Commentary on: Vaesen (2011)
ABSTRACT: 57 Words MAIN TEXT: 873 Words REFERENCES: 356 Words ENTIRE TEXT: 1286 Words
Not by thoughts alone: How language supersizes the cognitive toolkit Hans IJzerman E-mail:
[email protected] Homepage: http://h.ijzerman.googlepages.com Tilburg University Francesco Foroni E-mail:
[email protected] Homepage: Utrecht University
Correspondence regarding this contribution should be addressed to Hans IJzerman, Tilburg University, School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB, Tilburg, The Netherlands; e-mail:
[email protected].
ABSTRACT We propose that Vaesen’s target article (a) underestimates the role of language in humans’ cognitive toolkit and thereby (b) overestimates the proposed cognitive discontinuity between chimps and humans. We provide examples on labeling, numerical computation, executive control, and the relation between language and body, to conclude that language plays a crucial role in ‘supersizing humans’ cognitive toolkit.
Not by thoughts alone: How language supersizes the cognitive toolkit In the target article, Vaesen (2011) notes a remarkable discontinuity between humans and chimps in tool use and cognitive features. Language is suggested to play a merely facilitative role for other cognitive functions. We propose that Vaesen (a) underestimates the role of language in humans’ cognitive toolkit and thereby (b) overestimates the proposed cognitive discontinuity between chimps and humans.
Language can be considered, in Clark’s words (2008), as a mind-transforming cognitive scaffold. It can productively transform people’s cognitive capacities by simplifying their outer world. For instance, the simple act of labeling creates a new constellation of ‘perceptible objects’ and reconfigures the problem space (Clark, 1998a), thereby increasing people’s computational ability enormously. Consider numerical computation as another example. Dehaene and colleagues (1999) proposed that when people use number words to complement more basic biological capacities, people acquire an evolutionary novel ability to deal and think about unlimited exact quantities, hinging crucially on language. Systematic skill improvement attempts, fault detection, and corrections of flaws in people’s own planning - to mention only few – are the result of the interaction of biological brains with linguaform resources that together allow ‘thinking about thinking’ (Bermudez, 2003; Clark, 1998b; Clark, 2008). As such, language opens up new computational opportunities, enabling humans to solve complex problems. This may be the case for some (if not most) of the cognitive tools that Vaesen points out in his target article.
Furthermore, we agree that one cannot easily determine the evolution of language (cf. Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Yet, it is undisputed, also by Vaesen, that language has been particularly useful to participate in culture, in particular in keeping track of complex relational
systems (i.e., gossip). However, relatively simple forms of communication are not unique to humans; the most primary vocalizations even seemed to be present in primates, which often participate in relatively simple relational systems (Dunbar, 1997). As such, language seems to have primarily developed for purposes directly related to social interactions, and became more important once people started to begin living in larger groups. Language has since become immensely important for other cognitive tools. Clark even suggested that the “recent intellectual explosion in evolutionary time is due as much to linguistic-enabled extensions of cognition as to any independent development in our inner cognitive recourses” (p.232, 2008).
This point is further exemplified by recent work in (social) psychology. As an example of two of the cognitive tools Vaesen put forth, executive functioning and body plasticity, we know that both chimps and humans show relatively simple and automatic affiliative behaviors in response to an angered interaction partner (Preuschoft & Van Hooff, 1997; Häfner & IJzerman, 2011). Humans however seem to have the unique capacity to control the self to accommodate for the other for committed relationships (Rusbult et al., 1991). One could wonder to what extent similar behaviors may occur in other species that display monogamous pair bonding.
Yet, the simple fact that humans possess advanced abilities to postpone immediate selfinterest (i.e., self control) in relation to negative emotions like anger (and their facial expressions) is not surprising, as language has been shown to closely rely on modality specific representations that guide and help people’s cognition (e.g., Pulvermuller, 2005; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Verbs (indicative of action; compared to adjectives) related to smiling or frowning induce greater activation of zygomaticus or corrugator muscles (Foroni & Semin, 2009). In addition, physically warm (as compared to cold) conditions induce people to use
more relational language (verbs; IJzerman & Semin, 2009). One may logically propose that linguistic features play a vital part in actions and thoughts above and beyond ‘merely’ “extending the body”. Research suggests it can. Linguistic features permit to represent close and near ‘future’ at different abstraction levels, allowing people to coordinate and plan future joint and individual actions (Clark & Semin, 2007).
In short, whether it is for computational purposes or for social interaction, language allows complex uses for otherwise simple elements and thoughts. Language does not only allow new uses of people’s outer worlds, it also allows an “intellectual explosion” because of an exponential increase of the utility and potential of existing tools. Taken together, we think that the ‘discontinuity’ between humans and chimps tool use may be a misnomer. Indeed, this seems to find support in work on conceptual knowledge; research shows that both for humans and animals, the presence of a specific object (e.g., a conspecific or food) activates knowledge distributed across modality specific systems, rather than through modular and amodal systems (see Barsalou, 2005).
We have proposed that differences between humans and chimps in tool use are not due to a discontinuity between humans and chimps, but, instead, due to a vast discrepancy enabled by the language that provides immensely complex usages of otherwise relatively simple cognitive tools. Language thus complements otherwise basic biological abilities, thereby providing a key factor in the differentiation between humans and chimps.
For these reasons, language plays a fundamental role not only in the development of tool use but also, and most importantly, in creating culture accumulation. Vaesen’s discussion on
cumulative culture surprisingly omits the important and, we argue, necessary role of language in building complex systems and in the development of human technology.
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Preuschoft, S., & van Hooff, J. A. R. A. M. (1997). The social function of ‘smile’ and ‘laughter’: Variations across primate species and societies. In U. Segerstrale, & P. Molnàr (Eds.), Non-verbal communication: Where nature meets culture (pp. 171– 189). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Pulvermüller, F. (2005). Brain mechanisms linking language and action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6, 576–582. Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rusbult, C. E., Verette, J., Whitney, G. A., Slovik, L. F., Lipkus, I. (1991). Accommodation processes in close relationships: Theory and preliminary empirical evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(1), 53-78. Zwaan, R., & Taylor, L.J. (2006). Seeing, acting, understanding: Motor resonance in language comprehension. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 1–11.
