A theory of argumentative understanding - Springer Link

A Theory of Argumentative Understanding: Relationships among Position Preference, Judgments of Goodness, Memory and Reasoning N A N C Y L. STEIN

Department of Psychology University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois, 60637 U.S.A.

and C H R I S T O P H E R A. MILLER

Honeywell Systems, Inc. 3660 Technology Drive Minneapolis, MN 55418 U.S.A.

ABSTRACT: Data are presented that focus on the nature and development of argumentative reasoning. In particular our study describes how support for or against an issue affects memory for critical parts of an argumentative interaction, judgments of argument goodness, and the content of the reasons given in support of one view versus another. Two other factors were examined: developmental differences in argumentation skill and the conditional nature of supporting one side of an argument across varying contexts. Our results show that even seven year old children can recognize, identify, and use the basic components of an argument to provide evidence for and make judgements about their favored position. Moreover, if position support is held constant across all age groups of students, seven year old children were found to give reasons and explanations that were highly similar in content and principle to college students. The same similarities held across age with respect to biases in memory and judgements of argument goodness. The primary difference between children's and college students' argument behavior lay in the side of an argument the students chose to support. Seven year old children and some eleven yearold children supported positions that impute more value to friendship and social consequences than to the maintenance and advancement of individual rights, as specified in a contract agreement. The similarities and differences across development are discussed with respect to a theory of argumentation that speaks to the importance of understanding the nature of goal conflict and a theory of intentionality in predicting how arguments will be represented and resolved. KEY WORDS: Argumentative reasoning, memory, development.

Argumentation 7: 183-204, 1993. © 1993 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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INTRODUCTION This paper investigates the relationship between choosing to support one side of an argument and the ways in which memory and reasoning are affected by taking a particular stance. The act of supporting a position or engaging in an argument, by its very nature, initially requires a choice between two opposing alternatives. The fact that a person chooses to support one side versus the other reflects not only overt behavioral differences but also reflects differences in the beliefs and values that arguers use to make decisions (Bartlett, 1932; Ross and Lepper, 1980; Stein and Miller, 1990; in press). These differences have been shown to play an important role in predicting how argumentative information is understood and remembered (Noller, 1980, 1981, 1984; Stein and Miller, 1990, in press). At times, supporting a particular point of view may cause arguers to misinterpret, misrepresent, or misuse information, especially in situations where the information seriously contradicts an arguer's stance. Our goals are to explore the exact nature of the beliefs that arguers have when they choose to support a position and to describe the relationship between these beliefs, memory, and reasoning about position choice. We also wanted to explore the consistency with which people will support a position. Hypothetically, support for a position could extend over almost any set of conditions. However, our working model of argumentative reasoning (Stein and Miller, 1990, in press) predicts that support for a position is bound both by the context and by the specific opposing values that constrain the nature of the disagreement about a position. Individuals who actively support a position under one set of conditions may not support the same position under different operating conditions. For example, few people support a ban on abortion under all conditions (Bernas, t992), especially when the health of the mother is at risk. For many people, support for abortion is contingent on the exact nature of the stakes: the opposing values that are pitted against one another and the consequences of opposing or supporting a position under each set of conditions. Thus, our studies of argumentative reasoning were designed to examine the conditional nature of supporting one position over another. We describe the conditions under which certain positions are suppored and the conditions under which shifts in support are made. In the studies presented in this paper, we examine argumentative reasoning within a developmental context. Our subjects range in age from seven to twentyone years. In each of these studies, identical arguments are presented to all subjects. Thus, our results allow a description of the similarities and differences in argumentative choice and reasoning as a function of development.

The Representation of Knowledge about Arguments The definition of an argument According to our theory of argument in everyday interaction (Stein and Miller, 1990, in press), an argument is said to occur when two or more individuals

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maintain and develop positions that are initially incompatible with each other. In order to begin an argument, both opponents must recognize that they have conflicting, mutually exclusive goals (e.g., what one opponent wants is completely negated by what the other one wants). If either party is unaware of the conflict, then an argument cannot be initiated. If mutual recognition occurs and if both parties seek to resolve the conflict by defending and advancing a position, then an argument ensues.

The generation of evidence Normally, arguers have two goals throughout the duration of an argument. The first is focused on a continual assessment of whether or not the argument can be won or whether another strategy would be more appropriate in the given circumstances. The second is focused on an evaluation of evidence generated by both themselves and their opponent. In most argumentative situations, arguers initially bring forth evidence to explain their stance on an issue (Stein and Miller, in press). Evidence is normally given in the form of "reasons" for supporting a particular stance. Reasons consist of giving information about what arguers perceive to be both the causes and consequences of their desire to maintain a position. Moreover, arguers often try to make explicit the causal inferences they have made that link their claim to their evidence. Generating evidence also serves to advance an arguer's position. Not only do arguers bring evidence to bear to explain their own position, but they also attempt to provide evidence that advances their own position in relationship to their opponent's position. They do so by attempting to negate or weaken their opponent's position. By providing counter evidence to their opponent's claims or by contrasting their position with that of their opponent's position, arguers attempt to enhance the validity and credibility of their own position. Evidence normally consists of three categories of information: 1) personal or social preferences for supporting or not supporting a certain position; 2) the causes and consequences of being or not being able to advance a certain position; 3) moral, social, or cultural norms that would be upheld or violated as a function of maintaining a certain stance. We have shown (Stein and Miller, in press) that evidence given both for and against a position usually consists of memories or observations of a single encounter, observations gathered over time, or reports in the form of remembered testimony given by other people.

Biases in beliefs, judgements, and the generation of evidence Biases are so common in the course of argumentation because arguments involve, by definition, a conflict of goals between two or more people. By the very fact that arguers choose to support one side of an issue versus the other, they have already made certain decisions about the value of their opponent's position (Stein and Miller, in press). By supporting one side of an argument, arguers have already decided that their position will result in more positive benefits to them than the advancement of their opponent's position (Stein and Miller, 1980, in press). Moreover, when judging the relative importance of

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conflicting values that underlie an argument, people supporting one position think that the principle motivating support for their position is more important than the principle motivating their opponent's position. For example, Stein and Miller (in press) found that second grade children who disagreed about whether or not a contract should be upheld also disagreed on how the two opposing principles underlying the argument should be ranked. Those children who voted to uphold the nature of a contract said that the terms of the contract should hold, even if the action resulted in ending a friendship between two people. Conversely, those children who voted to nullify the contract said that the friendship was more important than upholding the contract. Given that people have devalued one principle in favor of another when choosing to support one side of an argument versus another, these differences in value rankings should be manifested in the judgements made about the goodness of evidence, in the specific content of evidence offered by the two opponents, and in the parts of the argument that are remembered and recalled by each side. Favoring one side of an argument should result in higher judgements made about the opposition's evidence. The reason for the differential goodness ratings is that an arguer is able to generate counterarguments against the opponent's evidence whereas counterarguments are rarely generated against one's own evidence (Stein and Miller, 1990, in press). Differential value rankings should also affect the types of reasons given in support of a claim. Reasons must be causally consistent with the claim being advanced. Therefore, evidence given in support of a position should be mutually exclusive of the evidence given to advance the other position. Moreover, the parts of an argument recalled, and therefore remembered, should reflect the constraints placed upon arguers in their attempts to advance a position and negate or constrain the opposition. Thus, our contention is that the decision to support one side of an argument will influence judgments of goodness, the content of explanations given for supporting a position, and memory for specific parts of an argument. In order to examine these hypotheses, the following study was carried out. Students from the ages of seven through twenty years were told about an argument that had just occurred between a boy and girl. The basic conflict concerned a difference of opinion about whether or not a contract made by the two children should be upheld. In one example of our argument situations, the two children had made a promise to help each other with their household chores the day before a baseball game took place. The reason the children made the promise was that if they did not help each other, neither would get their chores done in time to go to the game. The disagreement between the two children erupted because the baseball game was cancelled due to rain. One child contended that the two did not have to help each other with their chores, while the other argued that they did.


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The conditional nature of supporting a particular position According to our theoretical analysis of argument, support for a position should depend upon the operating conditions and circumstances that constrain the nature of the argument. In order to examine the validity of this hypothesis, our contract situations varied with respect to the explicitness with which a promise was made. In our attempts to vary the explicitness of a promise, we either excluded or included direct reference to the conditions that would invalidate the promise should the baseball game be cancelled. Thus, in one set of conditions, two children promise to help each other so that they would both get to go to the baseball game. No mention was made about what should be done if the baseball game were cancelled. In a second set of conditions, a clause was added to the promise explicitly stating that the children did not have to help each other if the game were cancelled. By systematically manipulating the dimension of explicitness, we can determine how the introduction of different constraining conditions influences the position that students choose to support. With respect to manipulating explicitness, the central principle under consideration is one of foreseeability. If a contract or promise states the exact way two goals should be interconnected to facilitate the accomplishment of both goals, must the contract also specify the interconnection between the two goals, if one of the goals cannot be attained?

The Development of Argumentative Knowledge The final issue to be considered concerns the development of knowledge and skill in reasoning about arguments. The main question concerns whether seven year old children have the logical ability to understand and reason about arguments in the same was as eleven year old children and college students do. Two different points of view have been advanced about the development of argument skill. One point of view relies heavily upon Piagetian theory and stipulates that the young child cannot argue in a logical manner until the onset of formal operational reasoning. According to this point of view, children under the age of ten or eleven cannot engage in sophisticated argumentative reasoning, primarily because they lack the competence to reason and understand many of the rules of formal logic. The evidence used to support this point of view is normally gathered in studies that examine the development of moral reasoning. Studies by Berkowitz and his colleagues (Berkowitz and Gibbs, 1983, 1985; Berkowitz, Oser, and Althoff, 1987) are prototypic of this line of research. One of the primary means of studying moral reasoning is to have two children who disagree with each other participate in a dyadic interaction. In the Berkowitz, Oser and Althoff 1987 study, subject dyads were matched for sex, grade level, and were known to differ in the position they favored in regard to a dilemma. Subjects from six to twenty years of age were studied. An analysis of the discourse produced by these subjects led Berkowitz et al. to conclude that justification for moral claims does not appear regularly, spontaneously, or in its adult form in children between the ages of six to eight years. These children are

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reported to resolve their disputes "... by power manipulations, either physical or verbal, but without recourse to collaborative justified discourse" (p. 337). "Arguments" at this stage are said to be simple repetitions of position. Justifications are offered only when they are demanded by an opponent, and then they are reported to be "personal, idiosyncratic, and illogical." Berkowitz et al. do claim that children from nine to eleven years of age recognize the need for an opponent to be convinced by a justification, but cannot generate effective justifications due to inadequate consideration of the opponent's viewpoint. It is only after the age of eleven that Berkowitz and his colleagues are willing to conclude that subjects have adequate argumentation skill to engage in reasoned dyadic interaction. A clear alternative to the Berkowitz and Piagetian point of view has emerged over the last ten years. A variety of other studies have shown that children at age five or even younger have many of the argumentative capabilities of older children and adults. Moreover, these studies raise concerns about the way in which children's reasoning and argumentative skill has been measured. Of primary concern are: the methodology and materials used; the amount of specific knowledge that children and adults have acquired about an issue before they enter an argument; and the role of commitment and prior value judgements in determining the choice of a position and the ability to retain an accurate representation of the conflict. The most direct counter-evidence to the claims of Berkowitz et al. (1987) comes from a study carried out by Stein and Trabasso (1982). These investigators argued that five year old children are fully capable of constructing complex moral justifications in domains that are familiar to them. When asked to resolve a moral dilemma that was familiar and made interesting to them, kindergarten children chose to support a position opposite to that of most third graders and junior high students. When asked to explain their choices, all groups of subjects, including five year old children, provided logically consistent reasons. Furthermore, when the evidence was evaluated holding constant the choice made by all children, reasons did not differ as a function of age. If children supported the same position at each of the three grade levels, they generated justifications that were similar in kind and content. The most likely explanation for discrepancies in claims made about children's argumentative competence lies in the methods and materials used to elicit justifications for arguments. Those researchers adhering to Piagetian tradition have generally used moral dilemma stimuli that were originally developed for adults and not young children (Rest, 1983). In presenting episodes to children, little care has been taken to ensure that understanding of the basic concepts was similar across age groups. A lack of comprehension about the dilemma, however, could easily result in a failure to provide "logically" consistent reasons. Moreover, the same lack of comprehension could easily be induced in adults who do not have full knowledge of the issues involved in an argument or who lack information about the appropriate reasons and counter-arguments that would support a position (Fischoff, 1988; Stein and Miller, 1990, in press).


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Thus, prior understanding of dilemmas used in argument studies is critical in predicting the number and quality of justifications or counter-arguments that students can supply. As Rottenberg (1985) contends, unless a person is familiar with the topic area of an argument, the correct evidence cannot be brought to bear, independent of the general level of argumentative skill. A second difficulty with many developmental studies is that judgements about reasoning ability have been determined solely on the basis of children's spontaneous generation of justifications and counterarguments. Although the study of spontaneous discourse ability is interesting in its own right, the ability to produce spontaneous complex discourse often lags behind the ability to understand and generate discourse in more structured circumstances, such as responding to questions (Trabasso, Stein, Rodkin, Munger, and Baughn, 1992). Spontaneous arguing is also constrained by the quality and type of evidence being offered by an opponent. Sophisticated reasoning may be used only if necessary and demanded in response to an opponent's reasoning skill. Furthermore, the course of an argument may be changed from one of evaluating the evidence to one of winning the argument at any cost. If this shift occurs, measurement of reasoned argument cannot proceed because the arguers have adopted a different agenda. As we indicated previously, personal goals underlying conflict resolution efforts determine the course and structure of the argument, and shifting goals make accurate measurement more difficult. In fact, Berkowitz (1980a and b) himself, reports that differences in the content of justifications do occur, especially as a function of the competitive or collaborative nature of the social interaction. Finally, the inability of young children to understand another's perspective must be discussed not only in the light of developmental change but with respect to the nature of interactive arguments per se. Koehler (i989) has noted that scientists providing reasons for the support of a position are heavily biased by their prior beliefs and commitments to a theory. This produces errors in interpreting incoming data, especially when that data are offered by the opposition. As we indicated previously, the nature of arguing is such that people come to the conflict predisposed to defend one position over another. Thus, when individuals encounter resistance, their goal may not be to understand the other's position, but rather to maintain their own beliefs. In these instances, we would expect retention of that information which clarifies their position and poorer memory for information which goes against their point of view. This behavior should be expressed independent of the age of the subjects.

Subjects and Methods Twenty children from second grade, twenty children from sixth grade, and twenty students at the University of Chicago were asked to participate in this study. Stimulus materials consisted of four dilemmas, three decision making tasks, and two sets of probe questions. Each dilemma was posed in narrative form by describing an argument that took place between two individuals. The

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narrative contained the events leading up to the argument, the specific issue over which the parties disagreed, and the position that each party in the argument took. The reasons that the two parties used to defend their positions were not included in the narrative text. In all four dilemmas, the dispute concerned a promise the two parties had made to each other. In two of the dilemmas, the promise specified that the two individuals would help each other with chores in order to be able to go to a baseball game. In the other two dilemmas, the promise specified that the two individuals would help each other repair flat tires in order to go on a bike ride. In all four dilemmas, a rainstorm occurred before work was begun and caused the second objective (e.g., going to the baseball game, go on a bike ride) to become unobtainable. Within each topic (baseball and bike ride), two narrative versions of the dilemma were constructed and differed in the following way. The first version stated the promise but made no provision for the actions that should be taken under conditions where the second goal could not be obtained. The second version stated the promise to help but also made explicit the conditions under which help would not be required. Thus, the promise stated that if obtaining the goal became impossible, then the promise to help each other would not be put into effect. The first version of the dilemma in each set was labeled the "implicit" promise argument while the second version was labeled the "explicit" promise argument. Subjects in each group were randomly assigned to either the implicit or explicit condition and responded to both the baseball and bike dilemmas within their condition. Table 1 presents the implicit and explicit versions of one dilemma: the baseball story. Three decision making tasks were required of all subjects. The Initial Decision task required subjects to select the position in the argument they supported. Subjects were told to pretend that they were a judge resolving the dispute between the two people in the argument narrative. They were asked to name the person whose position they would support and to provide their reasons for supporting the position that they chose. The Second Decision task required goodness ratings of explanations that each opponent could have given in the argument narrative. Subjects rated the goodness of each explanation on a seven point scale. Table 2 presents the explanations specific to each of the Baseball positions and the rating scales used to rate explanation goodness. The Third Decision task required subjects to make a forced choice between the opponents' explanations in terms of which explanation was the better one. The two explanations described in Table 2 were not pitted against each other, and subjects were asked to select the one explanation they thought was the better one for supporting a position. Two sets of probe questions were then administered. The first set assessed subjects' memory for specific information from the argument narratives and examined the type of causal inferences that were made to link clauses in the argument promise. Subjects were also asked to generate reasons that each of the opponents in the dispute might have had for supporting a particular position.

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Table 1. Texts included in the two versions of the Baseball narrative. Clauses used in the:

Sarah and Dan both wanted to go to a baseball game on Saturday afternoon. However, they both had chores to do. They realized that if each of them worked on their chores separately, there was no way they'd get done in time to go to the game If they helped each other, however, then they would be able to go to the game. Since Sarah and Dan wanted to go to the game together, they said "We promise to help each other with our chores so that we can both go to the game." They had also heard that there was a chance of rain on Saturday and they realized that the game might get cancelled. So they said, "If the game does get cancelled, then our promise will be off and neither of us will have to help the other one. As things worked out, on Saturday morning, it was raining real hard and they heard on the radio that the game had been cancelled. When this happened, Sarah said that they still had to help each other with their chores, but Dan said that they didn't have to. They got into an argument about this.

Implicit condition

Explicit condition

X X

X X

X X X X X X X X

X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X

X X X

The second set of probe questions examined the concept of a promise and the conditions under which promises should be kept. Moreover, subjects were asked to differentiate between legal and moral conditions that might dictate the appropriate course of action with respect to keeping a promise. Subjects were assigned either to the explicit or implicit promise condition. Thus, each person heard two dilemma stories, both of which included the same type of promise. However, each dilemma allowed the promise to be put in different contextual settings (the baseball game and the bike ride). After presentation of a dilemma story, subjects performed the decision making, memory, explanation, and question answering tasks.

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Table 2. Examples of arguments used with the Baseball story. HELP argument

"We made a promise to help each other with our chores and when you promise to do something, you're supposed to do it. It doesn't make any difference that the game was called off, you still promised to help me. If you don't help me, then you're breaking your promise and that's wrong." Use the rating scale below to show me how good you think this argument is. If we let 1 be a really horrible argument and 7 be a really fantastic one, then circle the number that you think best represents how good an argument you think this is. 1

2

3

4

5

6

Horrible

7

Fantastic

NO HELP argument

"The whole reason we made our promise was so that we could go to the baseball game. We agreed that we would help each other only so that we could go to the game. That means that if we can't go to the game, then we don't have to help each other anymore. Well, there's not going to be any game, so I'm not going to help anymore." Use the rating scale below to show me how good you think this argument is. If we let 1 be a really horrible argument and 7 be a really fantastic one, then circle the number that you think best represents how good an argument you think this is. 1

Horrible

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fantastic

Results Decision tasks Table 3 presents the data from two decision tasks. The top part of Table 3 (part A) refers to the proportion of subjects who supported the "No Help" position. As the data indicate, explicitly stating both the positive and negative implications of a promise significantly influenced how many subjects decided to support the position of not requiring the two children to help each other. When the promise contained exact specification of expected behavior for both positive and negative implications, more subjects supported the "No Help" position. A significant grade effect was also found but did not interact with variation in explicitness. Adults were more likely than children to lend support to a "No Help" position in both the implicit and explicit promise conditions. The bottom part of Table 3 (part B) presents the results from the explanation goodness comparison task. The comparative goodness ratings directly correspond to the significance of the findings from the initial decision task. In


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Table 3. Results from two forced-choice decision tasks: Support for a position and comparative judgements on the relative goodness of explanations. A. Initial Decision TaskProportion of subjects preferring the "No Help" position: Promise type**

Grade**

Implicit Explicit

Second 0.20 Sixth 0.40 College 0.88

0.32 0.67

B. Explanation Comparison TaskProportion of subjects rating a "No Help" explanation as better than a "Help" explanation. Promise type**

Grade**

Implicit Explicit

Second 0.31 Sixth 0.53 College 0.78

0.42 0.66

* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. judging comparative goodness, subjects who heard the explicit version of the promise were more likely to rate the explanation for the "No Help" position higher than they were the explanation for the "Help" position. Again, differences occurred as a function of grade. Adults were more likely than either group of children to rate the explanation from the "No Help" position higher in terms of goodness ratings than the explanation from the "Help" position. Figure 1 presents the data from the goodness assessments of each explanation across grade and promise condition. The ratings clearly show that second grade children and adults were less influenced by the inclusion of the explicit promise information than were sixth grade children. Second graders favored the "Help" position more frequently than the "No Help" position, independent of how explicit the conditions of the promise were stated. Adults favored the "No Help" position more frequently, independent of the explicitness of the conditions of the promise. The majority of sixth graders, however, were affected by the explicit statement of the negative implications of the promise. Whe n the promise did not contain information about the negative implications, the majority of sixth grade children supported the "Help" position. When the promise specified the conditions leading to not helping, the majority of sixth graders supported the "No Help" position. Individual subjects within each condition were highly consistent over the three different decision tasks. Over 75% of all subjects who supported a position, maintained their preferences over all three different decision tasks. Thus, once subjects chose an initial position, they not only maintained their position but judged the goodness of supporting evidence based upon their initial

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decision to support one side of the argument. Very little could change their minds. These data support our contention that deciding to support a position involves making an initial value judgement about the relative merits of one position versus another. Stein and Miller (in press) were able to show that children supporting different sides of an argument differentially responded to a comparison of the importance of the two opposing principles underlying support for each side of the argument (e.g., would you support not helping a friend even if not helping meant the end of the friendship; would you support helping a friend even if helping contradicted the terms of a promise). The data in the present study suggest that because arguers differentially weight one principle as more important than another, they assign different amounts of value to the evidence given by the supporting versus opposing position. Probed recall

In order to determine the nature of both condition and developmental effects, probed recall for four clauses was examined. The first two clauses, called the "Obligatory" clauses, referred to the initial portion of the promise that appeared in both implicit and explicit conditions. These clauses were: Oblig. 1

-

Initial P r o m i s e Condition: They said, 'We promise to help

Oblig. 2

-

Initial P r o m i s e I n t e n d e d Goal: ['We promise] ... so that we

each other with our chores..." can both go to the game." The second two clauses, found only in the explicit promise condition, were: Oblig. 3

-

Oblig. 4

-

N e w P r o m i s e Condition: So they said, "If the game does get

cancelled... S e c o n d P r o m i s e I n t e n d e d Goal: then our promise will be off,

and neither of us will have to help the other. As the data presented in Table 4 indicate, no differences due to age were found for recalling the initial part of the promise. All subjects recalled the first two clauses equally well. However, the probability of recalling promise information included only in the explicit condition was affected by the age of the subject. Approximately half of the youngest children recalled information about conditions that would negate the promise, while all of the adults and a clear majority of sixth graders recalled these clauses. Relationship between probed recall and position preference

Although developmental differences were found in probed recall, these differences could be due to the position children chose to support and not to differences in ability and understanding. A critical analysis would require that we conditionalize upon the position supported and then look for recall differences. Therefore, we determined the probability of recalling the critical

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Table 4. Proportion of subjects responding to probe questions about each of the four promise clauses. Clause

Description

Implicit 2nd

6th

Explicit Col. 2nd

6th

Col.

Oblig. 1

First promise action"They promised to help each other..."

Oblig. 2

First promise motive/ 0.95 0.90 1.00 0.89 0.90 0.90 condition-".., so they could go to the game."

Oblig. 3

Second promise condition"They said, 'If the game does get cancelled'..."

0.50 0.80

Oblig. 4

Second promise action"'...then our promise will be off...'"

0.44 0.70 1.00'

0.85 0.95 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.90

1.00"*

* Main effect of Grade: p < 0.05. ** Main effect of Grade: p