A Second Look at the Relationship between Cultural Theory, Political Ideology, and Political Knowledge Joseph T. Ripberger University of Oklahoma
[email protected] Geoboo Song University of Oklahoma
[email protected] Matthew C. Nowlin University of Oklahoma
[email protected] Michael D. Jones Harvard University
[email protected] Hank C. Jenkins-Smith University of Oklahoma
[email protected] Abstract: Numerous scholars have employed Cultural Theory (CT) to explain preferences, opinions, and risk perceptions across an array of issues. Recent research by Michaud, Carlisle, & Smith (2009) challenges the CT approach in two critical ways: first, they find that people with low levels of political knowledge are unable to recognize the latent dimensionality of egalitarianism and individualism, which are two of the four worldviews proposed by CT; second, they find that people with high levels of political knowledge treat these two dimensions as if they were opposite ends of a single scale of political ideology. This article presents a quasi-replication and extension of their study using a nationwide sample of 4,387 respondents in which measures of all four dimensions of CT were collected. We find that: 1) people with low levels of political knowledge are able to sort egalitarianism and individualism into coherent worldviews; 2) people with high levels of political knowledge do not collapse egalitarianism and individualism onto a single scale of political ideology; 3) all groups of people, regardless of political knowledge, are able to recognize all four dimensions of CT. Keywords: Public Opinion, Cultural Theory, Political Ideology, Political Knowledge
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1861213
Social scientists have long been interested in the attitudes, values, and beliefs that orient the formulation of political preferences (Adorno et al., 1950; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Feldman, 1988, 2003; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Knight, 2006; Lane, 1962; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985; Rokeach, 1973; Wittkopf, 1990; Converse, 1964). Though debate persists about the precise cognitive mechanisms that link these relatively abstract attributes to specific political preferences, many scholars argue that deeply held attitudes, values and beliefs enable boundedly rational individuals to organize and process information, simplify alternative options, and ultimately formulate “reasonably” rational opinions about political issues (Popkin, 1991; Goren, 2004). Accordingly, researchers have invested a great deal of time and energy into specifying the list of general attitudes, values, and beliefs that structure individual preferences. Cultural Theory (CT, also called “grid-group” theory), inspired by the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas (1966, 1970, 1990), marks one such attempt. In the words of Aaron Wildavsky, CT “enables people who possess only inches of facts to generate miles of preference” (1987, p. 8). Cultural Theory Introduced to political science by Aaron Wildavsky, CT argues that four distinctive worldviews or “cultural biases”—egalitarianism, hierarchism, individualism, and fatalism—serve as broad social orientations upon which individuals rely to formulate more specific political opinions (1987). In short form, these worldviews are intersubjectively derived from relational experiences that cut across two dimensions of social organization. The first of these dimensions is “group,” which defines the degree to which an individual understands herself to be incorporated into bounded units or social collectivities. At its base, the group dimension taps the extent to which one’s life is “absorbed in and sustained by group membership” (Douglas, 1982, p. 206).
1 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1861213
Accordingly, the further one moves along the group dimension, the more her individual autonomy will be subsumed by group determination. The second dimension of CT is “grid,” which incorporates the degree to which patterns of interactions in individuals’ lives are circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions, like rules, norms, laws, and traditions. The further one moves along the grid dimension, the more she is bound by externally imposed “order” in society. When the group and grid dimensions are overlaid, they produce a matrix of four worldviews: hierarchism, individualism, egalitarianism, and fatalism (Dake, 1991; Jenkins-Smith & Smith, 1994; Rayner, 1992; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). In brief, those disposed to a hierarchical worldview are persons with meaningful group identities and binding prescriptions (high group, high grid). They place the welfare of the group before their own, and they are keenly aware of whether individuals are members of the group or outsiders. Likewise, they prefer that people have defined roles in society, and place great value on procedures, lines of authority, social stability, and order. By contrast, a person disposed to an individualist worldview experiences little if any group identity, and feels bound by few structural prescriptions (low group, low grid). In general, they prefer a libertarian society based on bidding and bargaining without many rules and regulations, and hesitate to define themselves in terms of group memberships. Next, those disposed to an egalitarian worldview seek strong group identities and prefer minimal external prescriptions (high group, low grid). They prefer a society based on equality rather than differentiated status, express a powerful sense of social solidarity, and vest authority within the community rather than externally defined experts. Lastly, those disposed to a fatalist worldview consider themselves subject to binding external constraints, yet they feel excluded from membership in important social groups (low group, high grid). They
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believe they have little control over their lives and that one’s fate in life is much more a matter of chance than choice.1 Since their inception and development in the 1980s, the worldviews posited by CT have been used to explain opinion formation in a variety of disparate political domains, ranging from environmental, regulatory, and economic policy to public health and national security issues.2 Indeed, the primary utility of CT is its theoretical portability to a myriad of political issues. Nevertheless, a number of significant criticisms and theoretical limitations have surfaced throughout the years.3 In a particularly potent challenge, Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith (2009) argue that CT scholarship has neglected important research in public opinion and voting behavior. In doing so, they launch two interrelated challenges. First, they argue that studies dealing with CT have failed to adequately account for the fact that cognitive complexity (i.e., political sophistication or political knowledge) conditions the use of values-based reasoning in the formulation of coherent political preferences. Following a long line of scholarship in public opinion and political behavior,4 this challenge argues that political knowledge is an essential lynchpin that binds the formulation of coherent attitudes and beliefs. Relating this to CT, Michaud et al. (2009) find that 1 For a more complete description of these worldviews, see Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990. 2 For the application of CT to environmental policy, see Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Jenkins-Smith & Smith, 1994; Ellis & Thompson, 1997; Grendstad & Selle, 2000; Jones, 2010. For a discussion of economic policy and CT, see Malkin & Wildavsky, 1991; and Swaney, 1995. For a look at CT and regulatory policy, see Lodge, Wegrich, & McElroy, 2010. To see how some have applied CT to public health issues, see Kahan et al., 2010; and Jenkins-Smith, Silva, & Song, 2010. Lastly, for an example of the application of CT to national security issues, see Jenkins-Smith & Herron, 2009; and JenkinsSmith, Herron, & Ripberger, 2010. 3 For a brief discussion of these challenges, see Boholm, 1996; Marris, Langford, & O’Riordan, 1998; and Verweij & Nowacki, 2010. 4 For a brief introduction to this scholarship, see Achen, 1975; Converse, 1964; Judd & Milburn, 1980; Luskin, 1987, 1990; Stimson, 1975; and Zaller, 1992. 3
individuals with low levels of political knowledge are unable to formulate or express the worldviews posited by CT in a coherent fashion. In their second challenge, Michaud et al. (2009) argue that people with high levels of political knowledge treat egalitarianism and individualism as separate ends of a single, liberal-conservative continuum, rather than distinctive worldviews like CT suggests. If this is the case, then CT is simply another way to measure political ideology. These two challenges combine to form a rather damning criticism of CT. On the one hand, CT provides an inappropriate value system for people with low levels of political knowledge because they are not able to recognize the dimensions posited by the theory. On the other hand, CT is irrelevant to people with high levels of political knowledge because it simply measures political ideology. Though research by Michaud et al. (2009) pushes the scholarly community in the right direction, significant gaps remain in our collective understanding of the relationship between CT, ideology, and political knowledge. In particular, their decision to look at only two of the four worldviews posited by CT (egalitarianism and individualism) leaves us with a fragmented understanding of CT and the way in which worldviews interact to influence political behavior. What about hierarchism and fatalism, the other two dimensions of CT? Can they, like egalitarianism and individualism, be folded into a unidimensional construct of political ideology? Are people with low levels of political knowledge able to recognize fatalism and hierarchism as distinctive worldviews? In other words, we suspect that the research conducted by Michaud et al. (2009) is incomplete in that they base their conclusions on only two cultural types— egalitarianism and individualism. Without including the other two worldviews, it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion about the general relationship between cultural orientation, ideology, and political knowledge. Indeed, one of the strengths of CT, which helps to account for
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its issue portability, is that it able to account for the seeming contradictions in the standard ideological distinction of left and right (Wildavsky, 1987; Grendstad, 2003). For example, one would note the contrary positions taken between “social conservatives” that are willing to regulate with regard to social issues whereas “libertarian conservatives” oppose these types of restrictions on individual behavior. Despite this meaningful difference, both groups would be labeled as conservatives on a unidimensional ideological scale. CT offers the ability to account for these contradictory aspects of ideology. As Wildavsky explains, “hierarchical cultures favor social conservatism, giving government the right to intervene in matters of personal morality” (1987, p.11). He goes on to argue that, “egalitarians may support intervention in the economy to reduce economic differences but not intervention in social life to maintain inequality” (1987, p.11). Lastly, he suggests that, “libertarians, who are competitive individualists, oppose both social and economic intervention” (1987, p.11). In order to more fully examine the complex relationship between CT, political knowledge, and political ideology this paper uses nation-wide Internet surveys to revisit the questions asked by Michaud et al. (2009) about the relationship between individualism, egalitarianism, political ideology, and political knowledge. After this, we expand upon their work by looking at the way in which political sophistication and ideology interact with the full set of four cultural worldviews that are specified by CT. Data Collection and Measures The data used in our analysis come from a combined dataset that is composed of two different national surveys, both of which were census-balanced and administered on the Internet. The first survey consists of 2,676 respondents and was collected between April 24th and April 27th, 2009. The second survey consists of 1,711 respondents and was collected between June 22nd and June
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24th, 2010. In both samples, respondents were provided a three-dollar monetary incentive to take and complete the survey. Survey Sampling International (SSI) collected both samples.5 Like Harris Interactive, Polimetrix, Inc., and a host of other Internet-based survey companies, SSI achieves a census-balanced sample by recruiting a large number of Internet users to be members of a large SSI panel and then sampling from within the panel based on a variety of demographic attributes.6 The first step in our analysis is best categorized as a “reconsideration” rather than replication of Michaud et al. (2009) because our data is slightly different than the data used in the original analysis. Specifically, there are two points of variation—the survey mode and the questions used to measure CT and political knowledge. With regard to survey mode, Michaud et al. (2009) base their analysis on an RDD phone survey of 1,475 adults in the state of California. By contrast, our data are collected by way of self-administered Internet surveys of the US population as a whole. When thinking about how this difference might influence our results, one must consider differences with regard to sample characteristics as well as the potential for response bias that stems from answering self-administered surveys on the computer versus answering questions on the telephone that are asked by an interviewer. In terms of sampling, previous research has shown that RDD phone surveys (depending on the frame used) might be more representative of the US population than are Internet surveys, which tend to over-represent urban residents, men, wealthier, more educated, younger, and White people (Chang & Krosnick, 2009).7 However, the extent to which sampling differences influence research outcomes depends upon the questions asked. If one is interested in answering questions about the relationship 5 Visit http://www.surveysampling.com/ for more information. 6 For more on this approach to Internet sampling, see Best et al., 2001; and Berrens et al., 2003. 7 For a comparison of our sample to the US population as a whole, see Table AI in the appendix. 6
between variables (rather than population characteristics), like we are, then sampling differences are largely extraneous (Berrens et al., 2003). In terms of the potential for response bias, it is likely that the techniques used to administer a phone versus an Internet survey lead to variation in survey responses. For example, some have suggested that Internet surveys, because they are self-administered, alleviate the bias that might stem from the interviewer (Chang & Krosnick, 2009, 2011). Likewise, because respondents can actually read (and reread) the questions they are answering (as well as observe the numerical scales), some scholars have suggested that Internet surveys are more likely to yield accurate responses to complicated questions (Fricker et al., 2005). At the same time, phone surveys are said to provide an important check on the reliability of survey responses—rather than randomly clicking a list of answers, respondents that are interviewed on the phone are forced to listen to and respond to each question in a sequential fashion that is carefully monitored by the person conducting the interview. In other words, the interviewer is an important mechanism of accountability that Internet surveys lack. Regardless of the differences between the two survey modes, the vast majority of empirical research suggests that RDD phone surveys should yield results that are similar to Internet surveys when looking at patterns of association between multiple variables (Berrens et al., 2003; Sanders et al., 2007; Chang & Krosnick, 2009; Heiervang & Goodman, 2009; Stephenson & Crête, 2011). Thus, there is little reason to expect that the results of our reconsideration would be compromised by differences with regard to survey mode. [Table I about here]
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The second difference between Michaud et al. (2009) and our reconsideration concerns the questions utilized to measure CT and political knowledge.8 As listed in Table I, the set of questions we use to measure egalitarianism and individualism (two of the four cultural worldviews) are slightly different than the set of questions used by Michaud et al. (2009). In our survey, respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with a sequence of six randomized statements designed to indicate egalitarian and individualist worldviews. Specifically, each respondent was asked to assess how much or how little they agree with each statement on a scale from one to seven, where one is strongly disagree and seven is strongly agree. Dating back to the early 1990s, a number of studies have found that these survey questions provide for a valid and reliable measure of CT (e.g., Heron & Jenkins-Smith, 2006; Dake, 1991; Jenkins-Smith & Smith, 1994; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; Boyle & Coughlin, 1994; Lima & Castro, 2005; Ellis & Thompson, 1997; Swedlow, 2008). As shown in Table I, Michaud et al. (2009) rely upon a similar set of eight statements. While both sets of statements are designed to tap similar themes (e.g., fairness, competition, income inequality, markets), there are slight differences with regard to content and wording. Despite these differences, there is little reason to expect that one set of measures would invoke starkly different responses than the other set of questions. As is the case with CT, the set of factual questions we use to construct our additive scale of political knowledge are slightly different than the questions used by Michaud et al. (2009). As indicated in Table I, we deviate slightly from Delli Carpini and Keeter’s (1996) recommended set of five questions, used by Michaud et al. (2009). Specifically, we ask only four questions, two of which ask respondents to identify whose responsibility it is to nominate judges to the 8 As is convention in political science (e.g., Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992), we assess ideology by asking respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale where one is strongly liberal and seven is strongly conservative. For question wording and descriptive statistics, see Table AII in the Appendix. Michaud et al. (2009) do not say how political ideology was measured. 8
Federal Courts and how long the term is for a US Senator. Rather than asking these two questions, Michaud et al. (2009) ask respondents to answer questions about judicial review, the ideological location of parties, and the current vice president. Following Michaud et al. (2009), our scale of political knowledge was then constructed by adding the number of correct answers each respondent gave. If respondents correctly answered zero or one question(s), they were assigned a “1” and categorized as low knowledge; if they answered all four questions correctly, they are assigned a “4” and categorized as high knowledge.9 Step 1: Findings In the following section, we provide a step-by-step reconsideration of the statistical analysis in Michaud et al. (2009). In order to facilitate direct comparison, each step of the reconsideration displays two tables/figures—their findings followed by our findings. For instance, Table II displays the correlation table listed in Michaud et al. (2009, p. 35) and Table III displays a similar table with our findings. Following their lead, individualist answers are reverse-coded so that individualism and egalitarianism are coded in opposite directions—egalitarian and nonindividualist responses are coded as high values, while nonegalitarian and individualist answers are coded as low values. [Table II and Table III about here] The first step in the Michaud et al. (2009) analysis utilizes Pearson correlation analysis, finding that highly knowledgeable respondents are better able to recognize the latent similarities between individualism and egalitarianism. As Table II shows, the mean correlation among respondents with the highest level of political knowledge is 0.41, among those with a medium 9 Our results are robust to alternative specifications of the knowledge scale. In particular, our results remain the same when the low knowledge category is restricted to those who answer zero questions correctly. 9
level of political knowledge it is 0.19, and among those with the lowest political knowledge it is 0.04. In other words, pair-wise correlations among the least knowledgeable are inconsistent and low, whereas pair-wise correlations among the most knowledgeable are consistently strong and positive. This supports the conclusion that highly knowledgeable people are able to connect the opposing values, while respondents at the lowest level of political knowledge “seem not to recognize the ideas underlying the questions” (2009, p. 36). In a general sense, we find a similar pattern. As shown in Table III, highly knowledgeable respondents appear to recognize the fact that an egalitarian view is different than and sometimes contradicts the individualist worldview. By comparison, less knowledgeable respondents did not seem to recognize this pattern. Turning to the empirics, the mean correlation among highly informed respondents is 0.38, among moderately informed respondents it is 0.24, and among those with the least knowledge it is 0.06. Despite this general similarity, it is important to note that our results are substantively different when considering the pattern of ideological consistency among high knowledge respondents. Michaud et al. (2009), argue that high knowledge respondents display strong ideological consistency, in that those who hold strong egalitarian values consistently reject individualist values and vice versa. To support this notion, they compare the average correlations across the clusters of egalitarian and reverse-coded individualist measures to the mean correlation for the combined set of questions. In doing so, they find that the mean correlation for the individualist cluster, 0.36, is not substantively different from the mean correlation of the combined set, 0.41, albeit lower than the mean correlation within the cluster of egalitarian questions, which is 0.54 (p. 36). In other words, the average correlation across the combined set of questions is basically the same as the correlations within the individualist and egalitarian clusters—as such, it makes empirical sense to reduce the questions to a single dimension.
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When subjecting this step of the analysis to our data, we find a different pattern of value consistency among high knowledge respondents. According to our analysis, the mean correlation of the combined set is 0.38, which is substantially lower than the mean correlation within the subset of reverse-coded individualist measures, 0.51, and egalitarian measures, 0.55. This contradicts the logic of collapsing the scales onto a single dimension and suggests that highly informed individuals comprehend egalitarianism and individualism as distinctive value dimensions that are sometimes but not always antithetical. This finding is consistently supported in our subsequent analyses. Moving on to the next step of our reconsideration, the following set of figures and tables display the results from principal component analysis of the reverse-coded individualist and egalitarian questions at each level of political knowledge. Each bar in Figures 1 and 2 represents a separate principal component and the height of the bar indicates the total variance explained by each component. Tables 4 and 5 present the principal component coefficients for the highest and lowest knowledge group respondents. If CT is correct, we should consistently extract two principal components—one for individualism and one for egalitarianism—regardless of political knowledge. [Figure 1 and Table IV about here] As shown in Figure 1, Michaud et al. (2009) found that principal component analysis yields inconsistent results across the different levels of political knowledge. At lower levels of political knowledge, multiple components were extracted from survey responses. For example, at the lowest level of knowledge, the data were reduced to four components, each of which explained less than 20% of the variation within the data. However, as political knowledge increases, the number of components extracted decreases. At the upper extreme, individuals with
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the highest level of knowledge can be reduced to a single principal component that explains about 50% of the variance in the egalitarian and individualist measures. This illustration is backed by Table IV, which shows that the individualist and egalitarian questions load onto a single component with an eigenvalue of 4.06 among respondents with the highest level of political knowledge. By comparison, among the low knowledge respondents they extract four components that cross-load across the different questions. In sum, these findings lead Michaud et al. (2009) to conclude that the dimensions proposed by CT do not hold. Among low knowledge group, responses are random and scattered, rather than organized according to egalitarian and individualist dimensions. On the other end of the spectrum, a single component was extracted from the high knowledge group, suggesting that knowledgeable respondents see egalitarianism and individualism as opposite ends of a single dimension, rather than two separate scales. This is consistent with the notion that informed individuals recognize the cultural measures as merely different aspects of a single liberalconservative ideology. [Figure 2 and Table V about here] In stark contrast, analysis of our data suggests that responses to the egalitarian and individualism questions consistently load on two components, one for individualism and one for egalitarianism—regardless of level of political knowledge. A brief look at Figure 2 reveals that no one factor accounts for more than 35% of the variation in the measures of egalitarianism and individualism across all four levels of knowledge. Rather two components combine to account for about 60% to 70% of the total variation. Our story becomes even clearer when considering the coefficients listed in Table V. Though there is a slight difference in the magnitude of the coefficients between the two knowledge groups (high and low), individuals within both groups
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display a clear pattern of value consistency. In both knowledge groups component 1 is clearly tapping into a distinctive egalitarian dimension with an eigenvalue above 1. All of the coefficients associated with the egalitarian questions are positive and high, whereas the coefficients associated with the reverse-coded individualism questions are substantially lower. By comparison, component 2, which also has an eigenvalue that is greater than 1, taps into a separate individualism dimension. All of the coefficients associated with the reverse-coded individualism questions are positive and high, whereas the coefficients associated with the egalitarian questions are considerably lower. Contrary to what Michaud et al. (2009) find, these results strongly suggest that survey respondents consistently evaluate egalitarianism and individualism as distinctive values that evoke separate dimensions, which is expected by CT. In the third step of their analysis, Michaud et al. (2009) compare scale reliability statistics (Cronbach’s alpha) across separate egalitarian scales, individualist scales, and combined scales, when the sample is divided by level of political knowledge. [Table VI about here] As shown in Table VI, Michaud et al. (2009) found that political knowledge significantly conditions the latent reliability of the cultural measures. In short, as knowledge level goes up, the reliability of each scale increases. For example, Cronbach’s alpha score for the individualism scale at the lowest level of knowledge is 0.17, whereas the alpha score for the highest knowledge group is 0.74. More importantly, they found that for moderately knowledgeable respondents (those who scored greater than or equal to 3 on a 5 point political knowledge scale ranging from 1 to 5), the combined scale slightly outperforms the separate egalitarianism and individualism scales. For instance, the combined scale for highly knowledgeable respondents yielded an alpha score of 0.88 whereas the egalitarianism and individualism alphas were 0.83 and 0.74,
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respectively. Likewise, when the alpha scores are averaged across the 5 knowledge groups, the combined scale has a higher alpha score (at 0.74) than the other scales do on their own. Consistent with their findings in the previous sections, these results indicate that politically knowledgeable individuals will collapse egalitarianism and individualism onto a single dimension, rather than think of them as conceptually distinctive worldviews. [Table VII about here] At first glance our results, which are presented in Table VII, are somewhat similar. As political knowledge moves from low to high, the reliability of all three scales monotonically increases. This finding supports the general notion that there is a relationship between political knowledge and value constraint. However, it is important to note that the difference we find between the lowest knowledge group and the highest knowledge group is significantly smaller than the difference found by Michaud et al. (2009). For the low knowledge group, we find alpha values of 0.68 and 0.63 for the egalitarianism and individualism scales, respectively. For the high knowledge group, the corresponding alphas are 0.78 and 0.75, yielding an average difference of approximately 0.11. By comparison, the average difference found by Michaud et al. (2009) was about 0.46. Thus, our results indicate that the relationship between political knowledge and the reliability of CT scales is less pronounced than suggested by the previous research. Likewise, when comparing alpha values for the combined scale to alpha values for the egalitarianism and individualism scales, our findings appear to contradict the results provided by Michaud et al. (2009). With the exception of the highest knowledge group, the combined scale is less reliable than either of the egalitarianism or individualism scales. In the high knowledge category, the combined scale yields a reliability statistic of 0.79, which is only nominally higher than the individualism alpha of 0.75 and the egalitarianism alpha of 0.78. Regardless of the slight
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difference within the high knowledge group, our findings call into question the general assertion that politically knowledgeable individuals will collapse egalitarianism and individualism onto a single dimension, rather than think of them as conceptually distinctive cultural worldviews. A comparison of the reliability statistics we get for the lowest two knowledge groups is particularly revealing. The alpha scores for the egalitarianism and individualism scales in both knowledge groups in our analysis are greater than 0.60, which is considerably higher than the alpha scores for the combined scales, which are 0.24 and 0.30. Though alpha scores ranging from 0.63 to 0.68 are not particularly impressive, they are sufficient to suggest the presence of a latent dimension—even among low knowledge respondents. Accordingly, if one were trying to describe the value structure of low knowledge respondents it would seem that CT, which separates egalitarianism and individualism, would be a good place to start. By comparison, the extremely low reliability statistics for the combined scales are insufficient to warrant a similar conclusion about a unidimensional individualism-egalitarianism scale. In the final stage of their analysis, Michaud et al. (2009) provide a direct test of their argument that highly knowledgeable respondents consider egalitarianism and individualism to be components of a more general liberal-conservative political ideology. To do so, they add selfreported ideology to the principal component model that was summarized in Table IV. Table VIII presents their results and Table IX summarizes our findings. [Table VIII about here] As shown in Table VIII, Michaud et al. (2009) found that adding self-reported political ideology to their principal components analysis of egalitarianism and individualism does not change the underlying structure of the model. Among high knowledge respondents, a single component was extracted. Likewise, all 9 coefficients, including ideology, were large and
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positive. These findings once again suggest that high knowledge respondents tend to collapse egalitarianism and individualism onto a single scale. More importantly, as evidenced by the high coefficient of 0.78, that scale appears to mirror the liberal-conservative measure of political ideology. By comparison, they extract four seemingly random components from the same questions among the low knowledge group. Moreover, ideology is not uniquely associated with any one of those components. In other words, Michaud et al. (2009) did not find separate components for ideology, egalitarianism, and individualism for either group. Thus, they conclude CT is not supported. [Table IX about here] As shown in Table IX, our results are strikingly different. For the high knowledge group, two principal components are extracted. Based upon the factor structure, component 1 represents egalitarianism and component 2 appears to measure individualism. In our analysis, the political ideology measure split-loaded across the two components, with coefficients of 0.64 and 0.43. Meanwhile, three principal components are extracted from responses in the low knowledge group. Component 1 is highly correlated with egalitarianism, component 2 is associated with individualism, and component 3 appears to exclusively capture political ideology. These results reaffirm our findings in previous analyses that egalitarianism and individualism represent separate value dimensions, irrespective of political knowledge. More importantly, they suggest that egalitarianism and individualism, though related, are not capturing the same value dimension as political ideology. This is precisely what CT suggests. Stage 2: Findings Michaud et al. (2009) included only a partial representation of CT, neglecting two of the four CT types, hierarchism and fatalism. As suggested by our reconsideration of their analysis, their
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findings do not match those obtained from our data. Rather, as theorized by CT, our data indicate that egalitarianism and individualism are distinctive values (Thompson et al., 1990) that are not analogous to liberal-conservative ideology (e.g., Wildavsky, 1987). With this in mind, we take the analysis one step further by asking the obvious corollary question—are hierarchism and fatalism also distinctive value dimensions? If so, do these dimensions remain constant across the various levels of political sophistication? In the following section we answer these questions by incorporating hierarchism and fatalism questions into our multivariate model of cultural values. If CT provides a valid characterization of value orientations, our mix of CT questions should yield four principal components, each of which is associated with a different value dimension. Likewise, if CT is accessible to the entire population, the four-component solution should be consistent across each level of political knowledge. The results from principal component analysis of all four cultural value measures, broken down by respondent’ knowledge level, are presented in Figure 3 and Table X. Each bar in Figure 3 displays an underlying conceptual dimension extracted from survey responses for a total of 12 survey questions related to cultural values (3 survey questions for 4 different cultural values) and the height of the bar displays the total variance explained by each dimension. Table X shows the principal component coefficients for respondents with the highest and lowest level of political knowledge. [Figure 3 and Table X about here] As displayed in Figure 3, our principal component analysis extracted four components that account for about 60% to 65% of the variance in the 12 survey questions that were designed to tap into the egalitarian, individualist, hierarchism, and fatalist worldviews. Moreover, the fourfactor solution remains consistent across the different levels of political knowledge, and no one
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factor accounts for more than 20% of the variation within survey responses. Turning now to Table X, we see that individuals with a high level of political knowledge reveal a value structure that is remarkably consistent with CT. As indicated by the large and positive pattern of coefficient correlations, component 1 appears to capture individualism, component 2 looks to be measuring egalitarianism, component 3 is tapping into fatalism, and component 4 is clearly associated with hierarchism. For those respondents in the low knowledge group, the PCA results are somewhat less structured, but revealing of a pattern nonetheless. Component 1 appears to be measuring egalitarianism, component 2 is associated with fatalism, component 3 taps into individualism, and component 4 hints at hierarchism, though only 2 of the 3 coefficients seem to register high coefficients. Rather than being uniquely correlated with component 4, the Hier 3 measure cross-loads on components one and three, with moderate coefficients of 0.41 and 0.36, respectively.10 Despite this anomaly, the overall pattern of the component structure matrix for less knowledgeable individuals is very close to the one acquired from highly sophisticated respondents. In accordance with CT, these results strongly support the notion that survey respondents think about egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism as conceptually distinctive value dimensions. Likewise, the fact that our findings were reasonably consistent across each level of political knowledge suggests that CT offers a robust system of values that is accessible to a large portion of the population. Implications and Conclusions Recent research by Michaud et al. (2009) places CT within the long-standing and important debate about the nature of belief systems. On one side of this debate, scholars have argued that low levels of knowledge prompt inconsistencies within individual belief systems that prevent 10 We conjecture that the muddied loadings of Hier 3 result from ambiguities in the question wording for indicators of hierarchy. 18
uninformed individuals from formulating coherent political preferences (e.g., Converse, 1964; Stimson, 1975; Zaller, 1992; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). On the other side of this debate scholars have argued that affect, values, and/or cue-based heuristics, help individuals with low levels of political knowledge to formulate relatively coherent system of political beliefs (e.g., Goren 2004; Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991; Popkin, 1991; Lupia, 1994). In applying CT to this debate, Michaud et al. (2009) seem to conclude that low knowledge individuals will demonstrate incoherent preferences. Specifically, they find that individuals with low levels of political knowledge show little consistency in their ability to differentiate between the egalitarian and individualist worldviews that are associated with CT. They further argue that individuals with high levels of political sophistication collapse egalitarianism and individualism onto a single liberal-conservative continuum of political ideology, rather than treating them as conceptually distinct value orientations. When considered in tandem, these arguments undermine two of the primary arguments of CT. First, cultural orientations help individuals who are not actively engaged in politics to structure political preferences; second, these orientations help many people to reconcile the contradictions embedded in a unidimensional conception of political ideology. Given the theoretical importance of this argument, our work reconsiders relationship between egalitarianism, individualism, and political ideology when conditioned by political knowledge. Contrary to previous findings, we find that people across all levels of political sophistication are able to recognize the worldviews associated with CT, and that these worldviews are distinct from political ideology. At the same time, we were able to detect a subtle, yet monotonic, relationship between knowledge and CT. As political knowledge increases, the internal consistency of CT increases, suggesting that people with higher levels of political
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sophistication are better able to recognize the different dimensions of CT. Thus, we agree with Michaud et al. (2009) in noting the relationship between CT and knowledge, however, our results indicate that this relationship is much less pronounced than they suggest. After reconsidering their findings, we went on to examine CT in its entirety, by including hierarchism and fatalism in our analysis. Our findings suggested that all groups of people, regardless of their knowledge about politics, were able to sort our list of 12 randomly asked questions into four coherent dimensions that are uniquely correlated with hierarchism, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism. Overall, then, our research suggests that CT offers a relatively robust system of worldviews that both high and low knowledge individuals might draw upon to deduce coherent political preferences. As researchers continue to wrestle with the relationship between political ideology, CT, and cognitive sophistication, we suggest that the following four questions be addressed. First, why are our findings different than the results in Michaud et al. (2009)? Several methodological explanations are obvious candidates. One concerns the differing survey modes employed. Michaud et al. (2009) base their analysis on a RDD telephone survey of California residents, while we rely on a national census-based sample, with surveys administered on the Internet. Though these differences could certainly account for some variation in our respective findings, the majority of previous empirical research suggests that RDD phone surveys should yield results that are similar to Internet surveys when looking at patterns of association between multiple variables. To corroborate this notion, we conducted supplementary analysis using a nation-wide RDD telephone survey that was collected in 1995. The survey used the same questions that we used to measure CT, but did not contain questions about political knowledge; we therefore followed the lead of Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) by using education as a
20
measure of cognitive sophistication. The results were consistent with our findings in using the Internet surveys.11 Therefore we do not accept that differences in survey mode alone can account for the wide variation in our respective results. However, we encourage future research that compares the results from surveys (containing CT, ideology, and political knowledge measures) administered both through an RDD phone survey and the Internet. Another candidate for explaining the difference between our results and the findings presented in Michaud et al. (2009) rests on variations in question wording. The CT and political knowledge measures used in each study were somewhat different. However, as shown in Table I, the wording differences are modest, and generally stylistic rather than substantive. Both sets of questions are focused on similar themes. Accordingly, we are hesitant to attribute substantial fractions of the variation in our respective findings to question differences. After all, question differences exist across many of the CT studies using survey-based measures. Yet the bulk of this work points to similar conclusions, with no evidence of systematic bias caused by minor variations in question wording. However, measurement is always an issue and scholars should continue to develop indicator questions that better measure the latent concepts explored by CT. As a first step, we suggest that scholars reexamine the questions we use to measure hierarchism. Specifically, researchers might consider changing the Hier 3 statement that, “Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on those that break the rules” to “Society would be much better off if those in charge imposed strict and swift punishment on those that break the rules.” As it stands, this statement appears to neglect the grid dimension that separates hierarchs and egalitarians.
11 Results of supplementary PCA using the 1995 phone survey are available in the appendix, Tables AIII-AV. 21
A second question that future research should address concerns the collective understanding of scholars regarding cognitive sophistication. Consistent with the approach taken by Michaud et al. (2009), our analysis relied upon political knowledge as a measure of cognitive sophistication more broadly. When examining values related to politics, such as liberalconservative political ideology, this would appear to be an appropriate strategy. However, as we move beyond the realm of political values towards more abstract beliefs about the way in which society should be organized, the appropriateness of political knowledge as a measure of cognitive sophistication should be examined. Specifically, why should political knowledge (or lack thereof) influence a person’s beliefs about how they structure personal relationships? Perhaps, a broader measure of cognitive sophistication, like education, need for cognition, or individual aptitude would be more appropriate. Third, future research should continue to explore the complex relationship between ideology and CT, with a particular emphasis on the mediating role of political institutions. As recognized by Anthony Downs (1957), preference expression and aggregation does not take place in a vacuum. Rather, the structure of electoral systems and political parties tightly governs this process. In the US, with single member districts and plurality election rules, the system militates strongly toward two dominant political parties with relatively well-known ideological positions. As a consequence of this process, members of the public are forced to reconcile multidimensional values with dichotomous ideological preferences. This makes for an interesting and perhaps unstable relationship between value systems like CT and political ideology as it evolves to match the contemporary political landscape. Thus, rather than treating CT and ideology as if they were synonymous, we encourage scholars to explore the way in which the relationship between them changes over time and across institutional configurations.
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Finally, we suggest that future research should incorporate political preferences into our understanding of cognitive sophistication, CT, and ideology. In this article we have argued that all groups of individuals, regardless of political knowledge, are able to recognize the distinctive worldviews proposed by CT. As a logical extension of this finding, scholars should examine the extent to which groups of individuals, with varying degrees of political knowledge or cognitive sophistication more broadly, use CT to formulate their more specific policy preferences. For instance, we know that people with egalitarian values tend to support environmentally friendly policies. Future research should explore the extent to which the strength of the relationship between egalitarianism and environmentalism is conditioned by cognitive sophistication. Additionally, researchers might explore the way in which cognitive sophistication influences individual choices about which kinds of values and beliefs to use when faced with questions about public policy or politics. Perhaps those with lower levels of sophistication rely upon relatively abstract values like CT, whereas those who are more sophisticated rely on values that are specific to the political process, like ideology. In all, much work remains. Michaud et al. (2009) launched the scholarly community down an important path of research that we hope social scientists will continue to traverse.
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20
30
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
0
10
Percent variance explained
40
50
Figure 1. Principal Component Analyses of Cultural Value Questions by Knowledge Level
1 (low)
2
3
4
5 (high)
Knowledge level
Source: Michaud et al. (2009, p. 37)
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5
10
15
20
25
Factor 1 Factor 2
0
Percent variance explained
30
35
Figure 2. Principal Component Analyses of Cultural Value Questions by Knowledge Level
1 (low)
2
3
4 (high)
Knowledge level
28
15 5
10
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
0
Percent variance explained
20
Figure 3. Principal Component Analyses of All Cultural Value Questions by Knowledge Level
1 (low)
2
3
4 (high)
Knowledge level
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Table I: Comparison of Survey Questions Our Survey Cultural Theory Indi 1: Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people succeed or fail on their own. Indi 2: Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world. Indi 3: We are all better off when we compete as individuals.
Egal 1: What our society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal. Egal 2: It is our responsibility to reduce the differences in income between the rich and the poor. Egal 3: Society works best if power is shared equally.
Political Knowledge Which party has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives? How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto? Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the Federal Courts? How long is the term of office for a United States Senator?
Michaud et al (2009) Indi 1: Competitive markets are almost always the best way to supply people with the things they need. Indi 2: Society would be better off if there were much less government regulation of business. Indi 3: People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit. Indi 4: Competition, whether in school, work, or business leads to better performance and desire for excellence. Egal 1: What our country needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal. Egal 2: We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, Whites and people of color, and men and women. Egal 3: The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations. Egal 4: Government regulation of business is necessary to keep industry from becoming too powerful. Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the House of Representatives right now? How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto? Do you happen to know what job or political office is now held by Dick Cheney? Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not . . . is it the president, the Congress, of the Supreme Court? Would you say that one of the parties is more conservative than the other at the national level? Which party is more conservative?
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Table II: Correlations among Egalitarian and Individualist Questions by Level of Knowledge High knowledge
Reduce inequality Fairness revolution Regulation necessary Competitive markets Less regulate Enjoy wealth Competition best Mean Correlation
Wealth equal
Reduce inequality
Fairness revolution
0.64 0.65 0.47 0.35 0.33 0.42 0.33 0.41
0.58 0.46 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.40
0.47 0.47 0.27 0.39 0.34
Wealth equal
Reduce inequality
Fairness revolution
0.31 0.46 0.13 0.14 0.03 0.28 0.23 0.19
0.39 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.26 0.21
0.21 0.19 0.00 0.20 0.17
Wealth equal
Reduce inequality
Fairness revolution
Regulation necessary
Competitive markets
0.32 0.50 0.39 0.31 0.49 0.23 0.42 Minimum n = 218
Less regulate
Enjoy wealth
0.43 0.33
0.41
Less regulate
Enjoy wealth
0.22 0.06
0.25
Less regulate
Enjoy wealth
Medium knowledge
Reduce inequality Fairness revolution Regulation necessary Competitive markets Less regulate Enjoy wealth Competition best Mean Correlation
Regulation necessary
Competitive markets
0.03 0.29 0.06 0.10 0.22 0.06 0.35 Minimum n = 254
Low knowledge Regulation necessary
Competitive markets
Reduce inequality 0.25 Fairness revolution 0.31 0.21 Regulation necessary 0.11 -0.05 0.21 Competitive markets -0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.07 Less regulate -0.19 -0.08 -0.11 0.11 0.01 Enjoy wealth 0.03 -0.12 -0.01 0.09 0.16 0.01 Competition best 0.02 0.20 0.03 -0.14 0.15 -0.08 Mean Correlation 0.04 Minimum n = 181 Note: Variables have been coded so that egalitarian and non-individualist responses are high. Source: Michaud et al. (2009, p. 35)
0.05
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Table III. Correlations among Egalitarian and Individualist Questions by Level of Knowledge High knowledge (political knowledge = 4) Egal 1 Egal 2 Egal 3 Indi 1 Egal 2 0.48 Egal 3 0.71 0.45 Indi 1 0.39 0.22 0.45 Indi 2 0.27 0.15 0.27 0.62 Indi 3 0.33 0.20 0.32 0.49 Mean Correlation 0.38 Minimum n = 722 Medium knowledge (political knowledge = 2 or 3) Egal 1 Egal 2 Egal 2 0.40 Egal 3 0.61 0.36 Indi 1 0.18 -0.02 Indi 2 0.17 -0.02 Indi 3 0.16 -0.02 Mean Correlation 0.24
Egal 3
Indi 1
0.24 0.14 0.48 0.15 0.39 Minimum n = 1,546
Low knowledge (political knowledge = 1) Egal 1 Egal 2 Egal 3 Indi 1 Egal 2 0.44 Egal 3 0.47 0.35 Indi 1 -0.14 -0.21 -0.13 Indi 2 -0.13 -0.25 -0.21 0.46 Indi 3 -0.04 -0.18 -0.12 0.31 Mean Correlation 0.06 Minimum n = 700 Note: Variables have been coded so that egalitarian and non-individualist responses are high.
Indi 2
0.41
Indi 2
0.31
Indi 2
0.32
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Table IV. Principal Component Analyses of Cultural Values Questions, High and Low Knowledge High knowledge Wealth equal Reduce inequality Fairness revolution Regulation necessary Competitive markets Less regulate Enjoy wealth Competition best Eigenvalues n = 202 Low knowledge Wealth equal Reduce inequality Fairness revolution Regulation necessary Competitive markets Less regulate Enjoy wealth Competition best Eigenvalues
Component 1 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.70 0.66 4.06
Component 1 0.70 0.46 0.78 0.52 0.06 -0.17 0.12 -0.01 1.62
Component 2 -0.14 -0.56 0.07 0.56 0.33 0.45 0.47 -0.38 1.33
Component 3 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.24 0.69 -0.13 0.51 0.67 1.27
Component 4 -0.16 0.39 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.76 -0.40 0.26 1.04
n = 168 Source: Michaud et al. (2009, p. 37)
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Table V. Principal Component Analyses of Cultural Values Questions, High and Low Knowledge High knowledge Component 1 Component 2 Egal 1 0.84 0.25 Egal 2 0.79 0.02 Egal 3 0.82 0.29 Indi 1 0.25 0.83 Indi 2 0.06 0.85 Indi 3 0.21 0.71 Eigenvalues 2.95 1.21 n = 715 Low knowledge Component 1 Component 2 Egal 1 0.84 0.01 Egal 2 0.70 -0.25 Egal 3 0.77 -0.10 Indi 1 -0.11 0.77 Indi 2 -0.17 0.77 Indi 3 -0.02 0.70 Eigenvalues 2.27 1.33 n = 692
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Table VI. Scale Reliabilities (Cronbach's alpha) by Level of Knowledge Knowledge: Egalitarianism
1 (Low) 0.48
2 0.67
3 0.62
4 0.78
5 (High) 0.83
Total 0.71
Individualism
0.17
0.47
0.50
0.63
0.74
0.55
Combined scales 0.26 0.58 Source: Michaud et al. (2009, p. 39)
0.71
0.82
0.88
0.74
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Table VII. Scale Reliabilities (Cronbach's alpha) by Level of Knowledge Knowledge: 1 (Low) 2 3 4 (High) Egalitarianism 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.78 Individualism 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.75 Combined scales 0.28 0.62 0.67 0.79
Total 0.73 0.68 0.66
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Table VIII. Principal Component Analyses of Ideology and Cultural Values Questions, High and Low Knowledge High knowledge Ideology Wealth equal Reduce inequality Fairness revolution Regulation necessary Competitive markets Less regulate Enjoy wealth Competition best Eigenvalues n = 200 Low knowledge Ideology Wealth equal Reduce inequality Fairness revolution Regulation necessary Competitive markets Less regulate Enjoy wealth Competition best Eigenvalues
Component 1 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.64 4.53
Component 1 -0.36 0.70 0.52 0.63 0.33 -0.28 -0.42 -0.20 -0.01 1.69
Component 2 0.18 0.20 -0.25 0.41 0.54 0.57 0.23 0.62 -0.03 1.35
Component 3 0.30 0.12 0.43 0.06 -0.46 0.45 -0.13 0.08 0.74 1.28
Component 4 0.43 -0.07 0.33 0.24 0.14 0.04 0.63 -0.54 -0.14 1.08
n = 162
Source: Michaud et al. (2009, p. 40)
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Table IX. Principal Component Analyses of Ideology and Cultural Values Questions, High and Low Knowledge High knowledge Component 1
Component 2
ideology Egal 1
0.64 0.83
0.43 0.23
Egal 2 Egal 3 Indi 1
0.77 0.81 0.27
0.00 0.27 0.83
Indi 2 Indi 3
0.07 0.20
0.84 0.70
Eigenvalues n = 715
3.44
1.22
Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
ideology Egal 1
0.03 0.85
0.04 0.01
0.98 -0.02
Egal 2 Egal 3
0.71 0.77
-0.24 -0.09
0.01 0.06
Indi 1 Indi 2
-0.11 -0.17
0.77 0.78
0.04 -0.13
Indi 3 Eigenvalues
-0.03 2.33
0.70 1.29
0.12 1.00
Low knowledge
n = 692
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Table X. Principal Component Analyses of All Cultural Values Questions, High and Low Knowledge High knowledge Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Egal 1 -0.28 0.80 0.18 0.13 Egal 2 -0.02 0.80 0.08 -0.06 Egal 3 -0.30 0.80 0.09 0.03 Indi 1 0.83 -0.25 0.04 0.04 Indi 2 0.82 -0.08 0.05 0.07 Indi 3 0.68 -0.22 -0.02 0.00 Hier 1 -0.05 0.00 0.14 0.80 Hier 2 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.80 Hier 3 0.46 0.05 -0.08 0.52 Fata 1 -0.02 0.10 0.77 -0.04 Fata 2 -0.04 0.08 0.75 0.11 Fata 3 0.10 0.09 0.61 0.17 Eigenvalues 3.10 2.19 1.20 1.05 n = 715 Low knowledge Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Egal 1 0.83 0.14 -0.02 0.01 Egal 2 0.71 0.01 0.28 0.08 Egal 3 0.69 0.22 0.01 0.16 Indi 1 0.09 0.14 0.78 0.04 Indi 2 0.16 0.06 0.77 0.19 Indi 3 -0.06 0.47 0.55 0.06 Hier 1 0.03 0.27 0.10 0.79 Hier 2 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.83 Hier 3 0.41 0.01 0.36 0.38 Fata 1 0.04 0.69 0.20 0.19 Fata 2 0.31 0.66 0.00 0.08 Fata 3 0.11 0.76 0.13 0.15 Eigenvalues 3.70 1.43 1.14 1.03 n = 692
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Appendix Table AI: Demographic Comparison of Web Sample and U.S. National Population 2009 2010 Combined U.S. Sample Sample Sample Population* Gender Male 41.1% 50.5% 45.8% 48.1% Female 58.9% 49.5% 54.2% 51.9% Age 18-24 9.7% 4.7% 7.2% 13.2% 25-54 60.2% 58.9% 59.6% 57.0% >54 30.1% 36.4% 33.3% 28.8% Education High School or Higher 97.2% 98.6% 97.9% 83.1% College Grad or Higher 37.9% 45.8% 41.9% 24.3% Race White, non-Hispanic 68.0% 75.5% 71.8% 72.7% Black 16.4% 11.5% 14.0% 11.5% Hispanic 11.1% 7.7% 9.4% 11.0% Other 4.5% 5.2% 4.9% 4.7% Household Income $0-49,999 58.9% 51.0% 55.0% 57.3% $50,000-99,999 32.5% 35.6% 34.1% 29.3% $100,000 and above 8.6% 13.4% 11.0% 13.4% *Source: U.S. National Population Figures, cited in Herron & Jenkins-Smith, 2006, p. 180.
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Table AII: Survey Questions and Descriptive Statistics Survey Questions Cultural Theory Hier 1: The best way to get ahead in life is to do what you are told to do. Hier 2: Our society is in trouble, because we don’t obey those in authority. Hier 3: Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on those that break the rules. Indi 1: Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people succeed or fail on their own. Indi 2: Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world. Indi 3: We are all better off when we compete as individuals. Egal 1: What our society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal. Egal 2: Society works best if power is shared equally. Egal 3: It is our responsibility to reduce the differences in income between the rich and the poor. Fata 1: Most of the important things that take place in life happen by random chance. Fata 2: No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely determined by forces outside our control. Fata 3: It would be pointless to make serious plans in such an uncertain world. Political Knowledge Which party has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives? How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto? Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the Federal Courts? How long is the term of office for a United States Senator? Index of Political Knowledge Educational Attainment What is your highest level of education? (1-Elementary or some high school; 2-High School Graduate/GED; 3Some college/vocational school; 4-College graduate; 5-Some graduate work; 6-Master’s Degree; 7-Docterate) Political Ideology Which of the following categories best describes your view? (1-stronly liberal; 2-liberal; 3-slightly liberal; 4Middle of the Road; 5-slightly conservative; 6-conservative; 7-stronlgy conservative).
Mean
Std. Dev.
3.28 3.53 4.82 4.31 4.16 4.15 3.89 4.48 3.74 3.32 3.76 2.74
1.59 1.78 1.7 1.75 1.66 1.75 1.88 1.72 1.93 1.68 1.78 1.71
0.73 0.67 0.65 0.40 2.46
0.44 0.47 0.48 0.49 1.21
3.40
1.26
4.05
1.60
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Table AIII. Principal Component Analyses of Cultural Values Questions, High and Low Education High education (master’s degree or more) Component 1 Component 2 Egal 1 0.82 0.15 Egal 2 0.68 0.06 Egal 3 0.86 0.21 Indi 1 0.18 0.83 Indi 2 0.04 0.81 Indi 3 0.22 0.68 Eigenvalues 2.59 1.24 n = 268 Low education (high school or less) Component 1 Component 2 Egal 1 0.74 0.05 Egal 2 0.72 -0.15 Egal 3 0.74 0.00 Indi 1 -0.07 0.73 Indi 2 -0.09 0.68 Indi 3 0.06 0.66 Eigenvalues 1.71 1.37 n = 860 Data: 1995 National RDD Phone Survey (n = 2,490)
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Table AIV. Principal Component Analyses of Ideology and Cultural Values Questions, High and Low Education High education (master’s degree or more) Component 1 Component 2 ideology -0.54 -0.57 Egal 1 0.81 0.15 Egal 2 0.67 0.06 Egal 3 0.85 0.21 Indi 1 0.17 0.83 Indi 2 0.00 0.78 Indi 3 0.21 0.69 Eigenvalues 3.10 1.24 n = 860 Low education (high school or less) Component 1 Component 2 ideology -0.16 -0.34 Egal 1 0.73 0.06 Egal 2 0.73 -0.12 Egal 3 0.73 0.02 Indi 1 -0.10 0.72 Indi 2 -0.12 0.67 Indi 3 0.01 0.63 Eigenvalues 1.71 1.42 n = 268 Data: 1995 National RDD Phone Survey (n = 2,490)
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Table AV: Principal Component Analyses of All Cultural Values Questions, High and Low Levels of Education High education (master’s degree or more) Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Egal 1 0.36 -0.28 0.67 0.11 Egal 2 -0.06 0.04 0.81 -0.15 Egal 3 0.26 -0.29 0.77 0.01 Indi 1 0.02 0.79 -0.18 0.19 Indi 2 -0.04 0.82 0.04 0.09 Indi 3 0.05 0.61 -0.26 0.17 Hier 1 0.12 0.21 -0.06 0.73 Hier 2 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.83 Hier 3 -0.03 0.39 -0.14 0.63 Fata 1 0.78 -0.05 0.10 0.08 Fata 2 0.77 0.08 0.10 0.00 Fata 3 0.79 0.00 0.08 0.07 3.09 Eigenvalues 2.39 1.17 1.01 n = 268 Low education (high school or less) Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Egal 1 0.38 0.54 -0.20 0.21 Egal 2 0.06 0.77 0.16 0.07 Egal 3 0.15 0.73 -0.01 0.03 Indi 1 0.22 -0.01 0.70 0.02 Indi 2 0.02 0.16 0.71 0.05 Indi 3 0.03 -0.11 0.57 0.28 Hier 1 0.10 0.25 0.20 0.54 Hier 2 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.67 Hier 3 0.00 -0.07 0.02 0.75 Fata 1 0.74 0.07 0.16 0.13 Fata 2 0.69 0.17 0.05 0.04 Fata 3 0.78 0.11 0.10 0.00 2.77 Eigenvalues 1.47 1.19 0.95 n = 860 Data: 1995 National RDD Phone Survey (n = 2,490)
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