168 Decentralization of HR Functions: Lessons from ...

Review of Public Personnel Administration 2009 29: 168-188

Decentralization of HR Functions: Lessons from Singapore Civil Service ABSTRACT In the last two decades, nearly every country in the world has felt the urge to decentralize some of its Human Resource (HR) functions. This paper uses Singapore as a case study to illustrate how this urge has been addressed in civil service reforms over the past two decades. In so doing, the paper highlights also the necessity as well as the theoretical and practical implications of the decentralization process to the organizational arrangement of HR functions in the civil service of Singapore. The paper concludes that, as countries seek to decentralize HR functions in the civil service, understanding of how this process works is cardinal to enhancing coordination and the efficient delivery of public services. For, without this understanding, it is not possible to determine which functions must be decentralized and which ones must not be. Some popular myths and misconceptions about decentralisation are also explored. Key words: HR; reform; civil service; decentralization; Singapore

Traditionally, Human Resource Management (HRM) performs distinct but interrelated HR functions: planning, acquisition, development, compensation, integration, maintenance, and separation (Dessler, 2007, p.22). Nonetheless, the question of whether these HR functions are best performed by a centralized governmental structure, or a decentralized governmental structure is far from being settled, since both approaches have merits and demerits to parade against each other (e.g., Heady, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Rockwell, 2005). Over time, the way these HR functions are performed has tended to conform to changes in political ideology. As Legge (1995, p.58) exemplifies, “(in the present era), ideological shifts on the part of the government, toward a market-based philosophy, have resulted in changes in personnel management style in the public sector.” In other words, the current neo-liberal ideology, driven by free-market forces, has embraced the decentralized governmental structure as its preferred vehicle for, among other things, implementing HR functions. In many countries of the world, decentralization of HRM functions has, in the last two decades, occupied centre stage in the restructuring of the public sector (e.g., Kearney, 2003, Moor, 1996; Cayer, 2004). This article uses the case of Singapore to illustrate how civil service restructuring has caused central personnel agencies (CPA) to delegate HR authority to the line ministries and departments. Singapore is one of the newly industrialising countries that have shown a remarkable economic and social growth over the last four decades. Such fast economic growth has made Singapore one of the Asian Tigers (Cheema, 2005; Weder, 1999; World Bank, 1997). As a result, many Less Developing Countries (LDCs) have taken this nation as a role model. Although many factors have contributed to the outstanding Singapore’s economic achievements, the existence of an effective civil service has been particularly crucial to its success. Up to now, the organizational arrangement of HR functions in the Singapore civil service has not received much attention from researchers and scholars in development studies. In this paper, we aim to fill this void. That is, in order to properly comprehend the HR reforms in Singapore’s civil service, we conducted the current research. The Singapore public sector includes the central ministries (civil service) and statutory boards (PSC, 2004; PSD, 2007). This study, however, focuses on the civil service.

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LITERATURE REVIEW The debate over centralization and decentralization of HR functions in a civil service is an on-going one. Over the past two decades, almost all countries have been trying to decentralize at least some of their centralized HR functions. However, the real debate is not around the question of whether decentralization of HR functions in general is desirable. Rather, the debate appears to revolve around the following questions: How extensive should decentralization of HR functions be? Which HR functions should be consistent across civil service organizations? What HR functions should be up to individual line ministerial departments to determine? What should the role of the CPA be in a decentralized system? According to Heady (1996) decentralization and centralization refer to the extent to which authority is either passed down to lower organization levels or retained at the top. The greater the degree of delegated HR authority, the more decentralized the HRM system is. A decentralized HRM system, in our context, is one of the common administrative reforms made to re-distribute certain HR functions normally performed by a CPA. There are other three decentralization related terms: devolution, deconcentration, and delegation. Deconcentration is one type of administrative decentralization which redistributes decisionmaking authority and financial and management responsibility among levels of a government. Devolution is the transfer of governance responsibility for specified functions to sub-national levels, either publicly or privately owned, that are largely outside the direct control of the central government. Whereas delegation is the transfer of managerial responsibility for specified functions to other public organizations outside normal central government control (Kettl, 2000; Meyer, 2006). In most countries, the term “civil service” refers to employees selected and promoted based on a merit and seniority system, which may include examinations. It is regarded as less inclusive than public service or total public bureaucracy in a polity (Heady, 1996, p. 208). The concept of centralization and decentralization of HR functions can best be understood using a diagram indicating a “Turned U” (see Figure 1)1. From Figure 1 and other pertinent literature, we can identify the following important points:

Organizations neither use the extreme centralized nor extreme decentralized organizational form. Rather there is a continuum of options between these two extremes in the sense that the either/or approach does not work in reality. These two extremes are ‘ideal’ forms of organization. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000, p.90) remark that “they are not two separate categories but poles on a spectrum which passes through centralisation and 1

Inverted U represents a hypothesis that there is a “happy medium.”

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decentralisation.” In reality, governments have been seen to fall somewhere in the middle, or they may incline either toward the left (decentralization) or right (centralization). As Shafritz et al. (2001, p.15) argue, “as the emphasis shifts from one value to another in conjunction with changing political coalitions and different perceptions of what is required in the public sector, structural changes also take place, yet since the process of public personnel reform is somewhat cyclical, no set of arrangements will be immutable.” This indicates that reality is often somewhat more complicated as hybrids and mixed authorities can occur. The powers vested in a CPA can affect the HR system’s organizational structure. The more powerful the agency, the greater its role and responsibilities would be in the HR functions of a civil service. A decentralization of most HR functions to operating ministries implies a corresponding reduction in the functions and authority of CPA. Berman, West & Van Wart (2001, p.10) note that “operating organizations at the operational level now have greater flexibility and discretion in the acquisition, development, motivation, and maintenance of human resources.” This suggests that centralized HRM in a civil service is in state of decline (Kettl, 2002; Miller, 2008; Shafritz et al., 2001). Thus, it can be argued that since the last two decades, there is a high tendency toward decentralization policies, not only with regard to the general public administration systems but also in the way HR functions have to be organized. As Figure-1 demonstrates, performance increases as organisations strike a balance between centralization and decentralization of HR functions. This implies that there are some things the centre should influence, primarily the HR strategies and general policies, and some things that it should not try to influence, such as the detailed aspects of HR activities (Baron & Kreps, 1999, p.506-516). However, as Turner and Hulme (1997, p.154) argue, “how extensive this core of central government functions should be, has remained a major point in the ideological and intellectual debate of the late twentieth century.” Some of the main arguments for decentralized HR functions are: flexibility, innovation, responsiveness, and better decision making and hence greater efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Condrey, 1998; Hays & Kearney, 2001; Miller, 2008; Cayer, 2004). These arguments are brought forward on a number of grounds. It is said that locally specific plans can be tailored for local areas using detailed and up-to-date information that is only locally available. Workload reduction at the centre of government will relieve them from routine decision-making and give them more time to consider strategic issues. At present, therefore, the preferred structure is organic, devolved and shows flexible roles (e.g., Marcu & Onjala, 2008; Hall & Torrington, 1998). It must be underlined that HR arrangements satisfying some values inevitably raise complaints that others are being inadequately achieved. There are many paradoxes that are encountered in understanding or implementing decentralized HR system. Smoke (2003, p.7) also notes that “decentralisation is a complex and often somewhat elusive phenomenon.” As with many questions in public administration, the issue of how the overall HR functions should be organized has been plagued by an attempt to realize several incompatible values at once. Foremost among these values have been those of ‘merit’ or neutral competence, executive leadership, political accountability, and managerial flexibility, as well as representativeness (Miller, 2008; Rockwell, 2005; Barberis, 1998). The above arguments imply that a great care must be taken by governments in decentralizing HR functions. Most analyses of organizational arrangements of HR functions tend to focus largely on the structural arrangement of these functions as well as on the degree of autonomy or independence that is present in the structural arrangement (Heady, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). One indicator of the structural character of the civil service system of a particular country is the location of the responsibility for HR functions within the broader structure of civil service operations (Heady, 1996, p.215). Many authors generally tend to 170

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classify the approaches to the organizational arrangement of HR functions in the civil service under two approaches, namely commission (centralized) or executive (decentralized) (e.g., Hays & Reeves, 1984; Stephanos, 1996). Heady (1996), on the other hand, has propounded a more useful, four-way approach to the organizational arrangement of HR functions: independent agency, chief executive, divided, and ministry-by ministry. This paper sought to answer the following questions: [1] What HR functions have been (de)centralized in the civil service of Singapore over the last two decades? [2] How has the decentralization of HR functions been conducted in Singapore? [3] What lessons can be learned from the experience of Singapore with regard to decentralization of HR functions? RESEARCH METHODOLOGY In conducting this research, three methods of data collection were used: [1] interviews, [ii] analysis of published and unpublished documents from the Singapore civil service, and [iii] published articles and books relevant to decentralization in general and HR functions in particular. With regard to interviews, in-depth interviews were conducted with 15 senior Singapore civil service managers: • Five were from central personnel (management) agencies (i.e., 2 interviewees from the Public Service Division, 2 from the Public Service Commission, 1 from the Ministry of Finance), • Seven were from civil service organizations or ministries (i.e., 7 HR Directors representing about 50 percent of the ministries who were randomly selected), and • Three were from civil service training institutions (i.e., 3 Heads of the three Departments of the Singapore Civil Service College: IPD, IPAM and CSCC). This number proved to be sufficient to reach a high degree of saturation meaning that less new information was collected the more interviews we conducted; in qualitative research saturation is an important criterion to determine the number of interviews needed (Ezzy, 2002). The reliability and validity of the information was enhanced by using a multiple stakeholders approach – i.e. gathering information from several sources (managers), namely the central personnel agencies, the civil service organisations and the civil service training institutions. In order to focus the interviews on the most important issues, relevant concepts were identified from the literature, to be used later as signposts in the interview process. Three different interview questions were prepared for the three categories of managers, namely, managers from the CPAs, managers from civil service organisations and managers from civil service training institutions. Once the interview dates were set, the interview questions (See Appendix 1) were mailed to the 15 senior managers involved in the study. Because the interview questions were open-ended, the managers were able to freely express their subjective opinions and to provide additional insights in the restructuring processes of their agencies. Follow-up questions were asked to them as and when need arose. Brief notes were made of the responses of the managers during the interviews. The transcriptions were afterwards examined and the essential issues were extracted and annotated. Additionally, all the important themes were identified and gathered from the transcriptions. Interesting quotes were also identified and incorporated in the final report. THE FINDINGS In Singapore, there are 15 ministries consisting of about 60,000 civil servants. The civil service is the largest single employer in the country. About 50 percent of the civil servants are graduates and about 25 percent are diploma-holders. Besides, the median age group of the civil servants is 31-35. The highest civil servant is the permanent secretary. 171

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The civil service is not politicized, and thus, the civil service and the political careers are separate. The government has been endeavouring to keep politics out of the civil service. According to Weder (1999, p.12), “the Singapore civil service is competent and largely insulated from direct political pressures2.” In the last two decades, Singapore has been gradually delegating personnel authority from central personnel or management agencies to civil service organizations (ministerial departments). The summary of the interviews regarding measures taken by Singapore (1983-2005) are present in Table-1. In Singapore, there are two parties which play an important role in the management of civil servants. These are the central management agencies (Public Service DivisionPDS-, Public Service Commission, and the Ministry of Finance) and the ministerial departments (see also Quah, 2004; PSC, 2005; PSD, 2007). Since 1983, it is the PSD which has had the principal responsibility of formulating general policies and reviewing personnel policies in the civil service and ensuring that such policies are implemented. The PSD provides the framework for HRM in the civil service while the ministries operate within the framework to manage their human resources. In-depth interviews disclosed that, at present, the ministries are allowed to operate freely within the framework of HR principles, philosophy, policies and core values. Appointments, promotions and disciplinary control, on the other hand, rest with the Public Service Commission (PSC), which, however, has also delegated some of its authority to permanent secretaries. Furthermore, the budget division of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) plays a major role in controlling the size of the civil service, through its budget appropriation. The requests for more staff are subject to approval by the Budget Division of the MoF. The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amended no. 2) Act of 1994, in particular, stipulated that many HR functions be devolved to the Personnel Boards (the Special Personnel Board, the Senior Personnel Boards and the Personnel Boards) in the Ministries by January 1995. It was also reported to us that, following the decentralization of some of the HR functions to the ministries, central management agencies, such as the PSD, PSC and MoF, have been responsible for developing a general HR framework and other HR related functions, such as personnel costs (e.g. pay determination, staff number estimation, job classification), senior public servants (e.g. basic terms and conditions of employment and management), handling forwarded appeals, and pension and social security. The HR directors whom we interviewed informed us that, while central management agencies retain influence over policy setting, the emphasis in implementation has shifted away from detailed central controls over HR activities of ministerial departments, toward looser policy frameworks, guidelines and definitions of basic standards. Within such frameworks, ministerial departments have greater freedom to tailor HRM policies to their own unique organizational settings. In return for such discretion, departments are subject to greater accountability and are expected to attain higher standards of performance (see also Cheema, 2005; Chew, 1997; Jones, 2001; Quah, 2007). As remarked by one interviewee, the role of the central management agencies regarding HRM is now seen primarily in terms of ensuring that public expenditure and performance targets are met. To this is added also the role of disseminating advice and information about best HRM practices, rather than laying down detailed strategies for the execution of HRM functions. Thus, it could be argued that, it is not business as usual for the central management agencies (PSD & PSC), just as it is not business as usual for the public administration as a whole. Although Singapore embarked on decentralization in 1983, it was only in 1995 that a substantial delegation of HR authority was made to the ministries (see Table 1). Thus, the 2

A civil service cannot be 100 percent political free. However, as compared to other civil services, the Singapore civil service is less politicized (Das, 1998).

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organization of HR functions in Singapore was somewhat centralized till the early 1980s in the sense that the PSC had considerable authority in both the formulation and the implementation of HR policies. However, as noted by the interviewees, this does not mean that HR functions had been totally centralized in the hands of CPAs. Even before the reforms were implemented, line ministries had some authority to take HR decisions within the general policy guidelines, although at present they have a much wider spectrum of authority on a number of HR decisions. This demonstrates that the roles that the CPAs and ministries have been playing have been different before and after 1983. Table 1: HRM reforms introduced by the Singapore Civil Service (1983-2005) Year

Action

1983

Introduction of decentralized HR policies (e.g., recruitment at lower level).

1987

Introduction of salary system.

1990

Devolution of the PSC’s functions to the Education Service Commission (ESC) and the Police Defence Service Commission (PDSC) Decentralization of some HR functions to (and within) ministries (e.g., recruitment and training of all staff except top level). Establishment of a Civil Service Training College comprising of IPD, IPAM and CSCC.

1995

2001

flexible

2002

Establishment a Management Associate Programmes (MAPs) in order to focus on Administrative services.

2005

Establishment of Center for Shared Services.

Purpose(s) of the reform Decentralization Centralization To improve flexibility and efficiency, as well as to speed up decision-making and responsiveness. To insure timely response to varying economic conditions, to pay competitive salaries aligned to the market and strengthen the link between pay and performance. To reduce the PSC’s workload in the recruitment and promotion of teachers and police defence officers as these functions would be handled respectively by the ESC and PCDSC. To improve flexibility and efficiency.

To manage the three separate institutions under one college, which acts as a statutory board and to provide tailored training and consultancy related services to the civil service by competing on equal footing with the private sector. To recruit young and brilliant future senior civil servants (managers) for all ministries, co-ordinate mobility of senior civil servants in the Singapore civil service organizations and keep the civil service unified. To safe costs and improve efficiency when processing human resource and finance activities.

Source: Interviews with Singapore senior civil service managers Due to the decentralization of HR functions, there has been a reduction of staff in the CPAs of Singapore. For example, interviewees from the PSC revealed that the staff of PSC reduced from over 100 to 65 over the past two decades. During the same period, there has been an increase in HR staff at the ministerial department level. It was also reported to us that ministries want to have their own staff responsible for HRM, typically undertaking advisory functions in connection with hiring, training, performance and compensation (benefit) management. Most of the interviews noted that decentralization of HR functions, on the one hand and the lack of adequate HRM skills and knowledge on the part of line managers on the 173

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other hand, have raised the role of HR officers in the ministries. One can argue that the decentralization of responsibility for HRM from CPAs to line departments, accompanied by further devolution within departments to line managers, stands out as one of the key HR reforms in Singapore. Although it is beyond the objectives of the current study to assess the impact of decentralization of HR functions, the majority of the interviewees were of the opinions that the HR reforms have been somewhat successful in that they have had positive impact on the following eight issues: [1] the ability of the civil service to attract and retain best and brightest employees, [2] the image of the civil service, [3] the speed of the decision-making process- time from advertising to hiring (responsiveness of the HR system to the needs of the line managers), [4] employees’ morale and motivation, [5] in allowing the CPAs to devote more time to strategic issues and to higher-level appointments and promotions, [6] in strengthening ties between civil servants and their ministries, [7] increase in the number of training provided3, and [8] performance of the civil servants. The views of the interviewees were also supported by other studies (e.g., Cheema, 2005; Das, 1998; Iwasak, 2004; PSD, 2007; Soo Hoon, 2006). As remarked by one interviewee, the line between the private and public sector HRM practices are becoming ever more imperceptible. One clear indication is the compensation and benefit packages offered by the civil service is more competitive than that of the private sector, which is not common in other countries (Tessema et al., 2007). In depth interviews also revealed that the processes of HRM reforms were, in Singapore, incremental, sequential, and adaptive. Singapore has adopted a gradualist approach to implementing HRM reforms; introducing changes on a step-by-step basis over a number of years with implementation taking place on an ongoing process (see Table 1). The approach being followed allowed for room for continuous revision of the initial design, on the basis of what was learned. This implies that in terms of attaining significant HRM reforms, rapid change is probably less important than being able to maintain the momentum of change over time. The interviewees synonymously remarked that the HR reforms were designed and implemented as part of a coherent reform framework where key HRM changes were built upon and reinforced each other over time. With regard to the reactions of the civil servants, there has been almost no opposition to the HR reforms (decentralization efforts) mainly because, during the last two decades, the government has improved the civil service compensation and benefit packages (Tessema et al., 2007), which in turn made them more competitive in the labor market. DISCUSION AND IMPLICATIONS One of the main objectives of the current study is to review the process through which HR functions have been decentralized and the related measures taken by Singapore government (1983-2005). The experience of the Singapore shows that, although it started to decentralize some HRM elements in 1983, it was only in 1995 that the government gave the civil service organizations a substantial freedom or discretion on issues related to HR activities. The Singapore civil service has moved away from a centralized HRM system to a decentralized system of Personnel Boards. A closer examination of Table 1 also indicates that decentralization of HR functions was needed in the 1980s mainly because of competition with the private sector, the supply of new management ideas, global economic forces, and budget cuts (e.g., Durant et al., 2006; Moor, 1996; Reeves, 2006; Rockwell, 2005; Shafritz et al., 2001). Thereafter, a phase 3

After the reform, every civil servant has the right to training. The minimum training target is 100 hours per civil servant per year, of which 60% is on work-related courses and 40% on self-development courses. Civil servants are able to sharpen their skills and keep abreast of the latest developments. Training thus plays a crucial role in ensuring excellence throughout the public service (PSD, 2007).

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of exploration was ushered in, along with the decentralization of HR functions. The latter was followed by some sort of re-stabilisation through the intensification of co-ordination and interdependency among the ministries. This re-stabilisation, in turn, strengthened monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and centralized some previously decentralized HR functions since the late of 1990s, in order to keep the civil service unified (see also Marcu & Onjala, 2008; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). Hence, there seems to have been a tendency of some sort of a ‘back-swing’ with respect to the organizational arrangement of HR functions. That is, there is a certain ‘counter’-trend of centralising against decentralized activities, such as the recruitment and appointment of senior civil servants, mobility issues, benefit management and other technical and administrative related activities, which could provide economies of scale without jeopardising the autonomy of the ministries (see also Dessler, 2007; Strikwerda, 2005). That is, Singapore’s civil service seems to be centralising some of the previously decentralized HR related activities. Based on the in-depth interviews with the senior managers, we developed Figure-2. One can safely argue that the pendulum seems to swing from centralization to decentralization and back again to some sort of recentralization by the standardization of monitoring activities (via central accounting agencies and service sharing centres). In Figure-2 the pendulum initially goes from left to right and then somewhat back to left again. During those “swings” it also goes upward, implying that the impact of HR functions improves (it is quicker, more monitoring is done to preclude fraud, more standardization takes place, and costs that had been rising due to decentralization are reduced).

An important question to ask, at this juncture, is: which of the four approaches to organizational arrangement of HR functions in the civil service suggested by Heady (1996) fits most the case of Singapore? Till the early 1980s, Singapore seemed to follow an ‘independent approach’. This is because the PSC in Singapore were acting as principal CPA responsible for formulating and implementing HR related policies. Since mid 1980s, however, Singapore begun to allocate HR-related functions or responsibilities to two main agencies: the PSD and PSC in Singapore. Thus, Singapore seems to follow the ‘divide approach’. On the other hand, it also seems to follow the ‘ministry to ministry approach,’ starting from the early 1990s. This is because it has decentralized many HR functions to and 175

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within operating ministries. In general, the trend of the developments in the organizational arrangements of HR functions of Singapore seems to go from the left to the right in Heady's (1996) scheme: independent agency, chief executive, divided, and ministry-by ministry (see also table 1). The organizational arrangement of HR functions of a civil service in most LDCs is somewhat centralized in that the principal responsibility is frequently placed in the hand of an independent agency (e.g., CPA or CSC) or at the office of the president/prime minister (Bennell, 1994; Heady, 1996; Mudhoo, 1995; Tessema, 2005; World Bank, 1994). According to Bennell (1994), the principal characteristics of such kind of organizational arrangement are authoritarian, hierarchical, centralized rules and procedures based on rigid bureaucratic notions of legal authority and rationality. One of the major obstacles to the effective HRM in LDCs is the excessive concentration of decision-making and authority within central government (e.g. Bennell, 1994; Beugre & Offodile, 2001; Kiggundu, 1989; Tessema, 2005). In many LDCs, the CPAs jealously guarded their control over HR policies and practices. Individual ministries have had little control over recruitment and other HR functions (e.g., Heady, 1996; Tessema, 2005; World Bank, 1994). As a consequence, the protracted bureaucratic and all too often unfair nature of the recruitment process discourages a number of talented people to apply for jobs in the public sector (Buhwar, 2004; Heady, 1996). Osborne and Gaebler (1992, p.11-12) argue that hierarchical, centralized bureaucracies designed in the 1930s or 1940s simply do not function well in the rapidly changing, information-rich, knowledge-intensive society and economy of the 1990s and later. Cayer (2004) also argues that despite the years of service of the centralized organizational structure, there are major criticisms against it. It was a good model for a long time but its time has passed. As previously indicated, decentralization of HR functions in Singapore generally was assessed somewhat successful. When it comes to LDCs, most of the decentralization effort in general and HR functions in particular have not been effective (e.g., ILO, 1998; Smoke, 2003; Tessema, 2005; Wang et al., 2002). Turner & Hulme (1997) note that experience of decentralization in LDCs has almost everywhere fallen short of expectations and the declared objectives of policy makers. Some of the reasons are lack of institutional capacity, scarcity of experts, lack of effective controlling mechanism, and lack of will and commitment of policy makers and senior civil servants to delegate genuine authority (ILO, 1998; Smoke, 2003). For example, “in 1994, Uganda embarked upon a wide-sweeping process of decentralization, which, is to date, the most advanced decentralization experience in Africa” (ILO, 1998, p.69). However, because decentralization has followed the traditional borders of tribes, it is reported to have exacerbated tribal rivalries and the marginalization of weaker communities (ILO, 1998; Prinsen & Titeca, 2008). Singapore government started to decentralize HR functions after putting in place some of the critical factors for success, which in turn has not led to favouritism, nepotism and corruption (e.g., Cheema, 2005; Quah, 1999 & 2007). In most LDCs, however, decentralization in general and HR functions in particular has tended to lead to corruption, favouritism and nepotism (e.g., ILO, 1998; Mudhoo, 1994; Smoke, 2003). This suggests that without a strong controlling mechanism, decentralization of HR functions is likely to encourage favouritism and nepotism. In Singapore, however, this is not the case. Quah (1999, p.483) and Weder (1999, p.76) further remark that, corruption is ubiquitous in Asian countries with the exception of Singapore, the country that proved to be the only success story with a strong political leadership and better pay scales. The experience of Singapore depicts that adequate pay remains an indispensable weapon in the continuous anticorruption campaign. As a result, “Singapore’s civil service is one of the most efficient and least corrupt in the world” (Cheema 2005,p.163). Some interviewees disclosed that the decentralized HRM system in Singapore has tended to adversely affect the previously unified civil service. While interdepartmental co176

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ordination (e.g. between ministries) has always been somewhat problematic, the reforms have increased the need for intra-departmental co-ordination within ministries. Because of the challenges of creating a coherent civil service on the one hand, and decentralizing HR functions on the other, Singapore has been making efforts to keep the civil service unified. In-depth interviews also indicated that, after the introduction of HRM reforms, the government has [i] strengthened controlling mechanisms with respect to the decentralized HR factors, [ii] centralized recruitment of senior civil servants, [iii] provided management development (MD) programs and ethical related training, [iv] begun mobility of civil servants from ministry to ministry as well as from ministry to the private sector (to get exposure and experience in the public sector), [v] re-centralized some of the previously decentralized HR related functions, [vi] kept close contact with the decentralized levels through regular meetings with heads of HR departments and close contact at the department level, and [vii] launched Management Associate Program (MAP). Implications of the study ‘What’ HR functions should be decentralized and what HR functions should be centralized? As discussed, between 1983 and 2005 Singapore decentralized a number of HR functions (See Table 1). An important implication of the experience of Singapore is that, before decentralization of HR functions there is a need to identify the core HR functions, which have to be consistent across the civil service and those to be left to the ministerial departments, taking into consideration the specific organizational/national context. Generally, it would be worth centralizing the following HR-related functions: the grading or classification system, which classifies jobs in the civil service on the basis of common standards; the salary systems; requirements to employ a certain ratio of special groups (ethnic minorities, disabled persons) and to keep a balance between male and female employees; the number of persons employed; pension and social security; top management recruitment and appointment; and handling forwarded appeals. Besides, establishing a centralized shared service for all civil service organizations could also improve efficiency without affecting the responsiveness of the HR system (Strikwerda, 2005). Therefore, there are some things the centre should influence, primarily the HR strategies and general HR policies, and some things that it should not try to influence, such as the detail of organization action (see also Baron and Kreps, 1999; Escobar-Lemmon, 2006). ‘When’ should HR functions be decentralized? As previously indicated, Singapore had centralized HR functions until the early 1980s when it began to decentralize these functions. In the late 1990s, Singapore again began to centralize some of its previously decentralized HR functions. An important lesson that could be learned from the experience of Singapore is to know ‘when’ to decentralize HR functions and when not to. This, in turn, requires governments to put in place some critical factors that are necessary for a successful decentralized HRM system before they decentralize HR functions. One such factor is the institutional capability of the ministerial departments to deal with increased responsibility for HRM. That is, ministries to which HR functions are to be delegated must have the ability to effectively perform their new, (decentralized) tasks. Another requirement is the existence of a clear general framework within which ministerial departments can make appropriate HR decisions. Effective monitoring mechanisms need to be put in place, and increasing attention must be paid to issues of co-ordination and central steering. The introduction of a decentralized HRM system, in the absence of the foregoing factors, can result in evasion of responsibility, and the abuse and misinterpretation of central HR policies by civil service organizations, which in turn can lead to failure of the overall exercise (see also Hopkins, 2002; Raymond & Roberta, 2002; Reeves, 2006). 177

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‘What’ the role of central personnel agencies in the decentralized HRM system should be? As previously discussed, although Singapore has decentralized many HR functions over the past two decades, it has tried to strengthen its CPAs such as the PSC and PSD. This implies that even in a decentralized HRM system, there is a need to have strong CPAs. It must also be noted that even if it were possible to decentralize some HR function, there would still be a need for a politically independent agency to protect the merit principles (Berman et al., 2001; Cayer, 2004). To what extent’ the HR functions may be decentralized? Table-1 and Figure-1 demonstrate that generalizations of the extent to which HR functions should be decentralized are nonsensical and that the appropriate choice must be determined by a careful consideration of the specific objectives and contexts. This implies that each country must devise its own organizational arrangement of HR functions that relates directly to its unique circumstances. The evidence of Singapore, however, suggests that excessive centralization or decentralization of HR functions is counterproductive or detrimental. Here, a contingency perspective has great relevance because it stipulates that different organizational arrangements are required for different organizational contexts. For example, if the emphasis is on uniformity and equity, then the high formalization and centralization of HR functions is the most efficient and effective organizational form. However, if there is a need for, innovation, flexibility and responsiveness, then the centralized HR system is inappropriate (Robbins & Judge, 2008, p.501-502). Given the current organizational structure of HR functions of civil service in many countries, we believe that some lessons can be learned from the experiences in Singapore (see implications part of the paper). The question is: how can governments tailor the 4W’s questions related to the HR reforms to their respective countries? We suggest two important issues that have to be brought to the attention of senior civil servants and policymakers: integration and eradication. Integration refers to the extent to which civil service organizations assimilate new HR practices and policies and eradication refers to the extent to which civil service organizations eliminate old practices that may impede the success of HR reforms. Policy makers and senior civil servants have to figure out what in their specific context is conducive to better HR practices and what represents a threat to such an endeavor. They need to see what works and what does not rather than striving for a complete overhaul of an existing HR practices (Tessema et al., 2007). Many experts suggest that many HR related practices that have evolved in one country can be used in other countries by tailoring them to local realities (e.g., Beugre & Offodile, 2001; Kiggundu, 1989). We are aware of the fact that variations in contextual factors act as constraints on or enhancement in the HR reform efforts (e.g., Buhwar, 2004). Nevertheless, if there is a will and commitment on the side of policy makers and senior civil servants, the effectiveness of the HR reforms are likely to improve. CONCLUSIONS The study’s conclusion is that Singapore has tended, first, to centralize HR functions and then begin to decentralize them, followed by some kind of reintegration and stabilisation of the HR functions. This implies that generally, organizations facing complexity and turbulence in the environment tend first to centralize and then decentralize HR functions, which is subsequently followed by reintegration. The paper concludes that, the effectiveness of the civil service is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon. It is difficult to clearly know the net impact of the HR reforms (e.g., decentralization of HR functions) on the effectiveness of the Singapore civil service. This is because the effectiveness of the civil service is not the direct result of the decentralized HR system. Rather, the decentralized HR system is only one important component of a diverse 178

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set of influences that determine the effectiveness of the Singapore civil service. It is also interesting to note that the case of Singapore has been atypical in many aspects. Where other countries under budgetary pressures have had to reduce the real value of salaries paid to civil servants, Singapore has raised them. Where other countries have cut training budget, Singapore has increased it. Where other countries expanded the size of the civil service, Singapore reduced staffing levels. Where other countries compressed top/bottom occupational salary differentials, Singapore widened them (see Chew, 1997). In addition, the high level of political support on a continuous basis from the top political leadership was another critical factor that accounted for its success. The paper contends that the people to whom power is delegated via decentralization can abuse the power they receive. Civil service organizations with decentralized HR functions can go their own way. As nations increasingly delegate power, understanding how this process works is becomes more important than ever before. The effectiveness of a decentralization HR policy depends upon how well it is administered. A very common error is to delegate authority to act without adequate standards for guidance or adequate audit to ensure compliance with general policies. This would seem so elementary that it would hardly require iteration, but the frequency of its violation is too great to ignore. HR reforms could be either part of the problem or part of the solution in improving the impact of HR practices. The conclusion of the study is that there is a fairly long-standing debate in the literature on the public sector as to how far public personnel (HR) functions should be decentralized. While countries (e.g., Singapore) decentralize some of their HR functions in the civil service, the incompatible values such as managerial flexibility, accountability, and control of finance and size of the civil service continue to exist. The study further concludes that the above perennial questions of public administration (the conflicting values) remain and will continue to be a key public management issue in coming years. While this study is an important step forward in understanding how HR reforms were introduced over the past two decades in Singapore, it also leaves some questions open for future research. The study was mainly based on the perceptions of three categories of senior public managers: from central personnel agencies, operating ministries, and civil service training institutions. i.e., it did not include the perceptions of the ordinary civil servants. Future research, however, should be directed at examining the perceptions of Singapore’s ordinary civil servants as to the HR reforms or it should be directed at conducting a similar research in other Newly Industrializing Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan taking into account the perceptions of both senior public managers and ordinary civil servants.

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Appendix-1 I. Interview Questions for Managers at Central Personnel or Management Agencies   1. 2. 3. 4.

What are your duties/responsibilities?   What activities do you accomplish?   What are the objectives, and strategies of your Office/Agency?   Could you brief me about the HR related reforms introduced over the past two decades?  How was the reform  process?  5. When did you start to decentralize HR functions?  6. What HR functions have been centralized and what have been decentralized?  7. Are there any HR functions re‐centralized?  8.  In your opinion, how do you assess  [a] the ability of line managers in handling the decentralized HR functions,  [b]  the  government’s  commitment  to  decentralizing  HR    functions,  [c]  the  impact  of  the  recent  HR  related  reforms?  9. To your opinion, what are the major challenges that your Office/Agency is facing?  10. What are your future plans with regard to the organizational arrangement of HR functions? 

II. Interview Questions for Personnel Directors of at Ministries   1. 2. 3. 4.

What are your duties/responsibilities?   What activities do you accomplish?   What are the objectives, and strategies of your Department/Ministry?   Could you brief me about the HR related reform introduced over the past two decades? How was the reform  process?  5. What HR functions have been centralized and what have been decentralized?  6. Are there any HR functions re‐centralized.  7. How  do  you  describe  your  relationship  with  the  central  management  (personnel)  agency  and  operating  ministries?   8. In  your  opinion,  how  do  you  assess    [a]  the  ability  of  line  managers  in  handling  the  decentralized  HR  functions, [b] the government’s commitment to decentralizing HR  functions, [c] the impact of the recent HR  related reforms?  9. To your opinion, what are the major challenges that your Department/Ministry is facing?  10. What are your future plans with regard to the organizational arrangement of HR functions? 

III. Interview Questions for Civil Service Training Director   1. 2. 3.

What are your duties/responsibilities?   What activities do you accomplish? What are the objectives, and strategies of the training institutions?   Could you brief me about the training related reform introduced over the past two decades? How  was the  reform process?  4. What training related issues are decentralized (centralized)?  5. Are there any training related functions re‐centralized.  6. How do you describe civil service training process? How do you assess training budget?  7. How  do  you  describe  your  relationship  with  the  central  management  (personnel)  agency  and  operating  ministries? What are their roles in the administration of training programs?  8. In  your  opinion,  how  do  you  assess    [a]  the  ability  of  line  managers  in  handling  the  decentralized  training  functions, [b] the government’s commitment to decentralizing training functions, [c] the impact of the recent  introduced reforms on the effectiveness of training?  9. To your opinion, what are the major challenges that your institution is facing?  10. What are your future plans with regard to the organization of civil service training programs?     

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