commentary
A Critical Review of Agrarian Reforms in Sikkim Anjan Chakrabarti
A close look at the agricultural scenario in the hill state of Sikkim reveals that foodgrain production has been growing more slowly than population. The state has failed to augment agrarian reforms and public investment in agriculture has been on the decline. As a result, foodgrain production, productivity, gross sown area and the contribution of agriculture to the gross state domestic product are all declining. The limited availability of cultivable land and the unsuitable terrain have complicated the situation further.
The author is grateful to Tanka Bahadur Subba of the Department of Anthropology, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, for his valuable suggestions. Anjan Chakrabarti (
[email protected]) teaches economics at St Joseph’s College, Darjeeling.
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n the large contours of agrarian structure, land is considered as a primary productive asset in any agrarian society and land tenure system is one of the important determinants of land productivity. By and large, sharecropping has been used as a means of surplus appropriation by the dominant class, also allowing them to maximise labour input, land productivity and surplus. On the contrary, the term land reform has many connotations, and is interpreted and implemented in various ways in different countries. In broad terms, land reform means redistribution or reallo cation of rights to establish a more equitable distribution of farmland (Boyce et al 2005: 1)
Thrust on Land Reforms In India, the major policy thrust during the post-independence period till the pregreen revolution period of 1964-65 revolved around land reforms – to achieve greater productivity and production, and to ensure distributive justice for landless farmers. Sen (1962), Bardhan (1973) and Berry and Cline (1979), on the basis of their findings, have shown that smallsized farms have higher productivity. Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002), based on their field surveys in the mid-1990s, have concluded that a 17-18% increase in productivity in West Bengal has been observed in the plots operated by registered sharecroppers and this is in conformity with the hypothesis that security of tenure and fair crop sharing to sharecroppers ensure incentive to increase production. International evidence overwhelmingly endorses a rural growth strategy based on the dynamism of small family farms as these are demonstrably more poverty- reducing than large holdings and are typically more productive per unit area (Handstad et al 2001). If it is accepted that land reform has a direct bearing on agricultural production
Economic & Political Weekly EPW January 30, 2010 vol xlv no 5
and productivity, then rise in production and productivity certainly contribute towards achieving food security. The degree of success in implementing land reform has varied significantly from state to state including Sikkim, the 22nd state of India located in the Eastern Himalayas. Till 1975, the state was under hereditary monarchy for over three centuries (Subba 1989a: 80). However, from 1861 to 1947, the British had a de facto control over Sikkim. Prior to the integration of Sikkim with India, the migrant Bhutias were the ruling class and they ruled over the indigenous Lepcha tribes and migrant Nepalese. Majority of the Nepalese, however, did not have any land rights and they were either landless agricultural labourers or tenants. In Sikkim, around 70% of the population still depends on agriculture (Census of India 2001), and its importance can also be traced from the popular Nepalese saying in Sikkim: Padhi guni ke kam, halo joti khayo mam which means what is the use of reading and writing, when ultimately you have to plough the field (Sinha 2009). Therefore, the land tenure system, agrarian structure and relations in Sikkim demand special attention.
Agrarian Structure under the Monarchy The agrarian structure of Sikkim was feudal before its integration with India. At the top, there was chogyal or the king, and according to traditional Sikkimese economic system, all land belonged to him (Sinha 1975: 47). The king would lease out a portion of land as gift to the kazis and thikadars, who were primarily the absentee landlords. The kazis and thikadars finally leased out the lands to peasants under different exploitative terms. They would employ mandals (headmen) and karbaris (account assistants of headmen or mandals) to collect rent from the tenants and also settle their disputes. For collecting revenue, the state of Sikkim was divided into 104 estates, out of which 61 estates were leased out to the kazis and thikadars and they were assigned to pay a fixed sum to the state. Five estates belonged to the monasteries and 15 exclusively belonged to the king or chogyal as his private estates (GoS 1977:13).
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As per the revenue circular (No 8554/G) of 1924, a kazi could hold up to 100 acres of land. However, with special permission, he could hold up to 200 acres of land and for mandals it was settled at 30 acres. The landlords enjoyed and exercised enormous magisterial power relating to civil and criminal matters and they generally used this power to evict the tenants or subjects according to their wish. Generally, four types of tenants could be found – adhiadar/adhiawal, kutdars/ tanam, pakhureys or sukumbasis and chakureys (ibid: 9). An adhiawal/adhiadar, though a sharecropper who had to pay half of the produce as rent, did posses a sizeable amount of land. A kutdar had to pay a specific amount of grain (minimum half of the produce) as rent to the landlord at the end of the harvest. In case of tanam, rent was paid in cash and tenure was for one year subjected to yearly renewal which was at the discretion of the landlords. Landless agricultural labourers were identified as pakhureys or sukumbasis. The pakhureys had to pay rent in terms of labour as well as in gifts or koseli which consisted of milk, butter, eggs and fowls (Subba 1989b: 73-79). The Census of 1891 stated that about 1% of the then population were slaves. As mentioned by Subba, chakureys and slaves were probably the same group of people (Subba op cit: 83). In addition to rent, landlords (kazis and thikadars), mandals and karbaris forced the raiyats to render free service to them. This system was, however, scrapped vide notification number (5874/G dated 15.8.1924) and instead cash payment was introduced and rates to be paid were Re 1 to landlord, 50 paise to mandal and 25 paise to karbari, respectively. This system was in place till 1949 and thereafter it was abolished (Subba 1985:37). The amount of rent to be levied was fixed on ethnic lines and was discriminatory in nature. Nepalese had to pay a higher rent than the Lepchas and Bhutias. It was only in 1956 that the king abolished the discriminatory rent system and declared that Lepcha-Bhutia and Nepalese would pay rent at equal rate. The revenue order no 1 of 1917 was an act to protect land possessed by Lepchas and Bhutias; it prohibited the alienation of
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the land of Bhutias and Lepchas in favour of non-hereditary subjects (Nepalese). But gradually as the number of Nepalese immigrants increased and nearly outnumbered the Lepcha-Bhutia population, the king of Sikkim through a notification (No 5063/F), in 1948, prohibited the Nepalese people from acquiring land, especially in north Sikkim.
Post-1975 Land Reform Measures
this scheme, landowners were supposed to surrender their surplus land voluntarily and landless labourers (known as sukumbasis in Sikkim) were free to choose the plot of land they wanted for cultivation. Landless labourers were identified by the government and given permanent land rights; each landless family could choose a land up to 1,000-2,000 sq m at a cost not exceeding Rs 52,500 (including registration and stamp duty). In 2004-05 and 2005-06 alone, 114 families received land under this scheme (GoS 2007: 124). But a few pertinent questions need to be raised here. First, in the absence of any government measures, what would prompt the landowners to surrender the land? Second, how would the landless labourers accumulate the money to purchase the land if it is not financed by the state? Third, and most importantly, according to the constitutional arrangement, the land possessed by the Lepcha and Bhutia tribes is non-transferable and given this, the amount of surplus land available for redistribution is also a matter of concern (Chakrabarti 2009). From Table 1.1, it is evident that land distribution is skewed in Sikkim. The skewness is highest in north district where around 22% of the people hold 66% of the land. The plausible reason for this is that majority of the people are from Bhutia and Lepcha communities and their land is non-transferable to any other
After Sikkim became an Indian state in 1975, the first measure taken by the government was the abolition of intermediaries. Subsequently, it created the provision of land rights to the landless tillers, enforced ceiling laws of landholding, distribution of surplus land and protection of tenancy rights through legislations like the Sikkim Cultivators Protection Act (1975), the Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceiling and Reforms Act (1978), and the Sikkim Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act 1978. Land rights of the indigenous Lepchas and Bhutias, which were protected earlier by the revenue order no 1 of 1917 (it was mentioned there that the land owned by the Lepcha and Bhutia community cannot be transferred to other communities), continued to be so after the merger of Sikkim with India because of the tribal status of these two ethnic groups. Imposition of land ceiling on agri cultural holdings helped the state to acquire a substantial amount of agri- Table 1.1: District-wise Size/Class-wise Distribution of Landholdings (1991) Category North District East District South District West District cultural land, de- Holding Holding Holding Holding No (%) Area (%) No (%) Area (%) No (%) Area (%) No (%) Area (%) marcated as “vested 49.0 8.5 56.0 12.8 44.0 9.7 46.0 10.0 land”. However, Marginal Small 10.2 5.1 22.0 22.6 25.0 18.3 21.0 17.0 complete abolition Semi-medium 18.3 20.4 14.3 23.5 18.0 24.0 20.0 28.0 of feudal agrarian Medium 17.2 36.0 6.4 23.4 10.0 26.0 11.0 31.0 structure remained Large 5.3 30.0 1.3 17.7 3.0 22.0 2.0 14.0 unfulfilled because Total no of holdings of which the ceiling and total area under was applied only to holdings (in hectare) 4,942 14,407 19,666 32,936 12,548 28,575 13,971 31,088 Average holding the agricultural (in hectare) 2.9 1.7 2.3 2.2 land and no ceiling Source: Sikkim Human Development Report, 2001. was imposed on non-agricultural holdings. The kazis still community. Historically too, these two hold considerable amount of land and communities have been representative of many kazis are reported to have 1,500 the landed gentry in Sikkim. A sizeable acres of land even today. portion of the land is still used as comIn 1996, the government of Sikkim in- mon property. Landholding pattern in the troduced a land redistribution mechanism east district shows that the concentration through a land bank scheme. According to of marginal and small farmers here is the January 30, 2010 vol xlv no 5 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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highest among the districts. East district is also the largest producer of rice, therefore a conclusion may be drawn that an initiative for the distribution of land is more necessary in east district and west district (largest producer of foodgrains among four districts in Sikkim) for f urther improvement of agricultural production and productiv ity in the state. Thus, land reforms in Sikkim can still be viewed as an unfinished agenda, at least in the distributive sense. Against this backdrop, it becomes imperative to review the agricultural scenario of the state.
Status of Agriculture In Sikkim, almost 70% of the total working force is engaged in agriculture and allied activities – they cultivate around 16% of the total land area (7,096 sq km). Diversity in ecological conditions along with the varied elevation has brought considerable variation in agricultural practices in the state and a vast area has become unsuitable for traditional agricultural practice. Total foodgrain production in the state has registered a healthy increase in absolute terms and a rising trend is witnessed both in productivity as well as in the area of cultivation. However, from 2000-01, a very large proportion of the production of all major crops has either fallen or
s tagnated, with a very marginal increase observed in 2005-06 for most foodgrains. Since 1990-91, the area under cultivation of all the major crops has been falling and a marginal rise in yield has partly contributed to contain the fall in foodgrains production, especially in the year 2005-06 (Tables 1.2, 1.3 and Table 1.4 on p 26). In addition, the per capita availability of rice (which is the staple food) is just 158 gms/ day which is much below the all-India average of 417 gms/day and as a result the state has to depend heavily on its import from outside the state (GoS 2007: 30). Though maize has never been a staple food in Sikkim, its production has steadily increased over the periods, and it contributes half of the foodgrain production in the state. The contribution of agriculture to gross state domestic product (GSDP) has continuously been declining; though the dependence on agriculture has not declined over the periods. The share has declined from 48.7% in 1980-81 to just 18.8% in 2006-07. In addition to this, the average compound annual rate of growth of population since the 1980s has outweighed the growth rate of foodgrain production and the gap has widened between 1990 and 2000, though it narrowed down a bit thereafter (Figure 1, p 26). This is bound to create food scarcity within the state. In fact, Sikkim has registered the highest per
capita public distribution system (PDS) purchase in the country. The work partici pation rate (the ratio of labour force to population) has also been declining consistently. In 1971, the work participation rate was 53.2% and in 2001 the figure came down to 39.4%. Lower work participation rate reflects the difficulty of finding work and increased marginalisation of workers (Patnaik 2005). The growth of agricultural sector is further impaired by its very low share in the budgetary allocation. As a matter of fact, the budgetary allocation was 0.95% in 1980-81 and it stood at 1.22% in 1999-2000.
Conclusions Though Sikkim is no longer a monarchic state, feudal elements still have roots in the agrarian system. Land reform measures seem to be inadequate and have failed to ensure distributive justice for its agrarian society. Foodgrain production, agricultural productivity or yield and agricultural growth have started decelerating since 2000. With increasing use of land for commercial and residential purposes, the gross sown area is also declining and it is adversely affecting the growth of yield of foodgrains. The share of agriculture in the GSDP has continuously been falling. However, the population that depends on agriculture for its livelihood
Table 1.2: Foodgrain Output (1975-2006) (Thousand tonnes) Crop
1975-76
1980-81
1985-86
1990-91
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
10
10.63
17.05
22.04
21.68
22.06
21.45
21.35
21.37
21.22
21.19
21.61
22.69
Wheat
0.15
10.3
11.22
13.08
15.3
14.81
14.2
10.1
9.93
8.86
8.09
8.25
9.2
Maize
16.5
28.93
49.25
57.5
56.56
56.63
55.71
59.61
51.01
53.72
57.05
58.19
61.1
Finger-millet
3.2
3.84
4.3
4.62
4.75
4.71
4.73
4.23
4.46
3.74
3.57
3.6
3.78
Barley
0.5
0.46
1.3
1.18
1.57
1.56
1.51
1.21
1.45
1.5
1.51
1.52
1.59
Buckwheat
0.8
1.38
1.38
1.42
1.74
1.61
1.6
1.53
1.45
1.54
1.55
1.56
1.64
31.15
55.54
84.5
99.84
101.6
101.38
99.2
98.04
89.67
90.58
92.96
94.73
100
0.6
2.92
2.9
3.05
3.22
3.3
3.3
2.74
2.71
2.71
2.81
2.84
2.98 3.78
Rice
Total cereals Urd Other pulses
0.1
0.2
1.7
2.38
2.7
2.69
2.31
2.41
3.21
3.47
3.57
3.6
Total pulses
0.7
3.12
4.6
5.43
5.92
5.99
5.61
5.15
5.92
6.18
6.38
6.44
6.76
31.85
58.66
89.1
105.27
107.52
107.37
104.81
103.21
95.59
96.76
99.34
101.17
106.76
Total foodgrains
Source: Department of Agriculture, government of Sikkim and Economic Survey 2006-07, GoS.
Table 1.3: Agricultural Yield (1975-2006) (kilogram/hectare) Crop
1975-76
1980-81
1985-86
1990-91
1995-96
1996-97
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
Rice
891.3
729.8
1,117.7
1,395.2
1,381.9
1,405.3
1,426.21
1,457.25
1,457.78
1,460.66
1,489.61
1,564.06
Wheat
1,016.1
1,495.0
1,540.6
1,699.5
1,844.1
1,791.4
1,423.32
1,399.36
1,343.61
1,298.55
1,460.35
1,628.51
Maize
588.2
973.3
1,283.1
1,464.2
1,439.2
1,440.6
1,517.96
1,292.16
1,486.44
1,579.45
1,611.01
1,691.57
Finger-millet
677.4
780.3
910.2
958.0
965.2
957.1
942.52
919.19
875.58
874.05
881.39
925.46
Barley
564.5
805.8
1,320.9
1,332.2
1,477.0
1,440.9
1,078.44
1,248.54
1,239.09
1,247.35
1,255.61
1,313.43
Buckwheat
541.9
508.0
701.1
838.8
807.3
794.1
781.18
732.97
782.36
783.52
788.58
829.02
Total cereals
669.6
935.2
1,231.8
1,423.0
1,422.5
1,421.6
1,422.50
1,304.73
1,406.81
1,462.78
1,490.64
1,573.56
Source: Calculated by using data on production and area under crops. Economic & Political Weekly EPW January 30, 2010 vol xlv no 5
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commentary Table 1.4: Area under Different Crops (Thousand hectares) Crop
1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 199-91 1995-96 1996-97 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Rice
11.4
14.8
Wheat
0.15
7.0
15.5 16.05 15.94 15.95 15.21 7.4
7.82
Maize
28.5
30.2
39
39.9 39.93 39.94
8.43
8.4
14.74
14.74
6.7
6.33
5.74
5.74
39.9 40.11 36.72
36.7
36.7
36.7
7.21
14.9 14.79 7.21
14.74
Finger-millet
4.8
5
4.8
4.9
5
5
4.56
4.93
4.34
4.15
4.15
4.15
Barley
0.9
0.58
1
0.9
1.08
1.1
1.14
1.18
1.23
1.23
1.23
1.23
1.5
2.76
2
1.72
2.19
2.06
1.99
2.01
2
2.01
2.01
2.01
Buckwheat Total cereals
47.27 60.34
69.7 71.29 72.57 72.46 70.02 69.83 65.42 64.57 64.57 64.57
Source: Department of Agriculture, government of Sikkim and Economic Survey 2006-07, GoS.
e nsure distributive justice but also raise 12 12CAGR Foodgrain the allocative effi10 1010.5 ciency (allocative 8 86 6inefficiency results 4.2 4 42.9 2.5 when, given the 1.34 2 21.9 CAGR population 0.68 prices of inputs and 0 0 Between Between Between Between -2 -2outputs, a producer 1970s and 1980s 1980s and 1990s 1990s and 2000 2000 and 2006 -4 -4cannot optimally al-6 -5.3 -6Beween 1970-80s Between 1990s-2000s Between 1980s-90s 2000-2006 locate her resources -8 Source: CARG of population calculated from Census Reports of 1971, 1981, 1991Between and 2001 and CARG of foodgrains was calculated from data available from the Department of Agriculture, to minimise the cost CAGR population CAGR Foodgarin government of Sikkim and Economic Survey 2006-07, GoS. of production). As a has hardly declined. And this reflects result, the state would be able to avert the the decline in per capita income of the impending food scarcity, reduce the extent rural workforce. of unemployment, raise income and bring Growth rate of population has out- about a fall in poverty in rural Sikkim. weighed that of foodgrain production and References therefore food scarcity is a natural corolBoyce, James K, Peter Rosset and Elizabeth A Stanton lary. In addition to that, plan allocation in (2005): “Land Reform and Sustainable Development”, Working Paper Series No 98, Political agriculture has also started declining. In Economy Research Institute (Amherst: University view of the impending food scarcity, the of Massachusetts) (http://www.umass.edu/peri/ programs/development/naturalassets.htm). present practice of importing foodgrains Banerjee, V Abhijit, Paul J Gretler and Maitreesh under the PDS will vigorously be pursued. Ghatak (2002): “Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal”, Journal of This will further reduce the public expendPolitical Economy, 110(2): 239-80. iture on agriculture. Moreover, this situa- Bardhan, P K (1973): “Size Productivity, and Returns tion is bound to increase rural poverty, both from the nutritional point of view as well as in terms of declining employment opportunities in rural areas. It is indeed true that agriculture provides sustenance to a majority of the people in the state, but rising demographic pressure on cultivable land, physical constraints created by the terrain, limitations of terrace farming in terms of productivity, irrigation, cost of production, lack of infrastructural support, declining public expenditure and complete absence of marketable surplus work as major obstacles for the agricultural sector. Therefore, attention should immediately be given to raise the agricultural productivity and production in the state and to achieve that, institutional changes become imperative. Serious efforts need to be made to bring more land into cultivation through appropriation of surplus land possessed by big landowners – this would not only Figure 1: Compound Annual Rate of Growth (CARG) of Population and Foodgrain Production in Sikkim
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to Scale: An Analysis of Farm-Level Data in Indian Agriculture”, Journal of Political Economy, 86: 1370-86. Berry and Cline (1979): Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). Census of India (1981): Series 19, Part XIII A and B. – (1991): Series 22. – (2001): Provisional, Series 21. Chakrabarti, Anjan (2009): Economic Development and Employment in Sikkim (New Delhi: Authors Press), pp 19-20. GoI (2001): Indian Planning Experience – A Statistical Profile, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, January and 10th Five-Year Plan (2002-2007). GoS (1977): Report on Agricultural Census 1976-77, Agricultural Census Unit, Government of Sikkim, Gangtok, pp 9, 13. – (2001): Sikkim Human Development Report (Delhi: Social Science Press), Government of Sikkim. – (2007): Economic Survey (2006-2007), Government of Sikkim. Hanstad, Tim and Jennifer Brown (2001): “Land Reform Law and Implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and Recommendations”, RDI Reports on Foreign Aid and Development, 112, Seattle, Washington, December. Patnaik, Utsa (2005): “Theorising Food Security and the Poverty in the Era of Economic Reforms”, Social Scientist, Vol 33, No 7/8, July-August: 50-81. Sen, A K (1962): “An Aspect of Indian Agriculture”, Economic Weekly, Vol 14, Annual Number, February, 243-66. Sinha, A C (1975): Politics of Sikkim – A Sociological Study (New Delhi: Thomson Press (India) Limited, p 47. – (2009): “The Politics of Identity Formation in Sikkim”, Dialogue, Volume 10, No 4, April-June, http://asthabharati.org/Dia_Apr%2009/a.c..htm Subba, Tanka Bahadur (1985): The Quiet Hills – A Study of Agrarian Relations in Hill Darjeeling, (Delhi: ISPCK), p 37. – (1989a): “Agrarian Social Structure and Change in Sikkim”, Social Change, Vol 19, No 1, March: 80. – (1989b): Dynamics of a Hill Society: The Nepalis in Darjeeling and Sikkim Himalayas (New Delhi: Mittal Publications), pp 73-79, 83.
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