2015 Absence presence and the ontological politics

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Barrack 57, into a symbol of the Holocaust' (authors' translation of Dutch language ... dia attention given to the lost barrack resulted in questions in the Dutch ...
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Homepage: www.governancetheory.com This is a revised personal version of the article published in International Journal of Heritage Studies. Please cite as: Felder, M., Duineveld, M., & Van Assche, K. (2014). Absence/presence and the ontological politics of heritage: the case of Barrack 57. International Journal of Heritage Studies, 16. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13527258.2014.948483

  Absence/presence   and   the   ontological   politics   of  heritage:  The  case  of  Barrack  57   Martijn  Felder,  Martijn  Duineveld  and  Kristof  Van  Assche       Abstract   19  July  2009.  A  barn  burns  down  in  a  small  Dutch  town.  Afterwards,  this  invisible  and   insignificant  ‘barn’  became  widely  known  as  ‘Barrack  57’.  The  destruction  triggered  at-­‐ tention  and  led  to  the  barn’s  association  with  a  Nazi  WWII  transit  camp  and  with  Anne  

Frank.  Its  material  destruction  made  this  barn/barrack  both  present  and  absent  in  vari-­‐ ous   discourses.   We   use   the   case   of   Barrack   57   to   study   the   interplay   between   pres-­‐ ence/absence   and   non-­‐existence   of   objects   in   discourses,   an   exercise   which   connects   to   and   contributes   to   the   development   of   constructivist   perspectives   on   object   formation   in  heritage  studies.  Our  analysis  of  presence/absence  and  non-­‐existence  combines  Fou-­‐ cauldian   insights   with   concepts   derived   from   actor   network   theory   and   Niklas   Luh-­‐ mann’s  theory  of  social  systems.  Of  particular  importance  is  Luhmann’s  distinction  be-­‐ tween   first   and   second   order   observation.   We   argue   that   heritage   objects   themselves   are   the   result   of   different   enactments   of   (non)human   properties   in   various   pow-­‐ er/knowledge   configurations.   With   this   view,   a   new   task   for   critical   heritage   scholars   emerges.  Understanding  the  dynamics  of  presence/absence  and  non-­‐existence  of  herit-­‐ age   objects   in   discourses   deepens   insight   into   the   broader   issues   of   the   formation   of   heritage  objects  and  their  delineating  technologies  and  the  policies  of  normalisation  and   naturalisation.     Keywords:   object   formation;   absence/presence;   heritage;   Luhmann;   actor   network   theory      

 

 

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  Introduction   19   July   2009.   Early   in   the   morning,   a   wooden   barn   vanishes   in   a   blaze   (ANP,   July   19,   2009).  The  next  evening  a  Dutch  national  news  channel  reported  on  this  event:     Just   as   barrack   57   was   ready   to   be   dismantled,   moved   and   reassembled   at   Kamp   Westerbork  (a  former  WWII  Nazi  transit  camp),  it  burned  down.  For  more  than  fifty   years   it   functioned   as   a   barn   in   Veendam.   (...)   At   one   time,   Anne   Frank,   like   many   others,   was   forced   to   disassemble   batteries   there.   What   remains   is   an   enormous   photograph  of  the  building  and  many  stunned  visitors.  (NOS  2009a,  authors’  trans-­‐ lation  from  Dutch  language  source)     The  fire  soon  drew  the  attention  of  local,  national  and  even  German,  French,  Israeli   and  American  media  (Nederlands  Dagblad,  August  1,  2009).  In  the  two  weeks  following   the   fire,   more   than   100   articles   were   published   in   local   and   national   newspapers   (see   ANP,   July   19,   2009;   Dagblad   van   het   Noorden,   July   21,   2009;   Gelderlander,   July   20,   2009;   NRC.Next,  July  20,  2009;  Parool,  July  20,  2009;  Spits,  July  21,  2009;  Trouw,  July  20,  2009).   The   news   stories   often   highlighted   the   barn’s   relation   with   the   historical   figure   Anne   Frank  (see  ANP,  July  19,  2009;  NRC.Next,  July  20,  2009;  Trouw,  July  20,  2009).  The  barn   was  also  placed  into  a  broader  contemporary  context:  it  was  referred  to  as  a  (lost)  valu-­‐ able  object  for  reconstruction  and  an  important  object  for  enhancing  visitor  experiences   at  the  Kamp  Westerbork  memorial  site  (see  Gelderlander,  July  20,   2009;  Parool,  July  20,   2009).   Media   attention   soon   shifted   to   salvageable   barracks   in   the   area,   which   could   still   be   reassembled   at   the   former   Nazi   site   (see   Dagblad   van   het   Noorden,   August   1,   2009;   Spits,   July   21,   2009).   But   the   incident   also   raised   some   critical   thoughts   on   the   contemporary  use  and  valuation  of  such  objects  (see  Limburgs  Dagblad,  July  21,    2009;   Parool,  July  21,  2009).     In   a   very   short   period   of   time,   a   modest   ‘barn’,   far   removed   from   the   public   eye,   be-­‐ came   ‘Barrack   57’   for   an   impressively   large   audience.   What   interests   us   is   that   its   mate-­‐ rial   destruction   made   it   present.   It   made   the   barn   visible   and   relevant   for   different   groups  of  people,  and  it  acquired   a   presence  in  various  discourses.  Physical  destruction   created  a  new  discursive  object,  with  a  new  value  ascribed  to  it.  We  believe  this  offers   an   effective   starting   point   for   a   reflection   on   the   construction   of   heritage   objects   and   their  values.     In   this   article,   we   will   use   the   case   of   Barrack   57   to   study   the   interplay   between   the   presence,  absence  and  non-­‐existence  of  heritage  objects,  and  between  the  physical  and   discursive   worlds   (see   also   Bille,   Hastrup,   and   Soerensen   2010;   Meyer   2012).   Such   analysis  can  significantly  contribute  to  the  development  of  post-­‐structuralist  conceptual   frameworks   of   object   formation   in   heritage   studies   and   to   reflections   on   more   inclusive   or  participatory  heritage  management  (Ashworth,  Graham,  and  Tunbridge  2007;  Bunzl   2003;  Graham,  Ashworth,  and  Tunbridge  2000;  Hanna  et  al.  2004;  Harrison  2013;  Low   2002;  Muzaini  2014;  Robertson  2012;  Smith  2007;  Waterton  and  Smith  2009,  2010).  It   also  contributes  empirically  to  the  growing  literature  on  Kamp  Westerbork  and  to  her-­‐ itage   and   commemoration   practices,   in   general   (see,   amongst   others,   Hijink   2011;   Isaac  

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and   Çakmak   2013;   van   der   Laarse   2010a,   2010b;   Somers   2014;   van   Vree   and   van   der   Laarse  2009).     In   post-­‐structuralist   studies   on   heritage   and   participation,   one   can   distinguish   roughly  three  ways  of  thinking  about  heritage.  First,  heritage  is  conceived  of  as  an  ob-­‐ ject,  already  assumed  valuable,  to  which  different  meanings  are  ascribed.  A  quote  from   the   Getty   Conservation   Institute   in   Los   Angeles   illustrates   this   position:   ‘Heritage   is   meaningful  to  those  whom  it  is  intended  to  benefit  (i.e.,  future  generations),  it  is  neces-­‐ sary  to  examine  why  and  how  heritage  is  valued,  and  by  whom.  Cultural  significance  is   the  term  that  the  conservation  community  has  used  to  encapsulate  the  multiple  values   ascribed  to  objects,  buildings,  or  landscapes’  (Avrami,  Mason,  and  Torre  2000,  7-­‐8).  Se-­‐ cond,   heritage   itself   is   a   normative   concept   ascribed   to   objects:   ‘In   this   definition,   all   heritage  is  intangible,  as  it  is  redefined  as  a  cultural  process  in  which  the  values  and  cul-­‐ tural  and  social  meanings  that  help  us  make  sense  of  the  present  are  identified  and  ne-­‐ gotiated’  (Waterton  and  Smith  2009,  cf.  Beunen,  R.,  &  Hagens,  J.  E.  ,  2009).  Since  differ-­‐ ent  groups  of  people  or  communities  can  make  different  constructions  of  the  past,  dif-­‐ ferent  values  are  ascribed  to  objects.  A  third,  more  radically  post-­‐structuralist  version  of   the  participatory  heritage  discourse  considers  heritage  objects  themselves  to  be  the  re-­‐ sult  of  discursive  construction  (Duineveld  and  Van  Assche  2011;  Duineveld,  Van  Assche,   and  Beunen  2013;  Van  Assche  and  Duineveld  2013).  In  this  view,  heritage  values  or  sta-­‐ tuses   cannot   be   understood   as   new   or   different   layers   of   meaning,   but   rather   must   be   understood  as  new  objects.     We  position  ourselves  in  the  third  line  of  inquiry  in  which  the  object  itself  cannot  be   considered   to   be   an   a   priori   unity.   Otherwise,   we   argue,   one   would   perform   a   subtle   form  of  exclusion  by  inclusion,  by  taking  for  granted  a  unity  and  a  presence  that  instead   has  to  be  studied  and  found  empirically.  Before  returning  to  the  case  of  Barrack  57,  we   will  first  introduce  key  ideas  in  this  more  radical  post-­‐structuralist  version  of  heritage   theory   –   a   theory   of   heritage   in   which   objects   are   not   fixed   and   clearly   delineated   but   are  the  result  of  processes  of  object  formation.  These  will  serve  as  a  foundation  for  our   microanalysis   of   the   interplay   between   the   presence,   absence   and   non-­‐existence   of   her-­‐ itage   objects   in   our   case   study.   After   presenting   our   results   as   six   narratives   in   which   the  barn  plays  different  roles  and  is  present,  absent  or  non-­‐existent,  we  will  analyse  our   results  and  use  them  to  refine  and  support  the  theoretical  framework.    

Object  formation  and  heritage   In   line   with   a   still   growing   body   of   academic   work,   we   consider   objects   to   be   enacted   differently  at  different  sites  and  in  different  networks  (Law  2004),  practices  (Mol  1999),   systems   (Luhmann   1995)   or   discourses   (Foucault   1972).   Objects,   like   subjects,   truths,   facts   and   knowledge,   do   not   pre-­‐exist   observation;   they   are   relational,   contingent   and   arbitrary   (Fuchs   2001),   and   they   are   constituted   and   delineated   in   power/knowledge   networks  (Foucault  1972,  44–45;  Duineveld,  Van  Assche,  and  Beunen  2013).  An  object   is  only  real  when  it  is  enacted  as  real  in  actual  practices  and  in  constant  interactions  be-­‐ tween   humans   and   non-­‐humans   (Law   2004;   Mol   1999;   cf.   Fuchs   2001).   ‘Enactment   and   practice   never   stop,   and   realities   depend   upon   their   continued   crafting   –   perhaps   by   people,   but   more   often   (…)   in   a   combination   of   people,   techniques,   texts,   architectural  

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arrangements,   and   natural   phenomena   (which   are   themselves   being   enacted   and   re-­‐ enacted)’  (Law  2004,  56).   Within   a   discourse,   objects   can   be   observed   as   a   unity,   if   they   are   constituted   as   such.  A  discourse  is  a  unique  set  of  discursive  operations,  which  influence  the  formation   of   objects.   Discourses   are   constituted   in   informal   settings,   such   as   conversations,   but   also   in   formal   settings,   such   as   bureaucratic   organisations   and   universities.   Within   a   discourse,  an  object  forms  along  a  path  that  delimits  its  formation.  This  path  is  a  series   of  events  and  decisions  within  a  system.  With  each  step  of  this  process  the  irreversibil-­‐ ity  of  an  object  can  be  increased  or  decreased,  that  is,  an  object  can  be  ‘unmade’  or  forti-­‐ fied   (Duineveld,   Van   Assche,   and   Beunen   2013;   Van   Assche   and   Duineveld   2013).   De-­‐ pending   on   the   path   taken,   a   dependency   on   the   path   can   evolve,   increasing   the   level   of   irreversibility:  some  options  in  the  process  of  object  formation  become  more  likely  than   others   because   of   the   decisions   made   in   an   earlier   stage   of   the   process   (Callon   1991).   The  techniques  of  object  stabilization  are,  however,  never  perfect  and  are  always  likely   to   encounter   strategies   pushing   for   moulding   or   deconstruction   of   the   object   (Duineveld,  Van  Assche,  and  Beunen  2013).     Complementary   to   these   theories   inspired   by   the   discourse   theory   of   Michel   Fou-­‐ cault  (1972,  1994,  1998)  and  actor  network  theory  (Latour  2004;  Latour  and  Woolgar   1986;   Law   2004;   Mol   2002),   we   have   embedded   notions   from   Niklas   Luhmann’s   sys-­‐ tems  theory  (Fuchs  2001;  Luhmann  1987,  2000,  2010;  Seidl  2005)  in  this  study.  If  we   use  systems  theory  to  redefine  discourse,  we  can  say  that  discourses  are  operationally   closed.  This  implies  that  every  change  within  the  environment  of  a  discourse  (changes   of  other  discourses,  material  events)  can  be  observed  only  according  to  the  logic  of  the   observing   discourse   itself   (Luhmann   1989,   1995).   Thus,   objects   do   not   pre-­‐exist   dis-­‐ course,   and   the   observation   of   objects   is   necessary  for   the   formation   of   objects   within   a   discourse.  Furthermore,  objects  can  only  be  formed  in  such  a  way  that  they  agree  with   the  pre-­‐existing  logic  of  a  discourse.   The  historical  and  contextual  contingency  of  objects  becomes  visible  when  one  (e.g.,   a   scientific   discourse)   starts   to   observe   how   other   discourses   observe   (Fuchs   2001).   Observing  how  observers  observe  is  called  second  order  observation  (Fuchs  2001).  Ac-­‐ cording  to  Fuchs:     ‘Levels  of  observation  differ  in  the  ways  that  they  attribute  observation.  On  the   first  level,  observation  proceeds  naively,  observes  what  it  observes,  and  attrib-­‐ utes  its  results  to  the  world.  It  is  unaware  of  construction.  On  the  second  level,   observation  attributes  outcomes  to  the  distinctions  and  constructions  of  a  spe-­‐ cific   and   empirical   observer,   who   can   only   see   that   which   can   be   seen   from   where  he  is  at  the  moment’.  (Fuchs  2001,  33)    Second  order  observations  learn  that  an  object  observed  by  a  social  system  (or  a  psy-­‐ chic  system)  does  not  imply  the  observation  of  that  object  by  another  system.   These  general  insights  in  object  formation  align  well  with  recent  ideas  on  heritage   advanced   in   geography,   anthropology,   cultural   studies   and   philosophy.   These   insights,   inspired  by  post-­‐structuralism,  illustrate  how  subjects  and  objects  are  entwined  in  pro-­‐ cesses  of  co-­‐evolution  (Appadurai  1986;  Farquhar  and  Zhang  2012),  how  subjectivities  

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revolve   and   restructure   themselves   around   new   objects   and   projections   at   any   given   moment  (Žižek  2006,  2012)  and  how  the  material  world  is  an  active  participant  in  the   construction  of  objects  and  subjects  (DeLanda  2006;  Massey  2005;  Whatmore  2006).  As   such,  objects  do  not  exist  before  discursive  articulations;  instead,  properties  of  the  ma-­‐ terial   world   entwine   with   discursive   properties   and   energies   to   create   objects,   which   can  be  invested  with  value  and  desire.  Heritage  can  be  used  or  abused.  It  is  abused  by   oppressive   states   and   rigid   identities   that   reproduce   themselves.   In   a   more   positive   sense,  it  can  be  used  as  an  affective  and  conceptual  investment  that  enables  us  to  find   new  understandings  and  attachments  to  the  world,  new  ways  to  express  and  experience   life.  

Presence,  absence  and  non-­‐existence  in  heritage     If   we   accept,   as   Luhmann   (1989,   1995)   suggests,   that   the   observation   of   objects   can   on-­‐ ly  be  understood  as  the  result  of  the  closed  operations  of  the  observing  discourse  that   constitutes  the  object,  we  can  further  develop  the  notions  of  absence,  presence  and  non-­‐ existence   and   their   interrelations.   In   this   article   we   distinguish   between   pres-­‐ ence/absence,  as  observed  by  discourse,  and  presence/absence  and  non-­‐existence,  as  a   result  of  second  order  observations  between  different  discourses  (see  Van  Assche  and   Costaglioli  2012).     Within  discourses,  absence  functions  as  the  negation  of  presence  in  the  past  or  fu-­‐ ture:  something  is  only  absent  when  it  was  or  could  be  observed  to  be  present.  The  ob-­‐ servation  of  ‘absolute’  absence  by  a  discourse  is  impossible,  since  every  observation  of   absence   implies   the   observation   of   its   previous   or   future   presence   (Van   Assche   and   Costaglioli  2012).  Objects  can  emerge  in  discourse,  they  can  become  taken  for  granted   as   present   and   they   can   disappear   and   become   absent,   with   the   awareness   that   they   were   once   present.   When   objects   were   once   present   and   are   then   forgotten   by   a   dis-­‐ course,  their  absence  no  longer  exists  within  that  discourse.  They  become  (or  have  al-­‐ ways  been)  non-­‐existent.     Presence,   absence   or   non-­‐existence   in   different   networks   can   be   observed   by   means   of   second   order   observations.   Objects   can   be   observed   to   be   present/absent   in   one  social  system  and  non-­‐existent  in  all  other  social  systems.  An  object  that  is  delineat-­‐ ed   and   observed   as   real,   as   present,   in   discourse   A   could   be   unknown   in   discourses   B   and  C.  It  could  also  be  slightly  or  largely  differently  delineated  in  discourses  B  and  C,  but   it  can  never  be  the  same  in  different  discourses.  Identical  observations  across  observers   and  the  existence  of  identical  objects  within  different  systems  are  both  theoretically  im-­‐ possible,   since   every   system   has   its   own   unique   dependencies   and   path   of   operations,   which  enact  some  objects  as  real  (present  or  absent)  and  others  not  (Mol  1999;  Fuchs   2001,  see  also  Assche  and  Costaglioli  2012).     Because  a  discourse  often  takes  for  granted  what  it  observes,  the  awareness  that  an   object  could  also  be  differently  delineated,  could  be  differently  present  or  non-­‐existent,   is   not   part   of   the   immediate   observation.   This   can   only   be   revealed   by   second   order   ob-­‐ servation  (Fuchs  2001;  Duineveld,  et  al.  2009).   ‘Bringing   something   back’,   or   remembering   something,   can   therefore   never   be   an   operation  that  is  the  same  for  different  discourses,  and  it  can  never  bring  back  anything   identical  to  the  past  object.  An  object  that  is  brought  back  after  long  absence,  which  is  

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remembered  and/or  valued  as  heritage,  will  necessarily  be  altered  by  the  new  material-­‐ discursive  context  in  which  it  arrives.  It  will  be  reshaped  by  the  process  of  ‘remember-­‐ ing’  itself,  which  is  not  a  matter  of  retrieving,  but  of  reshaping  in  a  new  mechanism  of   selection  altered  by  the  history  of  the  discourse.  Additionally,  it  will  be  altered  because   the   subjectivities   which   remember,   the   groups   and   roles   and   the   perspectives   they   rep-­‐ resent,   are   not   the   same   anymore   (Assche   et   al.   2009;   Beunen,   R.,   &   Duineveld,   M.   2010).      Just   as   the   past   can   never   be   recreated,   past   objects   cannot   be   maintained   in   a   self-­‐ identical  state.  Absence  of  an  object  from  a  discourse  increases  the  difference  between   that   object’s   past   and   present   forms;   the   difference   between   past   and   present   context   is   larger   than   the   gradually   accruing   difference   one   encounters   in   the   self-­‐reproduction   of   discourse   and   the   gradual   transformation   of   material-­‐discursive   assemblages   (Van   Assche,   Beunen,   and   Duineveld   2014).   Moving   from   non-­‐existence   to   presence   will   like-­‐ ly  increase  the  difference  between  context  of  origin  (if  the  object  already  existed  some-­‐ where  else)  and  the  receiving  context  even  more.  In  such  a  move  between  discourses,   what  is  new  in  the  receiving  context  will  be  thoroughly  transformed  by  that  context  in   unpredictable   patterns,   since   the   originating   discourse   and   the   full   properties   and   func-­‐ tions   of   its   objects   cannot   be   fully   grasped   by   an   observing   discourse   (Van   Assche,   Beunen,  and  Duineveld  2014;  Duineveld,  Van  Assche,  and  Beunen  2013).  Second  order   observation   is   needed   to   discern   any   pattern   in   the   linkage   between   context   of   origin   and  the  context  in  which  the  object  appears  as  new.      

  Fire/wood/barn/barrack   In   the   following   six   narratives   we   attempt   to   reconstruct   how   the   event   of   a   fire   pro-­‐ voked   different   effects   in   different   discourses   at   different   times.   Our   reconstruction   is   based   on   3   site   visits   and   observations   (in   2011   and   2013)   at   the   Kamp   Westerbork   memorial  site,  11  indepth  interviews,  119  newspaper  articles  and  8  video/audio  news   samples  as  well  as  several  policy  documents,  letters  and  speeches.  We  focus  on  how  dif-­‐ ferent  groups  of  people  have  observed  Kamp  Westerbork  and  Barrack  57  and  how  these   observations  evolved  after  the  event  that  took  place  on  19  July  2009.  When  texts  have   been  produced  by  public  figures  or  are  used  in  public  sources,  full  names  are  reported.   However,  when  they  refer  to  the  memories  of  survivors  of  WWII  we  use  only  their  ini-­‐ tials  to  guarantee  their  anonymity.  We  present  this  reconstruction  as  a  series  of  narra-­‐ tives,   which   result   from   second   order   observations   of   newspaper   articles,   books   and   interviews.   The   presen   t-­‐day   presence   of   Barrack   57   in   each   discourse,   we   will   argue,   is   partly  due  to  the  fire  that  destroyed  large  parts  of  a  wooden  barn;  yet  the  ways  in  which   it  is  present  are  moulded  by  the  different  pathways  that  constitute  each  discourse.     First  narrative:  a  barn,  two  tractors  and  a  shovel   In   the   spring   of   2009,   Mr   Egges,   a   farmer,   showed   a   television   crew   around   on   his   farm.   The   reason   for   their   visit   was   his   barn,   which   he   said   was   no   longer   functional:   ‘The   front  is  rotten,  the  sides  are  rotten,  the  windows  are  broken,  and  through  the  middle  is  a   gutter   that   leaks’   (Rtv   Noord   2009,   authors’   translation   from   Dutch   language   source).   Mr  Egges  had  wanted  to  build  a  new  barn  for  a  long  time  but  had  been  unable  to  get  a  

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building   permit   from   the   municipality   because   the   new   barn   would   be   350   m2   bigger   than  the  old  barn  (Volkskrant  10  July  2008).     There  was,  however,  something  special  about  this  old,  worn  barn.  It  was  recognised   by   historians,   curators   and   the   public   as   a   former   barrack   of   Kamp   Westerbork,   a   WWII   transit   camp,   from   which   107,000   Jewish   people   and   245   Sinti   were   deported   to   Nazi   concentration  camps  in  the  east  (Memorial  Centre  Kamp  Westerbork  2011).     It  had  been  recognised  as  such  since  1985.  Back  then,  Mr  Egges’  father  had  laconi-­‐ cally   responded,   ‘I   do   not   understand   the   buzz   around   this   barn’   (cited   by   van   der   Laarse   2010a,   authors’   translation   from   Dutch   language   source).   In   contrast   to   his   fa-­‐ ther,   Mr   Egges   was   well   aware   of   the   historical   significance   of   the   barn   (van   der   Laarse,   2010a;  Rtv  Drenthe  2009a;  Rtv  Noord  2009),  which  was  often  visited  by  school  children   and   was   even   used   in   the   movie   The   Discovery   of   Heaven   (Rtv   Noord   2009;   Trouw   20   July  2009),  a  movie  directed  by  Jeroen  Krabbé  and  based  on  a  novel  by  Harry  Mulisch  in   which  references  to  Kamp  Westerbork  as  a  transit  camp  are  made.       Due   to   an   expressed   interest   in   the   barn   by   Memorial   Centre   Kamp   Westerbork   (from  now  on,  Memorial  Centre),  the  municipality  reopened  its  evaluation  of  Mr  Egges’   building  permit  in  2008.  Mr  Egges   was  willing  to  give  the  old  barn  to  the  Memorial  Cen-­‐ tre   if   he   was   allowed   to   build   a   new   barn   (Volkskrant   10   July   2008).   However,   in   the   early  morning  of  19  July    2009,  the  old  barn  burned  down,  along  with  everything  in  it.   The   next   day,   Mr   Egges   explained   that   the   fire   destroyed   all   his   agricultural   tools,   in-­‐ cluding  his  two  tractors  and  a  shovel.  In  front  of  a  regional  television  crew  he  stated,  ‘It   is  very  painful  because  all  my  tools  and  machines  are  gone.  I  had  tools  from  my  grandfa-­‐ ther,  just  simple  things,  but  it  means  a  piece  of  my  personal  history  is  gone’  (Rtv  Dren-­‐ the   2009a,   authors’   translation   from   Dutch   language   source).   For   Mr   Egges,   the   barn   stored   items   of   economic   and   personal   value.   He   added   that   the   loss   of   the   barn   itself   was  also  grave  because  it  could  –  despite  its  state  –  still  have  had  so  much  value  for  oth-­‐ er  people,  once  it  was  reconstructed  at  the  Memorial  Centre  (idem).   Second  narrative:  reconstruction  of  a  buried  past   After  WWII,  the  Westerbork  camp  was  used  first  to  house  collaborators  and,  later,  sol-­‐ diers   departing   for   the   Indies.   Between   1951   and   1971   the   camp,   renamed   as   Woonoord  Schattenberg,  and  some  of  the  barracks  were  used  to  house  people  from  the   Moluccas  (Memorial  Centre  Kamp  Westerbork  2011;  Obdeijn  and  Schrover  2008).  Dur-­‐ ing   the   1950s,   many   of   the   unused   barracks   where   sold   (without   proper   administra-­‐ tion)  as  building  materials.  Some  ended  up  as  barns  (such  as  Mr  Egges’)  or  community   houses,  others  were  used  to  house  migrant  workers,  as  was  done  in  southern  Limburg   (Reformatorisch   Dagblad   8   Augustus   2009).   Woonoord   Schattenberg   was   abandoned   in   1971  and  any  remaining  barracks  on  the  site  were  razed  and  used  to  fill  ditches  in  order   to   level   out   the   ground   (G.   Abuys,   personal   communication,   June   2011).   The   open   ter-­‐ rain  that  remained  was  scattered  with  radar  disks  and  used  as  a  centre  for  astronomical   observation  (Memorial  Centre  Kamp  Westerbork  2011).     In  1979  a  memorial  centre  was  constructed  near  the  site  and  in  the  1990s,  the  Me-­‐ morial  Centre  decided  to  reconstruct  the  former  Kamp  Westerbork  site  itself  by  creat-­‐ ing  symbolic  traces  that  referred  to  what  had  happened  there  during  WWII.  Following  

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old  building  plans,  they  erected  mounts  that  outlined  the  position  and  size  of  the  former   barracks  (Memorial  Centre  Kamp  Westerbork  2011).     However,  more  recently,  it  became  clear  to  the  Memorial  Centre  that  these  symbolic   references   no   longer   adequately   inform   visitors   about   what   had   happened   there.   The   director  of  the  Memorial  Centre,  Mr  Mulder,  explained  his  thinking:     Fifteen   years   ago   I   would   have   said   that   (reconstruction)   would   be   shoddy,   that   we   shouldn’t  do  that.  This  place  has  changed  so  dramatically.  There  is  nothing  left  here.   All  around  us  were  plains  and  drifting  sands  back  then.  Now  the  former  camp  is  en-­‐ tirely   surrounded   by   forests.   (...)   We   used   to   think   that   placing   one   object   back   in   these   changed   surroundings   would   be   incongruous.   (...)   This   has   changed   because   we   noticed,   by   the   responses   of   visitors,   that   (...)   it   was   very   hard   for   them   to   imag-­‐ ine   what   it   was   once   like.   (NOS   2009b,   authors’   translation   from   Dutch   language   source)   In  2009,  Barrack  57  was  considered  one  of  the  last  remaining,  relatively  intact  bar-­‐ racks,   which   could   be   reconstructed   at   the   former   camp   site   to   help   visitors   imagine   what  the  Nazi  transit  camp  was  like.  The  director’s  response  to  the  fire  was  consequent-­‐ ly  as  follows.     It   is   very   sad   that   this   happened   because   we   were   far   along   in   the   planning   of   what   we   would   do   with   it   [the   barrack].   We   had   already   placed   a   life-­‐sized,   three-­‐ dimensional   photo   on   the   site   where   it   was   to   be   reconstructed.   (...)   We   do   not   know  about  many  of  these  barracks,  and  if  you  then  lose  one  of  them,  one  that  we   were   certain   could   play   a   major   role   in   the   transference   of   the   significance   of   this   place  to  visitors,  it  is  a  great  loss.  It,  however,  also  means  that  this  should  not  hap-­‐ pen  again.  (...)  If  we  find  a  similar  object  in  the  future,  then  we  should  be  generally   prepared   to   say,   set   aside   all   the   rules;   they   do   not   matter   right   now;   we   have   to   protect  it.  (NOS  2009b,  authors’  translation  from  Dutch  language  source).     Third  narrative:  Anne  Frank’s  barrack     Within  one  month  after  the  fire,  over  100  articles  were  published  in  local  and  national   newspapers   (see   ANP   19   July   2009;   NRC.Next   20   July   2009;   Trouw   20   July   2009).   In   many  of  these  articles,  reporters  mentioned  that  the  barn  used  to  carry  the  number  57,   that  batteries  had  been  disassembled  in  it,  that  Anne  Frank  had  disassembled  batteries   in  it  (see  ANP  19  July  2009  for  an  example  that  mentions  all  three).  Soon  after  the  fire,  a   frequent   headline   in   the   newspapers   stated,   ‘Fire   destroys   the   industrial   barrack   of   Anne  Frank’  (e.g.,  Troop  20  July  2009,  authors’  translation  from  Dutch  language  source).   Thus,  Mr  Egges’  barn  had  become  Anne  Frank’s  barrack.  In  the  words  of  historian  van   der   Laarse   (2010a,   306),   ‘the   fire   immediately   became   of   iconic   importance   after   the   newspaper  headline  wrote  about  Anne  Frank’s  barrack,  a  name  that  the  Memorial  Cen-­‐ tre  itself  never  used.  (...)  The  Anne  Frank  effect  changed  the  barrack  from  Veendam,  or   Barrack   57,   into   a   symbol   of   the   Holocaust’   (authors’   translation   of   Dutch   language   source).     After   the   media   had   widely   covered   the   loss   of   ‘Anne   Frank’s   barrack’,   they   started   to   report   on   the   value   of   any   still   existing   barracks   (see   Gelderlander   20   July  

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2009;  Parool  20  July  2009);  there  had  to  be  other  barracks  left.  In  the  first  days  after  the   fire,   the   Memorial   Centre   and   the   media   received   a   lot   of   information   about   existing   former  Kamp  Westerbork  barracks.  The  most  interesting  of  these  became  the  centre  of   new  media  attention  (see  Dagblad  van  het  Noorden  21  July  2009;  Spits  21  July  2009).   ‘Anne   Frank’s   barrack’   changed   back   to   ‘Westerbork   barracks’,   in   general,   and   these   ap-­‐ peared  to  be  everywhere  (see  Trouw  25  July  2009).     Fourth  narrative:  Dutch  heritage  of  historical  and  monumental  value   The  Memorial  Centre’s  emphasis  on  protecting  the  remaining  barracks  and  all  the  me-­‐ dia  attention  given  to  the  lost  barrack  resulted  in  questions  in  the  Dutch  Parliament  di-­‐ rected   to   Mr   Plasterk,   the   minister   of   the   Ministry   of   Education,   Culture   and   Science,   which  is  responsible  for  monumental  legislation  and  protection  of  historical  objects  in   the   Netherlands.   He   was   asked   if   Barrack   57   had   been   given   monumental   status   that   required   protection.   Mr   Plasterk   responded   in   writing,   ‘the   barrack   destroyed   by   fire   was  not  protected  by  the  monumental  regulations  developed  in  1988.  This  barrack  had   not   been   recognised   as   a   national   or   municipal   monument   in   previous   inventories   ei-­‐ ther  (Plasterk  2009,  authors’  translation  from  Dutch  language  source).     The   role   of   the   municipality   in   granting   Mr   Egges   a   building   permit   was   also   scruti-­‐ nized.   However,   according   to   Minister   Plaster,   ‘the   municipality   followed   its   regulations   accordingly   and   responded   to   the   proposal   within   the   lawful   space   of   time’   (Plasterk   2009,  authors’  translation  from  Dutch  language  source).  He  added  that  the  building  li-­‐ cense   was   at   first   denied   because   the   owner   wanted   to   construct   a   new   barn   that   ex-­‐ ceeded  the  municipality’s  guidelines  for  development.  Only  after  consultation  between   the  municipality  and  the  owner  did  it  become  clear  that  the  barn  would  go  to  the  Memo-­‐ rial  Centre,  to  which  the  municipality  agreed  (idem).  As  Minister  Plasterk  concludes,  ‘My   impression  is  that  the  municipality  agreed  with  Mr  Egges’  request,  taking  into  account   the  cultural  and  historical  context  of  the  barrack’  (idem).   Fifth  Narrative:  something  on  the  telly     Four  days  after  the  fire,  in  the  village  of  Gees,  a  group  of  people  gathered  in  Mr  Oldejans’   backyard.   Along   with   a   television   crew,   there   were   experts   from   the   Memorial   Centre,   members  of  the  local  historical  society  and  of  course  Mr  Oldejans  himself  (Rtv  Drenthe   2009b).  They  were  looking  at  a  garage.  Mr  Oldejans  explained  about  the  garage’s  histo-­‐ ry:  before  it  ended  up  in  his  backyard,  it  had  been  taken  from  the  Kamp  Westerbork  site   and   reconstructed   in   Gees   to   function   as   a   Reformed   association   building   and   school   (see   Algemeen   Dagblad   23   July   2009;   Volkskrant   24   July   2009).   When   the   association   built  a  new  building,  Mr  Oldejans’  father  thought  parts  of  the  old  building  would  be  use-­‐ ful  for  the  construction  of  a  garage  in  his  garden  (Rtv  Drenthe  2009b).  Now,  many  years   later,   that   garage   was   in   a   bad   shape   and   Mr   Oldejans   was   planning   to   tear   it   down   (Algemeen  Dagblad  23  July  2009).     Directly  after  hearing  that  a  fire  had  almost  entirely  destroyed  a  former  Westerbork   barrack,  Mr  Hilbrands,  one  of  Mr  Oldejans’  neighbours  and  a  member  of  the  local  histor-­‐ ical   society,   contacted   the   Memorial   Centre   and   told   them   about   Mr   Oldejans’   garage   and  its  history.  As  Mr  Hilbrands  explained,  ‘I  was  afraid  that  the  Memorial  Centre  would  

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be  disappointed.  After  all,  there  are  just  a  few  rotted,  wooden  window  frames.  Yet  to  my   surprise,  they  were  very  enthusiastic’  (NOS  2009c).     News  about  the  destruction  of  the  barrack  spread  rapidly.  People,  like  Mr  Hilbrands   and  Mr  Oldejans,  started  comparing  their  own  barns,  chicken  sheds  and  even  latrines  to   the   lost   barrack   (interviews;   see   also   Nederlands   Dagblad   1   August   2009;   Reformato-­‐ risch   Dagblad   8   August   2009).   In   the   first   months   after   the   fire,   ‘hundreds’   of   notices   were  received  by  the  Memorial  Centre.  Some  of  these  objects  appeared  to  be  very  well   preserved  and  therefore  well-­‐suited  for  reconstruction  (Rtv  Drenthe  2009b).  In  March   2010,  about  eight  months  after  the  fire  in  Veendam,  Mr  Mulder  revealed  a  draft  plan  to   reconstruct   at   least   eight   barracks   at   Kamp   Westerbork   (Rtv   Drenthe   2010).   If   Mr   Eg-­‐ gers’  barn  had  been  a  unique  opportunity  to  reconstruct  a  barrack,  its  destruction  had   apparently  presented  many  more  of  them.     Sixth  narrative:  it  looks  big,  but  in  fact,  it  was  very  small   Because  of  this  revaluation  of  former  Kamp  Westerbork  barracks,  we  (the  authors)  be-­‐ came   interested   in   how   survivors   of   the   Holocaust,   and   specifically   those   who   had   stayed  in  Kamp  Westerbork,  felt  about  the  fire  and  the  loss  of  the  by  now  well-­‐known   Barrack   57.   While     walking   with   Mr   S.L.   on   the   former   Kamp   Westerbork   site,   he   ex-­‐ plains  to  us  that  he  thinks  it  is  a  pity  that  Barrack  57  was  lost  because  the  mounds  that   now  refer  to  the  barracks  on  the  memorial  site  might  give  visitors  an  incorrect  impres-­‐ sion.   Pointing   at   one   of   the   mounds   he   states:   ‘it   looks   big,   but   in   fact,   it   was   very   small’   (personal   communication,   July   2011).   Yet   when   we   asked   another   survivor,   Mr   F.S.,   about   the   barrack,   his   first   response   was,   ‘a   barrack   is   nothing,   and   a   barrack   will   never   be   anything’   (personal   communication,   July   2011).   Another   survivor,   Mrs   C.J.J.,   re-­‐ sponded  similarly  by  explaining  that  these  barracks  were  just  there  at  the  time,  just  like   many  other  objects  (personal  communication,  July  2011).  Their  thinking,  shared  by  sev-­‐ eral   other   survivors,   was   that   reconstructing   a   barrack   at   the   former   Kamp   Westerbork   site  was  not  of  historical  or  contemporary  importance.  It  would  be  like  rewriting  histo-­‐ ry,   and   it   would   be   impossible   to   recreate   the   actual   conditions   in   which   people   were   living  at  that  time  (Mrs  C.  J.J.,  Mr  J.S.,  and  Mr  F.S.,  personal  communications,  July  2011).   However,   Mr   F.S.   did   emphasise   that   he   thought   there   was   value   in   protecting   these   structures   at   the   sites   where   they   were   last   encountered   (personal   conversation   with   Mr  F.S.,  2011).    

Absence  and  presence  revisited   To  reinterpret  the  six  narratives  presented,  we  first  analyse  presence,  absence  and  non-­‐ existence   within   the   different   narratives.   Then,   we   focus   on   the   interplay   of   presence   and   absence   as   it   plays   out   between   different   discourses,   observing   each   discourse’s   reactions   to   the   event.   Finally,   we   touch   upon   the   discursive   origin   of   boundaries   as   they  are  empirically  observed  and  become  part  of  the  formation  of  heritage  objects.   Presence  and  absence  within  discourses  (internal  dialectics)   From  a  second  order  perspective,  we  can  observe  that  the  presence,  absence  and  non-­‐ existence   of   the   barn/barrack   played  out   in   multiple   ways.   Both   material   and   immateri-­‐ al  properties  were  enacted  and  ordered  differently.  In  the  first  narrative,  Mr  Egges’  barn  

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was   present   as   a   decrepit   building   that   barely   functioned   as   a   storage   place   for   a   few   possessions.  After  the  fire,  Mr  Egges  emphasised  the  loss  of  his  tools,  some  of  which  had   belonged  to  his  father.  What  became  absent  after  the  fire,  for  Mr  Egges,  were  the  tools   that   were   stored   in   his   barn.   In   the   second   narrative,   that   of   the   Memorial   Centre,   Mr   Egges’  barn  had  been  present  as  a  former  ‘Kamp  Westerbork  barrack’  since  1985.  The   existing   barrack   had   been   recently   revalued   as   a   potentially   interesting   object   to   recon-­‐ struct   at   the   Kamp   Westerbork   memorial   site.   What   became   absent   for   the   Memorial   Centre  after  the  fire  was  the  possibility  to  reconstruct  this  barrack  at  the  memorial  site.     Because   of   the   fire,   Mr   Egges’   barn   became   an   important   object   for   the   media   to   re-­‐ port   on   in   the   third   narrative.   The   fire   triggered   a   (re)discovery   of   the   object   in   new,   larger   circles.   It   had   been   discussed   in   the   media   sporadically   since   its   rediscovery   in   1985  and  had  received  media  attention  again  in  the  spring  of  2009,  as  plans  for  recon-­‐ struction   became   more   feasible;   but   only   after   19   July   2009   did   the   former   barn/barrack   become   an   important   object   in   a   continuous   stream   of   (inter)national   media   coverage.   In   this   post-­‐fire   coverage,   many   immaterial   properties   of   the   barn/barrack  were  ordered  into  the  narrative.  It  became  ‘Barrack  57’,  a  former  indus-­‐ trial  barrack,  and  ‘Anne  Frank’s  barrack’,  thereby  turning  it  into  a  (lost)  symbol  of  the   Holocaust.   The  fourth  narrative  described  how  the  fire  triggered  a  series  of  events  in  political   and  administrative  discourses.  The  loss  of  the  barrack  presented  a  legislative  problem   that  revolved  around  the  questions  of  whether  the  municipality  had  handled  Mr  Egges’   request  for  a  new  building  permit  correctly,  and  whether  Barrack  57,  as  well  as  all  re-­‐ maining  barracks,  should  have  been  recognised  as  a  monument  and,  as  such,  protected   better.   Before   the   fire,   monument   status   for   such   barracks   did   not   exist   (i.e.,   non-­‐ existence),  after  the  fire,  monumental  status  became  absent.     The  media  introduced  both  the  lost  material  barrack  and  its  immaterial  and  iconic   status   to   a   large   group   of   observers   in   the   fifth   narrative.   These   observers   started   to   connect   the   communicated   immaterial   properties   to   other   structures   that   looked   like   Mr  Egges’  former  barn.  This  turned  many  garages,  chicken  sheds  and  storage  rooms  into   potential  WWII  heritage  objects.     From  the  sixth  narrative,  we  learn  that  some  Holocaust  survivors  who  had  lived  and   worked  in  Kamp  Westerbork’s  barracks  during  WWII  were  aware  of  the  loss  of  this  par-­‐ ticular   barrack.   Yet   some   of   them   did   not   share   the   need   of   the   media   and   the   Memorial   Centre   to   give   such   attention,   symbolic   status   and   historical   value   to   it.   The   barrack   had   been  present  and,  after  the  fire,  continued  to  be  present  –  but  as  a  bad  memory,  not  as   something  deserving  reconstruction.     As   these   narratives   show,   presence   and   absence   play   out   in   a   multitude   of   ways.   Following   Luhmann’s   theory,   we   therefore   acknowledge   that   absence/presence   and   non-­‐existence   take   different   shapes   in   different   discourses.   The   interweaving   of   dis-­‐ courses   affects   the   forms   and   functions   of   absence   and   presence,   and   only   second   order   observation   can   discern   the   resulting   pattern.   Furthermore,   material   and   symbolic   changes   only   make   a   difference   within   a   discourse   according   to   the   logics   of   the   dis-­‐ course  itself.  According  to  Peirce,  a  sign,  or  a  distinction,  is  a  difference  that  makes  a  dif-­‐ ference   (Peirce   1958).   In   order   for   something   to   acquire   meaning,   a   difference   in   space,   time  or  qualities  has  to  be  observable  and  observed,  and  has  to  link  to  other  distinctions  

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or   signs.   A   blade   of   grass   catching   fire   next   to   a   barn   would   normally   not   irritate   (in   Luhmannian   language)   any   discourse   or   cause   any   change   in   material-­‐discursive   as-­‐ semblages.   When   the   difference,   in   this   case   the   physical   disappearance   of   the   barn,   be-­‐ comes  relevant,  it  does  so  in  the  context  of  a  discourse  or  assemblage  (depending  on  the   version  of  post-­‐structuralism  one  embraces).  The  sudden  material  absence  of  a  barrack   can   be   a   legislative   problem,   a   lost   potential   or   an   unimportant   event,   depending   on   the   discourse  in  which  it  is  observed.     Presence  and  absence  and  the  mutual  irritation  of  discourses     In   this   study   we   have   also   observed   shifts   in   a   discourse’s   constructions   of   the   ‘barrack’   –  and  its  presence/absence  –  through  the  discourse’s  observations  of  other  discourses’   structuring   and   valuation   of   events   construction   of   the   object   (its   delineation   and   (im)material   properties).   The   interweaving   of   discourses,   the   associated   processes   of   discursive  and  narrative  migration,  causes  not  only  the  arrival  of  new  objects  but  also   the   transformation   of   previously   delineated   objects.   Whatever   arrives   in   a   discourse,   changes  the  discourse’s  discursive  context  (cf.  Eco  1976).  A  striking  example  is  the  Me-­‐ morial   Centre’s   change   in   perspective   regarding   the   reconstruction   of   barracks   based   on   their   observation   that   visitors   could   not   understand   the   significance   of   the   place   through  merely  symbolic  representations  made  of  mounds  and  monuments.     Other   examples   are   the   ways   in   which   the   material   destruction   caused   by   the   fire   and  the  extensive  media  coverage  of  that  destruction  introduced  some  of  the  lost  bar-­‐ rack’s   immaterial   properties   throughout   a   large   network,   irritating   many   discourses.   Communicated   (im)material   properties   were,   in   different   discourses,   connected   to   al-­‐ ready   known   (im)material   properties:   changing   chicken   sheds   and   garages   into   new   material   presences;   raising   parliamentary   questions   on   the   legal   status   (monument   or   not)   of   this   and   similar   objects;   changing   municipalities’   perspectives   on   approving   building  permits.     We   argue   here   that   it   is   exactly   through   such   irritations   between   discourses,   be-­‐ tween  (external)  observations  and  (internal)  logics,  that  different  object  formations  of   the  barn/barrack  evolved.  An  old  barn  became  an  enabler  for  revised  building  permits;   ‘incongruous   elements’   became   valuable   objects   for   reconstruction;   a   non-­‐existing   monument  (not  on  the  monuments  list)  became  a  potential  monument;  something  lost   became  an  important  object  to  report  about;  something  in  the  backyard  had  the  poten-­‐ tial  to  become  a  highly  valued  historical  object.     Differently  delineated  objects  in  formation   Yet   the   impossibility   of   each   of   these   discourses   to   fully   observe   and   incorporate   en-­‐ actments  of  the  barn/barrack  in  their  own  discourses  results  in  different  unique  deline-­‐ ations  of  a  seemingly  unified  object  (cf.  Law  2004,  7).  Again  we  emphasize  that  objects,   and  any  other  element  that  constitutes  a  discourse  and  is  constituted  by  it,  do  not  travel   between  discourses.  Discursive  migration  occurs,  but  it  cannot  be  understood  as  an  ac-­‐ tual  migration  of  a  self-­‐identical  object,  not  even  as  an  object  that  is  transformed  during   travel.   Rather,   we   have   to   think   in   terms   of   discourses   as   observing   systems   that   recog-­‐ nise   objects   according   to   their   own   sets   of   distinctions   and   their   own   manner   of   linking   concepts,   objects   and   subjects.   One   can   also   speak   of   unique   material-­‐discursive   assem-­‐

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blages   which   produce   meaning,   with   some   materialities   playing   a   role   in   various   as-­‐ semblages  but  producing  different  insights  and  affects  there  (in  Deleuzian  language).      For  the  Ministry  of  Education,  Culture  and  Sciences,  the  barrack  had  not  been  rec-­‐ ognised   as   a   monument,   and   they   ‘refused’   to   observe   other   identified   former   WWII   barracks   as   monuments   (i.e.,   give   them   monumental   status).   The   owners   of   old   barns   and   garages   still   wanted   to   remove   these   structures   from   their   lands,   even   after   they   started   to   observe   them   as   barracks   from   Kamp   Westerbork   and/or   came   to   under-­‐ stand  the  value  these  objects  might  have  for  others.  The  barrack  that,  through  its  loss,   gained  an  iconic  status  in  the  Memorial  Centre,  in  the  media  and  in  wider  systems,  was   still   considered   nothing   by   some   survivors   of   Kamp   Westerbork.   Thus,   any   observed   shifts   in   material   and   immaterial   presence   and   absence   –   including   when   these   take   place  in  and  are  observed  by  other  systems  –  are  ordered  on  the  intersection  between   power   and   knowledge   according   to   the   internal   logics   of   the   observing   system   (Luh-­‐ mann    1989,  1993,  1995).   Discourses  are  thus  self-­‐referential  and  operationally  closed  (Fuchs  2001;  Luhmann   1995),   constituting   absence/presence   according   to   their   own   pre-­‐existing   logic.   Yet   at   the   same   time,   they   are   structurally   open.   This   implies   that   changes   in   the   environment   of  a  discourse  can  irritate  or  resonate  within  that  discourse.  Since  different  discourses   are  each  other’s  environment,  changes  within  one  discourse  can  be  observed  by  another   discourse,  and  these  observations  can  irritate  and  resonate  in  and  according  to  the  in-­‐ ternal   logics   of   the   observing   discourse.   Reconstruction,   legislation,   demolition,   Anne   Frank,  bad  memories  –  these  are  all  communicated,  observed  and  structured  according   to  different  systems  and  into  different  logics,  eventually  resulting  in  different  objects.    

Conclusion:  the  ontological  politics  of  absence  and  presence   The   presence,   absence   and   non-­‐existence   of   various   material   and   immaterial   properties   observed  after  the  fire  of  19  July  2009  played  out  in  a  multitude  of  ways,  each  of  which   depended   on   the   internal   logics   of   the   discourses   that   observed   this   event.   The   pattern-­‐ ing  of  absence/presence  and  the  coming  into  existence  of  non-­‐existent  objects  was  also   influenced   by   the   discursive   configuration   that   attached   itself   to   the   event   of   the   fire.   The  event  was  constituted  as,  amongst  others,  a  legislative  problem,  a  lost  potential  or   an  unimportant  event.  We  also  saw  that  different  discourses  observed  other  discourses   observing,   enacting   and   delineating   the   discursive   objects.   In   some   discourses   the   ob-­‐ ject   was   new,   in   others   it   was   rediscovered;   in   some   there   was   a   material   object   that   acquired   new   meanings,   in   others   there   was   no   material   object   discerned.   The   media   attention   entangled   discourses   in   a   new   manner   and   sparked   internal   changes   and   new   effects   in   neighbouring   discourses.   The   event   created   opportunities   to   remember,   to   create   and   to   influence   other   discourses.   Due   to   the   event   and   the   attention   it   garnered,   transformations   took   place:   non-­‐existence   into   absence,   absence   into   presence   and   pre-­‐ sent  objects  into  other  present  objects.   The   Memorial   Centre,   having   noticed   that   visitors   needed   physical   features   of   the   commemorated   past   at   the   Kamp   Westerbork   site,   changed   their   perspective   towards   reconstruction   and,   thus,   the   value   of   still-­‐remaining   barracks.   Owners   of   objects   deemed  similar  to  the  Veendam  barrack  observed  the  value  that  had  been  added  to  the-­‐ se  ‘still-­‐remaining  barracks’  and  contacted  the  Memorial  Centre.  It  is  in  this  tension  be-­‐

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tween   (external)   observations   and   (internal)   logics   that   modes   of   object   formation   con-­‐ tinue  to  evolve.  In  the  wake  of  the  fire  that  destroyed  Barrack  57  and  with  the  discovery   of  many  more  barracks,  the  ‘reconstruction  issue’  of  the  memorial  site  itself  (in  contrast   to  the  earlier  opposition  towards  reconstruction)  almost  entirely  disappeared  from  dif-­‐ ferent  discourses.   Studying   the   presence,   absence   and   non-­‐existence   of   Barrack   57   within   and   be-­‐ tween   different   discourses   allows   us   to   observe   the   entangled   complexities   by   which   heritage  policies,  practices  and  realities  are  discursively  formed.  It  leads  to  the  assertion   that,  for  heritage  policies  and  practices  to  become  fully  politicised  and  more  democratic   and  inclusive,  we  should  get  rid  of  the  last  bits  of  essentialism  in  the  theories,  conceptu-­‐ alisations  and  practices  of  inclusive  heritage.  Heritage  objects  are  not  given  and  clearly   delineated  presences  waiting  to  gain  meaning/value  as  heritage.  They  are  the  result  of   processes   of   object-­‐formation   enactment   in   various   discourses   and   in   various   pow-­‐ er/knowledge   configurations.   The   analysis   of   presence/absence   reinforces   both   the   epistemological  and  political  claims  of  post-­‐structuralist  heritage  theories.   Thus   new   tasks   for   critical   heritage   scholars   emerge   in   which   the   enactment   and   formation   of   heritage   objects   and   their   normalizing   policies   and   delineating   technolo-­‐ gies,   as   well   as   the   mechanisms   that   create   their   irreversibility,   become   the   objects   of   scrutiny  (cf.  Duineveld,  Van  Assche,  and  Beunen  2013).  The  concept  of  ontological  poli-­‐ tics  could  serve  here  as  a  valid  point  of  departure  for  future  mining  and  revisiting  of  ge-­‐ nealogies   of   object   formation   in   heritage   studies.   Ontological   politics   implies   that   we   acknowledge  that  ‘the  real’  is  implicated  in  ‘the  political’  and  vice  versa.  ‘If  the  term  “on-­‐ tology”  is  combined  with  that  of  “politics”  then  this  suggests  that  the  conditions  of  pos-­‐ sibility  are  not  given.  That  reality  does  not  precede  the  mundane  practices  in  which  we   interact  with  it,  but  is  rather  shaped  within  these  practices’  (Mol  1999).  Objects  cannot   escape   the   political;   only   by   unveiling   the   pathways,   sites   and   technologies   in   which   they  are  enacted  can  we  fully  grasp  the  politics  embedded  in  heritage.     P.S.   In   the   spring   of   2013   we   were   part   of   a   guided   excursion   in   Westerbork   and,   due   to   our   work  on  a  concept  version  of  this  paper,  we  were  especially  interested  in  Barrack  57.  To   our   surprise   the   official   guide   of   the   Memorial   Centre   told   us   that   the   barn   was   no   long-­‐ er  what  it  was  thought  to  be.  Recently,  questions  had  emerged  within  the  Memorial  Cen-­‐ tre  about  whether  the  burned  down  barn  had  indeed  been  Barrack  57.  Maps  and  build-­‐ ing   blueprints   were   analysed   and   some   of   them   contradicted   the   earlier   claims.   The   barn  was  not  Barrack  57.  It  had  no  industrial  function  and  actually  had  a  different  name   and  location  in  the  camp.  Anne  Frank  had  not  disassembled  batteries  in  it.    

Acknowledgements   We   would   like   to   thank   the   staff   of   Memorial   Centre   Camp   Westerbork   for   sharing   in-­‐ formation  with  us.  We  also  thank  everybody  who  was  willing  to  talk  to  us  about  Barrack   57   and   Kamp   Westerbork.   A   special   word   of   appreciation   goes   out   to   the   survivors   of   WWII   who   passed   through   Kamp   Westerbork   and   were   willing   to   share   some   of   their   most  difficult  memories  with  us.  

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Newspaper  articles,  websites  and  video  fragments  used  as  sources:   Algemeen  Dagblad,  23  July  2009.  Nieuwe  barakken  duiken  op.   ANP  [Algemeen  Nederlands  Persbureau],  19  July  2009.  Barak  Anne  Frank  net  voor  ver-­‐ huizing  afgebrand.     Dagblad  van  het  Noorden,  21  July  2009.  Beroep  op  Plasterk:  red  alle  barakken.    

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Dagblad  van  het  Noorden,  1  August  2009.  Barak  57  is  meer  dan  de  Anne  Frank  barak.     Gelderlander,  20  July  2009.  Authentiek  erfgoed  is  wezenlijke  toevoeging.   Limburgs  Dagblad,  21  July  2009.  Oppassen  voor  verkitsching  historie.   Memorial  Centre  Kamp  Westerbork.  2011.  Geschiedenis  van  Kamp  Westerbork.  Acces-­‐ sed     on  25  April  2014  via  http://www.kampwesterbork.nl.     Nederlands  Dagblad,  1  August  2009.  Krantenkoppen  Afgebrande  barak  uit  Veendam  is   meer  dan  de  Anne  Frankbarak.   NOS,  2009a.  Barak  Westerbork  afgebrand.  Accessed  on  14  March  2011  via   http://nos.nl/audio/38818-­‐barak-­‐westerbork-­‐afgebrand.html.   NOS,  2009b.  Oude  barakken  Westerbork  afgebrand.  Accessed  on  3  November  2011  via   http://nos.nl/video/38777-­‐oude-­‐barakken-­‐westerbork-­‐afgebrand.html.   NOS,  2009c.  Zoektocht  naar  barakken  Westerbork.  Accessed  on  3  November  2011  via   http://nos.nl/video/39165-­‐zoektocht-­‐naar-­‐barakken-­‐westerbork.html.   NRC.NEXT,  20  July  2009.  Barak  van  Anne  Frank  brandt  af.   Parool,  20  July  2009.  Net  voor  teruggave  aan  Herinneringscentrum  Westerbork:  Het  was   een  groot  en  belangwekkend.   Parool,  21  July  2009.  Joden,  NSB'ers  en  nu  varkens;  'Moet  je  dan  ook  die  ene  wagon  heb-­‐ ben  waarin  ze  is  weggevoerd?   Plasterk,  R.  H.  A.  25-­‐09-­‐2009.  Response  to  questions  raised  in  the  2nd  chamber  (text):   Reference  number:  2009Z15765.   Reformatorisch  Dagblad,  8  Augustus  2009.  Kampverleden  krijgt  gezicht  terug.   Rtv  Drenthe,  2009a.  Gees  heeft  barak  voor  Herinneringscentrum.  Accessed  on  4  Novem-­‐ ber  2011  via  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UzJQNkWeyBs.   Rtv  Drenthe,  2009b.  Barak  Gees  uit  Kamp  Westerbork.  Accessed  on  4  November  2011   via  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfTV3w6WvA0.   Rtv  Drenthe,  2010.  Plan  voor  aanpassing  terrein  Kamp  Westerbork.  Accessed  on  4  No-­‐ vember  2011  via:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BNC9YSI_qk8.   Rtv  Noord,  2009.  Historische  barak  terug  naar  Herinneringscentrum  Westerbork.  Ac-­‐ cessed  on  4  November  2011  via:   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=44XSlYx6MD8.   Spits,  21  July  2009.  Alle  barakken  terug  naar  Westerbork.   Trouw,  20  July  2009  Brand  verwoest  werkbarak  van  Anne  Frank.   Trouw,  25  July  2009.  Na  de  brand  duiken  ze  plots  op;  Barakken  Westerbork  zwierven  uit   om  te  dienen  als  huis  of  schuur.   Volkskrant,  10  July  2008.  De  lange  reis  van  een  barak  uit  Westerbork.   Volkskrant,  24  July  2009.  Jacht  op  de  laatste  Westerborkbarakken.      

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