Tan, C. (2016). A Confucian Conception of Critical Thinking. Journal of Philosophy of Education, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12228, 1-12. DRAFT
A Confucian Conception of Critical Thinking CHARLENE TAN ABSTRACT This article proposes a Confucian conception of critical thinking by focussing on the notion of judgement. It is argued that the attainment of the Confucian ideal of li (normative behaviours) necessitates and promotes critical thinking in at least two ways. First, the observance of li requires the individual to exercise judgement by applying the generalised knowledge, norms and procedures in dao (Way) to particular action-situations insightfully and flexibly. Secondly, the individual’s judgement, to qualify as an instance of li, should be underpinned and motivated by the ethical quality of ren (humanity) that testifies to one’s moral character. Two educational implications arising from a Confucian conception of critical thinking are highlighted. First, the Confucian interpretation presented in this essay challenges the perception that critical thinking is absent from or culturally incompatible with Chinese traditions. Secondly, such a conception advocates a view of critical thinking as judgement that is actionoriented, spiritual-ethical and interpersonal. INTRODUCTION Current conceptions of critical thinking are primarily derived from Anglo-European histories, traditions, writings, paradigms and experiences. A number of scholars have maintained that critical thinking in academic and popular discourses originated from Greek and Enlightenment philosophies and presuppositions (e.g. Griffin, 1988; Gardner, 1989; Burbules, 1995; Barnett, 1997; Thayer-Bacon, 2000; Cuypers, 2004). A representative view is the observation by Gardner (1989) that ‘we in the West esteem too narrow a band of capacities—a certain form of logical-rational thought, which grew out of the Greco-Roman heritage (shades of Meno!) and has dominated our schooling and dictated the form and content of our standardised tests’ (p. 110). This state of affairs has contributed to a perception that critical thinking is a Western product and is concomitantly absent from, marginalised in and/or culturally incompatible with non-Western societies. In particular, some researchers have contended that critical thinking is under-developed or suppressed in Confucian traditions and Confucian Heritage Cultures such as China, Japan and Korea (e.g. Atkinson, 1997; Volet and Chalmers, 1997; McBride et al., 2002; Tiwari et al., 2003; Turner, 2006; McGuire, 2007; Oda, 2008). However, the argument that critical thinking is non-existing or impoverished in non-Western contexts depends, among other things, on what one means by ‘critical thinking’. If, for instance, one defines critical thinking as the application of
2 Greek/Enlightenment canons of logical analysis and argumentation that reside in Western educational institutions, one should not be surprised to find a dearth of such application in non-Western localities. But this way of understanding critical thinking is culturally biased and circular, proving what one has already assumed to be the case. It is important to note that there is no consensus among scholars, despite decades of research and debates, on the definition of critical thinking (e.g. Johnson, 1992; Capossela, 1998; Bailin et al., 1999; Pithers and Soden, 2000; Tian and Low, 2011). Is critical thinking, inter alia, a generic set of skills (Ennis, 1992), discipline-specific processes (McPeck, 1981), the educational cognate of rationality (Siegel, 1988), a democratic learning process to interrogate power relations and social inequities (Benesch, 1993) or thinking that meets relevant standards or criteria of acceptability (Bailin and Siegel, 2003)? The ambiguity and controversy surrounding the concept of critical thinking may have ironically perpetuated its status as an educational ideal. As noted by Brookfield (1991), ‘The greater its conceptual malleability, the wider its interpretive latitude, the more chance an idea stands of being claimed by ideologically diverse groups to be their intellectual standard bearer’ (p. 1). Challenging the view that critical thinking is absent from or culturally incompatible with Chinese traditions, this article proposes a Confucian conception of critical thinking. It should be clarified at the outset that my focus is on the theory (or more precisely, a philosophical treatment) rather than the practice of Confucianism. Also, my proposed conception is by no means the only or best Confucian interpretation of critical thinking. Certainly other Confucian formulations of critical thinking are possible and welcome, given that Confucianism as a system of beliefs is not monolithic and unchanging but pluralistic and evolving (for a different but complementary account of critical thinking from a Confucian perspective, see Kim, 2003). The article begins by introducing and delineating critical thinking as judgement. This is followed by an exposition of a Confucian conception of critical thinking and its educational implications. CRITICAL THINKING AS JUDGEMENT It is not the purpose of this section to put forward the definition of critical thinking, given that the term is conceptually malleable and contestable. Nor is such an endeavour necessary, since the diverse meanings of critical thinking have accentuated the richness and versatility of the term. What I intend to do, instead, is to spotlight on a particular interpretation of critical thinking, that of judgement. Viewing critical thinking as judgement is appropriate when we consider that the word ‘critical’ is etymologically derived from Greek words that denote judgement and discernment. Scholars such as Hostetler (1991), Burbules (1995), Dunne and Pendlebury (2003), Lipman (2007) and Moore (2013) have referred or alluded to judgement in their discussion on critical thinking. Lipman (2007) conceptualises critical thinking as skilful and responsible thinking that ‘facilitates judgement because it relies on criteria, is self-correcting and is sensitive to context’ (p. 428). A judgement is ‘a determination—of thinking, of speech, of action, or of creation’ that may take the form of a decision, a solution to an actual or theoretical problem, an evaluation of performances etc. (Lipman, 1998, p. 39). In alignment with Lipman is Hostetler (1991) who posits that critical thinking is ‘a dynamic, ultimately social process requiring judgment and deliberation on the part of people’ (p. 10). Burbules (1995) adds that ‘it is in how and when persons change their minds that their reasonableness,
A Confucian Conception of Critical Thinking 3 or not, manifests itself’ (p. 86, italics in the original). Dunne and Pendlebury (2003) elaborate on the interrelated elements under the rubric of judgement: ‘… the open texture of the deliberation it sets in train; its need for fresh acts of perception or insight to meet the particularity of each action-situation; its irreducibility to general propositions and its hence inextinguishably experiential character; its being not only directive of present action but also itself shaped by the history of one’s previous actions as these have become layered in one’s character’ (p. 201, author’s italics). Two salient characteristics of judgement can be identified from the above quote. First, judgement is experiential where an individual applies generalisations to particular action-situations insightfully and flexibly. It is ‘knowledge invested in action’ in the sense that the individual recognises and resolves ill-structured problems in daily life by drawing upon established norms and procedures (Dunne and Pendlebury, 2003). The process of judgement requires personal insight to make sense of particular situations as well as flexibility to put to use general knowledge (Dunne and Pendlebury, 2003; also see Smith, 1999; Phelan, 2001). Reflection is also integral to judgement-making as the agent should not just blindly accept existing belief systems but also interrogate and modify them when necessary. The second feature of judgement is that it stems from and testifies the moral character of the agent. The deliberation process is invariably confronted with normative concerns that requires a combination of practical virtues and intellect (Dunne and Pendlebury, 2003). Virtues are the flexible aspects of our character that are tied to our sense of self and revealed through our choices and interactions with others (Burbules, 1995). The ethical dimension of judgement is further seen in the non-instrumental nature of practical reason. According to Cuypers (2004), a noninstrumental conception of rationality holds that reason is both normatively and motivationally practical. Critical thinking as judgement, to borrow the words of Cuypers (2004), ‘not only tells us what is intrinsically good (or bad) and what we ought (or ought not) to do, it also generates in us pertinent volitions and moves us all the way to action’ (p. 82). This conception is contrasted with an instrumental conception of rationality such as the Humean approach that views reason as the efficient means for given ends without any normative or motivational power. The next section builds upon and extends our understanding of critical thinking as judgement by turning to the Confucian context. A CONFUCIAN CONCEPTION OF CRITICAL THINKING I shall argue in this section that critical thinking as judgement is exemplified in the Confucian ideal of li. Li is usually translated as ‘ritual propriety’ or ‘rites’ due to its genesis in and close relationship with religious ceremonies in ancient China. But the meaning of li as intended by Confucius is much broader, as evident in the following remarks taken from the Analects1 (all quotations cited in this article are taken from the Analects and translated into English by the author): 12.1: Do not look unless it is in accordance with li; do not listen unless it is in accordance with li; do not speak unless it is in accordance with li; do not move unless it is in accordance with li.
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The verse above informs us that li covers all human actions, be it looking, listening, speaking or moving. This means that li goes beyond ritual propriety and rites to encompass all areas of human life. Examples of li recorded in the Analects are performing the di imperial ancestral sacrifice (3.10), observing mourning rituals (3.4), prostrating (9.3), offering appropriate greeting during a game of archery (3.7), sitting (10.12), eating (10.10) and even sleeping (10.24). I have elsewhere argued that li is best understood as the totality of normative behaviours that are accompanied by corresponding attitudes and values (Tan, 2013). Comprising ‘rites, ritual practice, roles and relationships’ (Hall and Ames, 1998, p. 269), li enables us to ‘understand, express, develop, and continue to interpret who and what we are, and that gives concrete shape to our forms of life’ (Ivanhoe, 2003, p. 34). It follows that li should not be viewed narrowly or pejoratively as superficiality, formalism or irrationality as connoted by the English word ‘ritual’ (Hall and Ames, 1998). Neither should li be observed mechanically or rigidly. Instead, individuals need the liberty and wisdom to act normatively and appropriately in each and every situation. To amplify the essence and role of judgement in Confucianism, it is instructive to refer to the two defining features of judgement identified in the previous section. Recall that judgement is experiential where the individual applies generalisations to particular action-situations insightfully and flexibly. In the case of Confucianism, the ‘generalisations’ for judgement is embodied in dao (Way). Dao is the Way of Heaven (tian) that provides the guiding or prescriptive discourse for human beings (Hansen, 1989). Dao is declared in and transmitted via various modes such as traditional texts, social institutions and exemplary conduct of sage-kings who lived before Confucius’ time (Tan and Tan, 2016). Of special mention is the Zhou dynasty that was singled out by Confucius as possessing the ‘empirical data’ of the golden past (Schwartz, 1985, p. 85). Dao is therefore encapsulated in the Zhou culture that provides individuals with the ‘established norms and procedures’ (Dunne and Pendlebury, 2003) to arrive at judgements. The relation between dao and judgement is further seen in Confucius’ call for human beings to broaden dao: 15.29 It is human beings who are able to broaden dao, not dao that broadens human beings. The exhortation for human beings to broaden rather than simply follow dao is significant. To broaden dao is to ‘experience, to interpret, and to influence the world in such a way as to reinforce, and where appropriate extend, a way of life established by one’s cultural precursors’ (Hall and Ames, 1987, p. 227). Such an endeavour necessitates the exercise of judgement where individuals apply the symbolic resources and shared values found in dao to particular action-situations in their everyday life. Bringing together our understanding of dao and Confucius’ injunction for human beings to observe li, it can be concluded that to broaden dao is to observe li. Put succinctly, the pattern of li is the ‘internal structure’ of dao (Hall and Ames, 1987, p. 237). The very act of understanding, fulfilling and extending dao requires individuals to arrive at judgements in unique and particularised contexts (Brindley, 2011). Demonstrating the exercise of judgement, Confucius rejected certainty and dogmatism (9.4), hated inflexibility (14.32), and chose to retain that which was good and efficacious (7.28). Slingerland (2001) highlights ‘the ease and grace with which the Master embodied the spirit of the rites [li] in every aspect of his life (no matter how trivial) and accorded with this spirit in adapting the rites [li] to new and
A Confucian Conception of Critical Thinking 5 necessarily unforeseeable circumstances’ (p. 103). Driving home the point that individuals living in a li-ordered community are defined by creativity rather than rigid hierarchy, Hall and Ames (1998) assert that individuals are ‘creating the other’ through ‘self-cultivation and articulation’ (p. 273). Broadening dao entails that the observance of li involves not just an adherence to but also a critique and revision of prevailing beliefs and practices. Our existing and taken-for-granted norms and presuppositions should be carefully examined and compared with the ideal standard that is embodied in dao. Confucius himself modelled this when he questioned and modified certain practices of li (cf. 9.3) and chastised the rulers of his time for violating li (cf. 3.1, 3.2, 3.10. 3.26).2 He also critically assessed and selected, rather than accepting or rejecting wholesale, specific practices from the Xia and Yin dynasties (cf. 15.11). In so doing, Confucius evinces individual judgement that is especially needed in dealing with controversial issues and moral dilemmas (Wu, 1987; Cua, 1992; Ahn, 2008; Ivanhoe, 2013; Tan, 2015a). To further understand the Confucian treatment of judgement, it is helpful to introduce another Confucian concept, that of yi. Translated as ‘appropriateness’ or ‘rightness’, yi refers to knowing and doing what is fitting for an occasion by exercising one’s discernment and discretion. The possession of yi is a distinguishing mark of a junzi (the noble or exemplary person), as stated by Confucius: 4.10 In one’s dealings in the world, the junzi is not for or against anything; such a person goes with what is yi. The application of yi is essential in day-to-day situations such as conversing with someone (10.2, 10.15), receiving gifts (10.23), commuting (10.26) and conducting oneself in public (10.3, 10.4). Commenting on 4.10 (cited earlier), Slingerland (2001) maintains that ‘[t]his sort of situation-centered reasoning resembles Aristotelian phronesis, and ultimately “what is right” in the ethical realm corresponds to what the gentleman (that is, the good person) [junzi] would do’ (p. 103).3 Yi guides an individual to perceive and respond to a situation that needs an action to make it a moral state (Cheng, 1972; Chong, 1998). Given that the observance of li in one instance may be in conflict with another, yi is needed to guide an individual to make ethical decisions in specific action-situations (Chan, 2002; Yu, 1998). By flexibly interacting with and manipulating ever changing situations, one becomes a person of judgement by doing what is both normative (li) and appropriate (yi) (Hall and Ames, 1987). The reference to ethical considerations in the preceding brings us to the second characteristic of judgement: its dependence on and reflection of the moral character of the agent. An individual’s judgement, to qualify as an instance of li, should be underpinned and motivated by the ethical quality of ren (humanity or benevolence) that testifies to one’s moral character. That ren and li are interdependent was underlined by Confucius: 2.1 Restraining the self and returning to li is ren. If a person could restrain oneself and return to li for one day, the whole world would regard such a person as ren. Confucius’ point is that ren—the over-arching virtue of humanity that encompasses all moral values such as respect, sincerity and empathy—is acquired when we observe li. Another way of putting it is that li is the means to and evidence of ren. The
6 actualisation of ren involves not just outward moral act but also corresponding feelings and dispositions, what Cua (1992) terms an ‘attitude of caring’ (p. 52). Ren inspires and directs an individual to arrive at judgement by integrating one’s practical virtues and intellect. The centrality of ren in the observance of li signifies that a noninstrumental conception of rationality is subscribed to. The practical reason that is premised on ren guides and spurs the agent on to do what is intrinsically good in accordance with li. An application of the non-instrumental nature of practical reason is the following episode recorded in the Analects: 3.15 When the Master went to the Grand Ancestral Hall, he asked questions about everything. Someone remarked, “Who said that this son of a man from the Zou village understands li? On entering the Grand Ancestral Hall, he asks questions about everything”. When the Master heard of this, he said, “The asking of questions is itself li”. Confucius’ act of asking questions at the Grand Ancestral Hall was construed as a sign of ignorance. But his reply shows that rationality (as evident in his seeking explanation through questioning) is not just an efficient means for a given end (in this case, learning about the ceremonies and related matters at the Grand Ancestral Hall). Rather, reason is both normatively and motivationally practical: the asking of question itself is an instance of li because such an act reveals and reinforces one’s attitude of sincerity, attentiveness, humility and most importantly, the love of li (Tan, 2013). EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS This last section suggests two educational implications arising from a Confucian conception of critical thinking. The first implication is that our Confucian conception challenges the assumption that critical thinking does not exist or is not promoted in Chinese traditions. As mentioned at the start of the essay, the extant literature on critical thinking is grounded in and shaped by Western historical developments, cultures, scholarship and educational practices. Within Western traditions, a critical thinker is often portrayed as an autonomous, rational and solitary individual who excels in applying the universal processes of logic and adversarial argumentation (Walters, 1994; Vandermensbrugghe, 2004; Turner, 2006; Waller, 2012).4 Hall and Ames (1998) describe such a person as a ‘truth-seeker’ who is resolved ‘finally to get to the bottom line, to establish facts, principles, theories that characterise the way things are’ (p. 105). However, the image of a critical thinker as an independent and truth-driven champion of propositional knowledge, syllogism and adversarial debates is foreign to the Confucian traditions. To be sure, an interpretation of critical thinking as logicalrational thinking is not totally absent from Chinese thought; Harbsmeier (1989) has drawn our attention to the logical theory of Mohism and the Chinese concept of semantic truth. But these instances are the exception rather than the rule. ‘Truthseeking’, defined as the Greek/Enlightenment systems of abstract argumentation and linear/causal thinking are under-represented in Chinese histories, philosophies, worldviews and social institutions (Feng and Bodde, 1948; Hansen, 1985). An example that illuminates the contrasting views between the Chinese and Westerners is the encounter between foreign Catholic missionaries and Chinese in China. Gernet (1985) reports that ‘the missionaries considered the Chinese to be poor at reasoning’ whereas the Chinese were puzzled by the missionaries’ indulgence in ‘all kinds of
A Confucian Conception of Critical Thinking 7 breaks and separations’ and ‘countless incomprehensible lines of reasoning’ (pp. 242-243). One way to defend the Chinese against the charge of poor reasoning abilities is to cite the scientific achievements of the Chinese in ancient China. It is untenable for a people who had developed a secular and observational view of the world and contributed to engineering and mathematical advances to be deficient in critical thinking, as alleged by the missionaries. But another rebuttal to the missionaries’ criticism of the reasoning abilities of the Chinese—a response that is more powerful—is to contrast the worldviews and assumptions held by the missionaries and Chinese. The question of whether the Chinese were ‘poor in reasoning’ or the Western missionaries were too fixated with ‘all kinds of breaks and separations’ boils down to one’s understanding of critical thinking and other epistemic terms such as rationality, evidence and truth. The missionaries were largely relying on a Western concept of critical thinking that centred on linear, causal, deductive and inductive reasoning (‘breaks and separations’). This understanding of critical thinking was, however, unacceptable to the Chinese as they were unfamiliar with the strict categorisation and atomic technical skills. Instead, they had been socialised into a more correlative and applied approach to thinking (Tan, 2016).5 Had the missionaries been aware of and acknowledged the Confucian conception of critical thinking as judgement, they might be less inclined to dismiss the Chinese as being poor in reasoning. The Chinese, on their part, might then be more receptive towards the evangelistic and educational efforts of the missionaries. The second implication of the Confucian conception of critical thinking forwarded in this paper is that such a conception advocates a view of critical thinking as judgement that is action-oriented, spiritual-ethical and interpersonal. First, a critical thinker is action-oriented as such a person applies generalised knowledge, norms and procedures to personalised and unpredictable situations insightfully and flexibly. This interpretation of critical thinking shifts our focus from abstract and universal canons of argumentation to concrete social-cultural practices that unite knowledge and action (Cua, 1989; Tan, 2015b, c). Rather than simply a ‘truth-seeker’, a critical thinker is also a ‘way-seeker’ who aims at actions that foster self-understanding, selfcultivation, self-transformation and harmonious social existence (Tu, 1985; Hall & Ames, 1998; Li, 1999).6 Adopting an ‘orientative’ worldview (Lao, 1989), such a person aspires to effect some change in the self or in the world by asking ‘what it is’ as well as ‘where should we go’. Besides being action-oriented, the proposed conception of critical thinking is also spiritual and ethical. Eschewing an instrumental formulation of rationality, reason is guided and motivated by metaphysical and moral ends. As pointed out earlier, the exercise of judgement is directed at broadening dao that is the Way of heaven. Human beings are to participate in the self-creation of dao in order to realise the Way of Heaven (Li, 1999). This spiritual (rather than religious) dimension of critical thinking elevates the horizon of human beings beyond this-worldly cares to the larger question of one’s existence and attributes a non-material component to life. Inseparable from the spiritual vision is the inherently ethical component of the Confucian conception of critical thinking as epitomised in the virtue of ren. The scope of morality for a critical thinker should go beyond a person’s actions and consequences to include one’s attitudes and disposition. Judgement, it follows, is an intrinsically moral engagement that bears witness to the agent’s character. Finally, the interpersonal rather than solitary component of critical thinking is privileged in the recommended conception of critical thinking. Instead of conceiving the critical thinking as championing individual autonomy and social independence,
8 our conception approaches critical thinking as an act and affirmation of the communal. Littlewood (1999) posits that the Enlightenment vision of autonomy, with its desired outcomes of self-fulfilment, freedom from constraints and authoring one’s own world without external interference, ‘may have little relevance outside the “individualistic” Western contexts in which it first rose to prominence’ (p. 72, also see Holliday, 1994; Jones, 1995; Pennycook, 1997). In the context of Confucianism, the task of broadening dao requires the cultivation of both the self and others: there is a symbiotic relationship between helping oneself and helping others to observe li. As Confucius put it, ‘In helping oneself to take a stand, one helps others to take their stand; in desiring to reach a goal, one helps others to reach their goal’ (6.30). In Confucian parlance, to ‘take a stand’ is to perform one’s social roles in accordance with li. The observance of li necessarily takes place within a network of relationships where one joins a community of dao-seekers and ren lovers (Hall and Ames, 1998). CONCLUSION Questioning the prevailing view that critical thinking is a Western concept and is imperilled in Chinese traditions, this article has proposed a Confucian conception of critical thinking. It was argued that a person who performs li exhibits critical thinking in two main ways. First, the observance of li requires the agent to exercise judgement appropriately (yi) by applying the prescriptive generalised discourse embodied in dao (Way) to particular action-situations judiciously. The judgement involved in carrying out normative behaviours is undergirded and motivated by ren that reflects the moral character of the agent. A Confucian interpretation of critical thinking enhances our understanding of critical thinking by foregrounding the practical, metaphysical, ethical and communal dimensions of judgement. It should be added that the Confucian notion of critical thinking as judgement is not necessarily antagonistic towards a definition of critical thinking as deductive and inductive reasoning, syllogistic argumentation and causal thinking. A Confucian way-seeker is open to utilising all resources, including the tools of truth-seeking such as logical-rational thinking processes to arrive at the best possible judgement. What a Confucian critical thinker rejects, instead, is a narrow and dogmatic approach to critical thinking that ignores the historical, situated, complex and inter-connected worldviews and problemsituations.7 Correspondence: Charlene Tan, Associate Professor, Policy and Leadership Studies, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, 1 Nanyang Walk, Singapore 637616.
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[email protected] NOTES 1 The Analects is a Confucian text that compiles the sayings and conduct of Confucius and his followers. Given that the book came into existence a few centuries after the death of Confucius, there are expectedly doubts over its authenticity. I have elsewhere argued that there are cogent reasons to regard the Analects as an authoritative source of Confucius’ teachings, keeping in mind the socially constructed and evolving nature of Confucianism (Tan, 2013, 2015a).
A Confucian Conception of Critical Thinking 9 2 In examining and questioning prevailing practices, Confucius displayed a questioning spirit that is integral to critical thinking. The Tokugawa era Japanese philosopher and Confucian scholar Kaibara Ekken (1630--1715) elaborates on the importance of doubt in the process of learning: ‘The gentleman-scholar of novice learning cannot immediately get to the heart of things. The way of learning must include doubt, for when one has doubt, advancement is sure to follow. (…) doubt accompanies learning, with doubt comes questioning, with questioning comes reflection. With reflection comes accomplishment: this is how the Way of inquisitive learning or scholarship (gakumon) comes to be’ (Ekiken, 1998, p. 70). 3
Dunne and Pendlebury (2003) also make reference to Aristotle in their discussion of judgement. They assert that ‘Aristotle’s treatment of phronesis incorporates the interrelated elements identified above under the rubric of “judgement”’ (p. 201). As correctly pointed out by Slingerland (2001), Aristotle’s notion of phronesis is similar to Confucius’ concept of yi (appropriateness). Another convergence between Aristotle and Confucius on the topic of judgement is the former’s concept of equity (epieikeia) (from Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics). Aristotle’s moral virtue of equity where one arrives at customised and particularised judgements reminds us of the Confucian notion of judgement as creative adaptation and application. Highlighting the parallels between Aristotle’s practical wisdom and Confucius’ judgements of appropriateness, Yu (2007) holds that both ethics direct human beings towards the goal of cultivation and refinement. For further reading, see Brunschwig, 1996; Yu, 1998, 2007; Broadie and Rowe, 2002.
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This does not mean that alternative and competing conceptions of critical thinking do not exist in the Anglo-American contexts. An example of a conception that is contrasted with the dominant individualistic, adversarial and logicistic formulation of critical thinking is one that emphasises community of inquiry, cooperation and dialogue (Paul, 1987; Durkin, 2008; Waller, 2012).
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Hostetler (1991) alerts us to the fact that all human inquiry must begin from what Gadamer calls ‘prejudice’ which are fore-judgments or pre-understandings. Gadamer (2004) criticises the Enlightenment’s search for ‘pure’ reason by contending that reason is ‘constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates’ (p. 277). Following Gadamer’s argument that our prejudices run so deep that we often cannot get to them, it is arguable that critical thinking exists in Confucian cultures but is so embedded in Chinese thinking that it is taken for granted and not seen in most cases.
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It should be added that a Confucian critical thinker is not necessarily antagonistic towards the search for and attainment of truth. Taylor and Choy (2005) claim that dao can be interpreted, among other meanings, as truth. As they put it, ‘the Way of Confucius, or the Way of Confucianism, refers to the Confucian teachings and practices as a tradition, specifically the essential ones; that is to say, the Truth’ (p. 589). But this understanding of truth as living out one’s tradition should be distinguished from a conception of truth as logical-rational analysis, facts, principles and theories, which is what Hall and Ames have in mind.
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The author is grateful to the journal referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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