it? It's best to go on knowing now that Cosmic Comedy must be the case whilst also not going on very seriously about it. This peppering of the pretzels here in this third show iteration of the infinite jest, instead of continuing the bastardization of the English language and good reason that this paper has otherwise wrought, will now leave you with immortal words from a mortal man: "Nothing is real, art is a lie." - Bo Burnham


:: The Philosophical State of the Union :: "For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods." - Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII139 Much like the advent of the Socratics rising over the Pre-Socratics, as Truth and search for Objectivity does over Relativism and Subjectivity, there must be a modern resurgence, a second large wave to crash down on the knowing shores. Much like the popular contemporary ideas of ancient times that no one steps into the same river twice being met with the ideas that categories can contain dynamic and changing things leaving them static ideas (leaving the river the same to be stepped in) and the contrarian's best friend (the Law of Non-Contradiction), there must be an ideological combatant to the postmodern ideas of Perspectivism and Cultural Relativity that have worked their ways back upstream. As the contrarian sands stretch everlong out into the low of the tides of justice and good reason, the glimmer on them lasts for only a few hours longer as the dusk of Brostoyevsky crawls across the sky and the first frothings of the waves and impending weight of the heavy crash that is Fuckery into the postmodernist sands comes down. Down it comes as the umbrella 'Brostoyevsky', down it comes as the ethics of fuckery, down it comes as the militant ad hominem inverse rectification of the bastard arguments attacking the evil nature of the sophists, the contrarians, and the misinformationists alike with all their postmodern hipsteries. With the three wise men of Athens typhooning the relativists into obscurity, they bestowed three distinct levels of thought ready to be re-met upon the modern Athenian stage. The Ancient powers-that-be came in the order of questioning everything, delineating all, and actuating the system that validates all others. In this sense it was Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, unified as Atlas, that hold up all other postceding philosophers the world over. A rebirthing of each, and of each of their distinct levels of thought is typhooning itself back into society as Atlas shrugs the disproportionately continental weight of the world off his ancient shoulders and into the shallow waters on the shore of this cosmic farce. Let us know the name of this first typhoonal re-emergence be Quin. Quin, for all equivocal and unequivocal means, is in every way the truest rebirthing of Socrates in modernity as it was Socrates that methodologically asked, "Why?" and it is Quin that methodologically asked, "Why not?" RedDyeNumber4 showed there is a systematic way to approach reality. VivaCaligula formalized the system and applied it to other frameworks. Harry Potter Syndrome: popular; agrees with popular opinion, kinda, doesn't want to be ostracized; shit it mediocre. 140

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http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.8.viii.html http://www.twitch.tv/meggsandbacon


:: Notes, and Extra Shit ::

Meta-Physical was previously titled Brostoyevsky. Philosophy of Cuil - http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/philosophy-of-cuil Impact of Cuil - http://cuiltheory.wikidot.com/impact-of-cuil Narration - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfdEdE96En0 The philosopher king would really just be the Master Comedian. Gervais' Principles of Comedy - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WTl_xjOyZsc "The Unified Field Theory of Reality" "Raff Track" denoting laugh tracks being indicative of lower-tier comedies, for the riff raff of society. The semi-colon is one of life's great mysteries; no one really knows what it does. Heckler's Veto - http://www.wsj.com/articles/barry-a-fisher-free-speechs-shrinking-circle-of-friends-1419899071 "The amount of void present in your place is such that it perverses logic in a formal manner" https://w2.eff.org/Net_culture/Folklore/Humor/godwins.law


:: Credits & Citations :: Editors of this document: Matthew Busby Other contributors: Ming-han Liu, Albert Castro, Garrett Cruz, Meggs&Bacon, various camgirls of the internet, Rizon's IRC channel #[adultswim], and the FCC forums.

Kidding on the square, omnia quae fiebant in comoedia, - The Dean of Jesters