21 Caught between East and West: Ukrainian ...

21 Caught between East and West: Ukrainian migration in the 21st century Lyubov Zhyznomirska and Svitlana Odynets

If globalisation has meant increased connectivity, then Ukraine is a fertile case study for exploring its effects – as well as the impact of geopolitical changes in Europe – on the directions and volumes of human mobility. Since entering the international migration map as an independent country in 1991, Ukraine’s migration profile has been complex in terms of the number, type and direction of migration flows. Its regulative framework for migration has also evolved. Ukraine has been a major migrant-sending country in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries; but it also hosts some 5 million foreign-born nationals. In 1991, Ukraine’s population stood at around 52 million people. It has decreased by almost 10 million since, mainly due to negative trends in natural reproduction (IOM Ukraine 2016: 4). As of 1 January 2016, Ukraine’s population was 42.7 million people (excluding the annexed territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol city). According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 5.8 million Ukrainian nationals (stock) were outside their country of origin as of 2015, of whom about 88 per cent (5.1 million) were in the world’s developed regions (UN 2015). Ukraine, with USD 6 billion in remittances in 2015, is highly dependent on remittance flows, and tops Europe and Central Asia in absolute terms (but not in relative terms, that is, remittances as a percentage of GDP) (Ratha et al. 2016). Ukraine has a long-established diaspora. Social, ethnic, economic and political discrimination of Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires and an acute shortage of arable land for Ukrainian peasants produced the first wave of mass emigration of Ukrainians in the waning decades of the 19th century and the early 20th century. About half a million Ukrainians left their homeland in search of better life in the US, Brazil, Canada, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand (Sapeliak 2008; Bondarenko 2008), while some residents of the eastern Ukraine moved to Siberia and the Altai. Two world wars expanded the geography of settlement of Ukrainian émigrés as those fleeing the Soviet Union also settled in Europe. In the inter-war period (1920–39) over 170 000 Ukrainians who opposed the Soviet regime and had fought for an independent Ukrainian state in 1917–20 migrated to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, France, the US and Canada. Later, between the end of World War II and 1954, fearing political persecution by the Soviet Union, about 300 000 Ukrainians – mainly those who had fought on the German side during the war or participated in the armed underground movement against the USSR in western Ukraine in the 1940s – fled and settled either in countries of their initial destination (such as France or Britain) or moved on to settle in such countries as Canada, the US, Australia or Brazil (Strilchuk 1999). These historic flows are categorised as ‘three waves’ of emigration from the lands that now comprise Ukraine. The ‘fourth wave’ of Ukrainian migration, composed of both permanent and 359

M4435-TRIANDAFYLLIDOU_9781785367502_t.indd 359

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360 Handbook of migration and globalisation t emporary migration abroad, began after the collapse of the USSR. The period of postCommunist transition was marked by a severe economic crisis. Mass redundancies and unemployment, wages unpaid by bankrupt employers and declining welfare allowances led to the rapid impoverishment of large sections of the Ukrainian population, forcing an estimated 1.2–4.5 million Ukrainians to look for jobs in Russia and Europe (UCSR and SSCU 2009; Markov et al. 2009; Libanova and Malynovska 2012; Poznyak 2012). The main destination countries were the Russian Federation (43.2 per cent), Poland (14.3 per cent), Italy (13.2 per cent), Czech Republic (12.9 per cent) and Spain (4.5 per cent) (ILO 2013). In line with global trends, Ukrainian labour migration has undergone rapid feminisation. According to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (SSCU), in 2001 women accounted for fewer than 24 per cent of migrants working abroad, but their numbers had grown to 32.8 per cent by 2008 and 33.8 per cent by 2012 (UCSR and SSCU 2009; ILO 2013). Grouped by age, women predominate in the 45–65 years category (47 per cent female to 28 per cent male), while men comprise the majority of long-term migrant workers in the 30–44 years group (50 per cent male, 36 per cent female) (IOM 2016: 15, data collected in 2014–15). The connection between labour migrants and their homeland enhances the impact of globalisation on the localities in Ukraine as migrants bring financial, social and cultural capital into their home communities. Various ethnic stores have sprung up on the streets of Ukrainian towns and cities. ‘Italian food shops’ are no longer a rarity in western Ukraine and in the Trans-Carpathian region. These are usually opened by migrant returnees, and their presence accelerates the globalization process and illustrates the transnational existence of many Ukrainian families that have participated at some point or are still participating in global migration flows. Ukrainian migrants in Italy and Spain, for example, tend to exhibit high levels of transnational existence, keeping tight connections with their country of origin and engaging in circular mobility. Frequently they occupy the lowest social structures in the receiving societies and do not anticipate becoming their fully fledged members (Gorodetska 2012). Migrant women in Italy (as well as in the other countries of Central and Southern Europe) have a strong attachment to Ukraine because of the families back home, but they tend not to permanently return home due to the family’s dependence on remittances as an essential source of income (Vianello 2009; Gropas et al. 2015). The impact of globalisation is also seen in the Ukrainian population’s greater international mobility. Besides labour migration, one can observe a growth in tourist-, business-, research- and education-related trips abroad by Ukrainian nationals (IOM Ukraine 2016: 10–11). A simplified process of applying for Schengen visas and cross-border mobility agreements with neighbouring EU countries led to an increase in short trips by Ukrainians. The number of Ukrainians residing in the EU has also increased, reaching 905 200 as of 2015, or about 6 per cent of all third-country nationals (ibid.). Ukraine has undergone significant political, economic and social changes in the last decade, the effects of which have been amplified by the war and geopolitical changes in Europe since 2014. The world financial crisis of 2008 dented the country’s economic growth. The illegal occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the outbreak of the military conflict in the Donbas region in the spring of 2014 have further worsened the economic and social situation in Ukraine, leading, among other things, to a drop in GDP, rising unemployment and the displacement of over 1 million people. Consequently,


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Ukrainian migration in the 21st century 361 migration statistics have registered a potential new wave of Ukrainian migration for work and/or residence in the EU, the US and Russia (IOM Ukraine 2016; Eurostat 2016b). Viewing Ukrainian migration flows as part of the pan-European migration system shows the interconnectedness of regional labour markets and economies. This chapter traces the evolution of studies into Ukrainian migration flows since 1991, drawing mainly on Ukrainian-, Russian- and English-language sources. The patterns of Ukrainian migration since the 1990s are examined against the backdrop of Ukrainian policy at that time, followed by the most current data on the socio-demographic profile and directions of movement of Ukrainian migrants. The chapter’s final section reviews the current and evolving situation of Ukraine’s internally displaced population since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and an outbreak of military conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

THE MIGRATION REGULATION ENVIRONMENT IN UKRAINE IN THE 1990S As a former member of the USSR that had been isolated by the Soviet Union’s strict migration and border controls, Ukraine was a part of an intense intra-union migration, with centralised control of migration flows from Moscow (Vollmer and Malynovska 2016). Having gained independence in 1991, the Ukrainian state had to develop institutional and legislative capacities to regulate the entry and exit of both nationals and foreigners, as well as to regulate the status of foreigners present on its territory. In January 1993, the Ukrainian government abolished both the system of total control over any travel abroad for its citizens and the Soviet system of obligatory registration for foreigners. That same month, the Ukrainian parliament approved a law ‘On Citizenship’ (revised in 2001). In January 1994, parliament adopted a law that guaranteed Ukrainians the right to leave and return to the country freely, without special authorisation from the state (as was the practice during the Soviet era), and emigration became a possibility. Ukrainians received the right to hold a national passport allowing travel abroad. In addition, the Ukrainian parliament approved a law granting Ukrainians the right to be employed or to conduct entrepreneurial activities abroad. For a country that had such a heavily regulated regime of movement both internally and externally, these were ‘revolutionary laws’ (Malynovska 2004). In the 1990s, Ukraine became known as a supplier of ‘illegal labour’ to Europe and a source country for human trafficking and smuggling. In the face of the social and economic hardships of the early post-Soviet years, some Ukrainian nationals became either legal or irregular labour migrants, working abroad in short-term or long-term employment (Pirozhkov et al. 1997, 2003). Between 1993 and 1996, the Ukrainian government concluded agreements with such countries as Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic and Vietnam to regulate the legal stay and employment of their nationals on a reciprocal basis (Malynovska 2004). Ukraine also joined in the framework agreement on labour migration among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as well as CIS efforts to curb unauthorised labour migration. This period is marked by Ukraine’s transition from the strict system of migration controls characteristic of the Soviet period (both at the borders and within the territory) to a more liberalised system allowing non-nationals to enter the territory. Lawmakers


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362 Handbook of migration and globalisation and migration experts in Ukraine were energised by independence and sought to liberalise entry rules for foreigners. However, Ukraine’s geographic proximity to the affluent Western European countries and the opening of its borders contributed to the country being used as a transit hub by migrants travelling further west from Africa, Asia and the Middle East (Malynovska 2006). Without a visa policy for foreigners in place, Ukraine’s relaxed border controls alarmed the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and some European countries over its potential to become a ‘transit’ territory for irregular migrants (IOM 1994). The Ukrainian media reported on ‘transit migrants’ from some 90 countries – especially China, Bangladesh and India – trying to cross Ukrainian territory en route further west. The government responded with the gradual introduction of legislative and administrative norms to control the flow of this ‘transit illegal migration’, which dominated Ukraine’s relations with the EU in the 1990s and the 2000s (Zhyznomirska 2012). Weak institutional, financial and organisational capacities hampered control of migration flows. In the 1990s, the number of irregular migrants detained by Ukrainian border guards increased from 148 persons in 1991 to approximately 14 646 in 1999. Detentions for illegal crossings peaked in 1999 before levelling off at around 5000 per year in 2000– 2002 (Polyakov 2004: 18–19). Such numbers show an increase in transit flows, but also attest to Ukrainian border guards’ increased capacity for detecting individuals trying to enter or leave the country without authorisation. The majority of migrants were detained at the western border where, historically, borders were better equipped and better controlled on both sides. Another hot spot for detention was the eastern border with Russia and the northern border with Belarus, where no borders had existed during the Soviet era. These borders were poorly equipped and posed major challenges for the uncontrolled movement of people, drugs, arms and organised crime networks. Russia long obstructed the demarcation and delimitation of its border with Ukraine, complicating the situation for Ukrainian border control authorities. The fact that Ukraine emerged in the early 1990s as an important source and transit country of regular and irregular labour migration and a source country for human trafficking and smuggling into Europe and North America affected which research themes were prioritised by scholars and practitioners. A shortage of qualified domestic scholars trained to conduct international migration research left a gap in what knowledge was readily available about migration from and to Ukraine (Vollmer and Malynovska 2016). The studies in the 1990s were mainly of an exploratory nature into the migration dynamics affecting Ukraine and were frequently commissioned by intergovernmental organisations (such as the IOM, UNHCR, the World Bank and the ILO), with topics such as human trafficking, labour migration, asylum-seeking and transit migration being popular. A few years into independence, the Ukrainian government still suffered from weak institutional, organisational and financial capacities to protect the rights of its citizens abroad and of asylum seekers on its soil; to regulate the movement of people across its borders; and to bring to justice individuals and networks involved in human trafficking and smuggling. Notably, an issue of governmental capacities of migrant-sending countries to manage migration flows eventually emerged on the radar of Western governments, practitioners and academics. This has given stronger impetus to organisations dealing with migration, such as the IOM, to monitor migration patterns and influence migration policies in the neighbouring EU countries on a regular basis. The IOM, for example, produces reports


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Ukrainian migration in the 21st century 363 on migration trends and patterns by drawing on the official government statistics that serve as research and policy tools (Pribytkova and Gromovs 2007; IOM Ukraine 2006). It also trains border and immigration officials, produces migration research and policy recommendations, and occasionally assists with legislature. The Budapest Process, a consultative forum on migration issues initially launched in the 1990s for the Central European and Eastern European accession countries, was extended to new neighbours of the expanding EU aimed at increasing their exposure to European policies and practices on migration, asylum and border management. In 2001, the Söderköping Process (CrossBorder Cooperation Process, or CBCP) was launched for cross-border cooperation on asylum, migration and border management between the EU and Eastern European countries, with its headquarters in Kyiv, Ukraine. Both platforms’ purpose was to facilitate policy transfer and institutional capacity-building on migration in the targeted countries as well as channel information and official government reporting on migration, asylum and border issues. The institutional aspects of migration policy cooperation in Europe is an area of research that is worthy of a separate chapter, and hence not undertaken here.

LABOUR EMIGRATION IN THE 1990S Labour emigration from Ukraine in the 1990s took place in conditions of deep socioeconomic crisis resulting from the economic and political transformations in the former Soviet states. The crisis negatively affected the quality of life and employment, especially for women. Whereas under Soviet rule female employment was around 90 per cent, in 1999, after independence, this fell to 57.2 per cent; data for 2000 show 729 600 women as registered unemployed, or 62.1 per cent of the unemployment rolls (Yegidis et al. 2005: 213, 214). Interestingly, women had – and continue to have – higher education levels than men (Komarova et al. 2001: 202). It is worth mentioning some gender-specific effects of the post-Communist economic and social transformations in Ukraine with direct consequences on who engaged in labour migration abroad. In 1998–99 about 67 per cent of all women employed in manufacturing were ‘laid off because of organisational restructuring’ (Ministry of Ukraine 2007: 97). The crisis had the biggest impact on women in towns with populations below 50 000 – or some 6 million women. Significant changes in public sector employment (e.g., closure of early education and child care facilities, libraries, community halls, hospitals and stores) and in the service industry – two large sectors employing mainly women – led to an additional loss of 200 000 full-time jobs held by women (Kolomiyets 2013: 143). Seeking employment abroad became one of the options for Ukrainian women under conditions of either unemployment or poverty (Malynovska 2011). Ukrainian women thus became easy targets for forced labour and the sex industry in Western Europe, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and other countries (Yegidis et al. 2005). Sudden and deep impoverishment pushed many Ukrainians towards alternative sources of income or employment, and towards engaging in new economic activities and acquiring new skills. This mass impoverishment was the main reason forcing some Ukrainians to seek jobs abroad in the early 1990s (Komarova et al. 2001: 97). Initially, individuals engaged mainly in ‘shuttle migration’ (or chovnykova mihratsiya) and short-term migration (working for only a few months) in neighbouring countries. Shuttle migration refers


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364 Handbook of migration and globalisation to a phenomenon of individuals (petty traders) engaging in regular back-and-forth commercial trips abroad in order to buy goods in foreign countries for resale in local markets in Ukraine (Zhurzhenko 2008: 97). In the 1990s mainly women (60–70 per cent) engaged in this marginal economic activity, creating a ‘niche’ in income-earning for themselves in Ukraine’s post-Communist transitional economy (ibid.: 97–104). Frequently these women were either former workers in large manufacturing companies, former public service employees or women residing in rural areas with no other income opportunities. This informal economy provided, and continues to provide, business opportunities for women to improve their well-being as it does not require ‘connections and large startup capital that are needed to establish a serious legal business’ (ibid.: 104). (This type of mobility continues within the framework of cross-border mobility agreements with neighbouring EU countries.) By the end of the decade, the trend had emerged for longterm labour emigration to such southern European countries as Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece, spurred by these countries’ demand for domestic labour and their geographic proximity to Eastern Europe. The crisis also had an impact on men’s employment and income. Ukrainian men, however, showed greater reluctance to losing their professional standing than women, who showed more readiness than men in accepting any job to earn a living, even with a lower social/professional status (Ashwin 2004: 67). Combined, these factors contributed to the gendered nature of labour emigration flows from Ukraine. Men migrated to countries where they could find employment compatible with their skills and jobs in Ukraine, working mainly in construction and transportation in Russia, the Czech Republic and Poland (UCSR and SSCU 2009). Some men also migrated to the Scandinavian countries to work in the oil refineries and maritime business, while women moved for work to South-Western and Central European countries, more rarely to the UK and Scandinavia. Ukrainian women migrated chiefly to Italy and Greece, the two countries with a high demand for domestic care, where they engaged in labour that was known to them prior to migration. They also moved to Poland, the Czech Republic, Portugal and Spain, where they worked in the service industry as well as in domestic care. With minor exceptions (see Volodko 2011; Odynets 2016; Khanenko-Friesen 2007; Solari 2011), these genderspecific migration trajectories and choices of Ukrainian labour migrants have not been sufficiently studied; at the time of writing, there has not been a single study of Ukrainian male labour migration published. What also remains unexamined is the evolution of long-term labour emigration of Ukrainians in the 1990s to European countries where no established diaspora or social networks existed prior to the first arrivals. Notably, up to 1994, temporary labour migration abroad by Ukrainians was still limited but picked up in the years 1995–99, with nearly 30 destination countries reported (Pirozhkov et al. 2003). Post-independence labour migration to Russia continued, to a large extent, to reflect the internal labour migration of the USSR, with Ukrainians blending in thanks to language knowledge and rich social networks. The existing research on other destination countries in the 1990s – such as Turkey, Poland and Hungary – suggests that the type of economic activity (e.g., ‘shuttle trade’, short-term trips), labour market niches in destination countries (e.g., construction, hospitality service, the sex industry) and the gender of migrants, together with a favourable regulative framework (visas and work permits), determined the choice of countries for those seeking to earn a living abroad. While ‘pathfinders’ to new destination countries


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Ukrainian migration in the 21st century 365 were driven by ‘hopelessness’, later migrants went abroad ‘because earnings abroad were considerably higher than due to the lack of employment in the native land’ (Pirozhkov et al. 2003: 16). Notably, the first attempts to study Ukrainian migrants in the destination countries were made by Ukrainian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and activists abroad. In the late 1990s–early 2000s, social networks in Italy, Spain and Portugal fostered the movement of thousands of Ukrainians to those countries, making Ukrainians ‘noticeable’ both to each other and to locals, and causing a demand for information by local Ukrainian communities and church organisations. Chumalo (2005) and Shegda (2007) showed that migrants living in Italy maintained very close economic and social ties with their families back home, and usually identified themselves as citizens of Ukraine temporarily working abroad. Among the reasons for leaving Ukraine, respondents listed: low salaries (54.8 per cent); housing problems (33.3 per cent); unemployment (29.6 per cent); high tuition fees for children (25.4 per cent); debts (30.2 per cent); and domestic violence (4.8 per cent). As for remittances from migrants, these were spent mainly on home maintenance and rent, food, clothing and other necessities for children, the purchase of computers and, most importantly, children’s education (Markov 2006; Chumalo 2005; Shegda 2007). Chumalo found that 60 per cent of respondents were married and the majority of migrants (88 per cent) left their children behind in Ukraine. The respondents in these studies were mainly women, which was a significant finding in itself for revealing the female face of Ukrainian migration to Italy. These first pilot research projects in the destination countries played an important role in Ukrainian academic discourse on migration, attracting scholars’ attention to the topic of female migration and spurring new studies of Ukrainian migration, in particular, to the EU. These findings made it possible to better understand the reasons, duration, trajectories and means of Ukrainians moving abroad. They also showed the main socio-demographic characteristics of migrants who left Ukraine in the late 1990s– early 2000s (namely, marriage status, age, education and number of children) (Chumalo 2005).

CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN MIGRATION FLOWS What do we know about migration from Ukraine in the 21st century? Markov et al.’s (2009) comprehensive study of Ukrainian labour migration to seven European countries and the Russian Federation showed that contemporary Ukrainian migrants are well educated or skilled and able to integrate quickly into the socio-cultural environments of EU host countries, with one of the lowest crime levels among immigrants. They frequently occupy low-skilled niches in the labour markets of destination countries and are deeply engaged in transnational mobility. Markov et al. (2009: 67–8) identified three categories of migrants on the basis of their migration experience. First of all, there are individuals aged 50-60 who had worked abroad for between 7 and 12 years. Having migrated with the strong intention of returning home, they had not tried to build new lives in the host country. Secondly, there are individuals, mainly aged 36-45, who reside ‘in-between’ – between the country of origin and the country of destination, moving back and forth as they cannot establish themselves permanently in Ukraine. Finally, the third group is


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366 Handbook of migration and globalisation comprised of younger migrants, under the age of 30, who show no particular attachment to either their country of origin or the country of destination. There are two large socio-demographic studies conducted on the national scale that paint a representative picture of external migration in Ukraine in the 2000s and early 2010s. The Ukrainian Centre for Social Reforms (UCSR) and State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (SSCU) collected data between 1 January 2005 and 17 June 2008 using a questionnaire-based survey of working-age members (women aged 15–54 and men aged 15–59) of 22 000 Ukrainian households (UCSR and SSCU 2009). Another survey was conducted between 1 January 2010 and 17 June 2012 with 23 500 Ukrainian households participating (ILO 2013). Both surveys included only Ukrainians with prior migration experience. While these surveys are limited to those nationals with migration experience who were present in Ukraine when the surveys were conducted, they nonetheless provide sufficient data for us to characterise the fourth wave of labour migration. Citizens from the western regions of Ukraine are more prone to participate in labour migration abroad (57.7 per cent of the total number of migrant workers) (UCSR and SSCU 2009). Almost one-third (31.8 per cent) of migrants from the western regions worked in the Russian Federation in 2005–08, while only a small number of labour migrants from the southern regions laboured in the Czech Republic, Poland and Portugal (UCSR and SSCU 2009). Western regions also had the highest proportion of female migrants (38.3 per cent) (ILO 2013). More than half (54.3 per cent) of the total number of Ukrainian migrants come from rural areas, but urban residents (18.1 per cent urban migrants v. 10.8 per cent rural) are more likely to engage in long-term migration (ibid.). Only every seventh migrant worked abroad for more than 12 months between 1 January 2010 and 17 June 2012, with more women (24.1 per cent) than men (8.9 per cent) participating in long-term migration. As to the migrants’ choices of destination countries, in 2010–12 Russia continued to be the main country of choice for Ukrainian migrants (43.2 per cent), followed by Poland, Italy, the Czech Republic, Spain and Germany (ILO 2013). Interestingly, in 2015–16, Belarus emerged as a new destination country for Ukrainians, while Russia (despite the war) continued to be the main destination, especially for short-term migrant workers (IOM 2016). Ukrainian migrants mostly move to neighbouring countries in search of temporary, short-term employment, with periodic returns home. Those who choose southern European countries remain there for several years and make less frequent visits home. Migrants in an irregular situation also remain abroad on a long-term basis as they are reluctant to risk leaving their host country. Some Ukrainian migrants change their migration intentions and choose to become permanent residents of their host countries (Libanova and Malynovska 2012). This is especially true for younger people (Poznyak 2012). Some 60 per cent of long-term migrants have the intention of returning to Ukraine, but the number of migrant workers who have decided not to return is almost double among those in the 18–29 age group compared to those aged 45–65 (IOM 2016). As for the sectors in which Ukrainian migrants are employed, two-thirds of all males and 20 per cent of females had jobs in construction (UCSR and SSCU 2009). Indeed, of those who had worked in the construction industry prior to migration, 82.8 per cent continued to work in the same sector in host countries. Women primarily work in the domestic care sector (over 36 per cent), retail (14.6 per cent, mostly in Russia and Belarus), agriculture (especially in Belarus, Poland and Hungary) and hotels and restaurants


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Ukrainian migration in the 21st century 367 (UCSR and SSCU 2009; ILO 2013). Only a small number of Ukrainians had high-skill jobs abroad in sectors like education, health care, information technology (IT) or science; most were male, but their geographic origin was evenly distributed across all regions of Ukraine (ILO 2013). With regard to migrants’ legal status, in 2012 one-third of Ukrainian migrants (38.7 per cent) had legal permits to reside and work, while roughly one-quarter (23.7 per cent) had temporary legal status and 12.8 per cent had a work permit. Regularisation policies significantly reduced the number of Ukrainians staying in the EU illegally. In 2013–15, Ukrainians were a top non-EU nationality receiving first-time residence permits in EU Member States; in 2015, for example, 500 000 permits or 19.2 per cent of the total number of first residence permits were issued to Ukrainians, with 70 per cent of them for employment in EU countries (Eurostat 2016a). Still, Ukrainians remain in the top 15 nationalities apprehended in the EU with irregular status and issued removal orders (Eurostat 2016b). Ukrainian public discourse in the last decade has dwelled on the agency of Ukrainian labour migrants and the significance of their skills and practices for Ukraine’s political and economic development. However, in practice, the development potential of migrants’ finances and experiences remain limited. While remittance flows have been significant in the last decade, the money largely maintains migrant families’ consumption habits – e.g., building and repairing houses, buying new cars (Kupets 2016). These monies are not allocated for the development of small and mid-scale businesses mainly because of a lack of incentive in the form of real reforms, an unstable environment for investors and business start-ups, corruption and excessive bureaucracy (Chorniy et al. forthcoming). While scholars have observed superficial changes in consumption and aesthetic patterns at the local level – including new patterns of interpersonal relations (especially in villages or small towns) – migration has not had a transformational effect on Ukrainian society. There is a direct correlation between successful integration and effectiveness of Ukrainian women’s migration projects and the women’s education, age and value system (Odynets 2016). Ukrainians in Italy tend to exhibit a low level of self-organisation and entrepreneurship in comparison to other ethnic and migration groups. They tend to have a low to middle degree of social mobility and understanding of the language and culture of Italy, which prevents their integration into Italian society (Havrylyshyn 2014). Women born between the 1950s and the 1970s (who constitute the majority of Ukrainian female migrants in Italy) tend to ‘invent’ their Ukrainian national identity, having no pre-existing cultural patterns to reproduce. Their long-term migration projects and permanent contacts with Italian employers stimulate their national self-identification and self-representation – either through elements of the Ukrainian traditional ethnic culture (such as food, clothes, crafts and rituals) or through public activism (street rallies, political protests, media publications and so on) (Odynets 2016). Although Ukrainian women accomplish complex emancipation projects in migration and contribute greatly to their family’s prosperity, this does not automatically lead to the redistribution of gender roles within the transnational family: women continue to carry the double burden of serving as breadwinners and ‘super mums’ at a distance (Fedyuk 2011: 47). Moreover, they frequently exist in transnational spaces in which they continuously mediate between their own ambitions and external obligations dictated by structural processes and social bonds of the family and community (Vianello 2009). Public discourse on labour migration in Ukraine is dominated by the effect of such


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368 Handbook of migration and globalisation labour mobility on the family structure and care provision, especially for children. UCSR and SSCU (2009) found that 51.3 per cent of female migrants and 61.6 per cent of male migrants were married, and that the majority of migrants (58.2 per cent) left their families behind. Up to 200 000 Ukrainian minors had one or both parents working abroad. The proportion of such children in regions of heavy migration ranged between 10 and 20 per cent (Libanova and Malynovska 2012). Not surprisingly, there is a growing number of migrant family reunions abroad (Odynets 2014; Libanova and Malynovska 2012). However, in public discourse, only female migrants are shamed for leaving children – or husbands, for that matter – behind. Indeed, some studies on the effects of labour migration on Ukrainian society have focused on the negative consequences of absent migrant mothers (see Ihnatolia and Rul’ 2012), while comparatively little attention has been paid to the positive effects of female migration (Odynets 2014). Women are unfairly stigmatised for social problems involving children in a society where a dominant discourse cultivates a specific image of the female as the only caregiver (Fedyuk 2016). There has been some speculation about the size of the most recent outflow of Ukrainian nationals since the 2013–14 Maidan and the military conflict in the east. In 2015, there was a 30 per cent jump in the number of Ukrainians receiving residence permits in EU countries compared to 2014; prior to 2015, this increase had been at the rate of 3–4 per cent per year (Europe without Barriers 2016). However, most Ukrainians tend to move to EU countries temporarily, until the political and social situation stabilises. With regard to the general population, 34 per cent of the Ukrainian population were prepared to permanently emigrate, while 55 per cent expressed no such intention (Andronik 2017). The high percentage of Ukrainians reporting a possible intention to migrate is even more significant when we consider Ukrainians’ low mobility: as of 2012, roughly one-third had never travelled outside their region (Tyzhden’ 2012). There has been a growing number of Ukrainians going abroad for studies or professional experience. For example, Ukrainians comprise 53 per cent of all foreign students in Poland (Stadny and Slobodian 2016); but whether and how many return is unknown as there has not been any research focused on student mobility. Therefore, new studies are needed to account for the size, nature and duration of current people’s outflow abroad.

UKRAINE AS A DESTINATION AND A TRANSIT MIGRATION COUNTRY During the Soviet era, immigration into Ukraine was prevalent over emigration and came predominantly from other Soviet republics (Malynovska 2006). Since the mid-1990s, the ethnic composition of foreigners arriving in Ukraine has included groups that had not historically resided there (that is, ethnically and culturally different immigrants from Asia, Africa and the Middle East) and who were thus dubbed ‘non-traditional migrants’ (Malynovska 2006; Braichevska et al. 2003). After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ukraine also received a significant number of asylum seekers from the former USSR countries. To regulate their status, in 1993 the Ukrainian parliament passed the law ‘On Refugees’. In March 1994, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees opened its office in Ukraine. A new law ‘On Refugees’ passed in 2001 allowed Ukraine to accede in January 2002 to the 1951 UN Convention


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Ukrainian migration in the 21st century 369 on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. As of 2016, a number of changes were made to the law ‘On Refugees and Persons in need of Complementary or Temporary Protection in Ukraine’ to align the Ukrainian legal framework with the internationally acceptable practices in the realm of humanitarian migration. Nevertheless, the rights of asylum seekers in Ukraine remain poorly safeguarded and international organisations undertake the bulk of the work of providing for asylum seekers (Human Rights Watch 2010; Butkevych 2016). Major problems include a lack of a clear division of responsibilities between state agencies working with migrants and legal uncertainty over migrants’ status and procedures for their entry to Ukraine. It is worth mentioning that Ukraine has agreements with 63 countries on visa-free entry and a 90-day stay in the country. These include all former Soviet states, the EU and some Asian countries: Korea, Mongolia, Japan, Turkey, Israel and Hong Kong. Visa procedures are obligatory for citizens of countries that are deemed high irregular migration risks, including China, India, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam (SMSU 2016a). Ukrainian law categorises foreigners as either tourists or those granted long-term residence (including refugees) (Chorniy et al. 2014). As obtaining a residence permit is difficult, many migrants enter Ukraine as tourists. Later, they either change their status to one that gives them the right to residency or remain in the country by simply overstaying their visa. Ukraine is considered part of the Central European migration route, which is one of five identified global routes of irregular immigration into the EU. This route – which includes Russia, Poland and Slovakia – is used primarily by migrants from the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the CIS. It was a major concern before EU enlargement to the east in 2004 and the subsequent expansion of the Schengen regime to these countries; but its importance – that is, in terms of perceived risks – has declined since. Similarly to their western counterparts, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies use the concept of ‘migration routes’ in their classification of migration flows towards Ukraine. The Vietnamese, Pakistani–Indian, Sri Lankan–Bangladeshi, Afghani, Chinese, Kurdish, Uzbek and Tajik and Chechen migration ‘routes’ are identified as the major migration channels into Ukraine and are labelled as such based on the migrants’ countries of origin (ICPS/IPP 2006: 11-12). These are also the major source countries of migration through and immigration into Ukraine. Some scholars had suggested that Ukraine – as a ‘transit migration’ country in relation to the EU – became a point of destination for some migrants unable to reach further west (Düvell 2008; Pylynskyi 2008). There have been no recent studies to support or reject this argument and evaluate the situation with transit migrants in Ukraine. Nevertheless, in 2005, Ukraine had a positive net migration (Pribytkova and Gromovs 2007), suggesting that the country may have become a destination by choice for some international migrants. The official state data on immigration to Ukraine show an increase in the number of immigrants selecting Ukraine as their destination point (SMSU 2016a, b). One possible indication of this trend is the fact that 60 per cent of the 20 000–25 000 immigration permits Ukraine issues foreigners every year are granted on the basis of family ties with a citizen of Ukraine (Europe Without Barriers 2016). Citizens from the CIS are the primary recipients of family reunification permits. Data suggests that corruption and a pervasive shadow economy are the main inhibitors for the migration of highly skilled or specialised workers to Ukraine. Conversely, lack of


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370 Handbook of migration and globalisation social pressure, low cost of living and an uncomplicated lifestyle appeal to migrants from Central Asia whose migration is eased by visa procedures and relatively better business conditions and lower levels of corruption than in their home countries (Markov et al. 2018). Interviews with migrants from Asian countries showed that Ukrainian migration officials are viewed as part of the illegal transnational networks providing necessary permits to stay in Ukraine. Due to the contradictions in Ukrainian legislation, gaining official status does not mean legality, and this ties into the problem of corruption in the country (ibid.).

INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS AND UKRAINIANS SEEKING ASYLUM SINCE 2014 The number of Ukrainians applying for asylum has risen since 2014. Before Crimea’s annexation and the war in the Donbas region, Ukraine had never been listed among the top 30 countries producing refugees and asylum seekers. The spike in Ukrainians applying for asylum was sharp, from an average 70 applications per month in 2013 to 14 000 applications for refugee status in the EU in 2014 (Solodko and Fetisova 2016). An even larger number – 392 552 – applied for asylum in Russia (Europe without Barriers 2016: 3). The Russian migration authorities cite the number of Ukrainians entering Russia in 2014 at 814–000. This figure includes people who have applied for refugee/temporary asylum and other residence options. Notably, in 2014–15, some 34 380 Ukrainians applied for asylum status in the EU countries, with just 13.3 per cent receiving positive answers and 70 per cent of applications rejected (Solodko and Fetisova 2016). The last two years has also seen a change in the main countries in which Ukrainians seek asylum; in the period 2008–13, these countries were Sweden, the Czech Republic and France, while, since 2014, Italy, Germany, Spain and Poland have become the main countries for launching asylum claims. The annexation of Crimea and the war in the east have also produced a swelling number of internally displaced populations (IDPs) in Ukraine. In the initial phase of displacements, these populations were mainly Crimean Tatars who, for the most part, headed for western Ukraine. Subsequently, and to date, people have been moving within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (which are partly occupied and partly under the control of the Ukrainian government) to the nearest neighbouring regions (including the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia regions) or Kyiv. These regions host nearly 80 per cent of all IDPs. As of April 2016, the number of IDPs had exceeded 1 million from the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (administrative regions) and 22 000 from Crimea (SMSU 2016b). These numbers are significantly higher, surpassing 1.7 million people, if one draws on the statistics of the Ministry of Social Policy in charge of social payments. The Ministry refuses social payments to those who are not registered in the government-controlled territory; this makes people who in fact permanently reside in the occupied territory register as if internally displaced to the government-controlled areas when they want to receive social payments from the Ukrainian government. Such ‘displacements’ on paper lead to a swell in the number of IDPs that the Ministry uses in its statistics as it actually provides social assistance to this larger number of people (Smal 2016). It is too early to know the full effects of the annexation and Donbas conflict on population movement in Ukraine, especially with regard to its temporary or permanent nature.


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Ukrainian migration in the 21st century 371 As the conflict lingers and the level of destruction escalates, individuals may be led to reconsider their life choices and strategies. For the moment, this internal movement has not produced a noticeable negative impact on society overall. The Ukrainian population expresses generally positive attitudes towards IDPs, albeit with some regional differences that are more pronounced in the areas hosting few or no IDPs (UNHCR 2016). Mikheieva and Sereda (2014) studied the causes of displacement and adaptation challenges of IDPs who had the opportunity to choose their direction of migration – that is, those who migrated from Crimea in March/April and from Donbas in May/June 2014. They found that government authorities had a limited role in assisting displaced people with relocation, and also found a high level of social isolation among IDPs. Displaced persons are reluctant to formally declare their status out of fear, social stigma or lack of need; bureaucratic inactivity is another reason. The researchers point out that the events in Ukraine during 2014 led people to rethink their attitudes toward Ukrainian state independence and its value, national and state symbols and so on. This new awareness has generated strong public criticism of practically all state institutions, and shows significant potential for civil society to assume the tasks of societal organisation.

CONCLUSION By 2017, Ukraine had developed a system of legislative norms and administrative practices on migration regulation directed at foreigners, frequently under external pressure from the EU and its Member States. The EU’s Visa Liberalisation Plan for Ukraine facilitated many of these policy and legislative innovations considering consecutive governments in Ukraine were interested in visa waiver for their nationals. Migration regulation, however, has not been a priority for these governments. Inter-institutional disagreements over what migration policy should be, continuous inter-agency ‘turf wars’ over both internal state budgets and external donors funds as well as the lack of political will to prioritise migration are some factors that have caused continuous institutional restructuring and discussions over the conceptualisation of migration policy, the categories of migrants and the relationship between the State and its citizens working abroad and foreigners working or residing in Ukraine. Since Ukraine’s independence, the political debate on migration has lacked reliance on expertise and understanding of the underlying mechanisms and consequences of migration. Despite the fact that Ukraine is a significant contributor to global migration flows and receives significant inflows of financial remittances from migrants, the country has not yet created conditions to turn migration to its development advantage. The legal status of Ukrainian citizens abroad remains unregulated, as is the situation with their social payments and taxation jurisdictions. Nevertheless, migration flows from and to Ukraine show that the country remains an attractive option for students, labourers and immigrants from the former USSR and some Asian and African countries – for example, Vietnam, Nigeria and Morocco (SMSU 2016a; IOM Ukraine 2016). Ukrainian nationals, meantime, choose to work in neighbouring European countries and Russia on a temporary or long-term basis, and settle for residence in the countries with favourable immigration policies such as the US, Canada and Israel. However, more research on the effects of economic instability since 2008 and


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372 Handbook of migration and globalisation political instability since 2013 on the attractiveness of Ukraine to foreign migrants would provide us with insight into the impact of crises on individuals’ migration strategies. As far as research studies on Ukrainian migrants are concerned, they frequently focus on a particular national context, and comparative analyses are still rare (for exceptions, see Hodovanska 2011; Fedyuk and Kindler 2016). Ukrainian migrants also feature as case studies in research on circular migration (Triandafyllidou 2013), domestic care work (Triandafyllidou and Marchetti 2015) and transnational migration (Gropas et al. 2015). Such studies enhance our understanding of the conditions of living and employment of Ukrainians in a given national context. Comparative studies on Ukrainian migration flows, however, may provide fertile ground to enhance our understanding of connections between political, economic, social and cultural conditions of immigrant-receiving societies and migrants’ strategies and life trajectories. Future interdisciplinary research into Ukrainian migration may focus on the changes, if any, in migrants’ social identities and transformations in their system of values as a result of their experiences. It would also be interesting to observe, beyond anecdotal evidence, whether Ukraine has been experiencing societal transformations as the result of large-scale migration. Studies into return migration may illuminate this. Examining the transposition of migrants’ cultural influences, knowledge and experiences onto everyday practices and lifestyles in their home country would shed new light on the impact of migrants on the countries of origin. Another interesting area of research is the transformation and functioning of family structures and responsibilities in migrant families. Different forms of functioning of transnational migrants’ networks and the shaping of new social milieu in the host countries are a few of many important aspects of Ukrainian migration waiting to be explored.

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