Review of: Leonard Blusse, Strange Company; Chinese Set- tlers, Mestizo ... headquarters of the VOC, 'a kind of super trade-factory', the author laments the fact ...
A. Kemasang Dutch insanity: Indonesian historiographys new cathartic tool of colonialism? In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 145 (1989), no: 2/3, Leiden, 336-350
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REVIEW ARTICLE A.R.T. KEMASANG
DUTCH INSANITY: INDONESIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY'S NEW CATHARTIC TOOL OF COLONIALISM?1 Review of: Leonard Blusse, Strange Company; Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia, Dordrecht: Foris, 1986. [Verhandelingen Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde.] 1. Introduction This collection of essays could be helpful particularly as regards the economic life in VOC Batavia. It is written in such great detail that one cannot but admire the collating diligence of its author. Unfortunately, his prodigious feat is marred by such disturbing discrepancies that this cannot be allowed to pass, if only because of the author's standing as the up-andcoming doyen of the Leiden group on the Java Chinese. It is a pity, to begin with, that Dr. Blusse is either unwilling or incapable of responding to my effort to understand the 1740 Chinese genocide in the wider context of colonial Java beyond reducing it to the 'conspiracy' level and trivializing its politico-economic analysis by remarking condescendingly on my 'enthusiasm': ' . . . the adherents of the "Dutch conspiracy" theory, have found an enthusiastic spokesman for their cause in A.R.T. Kemasang, who has over the past years published several articles on the subject, and intends to write a book about i t . . . For reasons unknown to me he has steadfastly ignored my viewpoint.' (263 n.9.) But let us concentrate on what he has to say about those subjects on which I have done some research, namely the politico-economic history of Batavia and the Chinese. The book's basic flaw springs from the author's inability, or unwillingness, to view his subjects from any other perspective than — to paraphrase J.C. van Leur — the high verandah of the colonial mansion above the rampart (see v. Leur 1939:590), or — to use another metaphor — his insistence on looking at the relevant issues from inside Academia's 'apple cart' (see Kemasang 1988a:6). From such a restricted frame of reference, he finds nothing basically wrong with Dutch colonialThis title is partly inspired by Dr. Blusse's original title of the second essay in his work: 'An insane administration . . .' (260).
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ism. He accordingly glosses over the violent destruction of 'Jakarta', on whose ruins 'Batavia was founded in 1619'. He then blissfully alleges that its natives were given the choice by the infinitely benign Dutch conquerors between either 'to follow their own ruler and [... flee] to nearby Banten' or being 'simply [sic] chased away' (3). He talks as if in Batavia's colonial world the peoples under review were equal protagonists. They entered freely, he asserts, into an allegedly mutual 'consensus arrangement' (4). Hence the so-called Sino-Dutch 'cooperation' is asserted repeatedly (8). And, despite five long years since his 1981 publication2, he reiterates his even more untenable assertion that Batavia was, in fact, a 'Chinese colonial town under Dutch protection' (74). Dr. Blusse's second main flaw is his lack of consistency. Hence, his above premise that the Chinese were the equals of the Dutch is asserted in the same breath with his claim that'... in ultimo they [the Chinese] were subject to the legislation of the Dutch business organisation on whose territory they had become established' (4). This inconsistency also casts him in the role of — to use his term when referring to me — a spokesman of those who latch on to the apparent, statistical, 'divergence' of interests between the Gentlemen XVII at home and their representatives in situ, the 'High Government' at Batavia. All this lands him into a third major error — anachronism, which in turn causes him airily to apply today's liberal moral standards as well as such concepts as 'nationalism' and racism to the 18th-century Dutch colony. What remains consistent throughout, however, is the message that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the Dutch colonial rule of Indonesia. 2. On Batavia's 'Ecological Disaster' (1619-1700) Whilst avowing that Batavia 'was meant to function as [no more than] the headquarters of the VOC, 'a kind of super trade-factory', the author laments the fact that it was not allowed 'to become a real town' in line with the Aristotelian tenets on civic planning (17, 18, 19). Whilst saying that 'the Gentlemen XVII did everything in their power to thwart or confine the activities of the private merchants' (20), he fails to grasp that it was therefore only to be expected that the colonial 'exploitation was mainly meant to support the trade policies of the . . . VOC and not the city itself (17). He rightly points out that to designate the prevalence of 'exotic diseases with sinister names', and even the 1699 Mount Salak eruption, as causal to Batavia's ruination in the eighteenth century is to confuse the symptoms with the 'real causes' (16). Tragically, however he merely substitutes that confusion with his own when he says that the 'problem that underlay 2
Up until now Bijdragen, the journal of the Dutch Royal Institute of Linguistics & Anthropology — which published Blusse's book — has adamantly refused to publish or even discuss any of my findings (see Kemasang 1988:7-8). Had it been otherwise, Dr. Blusse would have learned before now that he is not 'ignored' in my submitted essays.
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Batavia's demise . . . should be sought in the Ommelanden', i.e., Batavia's environs (17). On this flawed premise he rambles on, chasing red herrings when he should concentrate on the fact that precisely because Batavia was a VOC 'super factory', conceived and built for seventeenth-century spice privateering purposes, it naturally fell into disuse when the Dutch had to abandon this mode of colonial expropriation for that based on market crops in the 18th century. As I have indicated (see Kemasang, esp.l981a:127; 1982:63), from the 1700s Europe's demand shifted from spices to such commodities as cacao, sugar and tea. To lament the circumstance that 'unfortunately' the Gentlemen XVII 'regarded the real development of a free-economy centre as a threat to their own interests' as Dr. Blusse does (20), is to fail to understand how a colonial monopoly generally and the Dutch version especially worked. If he were consistent, the author would not fail to see that it is only to be expected that the VOC 'did not provide political power or privilege to the burghers' (20) of Batavia. For, to expect that it did is to expect the VOC to knowingly commit economic suicide. He ought to know from my essay cited by him how — to avoid repeating the Iberians' mistake in the Americas — the Dutch purposely thwarted the growth of any domestic capital, that of locally based Dutchmen included. This is why the VOC preferred to use the politically manipulable Chinese lease farmers (pachters) to help them levy various taxes and/or provide diverse services (see Kemasang, esp. 1985a:64; 1986:9). Indeed, as is observed by Dr. Blusse himself, Holland made it plain to its men in situ who — wallowing in the colonial cornucopia — lost sight of the VOC's overriding monopoly objective that, as he himself puts it,'. . . the stabilization of a real colony with burghers trading privately cannot be in the interest of the Company' (25). Finally, it escapes me how, where the author says that 'In conclusion we may say that... mismanagement and disease resulted in the old city's ruin' (33), these factors should be any less symptomatic than what he dismissed as being mere 'symptoms' earlier on. To talk of 'mismanagement' is to fail to grasp the nature of colonial extraction via a market crop economy. Such crops as coffee and sugar, and later cacao, indigo, etc., could only be cultivated on plantations, as, again, I have indicated (see Kemasang 198la: 127; 1982:63). On the one hand he avows that the VOC's raison d'etre was the siphoning off of as much profit as possible for Holland's benefit, both corporately — 'the economic stand-point of assets and liabilities . . . was the crux of the whole question' (161) — and individually — 'in Holland, young men of better families went East to make that period's equivalent of a "fast buck" so that they might return home and spend the remainder of their lives in leisure' (172). At the same time, he fails to recognize that Java's 'ecology' was never further from the concern of people with that frame of mind. Indeed, ecological disaster is merely one of the myriad of depredations that invariably accompany colonialism.
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Specifically, the deforestation of Batavia's environs was a direct result of the necessity, to use Dr. Blusse's own term, 'to exploit' these areas in order to meet the colonial demand for, inter alia, timber and sugar. Far from being a sign of 'mismanagement', this deforestation shows how well Batavia had discharged its duty in realizing contemporary Dutch colonial demands and/or requirements. 3. On the Picis as 'Trojan Horse' or 'Secret Weapon' This takes us to the book's fourth major flaw: confusing mere trappings with substance. Hence, the purely statistical information that the picis was manufactured by the Chinese blinds the author to the fact that in Java — especially in areas under the Dutch politico-economic sway — the coin was subject to forces that rendered its place of origin and/or the ethnicity of its manufacturers absolutely irrelevant. No doubt because of his Eurocentrism, mentioned above, he moreover fails to realize that Braudel's remark about money (42) in the European context is similarly irrelevant to colonial Java. This leads Dr. Blusse to the further error of assuming that the Chinese merchants — armed with what he calls their 'secret weapon' — traded independently of either the indigenous rulers or the Dutch colonial overlords. He seems to be unable, or unwilling, to comprehend the well documented fact that in Java during both the pre-colonial and the colonial era trade was always — to use Polanyi's term, quoted several times by Dr. Blusse himself — 'administered' by the ruler class. Indeed, Javanese Chinese were merely 'running errands', either for trading priyayk or for the European Tuan Besar (Big Bwana). The 'China connection' of the picis was purely coincidental and practically irrelevant. That this was so can be surmised even from the inconclusive statement that: ' . . . 1618, Pangeran Aria Rana di Manggala of Banten and his Chinese collaborators were able to manipulate the circulation of picis in the region and to gain control over the supply from China' (45). Unless we assume that the indigenous ruler was dim-witted, we can only read 'Chinese collaborators', as meaning 'junior partners', if not 'minions', of the Pangeran. This is entirely disregarding the fact that in pre-colonial Java people did not operate along such a 'nationalistic' divide as is anachronistically applied by Dr. Blusse. Again as I have already outlined (see Kemasang 1984/5:22; 1988a:21,24), in pre-colonial Java, free as it was from racist 'apartheid', the people later tagged 'Chinese' in the colonial period for divide and rule purposes were in the process of becoming 'acculturated', if they were not for all practical purposes already 'Javanized'. These 'ethnic Chinese' took part in social, economic and political activities as subjects of the local indigenous rulers, not as representatives of China, as suggested by Blusse's allegations about a so-called Chinese network purportedly independent of the polity of Java {6,1 A, 154). Likewise, during the colonial period, it was the VOC which — 'because
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of its unique position of [sole] supplier of lead' (47) — controlled the picisbased economy. And this was only one aspect of the reality of Chinese dependency on the Dutch. Another aspect of this control of the Dutch over their 'Chinese collaborators' was the fact that it was none other than the Dutch who decided the price of lead, the metal base of the picis (46 f.). To suggest that the Chinese pachters 'controlled' this game is to suggest that his forefathers were collectively imbecile or, to use Dr. Blusse's term, insane . . . 4. On Being Mystified over a 'Towkay' This is a fascinating story, the result of diligent research in VOC records, which can provide a helpful insight — provided it is used critically. For, hopelessly stuck in the colonial rut, Dr. Blusse draws the wrong conclusions. Metaphorically fixated on the Chinese puppet, he loses sight of the Dutch puppeteer, who, via political power and/or economic domination, inter alia by means of capital advances, manipulated the towkays. He therefore fails to recognize that the allegedly 'rich' towkays were no more than the statistical creation of VOC employees for diverse ulterior motives. This is why Jan Con 'died intestate'. For, in common with other Chinese towkays in the Dutch colony, Jan Con was none other than the agent of Dutch creditors, who, in his very own words, 'advanced large quantities of money' (51) 'at high interest rates' (269 n.62) — as I have also indicated (see Kemasang 198ra:125-6; 1982:62; 1984/5:22; 1985a:68-9; 1986b:13): '[ . . . in the 1630s] the Dutch burghers (the main moneylenders to the Chinese) asked a monthly interest of 1.5 - 3 percent . . .' (70). In his first essay Dr. Blusse cites the well documented fact that Dutch monopoly policies outlawed private trade by 'free burghers'as well as by VOC employees. At the same time widespread malversation had produced enormous wealth for such persons as Chastelein, referred to by the author, and many other Indies Dutchmen of lesser prominence. Here is the problem: these Dutchmen possessed vast amounts of capital which could not be openly put to work, for that would contravene all that the corporation which had enabled them to amass their capital in the first place — the VOC — stood for. The Chinese, in their 'intermediary' role, were convenient as front men for the«otherwise frustrated Dutch 'capitalists' in situ — who 'drove commerce in the name of foreigners' (see De Hullu 1914:349) — to circumvent the VOC monopoly restrictions by proxy. All this is noted by the author himself, both in this book (83) and in his earlier paper (see Blusse 1981:168) — yet another example of his innumerable inconsistencies. The author is wrong not only in oversimplifying but also in being racist, as he gives credence to one VOC Governor-General's allegation that the 'confidence game' was particularly Chinese. He is wrong in attempting to contrive to rhyme the abbreviation for 'confidence trick' — which he
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wrongly alters into 'confidence game', 'con' (50) 3 — with the central character's purported name: 'Jan Con'. This name was very likely not Chinese, but a Portuguese rendering of the Malay 'Jangkung', i.e. 'The Tall One', as can be surmised from Governor-General Van Diemen's 1636 letter to the Gentlemen XVII cited by Dr. Blusse (64), which referred to the man as 'Jan Congh'. He is wrong in accepting as 'gospel' the VOC empoyees' allegations that Jangkung owed them such and such amounts of money. Elsewhere, in the Introduction, Dr. Blusse himself warns that 'De Haan was right in pointing out that the official figures... quoted in the Company sources are totally unreliable.... These data therefore have little value.' (10.) He is furthermore wrong in accusing the Chinese of playing a 'con game', to the exclusion of the probability that Jangkung's alleged 'arrears' indicate an opposite situation: Dutch usurers forcing the Chinese into debt in order to earn interest and/or to hold them to ransom for diverse purposes. This is rather like the 'soul sellers', zielverkopers, forcing Holland's youth to borrow and later declaring them 'insolvent' so that they could pressgang the victims for the VOC ships and garrisons overseas (see De Hullu 1914:320ff.; Boxer 1973:91-93). In colonial Java, the Dutch in the final analysis were both judge and jury in the question of who owed whom what — as regarding practically everything else. The author's own findings should have made it patently obvious that in their colony, the Dutch alone stood to gain. The Chinese, vulnerable in the ways I have outlined (see Kemasang 1981a:123; 1982:61; 1985a:63; 1986b:8), were blatantly extorted and thus made to pay practically the entire cost of Batavia's canals, fortifications and all of its original edifices (esp. 56, 67). While Jangkung, at the mercy of just about everybody, including the imperial China mandarins, was fleeced all the way by the Dutch, until even after his death, when the colonial corporate and private creditors scavenged on what was left to his widow and family (esp. 68). This was what the Dutch did to their 'favourite handyman' (69). Imagine how much worse they must have treated the Chinese coolies and human dirt collectors. Regarding the latter, Dr. Blusse is only interested in the crude joke about 'folhas nonas horas' (28,260 n. 9), which the Batavia Dutch patricians probably exclaimed with hearty guffaws. He conveniently blots out the rest of the truth, set out inter alia by John Barrow, whom, for a different reason, Dr. Blusse praises for being 'a keen contemporary observer' (106): 'Instead . . . of [ . . . lavatories] [... the Dutch] substitute large jars, manufactured for the occasion in China . . . These jars remain 3
Evidently, Dr. Blusse finds this sort of joke amusing. This is how he writes about a prostitution case in 17th-century Batavia: 'Rather comic [sic] is the sheepish apology offered by the Church Council to Mr. and Mrs. Minne (literally meaning lovemaking) in response to their complaint . . .' (168).
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undisturbed, in a certain corner of the [Dutchman's] house, for twenty-four hours; at the end of which time, that is to say at nine in the evening... when [... most Europeans were in]... their respective houses, the Chinese sampans or dirt boats begin to traverse the canals of the city. At the well known cry of these industrious collectors of dirt, the slaves from the opposite houses dart out with their loaded jars, and empty their contents in bulk into the boats. In this manner the Chinese scavengers, paddling in their sampans along the several canals, collect from house to house . . . "the golden store." Such a custom, in such a climate, can be no less injurious to health than it is indecent and disgusting. But the Dutch appear to be as insensible of the one as they are reconciled to the other. If they happen to catch a passing breeze charged with the perfume of these jars, they coolly observe, "Daar bloeit defoola nonas horas" — the nine o'clock flower is just in blossom.' (Barrow 1806:213-214, original italics.) But to return to Jangkung, has it ever occurred to Dr. Blusse that Jangkung — whose death, as the colonial records repeatedly mention, 'was sudden' — might have committed suicide, since he could not find any way to end his subjection to the colonial extortion as long as he still breathed? As Dr. Blusse himself tells us, Jangkung again and again wanted to opt out; and, again and again, the Dutch denied him this possibility and, to rub salt into the wound, saddled him with even more unfair 'contracts'. How can Dr. Blusse fail to realize that it is palpably naive, if not insulting to his own forefathers' collective intelligence, to talk of the 'inability' — as opposed to 'unwillingness' — 'of the Batavian authorities to understand the needs of one of [. . . their] Chinese subjects' (72)? More fundamentally, given such obvious pointers, how can the author simply 'parrot' (31) the colonial cliche about the Chinese 'network'? Jangkung's advising his Dutch overlords to slave-drive his own fellow'countrymen' and not to trust them (57) provides a helpful insight, poignantly indicating that, firstly, 'nationalism'-orientated loyalty was unknown at the time and, secondly, contrary to the colonial propaganda that portrays it as monolithic, the Chinese community, too, was split along class lines. 5. On the Figment that Batavia was a 'Chinese Colonial Town' Likewise flummoxed by mere trappings, the author here invents the fictitious 'dualism' between the 'European Castle' and the 'Chinese Town' (78). Imagining that they were two independent, separate entities, he conveniently chops the selected pieces of evidence to fit into his apologetic brief. For, without such bowdlerization, common sense alone would have made it plain that both Castle and Town — at least in Java's 18th-century economy — were the inseparable parts of the Dutch colonial 'super factory'. Even their apparently different roles — one politicomilitary, the
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other economic — were complementary and both, jointly, existed for the same single purpose: to maintain the Batavia factory-fort for the sole benefit of the monopolistic VOC. This section clearly dispels any remaining doubt about Dr. Blusse's ignorance of the fact that violence is inherent in Dutch as in any other form of colonialism. Hence he not unexpectedly ignores the suffering and destruction visited on Dutch 'commoners' — whose youth were 'conned' and pressed by the 'soul sellers' referred to above — as well as the Indonesians. In his view the colonial Dutch fought innumerable wars both in Europe and in Asia and sailed half-way around the globe —. and in the process lost, according to their own estimates, practically one million lives and f6,500,000 in initial capital (see Kemasang 1985a:72-73 fn. 4 & 5; 1986b: 16-17 fn. 4 & 5) — for little other reason than to 'open a charity shop', where everybody was free to help themselves. Fittingly, he talks of 17th-century Sino-Dutch 'cooperation' and 'harmonious coexistence' (8, 74), as earlier he asserts Dutch 'generosity' and 'understanding' (55, 65) towards their Chinese 'favourites'. In my essay which provoked his remark, I have already mentioned that such talk is as ludicrous as it is to suggest that state power was surrendered to the colonial sepoys (see Kemasang 1985a:73; also 1986b:16). Even strictly within the context of his own argument, these observations are incongruous and at variance with his own note on Pieter de Carpentier's advice to his juniors: '. . . always follow the maxim that the Company's capital never should be put in Chinese hands, even if it should appear advisable to do so. In this way you will always remain master of the gross of your affairs and eliminate the risk of having trust repaid with bad faith . . .' (50). Dr. Blusse likewise fails to reconcile his assertions mentioned so far with his statement that 'Governor-General Brouwer stated in 1633 that the Chinese . . . are so full of deceit that we cannot trust them at all' (81). And that, 100 years later, Director-General Westpalm drew attention to the 'real character and the sly intrigues of this crafty people, so greedy for gain' of the Chinese (137). This is not to mention the opinion of the Dutch colonial 'great man' Coen, whose wisdom I cited in the essay singled out by Dr. Blusse: '[T]he nature of all Chinese [is] infamous, unfaithful, false and treacherous, not only singly but doubly so . . . if he is half-and-half [of mixed blood] then he is bound to be even worse...' (Kemasang 1985a:67; 1986b:ll). As regards the 'charity' imputed to the Dutch, the VOC directive of 23rd November 1631 shows clearly that even towards their own 'countrymen' the Dutch rulers of the Indies were not very charitable: 'The letters of the Gentlemen Seventeen do not trouble to disguise their point of view. If the [Dutch] civilians in Batavia could not subsist without ["free"] trade . . . then they must go, "for if one of
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the two must suffer, either the Company or the civilians, then it is much better that the civilians . . . make shift and suffer . . . let us be sensible about it for once and not employ any tender-hearted charity"[!]. . .' (Meilink-Roelofsz 1962: 233). It is of course right and proper to acknowledge the contribution made by the Chinese towards the creation and development of Batavia in its first century, just as right-minded historians do the contribution of African slaves to the formation of the USA's capital and/or wealth. And there is no reason to doubt Dr. Blusse's sincerity. However, this does not alter the fact that he talks of the Chinese contribution in isolation of its wider politico-economic context. He makes no attempt to understand the whys of the issue. In essence, he no more than 'parrots' what over 50 years ago such colonial writers as Fromberg — that 'champion of the Chinese' (see Purcell 1966:437 fn. 5) — already stated. As in their case, Dr. Blusse's preoccupation with single issues of the Chinese question, to the exclusion of their inseparable connections with other factors of the wider context, leaves the more fundamental questions of colonialism itself safely out of scrutiny. Withal, to assert that the Chinese coolies — or even their foremen, who were, using his own term, 'conned' by the Dutch with such empty titles as 'Kapitein'and 'Luitenant'(81) — were then allowed to outsmart the Dutch rulers to the point of 'controlling' the colony's economy is as nonsensical as to suggest that the African slaves — say their 'headmen' 4 — were allowed to 'control' the plantation-based system in America. I find it incredible how he can fail to see that to suggest this is to insult his own forefathers' intelligence. Further, is he so blissfully ignorant that his claims about the Dutch colonial 'protection' of the Chinese are uncannily reminiscent of the White slaveowners' claims that they 'protected' their slaves from attacks by the Amerindians? Even if their veracity is conceded, these claims oblige Dr. Blusse to explain why the colonial Dutch needed to 'protect' the Chinese, who had been in Java for centuries before the Dutch appeared on the scene (see Kemasang 1985a:58; 1986b:4). But, even more incredibly, Dr. Blusse asserts that:'... accumulation of capital among the Chinese was encouraged[!]... This ultimately resulted in the development of a Chinese property-owning middle class' (83). For a start, this is a transmogrification of quantum proportions from the Dutch position as represented by Governor-General De Carpentier — as quoted, we remember, by the author himself. It clearly demands an explanation. Lamentably, Dr. Blusse fails to provide any. But, more fundamentally, he is evidently incapable of grasping the most basic economic fact that to allow such capital accumulation is to create one's competitor. Obviously, such an assertion is not merely theoretically nonsensical. It is practically 4
I am grateful to Peter Hogg of the British Library for the titles used among the slaves in the Western Hemisphere, esp. the West Indies, and for drawing my attention to the Maria Theresa dollar in the Middle East in the 18th century.
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inconceivable in the context of any economic framework, but most certainly in that of a mercantilist colony striving after monopoly. Remarkably, the scholar who complains about being ignored by me, seems to have completely ignored my proposition in the essay he cites (see Kemasang 1985a:62-63), which outlines how in the event the Dutch took every precaution to forestall capital accumulation elsewhere. Withal, since his basic premises are wrong, virtually all those that follow are wrong. Space only allows us to deal with his wildest allegations. Dr. Blusse must have been aware that all the standard excuses for the 'accident' claim for the 1740 genocide have been shown wanting, most recently by myself (see Kemasang 1981b:555-70; 1985b:71-85; 1986a: 10-20). So, he comes up with the marginally novel assertion that the genocide was attributable to a purported 'breakdown' of the Chinese officers' alleged 'authority'. This is yet another example of his propensity to confuse mere trappings with substance, because in reality such 'authority' never existed. On the assumption that the Dutch were not dimwitted, it can only follow that they would never have allowed their Chinese 'middlemen or brokers' (87) to acquire any independent 'authority' of whatever kind. In my published work, I outline why this could only be so: the purely titular Chinese officers were foisted arbitrarily by the Dutch colonial rulers on the community, 'with appointees and thus had no independent power base'(see Kemasang 1981b:558; 1985b:75; 1986a: 13). Totally dependent as they were on Dutch support, the Chinese officers' vicissitudes faithfully mirror the degree of the Dutch colonial rulers' support; which, in turn, was dictated by whether or not the Dutch needed their services. In other words, a 'breakdown' of this 'authority' can only mean that the Dutch must have withdrawn their support. It is no coincidence that this phenomenon overlapped in time with the dawn of the 18th century, when Chinese labour became increasingly superfluous, since colonial expropriation, as I.have outlined, had to take place via plantation-produced market crops which, in turn, demanded the collaboration of the indigenous population (see Kemasang 1981a:127-34; 1982:63-7; 1985a:71; 1985b:63; 1986a:3; 1986b:15). Of course, Dr. Blusse's propensity for confusing trappings with substance is nothing other than a manifestation of the practice of accepting colonial records as 'gospel'. And he gives a clear demonstration of this conservative approach when dealing with the 1740 Chinese genocide. Here, in support of the colonial line — that the genocide was an 'accident' —, he cites the opinions of the compiler of Kai-pa Li-tai Shih-chi (Historical Records of the Foundation of Batavia through the Ages) and a Cantonese merchant (75,96). Since he provides no explanation whatever why
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he marshals their support5, one can only assume that he must have done so because of the ethnicity of these sources. If this is correct, it is racist and is unacceptable on many other grounds. To cite but one example, he totally disregards the class allegiance of his sources. Their opinions are influenced by the fact that they had vested interests in the Dutch colonial status quo. Indeed, as he himself notes, the Chinese history of Batavia is a 'document on cooperation' (77). Specifically, Dr. Blusse's attempt to revamp the old colonial 'accident' line raises the following questions: firstly, how could an 'accident' that cost 10,000 lives take place for 'three days' (94) in the close confinement of old Batavia, under the nose of the fully functioning state apparatus (see Kemasang 1981b:555 ff.; 1985b:72 ff.; 1986a: 11 ff.)? Old Batavia measured 'about 2250 metres in length and 1500 across' (23), including the Castle, which was out of bounds to the Chinese (see Kemasang 1985b:82; 1986a: 16). 'Little passed unnoticed in Batavia', as he himself puts it, albeit in a different context (241-2). Also, that the state was fully in charge is indicated by the etching depicting the massacre reproduced in his book, which shows how VOC-uniformed European soldiers armed with muskets stood guard while some of their comrades and the 'mob' of free burghers, slaves and 'natives' — indicated by their leafy headgear — were butchering the helpless Chinese (92), precisely as I have been suggesting since 1981 (see Kemasang 198lb:569-70; 1985a:73; 1985b:845; 1986a:19-20; 1986b:17; 1988b:90,92-3). Rather than being a testimony of an 'accident', this etching reminds me of Peter Breughel the Elder's painting !The Massacre of the Innocents' (see Wallerstein 1974:163; Rabb 1975:128), depicting Spanish troops slaughtering unarmed Dutch civilians during the Duke of Alva's terror campaign against the Netherlands' struggle for independence (see also Parker 1979:46). Secondly, how sincere is Dr. Blusse's claim that the slaughter lasted for 'three days', when the very same sources as consulted by him show that it went on from October 9th to 22nd (Kemasang 198 la: 137; 1981b:5545; 1982:68; 1985a:73; 1985b:68 ff.; 1986a:7 ff.; 1986b:17)? Thirdly, Chinese hospital patients and prison inmates not only were within the juridical purview of the colonial state apparatus — especially for Dr. Blusse, who talks loosely of the Chinese being 'formally integrated into the legal framework of the colonial administration' (70) — but by definition also posed no threat to anybody, let alone the state. They were nonetheless slaughtered. The first consideration rules out the 'accident' It is notable that in 1982 one organ of the Dutch Royal Institute of Linguistic and Anthropology, Bijdragen, rejected my essays, among other reasons precisely because I had used the 'Historical Records', albeit in the Medhurst version (i.e., 'Chronologische', see Kemasang 1988a:7,8), which it dismissed as being 'unreliable'. It is remarkable that this Institute — in its other organ, Verhandelingen — saw fit to publish Blusse's dissertation, which uses the 'Chronologische' as a source. Indeed, more remarkably, it is stated that 'an annotated English translation is scheduled to appear in the near future' (75).
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excuse, for I have shown that state control was in perfect order (see Kemasang 1981b:567-9; 1985a:73-4; 1985b:83-5; 1986a:17-20; 1986b: 17-18). The second point indicates that their slaughter was not at all motivated by 'fear', one reason why the Dutch supposedly 'lost their head' — hence the 'accident'. Fourthly, the Dutch declared an 'open season' on Chinese all over Java. As I have already noted in my published essays, no other subject community — not even the Muslims — was ever declared 'vogelvrij'(outlawed) in this way. 6. The Trappings of the Chinese Junk Trade and the Yellow Peril Myth This section contains masses of useful details — provided, again, the reader does not get bogged down in sympathy and fail to see the proverbial wood for the trees. For here we have again an overkill in terms of the sheer number of details, which should not be allowed to conceal its analytical tenuity. Sadly duped by mere trappings and misled, to boot, by anachronism, the author is evidently unable to see beyond the merely apparent. Hence, because the 'China trade' apparently involved 'China wares' — viz. tea, porcelain, etc. — transported in Chinese junks crewed by Chinese, he concludes that there was an independent junk-borne 'Chinese Nanyang trade network' (6, 154), in the same sense as the VOC's, and that Java's ethnic Chinese somehow played an important role in it. Firstly, even within his own argument this supposition is palpably untenable, without completely disregarding the author's own findings that an unaccountably significant part of this trade was financed with Dutch capital. Indeed, it is on record that the VOC functionaries who practised usury lent money even to debtors in Canton, China (see De Haan 1935:439,724). This goes to explain why even of thejunks which put out directly from China, 'Several among them were flying the Dutch flag, for they were loaded on Dutch account' (129). That the junk trade — far from being an independent participant in the 'world economy' — had become an adjunct of the Dutch colonial economy, and hence dependent on it, can also be surmised from Dr. Blusse's own description: '. . . it was not the strangling grip of an expanding world economy which killed the junk trade, but rather the stiffening grip of a worn-out colonial trading system which dragged the Batavian junk trade into the throes of its own death struggle' (155). Secondly, there is a confusion here between the 'China traders' — those who plied their trade to and from China — and the ethnic Chinese who settled in Java. And the basis of this confusion can only be the racist'nationalistic' anachronism which simplistically lumps together the ethnic Chinese of Java and the mainland Chinese on the ground that both were of the same 'race' and/or 'nationality'. As was mentioned above, I have outlined previously that, since the concept of 'nationalism' was unknown and since in pre-colonial Jave there was neither the need nor the means
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to racially segregate the population, the 'Chinese' who settled in Java became Javanized as a matter of course (see Kemasang 1988a:24, 25-6). It was only under Dutch colonialism that the ethnic and/or racial origin of the settlers — for divide and rule purposes — was given politicoeconomic significance. It was the Dutch who created and maintained the 'overseas Chinese'. As Dr. Blusse himself in fact admits — evidently inadvertently — where he remarks on the alleged 'influx' of Chinese immigrants: 'Fears of the Yellow Peril[!]... are as old as colonialism' (127). Regarding the 'great influx' of Chinese immigrants itself, which he loosely labels with its emotive and racist 'Yellow Peril' tag, assertions of this sort neglect two basic factors. Firstly, China's indigenous economy failed to sustain its population only after — and as a direct result of — Western irruptions (see also, for missed opportunities consequent upon Western colonization and/or semi-colonization, Kemasang 1982). What these irruptions accomplished in the way of upsetting an otherwise viable ecosystem can be inferred from the letter of 15th March 1628 of a VOC 'factor' stationed in Taiwan, who mentions that a certain Commander De Wit has rendered the whole of the Penghu Islands destitute of ships and people (see Coolhaas 1953:1250). The instructions of 9th April 1622 for the Dutch commander who was sent to China by the VOC stipulated that, if he could not get any business, then he must do all he could to cause maximum havoc and depredation along the entire coast of China and crimp as many men, women and children as he could carry (see inter alia Colenbrander 1921 :iii/157; Vermeulen 1938:9). And so, 'Junks were destroyed and the [ones] sailing up [= from China, laden with wares] lifted there [= on the spot]; expeditions overland [= into China] were undertaken, houses were burned to the ground and the defenceless people of the [China] littoral were shanghaied [to the colonies]' (Kemasang 1985a:59; 1986b:5). In a later letter, dated 23rd March 1628, the VOC factor in Taiwan referred to above mentions that the depredations brought about by the Dutch raids rendered the Chinese impoverished and wretched (see Coolhaas 1953:1254). Secondly, life offers innumerable examples of how people refuse to leave their habitats, often despite evidently grinding poverty. After all, the capacity to adapt to virtually any situation is only one indication of the resilience of our species. Like the rest of mankind, the Chinese did not live by bread alone. They therefore would not have uprooted themselves from their familiar environment had they not been forced to do so. Indeed, Crawfurd goes as far as to say that among the various human races the Chinese were the most reluctant to quit their native country (see Crawfurd 1856:96). And Hoetink concurs, saying: 'After all, they [the Chinese] had not come to Batavia of their own free will, any more than they had lived there voluntarily' (Hoetink 1917:352).
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7. Conclusion Colonialism is strictly only interested in its subject peoples in their capacity, or potential capacity, as tools for facilitating the attainment of its primary objective of extraction. Even the Reformed Church was tolerated insofar as it served this purpose, as the author himself makes clear (163) — this at a time when to most people Christianity was as real as the act of breathing. Hence, in all their records, the Dutch talk specifically, often exclusively, of the economic dimension of the Chinese. Dr. Blusse proves no exception with this collection of essays. Indeed, when juxtaposed with his attempt to investigate the entire spectrum of the other aspects of the life of the Dutch community and those forming part of it, Batavia's ethnic Chinese specifically appear as no more than cardboard cut-outs. But this is precisely what colonialism requires with respect to its subject peoples. For — thus denying them even the right to speak for themselves — apologists from the VOC days until the present can and do put whatever words they like in the mouths of the Chinese. To the detriment of us all, such scholars as Dr. Blusse blissfully perpetuate this 'one-dimensionalism'. Stuck inside Academia's 'apple cart' — to use my metaphor — they understandably cannot consider any analytical approach such as mine, even intellectually, from without, for this would upset their apple cart. And inseparable therefrom is the racist premise of the Chinese having an 'inherent' business acumen (39) which others purportedly lacked — which is merely the other side of the same colonial coin that defames them with equally racist insults. Virtually everything that Dr. Blusse says in his essays hinges on this racist line of reasoning. Equally inseparable from the cart is the practice of equating the dispensers of Dutch colonial power with the subjects of that power. This is one expedient used by the colonial rulers and their apologists to justify the exercise of their power and/or the exploitation of its subjects, i.e., colonialism. Lamentably, the book under review shows that Dr. Blusse makes no attempt to depart from this position.
REFERENCES Barrow, John, 1806, A Voyage to Cochinchina, in the Years 1792 and 1793: Containing a General View . . ., London. Blusse, Leonard, 1981, 'Batavia, 1619-1740: The Rise and Fall of a Chinese Colonial Town', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies XII-1:159-178. Boxer, C.R., 1973, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800, Harmondsworth. [Original impression 1965.] 'Chronologische', 1840, 'Chronologische Geschiedenis van Batavia, geschreven door een Chinees' (transl. W.H. Medhurst), Tijdschrift voor Neerland's Indie 111-2:1-145. Colenbrander, H.T., 1921, Jan Pietersz. Coen; Bescheiden omtrent zijn Bedrijfin Indie, vol.III, The Hague. Coolhaas, W.Ph., 195 3, Jan Pietersz. Coen; Bescheiden omtrent zijn Bedrijfin Indie, The Hague. Crawfurd, John, 1856, A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries, London. [Facs. reprint 1971.]
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Haan, F. de, 1935, Oud Batavia, Bandung. Hoetink, B., 1917, 'So Bing Kong; Het Eerste Hoofd der Chineezen te Batavia', Bijdragen tot de Tad-, Land- en Volkenkunde 73:344-390. Hullu, J. de, 1914, 'De Matrozen en Soldaten op de Schepen der Oost-Indische Compagnie', Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 69:318-365. Kemasang, A.R.T., 1981a, 'Overseas Chinese in Java and their Liquidation in 1740', Southeast Asian Studies XIX-2:123-46. —, 1981b, 'The 1740 Chinese Massacre in Batavia: Accident or Cover-up?', Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Asian Studies 1981, Hong Kong, pp. 551-579. —, 1982, 'The 1740 Massacre of Chinese in Java: Curtain Raiser for the Dutch Plantation Economy', Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars XIV-1:61 -71. —, 1984/5, 'Waarom de Positie van de Chinezen Kwetsbaar is Gemaakf, Indonesia, Feilen en Meningen 10-5:22-23. —, 1985a, 'How Dutch Colonialism Forclosed a Domestic Bourgeoisie in Java: The 1740 Chinese Massacre Reappraised', Review IX-l:57-80. —, 1985b, 'The 1740 Chinese Slaughters in Java; Officially Orchestrated Pogroms', Kabar Seberang 16 (December):65-91. —, 1986a, 'The Dutch Role in the 1740 Chinese Pogroms in Java', Jambatan IV-l:3-26. —, 1986b, 'Bagaimana Penjajah Belanda Mengkebiri Borjuasi Domestik di Jawa: Pengkajian Kembali Dibantainya Orang-orang Cina 1740', Kritis 1-1:3-22. —, 1988a, 'Bagaimana Propaganda Kolonial Belanda Mendistorsi Historiografi Hubungan Pribumi-Cina Peranakan', Kritis 111-1:5-34. —, 1988b, 'Governor-General Valckenier and the 1740 Chinese Massacre: Sacrificed for a Cover-up?', Kabar Seberang 19-20:85-96. Leur, J.C. van, 1939, review of F.W. Stapel (ed.), Geschkdenis van Nederlandsch Indie, vols.II & III, in Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde of the Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen LXXIX:589-595. Meilink-Roelofsz, M.A.P., 1962, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630, The Hague. Parker, Geoffrey, 1979, Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-1659, London. Purcell, Victor, 1966, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London. Rabb, Theodore K., 1975, The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe, New York. Vermeulen, J.Th., 1938, De Chineezen te Batavia en de Troebelen van 1740, Leiden. Wallerstein, Immanuel, 1974, The Modern World System; Capitalist Agriculture and the Origin of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York.
