Stuart W. Twemlow and Frank C. Sacco .... (1994), who studied South African children from .... a danger to the stability of the affluent middle class .... 4. Altruism seen as weak and naive. 5. Lack of positive male role models. 6. ...... 2 0t%) t7 (89%) t3 (39%) 20 (61%). 6. If a rnan with a knife or gun orders you into a car, should.
Cn^q.prnn19
A MULTI-LEVEL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE VIOLENT COMMUNITY Stuart W. Twemlow and Frank C. Sacco
Lethal violcnce does not occur in a vacuum.Most traditionalpsychologicalapproaches to violencefocus on family violence,battering,and child abuse. Theseapproachesseeviolenceas an eventthat steriis principally from individual causessuch as genetic predisposition, addiction,pastabuse,and otherfamily dynamics.The role of the violent community often servesonly as a backdrop or an after-the-fact tally sheetfor theseindividualevents.In this chapter, the authorsarguethat diagnosisof the violent community is a necessaryfirst step before interventions to deal with the lethal violence can be successful. While acknowledgingthe importanceof individual and family factors,the authorshave found that such factorsare significantly affectedby the mores of the large group - the community and the socio-economic conditions which reflect those mores. The authors' findings derive mainly from projects in Jamaica, but also from work in progressin east coast andmidrvestern citiesin theU.S.(Twemlow,1995a,b; Twemlow and Sacco, 1996; Saccoand Twemlow, I 997). Studieshave shown varying and oficn contraclictory trendsin lethal violence rates.Browne and Wil-
liams (1993) studiedhomicidereportsand discovered little variancein victim ratesfor men but found that unmarried women experienceda dramatic increasein homicide victimizationby their partners. Brownsteinet al. (1994),in a detailedstudy of female murderers,discoveredthat women involved in the drug trade resortedto violence to resolve their conflicts. Thus, domesticviolencealone does not explairrlvomen'slethalvroluncc. Bachman(1993) studiedpattemsof lethal victimization in older persons.Results suggestedthat they aremore at risk in their own homes.The highest levels of violence toward older personswere nonlethal attacksby strangersduring the commissionof anotherfelony. Thus, it seemsthe elderly are more passive targets for criminals, while younger, predominantly female victims die at the handsof more familiar males. In a Canadian study, Silverman and Kennedy (1993)found that maleschoseto shoottheir victims more often than did females,but that shootingoverall hasdeclinedfor most males.Surprisingly,maleshave moreoftenbeat:nar stabbedtheirvicti* 1 . according lo crime/strangerhomiciderates.Thes, ,tncirngsmay
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Collective Wolence
point to an evolving cultural influence driving the shiftsin how lethal violenceis perpetrated. Block (1993)and Block and Block (1992)studied Hispanic Americans in Chicago.Again, there was a clear link to community and cultural factorsin how lethal violence unfolded. This" study found a comparativelyhigh risk overall for homicide in Hispanic Americans vs. whites. Further, there was a clear age factor within the Hispanic American community, with teenagemales ages l5 to l9 being at high risk to be the victims of lethalviolence,but this effectdecreaseddramaticallywith age.The two main causesof lethal violencc were gang-relatedhomicides and male-on-maleexpressiveconfrontations. Thesepatternssuggesthow culture and community shapethe violenceresponse.Baron (1993) sftrdied the differencesin child murderfrom stateto statein the U.S. The findingssupporttlie hypothesisthat as thc level of genderinequalityincreases, child homicide increases. Thus, genderinequality,a culhrrally transmittedattitude,contributesto the socialclimate conduciveto lethalviolencetoward children.These findingspoint to specificmechanismswithin violent communitiesthatleadto the acceptance of a dominationandsubmission dialecticbetweenthesexeswhich transfersdirectlyto children.Ifit is culturallyacceptablc to hurt womcn, then it is likewiseacceptable to hurt children.Thesestudiesalso pointedto the impactof single-parentfamiliesandalcoholismascausal factorsin explainingvariancesin the child homicide cases, In an Australianstudy,Polk and Ransom(1991) found that 5l%oof homicidesinvolved victims and offenderslinked by some form of sexual intimacy. Possessiveness was the dominant characteristicof male violence toward their female partners. The youngerthe female,the more likely jealousy was the causal factor in the lethal violence. Older females were most often the victims of desperatemalesin the folie a deux of murder-suicide.Men were most often killed by women partners in self-defense.The culfure, the authorsargued, shapesthe lethal violence
responseaccordingto the valuesand attitudesof the community, male/femalerelationships,and the care of the young and the old. Rose and McClain (1990) srudiedblack homicide rates in large urban environments.Citing Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) statisticsover a 25-yearspan,they found that the transitionfrom the industrialto the post-industrialstategeneratedtrends for increasedblack male involvement in lethal violence both as victims and perpetrators.The age of involvement also slowly decreased.Thus, as job opportunitiesfaded, black males often enteredthe illegal economy,which clearly increases the risk of involvementin lethal violence.In contrastwith this more usual statisticis a highly creativestudy by Greenbergand Schneider(1994),who found that in threemarginalizedcommunities(high incidcnccof ghettos,unwantedland use, and unwantedpeople), the homicide rate traditionallyseen as highestin youngblack males,agesl5 to 24, is no higherin this group than in whites,HispanicAmericans,females, middle-aged,and older people. As Americanfamiliesshift awayfrom traditional relationships, thereis a decrease in the affiliationand associationof blood kin. Daly and Wilson (l9gg) positedthat increasedlethalityis relatedto a lowering of blood-kin inimunity to violence.Childrenare abusedmore frequently and severely by nonblood relativeswithin a family. Their study further found that the rate of lethal violencebetweenblood relatives in Miami in 1980was l.8o%,while the rateof homicide betweenmarital relatives(nonblood)was l0%. Similarly,in Detroit in 1972,l9% of homicide victims were relatedby marriage, and 6yo were relatedby blood. Zimring et al. (1983) srudiedl5l homicidevictims in Chicago and discovered that white males killed femalesrvith whom they were intimate twice as frequently as white males were killed; whereas, black maleswere twice as likely to be killed by their fenrrle intimatesas to kiil them.This culturalpattem s -.,-sts a differentcodeof ethicsamonsblack males
Understanding the Violent Community that leadsthem to kill their intimatesless frequently thanwhite males.Smith and Parker(1980)confirmed the importanceof social variablesin predicting homicide rates.Poverty was shownto be a causalfactor in motivating higher rates of homicide for economically disadvantagedindividuals. Living in violent communitiesincreasestheprobability of violent behavior,accordingto Liddell et al. (1994), who studied South African children from four different communities. It was shown that children from violent communities were significantly more likely to be involved in aggressiveacts,particularly when the children had more contactwith older boysand men. Paddock(1975)studiedcommunities in Oaxaca,Mexico, where there was an opportunity to compareseveraltowns, someof which were nonviolentwithoutheavypoliceactivity,andothcrsmorc violent. Low violence in communitiesseemedto re"machismo",(2) sult from (l) the near absenceof contrastingpractices of child rearing, (3) very few closefi'iendshipslinking adults of the samesex,and (4) a strong social role for women. Cicchettiand Lynch (1993)outlineda modelfor understanding the causesand consequences ofcommunity violence,emphasizingthat violencewithin cultures impacts on children's development. FitzpatrickandBoldizar(1993)describedhow young black children suffer symptoms of post-traumatic stressdisorder(PTSD) due to living in violent communities.Friedlander(1993) arguedthat living in a violent community, not violent media programs,accounts for increasedviolence. In fact, he reported that prosocialmessageson television have a greater effecton behaviorthan do violent messages. Richters and Martinez (1993) brought to light the complex interactionbetweenenvironmentalcontext and family. They investigatedthe early predictorsof adaptational successand failure of 72 children living in a violent community.It was not the mere accumulation of environinentaladversities,but the erosionof the home life that explained :. .Jccssor failure in adaptive behavior.Thus, if the family is strong,the impact
577
of the violent community is lessened,and if the family is weak,adaptabilityis greatlyat risk. Respondingto violence in the community demandsa balancedapproach.Clarke(1994)found that increasingper capitaincarcerationfrom 1975 to 1992 did not significantly reduce the per capita violent crime index or motor vehicle theft. Cahn and Cahn (l 993)suggested collaborativeeffortsbasedon Project Alliance, an approachdevelopedby the MassachusettsAttomey General,stressingcoordinationof law enforcementand treatment.DeJong (1994) offered school-basedinterventioncalledthe ResolvingConflict CreativelyProgram (RCCP), basedon work in the New York city schools.In this model, peaceful schools were the beginning of the evolution of a peacefulneighborhood. Jaros(1992)sawcommunityviolenceasa public health problem requiring the promotion of community educationandthe developmentof problem-solving work groups.Munoz and Tan (1994) describeda programthat brought youth, police, and community leaderstogetherfor a2-day retreatto solve problems and developprojectsto reducecommunity violence. Cordner(1993),Mastrofski(1993),andWalker(1993) suggested wayspolicecouldwork with citizengroups to reduceviolence in the comntunity. The NationalCrime PreventionCouncil, through the U.S. Departmentof JusticeAssistance,hasdevelopedkits to help createsafercommunities- Working TogetherTo Stop the Violence: A Blueprint for SaferCommunities(1994). The U.S. Departmentof Child and Matemal Health also offers a model program titled Building Safer Communities (1994). DeBryn et al. (1988)describecommunity effortsthat addressreducing violence in Native American and Alaskan Inuit communities. There have been many studieslinking violence and poverty. Hanson(1997) took an interestinghistorical viewpoint; in his article, "Why Don't We n ,' ,.;About the PoorAnymore?",he notedthat today poverty has lost its meaning;the modernview of the poor is that they are responsiblefor their own plight,
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Collective Wolence
rvith littlc attcmptby communitiesto understandor makea placefor thepoor.Hanson(1997)pointedout that during the middle agcs,povertywas "no social pathologybut, rather, an intrinsic part of the establishedsocialorder.Rich and poor alike were saidto orvetheir positionsto the graceof God ratherthan to anything they themselveshad done, and all were expectedto accepttheir lot with humility." In those days,therewas no stigmaattachedto poverty; in fact, therervassignificantsocialstatus,becausethe poor lvercconsideredto havecertainmysticalpowersand to bc availableto the rich as a meansto atonefor their sinslike thc Sadhu- the holy man - who begsin India.By thc l9th century,however,the poor were dcspisedinstcadof honored.Povertybecamea social canccl'tobc cradicatcd. The mysticalpoor hadbcen rcplaccdby poorpcoplcwho wereenragedandcrirninal. In thc 20th celttury,there was a brief respitc throughsocialismwhen the poor were consideredto bc helplessvictimsof a comrptpoliticalsystemdominatcdby thc wealthy.Now, instead,moderncontemporary individualismblamesthe poor for their lot. This hard-nosedapproachto povertyled to the abolition of welfareprogramsin partsof many countries, includingthc U.S. The failurc to deal with the psychologicalundcrpinuiugs of povcrtl,u'illandhaslcd to conditionsthat approachanarchyin countrieswhere politicianslegislateor demandthat the poor carefor thcmselves. Povertywreakshavocwith the logically functioning,anxiety-freemind; the rage of the poor can auger poorly for the safety and health of the rvealthy. A violent community is particularlyharshwith regardto the placeof the poor. At best,the poor are seenas freeloaderswith a possibilityof rehabilitation if sufficient incentives,punishments,or both, aregiven for laziness.At worst.the poor are seenas a dangerto the stability of the affluent middle class and are consideredto be a sub-human group that needsto be eliminated.This all-or-nothinf rr'',-rsimplifiedapproach ' h,-rrnan psychologyis urraracteristic of violent communities.The literaturere-
flectssomeof thesefindings:Hsiehand Pugh(1993) concluded that poverty and income inequality are both associatedwith violent crime. Sampsonand Laub (1994) pointedto social classand poverty as inhibitors of normal family functioning and thus as facilitators of violence.Hagan (1994) noted that, in Norway,inequalitybreedsviolence,especiallywhen inequality involves segregationby race and residence. Huff-Corzineet al. ( 1991)reviewedcrimestatistics in the U.S. and concludedthat severepovertyis related to increasedlethal violence rates for both blacks and whites. Kruttschnittet al. (1994) found that povertyincreasedthe likelihoodof child abuse. White (1994),in an Australianstudy,pointedto the power of povertyto crcatca permanent"underclass" blockedfrom advancement throughlimited accessto employment.Anderson(1990)conductedfield work in two urban communitiesand concludedthat povcrty contributedto lossof leadership in a community, ultimately resulting in increasedviolence. Osman (1992)studiedstreetgangsin theU.S. and concurred that reducingviolencerequirestargetingthe community, not alienatedor aggressive individuals.Warner and Price (1993) clearly outlinedthe link between violcnt crimc and neighborhoodcharactcristics, ilcludingpoverty,socialdisorganization, and isolation of racial groups. The great"War on Poverty"declaredby President Lyndon Johnsonin the 1960sillustrateshow global targeting of poverty failed to eradicatethe negativeimpactof povertyon communities.Despite entitlementprograms,communitymentalhealthcenters, and anti-povertyprograms,the problems of poverty and violencepersist,and the federaldollars to fund suchinitiativeshavebecomescarce.According to a sfudyby theChildren'sDefenseFund(1993), black childrenarepoorertoday than in 1968;the gap betweeninfant mortality of black and white infants was greaterin 1993 than -' any other time since 1940.The Children'sDefer,-.-,,rad andthe Annie E. CaseyFund (1993) advocatecoursesof action that
Understanding the Violent Community target the enrichment of community life for poor black children. This chapterreportsfirst on direct observationof the communityof Montego Bay, Jamaica,by a group of psychodynamicallyoriented pgofessionalswho worked within that community to reduce violence and improvethe residents'quality of life. The community was viewed as an organism with structures, roles,anddysfunctions, much like a patient;thediag"violent nosisof community" was basedon criteria summarizedby Twemlow and Sacco(1996a).They were derived from questionnairedata administered to Jamaicanpoliceofficers,directobservationof the city, analysisof crime information,contentanalysis of rnediareports,and talks with local and centr,rl governmentofficials. These criteria will be elaborateduponin muchmoredetailto form the substancc 01'thischapter. A smallerscaleprojectin two elementaryschools in midwesternU.S. is thenbriefly describedto show how schoolsfunctionas a barometcrof community hcalth.Violentcommunitiesalwayshaveviolentand dysfunctionalschools.The project's approachenablcdthc schoolto stabilizeand its surroundingcommunity supportstructurcbecameparticipant-observersin the school,ratherthan merecritics and skeptics. lf communityinterventionis to be suoccssful, thc diagnosismustbe accurate. Thereis a criticalmassor optimalanxietylevel within the group which, when attained,can lead to widespreadchangewith relatively small input of catalyzing resources(Yalom, 1985;Twemlowand Sacco,1996).
MontegoBay,Jamaica The interventionteam includedmental healthprofessionals,police,andmartialartistswho visitedMontego Bay, Jamaica,for 2 years,delivering approximately 100 hours of specializedleadershiptraining to the police and school teachers.Programswere developed vrith the police and teachersas partnerswithin
579
the community.This project is describedin detail in other works by the authors (Sacco and Twemlorv, 1997;Twemlow and Sacco,1994,1996).Table 19.1 summarizesthe training proceduresand theory of community growth used in the project. A core group of visionaryprivate sectorindividuals observedthat the emergingviolent natureof MontegoBay directlythreatenedits commerce,torlrism, and quality of life for citizens,and approached the team for help. The communityof Montego Bay is a mid-sizedcommunityin St. Jamesparish with a populationof approximately125,000.Although it did not have the devastatinginner-city problems of Kingston,MontegoBay's homicideratewas climbing. The policehad scarch-and-seizurc powerssll.urlar to thoseexistingduring emergencyconditions, and comrptionof policeand otherofficialswas pervasive.
Cross- Cultural C omparis on The team'sinterventions and observational analysis would likely be more difficult in a more evolved nation such as the U.S. The complexnatureof the politics and bureaucracyeven in the most destitute communitiesof thc U.S. rvould likely prohibit as much involvement,dialogue,and freedomto initiate experimentalprogramsas was possiblein Jamaica. Working in an evolving nation often allows for more innovation in both the study and the applicationof community developmentprinciples. Therewere strikingdifferencesbetweenthe roles of men and women in Jamaicaand in the U.S.; for example,in the percentage of femalepolice officers 20Yoor morein Jamaica, comparedto singledigit figuresin the U.S. At the sametime, although women appearedto be generallyassertive,malechauvinistic roles seemedentrenchedin the day-to-day husband/wife relationships,with men often being violent and conjugalrape common. Jamaicahad no formal entitlementprogramsfor financial aid, other
580 CollectiveWolence
Tnsl-e 19.1
A SnvnN-SrBpFt ow CHanr FoR CoMMUNrryVlolnncn PnnvrNTroN Theory Step I Data gathering
StepII Cornmunity diagnosis Step tII Identificationof cornmunity stabilizingsystems
Features
Anti-intellectual,action-oriented leadership
l. Counterattack approachto law and order 2. Communityfragmentation 3. Increasedcrime and corruptionof community leaders 4. Altruism seenas weak and naive 5. Lack of positivemale role models 6. High stress,fe'*, healthy or.rtlets
Violentcommunity
l . D i a g n o s i se s t a b l i s h e c
l. Law and Order 2. Education 3. Health 4. Spirituality
l. Policeand military 2. Schoolteachers 3. Medical personnel 4. Churchleaders
Guiding Principles
Source
Step IV. Peacekeeper/peacemaker training Trainingof community Leaderscatalyzelargegroup changeby changeagents role modeling common goals increasecohesiveness and reducecommunityviolence Leadersshould be strong and gentle Mental clarity, self-awareness, present centerednessand personalresponsibility Sublimationsreduceimoulsivitv Reflectiveself is enhancedby selfawarenessand role modeling Altruistic impulsescan motivate changein individualsand community
than child care for children up to age 15 months. There was no formal Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) equivalent. There was a Women, Infant, and Children (WIC) program which provided minimal foodstuffs for younger mothers until their babiesreached15 monthsof age.Jamaica
Psychoanalytic grouptheory Sociologyand psychoanalytic theory Martial arts training and theory Zen theory and practice Psychoanalytic ego psychology Psychoanalytic objectrelations
theory Literatureon altruism
was similarto theU.S.approximately 40 yearsagoin its attitudetowardteenagepregnancy.Young women rvho becamepregnantwhile in junior high or high schoolwerenot welcomedat schoolandexperienced significantrejectionby their familiesandl:omecommunities.
Understandingthe Violent Community 5gl Taslr 19.l (corurlr,,ruoo)
A snvnN-srnpFr,ow crnnr FoRcoMMuNrry vrolnNcn pnnvBNTroN Step V. "ornrn"n Factorsmotivating community to change
Communitygroupswhich fighi each other unpriductively Aggressionin schools
.,Engineered .*ni.t,,community forums resolve differences
Children and domesticviolence
protectionand care programsfor orphansand abusedwomen Protectionand community clean_up with beautification Trainingin effectivenonviolent altematives
Homeress andindigent Tourism Crime step vI Maintenanceof the effectivenessof the intervention
Step VII Ongoingevaluation
tlj:::f:::"i:jJ,.jJ.""'J,'"r,"..
Improveconditionsof employment and statusofpeacemaker/peacekeeper Continueregularsupervisionand training over severalyears Transfertrainingofpersonnelto local authoritiesas quickly as possible _ Faculty functionas low_profileadvocates. Credit goesto local communityactivists wherepossible Developmentof measuresof communitv violenceand growth Ongoingreview of the .,ViolentCommr.rnity,, diagnosis
jy;J,fjf ilii:::"il:i:i,TLff ;1il"?,y;i1,"ffi::i l,';:ilT.;:ff During l0 years of visiting and working with Jamaica'sschool children, the authors have observed, through hundredsof conversations,that Jamaicanchil_ dren have a much different attitude toward education thando American youth. In almostevery case,a Jamai_ can child is highly motivatedto pusue an education. Actually,educationis seenasthesoleroad to economic security.Even in homesfor delinquentyouth, the chil_ dren still value educationand welcome the oppornr_
nity to absorb available information. This attitude remainsfixed throughoutthe Jamaican citizen,s life cycle. When the interventionteam provided work_ shopsfor the JamaicanConstabulary Force(JCF),all of the faculty marveled at how intensely focused,energetic, and absorbedthesevery undereducated, poorly paid Jamaicanpolice officers were. In the U.S., thereis often a builrin adversarial relationshipbetweenschoolandhome beca ,; of the
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CollectiveViolence
"them vs.us" approachof requiredmeetingsbetween parentsand schoolpersonnel.In Jamaica,authority was questionedfar less.Parentsusually did not engage in ongoing conflict with the school concerning strong disciplinary action with their children. They more often cooperatedwith the school and police around disciplinary issues.It was virrually unheard for parentsto take legalactionagainsta schoolconcerningharshdisciplinaryaction againsttheir children. It was clear that Jamaicansvalue education, devalueentitlementof financialaid, andprefersimple social systemsover more complex ones.Whatever the etiologyof theseculturaldifferences,Jamaicans tended to accedeto internationalauthorityand to value educationalinterventionmore highly than we do in thc U.S. Although there were remnantsof a form of racismderivedfrom strongBritish colonial rulc until 1963,racismof the kind secnin thc U.S. was not prominent.Splitswithin communitieswerc more usuallyalongpolitical,religious,or socio-economic issuesratherthan on racial srounds
Psychological Attributes of a Violent Comnrunity Thc communitycan bc viewed as having ccrtain beliefs that drivc cultural attitudesand, ultimately, the actions of its members.Freud (1920) studied large groups,more particularly,the functioningof the church and the military. He observedthat such largegroupsexerta contagiouseffect on othergroups andon theirmembers,who becomesuggestible. Often, there is a submersionof the critical facility of individuals to a group agenda,resultingin impulsivity, a loss of the searchfor the truth. and an increasein affectivepitch. He alsoobservedthat groupmembers often subjugatetheir own personalgoalsto the ideals of their leader. The psychiatric literature abounds with researchstudies on how groups remain cohesive,work-oriented,andrational(e.g.,Yalom, 1985). Some, McDougall (1920) for example,concluded
that to be cohesive,groupsmust have continuity,a tradition.anda definitestructure.The individualmust understarrdhorvthe group rvorks,and the group must recognizethat othergroupsare equallyvalid. In spite of these and other complex factors which maintain the peacefulstructureof a community,identification and of the centralrole of leadershipin cohesiveness work function of a group is the unique contribution of psychoanalyticauthorsin the field; leadershiptraining was the main focusof this multi-level community intervention. Bion (1959)concludedthatsmallgroups searchfor three types of leaders:(1) a caring and (2) a frighr reliableleader(dependency assumption); ening, ruthlessleader(fight/flight assumption);and (3) a messianic, omnipotentleaderwho will solve problemsin his or her own uniqueway and in a way that doesnot needto be understoodby the members of the group,as in cults,(pairingassumption). From the authors' observations,at different times, large groups,includingviolent communities,also reactin thesevariousways toward their leaders. Another valuable conceptualizationof how a community obtainsand constructivelyusesknowledgcis relevantto the functioningof healthyascomparcdto violcntcommunities. Bion ( 1970)statedthat the knowledgea group developsis alwaysin a contcxt. It does not arise a priori and is not fixed or permanent.Thus,knowledgeis not a possession but a processand not individual property but a function of a relationshipand a cultural context. Knowledge changesconstantly,or, as Bion stated,the individual learns from experiencein a processof continuous reflectionand transformation.Knowledge,according to Bion, canbe employedfor discoveryand exploration and can also be employedto avoid painful and frustrating experiences(Grinberg, 1985). Knowing somethingexistswithin the contextof a containerthe community. Without that containing function, knowledge does not become useful, according to Bion. Bion referredto useful knowledge asplus Klinked.The oppositeof knowledge- mirursK- is an enviousand greedyspoilingof the culturalcontext
Understanding the Violent Community
583
or the container for the knorvledge.Parker (1996) "the celebration deliberate called it of and studied stupidity,the pushingaway and ruin of knowledge." In violent communities,as thc leadcrshipstructurecollapses,minus K dominatesgroupsand solutions that involve working togetherbreak down. The individualist solution to problemsdominatesin an attemptto avoid catastrophe or chaos,i.e.,minusK is substirutedfor plus K and thus for consciouscollective cooperation.Thus, the rules that hold communities togetherbecometangledand meaningless; for example, organized crime flourishes and sick and destmctivelytyrannicalleadersemerge.Sick leadership cannotbe indicted as the causeof the violent community, becausethe violent cornmunityand the leadershipstructureare in an intimatedialecticalrelationshipwith eachother.Thus,eachis interdependcnt on the other for its destructivefunctioningin a way sirnilarto Bion's (1970) "containerand contained"concept. In thc team'smodel(summarized in Table19.l), thc communitypeacemakers/peacekeepers function to retum the violent community to a collaborative work group mode,modelingqualitiesof self-reflection, and caring and compassionfor othersand the cnvironment. Thc interventionteam in Jamaicaobservedthe following psychologicaltrendswithin MontegoBay that wcre consideredto contributeto the violent climate there.
Thinking and intellectualpursuitswere seenas gentle arts that were antithetical to the everyday struggle for survival. Thus, the community placed much greater emphasison action and shorterterm, stop-gapsolutionsthanon reflection,abstraction, and the use of thought-throughintellectualsolutionsto a wide spectrumof community problems.Intellectual discussionwas reduced to a form of streetdebate. The averageJamaicanwas quite readily able to debatemost world topics;however,this type of debate and dialogue was not used when it came to dealing with local community problems. This nonthoughtful,action-orienteddynamicwas evidencedin two police initiatives observedduring the project period of 1992 to 1994. The first was titled OperationARDENT, a responseto increased citizenviolenceinvolvingthe useof policeandmilitary personnelin joint patrols of the Montego Bay tourist areas.Military personneldressedin fatigues and carrying automaticweaponswere visiblealong the main tourist strip (GloucesterAvenue).This approach quickly failed becauseit frightenedoff tourists and did not reduceviolence. After ARDENT came OperationACID. This approachusedpolice and military personnelin cooperativeraids and roadblocksdesignedto strikeat the heart of Jamaica'scriminal gangs or posses.This operation,again, failed to reducecommunityviolenceand certainly did not improve the community's or the tourists' senseof safetv.
Anti-lntellectualism,A trend of anti-intellectualism was clearly observed during many dialogueswith variousindividualsin the MontegoBay community. The concepts of abstract thinking and intellectual discr,rssion were seenas luxuriesbeyondmost citizens' grasp.Despitethe value Jamaicansplace on education,the ideaof reflection,intellectualdialogue and debate,and other methodsof reflective regulation of aggressionin dealing with community problemswereminimizedundertheregressive dragof the violent community group dynamics.
Personal Power ComesFrom Violence;Altnism Is Weakness.Community forums were organizedby the intervention team using an engineeredconflict model (Twemlow and Sacco,1996).Membersof the community were challengedto debatetheir views of violence in the community with a largegroupof JCF police officers. The moderator,a clinical psychologist, engineeredthe debateto elicit the deepfeelings of mistrust and disgust felt by both the community and the police for eachother,while moving thegroup to a realizationof convergentconcemsantl ,roals.
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Collective Wolence
Both the communityand the police sharedthe belief that action or violence was the most desirableresponsetoward ensuringthe public's safety.Through seminarsand supervision,the interventionteam addressedthe false basis of this approachto lasting peace. Anyone who offered goods or servicesgratis was viewed as weak and their motives as suspicious. Therewas very little trust that good could comefrom beingaltruistic,andbeing anythingotherthanstrongly self-interestedwas viewed as not only weak, but ridiculous.The conceptthatpowerfulindividualscan be altruisticseemedquite contradictoryto most Jamaicans.The notion that criminals would respect strong,yet minimally violent interventionswasviewed asludicrous.Thus,thepretestprimaryvisionofpower revolvedarounddomination,coercion,andultirnately, violencc,to inducc submission,exemplifiedwithin organizedcrimc. Therewas also clear evidenceof a high rateof lctlialviolenccuscdby tlteJCF in fightingcrime.The JCF was reportedto be responsiblefor upwardsof 20o/o of deathsby weaponsin Jamaica.Therewerea host of causesadvancedfor this phenomenon,including (l) very strict gun laws which forced gun fights during arrests,(2) unbelievablypoor working conditionsand pay for the police, and (3) an almost total lack of community supportand respectfor the police. There was little emphasison police trainingof any sort.Policewere neitherorientedto a community police model nor trained to see themselvesas involved, stable, police officers who helped prevent crimeasinteractivemembersofthe community.Some older JCF officers communicatedto team members that this punitive social control attitudeof the police began during the colonial period. The police were expectedto be the tools of oppressionagainst the field handsworking the sugarplantations.When the JCFwas first commissionedin 1867,its primaryrole was to maintain law and order among oppressed workers for the plantation industry. Thus, rank and
statuswithin the community were obtainedby exerting unquestioningcontrol over the oppressedworkers in the plantations.The roots of an oppressivelaw enforcementapproachran deep in this evolving nation, despitethe fact that Jamaicahas been valiantly strugglingto evolve into an independentnation since t963. Immediatevs.DelayedGratification. It appearedthat much of the everyday activities of the citizens of MontegoBay did not reflect a concem for the future developnientand security of their community, but was more self-centeredand focused on short-term gains. In fact, the primary driving force from most levelsof the community,including govemment,involved satisfying immediate needs with short-term solutions.This wasin greatpartthe resultof beingan extremely poor community where the increasing populationhad decreasingresources. This phenomenonwas most clearly evident by observingthe Montego Bay comrnunity'sview of tourism.Jamaicahas traditionallyenjoyedapproximately 30,000 new visitors a week to the island. From the mid-1980sto the mid-1990s,Jamaicahad a steadilyincreasing$ I billion a year travel industry. Tourism grew to be the third largestindustrysupporting the nation'seconomyas reportedby the Jamaican TouristBoard in 1994. Within Montego Bay, it could be clearly observedthat lessand lessenergywas being focusedon creatinga friendly and safeenvironmentfor visitors. Eventually, the community became hostile toward touristsand developedan impulsive frenzy to take as much as they could from passingvisitors. The conceptof respectinga growing industry was over-shadowed by immediateneed. Beyond slogans on billboards, there was little organizedcommunity effort to protect tourism as a valuableeconomicentity. Many citizensof the community argued that there were fewer oppornrnities for them to survive and provide for their families, justifying rvhater,errude and intrusive behavioru as
Understanding the Violent Community requiredto profit from the dwindling stock of visi_ tors. There was little organizedcommunity effort to addressthecoreissuesinvolvedin thisprocess.Again, the community'sresponsewas to dispatchits already overwhelmedand demoralizedpolice force to use outdatedtactics toward crime. Near the end of the project, the JCF began to respondto the increasing tourist conflict by appointing an intellectually ori_ ented leader (AssistantSuperintendent L.B. Rose) from within its own ranksto developsolutionsfor the tourisVpolice/communityinterface.AssistantSuper_ intendentRose later trained a team of hand-picked community police officers for the entire island. Driving from the airport in MontegoBay to rnost of the tourist hotels, it was abundantlyclear that the larger private sector community was not concemed about the upsettingperceptionstouristsmay have developedwhile traveling through the downtown section.Therewas little effortto protectvisitorsfrom the hard realities of daily life of the citizenry of MontegoBay. Touristsbecameupsetandscaredwhen confrontingpoverty and violencedirectly after leav_ ing the airport. In Montego Bay, it is common to see homelessandmentallyillpeople andcardboardshanty towns.Thereseemedto be a prevailingattitudewithin the tourism industrythat it was sufficientto transport touriststo the nice beachareas,with little organized efforts being directed toward improving the quality of life in downtown Montego Bay. Simple fences, Iocal art, and planting shrubscould have done much to protecttouristsfrom the harshvisionsof life on the downtown streets.All-inclusive Club Med-style hotels were built outsidethe cities with the idea that visitors could be protected from theserealities and the daily strugglesof the citizens of Montego Bay and others at various tourist locations in Jamaica. But, of course,tourists want to explore local color and are usually not at all happy being confined in American-stylevacation complexes. The unfortunateresult of this lack of forethought was a decreasingnumber of visitors and an increas_ mg perception in the U.S. travel industry that Ja_
5g5
maica was a violent place and should be avoided. This was simply no longer true. Most visitors were saferin Montego Bay than they were taking a downtown shoppingtrip in their home community in the U.S. Thus, a cycle of violencewithin the Montego Bay community was acceleratedby a lack of fore_ thoughtand preoccupationwith immediategratifica_ tion and greedratherthan strategic,nonviolentplan_ ning for an improved longer term stablefuture. The intervention team was able to help turn around this attitudeby presentingworkshopsand meetingswith the Chamber of Commerce, goverrrmentofficials, and private citizens in the area. Lack of StablePolitical and Family Systems.When a community becomesself-absorbedand feels impo_ tent, thereis often a perceivedlack ofrespect for the leader.This was very obvious in Jamaica.The team membersinitially observedthat the community was not cohesive;a lack of confidencein the national governmentwasevident.Therewas a prevailingbelief that politicians and police were corupt, resultingin a lack of faith that the leadershipcould providesafety. Since the mid-l960s, there was a reportedde_ creasein the integrity of the nuclear family within Jamaica,with a concomitantincreasein singleparent householdswith absentor marginally involved fa_ thers,accordingto the team members' communica_ tions with citizens during community forums from 1992 to 1994.The male population within Jamaica was generallya highly mobile and unattachedgroup, with many sub-family units. There was a movemenr away from the nuclearfamily, monogamy,and tradi_ tional Christianvalues,in spiteof the many churches in St. Jamesparish. This observation parallelspost-I 960sdevelopment in the U.S. For example,in Springfield,MA, the per_ centageof children in the public school systemwho were on AFDC was nearly 80% as reflectedin the 1994 Springfield Public School Records.This sug_ gestedthat 8 out of l0 childrenwere psychologically and economically fatherlesswithin the Springfield
586 Collective Wolence system.This rvas almost a replica of the Montego Bay SecondarySchool,which, accordingto the staff of the school,also had an estimated80% fatherless with most childrenliving in houseshrdentpopulation, holds headedby singlemotherswith only intermittent contactwith biologicalfathers.This highly mobile and unattachedfamily systemwas mirrored by the JCF. The JCF was designedto be a centrally trainednationalsecurityforce in which all officers were expectedto be ready to change station with little notice.There was little opportunityfor any of the officers to develop stable family relationships within any one communitybecausethey were oftcn transfcrredsuddenlyat unprcdictableintervals. Thc teammembersconsideredthis instabilityto be a causalfactor in thc high levels of policc stress rvhichcontributcdto thc violcnceof the policc.Somc JCF officcrsrcportcdthat they oftcn had four or flvc "lamilics" in dilfcrenttorvnsbecauscof this requircrncnt to lcavc onc community and live in anothcr. The nct rcsult was that the police families bccame dcstabilizcd by a lack of consistcntpositivemalcrolc modclsbecausethe strongmale modelswerc highly mobile and unattachedto any one community.This destabilizedthc basic structurewithin thc community andcreated a nonattached andhighlynarcissistic nralepopulationwhich believcdthat scll'-indulgence wastheirright.Responsibility andinvolvementwithin thecommunityweresubjugated by narcissism, sexual cntitlement, and hedonism. Pctvverlessrtess, Despair, and Anomie. Violent communitiesseemto lose a senseof purposein the expressionof their emotionsand actions.As a community becomesmore violent, there is an increased f'eelingof powerlessness and a perceived lack of pulpose,rvith a clear lack of motivation to be harmoniousandpeaceful.Individuals do not feel connected to othersor do not sharecommon goals.Groups becomedispersedindividualspropelledby self-interest. In Jamaica,therervasa high incidenceof volatile domesticdisputes,includingconjugalrape,r,vithran-
jealdom actsof violencestemmingfrom senseless ousy,envy,andpetty rivalries.This was immediately observablewhile walking aroundcommunities,where it was not uncommon to see amputatedbody parts due to the preferencefor machetesfor self-defense. This absenceof skill and compassionin practical problem-solvingseemedto stem from a lack of perceived alternativeresponseoptions,motivated by a senseof despair,fear,and powerlessness. Escapisrnas a Responselo Helplessnes.s. It is no surprisethat a violent community would want to createas many quick escapesas possible.The increascin alcoholand dmg addictionwithin any one communityis inverselyproportionalto theamountof hope and stabilityof a commlrnity.The more helplessand powerlessindividualsin a communityfecl, thc grcatcrthc temptationto seizcreadily availablc cscapcs,suchas chemicals. The intcrventionteam quickly observedthat alcoholismwithin thepoliceforcewasrampant.Within the community,alcoholwas an acceptedpart of thc ovcrall culturc,with rudimentarydrinking laws and no minimum drinking agc. Police stationshad bars attachcdto them,and driving underthe influenceof alcoholwas not exprcsslyprohibitedin Janraica. Therewas a clearincreasein the use of "crack" cocaineby males,with a noticeabledifferencebetweenthc sexeswith regardto drug abusein Jamaica. Within the U.S., crack cocainehas seen a widely expandeduse by females,especiallyamongsingleparentheadsofhousehold.This hasresultedin staggering increasesin addictedbabies.This plienornenon was rarely observedor reported in Jamaica, where crack addictionappearedto be primarily a male phenomenon. Although lesstrue with alcohol, there appearedto be a strong preferenceby males ratherthanfemalesto useescapismasa primaryway of copingwith helplessness. MontegoBay had very few escapesand sublimations availableto its citizenry.The local govemment did not sponsorcampsor many recreationalactivities.
Understanding the Violent Community Althoughthe JCF, local churches,and other groups madestmgglingefforts to developathleticprograms, these leagues were woefully underfunded,underequipped,overpopulated,and struggledwith a lack of facilities, transportation,and basic equipment. Thus, the dwindling resourcesand growing anomie blended tragically with a lack of healthy sublimatoryoutlets,resultingin an increaseof pathological escapismat all socio-economiclevelsof the community.Thesepsychologicalfactorsprovide the dynamicforcesdriving dysfunctionalcommunity behaviors by individual community membcrs.The interventionteam members hypothesizedthat change would stemfrom impactingthesepsychologicalvariableswithin the community. Educationand community program developmentwere the techniquesemployed. The Bttlly/Victim/Bystander Relationship and lts Destructive Effects. According to Edmond Burke, "The only thing necessaryfor the triumph of evil is for goodmento do nothing."In a violentcommunity, one sure way to assessthe level of violence is to measurethe frequencyof bullying, sexualharassment, and weaponviolencein schools.Middle and high schoolsare especiallyprone to eruptionsof violencebasedon a pervadingcommunitysenseof disconnection and anomie.A MontegoBay Secondary Schoolwas observedclosely over a Z-yearperiod (Saccoand Twemlow, 1997).There was noticeable violenceat this school of approximately2400 students.Reportsof five to six seriousphysical attacks per day,with at leastthreesexualassaultsper week, were not unusual; countlessincidents of sexual harassmentwere reportedby young females.Everyone at the school,including the administration,teachers, and especiallythe students,becameacculturatedto the high level of violence. They were numb to its impact on them as individuals. Although the schoolyardbully is the stereotypical model for bullying, the authors have found that similar complex coercive power stmgglesoccur be-
5g7
tweenadults,betweenadultsand children,and vice versabctweenchildrenand adults in comnrunities whosecohesiveness is collapsing.A harassing bully/ victim/bystanderinteraction is frequently seen in workplaceharassment, not only sexualbut alsoother combinationsof coercive power strugglesthat involve a strongerbully and a weaker victim with a facilitating bystanding audience(Twemlow l99g). Most of us met our first bullies at school.and most researchinto bullying has been done in school set_ tings(Twemlowet al., 1996a).In violentcommunities, the complex interaction of the structural and psychologicalfactors describedin this chaptercre_ atesa contextfavoringbullying coercivepower rela_ tionships.The authorsdefinecommunityharassment in a way very similar to how bullying in schoolsis described. It is theexposureofan individualoverand overagainto negativeinteractions on thepart of one or more dominatepersonsor community groups, who gain in some way from the discomfort of the victim. Thesenegativeactionsare intentionalinflic_ tions of injury or discomfortand may involve physical contact,words, or insulting gestures,forms, or sexualbribery and coercion,including quid pro qtto manipulation. Essentialto this definitionis thatthere is an imbalanceof power- an asymmetrical power relationship- and that the victims have problems defendingthemselves. Although the main actorsin this drama are the bulliesand victims,a greatdeal of pain comesfrom the passiveand facilitating role of the bystanders. This bystandingaudiencegives the supportivecon_ text or foundation for the bully/victim interaction. There are two types of bystanders.The butty bystandertypically enjoysseeingthe victimizationbut doesnot want to participatedirectly.Essentially,these individuals function as the bullies' helpersand are vicariously involved in the bullying. The bystander victim is ofteria frozenandfrightenedindividualwho is too afraidto deviatefrom the socialnorm and from the strongcharismaticleadership of thebully andthe bully bystander.Frequently,in communities,there
588
Collective Wolence
may be lack of supportfor activistsfor socialchange, especiallyif it involves a dangerousconfrontation with arbitraryand punishingauthorityrepresented by the leadership.Thosewho might be quite supportive in private,including friends and families,rnaybe too afraid of job loss or other recrimination and may unconsciouslysocially isolatethe complainingvictim. In the authors'experience,it is quite common for the victimsof communityharassment to find that they do not have the support of friends which they previouslyhad or thoughtthey had undertheseconditions. Unsupportive friends and family may even apologizeto the harassedindividual for being so lacking in courage.The important point here is that this interactionistperspectivedefincsthe bully/victim,/bystander relationshipdialectical ly. The relationshipbetweenthe victim and the victimizcr has been defined as a classicaldialectic (Twemlow, l995a,b).It is role-dependent relationships,with eachhaving no meaningwithout the existenceof theother.From this practicalpointof view, a dialecticcoercivepower relationshipin the community usuallyinvolveseveryonein thatcommunity rvho bccome involved in some way, usually in a bystandingrole basedon gossipand rumor,creating a completernilieuof pathologicalinterpersonal relationshipsdominatedby coercive power struggles. Theseconditionscan resultin violent and damaging consequences, for example,outburstsof homicideor gang violence.
other hand, if there is a meeting about how much money a school should spend,the meeting is usually overwhelmed with parents who want their children to have a little bit more in school. The idea of violence is related to death, and people have a universal aver_ sion to thinking about death. The government and community of Montego Bay were aware of the impact that the perception of vio_ lence would have on the tourism industry. During the period of the intervention, the external perception of violence was so high that it was highlighted in the travel literature. At one point, when a large German tour boat docked in Montego Bay, not one of the 700 passengersdisembarked. Travel companies issued warnings to avoid Jamaica becauseof the violence. Foreign visitors avoided Montego Bay. It was expe_ ricnces like thesc that shocked the community into facing the economic disasterthat would likely result from a drop in tourist revenues. There are four fundamental varieties of commu_ nity denial of violence: I.
2.
The Denial of Violence.The single most powerful ingredientin contributingto a violent communityis community-widedenial of violence.To closeone's eyesto violenceis a very easyand naturalthing to do for most people. When an entire community closes its eyesto how violent it has become,real solutions becomedifficult to identifyand almostimpossibleto accomplishthroughcreativeaction plans.This was quite noticeablein Montego Bay and is also very evidentin the U.S. When a public meetingis held about violence,usually few people attend.On the
3.
Direct denial.The effectof this modelis to encour_ agetypicalcitizensto sayto themselves thattheyare not, in fact,criminals,nor arethey part of the prob_ lem, althoughit is knorvnthat,undercertaincircum_ stances(for exanrple,theextremestressof warfare), thattheordinarylaw-abidingcitizenis quitecapable o f v i o l e n t r e s p o n s e(sB r a d s h a w e t a l . , 1 9 9 1 ,1 9 9 3 ) . Denial allows an individualto distancehimself or herself from any responsibilityfor the problem. Over-simplification.As we havealreadyobserved,a commonover-simplification in this model ts to re_ ducethe solutionto the problemof violenceto the eliminationof violentindividualsusingseverelegal penalties.For example,it is commonlyacceptedthat the deathpenalty does not deter violent crime. Ja_ maica had severe automatic penalties for crimes involving weapons.paradoxically,accordingto JCF personnel,a crime involvinga gun usuallyled to a shootout with a fatality becausethe felon did not lvant rnandatorylife imprisonment.Such shootor.rts were commonin Jamaica,even for minor crrmes. Over-generalizatiott.Sometimes,the sr.rccessful u s e o f f o r c e t o q u e l l a r i o t i n o n e c i r c u m s t a n c res
Understanding the Violent Community
4.
generalized to thecomplicated problemsof thecommunity. In the U.S., this has led to extraordinary situationsin which small towns have spent enormous amountsof money on sophisticatedweaponry without saving enoughof the town's budgetto train personnelin the useof this weaponry.If one can ann oneselfwith weaponrysurpassingor equalto that of the sophisticatedaggressor,then one feels safe. Stereotypedresponsepatterns.In the martial arts, thereis a truism that admonishesthe fighter neverto underestimatethe enemy. Military training often emphasizes the skill and strengthof the individual and the incompetence and ineptnessof the enemy, and has often led to an underestimationof the enemy. Continuing the use of force when it does not work often results in the failure to observe how stereotypedresponsepattemsare not useful, sometirnesdue to an underlyingconternptof the enemy. In Jarnaica, therewas alsothepossibleartifactof the racialbias of the coloniallawrnakers.
Basic Structures of the Violent Contmunity A violentcommunitywill havea numberof a priori structuraldeficits that can be observedand influcnccd in largerscalecommunity interventions.BecauscJamaicaoffered the interventionteam an opporhrnityto observethe inner workings of a communiry tunencumbcred by complexbureaucracies and tangled socialhelpingnetworks,the team's observations of theseelementsof a violent communitywere greatly enhanced.Violent communities,in the team'sview, consistof the following basicstructuralelements: Disconnection of thePolice.It wasdramaticallyclear that the JCF was viewed by the community as a corrupt, untrustworthy, violent group, often called "animals" by the populace.The police maintained that the community was ignorant,selfish, and unresponsive.Both the community and the police shared a lack of understandingfor one anothers' perceptions, and each group struggledwith gross misperceptionsand a lack of accurateinformationabout what the otherthousht or did.
589
The perceptionof the police as uninvolved,roving, somcwhatrnadwatch dogswas readily observableby simplyreadingthe daily newspaper. Any one of the three nationalnewspapersran severalarticles eachday detailinghow violent and out-of-controlor comrpt the JCF was. There was an unlimited community appetite for information through all of the media outlets concerningthe lack of discipline or comrpt and violent nature of the police. Little rapprochementwas attemptedbetween the police and the community. Severalof the commr,mityforums, outlined and describedin more detail by the authors (Twemlow and Sacco,I 996) revealedthat the JCF often had fcw vehicles,no radios,and no methodby which to respond to reportedcrimes.The community participantswere alarmedto discoverthat most police of_ ficerswererequiredto takelocaltaxisto the sceneof crimes, seldom with a buddy back-up system for policework. Therewas virtuallyno understanding of the altruistic work performedby the police, such as pickingup orphansandcopingwith thehomelessand mentally ill. Theseforums introducedawarenessand mutual understandingand concern for each other, which are fundamentalto peacefulcommunitics. PoptrlationIncreaseand Redistribution.Therewas a dramaticincreasein the St. Jamesparish population over the 20 years prior to the study. Jamaicahad evolved from an agricultural nation to one with a more expandedbaseof manufacturing,mining, and eventually,tourism.This drewpeopleinto communities suchas MontegoBay, Ocho Rios,and Kingston. The increasedpressurefrom the population explosion was easily observablein Jamaicathrough what is known asthe "capturedland" phenomenon.people with no housing beganto migrate into areaswhere there was secondaryaccessto resourcesgenerated from tourism and manufacturing.Without housing, these refugeeswere forced into "capturing" land. During the team's interventionperiod, team memberswas madeawareof several"rebellions" iir rvhich
590
Collective Wolence
the police rvere forced to break up unplannedcom_ munities made up of poor squatterswho had seized open land for personalhousing. Lack of Social llrelfare programs. There were no nationally subsidizedsocial welfare programsin Ja_ maica.Many conservative politiciansinvolvedin the U.S. welfare reform have turned to the idea that entitlementin the U.S. is the primary reasonfor the growth of poverty and single-parentfamilies. Al_ thoughvery limited welfare programsexistedin Ja_ maica,the same phenomenonof increasedsinsle_ parentfamiliesexistedthere. OverwhelmedSchools Dorninated by Builies. yiolent communitieshave violent schools.As popula_ tions shift, inner-city schoolsbecomeincreasingly populatedwith childrenfrom dysfunctionalhomes. One clearsignalof a violent communityis a school rr"rnby bullies,often with extensiveprotectionrack_ cts.MontegoBay SecondarySchoolwas thetargeted school in the team's intervention.When the team first beganto make observations at the school,therc rvasa startlingamount of physical,emotional,and sexualbullyingoccurringon a daily basis(Saccoand Twemlow, 1997). Beginningin elementaryschool,aggressionbe_ comesa primary tool of expressionof dominanceto counterfeelingsof worthlessness. Childrenbecome bullies,teachersbecomebullies,and the schoolbe_ comes dominatedby aggressionand intimidation. Teachers soonbecomedemoralized; childrenbecome distant, uninvolved participants in the educational process,with a high degreeof absenteeism; and poor relationshipsdevelopbetweenstudentsand teachers, teachersand teachers,and studentsand shrdents.Dys_ functionaland aggressiveadultsare at home writins the scriptsfor angry children who later becomebuI lies and disruptschoolsat an ever_increasing rate. Evolution of Criminal Enterprises.Violent commu_ nitiesoftenbecomemoreviolentbecauseof thepres_
enceof structuredand semi-structured criminal en_ terprisesor gangs.In Jamaica,the possecontrolled vice and drug activity.In the U.S., a wide spectrum of gangscontrol street-levelcrime. The lower level gangswithin both countriestypicallyconsistofyoung men underthe directionof an oldergeneration.These criminal enterprisesvary in the sophisticationof or_ ganization,rules,and methodsof operation,but they often provide money,status,protection,and a sense of purposeto the destituteand lonely.Both Jamaica and the U.S. have a significantproportionof young men becomingrandomlyviolent.In more sophisti_ catedcriminal operations,violenceis a tool to en_ force the rules of the criminal enterprise,whetherit is drugs,gambling,or prostitution.Violenceis nor toleratedunlessthereis a ,,business', purpose;also, eachact of violencemustbe allowedor orderedby a clearlydefinedcriminalbossor leader.young strect gangsor possesdo not havethis.,code"and thus, are more likely to experiencerandom,nonstrategic acts of lethalviolence. Often,criminalorganizations form the backbonc of the violent community. The community,s fear slowly beginsto increaseandhopefor anythingposi_ tive decreases because ofthe presence ofthesegroups. Policeareoftenaskedto trackdownandinvade thesc groups.The net resultof thesepure vigilante activi_ tieshasbeenobserved,in boththeU.S.and Jamaica, to be, at best,a short-termsolution.Gangmembers are drivenundergroundby suchtactics,only to spring up as soon as the intensityof the crack_down diminishes. Abuseand Rejectionof the Vttlnerable.Violent com_ munities usually do not take the time to care for the old and the young or thosewho are disabled or hurt. The more violent a community, the less tolerance there is for the undelprivileged,neglected, mentally ill, homeless,aged,and abandoned children.In Ja_ maica, there were a number of examples of how children were warehousedin rvoefully understaffed andminimally supportedorphanages, suchasBlossom Garden.Theseprogramshoused50 to 75 abandoned
Understanding the Violent Community childrenwho were often picked up off the streetby the police and placedin theseorphanages. Many of thesechildren sufferedfrom severemedicalandpsychological disordersresulting directly from neglect. In the U.S., violent communitiesignorethe vulnerabledespitethe presenceof governmentand private resources.Responsibilityfor the weak is subcontracted,and the citizensbrush off daily concem for the vulnerable,believingthat it is someoneelse's job. Injusticeto the weak is rationalizedaway becausesomeoneelse is supposedto do somethingto help. This is the modern,evolvedcommunity'sway of turning its back on the needy.Helping the weak strengthens, andnot helpingweakens,the moralfab_ ric of individualswithin the community.In a previ_ or.rswork (Twernlow and Sacco, 1996),the authors outlinedways of appealingto altruistictraits,cspecially to angry and demoralizedpeople,which can evokc a remarkable turn around in individual and communityattitudesand self-esteem.
Gender Myths and Their Intpact on Violence Thc violent communitycan be seenfrom a perspective whereculturalmyth dictatesattitude,with indi_ viduals within the communityactingin accordance with their understandingof the dominant cultural myth. One suchmyth that the authorsconsideredas fueling domesticand communityviolencewas that Jamaicanmen often believeit is important,and in fact, necessaryto "thump" (physicallyabuse).,their" women. This myth allows for a wide spectrumof highly dysfunctionalmale behaviorthatcumulatively weakensthe very fabric of the community. If violence toward women is acceptable,then the very essenceof good mothering and nurturanceof the community'syoung is at risk. The cycleof violence is thus fueled. Similarattitudeswereobservedconcemingsexual entitlementof males. The JCF officers reportedthat maritalrapewas not an issuein Jamaica.This belief
59I
involved the idea that marriage and rape could not co-exist:If you aremarried,thenrapeis not possible. This attitude flowed from a generallack of respect for women and the acceptanceof male dominance and violence. Table 19.2summarizesthe resultsof an opinion survey concerningsexual attitudesadministeredto 33 male and l9 femalemembersof the JCF partici_ pating in the seminarin 1992.No attemptwas made to attachstatisticalsignificancein this small survey, but examinationof opiniontrendssuggested thatmale police officerssaw rapistsas choosingvictims on the basis of physical attractivenessand that femalepo_ Iice officers suggesteda need for women to be sub_ missiveasthe motive.Paradoxically, femaleofficers recommended subrnission to a rapistand felt unable to control the likelihood of rape when comparedto malepoliceofficers.Whenaskedif a husbandhasthe right to engagein sexualintercourseregardlessofhis wife's consent,llo/o of female police officersand 39% of male officers answeredin the affirmative. Theseresultssuggesteda strict dominancesubmis_ sion attitudebasedon genderrolesevenin thepolice force which administered the domesticlaw.
Intervention in Violent Communities There are few altemativesto trying to rebuild a vio_ lent communityusingany systematicapproachwhich canbe appliedwith minimalresources yet gainmaxi_ mal impact. In Jamaica,there were very sparsere_ sourcesandexpertisewith which to initiateandmaintain a sophisticatedinterventionto reduceviolence. In the U.S., there are often so many resourcesthat competing interests over-complicate potentially simple solutions. The Montego Bay project provided an interesting opporhrnityto demonstrate how minimal resources directedtoward key structureswithin a community could catalyzean improved quality of life. Although this 2-year project was not sfudiedusing a rigorous
I
592 Collective Wolence
T,rsI-E19.2
J.q.ruA.rcaN CoNSTABULARv FoncB Srxul.r Arnruon
Sunvnyo Male
Yes l. Men choosetheir rape victirnsbecause: a. Women are physicallyattractive b. They threatenthe men c. They are abusive d. They appearself-confident
No
10 (53%)
Yes
No
2 (6%)
26 (79%) 1 e%) 4 (12%) | (3%)
2. Shottlda woman submit to a potentiallyviolentrapist?
12 (63%)
7 (37%)
t5 (45%)
t7 (52%)
3. Can a woman control the likelihoodof being raped?
14 (74%)
5 (26%)
29 (89%)
4 (12%)
4. Is therea likelihoodof rape being preventable?
16 (94%)
2 (tt%)
26 (jg%)
7 (21%)
2 0t%)
t7 (89%)
t3 (39%) 20 (61%)
6 (32%) 3 (16%)
5. Does a husbandhave the right to havesex regardless of thewife's consent?
I (3%)
6. If a rnanwith a knife or gun ordersyou into a car, should you go, hoping you will be releasedor get a chanceto b r e a ka w a y l a t e r ' /
l0 (53%)
I (42%)
23 (10%) l0 (30%)
7. Doessttblnissionto a rapist increaseor decrease thc likelihoodof the rapistcontinuingrvith the act'/
Increase 9 (47%)
Decrease i (31%)
Increase Decrease 13 (3g%) 19 (5S%)
' N = 5 2 ( 3 3 m a l c s / 1 9f c n r a l c s ) .
hypothctical-dcductivc model,it showcdclcarlyobscrvableresultsand thc teamwasablcto demonstrate how to developprojectsthat could targetinterventionsto createpeacefulcommunities(Twemlowand Sacco,1996). The key to rebuildinga violent communityis to identify peacemakers/peacekeepers (Table 19.I ). Thesespecialindividualsare active citizen leaders willing to standtall againstviolence.Thesepeople work in thepoliceforce,schools,healthandcommunity agencies,churches,and the healthprofessions. Theyrepresent a specialkind of personrvithstrength, honor,anda dedicationto peacefulsolutionsto community problems.Peacemakers have to be identified and then trained.It is not possibleto createthem from scratch,a-sthe team found that certainperson-
ality andbehavioralcharacteristics needto bc presenr first. The peacemakerfunctions to defusecrisesand deal with emergencysituationsnecessary to prevent the physicalsequelaeof violence.Theseindividuals then becomepeacekeepers, whose role is to create the conditionsnecessary for a lastingnonviolentand creativecommunity atmosphere.These peacemakers/peacekeepers were selectedfrom groupsthat the teamdefinedas critical to peacefulnessand the quality of life in the communities.Ratherthantreatingthe symptoms of community disorganization,such as disease, child abuse,etc.,the teamattemptedto getto the fundamentalcauseof the disorganization. This had to do, in the team members' minds, with the failure to provide an effective mechanismfor preservingcommunity cohesionand to developa feeling
Understanding the Violent Community of safety within the community and a communal concem for economic growth from tourism. Teammembersfelt that the stabilityof a commu_ nity is largely dependenton four major community systems- law and order, education,health, and spirituality domains. These four community roles embody the heart and soul of a functioning commu_ nity. When any of these four domainsbecome,,in_ fected" with violence, there is a weakening of the overall community's ability to decreaseimpulsivity and increasepositive communityaction. Larv and order are maintainedthrough the tradi_ tional socialcontrol elementof the police and mili_ tary.In mostsuccessfulnonviolentcommunities, the police andmilitary serveonly asa last resortmeasure to controlcrime and violencein the community. The intemal control of the community is enhancedthroughthe spiritualrootedness of the mem_ bersof the community in variousaltruistic organiza_ tions,suchas the church.In choosingpeacekeepers, lt was clear that there was a strong relationshipbe_ tween the JCF and the ministry, with a need for the police and the various community organizationsto work collaboratively on altruistic projects.This began to occur when JCF officers developedprojects thatwerepurely altruistic.The mostnotableof these was the evolutionof the role of JCF officersas our_ reachstreetworkers assistingthe homelessandmen_ tally ill. Educationis the lifeblood of any community. When violencebegins to reducea community's fun_ damental structuresto anarchy, the most dramatic signs can often be seen in the schools.In Montego Bay, violencewas a daily occunenceat the testschool - Montego Bay Secondary School and other schools.This shroud of violencecreateda senseof despair and a lack of interest in or opportunity for effective leaming and teaching. Teachersand stu_ dents felt unsafe and bullies ran the school. It was imperativefor the JCF to work collaborativelywith the intervention team and for school teachersand local community sponsorsto developprogramsthat
593
would reducethe violence at the school. When the schoolsare violent, the community is fed more and more bullies, and the overall long_termevolution of the communityis directedtowardincreasedviolence. The last elementof a nonviolent community is proper health and nutrition of its citizens.With few exceptions,the Jamaicancitizenry relied mostly on private medical care.The social welfare systemwas essentiallydevelopedand implementedinformally by the JCF officers who were solely responsiblefor picking up abandonedchildren.Entitlementprograms were virtually nonexistent.The Family Court was responsiblefor most probate decisionsrelating to child abuse,neglect,andabandonment. Unfortunately, public healthand recreationalso are primary targets for reductionwhen financial resourcesbecomeslim. This reductionin the focus on healthfurtheraddsfuel to the violent community evolution. The team selectedthe JCF as the first targetfor training becauseJCF officers were underthe greatest pressureto change.Ministers were already partici_ pating in the daily work of police officers as their spiritual guidesand counselors.Later, school teach_ ersand studentsparticipated,and finally, the medical community became involved through the team,s workersin child careand mentalhealthprograms. To achievethese objectives,clearly a comprehensive leadershiptraining program was needed. In Jamaica,the interventionteam memberswere nonpartisanand nonpolitical,and actedas advocates for all of the agenciesin the community. From a distance,the interventionteam was able to provide the necessaryinformation,intervention,and back_uo to allow the naturalhealingforceswithin the commu_ nity to gel and be guided from a point outsideof the community, with these peacemakers/peacekeepers takingmostof the creditandcriticismfor any changes in the community atmosphere.Thus,no one element of the communityworked alone,and the goalsof the peacefulcommunity could be set and monitored as long as necessaryby a more objective, professionai teamwith a clear,nonviolentphilosophicalorientation
5 94 CollectiveWolence Tasr.r:19'3
Copn Tun PnacnxnEPER/PEACEMAKER
oF CoNDucra
The peacekeePer/Peacemaker: and if force is necessary'ttsesthe anclself-confidence' ,,Enforces"peacenonviolentlywith coLlrage 1. leastinjuriousstrategypossible' more altruisticthan self-centered' Values,.fu,,ons;ii, *,f,"",f,.* and.is 2. othersfr.omhann' protecting ls comrnittedto-ftut", kindness'and 3. is not judgmental' and others' in Showsr,".irity,"".r.pts difference 4. the initiativeto betterthe community. Is a leaderunirot. model who takes 5. 6'lsmentallyalertandrrrindful,anclactssrviftlyandeffectivelyrvhenappropriate' and flexible' Is physicallyand rnentallyhealthy 7 antl self-control' ls able to ouercomefea' ty self-arvareness 8. Is quiet and self-restrained 9. t o keep this code. and to nlaintainthe knorvledgenecessary Ilas a commiturentto seck ncw knorvlcdgc, 10. l - h i s c o t l cc p i t o m i z c st h c C O A L S
o f t h c l c a d c r s h i pt r a i n i n g
lvho of thisoncinclividualpcaccmakcr charactcristics torvarclraisingconsclotlsncssandimprovingtlrcqualidcntificd providedthc intcrvcntion'Thc tcam also intcrvcntions ity of lit'c.Thc tcarnfollowcd up on thc altruistic othcr JCF officcrs who bcgarrto takc on visits' *irh fr"qu.nt tclcphoncrcportsand sitc rcspondby rolcswithin thcir law cnforccmentdtrties colnmuSucccssfulintcrvcntionsin the violent ill' and ing to thc needsof thc homelcss,mcntally both thc idcntificationand organizatton nity clcmancl 1996)' or"pnon.achildrcn(Trvemlowand Sacco' and thcir dircctionby a profcssional of pcacernakcrs It is essentialto be able to choosepeacemakcrs importantfor cniity outsidcof the community' lt is charwho havethe necessaryattitudeandpersonality of cross-section a represent to force professional the to beacteristics,as it is very easyfor peacemakers and racessufficientto be ableto develop discrplines Without the comecaughtup in their own importance' emerging the to responses creative individualized the stated proper leadership,they can stray from The profesproblemsthat a community may have' highly goais. Although these individuals must be to the wide ,ionul t"u* should be able to respond very and boundaries motivated, they require clear in the medispectrumof community needsincluding firm guidance.A code of conductfor Peacemakers educational,spiritual' and larv encal, recreational, 19'3)' was providedto eachJCF trainee(Table forcementdomains. essenihe qualitiesthat were identifiedasbeing peaceIn Jamaica,the team identified several tial for peacemakersinclude the following: the Montego makers.One such individual worked in worked coBay SecondarySchool'Team members thanegoistic L Morealtruistic police officer who operativelyfor 2 yearswith a JCF for commtrnity 2. Arvareof andtakesresponsibility a violent *u, ,ingt.-t andedly able to tum around Problems 1997)' schoololZ+OOchildren(SaccoandTwemlorv' Willing to takerisksfor peace,not easilyfrightened 3. Montego Bay It rvasclearthat this interventionat the andhumanistic 4. Relationship-oriented the efforts and SecondarySchoolwas due mainly to
Understandingthe Violent Community 595 5.
Self-rnotivated andmotivatorof others 6. Alert,strong,andpositive 1. Self-rewarding with low needfor praise 8. Personallywell-organized 9. Advocatefor the vulnerableanddisempowered 10. Optimistwho seesthebestin people I l.
Low in sadism
12. Highly enthusiastic advocateof the projectwith a personalunderstanding andcommitment to it Thesekey characteristicsneedto be identifiedin peacemakers, and, once identified,the selectedleaders should bc strategically located in key organizationswithin thecommunity.The outsideprofessional agencyneedsto more objectivelysupervise and fully apply liniited resourcesto motivate changewithin the various organizations.Teams of peacemakers couldbe developed; policecanwork in schools, teachers can work with police, churchescan work with child protectiveagenciesand police,etc. All peacernakers/pcacekeepers shouldkeepin touchwith each other with the cooperationof the primary agency rvith which they are affiliated. The observablefruits of this interventionwerc discussedin more detail by the authorsin an earlier work (Twemlow and Sacco,1996).In summary,the project was credited with promoting a significant increasein tourism (which continues)and a reduction in violentcrime.Although complexfactorsmake the crime-reduction figures suspect,there was no doubt about the enthusiasm of the community for what was seenby all as a highly successful collaborative venture. Lasting and successfulprojects establishedby the team included: l. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Rapeanddomestic crimeprevention liaisonservices Schoolviolenceprevention services Programfor the homelessmentallyill Rapepreventionteachertraining Communityyouth rap and recreation groups Shiftsin the trainingof police to a community
policingmodelwith significantimprovements in salaries andconditions of employment for police officers The authorsbelievethat this type of intervention worked becauseof its focus on treating causesof violence (community attitudesand demoralization) ratherthan treatingsymptoms(increasedbuilding of prisons,toughersentences, etc.).Trainingthosewlio have an assignedleadershiprole in the community was alsofelt to be of major import for the widespread changeseen,inspiteof relativelyminimal expendi_ ture ofresources.
Greatinga PeacefulSchootLearning program) Environment(C.A.P.S.L.E. The principles for a successfulinterventionwithin the primary school grades can be drawn from an activeprogram,currentlyworking in two elementary schoolsin the midwestemU.S. (Twemlow et al., 1996b).This programhas severalcomponents _ it usesan outsidemartial arts school as a resourcefor specialclassestargetingkindergartenthroughthe fifth gradesasa whole.Theseclasses, known asthe,,Gentle Warrior" programs, develop a psycho-educational approachto bullying.The roles of bully, bystander, and victim areclearly explainedand enactedthrough role playing.The speciallytrainedmartial artistspro_ videsalternativedefensivephysicalandpsychologi_ cal responsepattemsfor all the children in a fun and active program. The classesare conductedduring regularschooltime as part of the physicaleducation and health curriculum. The schoolsprovide additional internalmotivations by creating a variety of ,,zero tolerancefor bullying" programssuchasthe,,peaceflag programs". Eachclassroomhas a peaceflag flying outsidewhen therewasno conflict; but if a studentcausesa disruption, that student is responsiblefor taking the flag down for the dav.
596
Collective Wolence
The schoolsalso adopteda postercampaignrc"Bullying is not toleratedhere." inforcingthemessage, The schoolwalls are coveredwith postersdefining thetermsbully, victim, andbystanderandillustrating ways to recognizethem and to recognizeangerand horv to respondto it, including personalrelaxation techniquesand positive, empathic,and courteous Additionalaspectsof the intervencommunications. tion include involvementof peer mentors from a ncarbyhigh schoolto assistthe childrenin conflict rcsolution,and adult mentors(often seniorcitizens) to providerole modelsfor childrenandto assistthem in developingmannersand other socialskills. This programhas been operationalsince 1992 and has seenout-of-schoolsuspensions cut in half rvithinthc first year,with subsequent significantcontinucdrcductions.Additionalbcncficialeffectsof thc programcomparcdto a control school includeda dccreascin refcrralsof problen,studentsfor spccial trcatmcl'rt. an increascin standardizcdacademic achievemcnt testscores,and a decreasein disciplinary rcferralsto the principal. The feeling of bcing able to play safelyand learnwithout intermptionin thc classroomimproveddramatically,togetherwith significantimprovementin classroom behaviorscharactcristicof thc bully/victinr,/bystander intcraction. Projectivetestsrevealcdthat bullies changedin the directionof being able to inhibit aggressivebehaviors and that victims increasedtheir assertiveness. Detailsof thesefindingswerereportedby Twemlow et al. (1996b). In the model schools,therewas a commonlanguageconcerningthe bully/victim/bystanderrelationship.It was not uncommonto hear teacherscommunicating with studentsand studentscommunicating with studentsusing the learnedvocabularyof bully, victim, and bystander.The saying for the day often rnvokedthat theme.The messagewas kept simple, reinforcing the idea that everyone communicated better in the absenceof power struggles.After the initial dramaticeffecton schoolclimatein the 19961997year,only one parentin the entire schoolrvith-
hcld conscntfor his or her child to participatein the program. Comparisonof the StandardizedAcademic Achievementtests (MetropolitanAchievementtest) math percentileranks revealedthat the lowest ranking was for victims at 30.5%o,with bully-bysiandersat 33.8yo,bulliesat 42Y0,victim-bystanders at 48.0oA, and children with no problemsat 56.9o/o (Twemlow et al., 1996b).It was such findingsthat highlight thc very low academicachievement of victims,whosequietnesscomparedto bulliesoften leadsto lessattention from teachers.Programsthat over-focuson bullies run the risk of inadvertentlypromotingsimilar errors.
Conclusionand Summary This chaptcrdcvclopsa psychodynamic approachto violent communitiesas functioningentitiesinterdepcndentwith the individual dynamicsof its members.Two successful, inexpensiveinterventionsarc describedwhich focuson the developmentof leadershipskillsof altruism,fearlessness, and strengthwith compassionand diplomaticskills in the caseof thc JamaicaProjectand a focus on the importanceof groupsolutionsidentifyingpowerstrugglesandsharing responsibilityfor the working of the group as a whole as in the caseof the C.A.P.S.L.E.project.The effectivenessof interventionsof thesetypesdepends on the urgencyof the need as perceivedby private citizensand their willingnessto get involved, togetherwith an accuratediagnosisof the characteristics of a "violent community",the expertiseof its leadership, andthe cohesiveness of all membercomponentsto meet a common goal.
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About the Authors Stuart W. Twemlow, M.D., is in privatepracticeof psychiatryand psychoanalysisin Topeka,KS. He is also a faculty member of the Topeka Institute for Psychoanalysis at the MenningerFoundation,Topeka,KS, and ClinicalProfessor of Psychiatryat the Universityof KansasSchoolof Medicine,Wichita, KS. He is an advancedblackbelt andmasterteacher in Kempo Karate and Kobudo. Frank C. Sacco. Ph.D., is a Clinical Psychologist; Presidenr of Community Services Institute in Agawam, MA; and a memberof the adjunctfaculty at the AmericanInternational College, Springfield,MA
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