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4-1-1991

A Vulnerable Glance: Seeing Dance Through Phenomenology Sondra Fraleigh The College at Brockport, [email protected]

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III. A VulnerableGlance: Seeing Dance through Phenomenology SondraFraleigh When phenomenology is true to its intent, it never knows where it is going (1). This is because it is present-centeredin its descriptive aims, accounts for temporalchange, and does not have appropriateand inappropriatetopics. It might move from Zen to dance to baseball to washing dishes, and even isolate a purity of attention that under certain circumstances connects them all. Phenomenology develops unpredictably, according to the contents of consciousness. This is its first level of method. Its second level develops philosophical perspectives from the seed of consciousness. It holds that "philosophyis not the reflectionof a pre-existingtruthbut,like art,the act of bringingtruthinto being"(2). HereI will discuss phenomenology as a way of describing and defining dance, shifting between the experience of the dancer and that of the audience. Experiential Truth Phenomenology depends on immediate experience, but includes more. It hopes to arriveat meaning,perspectiveson the phenomena of experience (dance in this case) which can be communicated. It is not devoid of past and future,since both are lived as partof the present. Presenttime takes its meaning in part from past and future. Heidegger described time as belonging to the totalityof being, as "thehorizonof being." He chose the vulnerable image of falling to describe the lived dimension of present time. Falling is both a movement and a symbol of our existential mode of being-in-the-world(3). Existence is not static. It moves always just beyond our grasp. It has no specific shape, no texture,no taste (because it is nowhere). Yet we assume it is something. We can't see it (because it is everywhere), and we feel its perpetual"dance" inside us. It is of the essence of vulnerability. It surfaces to attentionthroughreflection in literature,history, and philosophy, with the urgency of word and gesture, formulationsof concrete materials,the actions and passions of drama,and the infinite combinations of sound and bodily motion in the various arts. Here psychic life, visible form, and experiential truthmerge;thoughtandfeeling converge, andmeaningarises. Art is an attemptto give substanceto existence, thatwe may gain insight throughdistilling life's ongoing nature,repeating selected gestures,motions, andsounds,moldingandmaintaining certainshapes. Art in its various forms holds these before our senses. It allows us to absorbthe textures,meanings, and motions of a perishablebodily existence. Artandexistence are both within the context or "horizon"of time. Both are subject to the ways in which time is lived-compressed, elongated, endless, a long time, a short time, barely enough time, etc. Lived time does not refer to clock time, but to how time feels.

Falling in love may take "an instant,"for example, and some chores may "never"get done. Heideggeralso describesthe "ecstasyof time"-those times when past and future are realized in the present-as "the moment of vision" (4). We say we "lose trackof time" when we become fully involved in an experience; then consciousness is not divided, and an act or thought emerges from a present-centeredness. Insight, or moments of vision, as we take "sight"as the basis for "insight,"depends on our experiencing the fullness of present time. Lived dualisms (tugs, pulls, and scatteringsof attention)disappear,and the unity of our being is experienced. When I use the term phenomenology I mean existential phenomenology, the development of EdmundHusserl's phenomenological philosophy by latertwentiethcenturyexistentialist philosophers: MartinHeidigger, JeanPaul Sartre,Paul Ricoeur, Maurice Merleau-Ponty,and Gabriel Marcel. The common concern of these philosopherswas to describe existence from the "horizon"(Husserl's term for the "context"in which experiences arise) of being-in-the-world. Existential philosophy originatedprimarilyin the thinkingof men-with the exception of feminist Simone de Beauvior. As a revolt against traditionalwestern philosophy, it developed several concerns consistent with feminists (see Addendum on Phenomenology and Feminism). Of particularinterestis that the body (mythically associated with woman and the mystery of birth)has been ignored and denied by traditionalphilosophy, but is importantin phenomenology, and is a centraltheme in existential phenomenology. Existentialphenomenologyis vulnerablebecause it rests on experiential descriptionsof the lived world; more precisely, human experiences arising always in particularcontexts of being-in-the-world. While much of male dominatedphilosophy has striven for invulnerabilitythroughlogic and reason, phenomenology took up the risky position of experiential description. It is clear, however, thatparticularconcernshave helped to shape phenomenologicaldescription,making it less relativethanit would be withoutguidingprinciplesor method. Phenomenology does not rely primarilyon the uniqueness of experience. Overall, it is propelled by a universalizing impulse, since it hopes to arriveat sharedmeaning, recognizing thatthis worldis indeed"ourworld,"thatourbeing-in-theworld is conditionedby the existence of others. Self andother are terms that take on meaning in relation to each other. Individualsubjectivity is thereforeunderstoodin view of its intersection with a surroundingworld, constituted by other objects, naturalphenomena, and other human beings. Intersubjectivity is a given. It is the basis of both alienation and

Sondra Fraleigh directs the graduatedance programat State University of New York, College at Brockport. She is currently Presidentof the Congress on Research in Dance, and has published a book on dance aesthetics, Dance and the Lived Body. She has publishedmany articles on dance, frequentlypresentspapersat CORD conferences and conferences of the AmericanSociety for Aesthetics, and has choreographedworks for studentand professional dance companies. Dance ResearchJournal 23/1 (Spring1991) 11

communion,all possible shades of relationand solitude, for to be alone is to be (in fact, or feeling) without others. If thereis a single guidingprinciplebehindphenomenology, it derives from Husserl's repeatedassertion that "consciousness is always consciousness of something." He first formulated his phenomenologicalmethod accordingto this concern in Ideas: General Introductionto Pure Phenomenology (5). Here he analyzed the basic structures of what he called "transcendentalconsciousness." Consciousness, he held, was the necessary condition for experience, or experience is presupposed by consciousness. Experience has both immanent and transcendentlevels. Immanence is that which is held within consciousness, a memoryin a streamof experience, for instance. Transcendenceis not a mystical termhere, nor does it necessarily mean an ecstatic level of consciousness. Transcendent consciousness is active since it unifies impressions, grasping phenomena in their entirety. (A phenomenon is anything that appears to consciousness.) Consciousness is transcendentbecause it refers beyond itself, attesting to a world of objects and the reality of others. It is the groundor possibility of our recognition of a world outside ourselves. Central to phenomenology is the understandingthat we never perceive a phenomenon in static unchangingperspectives, butratheras existing throughtime. Time andmotion are ever presentconditions influencing attentionand perspective. Nevertheless, consciousness can unify experience. For example, when one considers a particularphenomenonsuch as a dance, one not only has changing sense impressions of the dance as it flows throughtime, but also insight into the essence of the dance. By essence here I mean that something is discerned which characterizesor typifies the dance, so that it is recognized as itself and not some other dance. The dance then becomes more than sense impressions of motion. The essence of the dance is not identical with its motion. It arises in consciousness as the motion reveals the intentof the whole and its parts. Consciousness transcends separate acts of perceptionto unify our experience of phenomena. Essence: Identity When I look at a dance I perceive something of the work's identity, its individuality. Not only do I perceive it-I consciously construct it. That is, I imbue the work with the meaning I find thereas a viewer (or critic). This requiresboth my perceptualgrasp and conscious integrationof the work. For example, it is obvious that Cunningham'swork Eleven takes its title from the eleven performersin the dance. It is also strongly identified with the mantra-likeword/soundscore. In the following description,partof the work's identityemerges for me: The text is sparse, with sound and silence coming at intervalsandchantedin monotone,returningover and over, lending to the meditative quality of the whole. Duets, solos, trios, and other groups collect and disperse without emotional impetus, like a hand plays easily with an intricatedesign when the design begins to lead the hand unconsciously into the next figure. However, the exact movement, its energies and space/ time configuration,is unique to Eleven. At one point, there is a long stalking sequence with body leans and leg extensions. It finally develops into a reachingwalk with the body twisting andturningon one foot, ending 12 Dance ResearchJournal 23/1 (Spring1991)

with the torso bending over the leg, and an arm dangling, the hand tracinga circle, actually outlining it on the floor. This sequence contributesto the individualityof Eleven for me. Others may pay attention in a different manner, thus consciously constructingaspects I don't see. When I reflect back and relate this work to other Cunningham dances, I understandthattheir lack of overt expressiveness focuses my attentionon intricatetangles of sound, movement,color, lines of energy, shape, and design. Thus, I see them as abstractand formal, or form become content. I further notice that my attentionbecomes cleared and concentratedtowardthe end of his dances, like the concentratedattentionof the dancers. The phenomenologist approaches the task of defining or describing a phenomenon(a dance or a dance experience, for instance) as though seeing it fresh for the first time. Of course this is not possible since we do have conceptions,attitudes,and assumptionswhich color understanding.Phenomenologyis at best an effort to remove bias and preconception from consciousness. It aims to describe throughsome direct route,not to analyze and theorize (at least not in the beginning), but first to describe the immediatecontents of consciousness. As Husserlendeavoredto clarify how experience is unified in consciousness, he eventually extended his phenomenology to what he called a "science of essences." This remains the most controversial aspect of his philosophy. Existentialism never embracedphenomenology as a science, ratherit developed the original method initiatedby Husserl of "bracketing" the naturalattitude-that is, suspendingall common assumptions (presuppositions)aboutphenomenaand removing theoretical or analytical biases. This narrowing of attention to essential elements is called phenomenological reduction. Phenomenology strives to capture pre-reflective experience, the immediacy of being-in-the-world. I think of this initial impulse of phenomenology (the basis of phenomenological reduction) as poetic and subliminal, containing moments of insight into an experience when the details of "being there"are vivid in feeling, but have not had time to focus in thought. The subsequent descriptive process may also be similar to the poetic; both are grounded in experience and requirereflection,or a looking back on the experienceto bring it to language. It is furthersignificant that both poetry and phenomenologicalreductionseek the essence of experience, a re-creationin wordsof the living of the experience,as the most salient features arise in consciousness and others drop away. In this, the phenomenologist knows that finally she cannot strip away her own consciousness, nor would she want to, however much she may rid herself of baggage in terms of previous knowledge or attitudes. Consciousness and moreover her particularconsciousness, will be a partof the experience and its description. (This could be comparedto Sklar's point on ethnographyand self-reflexivity in the second article in this series. See also Addendum on Phenomenology and Ethnography). Meaning Let's take an example again from Cunningham: I notice in general that his dances use the geometrically clean lines of ballet, even though they are overlaid with radical departures fromtypicalballetgeometry,andthatthe performeris cool and detached(as othershave also noticed). The male danceris not

simply a propfor the female as in ballet stereotypessince much of theirdancingtogetherdevelops unison andequality,but the partneringper se continues the classical/romanticdependence of the female as she leans on or is held and lifted (however dispassionately) by the male. Withcomparisonsto ballet, I am of course bringingto consciousness my backgroundin dance, and I move from the purelydescriptiveto the comparativeand analytical. This comes about naturally as a result of first recognizing attenuatedlines and geometric forms. However, I would miss what seems a major point of Cunningham's works if I let themrest with balletic influence. InDoubles, for instance, dancersare seen in problem solving modes, and the balletic movement serves more as a backgroundfor this to occur, as my attemptto describe a partof the dance indicates: One movement motif develops out of a small leap stubbornly turned to the back at the landing, then stoppedin a balancedposition on one leg. Small leaps eventuallyturnto giant steps with voluminouspauses. An incomplete stop-actionfall is the most memorable of the work's challenges to the dancer's skill and the choreographer'sinventiveness. The dancerfalls sideways withoutwarningor preparationin a suddendrop to his hands. He recovers from the fall but not completely, getting up only half-way, reaching that difficult to control mid-zone between standing and falling, only to fall againandagainfroman incomplete recovery. The dance's repetitionof this series draws upon my body's memory, touching those murkymoments in experience where something is about to happen, but never quite breaks through. The foregoing is an example of my consciousness of one aspect of Doubles. It is true for me, it contains both descriptive, interpretive,and evaluative elements. One of the major purposes of phenomenological description is to build toward meaning. Then others may be able to see what you see, or at least understandwhat you see. The truths of dance are not scientific or irrefutable. They are of anotherorder,createdby the choreographer,the dancer, the audience, and the critic. Good critics do phenomenology naturally,describingwithout pre-judging, and then drawing forth the meaning they find. They exercise their consciousness of the dance in writing aboutit, finally delineatingits values (anddisvalues) for them. Critics, like phenomenologists, try to speak the truthof their own experience clearly, so thatothersmay find meaning in it. The admission of the primacyof consciousness is centralto existential phenomenology, distinguishing it from scientific phenomenology, claims to distill (reduce)phenomenato pure essences of ideas (eidos) through "eidetic reduction." A phenomenology which takes for granted our being-in-theworld owes more to insight than to an objective scientific stance. Existential phenomenology is vulnerable because it admitsthis level of subjectivity. It allows for irrationalityand accident as humanconcerns. It is also paradoxical. While it seeks to describe the essence of things, it acknowledges the impossibility of knowing things purely as objects, since objects are relative to our perception of them. It celebrates subjectivity without surrenderingto a view of a privatizedor narcissistic world where individualconsciousness is isolated, understandingandcommunityan impossibility. It is the desire to reachbeyond the boundariesof one's own consciousness to

understandhow consciousness is human which in fact motivates existential phenomenology. Definition Merleau-Pontyheld that phenomenology united the poles of subjectivism and objectivism in its philosophical approach (6). We know that it was also an attempt,in its formulationof the existential concept of "the lived body," to mend the subject/object(mind/body) split in Western attitudestoward the body (7). When I turnto phenomenology, I am awareof a nondualistic way of using language, and seek modes of expression that will most closely appropriatethe experience I wish to describe. Out of the descriptiveprocess, I understand thatI will be defining dance while drawingmy readersinto the process with me. In its own way, a descriptionis a definition. My process of phenomenological writing develops definitional anchors and experiential description toward an overview. Otherwise, I would lose my reader in a stream of consciousness which, however meaningful to me, may seem pointless and ramblingto the reader. My philosophical obligation is to extractthe meaningfulessentials, to communicate to the reader well founded points of reference. These often come through questioning, even through questioning the questions. For instance, instead of asking the typical question Whatis dance, I might get a fresh approachto my subject by asking anotherdefinitional question, such as Whenis dance happening, as I have in a recent paper. If I can answer the second question, I will be answeringthe first, and from a perspective that will not allow me to revert to assumed definitions. I examine this question descriptively from the dancer's experientialperspective: When I dance, I am subtly attunedto my body and my motion in a totally different way than I ordinarilyam in my everyday actions. That is, I seldom take notice of my ordinarycomings and goings. I'm either in a rush, just getting things done, or maybe couch potatoing, trying to get going. The point is I'm not really paying much attention to my movement. I'm just doing it (or not, as the case my be). But, when I dance, I am acutely awareof my movement. I study it, try out new moves, study and perfect them, until I eventually turn my attention to their subtleties of feeling, and meaning. Finally, I feel free in them. In other words, I embody the motion. When I make any movement truly mine, I embody it. And in this, I experience what I would like to call "purepresence," a radiantpower of feeling completely present to myself and connected to the world. This could also be describedin other ways, but I thinkdancingmoments can be named. These are those moments when our intentions towardthe dance are realized. (8) Further questions crop up immediately. What kinds of intentions are these? Is my intentionalityin dance different from my intentionality in other kinds of movement? The subject of "the aesthetic"as it applies to performancewould then become important, since one apparentdistinction between dance movement and everyday actions is that dance is "performed"with qualitativeattentiontowardthe movement (even when it is not performedfor others). Orwe could say the Dance ResearchJournal 23/1 (Spring1991) 13

movementis intentionallydesigned andperformed,not merely habitualand functionalnor purely accidental. My description obligates me to look into these aesthetic distinctions and whetherthey might hold for all forms and cultures. It is also apparentfrom the description that the movement is not only intentionallyperformed,but it is also performedfor itself, for the experience of moving this way. And theremay be purposes beyond this intrinsic one that appear in dance according to culturalcontexts. Most of our movement accomplishes some objective; it gets us some place or accomplishes a task. Generallydance movementdoes not, especially theatredance. Rather its values are not utilitarian or practical; they are affective or aesthetic. In termsof humanmovement, aesthetic intent implicates intrinsic values which inhere in actions, be they appreciatedfor their beauty or for some other affective quality. (My brief description included affective aspects of freedom.) Imagination Still anotheraspect of aesthetic intentis involved. The dancer deals not just with movement, but with the motivational source, idea, or metaphorbehindthe movement,thatwhich the movement will bringto mind. Even if the dance is stylistically abstract,it will draw our attention to its unique unfolding of movementpatternsin space-time. Movementpatternsarealso images, andthey impressthe imagination,as the word"image" implies. The imaginative, or meaningful, level of the dance may be thefocus ofphenomenologicaldescription.Clearlytherewould be many ways into this, and the description would be influenced by the full intentof the dance-theatrical, ritual,social, etc. In the following descriptionbased on phrasesof original choreography,I carrythroughmy consciousness of freedomas a compelling experience in dance and discover that dance is less ephemeralthan I have supposed: My dance contains an original structureall its own, howeverrelatedor unrelatedto the worldfromwhence it springs. As I move up, down, or spin around,I feel the purity of these directions. As movements, they take on specific identity. My own identity merges with the movement I experience. And I can repeatit. To a great extent, my dance is repeatable; it has permanence,but my life moves always into the future. I cannot relive it, nor any partof it, as I can my dance. There are certaindance phrases I like to do again and again. They strikemy imagination. In one there is an upwardreach that seems to pull down the stars. I can depend on this happening. It is there when I do it. It fills me with wonder, and I feel free in it. In another more complex phrase, I also feel free, but it is more precarious. The phrasebegins with a triangleof steps. First a glide forwardon the right foot is mirroredwith the left hand. As the glide gives in to a step to the left and rocks back to hold a step on the right, the hand polishes and smooths out the airover the triangle,then suspends in a momentaryreach as the last step is held and the eyes look across the passing movement into the distance. Outof this, the left foot takes a soft lunge forward and grounds only enough to permit a slow smooth turnto the right, while the reaching armfolds 14 Dance ResearchJournal 23/1 (Spring 1991)

at the elbow and the hand brushes the heart, then extends again. The head bows down as I returnto the soft lunge beginning,completingthe turn. This phrase always invokes feelings of tendernessanddevotion in me. It holds the fullness of some special gratitude,the more because the slow turnis risky. I could fall short or overturn. When I do it well, I feel peaceful, serene, and free. Since phenomenology seeks to get at the core of things (phenomena), it aims for simplicity in the initial descriptive process. For me it often comes to rest on a single word, such as "freedom,"as has come up thematically in the foregoing descriptions,but much depends on where I begin, the point of entryinto my own consciousness of a particulardance experience, andwhetherI amconscious of my own dancingorpaying attentionto the dances of others. I am also aware that what I already know experientially and theoretically eventually enters the picture, but it is questioned, expanded, reinforced,or discardedin the process of extractingcore values. Contraryto whatmight be expected, it is not easy to see (and give wordto) the most basic constitutiveelements of phenomenawithoutthe supportof commonassumptionsanddualistichabitsof thought which favorthe objective statusof phenomenaapartfromtheir manifestationsin subjective life. As a philosophical school, existential phenomenology returnsto the traditionaltasksof philosophy(9). Plato statedthat "philosophybegins in wonder,"and indeed this is the point of beginning for the phenomenologist. As I step back from my own processes to better understandthem, I confess to giving myself up to a quest and questioningwith a kind of blind faith that something in me already knows the answers, if I can somehow get out of my own way (remove my conditioning) long enough to glance them. Addendum on Phenomenology and Feminism While I don't identify existential phenomenology directly with feminism, I am aware that the anti-philosophersat the foundationof existentialism, Neitzsche and Kierkegaardand the later twentieth-century philosophers who extend that foundation with phenomenology, are in revolt against the traditions-especially the logic, essentialism, and idealismof Westernphilosophy. They admitconcerns into philosophy which are also important to feminists: the importance of individual consciousness, freedom, and choice. They are against determinism,and against the Westernbody/mind dualism propagating the body as inferior that also concerns feminists. Indeterminacy,expressed by Sartre'sfamiliar"existence precedes essence," is at the root of existential selfresponsibility and the existentially feminist assertion that biology is not destiny, as first taken up in the existentialist movement by Simone de Beauvior in The Second Sex. Existential phenomenologists, like feminists, are deconstructinga Western hierarchy. Self and other are major existentialist themes, receiving their first extensive treatmentas aspects of consciousness in existential phenomenology. Ann Daly's article in this series statesthat"womanhas always been the other,"andthatwomen are consumed and debased in the objectifying "male gaze," suggesting a genderdivision accordingto intentionsembodied in the act of looking at others. Sartreinterpretedthe "gaze of the other"as an objectifying and alienatinggaze in Being and

Nothingness. He (a man) felt chill and usury in becoming the "object"of another'slook, as he describesat length. One of his most popularizedexpressions became known as "the gaze of theother,"fueling subsequentexaminationsin phenomenology and other areas of thought about what intentions gazes may contain and communicate. While Sartregave the first phenomenologicalaccountof the affective power of the objectifying gaze, Gabriel Marcel describedthe otheras a sourceof "communion."I takeupboth of their perspectives in examining dance performance as "body for other"in Dance and the Lived Body, developing a view thatdance(thoughmanyof its practicesmay objectify the body) is in essence (or by definition) a human activity that seeks a bodily lived communion with others. Phenomenology has explored a wide spectrum of intentionally regardingthe self in relationto others,holding thatthe other always arises in context and imbued with the complications of individualselves relatedto particularothers. For phenomenologists there has been no one gender specific way of gazing, but nothingto precludean examinationof genderas influencing intention in any action. Questions concerning a possible "malegaze" and its implications for dance arise immediately for me. As a phenomenologist, I would need to examine the term without its rhetorical baggage to try to understandwhat men see, what they see when they look at women and when they look at women dancing (would reviews of male dance critics be useful?). If thereis a patternor way of looking so prevalentthatit could be attributedto all or even most men, I would want to explore what intentionscolor or influence the pattern. I would need to set aside any assumptions I might have about what men see when they look at women, or I wouldn't be doing phenomenology. I would inevitably need to admitmy own consciousness and to examine what I may be awareof when men look at me, or at my dancing. If I used the term "male gaze" as it originated in the filmfeminism of Laura Mulvey and is adopted by Ann Daly, I would not be doing phenomenology. I would just be general-

izing to make a point, and conflating objectifying gazes with maleness in men (and woman?). If, as a writerwith feminist concerns and a phenomenological disposition, I took up a critiqueof "the male gaze" in the context of dehumanizing intentions attributedto it, I would have still other questions: what is the distinction between a possessive or consuming glance and one of erotic pleasure? Would an erotic magnetic attractionto the body of "theother" also be an aspect of the male gaze? If the female is "alwaysthe other,"as Daly states, wouldn'tthis be the case? How thencan we account for erotic pleasure in the way that women look at (perceive) the world andthe bodies of others? Would we deny women erotic vision (seeing, looking, gazing)? Phenomenologically speaking (and as a woman), I know that I see, and I am also seen. On the other hand, I am also aware that as a woman, I have often been objectified in the gazes of men. However, it would not be so easy for me to generalize this perception,creatinga lens throughwhich I color the worldand interpretthe female as seen in dance (all dance). Addendum on Phenomenology and Ethnography Culture develops as people relate to each other and build common understandingsand traditions. The phenomenologist's admission of the subjective level of awareness is not clearly focused on the accumulatedcultural knowledge that interests the ethnographer. Phenomenology aims first to describe immediately perceived features of anything, admitting the subjective characterof perception. Culturalcontext inevitably arises in phenomenologyin termsof "theother,"or the ever presentunderstandingthatsubjectivityis conditioned by our relationto others-intersubjectivity. The very notion of a self depends on the notion of an other(or others) separate and distinct from the self. The concept of culture further assumes that distinct individuals can build relationshipsand sharemeaning. A generaltask of phenomenologywould be to expose these notions and the constructsof cultureas elements of humanconsciousness-or perspectivesthatwe take on life as we literally "makemeaning"out of it.

NOTES

1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty,Phenomenology of Perception, trans.Colin Smith(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul, 1962), p. xxi. 2. Ibid. 3. MartinHeidegger,Being and Time,trans.JohnMacquarrie andEdwardRobinson (New York: HarperandRow, 1962), p. 164. 4. Ibid., p. 239 5. Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie undphanomenologischen Philosophie. ErsterBuch. AllegemeineEinfuhrungin die reine Phanomenologie, ed. Walter Beimen (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1950). Ideas: GeneralIntroductionto Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York:

HumanitiesPress, 1931: paperbacked., Collier, 1962). For a comprehensivesurveyof phenomenologyincludingorigins of the phenomenological method, its subsequent development, and its contemporarymanifestationssee HerbertSpiegelberg, ThePhenomenologicalMovement:A Historical Introduction. 2 vols., 2nd ed. (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1971). 6. Merleau-Ponty,p. xix. 7. I dealt with this in terms of dance in the first chapter of Dance and the Lived Body, and Richard Zaner takes it up extensively in The Problem of Embodiment.Sondra Horton Fraleigh,Dance and theLivedBody (Pittsburgh:Universityof PittsburghPress, 1987), pp. 8-15. RichardZaner,TheProblem of Embodiment,2nded. (TheHague: MartinusNijhoff, 1971), pp. 239-40. Arturo Fallico believed that the joining of the phenomenologicalmethodwithexistentialconcernsconnected Dance ResearchJournal 23/1 (Spring 1991) 15

philosophicalefforts with ontological, religious, andaesthetic interests. For existentialism, it meant a transition from unsystematic literary expression to technical writing. For phenomenology, it signaled a change in applicationfrom pure idea to concreteproblemsof humanlife. ArturoB. Fallico, Art and Existentialism (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, 1962), p. 7 8. SondraFraleigh,"GoodIntentionsand Dancing Moments:

16 Dance ResearchJournal 23/1 (Spring 1991)

Agency, Freedom and Self Knowledge in Dance," Emory Cognition Project with the Mellon Foundation,Colloquium on the Self, EmoryUniversity, AtlantaGeorgia, May 5, 1989. 9. David Stewart and Algis Mickunas, Exploring Phenomenology(Chicago: AmericanLibraryAssociation, 1974), pp. 5-6.