The business case for HS2 is very weak and has been based on a number of ... In the debate it is important to recognise
A Better Railway for Britain www.betterthanhs2.org
A BETTER RAILWAY FOR BRITAIN SEPTEMBER 2011
www.better than hs2.org
‘HS2 is no substitute for comprehensive regional investment and national sustainable transport strategies. The DfT have ignored all the evidence that shows high speed rail will likely result in higher carbon emissions, and poorer areas will still be on the outside looking in.’ New Economics Foundation ‘In most developed economies high‐speed railways fail to bridge regional divides and sometimes exacerbate them... Especially in smaller countries, upgrading existing, slower networks often makes more sense. Capacity can be increased with longer trains and extended platforms. Some spacious first‐class carriages could be converted to more compressed second‐class ones; Better signalling can increase the average speed of journeys. Britain still has time to ditch this grand infrastructure project—and should.’ The Economist ‘It is utterly indefensible that the Government is planning on spending such an incredible amount of money on this project. There are more affordable ways of getting the capacity needed and a high speed line for the rich, on a route already served by very quick trains, can’t be the priority over giving ordinary families and firms across the country a better deal.’ The TaxPayers’ Alliance ‘HS2 is a hugely expensive scheme which will benefit a minority of wealthy travellers while doing nothing to solve the dire transport problems faced by the majority of the population. If HS2 offered good value for money or significant environmental and economic benefits then perhaps a case could be made for it. Unfortunately it does neither.’ RAC Foundation ‘The burning need in public transport is not for sexy, pointy‐nosed high speed trains whose economics simply don’t stack up. It’s for boring unglamorous improvements to the services we actually use.’ Andrew Gilligan, The Daily Telegraph ‘Too much is being spent on these big vanity projects, such as High Speed 2, and not enough on local schemes that will offer practical benefits in people’s daily lives.’ Andrew Lee, Sustainable Development Commission
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A BETTER RAILWAY FOR BRITAIN
CONTENTS Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 5 Part 1: A Manifesto for our Railway................................................................................ 8 Part 2: Increasing Main Line capacity to the North................................................19
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INTRODUCTION The £30 billion High Speed 2 rail project has rightly triggered a national debate about our railways. Is HS2 the right project to address the issues our railways face? Is it value for money? Are there better alternatives? How does a new high speed rail (HSR) line fit into the UK’s overall rail strategy? Sir Rod Eddington in his 2006 rail study asked similar questions and concluded (as McNulty in 2011 also has) that we should generally prioritise getting greater use from our existing assets before building new ones. This document is intended as a contribution to this wider debate. The business case for HS2 is very weak and has been based on a number of false premises. It fails to recognise that time spent on trains can be economically productive (so the boost to productivity it claims is overstated). It does not use a realistic comparator (so the benefit of reducing overcrowding is exaggerated). The required sensitivity analysis has not been done (so it does not say what would happen if the growth in demand falls, for instance due to new technology). There is little evidence that a new railway would bring regeneration or significant job creation. The claimed ‘regeneration’ jobs are unlikely to be new jobs and even the Department for Transport (DfT) say that most will be in London. Furthermore, HS2 will leave many areas with slower train travel, the Euston rebuild will cause chaos for 8 years and it costs £½ billion for every minute saved to Birmingham. Nor is there an environmental case: HS2 say 87% of passengers will be either new journeys or from lower carbon classic rail. Only 6% are expected to come from air travel – and BAA say any domestic slots made available will be replaced by international flights. The line runs through an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, sites of Special Scientific Interest, ancient woodlands and some of Britain’s most tranquil countryside. It is therefore important to look at the alternatives to HS2. There are better ways to improve capacity and speed on mainline services between London and the North. These alternatives can meet forecast demand, and will benefit more people, more quickly and at a much lower cost. The starting point, however, is to step back and look at key rail needs. Services between London and the North are already high speed and are not the most congested routes. This broader needsbased approach is picked up in Part 1. The specific issue of mainline capacity to the Midlands and North is covered in Part 2. But the debate is wider than just rail. Investment in roads tends to have much higher returns than rail. While motorists contribute 4p per mile to the Treasury, rail requires an average 21p per mile subsidy. And while road is part of everyday travel for most people, rail is for the few, and long-distance rail is for the wealthier few – with 47% of journeys taken by those with the top 20% of incomes. The debate also includes the role of ultra-high-speed broadband. The internet has only been used by business for around 15 years. Applications and speed will continue to develop rapidly. Over the last year, Skype has starting becoming a mainstream business alternative to physical
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meetings and webinars are also taking off. Meanwhile, the DfT is encouraging telecommuting. Software for 3D teleconferencing is already available. This technology will be a game changer and will cut growth in expensive, high CO2 physical travel. The debate is also about growth and jobs, on which HS2 scores badly. The proposals in this document are likely to do more to benefit the economy because they spread the benefits more widely and focus on gaining significant benefits at relatively low costs. The bodies behind this document are in favour of higher speed rail but not the proposed HS2 project. In the debate it is important to recognise that we already have a rail system that compares favourably with the best in Europe. According to a recent Eurobarometer survey, there is a 92% satisfaction with journey times in the UK, higher than all our main European competitors. Furthermore, we need to avoid the expensive disasters that many of our competitors have faced in their high speed rail projects and look at the opportunity cost of HS2 and alternatives that are more beneficial and appropriate to the situation in the UK. We also need to avoid investing in heavily in current technology when new rail technology may be on the point of adoption. Some say that Maglev offers greener, quieter, cheaper and faster rail systems. Given reliability issues at the UK’s first Maglev installation and given that the capacity offered by HS2 is not needed for many decades, we would be wise to wait. We have a genuine win-win opportunity: we can meet the objectives of HSR – supporting growth and solving capacity issues, as well as achieving faster speeds – but without the need for ultrahigh speed. The many organisations across the political spectrum campaigning against HS2 and for better alternatives have been accused of being NIMBYs and Luddites. Personally, I am an entrepreneur, an innovator and a risk taker in the context of economic development. But the friend’s flat full of Concorde memorabilia and the former Maglev carriage languishing as a shed in a field in Burton Green, serve as reminders of what can go wrong when political vanity and misjudgment cloud sound analysis and decision making.
Jerry Marshall, Chairman, AGAHST Federation
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A BETTER RAILWAY FOR BRITAIN – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Government’s plans for a High Speed 2 railway line will cost in excess of £30 billion and benefit a few at the expense of the majority. The benefits are uncertain whilst the costs will add to our legacy of public debt. Meanwhile there are many pressing issues on our railways and wider transport networks that HS2 does not address. Our railways – and the passengers who use them – deserve better. There is an alternative. An alternative that meets the capacity challenge but at much lower cost, that can be delivered sooner, that integrates with our existing transport networks, that does much less environmental damage, that improves customer service across a wider section of the railway network and that improves financial performance, reducing the spiral of public subsidy. The manifesto argues the case for action on six key priorities.
1.
MEETING THE CAPACITY CHALLENGE
Rail use has grown very strongly in the last fifteen years, and there is little capacity on many parts of the network. In particular: •
There is an emerging critical shortage of capacity on key London commuter routes
•
There is a need for additional capacity on inter-urban routes
•
There is a need for additional capacity in major urban areas, particularly Leeds and Manchester.
But solutions need to be developed on a cost effective basis. Rather than spending £30 billion on HS2, specific improvements – such as reducing the proportion of first-class seats, removing the artificial peaks caused by the current fare structure, and targeting pinch points on the network – can increase capacity on the West Coast Main Line at a fraction of the cost of HS2. Part 2 of the Manifesto sets these out in full.
WEST COAST MAIN LINE – A CASE STUDY The incremental approach delivers a solution (the 51m ‘Optimised Alternative’) which fully meets foreseeable demand for both passenger and freight traffic. This is achieved at a fraction of the cost of HS2, which is an example of starting with the project before considering the realistic options. The Optimised Alternative comprises: • 12 car trains (3 cars first, 9 cars standard) • Grade separated junction at Ledburn • Additional track south of Nuneaton • ‘Stafford bypass’. This delivers more than three times the standard class capacity in the ‘base’ used in the evaluation of HS2, and with faster commuter trains doubles peak commuter capacity to Milton Keynes and Northampton. Capacity increases can be delivered incrementally, as needed, at a total infrastructure cost of £2.06 billion – Phase 1 of HS2 costs £17 billion, and delivers no benefits until 2026.
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2.
NARROWING THE QUALITY GAP
The best parts of the British rail system provide services as good as or better than anywhere else in Europe. However, overall standards are very variable, in terms of service levels, rolling stock and the quality of the station environment. There should be an audit of quality by route, to quickly identify the key ‘gaps’ in overall service quality, which in turn would drive future franchise specifications – based on outputs, not inputs.
3.
MAKING BETTER CONNECTIONS
The timetable is fragmented on many parts of the network, with too many poor connections, often simply as a result of failures to co-ordinate between different train operating companies. The industry should be tasked with developing ‘clockface’ timetables, which would improve connections and save passengers’ time.
4.
DRIVING MODAL SHIFT
Rail already does well in two key markets, commuting to central London and InterCity travel to central London. Much of the latter is already high speed by EU definition – comparable with say the German ICE service – and speeds will increase further with ERTMS1. The faster journey time offered by HS2 is smaller than headline speed figures suggest because of short distances between stations and travel time to HS2 stations. Furthermore, time can be used very productively on trains so the value of the additional time saving is small, therefore modal shift from HS2 would be limited. But the major opportunities to increase the use of rail and achieve mode shift to reduce congestion and deliver carbon savings are in markets where rail is weak at present. Away from the routes to London, speeds are generally low, many centres do not have frequent direct links, and on some routes the trains themselves are unattractive. If we want to encourage more people to use trains, Britain should follow the Swiss example, developing a plan for a comprehensive, national network linking all the key centres of population with through services or attractive, regular connections. Delivery of this will not only require improved frequencies and ‘clockface’ services (departures at fixed times past the hour), but also targeted investment to raise line speeds, eliminate speed restrictions and ensure that modern, attractive rolling stock is provided on all routes.
5.
CHARGING FAIR PRICES
For any but the simplest journey, finding the best value for money ticket requires sustained research and often a knowledge of the rail network that no-one should need to have. As a result,
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European Rail Traffic Management System, which includes the European Train Control System (ETCS), a standard for incab rather than external signaling, and GSM-R, the mobile communications standard for rail.
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many passengers pay more than they need, or get a more restrictive ticket than they need, or both – or give up in frustration. There should be a thorough review of the current fares structure, creating a national, affordable structure for ‘walk on’ fares. The review should not be limited to just looking at the off peak fare arrangements.
6.
DELIVERING A MORE AFFORDABLE RAILWAY
The high cost base of our railway is the central theme of the 2011 McNulty review. Specific actions are discussed for achieving up to £1 billion p.a. savings by 2019. In the more medium term there are already changes that Government have signed up to for cross boarder interoperability i.e. ERTMS (level 2) that can benefit affordability. ERTMS not only reduces our cost base (by lower maintenance costs) but coincidentally also enables more capacity (through more intensive use of the track) and shorter journey times (by allowing faster speeds across the whole intercity network). This is exactly the way Eddington saw speed improvements being delivered – as a side benefit of changes made to secure other more important benefits, in this case lower costs. We should be looking at these plans and benefits before developing new capacity and a dedicated HSR.
The Way Forward •
A committed, medium/long term programme of investment will progressively raise standards across the railway nationally on an affordable basis – perhaps half the level of expenditure envisaged for HS2 over the next twenty years.
•
The improvements can better meet the capacity challenge, provide greater support for growth as well as achieve a higher speed core network.
•
The improvements to the network will increase revenue across the country, hence improve the financial performance of the industry.
•
The improvements will also increase rail’s share of the total transport market, relieving congestion and delivering environmental benefits.
•
A new fares policy will make the network easier to use and better value for money, while maintaining the ‘walk on’ benefits of high frequency.
The manifesto sets out the basis for a better, faster railway for the whole country – a railway of which Britain can be proud.
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PART 1: A MANIFESTO FOR OUR RAILWAY In many ways the British rail network provides a good overall service, and customer satisfaction is generally high – recent research for the European Commission showed that passengers in Britain are more satisfied than in most other European countries. British passengers have higher satisfaction levels with punctuality, service frequency and length of journey times than in France, Germany and Italy, all who have majored on HSR. However the recent McNulty review confirmed that the industry’s costs are too high, and that a major reason for this is fragmentation of the industry, with a failure to deliver a ‘joined up’ network. We believe that delivery of high standards across the network will drive increased revenue hence better financial performance, and create a national railway of which the country can be proud – this is a much better way forward than concentrating investment in a new high speed line which will benefit a few at the expense of the majority. This manifesto argues the case for action on six key priorities: •
Meeting the capacity challenge
•
Narrowing the quality gap
•
Making better connections
•
Driving modal shift
•
Charging fair prices
•
Delivering a more affordable railway.
In many cases, actions will bring benefits in several of these areas; taken together, they will deliver a better, more cost effective rail network, able to play a vital and growing role in meeting Britain’s transport needs in the future.
1.
MEETING THE CAPACITY CHALLENGE
The current position Rail use has grown very strongly in the last fifteen years, and capacity on some parts of the network is now under pressure. Network Rail is tasked with leading detailed planning for the rail industry. It carries this out through ‘Route Utilisation Strategies’ (‘RUSs’), developed through a process of engagement with the industry, stakeholders and funders. The RUSs cover the network in a number of geographical sections and also cover ‘network’ issues such as electrification and rolling stock on a national basis.
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Taken together, the RUSs comprise a comprehensive set of plans and aspirations which are in turn a key input into the Government’s strategic planning for the railway and the development of its ‘High Level Output Statement’, a periodic specification of the outputs which the Government wishes the industry to deliver. This, together with the ‘Statement of Funds Available’, provides the basis for the Office of Rail Regulation’s five yearly periodic review process which determines both the revenue which Network Rail is allowed and the access charges for train operating companies. The RUS process highlights a number of key issues for network development, all driven by the ‘capacity challenge’ highlighted in the 2007 White Paper: •
An emerging critical shortage of capacity on key routes in the London Commuter area. The recent draft London and South East RUS flags major capacity shortfalls in the peak hour on a number of routes by 2031, including the South Western Main Line into Waterloo (a capacity shortfall of 7,100 passengers), the Great Eastern Main Line into Liverpool Street (4,200 shortfall) and the Brighton Main Line (1,600 shortfall). However, the RUS process has not developed a strategy to increase capacity on these routes.
•
The need for additional capacity on inter-urban routes. Here, except for the West Coast Main Line, the RUSs propose medium term timetable and rolling stock solutions to provide the increased capacity to meet forecast demand. For the West Coast Main Line, the draft RUS defers to stated government policy to build HS2, hence does not consider medium term alternative solutions, although it is possible to meet foreseeable demand increases by train lengthening and reconfiguration, together with limited infrastructure enhancements to relieve specific pinchpoints.
•
The need for additional capacity in major urban areas, particularly Leeds and Manchester. This can be achieved by a combination of additional rolling stock to allow train lengthening, and targeted infrastructure investment such as the Northern Hub project.
•
The case for electrification – Network Rail’s Electrification RUS has identified a cost benefit case for significant electrification for routes ranging from the Midland Main line to the Basingstoke – Exeter route. Electrification reduces operating costs and the industry’s carbon footprint, and delivers better services and increased revenue.
Overall, the industry planning process has carried out a comprehensive analysis of future needs and opportunities. In contrast, the approach to the development of HS2 can be characterised as ‘High Speed Rail is the solution. What’s the problem?’
The way forward There is a clear need to prioritise the provision of greater capacity, and to ensure that solutions are ranked in order of cost effective means: •
Rolling stock reconfiguration, for example conversion of some first class vehicles to standard class – which is virtually costless where first class loadings are low
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•
More effective demand management to get better capacity utilisation, for example with pricing to encourage the spread of peak demand, including use when appropriate of obligatory reservations to manage ‘high peak’ InterCity demand.
•
Operation of longer trains, to the extent that this is possible without major infrastructure expenditure.
•
Better timetables to run more trains
•
Targeted infrastructure investment to clear selected bottlenecks to enable the operation of longer trains and/or increased frequency.
•
Construction of new infrastructure
This logical process works. It is used to develop a cost effective alternative to HS2, as summarised below:
WEST COAST MAIN LINE – A CASE STUDY Adoption of this incremental approach delivers a solution (the 51m ‘Optimised Alternative’) which fully meets foreseeable demand for both passenger and freight traffic. This is achieved at a fraction of the cost of HS2, which is an example of starting with the project before considering the realistic options. The Optimised Alternative comprises: •
12 car trains (3 cars first class, 9 cars standard)
•
Grade separated junction at Ledburn
•
Additional track south of Nuneaton
•
‘Stafford bypass’.
This delivers more than three times the standard class capacity in the ‘base’ used in the evaluation of HS2, and with faster commuter trains doubles peak commuter capacity to Milton Keynes and Northampton. Capacity increases can be delivered incrementally, as needed, at a total infrastructure cost of £2.06 billion* – Phase 1 of HS2 costs £17 billion, and delivers no benefits until 2026. *Costs drawn from RP2, ‘Strategic Alternatives to the Proposed ‘Y’ Network’ p41; see breakdown at http://www.51m.co.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/ch1.pdf p10)
The development of an enhancement programme can build on the work already done by the industry, prioritising capacity projects on a national basis, clearly focused on the needs of passenger and freight customers. Generation of a medium term programme will provide a consistent work stream for industry contractors, potentially leading to a progressive reduction in unit costs, in line with the clear need to achieve savings identified by the McNulty review. Illustrative projects are shown overleaf:
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OTHER POTENTIAL CAPACITY ENHANCEMENTS: • East Coast Main Line – development of the Peterborough–Lincoln–Doncaster route as an alternative for freight • Reopening of the Leamside Line (Darlington–Newcastle) to provide additional capacity • Midland Main Line, Trans-Pennine, Cross Country – electrification • Northern Hub • Projects for increased capacity on major London commuter routes
2.
NARROWING THE QUALITY GAP
The current position The best parts of the British rail system provide services as good as or better than anywhere else in Europe, in terms of frequency, speed and comfort. Reliability across the network has progressively improved since the crisis following the Hatfield accident, to an all-time high in 2009. And the industry is held publicly accountable for its performance , unlike, for example, in Germany where the state owned operator Deutsche Bahn does not publish punctuality statistics. However, overall standards are very variable, in terms of service levels, rolling stock and the quality of the station environment. This is illustrated in the West Yorkshire network centred on Leeds: the routes between Leeds and Ilkley and Skipton have been electrified and have modern, attractive rolling stock, and passenger numbers have increased dramatically both peak and offpeak – it is a smart way to travel, and an attractive, positive alternative to the car. In contrast, other routes are still operated by uncomfortable ‘Pacer’ units, with slow journey times and lower frequencies, and minimal off-peak traffic – the poor quality offered means that use of rail is a ‘distress purchase’ on these routes. Similarly the service offered for inter-urban journeys varies between fast and frequent services to and from London, fast but less frequent services between places on the main London routes (for example Peterborough to Leeds and Milton Keynes to Manchester) and still painfully slow links between many city pairs away from London. The largest gains in modal share, and hence environmental benefits, can be achieved where services are currently poor. At the bottom of the heap, there are some routes where the service is so bad that it is pointless – these should either be developed or closed. The Doncaster–Lincoln franchise service specification is written to allow for the service pattern at the time the franchise was let, when British Rail had been running the service simply to minimise costs. So southbound there are only five trains daily, departing from Doncaster at 1024, 1305, 1427, 1934 and 2033. These are clearly not peak demand times – but these were broadly the times that British Rail could manage without requiring an additional train set in 1995/6!
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The way forward The first step is to establish where we are. There should be an audit of quality by route, taking into account every aspect of the passenger experience: punctuality and reliability, rolling stock capacity and quality, service frequency and journey times, station standards and station access, including integration with local public transport and car park provision. This process would quickly identify the key ‘gaps’ in overall service quality, which in turn would drive future franchise specifications – based on outputs, not inputs. We recognize progress is being made. New franchisees are required to commit to service quality targets that build on their performance in the regular National Passenger Satisfaction surveys and to have in house arrangements that use mystery shopping techniques to manage progress. This is a first step. But there is much more to do. Many services would also be improved by devolution of responsibility to the Regions. The improvements made in Scotland and Wales since devolution demonstrate the potential benefits of this approach – services have been substantially improved in both countries, and 62 stations have been reopened in Scotland alone.
3.
MAKING BETTER CONNECTIONS
The current position The timetable is fragmented on many parts of the network, with too many poor connections, often simply as a result of failures to co-ordinate between different train operating companies. The new East Coast Main Line timetable is full of examples of this. Despite, for the first time ever, having intermediate stops scheduled on a regular interval pattern, connections with a number of other routes have markedly deteriorated.
EXAMPLES OF POOR CONNECTIONS Milton Keynes–Preston and Glasgow, changing at Crewe Northbound
20 minutes
Southbound
58 minutes
X
London–Lincoln, changing at Newark Northbound
irregular, up to 45 minutes
X
The last ‘connection’ of the day to Grimsby and Cleethropes via Lincoln is 1 minute at Newark – impossible as, travelling north, passengers have to change platforms via a footbridge Southbound
10 – 15 minutes
Cambridge – the North East, changing at Peterborough Northbound
49 minutes
X
Southbound
53 minutes
X
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In contrast, connections on other parts of the network are good, with thoughtful customer service at some stations: The Southminster branch in Essex connects with the Southend–Liverpool service at Wickford, which has ‘bay’ platforms on either side of the main line. In the morning, branch trains use the platform on the London bound side of the station, but use the Southend bound side in the afternoon – so most passengers are able just to walk across the platform. The connection time is just five minutes in both directions.
The way forward The process of audit described in ‘Narrowing the Quality Gap’ would certainly involve identification of the critical connectional requirements for each route. As an example, the Nottingham–Boston–Skegness service has one critical connection at Grantham, from Skegness and Boston to Peterborough and London and vice versa, with no major constraints on the route – yet many of the connections are dreadful. As with overall quality, the industry should be tasked with developing ‘clockface’ timetables with improved and consistent service patterns and connections; this does not involve detailed timetable planning from Whitehall, but setting clear criteria, with an obligation on the industry to work together, in such a way that improves the overall service provided by the industry, hence driving increased revenue – a virtuous circle. There are also rail connection issues at key cities where they have several city centre stations. The audit should identify those connections that suffer from no direct links and provide solutions that enable better transfer times and ease of use (particularly for passengers with luggage). The creation of satellite stations (as HS2 would do) would simply worsen the problem.
4.
DRIVING MODAL SHIFT
The current position Rail already does well in two key markets: •
commuting to central London
•
InterCity travel to central London
and has been growing strongly in many other markets too, particularly commuting to big cities in the Regions, and interurban journeys where rail provides a reasonable alternative to road. But the major opportunities to increase the use of rail and achieve mode shift to reduce congestion and deliver carbon savings is in markets where rail is weak at present: rail already has a major share of long distance business travel, for example Leeds, Manchester and Birmingham to London, but a low market share between the major regions outside London and the South East.
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Away from the routes to London, speeds are generally low, many centres do not have frequent direct links, and on some routes the trains themselves are unattractive. There are some striking examples Liverpool–Manchester has three semi-fast trains an hour, with a fastest journey time of 47 minutes, averaging 45 mph for the 35 mile journey – trains on this route are no more frequent and slightly slower than 100 years ago. Leeds–Hull has one train an hour, with a journey time of 56 minutes, averaging 55 mph for the 51 mile journey.
But other parts of the United Kingdom are doing much better, especially Scotland: Edinburgh–Glasgow already has 10 trains an hour by four different routes, two of which are electrified. The main route via Falkirk is to be electrified with frequency on this route alone to be increased to six trains an hour, making 12 in total, with a fastest journey time of 37 minutes, averaging 76 mph.
The Way Forward Britain should follow the Swiss example, developing a plan for a comprehensive, national network linking all the key centres of population with through services or attractive, regular connections. Given the density of population in this country, this should operate on at least a half hourly frequency, with up to four trains an hour on busier routes. The Swiss timetable ensures both direct trains and a chain of good connections for the many journeys that involve a change. It embraces the national railway, the many independent railways, buses, steamers and mountain lines. Initially introduced in 1982 the ‘Taktfahrplan’ has been developed in stages and now includes a vision for 2030. Clearly-specified concepts of organising optimal interchanges at key nodes, of infrastructure projects to deliver timing benefits, of regular patterns of service and of ‘mirror-image’ timetables for the two directions have been crucial to its success in attracting passengers and operating reliably. And because the ‘offer’ is consistent and comprehensive the public transport system has become embedded in the Swiss way of life.
Parts of this are already in place, particularly in London and the South East, but there are big gaps in most of the country, and as highlighted already, the services on many key routes are too slow and infrequent to attractive a substantial share of interurban travel. Delivery of this will not only require improved frequencies and ‘clockface’ services, but also targeted investment to raise line speeds, eliminate speed restrictions and ensure that modern, attractive rolling stock is provided on all routes. Network Rail should be tasked to work with the
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train operators and key stakeholders to develop a medium term programme of route improvements, for implementation over , say, a ten – fifteen year period. Many schemes have already been identified, so an early start could be made on projects such as the Northern Hub.
EXAMPLES East–West Rail: reopening the Bicester–Bletchley section to provide a through Bristol– Swindon–Oxford–Milton Keynes route. Manchester–Bradford–Leeds: electrification and speed improvements, with through trains to Manchester Airport and Liverpool. Teeside–Newcastle–Edinburgh: new inter-urban service.
The existing main line services between London and the North are already high speed by EU definition. Although currently limited to 125 mph, ERTMS and in-cab signaling is planned to be mostly complete by 2025 on ECML and completed on WCML by 2030. This will allow speeds of 140 mph on many stretches of the WCML and 150+ mph on much of the ECML with suitable rolling stock. HS2 would have a higher maximum speed but the impact on journey time is small because the distances between stops are small. The average speed for HS2 phase 1 is only around 130 mph. Furthermore, as time can be used very productively on trains, the value of the additional time saving is small, and there would be longer travel times to HS2 stations for many. HS2 will only compete with air to win traffic from the lowlands of Scotland, for which HS2 has a projected journey time of 3:30 to 3:40. The summer 2011 ECML timetable includes one train from Edinburgh to London at 4:00. Given that the additional timesaving by HS2 is small the consequential modal shift is likely to be limited compared with modal shift from the measures discussed above.
5.
CHARGING FAIR PRICES
The current position The industry trade body, the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) claimed that the fares structure was simplified in 2008. Anyone who has attempted to navigate the labyrinthine complexity of any of the rail industry websites would greet this with a hollow laugh. For any but the simplest journey, finding the best value for money ticket requires sustained research and often a knowledge of the rail network that no-one should need to have. As a result, many passengers pay more than they need, or get a more restrictive ticket than they need, or both – or give up in frustration.
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Virgin operate a superb frequency of service between London and both Manchester and Birmingham, with trains every twenty minutes. But ‘open’ tickets, which passengers can use on any train, are now enormously expensive (£279 for a standard open return from Manchester to London). The great majority of passengers therefore either use the off–peak ticket, so the first available trains from London in the evening, after 1900, are horribly over crowded – or buy advance purchase tickets and have to wait around for their nominated train, or risk being charged a fortune if they board the ‘wrong ‘ train. This totally undercuts the attraction of having a train every twenty minutes!
The Way Forward There should be a thorough review of the current fares structure and fares regulation policy, with clear ‘public interest’ objectives: •
Delivery of a coherent and understandable national fares structure, applicable to the full range of potential journeys – the national network is one of the industry’s strengths, but it is and feels fragmented
•
Development of clear standards for internet sales presentation – many of the current rail industry websites are extraordinarily complex and difficult to use
•
Affordable ‘walk on’ fares to ensure that passengers and the industry both get the full benefit of high frequency InterCity services
•
A review of fares regulation to smooth the current major artificial peaks, for example the overcrowding on departures from Euston at 1900 and immediately afterwards.
None of these changes are in reality likely to result in reduced revenue – a simple to understand, national offer will drive increased use, and many people, especially business passengers, would be willing to pay some premium for the flexibility provided by ‘walk on’ fares – but not with the present level of difference. In May 2011 the Government announced ‘a full review of fares policy, including addressing anomalies in the current system and the potential for much greater use of smart technology’. This followed the McNulty review that highlighted anomalies such as the ‘1900 fares cliff’. We support a vision for fares that meets the expectations of passengers and enables much better use of rail capacity. But this needs to be more than just tinkering with the off peak periods. Fares vision – the creation of a national, affordable structure for ‘walk on’ fares, with cheap ‘off peak’ tickets available for shorter distance journeys (
