instance, the one-child family planning campaign in the People's Republic of China ..... existing social networks and local leadership to achieve the goals of the.
Population Research and Policy Review 13: 49-67, 1994. © 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
A theoretical framework of collective action for the evaluation of family planning programs TIM FUTING LIAO University of Illinois-at Urbana-Champaign,
USA
Abstract. Typically, a family planning program seeks to alter individuals' fertility behavior. The very necessity for the existence of a family planning program presumes that individuals' fertility expectations and behavior are not yet consistent with the objectives of the program. Therefore, some individuals may choose not to cooperate. In this article I establish a theoretical framework for the evaluation of family planning programs by synthesizing the literature on the theory of collective action. Because of the characteristics of collective action - indivisibility and externality - noncooperation (free riding) is bound to occur. Faced with the problem of free riding, a good family planning program should ideally apply selective incentives, localize the costs and benefits, and invest in social capital. The relations among these three factors, cooperation, and fertility are also spelled out. Key words: Collective action, Family planning, Free rider, Selective incentive, Social capital
Introduction Often the objectives of family planning programs are not easily met. This is likely whether the fertility expectations of a population are above the level necessary to keep its growth under control (as in many developing countries) or below the level of replacement (as in many developed nations). For instance, the one-child family planning campaign in the People's Republic of China succeeded in lowering fertility and slowing the growth of Chinese population (e.g., Chen 1984). Yet the original goals of the policy were not reached, and recently the Chinese family planning program has set more realistic objectives. The family planning program in socialist China is a relatively effective example of curbing fertility. A family planning policy may have as its goals encouraging births and can be found in the programs implemented in some former East European socialist states, such as the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the former Czechoslovakia, at least before the recent democratization. Family planning policies there give high levels of maternal support to Czech or East German women, though the results as reflected in fertility are by no means outstanding (e.g., Btittner & Lutz 1990; Heitlinger 1987). The family planning policies in these three countries demonstrate that human fertility An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, DC, 11-15 August 1990.
50 can be regulated with the implementation of such policies in either way reducing or increasing the level of childbearing. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of either birth-control or pronatalist policies requires an examination of not just what means of fertility regulation (such as contraceptives or guaranteed paid maternity leaves) are available and used but also, and more important, of the individual's reaction to, and dealings with, the societal need of regulating fertility. Indeed, Lapham and Mauldin's (1972, 1984, 1985) research provides a good way of evaluating the strength of family planning programs in terms of the following criteria: policies, resources, and stagesetting activities; service and service-related activities; record-keeping and evaluation; and availability and accessibility of fertility regulation supplies and services. Given a similar level of a program's input and contraceptive availability in a society, however, individuals may choose either to answer the program's call to regulate fertility or to ignore it. Most research evaluates family planning programs by examining their supplies especially in terms of the availability of contraceptives or the unmet need or demand for family planning (Boulier 1985a; Westoff 1978; Westoff & Pebley 1981, 1983) rather than whether individuals demand such programs (low or no demand) and how to deal with the mismatch between collective and individual interests. A low demand for family planning is conceptually different from a high demand for children, although the two demands are related and often explained by similar factors (Boulier 1985b). In this article I attempt to set up a collective action theoretical framework for the evaluation of family planning programs. In this perspective, fertility regulation is seen as a collective action for producing a public good that will benefit all in the long run, whereas individuals tend to maximize their own (usually more immediate) interests regardless of societal efforts to regulate fertility. Although individual interests may vary, individuals are considered rational because they want to maximize their own interests, which may or normally may not coincide with the collective interests in a society. My purpose is to establish such a general theoretical framework so family planning programs to contain fertility and those to encourage births can be evaluated for their effectiveness in getting individuals to respond to them. The applicability of this framework is confined to societies where controlling fertility (by increasing or decreasing it) is necessary and thus collective action is in order. Countries that have gone through the fertility transition without needing a family planning program, however, may also be examined in the light of the proposed theoretical framework. In West European countries during the fertility transition and where public and individual interests coincided to a large extent, the major components of a collective action model of a family planning program - that I will examine later as represented by selective incentives, internalized externalities (or localized public goods), and social capital for controlled fertility - were all present on their own accord. Thus, no purposive collective action was called for. The present endeavor differs from another theoretical perspective de-
51 veloped by Butatao and Bos (1992), which attempts to explain the spread of fertility regulation as collective behavior determined by structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth and spread of generalized beliefs, precipitating factors, mobilization of participants for action, and ineffective operation of social control. These determinants in their approach are based on Smelser's (1962) theory of collective behavior. The perspective I develop focuses on the organizational characteristics of family planning programs and their interaction with an individual's rationale for how to respond and react to such a program. This article also differs from various empirical evaluations of some of the major components in the framework proposed here such as incentives and information (e.g., Palmore & Yap 1987; Sadik 1991). A major difference is that the provision of incentives is seen not just as a means to motivate an individual, but from the larger perspective of collective action. Therefore, all the components, to be discussed in detail later, form a coherent framework of collective action, in which individuals contribute (or do not contribute) to the creation of public goods. To lay down the theoretical foundation, I first review the literature for collective action and construct the theoretical framework. Family planning efforts in various societies are then examined as examples within the three components of this theoretical perspective. Also discussed are the function of social organizations to facilitate the policies and the socialization factor of family planning campaigns as another method for getting a higher degree of participation in the collective action of fertility regulation. Relating collective action theory to family planning programs, I demonstrate the usefulness of the theoretical framework for determining why some programs have or have not succeeded.
A theoretical framework of collective action
The theoretical framework used in this article is a synthesis of Coleman (1970, 1972, 1973, 1988a, b, 1987, 1988a, b), Hardin (1982), Heckathorn (1988, 1989, 1990), Marwell, Oliver and Prahl (1988), Oliver (1980), Oliver and Marwell (1988), and Olson (1971, 1982). Most of the research on collective action follows, builds upon, and improves Olson's original work (1971, 1982), which is primarily out of an economic tradition. The choice of collective action theory, rather than other social science theories such as exchange theories, for studying family planning programs is a natural one: A family planning program is a social intervention or social engineering program. The type of collective action theory examined is particularly appropriate for explaining individual participation in a social intervention or social engineering program, which can be a social movement or a family planning program. A basic assumption for a model of collective action in the economic tradition is that individuals, void of the influence of social norms and expectations and that of social organizations, are considered self-interested in that
52 they try to maximize their own personal gains. Typically, material and physical properties and goods can be, though not exclusively, types of private goods that individuals seek and own. A collectivity, or a group of people, on the other hand, has public or collective interests, hence public goods. A public or collective good is defined as any good that, if consumed by any person in a group, cannot be feasibly withheld from the others in the group (Olson 1971). Put differently, a collective good provides benefits to a collectivity of individuals (Coleman 1987). A clean natural environment is a public good; so are the financial resources of the state. A collective good cannot be produced without concerted action: The environment cannot be kept clean if some individuals litter; similarly, the implementation of policies to lower (or increase) the existing level of fertility (a level believed to produce public vices if uncontrolled) cannot be fulfilled without public supports, although fertility as a public good is a more complex issue, a point to be discussed in the next section. One characteristic of collective action and goods is their indivisibility. They cannot be divided among individuals because the consequences of collective goods for one person are inseparable from those for another (Coleman 1970). One person cannot claim full control of a fraction of the benefits of a collective good and turn that fraction into a private good (Coleman 1986a). Thus, an individual cannot take home a piece of the clean environment. The long-term benefits of birth regulation also have similar consequences for most people in a society, though the short-term, direct benefits of having (or not having) additional babies - which are private instead of public goods can be quite different for various social groups. Another characteristics of collective action is its externality. An action is internal when the action is carried out by an individual and its consequences affect only the actor who exercises control over the action, no others (Coleman 1972). Conversely, an action with consequences for other persons can be said to exhibit externalities (Coleman 1986a). The activity of drinking water at home can be said to be internal, while that of eating garlic before going to a party can be said to be external. Ignoring a fertility regulation can be viewed as external because the consequences of individuals' refusing to have fewer children (when society's fertility is too high) or to have more children (when society's fertility is too low) affect the society as a whole. In a typical developing country such as a sub-Saharan African nation, where the average age of the population is young and the rate of natural growth is high, maintaining a large family size and refusing to have fewer children will have negative consequences for the national economic and educational systems because a more youthful population produces a greater demand for school and for food and health care. In contrast, for an aging population such as the Japanese, not wanting to have a larger family will also have negative consequences for its society and economy due to a smaller proportion of working-age population and greater demand for care for the elderly, barring the possibility of a large increase in the immigration of foreign workers.
53 Because of these two attributes of collective action, a problem arises when concerted action is needed. Although all the members of a group have a common interest in obtaining the benefit of collective actin, 'they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good' (Olson 1971: 21). Put differently, contribution to the public good becomes a burden to the individual, which is 'the difference between the marginal cost and the marginal utility' (Coleman 1987: 64), Due to this burden, individuals may become 'free riders' because the very commonness of collective goods suggests that others' actions contribute to the collective good just as do one's own. Thus, it may be in one's interest not to contribute to the collective good (Coleman 1986b, 1987). Individuals who do not lower (or increase) their levels of childbearing activities can be viewed as free riders because they can reap the benefits of the private good provided by more (or fewer) babies; regardless of whether others contribute to the collective good, those who do not contribute will be able to benefit from that common good (assuming that there are still a sufficient number of others who do contribute to the common good). There are three solutions for overcoming the free riding obstacle. The identification of the three solutions assumes that the issue of critical mass is not a problem when the collective action is family planning, although it can be an issue when studying free riding in general. Sometimes the creation of a public good does not require participation of every member involved. Only a small subset, or critical mass of interested members whose contribution can patronize a much larger group, is needed so that the public good in question can be produced (Macy 1990; Oliver, Marwell & Teixeira 1985; Oliver & Marwell 1988). A classic example is the lighthouse that would cost the same no matter how many contribute and benefit and that would be worth the same value no matter how many use it (Hardin 1982). For producing such a public good, solutions such as using selective incentives discussed later are not necessary as long as a critical mass of individuals are willing to contribute. Clearly, decreased (or increased) fertility is not such a public good. The first solution is to use selective incentives. A selective incentive is one applied to the individuals depending on whether they do or do not join the collective action to provide the collective good (Oliver 1980; Olson 1971, t982). Selective incentives can be either positive (rewards) or negative (punishments). One example of a negative incentive is the imposition of fines that are slightly greater in value than the cost of contribution (Coleman 1973), Incentives can also be structurally different because of the type of social organization. The incentives for participation in voluntary community action, usually not large enough to make a person want to absorb the cost of involvement, are often psychological, including social contacts, deference or respect, self-actualization, learning new skills, or feeling a sense of accomplishment (Oliver 1984). A second solution is to have small groups to which an individual is responsible. A first way this may work is via 'internalizing externalities' (Coleman 1987). This involves the use of social organizations to allocate the cost of
54 providing the public good among those that experience its benefits. This strategy hinges on the size of a group. Other things being equal, 'the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good' (Olson 1971: 35). Olson's group-size argument, however, has been criticized for a variety of problems (e.g., Chamberlain 1974; Hardin, 1982; Oliver 1980; Oliver & Marwell 1988). A major issue arises when a public good, termed a good with jointness of supply, costs the same regardless of the number of people who enjoy it. In such a case, group size has positive rather than negative effect on the contribution to the public good (Oliver & Marwell 1988). For this type of public goods (e.g., building a bridge or keeping a public radio station running), only a critical mass is absolutely necessary. Controlled fertility clearly does not fall into this category because the contribution of every individual affects the overall amount of public good. Individuals in a group that is small enough experience a net benefit from the contribution to the public good, and this benefit may exceed the cost of the contribution (Coleman 1987). This is so because the 'localized' collective good for a small number of individuals becomes much more tangible for a particular person. The cost of the contribution from another person is not just that from another in a million other strangers, but from another person in a small number of people whom the individual may know personally. Another advantage of localizing the collective action is that one's contribution can be matched by the contribution of others through organization. Seen in a different light, the smaller the group's size, the more likely that the group will have closure of its networks. When there is a problem of suboptimal activity and free riding, 'a system with a degree of connection to the actor may exhibit a strong potential that induces higher levels of activity, [andl a system with high closure provides an added potential, due to the benefits received from one another by each of those who experience externalities of an actor's action' (Coleman 1988a: 56). That is, as the size of a group decreases, the probability that one person knows every other person increases, and so does the degree of internalized externality. Another advantage of smaller groups is the availability of 'collective sanction'. Sometimes the agent of collective responsibility may reside, instead, in a spiritual, governmental, or organizational entity in the more diffuse form of normative control (Heckathorn 1988). In a smaller group, normative control is more easily achieved. It proceeds more swiftly than formal controls by a complex legal or bureaucratic organization if at least one of the following is present: sanctions that are directed at an individual and generate outcomes consequential for other members in the group; members who expect equal treatment and thus may keep an eye on how others behave; and, in special cases, all members being held accountable for one member's conduct (Heckathorn 1990). Therefore, as group size increases, full cooperation always becomes less robust than hypocritical cooperation (Heckathorn 1989). In full cooperation, an individual chooses to cooperate with the collective action,
55 thereby contributing to the common good, and to cooperate to help with the intragroup sanctioning system. In hypocritical cooperation, an individual chooses to cooperate with sanctioning the norms of collective action when applied to others but free rides when it comes down to his or her own action. Yet another advantage of smaller groups can be understood from a social network point of view. Collection actions tend to occur in a group in which 'network density' - the number of actual social ties given the total possible number of ties - is greater (Marwell, Oliver & Prahl 1988). Naturally, a smaller group provides an environment conducive to greater network density and thereby more likely to generating contributors to collective actions. In sum, smaller groups provide a milieu in which density is greater, collective sanctions easier, and benefits and costs of public goods more localized or, in other words, externalities are internalized. All these contribute to collective action in favor of public goods. The same emphasis on network density is also evident in the research on diffusion of family planning knowledge and ideas through small, localized groups or cliques, that would facilitate communication (Palmore 1967; Retherford & Palmore 1983; Rogers & Kincaid 1981). A final, important way of overcoming the free riding problem is through socialization that creates social capital. Social capital is defined by its function, and the 'function identified by the concept of "social capital" is the value of [certain] aspects of social structure to actors as resources that they can use to achieve their interests' (Coleman 1988b: S101). Forms of social capital include obligations, expectations, and trustworthiness of structures; information channels; and norms and effective sanctions. Norms, related to generalized beliefs (Bulatao & Bos 1992; Smelser 1962), are the most relevant form of social capital for the present analysis of family planning policies. A norm that asks individuals to forgo self-interest and act in the interests of the collectivity, reinforced by social support, status, honor, and other rewards, in general leads individuals to working for the public good (Coleman 1988b). (Because social capital such as a norm is indivisible, it is a collective good.) The creation of the ideal of a two-child family as the most socially desirable gives an example of a norm as social capital, whereas members of a co-worker group watching out for each another to make sure the group's standard of birth control is upheld provide an instance of normative control in a small group.
An examination of some family planning programs in the theoretical perspective
One assumption underlying this theoretical framework is that the necessity for the presence of a family planning program dictates the existence of free riders because there is no need for such a program if the collective need of a society is in line with what individuals desire. This assumption should hold
56 true for most national family planning programs save extreme cases such as Mongolia. Using positive incentives, the Mongolian government encourages women to have four or more children. The desire of most women, which is also the tradition of that society, is to have a large family anyway. Such an example is certainly far from the usual case. This assumption partially challenges a classic definition of family planning programs by Freedman and Berelson (1976: 3), who described them as organized programs designed to provide the information, supplies, and services of modern means of fertility control to those interested. An effective family planning program also attempts to get the attention and change the opinion and behavior of those who are not interested. As an example of the former, the Taichung experiment in the early 1960s provided family planning to those who wanted to limit family size rather than ways to attempt to change desired family size (Freedman & Takeshita 1969). Atthough the pure existence of family planning to those interested may have some impact on those not interested due to knowledge diffusion, many successful programs, such as the Chinese and the Singaporean, specifically targeted those not yet interested. In fact, this is a more difficult task for a family planning program, and it is a more important task in many developing countries, where high fertility is the norm, and in many developed countries, where lower fertility is the norm. The Singaporean case, in which the level of fertility is low although it would be for the public good to have a higher fertility, is by no means uncommon. A recent survey of government views on population shows that 13 of 37 European countries explicitly expressed concern over current levels of fertility that are too low (United Nations 1988). For countries in need of a family planning program to lower their fertility levels, the mechanisms leading to high fertility may not be the same. Although some may have high fertility rates because they are still in a stage long before fertility transition, others, typically accompanied by economic development, may experience a predecline rise in fertility and a need for family planning even if there is actually no change in desired family size (Dyson & Murphy 1985). In this article, both situations are treated alike because the issue concerns how a program can induce individuals to conform to its standards. Given that many societies want to lower or increase fertility levels, it is only natural that controlled fertility is a public good. Controlled fertility here refers to adjusting reproductive behavior for the sake of society: Individuals may need to lower or increase their own fertility, conditional upon the needs of society, so collective goals may be achieved. Without regulation, a demographic process such as fertility results from a large number of uncoordinated individual decisions (Demeny 1986). Some may argue that it is a private good because people can benefit in concrete ways from having one more (or fewer) child. Indeed, examined in the economic rationality of childbearing behavior, individuals may actually benefit from controlled (lowered) fertility because of the limited time and income available for additional
57 children rather than other consumer goods (see, e.g., Becker 1965, 1981). The same economic rationality, however, also gives rise to childbearing behavior inconsistent with society's demand. Moreover, it is important and sensible to distinguish between individual childbearing behavior and aggregated childbearing behavior or fertility. The former is primarily a private good, though it has externalities. The latter, or fertility, once controlled in a way" desirable for society at large, is a public good and indivisible. One can enjoy an additional daughter or son but cannot take a piece of the resulting increased (or lowered) fertility at the societal level, which has great ramifications for many aspects of social life. For instance, increased fertility would mean a decreased dependency ratio and more working-age labor in the future to certain developed societies, whereas decreased fertility would mean lessened demand of food and energy as well as a dereased primary and secondary education budget for many developing countries. It is such benefit as public good that is indivisible. Controlled fertility as a public good may have differential benefits for various social groups. Every individual in society does not reap (short-term, at least) benefits equally from a high or low fertility. For instance, switching from a pronatalist position to espousing a family planning program, especially faced with a deteriorating economy by 1980, Brazilian professional elites favored such population policy measures as sex education courses in secondary schools, information programs about contraceptive methods, and tax incentives for small families (McDonough & DeSouza 1981). It is precisely the differential benefit of controlled fertility for different groups that generates a problem. Externalities become apparent when some people's preferences for not wanting children endangers other people's claims for secure pension rights (Demeny 1986). This type of differential interest points squarely to the rationale for the existence of a national family planning program. It also shows that not all individuals are concerned with the longterm collective interests of society. The contribution to controlled fertility, however, does vary with group size. Unlike contributing to a public television or radio station, for which a minimal amount is desired so a critical mass of contributing individuals is sufficient for the collective action, individual nonconformity to the desired level of fertility actually means that others will have to contribute more. It does not matter whether you contribute to a public radio station as long as some others do and the total adds up to the desired amount. In the case of controlling fertility, the desired total fertility rate of two children per woman will not be reached if some women have five, even if all the remaining ones have only two. To reach that goat, some of the rest will have to sacrifice and remain childless in order to balance the effect of the nonconforming women. To see all this in terms of national family planning programs, a typical family planning program seeks to decrease (or increase) the fertility level of a society, thereby contributing to the common good of the general public's welfare. Clearly, this common good is indivisible because individuals cannot
58 divide the benefit of family planning for personal consumption. In addition, individual actions are external, regardless of responses to the calls of a family planning program being positive or negative. Given these two characteristics, the problem of free riding is bound to occur. Therefore, if the amount of financial resources and the degree of contraceptive availability of a program are equal, effectiveness depends upon how well the program can deal with the free riding problem. A family planning program can be evaluated in terms of the three aspects or ways of handling the free riding problem: selective incentives, localized costs and benefits, and social capital. The following examination will show that most programs use at least one way, sometimes all three, to mobilize individuals, and that these activities have been documented by previous research. It is the collective action framework, however, that provides the leverage to see all this in a more theoretical light and organized mode. Selective incentives
First, to decrease the number of free riders and increase participation in fertility regulation, selective incentives in both positive and negative terms are helpful. Whether for reducing or increasing fertility, whether oriented to individuals, couples, or communities, incentives and disincentives, though often perceived as controversial, are recognized as important in family planning (Sadik 1991: 121). Programs in China and in India use incentives to a varying extent for those who conform to the programs' requirements. Two positive incentives are the guaranteed, paid, long maternity leave (26 weeks for all childbearing women; 35 weeks for single mothers and women giving multiple births [Heitlinger 1987]) in pronatalist Czechoslovakia and, in China, an educational priority set for the only child combined with a system of reawarding couples with only one child. In 1976 the East Germans prolonged maternity leave from 18 to 26 weeks (six weeks before and 20 weeks after delivery) and introduced a paid leave (with a payment equaling the regular sick pay for all working mothers with two or more children) beyond the basic maternity leave up to the youngest child's first birthday (Btittner & Lutz 1990). The Chinese family planning program also uses such negative incentives as depriving the second child of the aforementioned priority and the mother of regular maternity leave. A closer examination of a particular set of incentives and disincentives would be helpful. The government in Singapore provided six positive and negative incentives (Saw 1980): (1) The Employment Act of 1968 entitles a worker to paid maternity leave for four weeks before and four weeks after each confinement up to the third child only; the traditional practice had been to give paid maternity leave for a certain period before and after each birth no matter how many children a woman already had. (2) In 1970 the accouchement fee was changed from a fixed rate to $10 for the first child, $20 for the second, $50 for the third, and $100 for the fourth and subsequent
59 child and in 1973 this system was refined to a set of three different progressions of charges, depending upon which of the three classes a hospital belongs to. Thus, the effect would be approximately equal regardless of income levels. (3) Taxpayers with three or more children on or before 1 August 1983, were given tax relief of $750 for the first child, $500 for the second and third, and $300 for the fourth and fifth. Those with four children or fewer after that date were given $750 for the first and second child, $500 for the third, and no deduction for any subsequent child. (4) In 1973, public housing authorities changed their rules of giving preference to larger families in order to give families, whatever their sizes, to acquire public housing apartments. (5) Certain education privileges of a child's registration in a desired school would be given only up to the third child unless the fourth were the last child in the family. The privileges would be given to children, irrespective of birth order, if one of their parents had undergone sterilization. (6) A policy in 1976 ruled that foreigners who held work permits would be permitted to marry citizens of Singapore if both partners would undergo sterilization after the birth of their second child. Failure to observe the rule might result in withdrawal of work permits, nonrenewal of permits, and loss of medical, educational, housing benefits that would otherwise have been given. These selective incentives used in the family planning program in Singapore help explain why the program has worked effectively. Sometimes incentives may be in monetary form and given not only to people who conform but also to those who help them conform. In the state of Madras in India, canvassers who worked for the vasectomy program would be paid a fee of Rs. 10 for each male brought to the vasectomy center; those who underwent the operation would be paid Rs. 20 (Salkar 1986). Selective incentives, however, are not major features of African family planning programs because some argued that the incentives are by nature aimed primarily at the poor, thereby raising ethical questions (Sai & Newman 1989). Strictly speaking, to get rid of free riders, negative incentives must be slightly greater in value than the cost of contribution in the collective action (Coleman 1973). In reality, however, a negative incentive with a value less than the cost of contribution should also make some free riders cooperate in the collective action of fertility regulation, especially when the cost of contributing in the collective action cannot be accurately calculated in monetary terms.
Internalizing externalities A second point of departure for examining a family planning program is to see whether the program is set up so the public good is localized and externalities are made internalizable, or whether collective sanctions become possible. Given that family planning goals are typically set at the societal level, localizing the costs and benefits of the public good of lower (or higher)
60 fertility involves having a well-structured social organization to mobilize people into participating in the collective action of fertility regulation. A few examples of family planning programs, some of which are quite successful, will illustrate the importance of localizing public good. The mothers' club program in South Korea is an outstanding success story. Initiated in 1968 by the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea, the Korean mothers' club program aimed to organize mothers in rural villages and use existing social networks and local leadership to achieve the goals of the national family planning program. The number of mothers' clubs grew from 12,650 in 1968, organized in about one-fourth of Korea's 48,000 villages, to more than 23,000 in 1973, involving more than 700,000 women (Rogers & Kincaid 1981). An objective of mothers' clubs is to encourage family planning practice and help distribute contraceptives so overburdened field workers, who had not been too successful before the initiation of mothers' clubs, can be assisted. The clubs are also to encourage women's participation in community development programs. Localized costs and benefits in both family planning and community development programs make mothers and then villagers aware of a public good being produced at the village level before they become aware of a larger public good at the societal level. One model village with an exemplary club is Oryu Li, where family planning and community development succeeded hand in hand (Rogers & Kincaid 1981). Another reason that the Korean mothers' clubs have accomplished so much is that communication about family planning is much easier in a localized setting through cliques or smaller groups (Rogers & Kincaid 1981). Small groups have a higher degree of social integration, thus facilitating the diffusion of information, including information about contraception and family planning (Palmore 1967; Retherford & Palmore 1983). Another successful program is the Indonesian family planning program, which has gradually shifted from national to community-based management. The village-based family planning program depends largely on voluntary participants, especially women's groups such as the Women's Development Movement (PKK), to create clubs (Suyono 1990). Thus, the hallmark of the Indonesian family planning program since the early 1970s has been a decentralized system of organization and delivery of contraceptive services, and the system has proved very effective not only in making services more accessible but also in promoting individual acceptability of family planning practices through community acceptance (Smyth 1991). Family planning organizations are often described as being at all levels (Xiao 1988). Work units in urban China have greatly localized the collective good. Because most people in a work unit (or a subdivision of it) know one another, their nonconformity with the requirements of family planning programs means that individual actions have external as well as internal consequences (those affecting themselves). Although the demand for children has been higher in rural areas, many urban Chinese also have wanted to have more than one child. The relative lack social organizations such as
61 work units to localize the collective good of family planning in rural China certainly contributed in part to the difficulties that one-child family policy experienced there, although efforts were still made. In rural Hunan Province, family planning quotas for a second birth were regulated through a contract responsibility system (Hardee-Cleaveland & Banister 1988). Such contracts were often assured through the use of a multitiered system to localize the public good. In Ningxia Province in 1987, a universal contract system was set up so township cadres were responsible for villages, whose cadres were responsible for households. Childbearingage couples from the households, in turn, signed family planning contracts (Hardee-Cleaveland & Banister 1988). Many areas even set up systems to evaluate their family planning efforts. In a county in Inner Mongolia, for example, 'townships and villages are rated on their family planning performance and are given a series of awards based on their rating on marriages, births, and abortions' (Hardee-Cleaveland & Banister 1988: 266). In urban areas, birth quotas were even more strictly reinforced through work units. A crucial feature of the Indonesian family planning program is also its use of quantified targets, fixed in terms of the numbers of acceptors, set for all levels of the administrative structures that implement the program down to the village level (Smyth 1991). The reliance on clinics, in comparison, portrays the early Indonesian program, which was ineffective (Suyono 1990). In contrast to Indonesia and China, especially its urban areas, under the state (later government) population commission in the former Czechoslovakia (Heitlinger 1987), no comparable lower-level family planning organizations existed. This may in part explain the lack of effect of the pronatalist program there. Consider another example. The 1977-78 Kenya Fertility Survey revealed that the country's net family planning program effect was negligible (Frank & McNicoll 1987). The lack of effect in the early years of Kenyan family planning can be at least partially attributed to a clinic-based program, which provided contraceptive supplies and services without involving and mobilizing individuals in grass-roots groups. Examples with an intermediate number of levels can also be found. In Namibia, a program of Depo-Provera injections, the major form of contraceptive in use by black women there, is funded and run through a two-tier administration (Lindsay 1989). Sometimes collective sanctions become prevalent among individuals in small groups in China, and family planning is no longer a personal matter. In Henan Province, 'blackboards and posters publicize information contained in birth control registration cards of newlyweds, one- and two-child households, and households practicing birth control, so that people can supervise each other and cadres can monitor the situation' (Hardee-Cleaveland & Banister 1988: 265). To create collective sanctions, generate dense information networks, and internalize externalities, it is necessary for groups to be small enough to carry out a program. When a society is large, more levels of administrative structure are needed to implement a family planning program to ensure that
62 the lowest level of the structure is comprised of small enough groups. The success of the Chinese family planning program in the urban areas is a good example of internalized externalities, collective sanctions, and dense networks at the grass-roots level. Another advantage of a small group is that information on conformers and nonconformers can be more accurate and current. In South Korea, local canvassers from a population program study were used to register women 'at risk' of childbearing and keep the lists up to date. The convassers would visit the women at home and offer a free three-month supply of birth-control pills, condoms, or coupons for a free IUD insertion or tubal ligation (Mauldin 1983). By so doing, family planning efforts can be better targeted and more effective.
Social capital Finally, a good family planning program most likely understands the importance of investing in the social capital relevant for the objectives of the program. To set up a fertility norm to which people will conform, public education and information exchanges are essential. This includes making people aware, through the media and other means of communication, of the advantages of having fewer (or more) children. Signs of making such an investment in social capital by letting people know the advantages of having a smaller family are apparent in such societies as China, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, among many others. For instance, even before the implementation of the one-child policy in China, the public was made aware of the benefits of later marriage (older age at first marriage), later childbearing (later in timing the first birth and greater intervals in spacing consequent births), and fewer babies (small family size) (Xiao 1988). In Singapore, where family planning programs have been extremely successful, a KAP survey showed that 75.2 percent of married women knew of the exact number of children recommended, the two-child family the government advocated, whereas only 16.8 percent were unaware (Saw 1980), thereby underscoring the necessity of information for creating a social norm. A set of program activities of the Indonesian family planning program involves individual and community motivation toward the practice of family planning and, more important, acceptance of the small family norm (World Bank 1990). The success of the Indonesian family planning program cannot be separated from its transformation from a governmental effort primarily to improve maternal and child health to a sophisticated social marketing program with a multiplicity of services involving information, education, and communication campaigns (Suyono 1988). The objectives of population education believed to be appropriate for the Indian population, another Asian population, cover the following (Salkar
63 1986:113): (1) Creating among the younger generation an understanding of one of the most important phenomena in modern world - rapid population growth - and its causes, trends, and regulation. (2) Studying the social, cultural, economic, and political consequences of population trends and the close interaction of population growth and the development process, with particular reference to the national program to raise the standards of living. (3) Recognizing that scientific developments enable increased control over famine, disease, untimely death, and unplanned births. (4) Realizing the significance of population growth on individual and family life and encouraging attitudes of responsibility and mutual help and cooperation in all aspects of personal and family life. (5) Appreciating that for preserving the health of the mother, the welfare of the children, the economic stability of the family, and the future prospects of the younger generation, Indian families should be small and compact, with no more than two or three children. The impact of such population education, once carried out, should be tremendous and far-reaching in a society in which the population increases as rapidly as India's. In the former Czechoslovakia, education for parenthood begins as early as kindergarten and continues until the student is at least in college. It includes some pronatalist propaganda about the importance and desirability of children as well as sex education, contraceptive knowledge, and marital counseling (Heitlinger 1987). In Thailand, women's access to rapidly expanding communications and transportation networks has facilitated the creation of the social capital for fertility regulation, the message of the benefits of smaller family size and the information on contraceptives. Members of the younger generation receive such information via mass media and informal channels of communication; members of the older generation, however, learned about birth control through some source connected with the official program (Knodel, Chamratrithirong & Debavalya 1987). The somewhat vaguely pronatalist parenthood education in the former Czechoslovakia and the one-child family campaign in China can both be seen as efforts to create a norm to help mobilize individuals to contribute to and to work for the collective good. It is important to note that other existing norms, such as the traditional idea of a large family, may also serve very well as rationales for nonconforming behavior, thus letting individuals free ride. This is exactly why investing in social capital is a worthwhile way to counteract those existing norms. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of having such social capital of fertility regulation via all possible means of information diffusion and popularization. As Cleland (1990: 137) eloquently argues, 'If the legitimacy of birth control is a determinant of the timing of fertility decline, then government action to popularize and promote family planning may be a catalyst for change in reproductive behaviour' because the mere provision of birth control services cannot make a major impact if couples do not use them, for they 'can always control their fertility
64 (by abstinence or withdrawal, for instance) if they are determined to do so'. The same point can be made about efforts to increase fertility in countries below replacement level. Yet another kind of critical mass may also be at work to create social capital. If enough people have internalized the new norms, the ensuing social capital production may be much faster because these individuals who have the social capital may serve as catalysts. When such a tipping point has been reached, the new set of fertility norms can gradually replace the old ones.
Conclusion To succeed, family planning programs must mobilize individuals to conform to the objectives of the program, be they pronatalist or antinatalist. The very necessity for the existence of family planning programs demonstrates that people's fertility expectations and behavior are not yet consistent with objectives of the programs. Here I have established a theoretical framework of collective action for the evaluation of family planning programs by adapting collective action theory. Because of the characteristics of collective action indivisibility and externality - noncompliance (free riding) is bound to occur. Three major ways of solving the free riding problem are discussed: applying positive or negative selective incentives, localizing the costs and benefits by internalizing externalities and using collective sanctions, and investing in the social capital that helps set up the norms for the collective action. On the supply side, a good family planning program needs to provide contraceptive knowledge and means so people will be able to cooperate without having to deal with technical difficulties and material shortage. Faced with the problem of free riding, a good family planning program, on the demand side, needs high achievement in the areas of applying selective incentives, localizing costs and benefits, and investing in social capital. These aspects, with which many programs have already been working, are not only the major components for evaluating family planning programs when providing contraceptive knowledge and means is not a problem. They are also major factors policymakers should consider in constructing an effective family planning program. After all, reducing (or increasing) fertility because of rapid population growth (or aging and below replacement growth) requires concerted, collective action.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Frank Bean, Gillian Stevens, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The paper also benefited from dis, cussions with Anthony Oberschall.
65 References Becker, G.S. (1965). A theory of the allocation of time, Economic Journal 75: 493-517. Becket, G.S. (1981). A treatise on the family. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Boulier, B.L. (1985a). Evaluating unmet need for contraception: Estimates for thirty-six developing countries, World Bank staff working papers, No. 678. PopuIation and development series, No. 3. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Boulier, B.L. (1985b). Family planning programs and contraceptive availability: Their effects on contraceptive use and fertility, pp. 41-115, in: World Bank staff working papers, No. 677. Population and development series, No. 2. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Butatao, R.A. and Bos, E. (1992). The spread of fertility regulation as collective behavior, pp. 123-137, in: J.F. Phillips and J.A. Ross (eds.), Family planning programmes and fertility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. B~ttner, T. and Lutz, W. (1990). Estimating fertility responses to policy measures in the German Democratic Republic, Population and Development Review 16: 539-555. Chamberlain, J. (1974). Provision of collective goods as a function of group size, American Political Science Review 68: 707-716. Chen, P. (1984). Births planning and fertility transition, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 476: 128-141. Cleland, J. (1990). Fertility decline in developing countries: The role of economic modernization, culture and government interventions, pp. 126-145, in: L Landers and V. Reynolds (eds.), Fertility and resources. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coleman, J.S. (1970). Political money, American Political Science Review 64: 1074-1087. Coleman, J.S. (1972). Systems of social exchange, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 2: 145163. Coleman, J.S. (1973). The mathematics of collective action. Chicago: Aldine. Coleman, J.S. (1986a). Individual interests and collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coleman, J.S. (1986b). Social theory, social research, and a theory of action, American Journal of Sociology 91: 1309-1335. Coleman, J.S. (1987). Free riders and zealots, in: K. S. Cook (ed.), Social exchange theory, Newbury Park, CA: Sage. (1988a). Free riders and zealots: The role of social networks, Sociological Theory 6: 52-57. Coleman, J.S. (1988b). Social capital in the creation of human capital, American Journal of Sociology 94: $95-$120. Demeny, P. (t986). Population and the invisible hand, Demography 23:473-487. Dysou, T. and Murphy, M. (1985). The onset of fertility transition, Population and Development Review 1I: 399-440. Frank, O. and McNicoll, G. (1987). An interpretation of fertility and population policy in Kenya, Population and Development Review 13: 209-243. Freedman, R. and Berelson, B. (1976). q'he record of family planning programs, Studies in Family Planning 7: 3-40. Freedman, R. and Takeshita, J.Y. (i969). Family planning in Taiwan: An experiment in social change. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Hardee-Cleaveland, K. and Banister, L (1988). Fertility policy and implementation in China, 1986-88, Population and Development Review 14: 245-286. Hardin, R. (1982). Collective action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Heckathorn, D.D. (1988). Collective sanctions and the creation of prisoner's dilemma norms, American Journal of Sociology 94: 525-562, Heckathorn, D.D. ,(1989). Collective action and the second-order flee-rider problem~ Rationality and Society 1: 78-100. Heckathorn, D.D. (1990). Collective sanctions and compliance norms: A formal theory of group-mediated social control, American Sociological Rev&w 55: 366-384.
66 Heitlinger, A. (i987). Reproduction, medicine, and the socialist state. New York: St. Martin's Press. Knodet, J., Chamratrithirong, A. and Debavalya, N. (1987). Thailand's reproductive revolution: Rapid fertility decline in a third-world setting. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Lapham, R.J. and Mauldin, W.P. (t972). National family planning programs: Review and evaluation. Studies in Family Planning 3: 29-52. Lapham, R.J. and Mauldin, W.P. (i984). Family planning program effort and birth rate decline in developing countries, International Family Planning Perspectives t0: 109-118. Lapham, R.J. and Mauldin, W.P. (1985). Contraceptive prevalence: The influence of organized family planning programs, Studies in Family Planning 16: 117-137. Lindsay, J. (1989). Population control policies in Namibia, Leeds Southern African Studies, No. 3. University of Leeds, African Studies Unit/Department of Politics. Macy, M. W. (1990). Learning theory and the logic of critical mass, American Sociological Review 55: 809-826. Marwell, G., Oliver, P.E. and Prahl, R. (1988). Social networks and collective action: A theory of the critical mass. IH, American Journal of Sociology 94: 502-534. Mauldin, W.P. (1983). Population programs and fertility regulation, pp. 267-294, in: R.A. Bulatao and R.D, Lee (eds.), Determinants of fertility in developing countries, Vol. 2: Fertility regulation and institutional influences. New York: Academic Press. McDonough, P. and DeSouza, A. (1981). The politics of population in Brazil: Elite ambivalence and public demand. Austin: University of Texas Press. Oliver, P.E. (1980). Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: Theoretical investigations, American Journal of Sociology 85: 1356-1375. Oliver, P.E. (1984). 'If you don't do it, nobody else will': Active and token contributors to local collective action, American Sociological Review 49: 601-610. Oliver, P.EI, Marwell, G. and Teixeira, R. (1985). A theory of critical mass, I: Interdependence, group heterogeneity, and the production of collective action, American Journal of Sociology 91: 522-556. Oliver, P.E. and Marwell, G, (1988). The paradox of group size in collective action: A theory of critical mass. II, American Sociological Review 53: 1-8. Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagftation, and social rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press. Palmore, J.A. (1967). The Chicago snowball: A study of the flow and diffusion of family planning information, pp. 272-363, in: D.J. Bogue led.), Sociological contributions to family planning research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Palmore, J.A. and Yap, M.T. (1987). Incentives, disincentives and family planning, in: Population policies and programmes: Current status and future directions. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations. Retherford, R.D. and Palmore, J.A. (1983). Diffusion processes affecting fertility regulation, pp. 295-339, in: R.A. Bulatao and R.D. Lee (eds.), Determinants of fertility in developing countries, Vol, 2: Fertility regulation and institutional influences. New York: Academic Press. Rogers, E.M. and Kincaid, D.L, (1981), Communication networks: Toward a new paradigm for research. New York: Free Press. Sadik, N. (1991). Population policies and programmes: Lessons learned from two decades of experience. New York: United Nations Population Fund/New York University Press. Sai, F.T. and Newman, K. (1989). Ethical approaches to family planning in Africa. The policy, planning, and research working paper series, WPS 324. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Salkar, K. R. (1986). Population education for developing countries. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers. Saw, S.-H. (1980). Population control for zero growth in Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Smelser, N.J. (1962). Theory of collective behavior. New York: Free Press.
67 Smyth, I. (1991). The Indonesian family planning programme: A success story for women?, Development and Change 22: 781-805. Suyono, H. (1988). The strategies, experiences, and future challenges of the information component in the Indonesian family planning programme, Asian-Pacific Population Journal 3(4): 33-44. Suyono, H. (1990). Family planning in Indonesia: A successful community development programme, Populi 17(4): 4-11. United Nations (1988). World population trends and policies, 1987 monitoring report. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Population Studies No. 103. New York. Westoff, C. (1978). The unmet need for birth control in five Asian countries, International Family Planning Perspectives 4: 9-18. Westoff, C. and Pebley, A. (1981). Alternative measures of unmet need for family planning in developing countries, International Family Planning Perspectives 7: 126-136. Westoff, C. and Pebley, A. (1984). The measurement of unmet need for family planning in developing countries, pp. 11-36, in: J.A. Ross and R. McNamara (eds.), Survey analysis for the guidance of family planning programs. Liege, Belgium: Ordina Editions. World Bank (1990). Indonesia: Family planning perspectives in the 1990s. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Xiao, Z. (1988). China's population policy and family planning, pp. 213-227, in: China Financial & Economic Publishing House (ed.), New China's Population. New York: Macmillan.
Address for correspondence: Tim F. Liao, Department of Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 326 Lincoln Hall, 702 South Wright Street, Urbana, IL 61801, USA Phone: (217) 333 1950; Fax: (217) 333 5225
