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9 Water Governance in a Changing Era: Perspectives on Vietnam Tien L.T. Du, Duong D. Bui, Xuan T. Quach and Lisa Robins
Vietnam has long struggled with wide ranging water-related challenges and disasters owing in part to its tropical climate, a long coastline and vulnerable lowland topography. These challenges will become more pressing with further economic development, population growth, an expanding wealth gap and climate change, heightening the imperative for and focus on good water governance. Do (2007) has cautioned against over-reliance on marketbased solutions for addressing Vietnam’s water governance problems, which reflect development paradigms in the broader Mekong region that have favored economic rationality and efficiency over social welfare, livelihood security and environmental sustainability (Lazarus et al. 2011). Increasingly, attention is being paid to aspects of fairness and sustainability of institutional arrangements and water-related decisions throughout the region. Dore et al. (2012) have framed the desired outcomes from water-related decisions in terms of the ―4Rs‖ (rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities), emphasizing fairly shared rewards, minimized and fairly divided risks and costs, respected and recognized water rights, and clarified and discharged actor responsibilities. Against this framing, efforts to address water governance challenges in the Mekong region generally and in Vietnam specifically, have had mixed success in realizing fairer and more sustainable outcomes. This chapter explores recent changes to and progress in Vietnam’s system of water governance based on qualitative research conducted by the authors, attempting to build on earlier regional studies by M-POWER researchers and others.
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It opens with an outline of the approach and conceptual framework underpinning the research. This is followed by a summary of the state’s water governance challenges from social, economic, ecological and institutional capacity perspectives. Next, Vietnam’s water governance regime is examined in terms of institutional arrangements (formal and informal), the roles of actor groups (state and non-state), and the levels of interaction between them and differing modes of governance. The learning process of each of these aspects of governance is subsequently classified as single-, double- or triple-loop learning. Finally, a comparison of the state’s water governance regime is made with reference to global-level water governance trends, and conclusions are drawn to inform future research and policy interventions.
Methodology and Conceptual Framework The research presented in this chapter is based on a qualitative exploration of water governance in Vietnam informed by expert interviews and supplemented by a review of key literature. The latter comprised an examination of, inter alia, water policies, conference proceedings and a range of grey literature published by local water institutions, international organizations and others. The research uses the conceptual framework in Pahl-Wostl (2009: 354) designed ―for analyzing adaptive capacity and multi-level learning processes in resource governance regimes‖. Pahl-Wostl (2009) explains the complexity of governance regimes in terms of four dimensions connected via a process of multi-level social learning, namely:
Institutions—the relationship between formal and informal institutions;
Actor groups—the interactions of state and non-state actors;
Multi-level interactions—vertical versus horizontal integration, and formal versus informal interaction; and
Governance modes—bureaucratic hierarchies, markets and networks.
In this conceptual framework, social learning is assumed to promote development and sustainable capacity of related stakeholders, and to lead to greater action occurring inpractice consequent to the higher prevalence of negotiations among such actors. The framework denotes three stages of learning:
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Single-loop learning—occurs when an action to improve performance is refined, but without consideration of or changes to underlying values or assumptions;
Double-loop learning—occurs when underlying values and assumptions are revisited, but within the scope of how specific goals may be achieved; and
Triple-loop learning—continuous reflection on and refinement of the underlying values and assumptions that influence certain actions and outcomes, leading to a transformation in the structural context and the factors determining the framing of the issue or problem.
The conceptual framework assumes that shifts towards adaptive governance will require higher levels of learning (as well as incur higher costs). Water Governance Challenges in Vietnam This section describes the challenges facing water governance in Vietnam according to social, economic, ecological and institutional capacities Social Challenges Vietnam is the fifteenth most populous country in the world with an estimated population of 94.3 million in 2015, experiencing an increase of more than 40 percent since 1990 (CIA 2014). The urban population, which makes up around 30 percent of the total, has more than doubled between 1990 and 2010 from 13.4 million to 27 million (Hoang 2012). With this rapid population growth and urbanization has come greater demand for and pressure on water resources and related infrastructure. Rising indicators of inequality present concerns for the sustainability of the state’s socioeconomic development. Between 1993 and 2006 the income share held by the wealthiest fifth of the population rose from 43 to 45 percent, while that of the poorest fifth fell from 8 to 7 percent (Vandemoortele and Bird 2011). These increasing income disparities widen the gap in access to health-related services, particularly water supply and sanitation. In 2008, tap water was accessible to only 26 percent of the total population, representing 67 percent of urban dwellers and 10 percent of rural people (SNV Netherlands Development
243
Organization 2010). The establishment of water markets within the state’s policy framework presents concerns for access to water by poorer users, who form a majority. Poor general awareness of water issues and related behaviors present a significant social challenge and threaten water resources and human health at local-to-national scales, especially in urban settings. Low awareness of and commitment to reducing water use and protecting water resources is founded in part on the perception of many Vietnamese that water is a limitless ―god-given‖ resource. One manifestation of this attitude in urban environments is the chronic incidence of littering in public spaces and waterways, for which current regulations and enforcement are both inadequate and ineffective. Many urban waterways have become ―garbage‖ rivers. Closing the gap between local awareness and actual behavioral change, according to Bui et al. (2015), is essential to conserving scarce water resources but will require a huge shift in Vietnam’s water governance regime.
Economic Challenges Since the 1990s, the rate of economic development in Vietnam has been rapid with average annual growth of 7.4 percent (1990 - 2008), with a dramatic reduction in household poverty levels over the same period from 58 to 14.5 percent (based on the national poverty line) (Vandemoortele and Bird 2011). At the same time, the structure of Vietnam’s economy has been fundamentally reshaped. In 1990, the sectors of agriculture and services both contributed to gross domestic product (GDP) equally at around 38.50 percent, compared to the industry sector at 22.67 percent. Nearly a quarter of a century later in 2014, the agricultural sector has shrunk by almost half to 18.12 percent of GDP, while the services sector has grown somewhat (43.38 percent) and the industry sector has expanded more markedly (38.50 percent) (General Statistics Office 2014). A recent national development policy1 places emphasis on sustainable development, as does the national green growth policy.2 However, the framing of these policies gives much greater weight to economic efficiency and growth than to social and ecological outcomes. As a consequence, the implementation of these policies may perpetuate the degradation of water and other environmental resources in the process of boosting development and growth at different scales. Water resources are further threatened by limited use of economic principles
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(e.g. user-pays, polluter-pays) or instruments (e.g. water pricing, water trading) that effectively account for the many values that water can provide. For example, water prices are approved by local People’s Committees (PPCs) based on the advice of local water service providers, compliance with the regulations of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and agreement of local in-line departments, but without reference to data on storage volumes and usage trends at the scale of inter-regions or river basins.3 Furthermore, although water resources allocation planning is under development throughout the country, there is no formal guideline for water valuation, as a basis for water allocation and sharing.4 A priority challenge for government is to establish water markets at different scales with adequate safeguards to protect the access of poorer and less powerful users when competing with wealthier and more influential actors and groups.
Ecological Challenges Vietnam’s average annual rainfall is 1,960 mm; however, this rain is unevenly distributed spatially and temporally, with many areas experiencing a prolonged dry season and serious water shortages. In 2006, Vietnam was officially declared ―a water deficient nation‖ (ADB 2006: 1) based on an estimated annual surface water availability of 3,480 cubic meters (m3) per person. The International Water Resources Association defines 4,000 m3 per year per person availability as the minimum international standard (ADB 2006). About two thirds of Vietnam’s water resources originate outside of the country, making it highly susceptible to adverse outcomes arising from any water-impacting activities occurring in upstream countries, especially dam construction and operation. Unlike surface water, groundwater resources are abundant with total potential exploitable aquifer reserves estimated at nearly 60 billion m3 per year (World Bank 2005). Although less than 5 percent of total reserves are exploited for the country as a whole, over-exploitation in some areas has caused land subsidence and saline intrusion (World Bank 2005). Meanwhile, Vietnam is located in a region experiencing an unprecedented boom in construction of hydropower dams (Winemiller et al. 2016). The proposed more than 800 hydropower projects in Vietnam (205 of which are under construction and intended to be in operation by 2017), which together with existing hydraulic infrastructure, will cause irreversible losses of biodiversity of international, national and local importance (Carew-Reid et al. 2010; Anonymous 2013). 245
According to Winemiller et al. (2016), model simulations of proposed large dams in the lower Mekong basin predict major reductions in fish diversity, migratory stocks and productivity levels; with impacts that extend beyond aquatic ecology to agriculture, fisheries and human settlements. Vietnam is very vulnerable to water-related issues, including typhoons, tsunamis and urban flooding (World Bank 2005). Water related threats differ greatly across its many regions, including its long coastline (more than 3,200 kilometers, excluding islands). Coastal lowland regions are becoming more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, in addition to threats like salinity and flooding, exacerbated by increasing population density. Similarly, incidences and severity of drought and flash floods are increasing in the uplands. The diverse nature and extent of these issues present a complex challenge for actors concerned in realizing tangible improvements at scale.
Institutional Capacity Challenges The limited capacity of Vietnam’s water-related institutions is a major impediment to the sustainable management of its water resources. While new institutions have been created since 2002—notably, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) and its provincial-level departments (Department of Natural Resources and Environment, DONRE)—improvements in effectiveness and efficiency necessitate commensurate skills and capacities development in order to deliver on assigned responsibilities. When several functions and activities were shifted to MONRE from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) in 2002, MARD’s sizeable pool of water experts largely remained with that agency. Now more than a decade later, few staff at MONRE have tertiary-level qualifications specifically in water resources management, which presents a critical challenge for that agency in achieving its water-related goals and responsibilities. There are 1,130 staff employed across MONRE’s three main agencies, namely the Department of Water Resources Management, Vietnam National Mekong Committee and the National Center for Water Resources Planning and Investigation (NAWAPI) (Hanoi University of Natural Resources and Environment 2010). According to a staff survey in 2010, only 0.4 percent were considered water sector experts, which includes those skilled in the use of specialized
246
software for water management—this figure represents the lowest proportion among government agencies within the natural resources and environment sector. MONRE staff rank more highly in the sectors of land and environment at 52.2 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. Civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are an integral part of Vietnamese society, as they actively engage in issues that affect people’s lives and the development prospects of their communities. As early as 1935, emergent mass organizations - such as the Women’s Union, the Farmers’ Association, the General Federation of Trade Unions, the Youth Union and the Veterans’ Association - have operated through extensive bureaucratic structures at central, provincial, district and local levels and continue to play a dominant role in civic life in Vietnam (Taylor et al. 2012). Professional associations have also operated at both national and local levels since independence in 1945, but have become more prevalent in recent decades. Several new administrative guidelines not only establish clearer roles for these organizations to engage in technical consultation, policy engagement and advocacy, but also aim to orient the activities of CSOs and NGOs towards having greater policy relevance and making a more substantive contribution to overall societal development.5 Nevertheless, these recently issued decisions still lack sub-laws and further guidelines for practical implementation. Water Governance System in Vietnam This section discusses recent changes in the ways in which water resources are managed in Vietnam in response to the social, economic, ecological and capacity challenges confronted by state and non-state actors. These changes are examined in terms of formal and informal institutional arrangements, the roles of state and non-state actors, and their levels of interaction and differing modes of governance. The section concludes with an indicative classification of each of these aspects as single-loop, double-loop or triple-loop learning, following Pahl-Wostl’s (2009) framework.
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Institutional Arrangements According to Pahl-Wostl (2009), formal institutions are those with legal and regulatory structures and frameworks, whereas informal institutions are those based on socially shared rules and local values. The latter are also referred to as normative or cultural-cognitive institutions. Vietnam’s institutions, whether formal or informal, reflect the traditions, norms and beliefs of its 54 ethnic groups and its 4,000-year history - across the broad spectrum of institutions for religion, education and urban development, to health and defense. For water resources, the embodiment of a range of socio-cultural values and norms is evidenced in both formal and informal institutions, which co-exist at different scales for governing the behaviors of actors in relation to the utilization, protection and development of water.
Levels of Formal Governance and Institutional Reshaping Vietnam’s formal arrangements for water management comprise a multitude of institutions across four levels of governance - central or national, provincial, district and commune (fig. 9.1). The central government has responsibility for the unified management of water resources at the state level with specific responsibilities for implementation assigned to ministries, ministerial-level agencies and other government agencies. Ministries at the central or national level have concomitant departments, divisions and bureaus at the provincial, district and commune levels,6 for example:
MONRE – DONRE – DONRE - Bureau (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment - Department of Natural Resources and Environment - Division of Natural Resources and Environment - Bureau of Environment);
MARD – DARD – DOA - Bureau (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Department of Agriculture and Rural Development - Division of Agriculture Bureau of Agriculture); and
MOC - DOC – DUM - Bureau (Ministry of Construction - Department of Construction - Division of Urban Management - Bureau of Urban Rules).
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At the provincial, district and commune levels, the above departments, divisions and bureaus under PPCs at each level respectively manage state-owned water resources within their localities in accordance with terms determined by higher levels of governance. Vietnam’s institutional arrangements for the water sector have progressively evolved over the past half-century. A paradigm shift has taken place from water resources exploitation to its sustainable management and protection, which is reflected in part in the reshaping of related formal institutions. In October 1995, the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR) established in 1958 with responsibilities for flood prevention, hydropower and irrigation planning and development - was merged with the Ministry of Forestry and Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industries (MAFI) to form the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) (Do 2014). The broad function of water resources management was officially assigned to MOWR by the central government in May 1994, shortly before the formation of MARD. MARD’s functional responsibilities for water resources management were legalized four years later with the passing of the Law on Water Resources in May 1998 and came into effect on January 1999 (Do 2014). With the establishment of MONRE in July 2002, the government moved the function of water resources management from the agricultural sector to the natural resources and environment sector.
“Apex Body” for Vietnam’s Water Sector For coordination of line ministries at national level, pursuant to the 1998 Law on Water Resources, the National Water Resources Council (NWRC) was established in 2000 as a water sector ―apex body‖ chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister. It has 18 members from various ministries, of which seven permanent members are from MONRE, MARD, MOC, Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), Ministry of Transport (MOT), Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the Government Office.7 The impetus to form the NWRC arose from the ADB policy, ―Water for all‖, which has promoted such ―apex bodies‖ within Southeast Asian nations as part of a water governance reform discourse (ADB 2006)
.
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Figure 9.1: A diagrammatic representation of institutional changes in water governance in Vietnam
Pursuant to the amended 2012 Law on Water Resources, Prime Ministerial Decision No. 459/QD-TTg officially regulates the functions and responsibilities of the NWRC specifically, to advise the government on important decisions on water resources; to promote discussion among specialists; to invite scientists to make recommendations on national water resources; and to solve conflicts between ministries and provinces. However, similar to the situation in Thailand and Laos where ―apex body‖ agencies do not have adequate power and resources to effectively reform the existing line agencies, the achievements of these bodies in the Mekong region have been rather modest (IWMI 2006; Molle 2007).
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Overlapping Sectoral Mandates Overlapping responsibilities between MONRE and MARD as a result of changes to institutional arrangements have been gradually resolved with improvements in legal frameworks. In 2012, the Law on Water Resources was amended to clarify the roles of MONRE and MARD with respect to the state’s management of water resources and, in doing so, has reduced internal conflicts. Accordingly, MONRE is responsible for the development and implementation of laws and policies related to water planning (in river basin and transboundary water resources), water protection, water extraction, water resources monitoring and measurement, projections and licensing provisions. MARD, on the other hand, is responsible for the development and implementation of strategies related to irrigation (projections, dike systems, prevention and mitigation of negative impacts from works failures), natural disasters (prevention and mitigation of floods, storms and droughts) and rural water supply and sanitation. MONRE has produced 35 legal documents in the arena of water resources management over the decade between its establishment in 2002 and the 2012 amendment of the Law on Water Resources, each of which were enacted by MONRE or the government. Following the amendment, a further five sub-law documents were produced and enacted to facilitate implementation of the overarching law (e.g. a decree on the management of water protection corridors, a circular on groundwater drilling). However, as with some other countries in the Mekong region like Thailand and Cambodia where water resources management has been partly separated from supply operations, difficulties in human resources still arise due to inadequate or conflicting transfer of professionals between departments (IWMI 2006; Molle 2007). Although laws play an important role in reducing overlapping sectoral mandates, more high-level political will, substantial funding, and reshuffling of roles and responsibilities are required to bring more effective role separation. Reflecting Contemporary International Principles The 2012 amendment of the Law on Water Resources further clarified the principles of integrated water resources management (IWRM) and participatory-based mechanisms, and
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gave greater emphasis to the essential role of water in ecosystem conservation. It now provides a legal framework for applying economic instruments, penalizing the misuse of waterways, and allocating environmental flows. Furthermore, the amended law enables regular monitoring of and reporting on water quality and quantity, together with hydrogeological and hydrographic mapping. The amended law has specific articles that give emphasis to ecosystem management and protection, and the importance of aquatic species. The addition of many widely promoted modern principles in the 2012 amendment of the Law on Water Resources are similarly reflected in water resources-related laws in neighboring countries, notably Thailand, Cambodia, China and Laos. According to the International Water Management Institute (2006), the application of such legal frameworks and their embodied principles in practice in Vietnam and other Mekong countries is highly challenging; there is a need for further enabling decrees, a significant redistribution of power and multi-level capacity development. Future progress in the management of Vietnam’s water resources depends not only on the current legislative framework but also on political will and the ability of the state to enforce and further improve it in order to bring about positive change. Role of river basin organizations At the watershed level, state-controlled entities referred to collectively as ―river basin organizations‖ (RBOs) have responsibilities for river basin planning and management. The Committee for Red River Water Control and Development (1961 - 76) is regarded as Vietnam’s first RBO because of its river basin focus, together with the high level of commitment to the model demonstrated by different tiers of government at the time. Since then, there have been three main (overlapping) phases in the evolution of RBOs; underpinned by the 1998 Law on Water Resources which enabled the formal establishment of RBOs for the purposes of IWRM:
The first phase commenced a quarter of decade later in 2001 with the establishment of the three River Basin Planning Management Boards (RBPMBs). A further five were established over the following five years. While under MARD’s jurisdiction, international organizations advocated for and contributed significant resources to their creation and operation. As at 2016, a total of seven RBPMBs remain in 252
operation, after the Srepok River RBPMB was suspended because of insufficient funding for its operation and activities (Nguyen et al. 2013). However, the operational sustainability of the remaining seven RBPMBs - Mekong, Dong Nai River, Red–Thai Binh River, Cau River, Nhue–Day River, Vu Gia–Thu Bon River and Ca River—is in question due to ongoing funding reliance from international donors.
The second phase marked the establishment of River Basin Environment Protection Committees (RBEPCs) by MONRE under the jurisdiction of its line agency, the Vietnam Environment Administration (VEA). The first RBEPC was formed in 2007 - this phase therefore follows on from the last RBPMB (established in 2006), but overlaps with the RBPMB model (which is still in place). By 2009, MONRE had formed the last of three RBEPCs - Cau River, Dong Nai River and Nhue–Day River—all of which had existing RBPMBs in place.
The third phase saw the advent of River Basin Committees (RBCs), which the aforementioned 2008 Governmental Decree No. 120 emphasized as an important attribute of Vietnam’s system of water governance. According to this Decree, MONRE was officially assigned coordination responsibilities for water resources management in river basins, including the oversight of RBOs. Since then, MONRE has taken steps to establish RBCs for coordinating water resources management at the river basin scale. However, until now, no RBCs have been established. As recently as 2014, a new division of River Basin Management under the Department of Water Resources Management (under MONRE) has been established to coordinate water resources management and monitoring at river basin scale, including establishment of new RBOs.
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Figure 9.2: The Evolution of river basin organizations in Vietnam
Notes: MARD - Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; MONRE - Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment; VEA - Vietnam Environment Administration; River basins: 2001 (Mekong, Dong Nai, Cau, Red-Thai Binh, Vu Gia–Thu Bon, Nhue–Day, Srepok and Ca) and 2006 (Cau, Dong Nai and Nhue–Day).
Table 1.9 compares the functions, organizational structures and resourcing of the three types of RBOs outlined, namely RBPMBs, RBEPCs and RBCs. The most recent RBO type, RBCs, has more functions with respect to the coordination and monitoring of ministries, sectors and localities for river basin planning, and the formulation of policies and response options for water development and protection, and the mitigation of water-related natural disasters. The collaboration and consultation responsibilities of RBCs are more extensive than those of RBPMBs or RBEPCs (which are confined to designated environmental protection areas). However, Vietnam’s RBCs are not independent entities in the form advocated by international standards or models (e.g. Global Water Partnership 2009), and therefore do not have the autonomy to resolve basin conflicts alone. The membership of RBCs is more diverse than that of RBPMBs or RBEPCs, with the participation of ministries, PPC leaders at provincial level, and representatives of some large water service providers within the river basin. Like Vietnam’s other RBO types, however, the 254
representation of local communities, NGOs and research bodies is absent, and out of step with RBO models promoted as best practice internationally. Operating resources across all RBO types lack certainty and threaten institutional sustainability. Their dependence on annual budget allocations from central agencies (MARD for RBPMBs; MONRE’s VEA for RBEPCs; MONRE for RBCs) and other members (in the case of RBCs) dictates staffing levels and limits the scope for forward planning. Additional finances mobilized from other domestic sources and from international donors can be substantial but nevertheless highly variable from year to year. Overall, the functions, organizational structures and resourcing of Vietnam’s existing RBO types have many positive elements, but vary significantly from international models with respect to stakeholder representation, decision-making powers and access to reliable resourcing.
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Table 9.1: A Comparison of river basin organization types in Vietnam: Functions, structure, resources Functions RBPMB
RBEPC RBC
To develop and monitor the implementation of river basin planning. To collaborate with ministries, sectors and localities with respect to investigations, inventories and evaluation of water resources in the river basin. To propose solutions for resolving water-related conflicts in the basin.
To coordinate specific environmental protection projects in the river basin.
To coordinate and monitor the activities of ministries, sectors and localities with respect to river basin management and planning. To propose policies and solutions for water development and protection, and the mitigation of water-related natural disasters. Organizational structure Chaired by a MARD leader (at Deputy Minister level). Members represent ministries. No representation from localities and communities, with the exception with Vu Gia Thu Bon RBPMB (with the participation of the Deputy Chairman of Provinces).
RBPMB
RBEPC
RBC
RBPMB
RBEPC
RBC
Chaired by a PPC leader with a maximum of two office terms (the duration of the first is 3 years and second is 2 years) Vice-chaired by a MONRE or MARD Deputy Minister. Members represent ministries and PPC leaders at provincial level. No representation from local communities, non-government organizations (NGOs) and research institutes. Each RBEPC Office is co-located with MONRE’s VEA. Chaired by a MONRE deputy minister in the case of large river basins, and by a PPC leader (each term of office is 2 years) in the case of inter-provincial river basins. Each RBC Office is co-located with a MONRE administrative unit. Members represent ministries, PPC leaders at provincial level and some large water service providers. No representation from local communities, NGOs and research institutes. Resources MARD provides RBPMB with a small annual budgetary allocation sufficient for periodic, ad hoc meetings and report printing costs. Mostly funded by international donor organizations. Access financial resources from domestic and international donors. VEA provides a small annual budgetary allocation for the administration of RBEPC Offices and their operational activities. Access financial resources from domestic and international donors. MONRE provides an annual budgetary allocation for the administration of RBCs. Participating members of the RBC also make an annual financial contribution. Access financial resources from domestic and international donors’.
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Notes: PPC – People’s Committee; MARD – Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; MONRE – Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment; RBC – River Basin Committee; RBEPC – River Basin Environment Protection Committee; RBPMB –River Basin Planning Management Board; VEA – Vietnam Environment Administration. Sources: Decree No. 179/1999/ND-CP dated 30 December 1999 regarding implementation of the Law on Water Resources; Decision No. 20/2005/QD-BNN dated 13 April 2005 regarding establishment of RBMPB in Vu Gia Thu Bon River Basin; Decree No. 120/2008/ND-CP dated 1 December 2008 regarding management of river basins; Dao T. Tu, Nguyen V.D Nguyen H.V., 2011, ―Tổ chức Quản lý Lưu vực sông ở Việt Nam: Quyền lực và Thách thức‖ [River Basin Organizations in Vietnam: Power and Challenges] (Hanoi: PanNature), http://www.nature.org.vn/vn/tailieu/RBOs_Power_and_Challenge_VN.pdf
Informal Arrangements Vietnam’s informal institutions in the arena of water resources are not well researched; however, some useful insights have emerged from recent studies (e.g. Kien et al. this volume). In general, information and data on water use, values and other aspects relevant to water management are both limited and geographically highly dispersed. This lack of baseline information on how water is used or valued by different community groups and at different scales is a hindrance to effective water resources management planning in Vietnam. Tran (2013) explored the socio-cultural values of water for different ethnic groups in the Huong (Perfume) River basin in Thua Thien Hue province in central Vietnam. The work used case study-based storytelling as a way of recording the range of values attached to water. It found that Van Kieu people have their own customary laws for water protection and sharing, which include the prohibition of fishing using electricity or poison in the waterway, and of cutting down forests in water supply areas. Any member of the community who breaks these customary rules is punished or fined. In the case of Hue people, water from the Huong River is believed to enhance the flavor and smell of local food—such as Huda beer and Thanh Tra (Hue grapefruit)—and to make those who drink it very polite, gentle and charming. In the first months of the life of a Hue child, water is collected from the river using a bucket and oar from the family’s boat in a ceremony that is believed to imbue the child with good skills in swimming, sailing and working on the river. Dang (n.d.) investigated water management folklore in the case of the Ha Nhi people in Lai Chau and Lao Cai provinces in northern Vietnam. Ha Nhi people were found to use 257
and manage water in simple but effective and flexible ways, especially in the usage of field ditches to transport water from springs to terrace fields. However, not all socio-cultural-based practices were found to be positive for water protection. Some sanitation norms of the Ha Nhi people had deleterious outcomes for water resources - for example, a fear-based custom underpins the accumulation of litter and waste beside waterway bathing sites, which are only tidied on ritual days. Many informal norms and rules embedded in local systems of practice have been shown to produce positive outcomes for water management (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2003). Compared to formal state-based institutions, many local unwritten rules, such as conflict resolution mechanisms, have been found to be more efficient, cost-effective, longer lasting and more broadly accepted among local water users (Nhundu et al. 2015). A combination of different types of institutions (formal and informal) has also been demonstrated to be more efficient and workable than applying one type alone (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2003; Nhundu et al. 2015). However, the legalization of or interference with these unwritten rules by external agencies should be carefully considered as the benefits of such rules may be inadvertently distorted. In Vietnam, water user groups (WUGs) were formed in the early 1990s as both formal (registered with local authorities) and informal (without registration) entities to coordinate irrigation and drainage activities, as well as to respond to the state’s collectivization campaign and participatory irrigation management (PIM) movement after the Doi Moi reforms of 1986 (Benedikter and Waibel 2013). The groups were anticipated to deliver economic benefits and efficiencies, as well as to provide learning opportunities. In Can Tho City, for example, the formation of WUGs coincided with the expansion of secondary and tertiary canals and dyke systems for irrigation and flood mitigation. When the state intervened to integrate the informal, unregistered WUGs into the formal governance structure - by only considering registered groups as legal entities and allowing only formal groups to access training and funding opportunities—the participation, willingness and performance effectiveness of the informal groups was found to decline (Benedikter and Waibel 2013).
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Further studies of informal (normative or cultural-cognitive) institutions are needed to inform the development of effective strategies for managing water resources, and to identify opportunities for informal and formal institutions to interact and align more effectively. The structures and processes of formal institutions need to acknowledge and take into account the diverse range of socio-cultural practices in their efforts to better manage water resources, including aspects of planning and enforcement. Roles of Actor Groups Vietnam’s water governance regime is characterized by a wide network of state and non-state actor groups. These actor groups represent five main categories, namely state agencies, international development organizations, research and educational institutions (with both state and non-state participation), businesses (with both state and non-state investment) and CSOs. The first category, state agencies, has been discussed in the previous section. This section examines the roles of the four remaining actor groups in water governance in Vietnam. International Development Organizations International institutions have promoted and been a trigger for crucial changes in Vietnam’s water governance arrangements, particularly in terms of the adoption of IWRM principles, the establishment of key water institutions, human resource capacity building, and the provision of technical infrastructure. Notable contributors in this regard have been the World Bank, ADB, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The World Bank has been a funder of improvements to core water-related infrastructure such as transboundary water monitoring stations. ADB and DANIDA have provided technical and financial support to establish contemporary institutional frameworks—for RBOs, for the NWRC, and for national water policies and laws (Nguyen et al. 2013). Recently, the French International Office for Water invested in capacity building of governmental officials in river basin plan development (National Center for Water Resources Planning and Investigation 2015).
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Despite increasing support from international organizations, in-country capacity and resources are limited and present challenges for scaling up from pilot projects or activities to larger scales of implementation, including a need to adapt and redesign to account for local needs and differences. Overall, support from international organizations is modest compared to the scale of the issues confronted by the water sector and, collectively, their focus and efforts tend to be scattered and lack coherence within an overarching strategic framework. Research and Educational Institutions Research and educational institutions in Vietnam have an essential role to play in building capacity for improving water governance at all scales throughout the country and in the Mekong region. Many institutions, both public and private, currently provide research and educational services in water resources and hydrology. Some notable examples include the Vietnam Academy for Water Resources, Institute of Water Resources Planning, University of Natural Resources and Environment (in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh), University of Water Resources, University of Thai Nguyen, University of Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh University of Technology and Can Tho University. The focus of training and research in most of these institutions has been on technical aspects of irrigation, hydropower, drainage and water treatment, with attention given only recently to the integrated management of water resources, including monitoring, planning, investigation and protection. MONRE recently established the Faculty of Water Resources at the University of Natural Resources and Environment in response to the growing need for skilled human resources in the area of water resources management. Research and educational institutions such as this may apply for state funds (allocated in each annual budget) to undertake research in water governance, including developing decision-making tools and eliciting insights for better management. Many research and educational institutions also receive grants from international bodies, particularly when partnering with other entities that have stronger capacities in aspects of formulating, conducting and reporting on research and educational activities. Significant scope exists to further build in-country capacities through such partnering (and related financing) arrangements.
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Business Vietnam’s central government has progressively increased levels of private investment in the water sector through partial privatization of a number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and promotion of public–private partnerships. This approach aligns with its aim to develop a socialist-oriented market economy. The government has promoted the participation of the private sector in the operation of water services to enhance and diversify resources, and strengthen mutual partnership (Trujillo et al. 2015). In turn, the government anticipates that this will result in better public access to water services, higher cost recovery and greater efficiency in water collection (Trujillo et al. 2015). In 2015, a state-controlled publication under the Ministry of Planning and Investment, the Vietnam Public Procurement Review, reported the estimated total investment needed for urban water supply and wastewater treatment, respectively, at VND68.95 and VND108.5 thousand billion (equivalent to about US$3 and US$5 billion8) over an 8-year period (2012– 20), and concluded that private sector participation will be essential in realizing this infrastructure investment (Viet Thang and Ngoc Thanh 2015). To date, the private sector’s share of capital investment in urban water supply has been 13 percent (ibid.). For urban wastewater treatment, most capital infrastructure is national government-funded through official development assistance loans (e.g. World Bank, JICA, DANIDA). Some private sector participation has been attracted in recent times through specific contracts (including common forms of public-private partnerships such as ―build–operate–transfer‖ and ―build– operate–own‖). From 2010 to 2015, the private sector invested VND11.4 thousand billion in urban water supply, and VND24 thousand billion (US$500 million and US$1 billion) in wastewater treatment infrastructure (ibid.). Also, there are examples of substantive private investment in some aspects of rural water supply and sanitation, and small-scale urban water supply. Small-scale private investors have access to subsidized loans from the National Target Program for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation through community-level credit groups (Trujillo et al. 2015). Many private enterprises have violated environmental protection regulations owing to weak punishment measures and the existence of ―back door‖ approaches to circumventing the rule of law. As a result, few private enterprises have made investments in aspects of
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environmental protection. Some notable examples are Nui Phao Mining Company, which has constructed a water quality monitoring station (Phong Cam 2014), and A Vuong Hydropower Joint Stock Company, which has put in place a community-based reservoir operation initiative (Hoang Nguyen 2014). However, low tariff levels and full cost recovery constraints (with average system water loss estimated at 35 percent) present challenges for potential private investors in water and sanitation sector (Trujillo et al. 2015). In the water supply sub-sector, the price of water still remains under government control, which acts as another constraint to private participation. Significant upscaling of private sector investment and concomitant protection of natural resources will need further attention in policy reform, especially of regulatory frameworks. Civil Society Organizations Community participation in water resources management in Vietnam has a long history, especially in the northern coastal plains and the southern region, where communities experience annual fluvial flooding. The National Water Resources Strategy provides the first official recognition of community participation in the management of water resources.9 Since that time, numerous legal documents have articulated and reinforced the role of communities in different aspects of the water sector, notably in irrigation management, river basin planning, water protection, water exploitation, prevention of damage caused by water, information dissemination and education, and monitoring of water-related behaviors (Tran 2013). As required by the 2012 Law on Water Resources, public and stakeholder opinions have been canvassed in the drafting of water-related policies and laws. To date, efforts to engage with communities and garner their feedback (using a variety of approaches, including online surveys) have raised the level of agreement in water policy formulation and implementation, but there remains significant scope for improving the willingness and responsiveness of communities in interacting with such processes. At the local-scale, WUGs are a form of CSO that has existed in Vietnam since the early 1990s. These groups share responsibility for water system management at the local level. According to Can Tho University (2011: 26), there are 10,457 irrigation management groups at grassroots level in Vietnam. While district offices hold the records of registered 262
WUGs, these groups co-exist with informal (unregistered) WUGs in -practice (Benedikter and Waibel 2013). WUGs have been credited with improving the efficiency of rural production and providing positive side effects for social welfare and household savings (ibid. 2013). When faced with climate variability, for example, a WUG may negotiate an agreement among its local farming members to respond by building saltwater protection dykes (see Kien et al. this volume), an underground dam or a reservoir. WUGs have introduced and applied new technologies, such as drip irrigation and crop adaptation in response to the threat of climate change (ibid. 2013). As previously discussed (see ―Informal Arrangements‖), introducing policies that aim to formalize unregistered groups should be done with caution, as such approaches may inadvertently decrease levels of effective participant engagement. Some local-to-basin-scale, CSOs have been established in response to water-related disputes. One such example is the Sesan Working Group (SWG), which was formed in 2000 by international and local NGOs, and evolved into the officially-recognized Sesan, Srepok and Sekong Protection Network (3SPN) in 2005 (Nguyen et al. 2013). The SWG, and subsequent 3SPN, provided an effective platform for local people to publicly express their concerns about the potential impacts of hydropower development on their livelihoods. The main mechanism for this was the conduct of a series of dialogue events. Nevertheless, CSO participation in hydropower development negotiations and decision-making processes is limited (Nguyen et al. 2013). There is much greater scope to increase the participation of community groups in addressing the competing demands of and impacts on different water users in any given river basin. In the Vu Gia Thu Bon river basin, for example, local people have experienced adverse impacts from diversion dam development for the Dak Mi 4 hydropower project, including resettlement. Households resettled upstream and those villagers downstream whose livelihoods have been affected by less water for agriculture and urban uses have expressed high levels of discontent with both the outcome of the development and the lack of information provision and opportunities for community dialogue (Le and Lam 2013; Quach 2014). According to the 2012 Law on Water Resources, local communities affected by the Dak Mi 4 hydropower project should in theory play a key role in monitoring its operation; however, this is not the case in-practice and enforcing the intent of
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the law is hampered by an absence of targeted resources and supporting sub-laws that define its operationalization. At higher scales of water governance institutions, there are successful examples of community representatives participating in working groups or committees focused on waterrelated issues, but usually with the support of international donors and mainly in relation to transboundary river basin issues (Nguyen et al. 2013). The participation of disadvantaged community groups at all scales of decision-making and as officially-sanctioned representatives is inadequately supported by existing legal mechanisms, with consequent limitations for the fairness and sustainability of water governance. Multi-level Interactions Water governance systems are characterized by ―multi-level interactions‖. Multi-level interactions in polycentric systems—described by Ostrom et al. (1961), cited in Ostrom (2010) as ―many centers of decision making that are formally independent of each other”implies that decision-making authority is dispersed and does not reside at any single level; in the case of Vietnam, neither at the top tier (central government), the mid tiers (provinces enforcing state decisions for regional benefits) nor the lower tiers level (involving a number of different groups with the freedom to benefit from market structures). Multi-level interactions are discussed in this section in terms of, firstly, vertical versus horizontal integration and, secondly, formal versus informal interaction. Vertical Versus Horizontal Integration In Vietnam, the level of integration between different tiers of government in developing and implementing policy initiatives may be characterized as having horizontal and vertical elements:
Horizontal integration is across different ministries (by territory) and their respective departments, divisions and bureaus; it occurs between same-level agencies, such as different ministries at the central level or different departments at the provincial level;
Vertical integration is within each individual ministry (by sector) and its respective departments, divisions and bureaus; and
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For both, ministries are under central government coordination, and the departments, divisions and bureaus are under PPC coordination at the levels of the province, district and commune.
In the case of vertical integration, some flexibility exists for local authorities and lower levels of government to identify and implement solutions tailored to their areas (within the higher level principles of democratic centralism and abiding by relevant laws). A conservation initiative in 2000 for the Thanh River in Quang Nam is an example of a creative and flexible locally-designed approach to management (Nguyen Son 2015); however, challenges nevertheless arose from internal bureaucratic struggles among line ministries (horizontal interactions), which are often driven by political and investment interests. The Ministry of Finance’s introduction of national water tariffs is an example of a policy primarily characterized by horizontal integration, which has faced implementation challenges at the local level. The private sector has failed to invest in water supply and wastewater treatment due to insufficiently attractive returns; as the policy covers only basic operational costs, such that full cost recovery cannot be guaranteed (Trujillo et al. 2015). In the case of the company Travaco in Tra Vinh province in southern Vietnam, this has resulted in wastewater treatment plant ceasing to operate. Formal Versus Informal Interaction Multi-level interactions between formal and informal actor groups have improved markedly further to the 2012 amendment of the Law on Water Resources, especially in terms of advancements in informal knowledge exchange and formal dialogues among management agencies, user groups and stakeholders. The current law has provisions for the collection and dissemination of public and stakeholder opinions, and therefore enhances the scope for cooperation and consensus among relevant parties. However, public participation in decisionmaking in-practice remains limited despite the stronger participatory framework enacted under the 2012 legislation. The main reason for this is the paucity of sub-legal documents for clarifying the mechanisms and resources for stakeholder participation.
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Governance Modes The last water governance characteristic noted in Pahl-Wostl’s (2009) conceptual framework is ―governance modes‖, defined as:
Bureaucratic hierarchies—based mainly on formal institutions where state actors play the dominant role;
Networks—governed largely by informal institutions where both state and non-state can participate; and
Markets—based on a combination of formal and informal institutions where non-state actors dominate.
The formality of related institutions differs for each of the three modes, as does the role of state versus non-state actors. According to Ostrom (2010), polycentric structures that achieve a balance between bottom–up and top–down approaches produce governance regimes with greater adaptive capacity and sustainability. Vietnam’s current governance mode is one that is dominated by formal institutions and state actors; that is, the bureaucratic hierarchy mode. While this mode has been instrumental in protecting common property, including water resources, evidence also shows that power-sharing and long-term sustainability are unlikely to result from the adoption of top–down, hierarchical approaches to natural resource management (Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2001). Examples of networks and markets are increasingly evident as new modes of governance, but remain far less prominent than the mainstream mode of bureaucratic hierarchies. In the case of networks, this emerging trend is evidenced in recent legal frameworks for the establishment and operation of CSOs and NGOs (see ―Capacity Challenges‖), together with greater recognition given to the informal norms and sociocultural values of water for different ethnic groups (see ―Informal Arrangements‖). In the case of markets, the same trend is evidenced in legal frameworks that enable businesses, CSOs, NGOs and other non-state actors to participate in aspects of Vietnam’s water governance. However, hierarchical modes of governing are strongly embedded in existing power and legal structures, so a significant shift to governance modes dominated by networks
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and markets is likely to be some time off. For water service delivery, governance modes that favor markets face pressure to adequately provide for basic social and human security needs. Classification of Learning Processes This sub-section rates each of the four dimensions of Vietnam’s water governance regime institutions, actor groups, multi-level interactions, and governance modes—as single-loop, double-loop or triple-loop learning according to Pahl-Wostl’s (2009) conceptual framework. Institutions The first governance dimension of ―institutions‖ is rated overall at the level of double-loop learning. Although Vietnam’s formal institutions are at a more advanced stage of learning (early-stage triple-loop) than its informal institutions (early-stage double-loop), the advancement of the latter is closely tied to the many constraints to enacting higher levels of learning that are constructed by the former. To a large extent, for Vietnam’s institutional arrangements as a whole to move beyond double-loop learning, formal institutions need to afford much greater recognition of and support to informal institutions. For example, although RBOs have created platforms to bring relevant stakeholders together to address water issues and discuss how to solve water conflicts in shared basins, there is no representation of communities (beyond PPCs), NGOs and research bodies. A shift to more advanced triple-loop learning by institutions overall is also hindered by a relatively small body of research in the governance arena, including research specifically focused on informal governance arrangements, and related financing. However, there are some notable recent efforts—for example, on the socio-cultural values of water within different community groups (Tran 2013). This paucity of research undermines both formal and informal institutions in the process of evidence-based policy formulation and implementation. The progression of institutions overall to the stage of triple-loop learning will be further hampered by the inherent lengthy lead-time from research formulation and commencement to data analysis and the wider reporting of findings and recommendations. Aspects of Vietnam’s formal institutions in the water sector show evidence of earlystage triple-loop learning. Both ―reconsidering underlying values and beliefs, world views‖ and ―a transformation of the structural context and factors that determine the frame of
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reference‖ (Pahl-Wostl 2009: 359) are evidenced in the paradigm shift from water resources exploitation to sustainable management and protection, and in the reshaping of institutions (especially the creation of MONRE, the establishment of NWRC as a water sector ―apex body‖, and the evolving forms and roles of RBOs) and laws (especially in the case of the Law on Water Resources and related legal documents). The creation of MONRE has focused the attention of the central government and its agencies on measures to better allocate and protect the state’s water resources. MONRE has provided a clarification of functions, responsibilities and powers between itself and MARD under the umbrella of the 2012 Law on Water Resources. There is now less fragmentation than in the past in terms of the functions, structures and resourcing for the water sector in particular and for natural resource management in general. Actor Groups The second governance dimension of ―actor groups‖ has been rated here as having reached an early stage of double-loop learning. This rating recognizes that the boundaries within which actor groups operate in Vietnam have changed, but that this has not been matched by a commensurate shift in the distribution of power. State actors continue to retain significant power and influence, especially those operating at higher levels of Vietnam’s system of governance. The remit and actions of non-state actors are strongly determined by the state, including the nature and form of their interactions with representatives of the state itself and with other non-state actors. Advancements have been made in the official recognition and establishment of more diverse actor groups, especially businesses and CSOs; however, the ability to fully assert their legitimate roles in decision-making processes has been constrained by inadequate legal regulation of their functions and powers. Multi-level Interactions The third governance dimension of ―multi-level interactions‖ is rated on a par with ―actor groups‖ as having reached an early stage of double-loop learning. This rating is mainly a function of the top–down approach of established power structures continuing to dominate how water resources are managed at all levels in Vietnam. This dominance manifests in lower levels of the governance system, whether formal or informal, having limited scope to
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make and implement decisions tailored to specific local circumstances. Importantly, the diversity of Vietnam’s actor groups (e.g. CSOs, RBOs, businesses) has expanded, as has the level of their activities. Although the range of actor groups has greater scope to interact in both formal and informal contexts than in the past, these interactions remain strongly determined by boundaries set largely by formal systems of governance and overseen by formal actors. Governance Modes Like ―actor groups‖ and ―multi-level interactions‖, the fourth governance dimension of ―governance modes‖ has not developed beyond an early stage of double-loop learning. This rating is based on the dominance of ―bureaucratic hierarchies‖ as the principal mode of governance, and the limited expression given to the alternative governance modes of ―networks‖ and ―markets‖. The trends toward ―networks‖ and ―markets‖ are emerging with enabling legal frameworks for participation of non-state actors and increasing recognition given to the socio-cultural values and informal norms. However, hierarchical modes are strongly embedded in existing power and legal structures, such that the shift towards other modes will take some time.
Comparing Vietnam against Global Water Governance Trends This section compares water governance in Vietnam against four trends in global-level water governance identified in research conducted by Saleth and Dinar (2000). Discussion of governance has gained growing importance within the global water institutions in the light of perceived failures in water governance significantly contributing to water crises in both developing and developed countries (UNDP 2004; Pahl-Wostl and Kranz 2010), including poor outcomes from past investments in technology and infrastructure. According to Tropp (2007), changes to water governance in the international arena have evolved from ―old‖ notions of governance to ―new‖ forms, with the latter considered an essential prerequisite for improving water resources management:
―Old‖ notions of governance emphasized hierarchy and the role of government to steer societal interactions and inter-governmental relations; and
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―New‖ forms stress horizontal decision-making through partnerships and networks that involve a wide range of actors—local-to-global, state-to-non-state, and formal-toinformal.
While water management and institutional reforms may differ between countries, there are nevertheless recognizable common trends amongst them in the transformation of governance forms. Saleth and Dinar (2000) observed institutional changes in eleven countries in five continents, and reported a remarkable degree of similarity in water sector-related changes. Their research identified four main trends in the evolution process from ―old‖ to ―new‖ forms of water governance. The first trend is referred to as the ―Allocation Era‖—a paradigmatic shift from bureaucratic and state-centric decision-making towards a more holistic and participatory approach to water management. This trend poses a considerable challenge in developing allocation-oriented water laws and policies (i.e. ones that facilitate the fair and efficient allocation of water resources), as well as building an allocation-oriented organizational structure out of an existing water administration with insufficient skills and resources. In Vietnam, water protection and its fair and efficient allocation to the full range of user groups has become increasingly important, and is reflected in progressive changes to institutional frameworks and power distribution and sharing at different levels of governance. The second trend is a marked shift towards decentralization and privatization. Decentralization aims to achieve local flexibility and solve inter-provincial and inter-sectoral conflicts in water use through devolving coordination and operational functions to lower geographical and administrative levels. Privatization adds an additional institutional dimension to water resources management with the aim of creating a healthy level of competition between the public and private sectors. In Vietnam, a more diverse and active network of actors combined with regulatory framework changes have contributed to a more distributed power base and greater scope for privatization within the water sector. However, these shifts in the direction of decentralization and privatization have some way to go, relative to broader global trends.
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The third trend is a focus on IWRM and river basin management to address the complexities of water issues, which is in turn reflected in institutional reforms in both developed and developing countries alike. Common responses found among countries were:
Policy organizations (e.g. water resource councils or stakeholder bodies) established to facilitate an integrated perspective on the water sector;
A national water plan prepared to provide a technical framework for an integrated approach, with its implementation resulting in significant institutional changes; and
Moving water from the agriculture and energy ministries to the environment or natural resources ministries to eliminate sectoral bias, and including environmental issues within water management.
Vietnam (like Thailand and Malaysia) has moved functions for water resources management to the recently created MONRE and established the NWRC as an ―apex body‖ and introduced RBOs, seen as attempts at transforming conventional approaches to water management to more integrated approaches (Molle 2007). Thailand’s National Water Resources Committee was founded in 1987 to coordinate water-related issues, with the addition a decade later during sectoral reforms of the Office of National Water Resources Committee—in 2001, the latter was strengthened and transformed into an ―apex body‖ (Do 2014; Molle 2007). In Malaysia, the government moved water resources from the Ministry of Agriculture to the newly established Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment in 2003–04 (Do 2014). Its ―apex body‖, the National Water Resources Council, was established in 1998 in response to a significant El Nino event (Do 2014). The fourth trend is towards financial viability and physical sustainability of the water sector to avoid or mitigate financial crises and the degradation of the natural resource base. Saleth and Dinar (2000) found that all focal countries exhibited awareness of the health and environmental impacts of water pollution in their policies, and most had given consideration to different methods for cost recovery, pollution control and water quality maintenance. In Vietnam, the state has sought technical and financial assistance in its efforts to improve the fairness and efficiency of the water sector, including its water supply operations.
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Conclusions This chapter has provided insights on progress and trends in Vietnam’s water governance system in a changing era, including the domestic situation relative to global-level water governance trends. Pahl-Wostl’s (2009) conceptual framework provided a basis for examining Vietnam’s water-related institutions, the roles of actor groups, multi-level interactions and governance modes, and for rating the stage of learning of each in terms of single-loop, double-loop or triple-loop learning. This analysis was contextualised within a summary of the Vietnam’s water governance challenges (social, economic, ecological and capacity) in achieving fairer and more effective water resources management. Consultations with in-country experts and a review of key literature indicates substantial efforts by the state to reform institutional structures and regulatory frameworks in line with global-level trends in water governance reported in Saleth and Dinar (2000). In practice, the implementation of these water governance reforms is constrained by a number of factors, most notably: inadequate research about informal institutions and socio-cultural values in Vietnam and how to adapt international best-practice models and policies in this context; lack of mechanisms and incentives for enabling private sector and community group participation, inadequate coordination among actors; absence of an overarching strategic framework that aligns international support with the country’s priority needs; and ongoing dominance of top–down power structures and influential individuals. This is reflected in the (mostly early-stage) double-loop learning ratings attributed to all four dimensions of Pahl-Wostl’s (2009) framework, namely institutions, actor groups, multi-level interactions and governance modes. While the rating for formal institutions alone was early stage triple-loop learning, formal institutions are the main constraint limiting informal institutions from advancing beyond double-loop learning. This chapter provides potentially useful insights to inform future research and policy interventions for addressing the current challenges confronted by the range of state and nonstate actors in Vietnam with an interest in improving the fairness and sustainability of its water resources management paradigm. Priority areas for research and associated policy development include socio-cultural contexts, alignment of international support with country priorities, improvements to and enforcement of legal frameworks, enhancement of non-state
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actor participation, and capacity development to support assigned roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders.
Acknowledgments This chapter is based on work conducted under the ―ASEAN–U.S. S&T Fellowship 2015 supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Mission to ASEAN" and the project MK27 ―Inclusive development paths for healthy Red River landscapes based on ecosystem services‖ funded by WLE Greater Mekong and the CGIAR program. We would like to express our gratitude to government officials and experts for their helpful advice, especially Dr. Tong Ngoc Thanh, Dr Nguyen Chi Cong (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment) and Dr Nguyen Quang Tuan (Ministry of Science and Technology).
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Decision No. 432/QD-TTg, April 12, 2012, regarding the approval of strategies for sustainable development. Decision No. 1393, September 25 2012, regarding the approval of strategies for green growth Joint Ministerial Circular 75/2012/TTLT-BTC-BXD-BNNPTNT, May 15, 2012, regarding principles, methods and authorization to determine the consumption price of clean water in urban areas, industrial zones and rural areas. Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment Circular 42/2015/TT-BTNMT, September 29, 2015, regarding technical regulations of water resources planning. Recent examples include Decree no. 93/2009/NĐ-CP ((which regulates the management and use of foreign non-governmental aid), Prime Ministerial Decision No. 97/2009/QĐ-TTg (which defines the categories of science and technology organizations that can be established) and Ministry of Science and Technology Circular No. 02/2010/TT-BKHCN (which provides more detailed guidance on the establishment, registration and operation of science and technology organizations). A ―bureau‖ often comprises several field staff with responsibility for the commune area. However, most communes are small in area and therefore typically have only one staff member. In this chapter, ―bureau‖ has been used to include both instances. Office of the Prime Minister, Decision No. 459/QD-TTg, April 2, 2014. This and other conversions are based on an exchange rate of US$1 = VND22,000. Prime Ministerial Decision No. 81/2006/QD-TTg, April 14, 2006.
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