The popular understanding of Leo Strauss as an aristocratic elitist or even as a ... the theologico-political problem, which Strauss himself regarded as the central ...
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Abstract
The popular understanding of Leo Strauss as an aristocratic elitist or even as a crypto-fascist was initially advocated by the scholarship of Shadia Drury (1987), who claimed to have found the “esoteric” meaning of Strauss’s writings. As Catherine and Michael Zuckert (2008) point out, Drury’s is one of the only books to address Strauss’s project comprehensively. Her scholarship has been called into question by Pangle (2006) and Minowitz (2009). Heinrich Meier (2006) and Marc Guerra (2007) have addressed Strauss’s project from the perspective of the theologico-political problem, which Strauss himself regarded as the central theme of his own project (Meier 3, 4). This paper presents decisive evidence that the second chapter of Natural
Right and History is not primarily about the distinction between facts and values, as the title implies, but about the conflict between philosophy and theology- the “theologico-political problem”. The fundamental design of Strauss’s argument is to gradually reduce the distinction between facts and values to the distinction between reason and revelation. He provides clear hints that this is what he is doing. His conclusion is that the distinction between reason and revelation leads to atheistic nihilism. He opposes atheistic nihilism to the natural understanding, which involves the synthesis of reason and revelation. The evidence presented shows decisively that Drury’s crypto-fascism cannot be the correct interpretation of Strauss’s thought, because it relies on Strauss being an atheist and a nihilist, when he is neither.
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The Jewish Plato
The second chapter of Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History (1953) is ostensibly an attack on value neutral social science as advocated by Max Weber. However, it is also one of Strauss’s most nuanced discussion of the theologico-political problem. The theologico-political problem concerns the irreconcilable conflict between philosophy and revelation. The second chapter of Natural Right and History is an attack on the positivistic worldview in general, but it also contains a subtle defense of both revelation and philosophy. A close reading of this chapter goes against the common understanding that Strauss was an atheist. It is not hard to understand why Strauss would have tried to hide the fact, given the strongly atheist intellectual atmosphere in the 20th century. Strauss must address revelation outside of its religious connotations. The claim that Strauss defends both philosophy and revelation is based on the clear and simple progression of his argument in this chapter. In this chapter, Strauss argues against the separation of facts and values and against the value neutral methodology advocated by Max Weber. Yet, over the course of the chapter Strauss gradually reduces Weber’s separation of facts and values to the separation of philosophy and revelation. This suggests that his claim toward the end of the chapter, that philosophy and revelation are separate (Strauss 74-76), is to be taken ironically. This is confirmed by the actual conclusion of the chapter (77-80), in which he openly states that both reason and revelation together are necessary for natural understanding (80). The structure and progression of the argument make Strauss’s reduction of facts/values to philosophy/revelation clear. Strauss begins his argument by reducing the distinction between facts and values to the denial of a true value system (41). From 42 to 63, he argues against
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Weber’s value neutrality. At the end of this section, Strauss reduces the denial of the true value system to Weber’s conflict between ultimate values (63-64). From 64 to 74, he discusses Weber’s conception of ultimate values, and gradually reduces the conflict between ultimate values to the conflict between philosophy and revelation, which is finally stated explicitly on 74. And after arguing against Weber the whole chapter, we find Strauss apparently agreeing with Weber that philosophy and revelation are separate! Strauss clearly intends this apparent final stage of the argument (72-76) as a ‘false conclusion,’ to be taken ironically. The very final pages of the chapter confirm that his real argument is that philosophy and revelation are to be taken together. Together, philosophy and revelation make up the natural understanding of the world, which is opposed to an atheistic, nihilistic, value neutral, scientific understanding of the world (77-80). This argument amounts to a reductio ad absurdum proof of natural right. Strauss reduces the separation of facts and values to the separation of reason and revelation, which is the absurdity of nihilism- “...the quest for truth has the same dignity as stamp collecting. Every pursuit, every whim, becomes as defensible or as legitimate as any other.” (72) He concludes the chapter by showing that even more fundamental than the distinction between reason and revelation, is the distinction between the natural understanding of the world and nihilism. (74-80) The purpose of Strauss’s vehement attack on Weber [1], is not merely to criticize value neutral social science, but on a deeper level, to criticize the separation of philosophy and revelation. The core of Strauss’s project is the internalization of the theologico-political problem, the tension between revelation and philosophy. The central motivation in all of Strauss’s writing is the profound tension between faith in the divine and direct knowledge of the divine. This
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could also be understood as a tension between writing that is acceptable to the academic or political community and writing that conveys true wisdom, or the tension between convention and nature. This is reflected in the very format of most of Strauss’s writing, the commentary. By choosing to write mostly in the form of the commentary, Strauss communicates the tension between traditional knowledge and his own knowledge before we even begin to read him [2]. I think that Strauss regards the history of philosophy as its own revelatory tradition, a series of political and ontological revelations that are justified by the history of political organization and the transhistorical purpose of political organization, the best political order. Strauss’s writing is the embodiment of the fundamental tension between philosophy and revelation, the “secret to the vitality of the West” (Strauss 1979, 113) and perhaps not coincidentally, the secret of his own philosophy. The problem of revelation is not whether we should obey an imaginary man in the sky. The problem of revelation is how and whether revelation is accepted by the political community. This is the reason that Strauss calls it the theologico-political problem, and not the theologico-philosophical problem. The crux of Strauss’s modern theologico-political problem is that the academic and political community of the 20th century no longer accepts the divine in any form. The divine has taken on the status of a stale, disenchanted orthodoxy. There is no longer any reason to value human virtue or human excellence. Strauss and Weber are required to start from what everyone can see, that there is no god [3]. Strauss was required to start from the commonly accepted atheism of the day, or else he would not have been taken seriously as a thinker. Strauss faces the inverse of the political situation of the medieval thinkers like Al-Farabi and Maimonides, who could not openly be atheists in their religious communities. Strauss cannot
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openly be a theist, but through his philosophy, he implicitly advocates a kind of monotheism or fundamental unity of truth. This is the true sense in which his project is a response to Nietzsche and Heidegger. The cosmic task of Leo Strauss is to reignite the feeling of the divine, to initiate the spiritual renewal of man through philosophy. He wants to very carefully suggest that philosophy has the potential to achieve the same heights as divine revelation. From the very beginning of the chapter, we are presented with a phrasing of the theologico-political problem. Strauss says that political philosophy is possible if man is capable of grasping the fundamental political alternative. There cannot be natural right if this fundamental political problem cannot be solved in a final manner (35). All political philosophers, he claims, have assumed that the fundamental political problem can be solved in a final manner (35-36). The assumption that the fundamental problem can be solved in a final manner is based on Socrates’ answer of how to live a good life. Socrates claimed that when we realize that we are ignorant of the most important things, we simultaneously realize that the one thing that we absolutely need is the quest for knowledge of these things, the quest for wisdom (36). The successful quest for wisdom might lead to the result that wisdom is not the one thing needful, but this would still be a result of an inquiry based in reason (36). The only alternative is a result that has no reason. The conflict between Socrates’ answer of how to live a good life and the non-Socratic answer of how to live a good life, creates the impression that Socrates’ answer is as arbitrary as its opposite (36). With this introduction, Strauss sets up the dichotomy of Socratic vs. anti-Socratic way of life and shows that the real subject of this chapter is the theologico-political problem. Strauss has introduced us to the theologico-political problem before he has even started to discuss Weber. Strauss appears to suggest that philosophy or the Socratic way of life, rather
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than revelation, is the solution to the political problem, and that revelation is opposed to the Socratic way of life. But we will see how he later suggests that the Socratic way of life is the same as the way of life of revelation, and that both of them together are opposed to nihilism. From 36-39, Strauss discusses Weber’s basic philosophical position, which leads to an explanation of the distinction between facts and values (39), and how Weber uses this distinction to justify ethically neutral or value neutral social science (41). Weber believes there is no way to speak scientifically about what ought to be, only what is (Bruun 345-346, Weber 182). Since the researcher cannot speak scientifically about what ought to be, his personal values or faith are mostly irrelevant to his research. However, Strauss asserts that if we could have true knowledge of the Ought, if there is natural right, then the knowledge of natural right would necessarily guide all empirical social science (41). Weber, then, did not insist on ethical neutrality because of the separation of the Is and the Ought, but more fundamentally because he believed there could be no true knowledge of the Ought (41). It is completely plausible that we could have genuine knowledge of the Ought and that the Ought would still be separate from what Is. Weber insists on ethical neutrality not because values and facts are separate, but because he believes that there is no true value system, there is no true ethics (41). Strauss has reduced Weber’s distinction between Is and Ought to a denial of the true value system (41). This discussion leads into Strauss’s thesis that Weber’s contention is nihilistic (42). Strauss argues that Weber’s vision of social science is nihilistic because “the true value system does not exist; there is a variety of values which are of the same rank, whose demands conflict with one another, and whose conflict cannot be solved by human reason.” (41-42) This statement already alludes to the conflict
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between ultimate values, which is not explicitly discussed until 64. Evidence of Weber’s nihilism is given by his views on the prospects of Western civilization.
“He saw this alternative: either a spiritual renewal (‘wholly new prophets or powerful renaissance of old thoughts and ideals’) or else ‘mechanical petrifaction, varnished by a kind of convulsive sense of self-importance,’ i.e., the extinction of every human possibility but that of ‘specialists without spirit or vision and voluptuaries without heart.’ Weber felt that the decision in favor of either possibility would be a judgment of value or of faith, and hence beyond the competence of reason. This amounts to an admission that the way of life of ‘specialists without spirit or vision and voluptuaries without heart’ is as defensible as the ways of life recommended by Amos or by Socrates.” (42, italics added)
Here, Strauss speaks of “the way of life recommended by Amos or by Socrates,” in one breath. They are to be understood as a single way of life. Previously, he had simply called it the Socratic way of life, but now he calls it the way of life of Amos or Socrates, revealing that he does not oppose philosophy and revelation to one another. He opposes both of them together to the way of life of “specialists without spirit or vision and voluptuaries without heart.” The way of life of philosophy and revelation is opposed to nihilism. Strauss sees the same fundamental alternative as Weber, but unlike Weber, Strauss considers one alternative to be in accordance with reason, namely that of spiritual renewal. Strauss is not simply arguing as an atheist. He is arguing that the spiritual renewal of man is in accordance with human reason.
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The section that discusses value judgments and the prohibition on value judgments goes from 41 to 64. This is to be treated as a single section because immediately preceding and following this section is a discussion of Weber’s concept of reference to values. References to values are different than value judgments. “To understand a factual or possible evaluation is something entirely different from approving or forgiving that evaluation.” (40) And,
“...by saying that something is relevant with regard to political freedom… one does not take a stand for or against political freedom. The social scientist does not evaluate the objects constituted by ‘reference to values’; he merely explains them by tracing them to their causes.” (40)
In the section from 41-64, Strauss shows that Weber was fundamentally incapable of adhering to his own value neutral directive. Strauss returns to the topic of reference to values, at the very end of this section, on 63 and 64:
“It seems, then, what Weber really meant by his rejection of value judgments would have to be expressed as follows: The objects of the social sciences are constituted by reference to values. Reference to values presupposes appreciation of values. Such appreciation enables and forces the social scientist to evaluate the social phenomena… Reference to values is incompatible with neutrality... since the various values are incompatible with one another, the approval of any one value necessarily implies the rejection of some other value or values. Only
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on the basis of such acceptance or rejection of values, of ‘ultimate values,’ do the objects of the social sciences come to sight.” (63-64, italics added)
Denying the existence of a true value system does not allow the social scientist to forgo value judgments. In order to do his work, the social scientist is forced to accept some values and reject others, and thus the conflict between values becomes the conflict between ultimate values. The denial of the true value system necessarily leads to this conflict between ultimate values:
“… Weber’s whole notion of the scope and function of the social sciences rests on the allegedly demonstrable premise that the conflict between ultimate values cannot be resolved by human reason. The question is whether that premise has really been demonstrated, or whether it has merely been postulated under the impulse of a specific moral preference.” (64)
The ultimate values in question are still something like reason versus nihilism, in accordance with Weber’s prospects for western civilization, spiritual renewal vs. mechanistic petrifaction. From 67-70, Strauss gives two examples that support this interpretation. But with the second example, the conflict between ultimate values is reduced to the conflict between reason and revelation, when Weber reiterates the fact that Weber does not prove his central contention.
“Yet [Weber] never proved that the unassisted human mind is incapable of arriving at objective norms or that the conflict between different this-worldly ethical doctrines is insoluble
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by human reason. He merely proved that otherworldly ethics, or rather a certain type of otherworldly ethics, is incompatible with those standards of human excellence or of human dignity which the unassisted human mind discerns. One could say, without in the least becoming guilty of irreverence, that the conflict between this-worldly and otherworldly ethics need not be of serious concern to social science.” (71)
This ingenious passage appears assert the primacy of philosophy over revelation“otherworldly ethics, is incompatible with those standards of human excellence or of human dignity which the human mind discerns...” But it actually points out that there is no essential conflict between philosophy and revelation- “the conflict between this-worldly and otherworldly ethics need not be of serious concern…” With this example, Strauss reduces the conflict between ultimate values, which thus far appears to be the conflict between reason and nihilism, to the conflict between this-worldly and other-worldly ethics, or reason and revelation. Yet he simultaneously asserts that the conflict need not be of serious concern. The cryptic passage on 66 has been ignored by previous commentators because it is out of place. It is after the first insistence that Weber does not prove his central contention (64), but before the final stage of Strauss’s reductio (74). This passage makes sense only if Strauss is speaking of the fundamental political alternative, the relationship between philosophy and revelation. Strauss says that if it is true that all values are of the same rank, as Weber thought, then a social scheme that satisfies the requirements of two values is preferable to one that is more limited (66). The conflict between philosophy and revelation is ostensibly irreconcilable and therefore, philosophy and revelation are of the same rank. Neither can be
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preferred to the other. The comprehensive scheme might demand that some of the requirements of each of the two values be sacrificed. The question would arise as to whether the one-sided schemes are not as good as, or are better than, the more comprehensive schemes (66). To answer this, one would have to know if it is possible to adopt one of the two and unqualifiedly reject the other (66). Is it possible to adopt a purely philosophical perspective or a purely religious perspective and unqualifiedly reject the other? If it is impossible, then some sacrifice of the requirements of the two component values is a dictate of reason (66). In other words, if it is impossible to unqualifiedly reject one or the other, the synthesis of philosophy and revelation is a dictate of reason. The optimal scheme, or the best regime, might only be realizable under very favorable conditions, and the actual conditions may be very unfavorable (66). But, the fact that it is unlikely “...would not deprive the optimal scheme of its importance, because it would remain indispensable as the basis for rational judgment about the various imperfect schemes” (66). This is a clear reference to 41, “Let us assume that we had genuine knowledge of right and wrong, or of the Ought, or of the true value system. That knowledge, while not derived from empirical science, would legitimately direct all empirical social science...” This passage is advocating the synthesis of revelation and philosophy, as the optimal political scheme or the best regime. This optimal scheme is natural right, the criteria by which social phenomena are judged as right or wrong. The appearance of the suggestion that revelation and philosophy are fundamentally antagonistic is intended to be ironic. Strauss’s strongly nihilistic style is strictly limited to the “false conclusion” on pages 72-76, which would lead careless readers to the conclusion that Strauss is some sort of nihilist. These pages are a brilliant comedic parody of the entire atheistic
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intellectual and political atmosphere of the 20th century. He shows that the strict separation of philosophy and revelation is absolutely absurd and leads to the crudest nihilism [4]. His reductio ad absurdum proof links to the joke at the beginning of the chapter: “…we must avoid the fallacy that in the last decades has frequently been used as a substitute for the reductio ad absurdum: the reductio ad Hitlerum.” (42) With this joke, he warns the reader against confusing his proof that the separation of reason/revelation is nihilistic with an interpretation that Strauss himself is a nihilist. He clearly is not. He clearly knows that this interpretation will be tempting, given pages 72-76. With this incredible joke, Strauss simultaneously makes fun of all those who carelessly read him as a crypto-fascist, positivist philosophers obsessed with proving their contentions, and atheist politicians who lack the art of moderation and the ethic of responsibility. Strauss finally states the theologico-political problem in its most well known form on 74: “No alternative is more fundamental than this: human guidance or divine guidance.” (74) And “...the one thing needful proclaimed by the Bible is the opposite of that proclaimed by philosophy: a life of obedient love versus a life of free insight.” (74) And immediately following these statements, he appears to make the claim that no synthesis or harmony of the two is possible. Strauss has just spent the entire chapter ostensibly criticizing Weber for the unproven claim that this conflict is insoluble by human reason. If Strauss, at this point, simply agrees that the conflict is insoluble, then his argument makes no sense. It becomes apparent that Strauss is not actually arguing for an antagonism between philosophy and revelation with the way that he frames his sentences. “The dilemma cannot be evaded by any harmonization or synthesis.” (74) This sentence uses a double negative to suggest that the dilemma of harmonization must be confronted. “In every attempt at harmonization… one of the two elements is sacrificed, more or
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less subtly but in any event surely, to the other: philosophy… must be the handmaid of revelation or vice versa.” (74-75) This suggests that though one of the elements is subtly sacrificed, the relation is a partnership rather than an antagonism. When he suggests that neither has ever succeeded in refuting the other, he says, “This state of things would appear to be but natural.” (75) This sentence confirms that the relation between philosophy and revelation is related to natural right and the natural understanding of the world that he explicates from 77-80. Strauss’s central thesis in this chapter can be stated as follows: there is a true value system, which is the solution to the conflict between ultimate values, and that solution is the synthesis or tension between philosophy and revelation, which is the best regime. The reductio is only part of his proof. The constructive aspect of the proof depends on whether he has succeeded in redefining human reason to include the natural understanding of the world, whether he has established a politically and philosophically acceptable form of revelation, a spiritual renewal of humanity in accordance with reason. And this depends on whether society actually experiences these things. In other words, Strauss’s thesis might not be fully proven by Strauss himself, but by the followers in the tradition that he has established, or more precisely, the tradition that he has re-established. The conclusion of the chapter, 76-80, shows that opposition between the natural understanding of the world and nihilistic understanding of the world is more urgent and more fundamental than the opposition between revelation and philosophy. He says that Weber would have rejected the idea that social science must be based on social reality as it is experienced in social life, or as it is known to common sense (78). The rejection of common sense understanding of the social world stems from the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment thinkers
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conceived of philosophy or science as the perfection of man’s natural understanding (78). But in the 19th century, it became apparent that the “scientific understanding of the world emerges by way of a radical modification, as distinguished from a perfection, of the natural understanding.” (79) Science presupposes common sense, or the natural understanding (79). Just to be sure that we understand that philosophy and revelation go together, Strauss ends the argument by again speaking of philosophy and revelation in the same breath:
“ To grasp the natural world as a world that is radically prescientific or prephilosophic, one has to go back behind the first emergence of science or philosophy. It is not necessary for this purpose to engage in extensive and necessarily hypothetical anthropological studies. The information that classical philosophy supplies about its origins suffices, especially if that information is supplemented by consideration of the most elementary premises of the Bible, for reconstructing the essential character of ‘the natural world.’” (79-80)
His suggestion that the opposition between scientific and natural understanding is more fundamental than the opposition between philosophy and revelation, does not imply that Strauss has an anti-scientific attitude. He does not advocate unreason or divine madness. In another work, he rightly calls into question whether the effort to create the hydrogen bomb “is reasonable with a view to its practical usefulness.” (Strauss, 1979, 118) But Strauss does not want to completely reject Weber’s value-neutrality, he wants to augment it by showing us that the selection of facts always suggests certain values, that reason and revelation are always interdependent. Thus a spiritual esotericism replaces value neutrality. According to common
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sense, all expressions have implied value judgments or validity claims which are important to consider and evaluate. Divorced from this common sense understanding of reason and morality, science is dangerous. Strauss’s writing is the pursuit of “the science of all the beings,” (Strauss 1953, 122 [5]) what would be known in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment as the mathesis universalis. The logic of Strauss’s philosophy shows us how to take up that pursuit. This reading of the Weber chapter suggests that Strauss’s other works may be open to reinterpretation, in light of his real views on the theologico-political problem, as of 1953. I do not claim that my reading covers every aspect of the chapter on Weber. However, I have presented very clear evidence that the penultimate stage of the argument of this chapter is intended ironically, as a comedic parody of twentieth century atheistic nihilism. This reading invalidates the view popularly attributed to Strauss, that Strauss is an atheist who holds that philosophy and revelation are necessarily irreconcilable. This false view is essential to the understanding of Strauss as an aristocratic elitist, or even a proto-fascist. In place of the view that Strauss was an atheist, I advocate that Strauss’s proof of the superiority of philosophy and revelation over nihilism is shown by his reductio proof in this chapter, and that the constructive aspect of the proof can only be demonstrated by the future readers and followers of Strauss. The constructive aspect consists of the moral regeneration of humanity, initiated by political and esoteric philosophy which redefine human reason to include the natural revelatory understanding of the world in perfect synthesis with the scientific understanding of the world.
Bibliography:
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Behnegar, Nasser. Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics. Chicago: U of Chicago, 2003. Print.
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Weber, Max, and Edward Shils. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Glencoe: Free, 1949. Print.
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[1] “Whatever may have been his errors, he is the greatest social scientist of our century.” (36)
[2] “There is a kinship between this art of writing and the favored form of writing, favored in the Jewish tradition, namely, the commentary, always referring back to something earlier. Man does not begin.” (Strauss 1979, 112)
[3] “We are irreligious because fate forces us to be irreligious and for no other reason.” (73)
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[4] “… the quest for truth has the same dignity as stamp collecting. Every pursuit, every whim, becomes as defensible or as legitimate as any other.” (72), “What claims to be freedom from delusions is as much and as little delusion as the faiths which prevailed in the past and which may prevail in the future.” (73) “…there is no possibility of consistency, of a consistent and thoroughly sincere life, without belief in revelation.” (75)
[5] Like every other philosopher, [Socrates] identified wisdom, or the goal of philosophy, with the science of all the beings: he never ceased considering ‘what each of the beings is.’” (122)
This paper was made possible by a intensive research grant from the George Mason University OSCAR program.
