Michelle L. Rizzella and Edward J. O'Brien, Department of. Psychology ... Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, New York 14456. ence fails (e.g. ...
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 19%, Vol. 22, No. 5,1208-1218
Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0278-7393/96/$3.00
Accessing Global Causes During Reading Michelle L. Rizzella and Edward J. O'Brien
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University of New Hampshire In 4 experiments, the authors examined whether readers accessed distant causal antecedents for consequent events when the text was locally coherent and a more recent causal antecedent was available. Participants read passages that contained 2 possible causal antecedents for a consequent event; 1 appeared early in the passage, and the other appeared late. The early causal antecedent was elaborated in half of the passages, and neither causal antecedent was elaborated in the remaining half. Experiments 1A and IB demonstrated that when the more distant, early causal antecedent had been elaborated, both it and the more recent, late causal antecedent were active in memory following the consequent event. In Experiments 2A and 2B, both causal antecedents were backgrounded prior to reading the consequent event. When neither causal antecedent had been elaborated, only the late causal antecedent was reactivated by the consequent event. However, when the early causal antecedent had been elaborated, only it was reactivated. Results are discussed in terms of several recent models of comprehension.
A primary focus in the study of discourse comprehension is the development of theoretical models that adequately describe comprehension processes and the resulting memory representations. For readers to successfully comprehend a text, they must be able to identify relations among ideas presented in a text and to connect those ideas in memory on the basis of the identified relations. Although there are many types of relations that can exist among text elements, there is considerable evidence that readers focus primarily on the identification and establishment of causal relations (e.g., Black & Bower, 1980; Bloom, Fletcher, van den Broek, Reitz, & Shapiro, 1990; Fletcher & Bloom, 1988; Fletcher, Hummel, & Marsolek, 1990; Keenan, Baillet, & Brown, 1984; Mackie, 1980; Magliano, Baggett, Johnson, & Graesser, 1993; Myers, 1990; Myers, Shinjo, & Duffy, 1987; O'Brien & Myers, 1987; Singer, Halldorson, Lear, & Andrusiak, 1992; Trabasso, Secco, & van den Broek, 1984; Trabasso & Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985; Trabasso, van den Broek, & Suh, 1989; van den Broek, 1990; van den Broek & Lorch, 1993).
ence fails (e.g., Fletcher & Bloom, 1988; van den Broek, 1990). For example, Fletcher and Bloom (1988) proposed the currentstate selection strategy, which placed limited capacity constraints on the extent to which readers establish causal relations. According to the current-state selection strategy, causal connections are made primarily between currently read consequences and causal antecedents that are still in shortterm memory. Causal antecedents remain in short-term memory until they are provided with a consequence. The antecedent is then transferred to long-term memory. The current-state selection strategy is considered a local coherence strategy because it specifies that a reader will only search long-term memory for a global causal antecedent when a causal antecedent is not currently available in short-term memory. Global connections are possible within the current-state selection strategy, but only when a distant cause has not been provided with a consequent event and, as a result, has been held in active memory over several cycles. Similarly, van den Broek (1990) proposed the causal inference maker, which assumes that the reader makes only those inferences and causal connections that are necessary to maintain local coherence. As in the current-state selection strategy, the reader first seeks to establish a causal connection between a currently read consequence and the most recently occurring causal antecedent. Global causal connections are only made when there is a break in local coherence. According to the causal inference maker, a local coherence break occurs if there is no causal antecedent currently available or when an available causal antecedent does not provide a sufficient explanation for a currently read consequence. In contrast to models that assume that readers focus on local coherence, several other models suggest that readers routinely attempt to maintain coherence at both a local and global level (Albrecht & O'Brien, 1993, 1995; Garnham, Oakhill, & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987; Graesser et al., 1994; O'Brien, 1995; O'Brien & Albrecht, 1992; Singer et al., 1992,1994; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). There are two general views of how a reader may gain access to global information. One view is that the
The extent to which readers are assumed to identify and establish causal relations varies widely across different theoretical perspectives (e.g., Fletcher & Bloom, 1988; Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; Singer, Graesser, & Trabasso, 1994; van den Broek, 1990). Several models propose that readers are primarily concerned with establishing causal connections to maintain local coherence; readers only seek global causes under special circumstances, such as when local causal coherMichelle L. Rizzella and Edward J. O'Brien, Department of Psychology, University of New Hampshire. Portions of this research were conducted by Michelle L. Rizzella in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the master's degree at the University of New Hampshire under the direction of Edward J. O'Brien. We thank John Limber and Liz Stine, who also served as members of the master's committee. We also thank Jason Albrecht and Simon Garrod for helpful suggestions on improving this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michelle L. Rizzella, who is now at the Department of Psychology, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, New York 14456. 1208
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GLOBAL CAUSES
activation of global information occurs primarily through a fast-acting, passive resonance process (e.g., Albrecht & O'Brien, 1993; Garrod, O'Brien, Morris, & Rayner, 1990; Garrod & Sanford, 1988, 1990; Glenberg & Langston, 1992; O'Brien & Albrecht, 1992; Sanford & Garrod, 1981). For example, Albrecht and O'Brien (1993; see Garrod et al., 1990) argued that contextually relevant inactive traces in the discourse model as well as relevant traces from world knowledge resonate in response to related information or trace elements that are currently active in memory (e.g., Gillund & ShifFrin, 1984; Hintzman, 1986; Ratcliff, 1978). That is, incoming text elements, as well as information currently in focus, serve as a compound cue (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988), reactivating strongly related information from further back in the text. The extent to which relevant backgrounded traces resonate is a function of their strength and the degree to which they share overlapping features with information currently active in memory. There is considerable evidence that readers tend to activate information from general world knowledge to connect explicitly stated discourse elements on the basis of causal relations (e.g., Duffy, Shinjo, & Myers, 1990; Keenan et al., 1984; Myers et al., 1987; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Sperry, 1985). As a result, causally related information has a greater likelihood of being encoded and elaborated. This in turn increases its strength in memory and the extent to which it overlaps with other causally related information and increases the likelihood that it will resonate in response to current information. However, according to the resonance process, once causal relations have been encoded they are accorded no special status; their accessibility depends on the same factors that influence accessibility of other discourse elements. An alternative view is that comprehension is more of a problem-solving process in which backgrounded global causes that provide reasons for currently read actions or events are reactivated, even when local causes are readily available in active memory (e.g., Bloom et al., 1990; Graesser et al., 1994; Singer et al., 1994). This view is best captured by the constructionist model (e.g., Graesser et al., 1994; Singer et al., 1994), which contains a highly strategic view of how readers identify and establish global causal connections. The constructionist model is built around the search-after-meaning principle: Readers establish both local and global causal connections by continually seeking the answer to "why" questions. For example, the reader may want to know why a particular episode took place or why certain information was presented. Causal explanations, and therefore causal connections, play a major role in comprehension. The search for global causal connections that produce global coherence is assumed to be made even when a text is locally coherent. Recently, Singer and his colleagues (Singer et al., 1992; Singer, Revlin, & Halldorson, 1990) demonstrated that consequences are bridged to distant causes, even when a text is locally coherent. For example, Singer (as cited in Singer et al,, 1994, p. 432) had participants read passages such as the following: la Valerie left early for the birthday party, (motive) lb Valerie left the birthday party early, (control) 2. She checked the contents of her purse. 3. She backed out of the driveway.
4. She headed north on the freeway. 5. She exited at Antelope Drive. 6. She spent an hour shopping at the mall.
Participants read passages in either a motive condition (Sentence la) or a control condition (Sentence lb). The last sentence (Sentence 6) shared a causal connection with the motive sentence, but not with the control sentence. In both conditions, the last sentence was locally coherent; that is, it integrated well with the immediately preceding sentences. Singer found that the last sentence reactivated information in the motive sentence, but not in the control sentence. Participants were drawing distant causal inferences even when the text was locally coherent. Although the passages used by Singer (as cited in Singer et al., 1994) were locally coherent, they did not contain a locally available cause. To the extent that readers seek to identify causal relations, the lack of an immediately available cause would trigger a search for a more distant cause, even when a text is locally coherent. A further test of the view that readers have access to both local and global causes is to determine whether more distant global causes for a consequent event become available when both the text is locally coherent and a local cause is available. In Experiments 1A and IB, we examined whether a distant potential cause for a consequent event would be activated even when the text was locally coherent and a recent potential cause was available. In Experiments 2A and 2B, we backgrounded two potential causes and examined whether reactivation of distant causal antecedents was consistent with models that focus primarily on the maintenance of local coherence or models that focus on the maintenance of both local and global coherence. Experiment 1A Both the current-state selection strategy (Fletcher & Bloom, 1988) and the causal inference maker (van den Broek, 1990) assume that readers focus primarily on the maintenance of local causal coherence. One of the basic principles of these local coherence strategies is that as long as a causal antecedent is available in short-term memory, a reader will not search other portions of the discourse model for additional causal antecedents. The current-state selection strategy further assumes that a causal antecedent only remains in short-term memory until it is provided with a consequence; once provided with a consequence, the antecedent is transferred to long-term memory. Similarly, the causal inference maker assumes that when there are several potential causes for a consequence, only the most recent one will be selected. As long as that cause provides a satisfactory account of the consequent event, there is no further search of memory for additional antecdents. However, if readers gain access to both local and global information either through a fast-acting, passive resonance process or through a more strategic process, this is not necessarily the case. Under some conditions, a reader may activate a more distant causal antecedent even when (a) a more recent cause is active, (b) the recent causal antecedent provides a sufficient explanation for the consequent event, and (c) the distant causal antecedent has already been provided with a consequent event.
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Table 1 Example Passage From Experiments 1A and IB
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Probe
Example passage
Neither causal antecedent elaborated Early antecedent: keys Billy was walking home from school after playing a game of basketball. Late antecedent: window Billy looked for his keys to unlock the front door of his house. He searched everywhere but couldn't find the keys. Billy needed to find another way to unlock the door. In order to unlock the door, Billy broke a small window. The window fell in pieces on the ground. He knew that once his father came home he would be in trouble. Early causal antecedent elaborated Billy was walking home from school after playing a game of basketball. Billy looked for his keys to unlock the front door of his house. He searched everywhere but couldn't find the keys. He realized there was a big hole in his pocket. Now, he had no idea where to look. Billy shuddered when he recalled the warning his father gave him about being more responsible. His father told him that if he was not more responsible, he would ground Billy for an entire month. Billy needed to find another way to unlock the door. In order to unlock the door, Billy broke a small window. The window fell in pieces on the ground. He knew that once his father came home he would be in trouble.
that represented either the early or late causal antecedent (e.g., keys or window). Because the early causal antecedent was always provided with a consequent event, local coherence strategies predict that it should not be active in memory immediately prior to the target consequent event (Experiment IB tested this assumption directly). Also, because the late causal antecedent always provides a sufficient cause for the target consequence, the early causal antecedent should not be reactivated. That is, the time to name the early causal antecedent will not vary as a function of elaboration and will be slower than the time to name the late antecedent. In contrast, if readers are maintaining both local and global coherence, then the early antecedent may be active as well; however, this is more likely to be true when the early causal antecedent has been elaborated than when it has not. If so, then the time to name an elaborated early causal antecedent should be faster than times to name an unelaborated early causal antecedent and as fast as times to name a late causal antecedent. Method
Participants. Forty University of New Hampshire undergraduates participated for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four material sets, with the restriction that each set be read by an equal number of participants. Materials. A set of 20 passages was constructed. In the unelaborated version, the second and third sentences mentioned an early causal antecedent. The fourth sentence provided a causal consequence for this antecedent. The fifth and sixth sentences mentioned the late causal antecedent. The seventh sentence, which was the last one, provided a consequence for the late causal antecedent and served as a potential consequence for the early causal antecedent as well. In the elaborated version, there were four additional sentences elaborating on the early causal antecedent. However, these sentences did not In Experiment 1A, participants read passages that conmention the early causal antecedent. In both the elaborated and tained two possible causes for a target consequent event; unelaborated versions, the early and late causal antecedents were each establishing a connection between the consequent event and mentioned explicitly twice in the passage. the more recent of the two causes was necessary to maintain Probe words were selected to capture the basic idea of each early and late causal antecedent (e.g., keys and window). Each passage was local causal coherence, whereas establishing a connection with followed by a probe word to be named. The length of the probe words both the recent and the more distant cause was only necessary ranged from three to seven characters with a mean length of 4.92 if readers attempted to maintain both local and global causal characters. Within each passage, probe words were matched in length coherence. In all passages, the more distant cause was proso that they varied by no more than two characters. vided with an immediate consequence. In half of the passages, Each passage was analyzed using the current-state selection strategy the more distant cause was also elaborated, increasing its to ensure control of several factors.1 First, it ensured that in the importance and the degree of featural overlap between it and unelaborated version, the early and late causal antecedents did not the target consequent event. Two examples of the passages are vary with respect to their degree of interconnectedness. The mean presented; one example is presented in Table 1 and a second numbers of connections leading to and from the early and late causal example is presented in Appendix A. Consider the example antecedents in the unelaborated condition were each 3.8. Second, it passage in Table 1. In the unelaborated version, the second ensured that in the elaborated condition the early causal antecedent and third sentences introduce an early causal antecedent (e.g., had more interconnections than the late causal antecedent; the mean Billy looked for his keys... couldn't find the keys) followed by a number of connections for the early causal antecedent in the elabocausal consequence (e.g., Billy needed to find another way to rated conditions was 7.2. Third, it confirmed that the early causal
unlock the door). In the elaborated version, four additional sentences continue the theme of Billy losing his keys. Both versions subsequently present a late causal antecedent (e.g., Billy broke a small window. The window fell in pieces on the ground) and its causal consequence {He knew that once his father came home, he would be in trouble). Note that the late causal consequence is also a potential causal consequence of the early causal antecedent. Following each passage, participants were presented with a single-word probe to be named
1
Procedures for applying the current-state selection strategy were presented by Fletcher and Bloom (1988) and were applied to the current set of materials by Michelle L. Rizzella. With the current-state selection strategy, the number of propositions active in memory at any one time is determined by the text. The last causal antecedent without a causal consequence was maintained on each cycle. When this criterion was used, the number of propositions maintained at any one time varied between one and three.
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GLOBAL CAUSES antecedent was always followed by a consequence prior to the first mentioning of the late causal antecedent. Finally, the analysis ensured that the final sentence of each passage provided a consequence for the late causal antecedent.2 Four sets of materials were generated; each set contained 10 passages in which the early causal antecedent had been elaborated and 10 in which neither antecedent had been elaborated. Within each set, half of the to-be-named probes were the early causal antecedents, whereas for the remaining half they were the late causal antecedents. Each passage appeared an equal number of times in each of these four conditions. Rating experiment. To ensure that the elaborated and unetaborated early antecedents served as equally effective causes for the target consequent event, a rating experiment was conducted. If elaboration does not affect the causal quality of early causal antecedents, then participants should rate the elaborated and u ne labor at ed early causal antecedents as equally sufficient causes of the target consequent event. Thirty students from an introductory cognitive psychology course served as participants. Each participant was given a booklet containing each of the 20 passages, 1 per page. For each passage, the late causal antecedent was removed. Thus, the last sentence of each passage served as a potential consequent event for only the early causal antecedent. Following each passage, participants were asked to rate how good the causal relation was for a statement that contained both the early causal antecedent and its consequent event for that particular passage (e.g., Billy was in trouble because he lost his keys). For each passage, one or two additional statements containing causal relations presented in the passage were included to serve as distractors. The participants were instructed to read each passage carefully and then rate each statement on a 5-point scale—poor (1) to good (5)— indicating how sufficient they viewed the causal relation presented in the statement. Two sets of booklets were generated; in each set, half of the early antecedents were elaborated and the remaining half were not. Across both sets, each passage appeared in each condition equally often. The mean ratings for the elaborated and unelaborated early causal antecedents were 4.12 and 3.95, respectively. This difference did not approach significance in an analysis based on either subject variability, Fj(l, 28) = 0.52, MSE = 0.11,/; > .4, or item variability F2(l, 38) = 0.68, MSE = 0.48,/? > .4. Thus, elaboration did not affect the sufficiency or the quality of the early causal antecedent as a cause for the target consequent event. Procedure. Participants were assigned to one of the four material sets. Each participant was tested individually in a session that lasted approximately 20 min. The texts were displayed one line at a time on a video monitor controlled by a Zenith Z100 microcomputer. Each trial began with the word Ready at the center of the display. To read through a text, the participant pressed a line-advance key. Each keypress erased the current line of the text and displayed the next line. Immediately upon pressing the line-advance key to erase the last line of the passage, a cue (xxx) was presented for 500 ms, followed by the probe word. Participants were instructed to read the probe word aloud as quickly as possible. This triggered a voice key that erased the probe word and recorded the naming time of the probe word. Then, another cue (QUESTIONS) was presented for 2,000 ms, followed by a comprehension question. In response to the question, participants pressed either a yes or no key. On those trials in which the participant responded incorrectly, the word ERROR was presented for 750 ms as feedback.
Table 2 Mean Naming Times (in Milliseconds) for Early and Late Causal Antecedents as a Function of Elaboration in Experiments lAandlB Elaboration Antecedent position
Neither antecedent elaborated
Early antecedent elaborated
Experiment 1A: Target consequent event present Early Late
501 482
485 486
Experiment IB: Target consequent event removed Early
522
528
experiments reported in the article, F\ and t\ refer to tests against an error term based on subject variability, and F2 and t2 refer to tests against an error term based on item variability. For several significant subject analyses, the corresponding item analyses failed to reach significance. The probability levels for these nonsignificant item analyses across all experiments reported ranged from .06 to .64. This issue will be discussed after reporting the results of Experiment 1A. All analyses based on subject variability are significant at the .05 alpha level unless otherwise indicated. The mean time to name a causal antecedent in each of the four conditions is presented in Table 2. Overall, late antecedents were named more quickly than early antecedents, f t (l, 36) = 4.38, MSE = 746.11; F2(l, 16) = 1.03, MSE = 1,592.98. However, this difference between early and late antecedents only occurred when the early causal antecedent had not been elaborated, F,(l, 36) = 7.32, MSE = 510.27; F 2 (l, 16) = 5.16, MSE = 339.06. Planned comparisons confirmed that for passages in which neither causal antecedent had been elaborated, the late causal antecedent was named significantly faster than the early causal antecedent (482 vs. 501 ms), fj(36) = 3.45; *2(16) = 1.58. For passages in which the early causal antecedent had been elaborated, the time to name the early and late causal antecedents did not differ reliably (485 vs. 486 ms) *i(36) = 0.10; *2(16) = 0.04 (p > .9). Further comparisons confirmed that early causal antecedents were named more quickly when they had been elaborated than when they had not been elaborated (485 vs. 501 ms), /,(36) = 3.79; *2(16) = 2.30. No other comparisons approached significance {p > .5). Mean reading time for the last line of the passages was 1,453 ms for those passages in which neither causal antecedent was elaborated and 1,464 ms for those passages in which the early causal antecedent was elaborated. These times did not differ reliably (p > .1). Although many of the item analyses were marginal or nonsignificant, a closer examination of the individual items indicated that the effects for items were small but consistent,
Results and Discussion The time to read the last line of each passage and the time to name the early and late causal antecedent were recorded. Reading times and naming times that were 3 SDs away from a participant's mean were eliminated. This resulted in a loss of 2% of the reading times and 6% of the naming times. In all
2 The causal network model proposed by Trabasso et al. (1989) was applied to a subset of the passages. These analyses confirmed the number of causal connections obtained by the current-state selection strategy for each of the causal antecedents. It also confirmed that each causal antecedent was provided with a consequence. We thank Tom Trabasso for providing these analyses.
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with only a couple of items failing to show an effect. This was true for all subsequent experiments to be reported as well. However, the items failing to show an effect varied across experiments, suggesting that the weak or nonsignificant item analyses were due to a reduction in power rather than inconsistencies in the items. The results of Experiment 1A are consistent with the view that readers gain access to causal information at both local and global levels. When neither causal antecedent was elaborated, only the late causal antecedent was active following a target consequent event. When the early causal antecedent was elaborated, both the early and late causal antecedent were active following the target consequence. This conclusion rests on the assumption that neither the elaborated nor the unelaborated early causal antecedent was active in memory immediately prior to the target consequent event. Experiment IB tested this possibility.
Experiment IB Experiment IB was designed to ensure that there were no differences in the activation levels of the elaborated and unelaborated early antecedents immediately prior to the target consequent event. Participants read the same passages as in Experiment 1A, except that the last sentence (i.e., the sentence containing the target consequent event) was removed. Following each passage, participants were required to name either the elaborated or unelaborated early antecedent. If neither the elaborated nor the unelaborated early causal antecedent was active in memory immediately prior to the target consequent event in Experiment 1A, then the time to name elaborated and unelaborated early antecedents should not differ. In addition, if the target consequent event served to reactivate the elaborated early antecedent in Experiment 1A, then the time to name the elaborated early antecedent should be longer in Experiment IB than in Experiment 1 A; the time to name the unelaborated early antecedents should not differ. Method Participants. Twenty University of New Hampshire undergraduates participated for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two material sets, with the restriction that each set be read by an equal number of participants. Materials and procedure. The materials were the same 20 passages used in Experiment 1 A, except that the final sentence of each passage was removed and we probed only for the early antecedent. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1A.
Results The mean times to name the elaborated and unelaborated early causal antecedents were 528 ms and 522 ms, respectively. This difference was not reliable, Fx{\, 18) = 1.10, MSE = 344.06,/? > .3;F2(1,18) = 1.46, MSE = 184.83,p > .2. Planned comparisons were performed to compare the time to name the early causal antecedents immediately prior to the target consequent event (Experiment IB) with the time to name the early causal antecedents immediately following the target consequent event (Experiment 1A). The time to name the elaborated early antecedent was significantly faster follow-
ing the target consequent event than immediately prior to the target consequent event (485 vs. 528 ms), ^(55) = 2.23; f2(38) — 3.50. The difference in the time to name unelaborated early antecedents was not reliable (501 vs. 522 ms), ?i(55) = 1.69; r2(38) = .95. Discussion Experiment IB confirmed that when the target consequent event was removed, the time to name elaborated and unelaborated early antecedents did not differ. In addition, the time to name unelaborated early antecedents before (Experiment IB) and after (Experiment 1A) the target consequent event did not differ. However, the time to name the elaborated early antecedent was significantly faster following the target consequent event (Experiment 1A) than immediately prior to the target consequent event (Experiment IB). Taken together, these results indicate that the target consequent event served to reactivate only the elaborated early antecedent and not the unelaborated early antecedent. Although the time to name the unelaborated early antecedent in Experiments 1A and IB did not differ reliably, there was a trend suggesting that the unelaborated early antecedent may have received some activation in Experiment 1A. The combined results of Experiment 1A and IB suggest that readers have access to causal information at both local and global levels. That the late causal antecedent was active in memory following the target consequent event is consistent with local causal coherence strategies, such as current-state selection strategy and the causal inference maker. However, because the late causal antecedent appeared in the sentence immediately preceding the target consequent event, most local coherence strategies would predict this finding (e.g., McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The more interesting result is the level of activation of the more distant, early causal antecedent. The results of Experiment IB confirmed that immediately prior to the target consequent event, the elaborated early antecedent was not active. However, when the early antecedent had been elaborated, both the early and late antecedents were active in memory following the target consequent event. If participants had adopted a local coherence strategy (either the currentstate selection strategy or causal inference maker), there are two reasons why this should not have occurred. First, the early causal antecedent was always provided with an immediate consequence and should have been dropped from active memory. Second, because the late antecedent provided a local cause for the target consequent event, there was no need to activate the more distant early antecedent. It could be argued that when the early causal antecedent had been elaborated, it provided a more direct explanation for the consequent event. As a result, the late causal antecedent no longer provided a sufficient causal explanation for the target consequent event. This in turn triggered a search for the early causal antecedent. However, the rating study confirmed that the elaboration did not change the causal quality of the early causal antecedent. Also, the late causal antecedent was the same independent of whether the early causal antecedent had been elaborated. If the late causal antecedent did not provide a sufficient explanation, then the early causal anteced-
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GLOBAL CAUSES
ent should have been reactivated in the unelaborated condition as well. It was not. That both the elaborated early antecedent and the corresponding late antecedent were active is consistent with the view that participants were attempting to maintain both local and global causal coherence. That is, readers were attempting to integrate the target consequent event with both the locally available late causal antecedent and the elaborated early antecedent. The finding that the early causal antecedent was only active when it had been elaborated is consistent with both the resonance model and the constructionist model. For example, within the constructionist model, elaboration of the early causal antecedent may have served to signal the reader that it was central or important to the theme of the passage. If so, then the elaborated early antecedent would have been an integral part of the situation model and all possible consequent events would have been linked to it. Within the resonance model, any cause that shares features with a subsequent consequent event will resonate to some degree. Assuming that the level of activation of any element in the discourse model decays as a function of referential distance, late causal antecedents are likely to resonate more strongly than early causal antecedents. However, elaboration of the early causal antecedent would result in it being embedded within a more highly interconnected set of elements than an unelaborated causal antecedent; any element that resonates with that set would also activate the early causal antecedent. Several studies of antecedent retrieval suggest that both distance and elaboration influence the accessibility of antecedent information, and that with sufficient elaboration, more distant antecedents are activated more quickly than recent, unelaborated antecedents (e.g., O'Brien, 1987; O'Brien & Albrecht, 1991; O'Brien, Albrecht, Hakala, & Rizzella, 1995; O'Brien & Myers, 1987; O'Brien, Plewes, & Albrecht, 1990). Thus, the resonance model predicts that an elaborated early antecedent would likely be reactivated by the target consequent event. Because the unelaborated early antecedent shared some features with the target consequent event, the resonance model would predict that this antecedent may be activated as well, but to a lesser degree. This would explain the slight trend towards faster naming times for the unelaborated early antecedents in Experiment 1A than in Experiment IB.
Table 3 Example Passages From Experiments 2A and 2B Probe
Example passage
Neither causal antecedent elaborated Early antecedent: keys Billy was walking home from school after playing a game of basketball. Late antecedent: window Billy looked for his keys to unlock the front door of his house. He searched everywhere but couldn't find the keys. Billy needed to find another way to unlock the door. In order to unlock the door, Billy broke a small window. The window fell in pieces on the ground. Billy walked into the house and cleaned up the mess. Then he went into the kitchen for something to eat. Then he went into the living room to watch T.V. He knew that once his father came home he would be in trouble. Early causal antecedent elaborated Billy was walking home from school after playing a game of basketball. Billy looked for his keys to unlock the front door of his house. He searched everywhere but couldn't find the keys. He realized there was a big hole in his pocket. Now, he had no idea where to look. Billy shuddered when he recalled the warning his father gave him about being more responsible. His father told him that if he was not more responsible, he would ground Billy for an entire month. Billy needed to find another way to unlock the door. In order to unlock the door, Billy broke a small window. The window fell in pieces on the ground. Billy walked into the house and cleaned up the mess. Then he went into the kitchen for something to eat. Then he went into the living room to watch T.V. He knew that once his father came home he would be in trouble.
tested this assumption directly). The final sentence contained the target consequent event from Experiment 1A. Following the target consequent event, participants were probed for either the early or late causal antecedent (e.g., keys or window). Experiment 2A According to the current-state selection strategy and the causal inference maker, the presence of a consequent event Experiment 2A was designed to further test the predictions without an immediately available causal antecedent should made by both local and global coherence strategies by examintrigger a search of long-term memory for an explanation of that ing the influence of both recency and elaboration on the event. Bloom et al. (1990) have indicated that within the activation of potential causal antecedents when both antecedcurrent-state selection strategy, retrieval of a causal antecedents had been backgrounded prior to the target causal conseent begins with the current contents of short-term memory and quent event. Experiment 2A used modified versions of the proceeds backwards along the causal structure, terminating as passages from Experiment 1A. Two examples are presented; soon as a causal antecedent is encountered. The causal one example is presented in Table 3 and a second example is inference maker makes a similar prediction: The presence of a presented in Appendix B. Consider the example passage in consequent event without an immediately available causal Table 3. The late causal antecedent was followed by a antecedent should trigger a search of long-term memory for consequent event that only satisfied the late causal antecedent (e.g., Billy swept up the mess with a broom). Twofillersentences the most recent explanation of that event. As long as the most recent causal antecedent provides a sufficient explanation of that shifted the topic of the passage were added to ensure the consequent event, the search for causal antecedents is backgrounding of both causal antecedents (Experiment 2B
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terminated (van den Broek, 1990). Thus, according to both causal coherence models, only the late causal antecedent should be reactivated by the target consequent event; this should occur independent of whether the early causal antecedent has been elaborated. In contrast, models that focus on the maintenance of both local and global coherence assume that readers are also sensitive to earlier occurring information as well as to more recent information (e.g., Albrecht & O'Brien, 1993; O'Brien & Albrecht, 1992). For example, according to the resonance model, any causal antecedent that has features in common with the target consequent event should resonate to some degree. Presumably, the extent to which any concept will resonate decays over time, making it more difficult to retrieve the early causal antecedent than the late causal antecedent. Thus, when neither causal antecedent has been elaborated, only the more recent late antecedent should be reactivated. However, when the early causal antecedent has been elaborated, there is a corresponding increase in the number of features in common with the target consequent event, which should result in reactivation of the more distant early antecedent. With the constructionist model, retrieval of backgrounded concepts is guided by the search-after-meaning principle. According to this principle, readers routinely attempt to establish causal connections at both the local and global level. Because the exact nature of the search process has not yet been specified, exact predictions concerning the retrieval of backgrounded causal antecedents are difficult to make. However, because the model assumes that readers routinely attempt to maintain global coherence, a rinding that elaborated early causal antecedents are reactivated would be consistent with the constructionist model; afindingthat only late causal antecedents are reactivated would be difficult to explain. Method Participants. Forty University of New Hampshire undergraduates participated for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four material sets, with the restriction that each set be read by an equal number of participants. Materials. The materials were the same 20 passages used in Experiment 1A, with the following modifications. First, a new consequence was provided for the late causal antecedent that could not serve as a consequence for the early causal antecedent. For example, for the passage presented in Appendix B, the consequence for the late causal antecedent was Billy swept the mess up with a broom. Two additional filler sentences were added following the late consequence to ensure that, according to the current-state selection strategy, the late causal antecedent was backgrounded prior to the target consequent event. Following the filler, the last sentence contained the target consequent event used in Experiment 1A. This ensured that both causal antecedents could be integrated with it. Finally, two of the target words from Experiment 1A were replaced because participants had difficulty activating the voice key when naming those words in Experiment 1A. Procedure. The design and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1A.
Results The time to read the last line of each passage and the time to name the early and late causal antecedent were recorded.
Table 4 Mean Naming Times (in Milliseconds) for Early and Late Causal Antecedents as a Function of Elaboration and Backgrounding in Experiments 2A and 2B Elaboration Antecedent position
Neither antecedent elaborated
Early antecedent elaborated
Experiment 2A: Target consequent event present Early Late
502 (469) 489 (455)
487 (454) 502 (466)
Experiment 2B: Target consequent event removed Early Late
525 530
525 525
Note. The mean naming times in parentheses are from the replication of Experiment 2A.
Reading times and naming times that were 3 SDs away from a participant's mean were eliminated. This resulted in a loss of 3% of the reading times and 5% of the naming times. The mean times to name a causal antecedent in each of the four conditions are presented in Table 4. The interaction of antecedent position and elaboration reached significance but only when tested against subject variability, F\(l, 36) = 17.44, MSE = 441.58; F 2 (l, 16) = 1.86,MSE = 2,708.32. Planned comparisons showed that when neither antecedent had been elaborated, late antecedents were named more quickly than early antecedents (489 vs. 502 ms), ti(36) = 2.14; r2(16) = 0.476. When the early antecedent had been elaborated, early antecedents were named more quickly than late antecedents (487 vs. 502 ms), fj(36) = 4.34; /2(16) = 1.32. Further planned comparisons showed that the early causal antecedent was named more quickly when it had been elaborated than when it had not been elaborated (487 vs. 502 ms), fi(36) = 2.61;/2(16) = 1.11. Also, the time to name a late causal antecedent was significantly faster when it followed passages in which neither causal antecedent had been elaborated than when it followed passages in which the early causal antecedent had been elaborated (489 vs. 502 ms), r,(36) - 2.40; /2(16) - 0.90. Mean reading times for the last line of the passages were 1,568 ms for those passages in which neither causal antecedent was elaborated and 1,546 ms for those passages in which the early causal antecedent was elaborated. These times did not differ reliably (p > .5). Replication Because the interaction of antecedent position and elaboration failed to reach significance when tested against item variability, we conducted a replication of Experiment 2A. The time to name the early and late causal antecedents in the replication study are presented in parentheses in Table 4.3 Here the interaction of antecedent position and elaboration was significant both when tested against subject variability 3 The replication was the last experiment to be conducted. Prior to the replication, the voice key was repaired and the sensitivity adjusted. This resulted in faster overall naming times in the replication than in any of the other experiments reported.
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GLOBAL CAUSES
Fi(l, 36) = 24.29, MSE = 304.50, and item variability, F 2 (l, 16) = 5.5$, MSE = 410.53. Planned comparisons again showed that when neither antecedent had been elaborated, late antecedents were named more quickly than early antecedents (455 vs. 469 ms), fi(36) = 2.88; f2(16) = 1.97, p = .06. When the early antecedent had been elaborated, early antecedents were named more quickly than late antecedents (454 vs. 466 ms), ^(36) = 3.06;r2(16) = 1.05. Further planned comparisons again showed that the early causal antecedent was named more quickly when it had been elaborated than when it had not been elaborated (454 vs. 469 ms), fi(36) = 2.98; /2(16) = 2.35. Also, late causal antecedents were named significantly faster following passages in which neither causal antecedent had been elaborated than following passages in which the early causal antecedent had been elaborated (455 vs. 466 ms), ^(36) = 3.23; /2(16) = 1.23. Mean reading times for the last line of the passages were 1,613 ms for those passages in which neither causal antecedent was elaborated and 1,597 ms for those passages in which the early causal antecedent was elaborated. These times did not differ (p > .6). Discussion The results of Experiment 2A are consistent with coherence strategies that focus on the maintenance of both local and global coherence. When neither causal antecedent was elaborated, only the late causal antecedent was reactivated. In contrast, when the early causal antecedent was elaborated, it was reactivated in response to the target consequence. Equally important is the finding that when an elaborated early causal antecedent was reactivated, the more recently occurring late causal antecedent was not reactivated. This latter finding is especially difficult to explain within the context of local causal coherence strategies, which predict that only the most recent (late) causal antecedent should be reactivated. However, these conclusions rest on the assumption that there was no difference in the activation level of either causal antecedent immediately prior to the potential consequence presented in the last sentence. According to analyses based on the current-state selection strategy, neither causal antecedent should have been active; Experiment 2B tests this assumption directly. Experiment 2B Experiment 2B was designed to ensure that there was no difference in the level of activation of the early and late causal antecedent in Experiment 2A prior to the target consequent event in the last sentence. The design of Experiment 2B was the same as that for Experiment 2A. The only difference was that the last sentence of each passage was removed. If there was no difference in the activation level of the early and late causal antecedents prior to the target sentence in Experiment 2A, then there should be no difference in the time to name either antecedent when this sentence has been removed. Method Participants. Forty University of New Hampshire undergraduates participated for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to
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one of the four material sets, with the restriction that each set be read by an equal number of participants. Materials and procedure. The materials were the same 20 passages used in Experiment 2A except that the final sentence of each passage was removed. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2A.
Results and Discussion The mean time to name a causal antecedent in each of the four conditions is presented in Table 3. There were no reliable differences in the time to name the early and late causal antecedents in any of the four conditions {p > .2 for all contrasts). These analyses confirmed that immediately prior to the last sentence containing the target consequent event, there was no difference in the level of activation of the causal antecedents. A series of planned comparisons was performed to compare the time to name each of the causal antecedents prior to the target sentence (Experiment 2B) with those following the target sentence (Experiment 2A). When neither antecedent had been elaborated, late antecedents were named more quickly following the target sentence than before the target sentence (489 vs. 530 ms), /j(72) = 2.64; *2(32) = 1.62. The time to name the early antecedent did not differ reliably (502 vs. 525 ms). However, when the early antecedent had been elaborated, early antecedents were named more quickly following the target sentence than before the target sentence (487 vs. 525 ms), ri(72) = 2.54; r2(32) = 2.86. The time to name the late antecedent did not differ reliably (502 vs. 525 ms). In the overall comparison between Experiments 2A and 2B, several effects reached significance. First, naming times were significantly longer in Experiment 2B than in Experiment 2A, Fi(l, 72) = 4.72, MSE = 16,406.75; F2(h 32) = 5.58, MSE = 5,934.80. The interaction between antecedent position and elaboration also reached significance, Fi(l, 72) = 4.51, MSE = 598.80; F2(l, 32) = 1.69, MSE = 2,306.40. However, this interaction was only present in the naming times from Experiment 2A and not Experiment 2B, Fi(l, 72) = 8.69, MSE = 598.80; f2(1,32) = 0.62, MSE = 2,306.40. The results of Experiment 2B confirmed that the target consequence resulted in the reactivation of the late causal antecedent when neither antecedent had been elaborated and the reactivation of the early causal antecedent when the early causal antecedent had been elaborated. However, the pattern of naming times for the early causal antecedent when neither causal antecedent was elaborated, or the late causal antecedent when the early causal antecedent was elaborated, suggests that these alternative causal antecedents were activated, but to a lesser degree. This finding is not surprising. Presumably, all potential causal antecedents that have features in common with the target consequence should resonate to some degree. O'Brien and his colleagues (O'Brien, 1987; O'Brien & Albrecht, 1991; O'Brien et al., 1995; O'Brien et al., 1990) have demonstrated that multiple potential antecedents may resonate in response to an anaphoric phrase and that the antecedent with the highest level of activation is generally selected. Two of the factors that influence the level of activation are referential distance and elaboration. Thus, when neither causa) antecedent was elaborated, the less distant, late causal antecedent was more active than the early causal antecedent; the early causal antecedent may have been reactivated but to a
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lesser degree. In contrast, when the early causal antecedent was elaborated, it had the higher level of activation; here the late causal antecedent may have been reactivated, but again, to a lesser degree.
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General Discussion The current set of results adds to a growing body of literature demonstrating that readers routinely have access to causal information at both local and global levels. In Experiment 1A, participants read passages containing two possible causes for a consequent event. When the more distant early cause had been elaborated, both it and the more recent late cause were active in memory following the consequent event. This occurred despite the fact that activation of the early cause was not necessary to maintain local coherence: The late cause appeared in the immediately preceding sentence and was therefore readily available to the reader, the late cause provided a sufficient explanation for the consequent event, and the early cause had already been provided with a consequent event and should have been dropped from active memory. Singer and his colleagues (Singer et al., 1990, 1992, 1994) have built a convincing case that readers attempt to maintain causal coherence at a global level by demonstrating that readers will reactivate distant causes for current consequent events even when the text is locally coherent. However, it is important to note that there is a distinction between local coherence and causal coherence. A text is considered locally coherent if currently read information can be integrated with the immediately preceding context; identification of a causal connection is not necessary. To the extent that readers seek to identify causal relations, a text that is locally coherent but that lacks a readily available cause could trigger a search for a more distant cause. The results of Experiment 1A add to Singer's findings by showing activation of a more distant cause when a text was not only locally coherent, but also when a recent cause was also readily available. The results of Experiments 2A and 2B are consistent with the view that the activation of relevant global information occurs through a fast-acting, passive resonance process. Within this framework, concepts and propositions from earlier backgrounded portions of the discourse model resonate in response to information currently in active memory. The extent to which this backgrounded information resonates is a function of several factors such as recency of mention, elaboration, and degree of featural overlap with information currently active in memory. For example, consider the sample passage from Experiments 2A and 2B, in which both causal antecedents had been backgrounded. When neither causal antecedent was elaborated, the target consequent event (i.e., He knew that once his father came home he would be in trouble) had an equally limited set of features in common with both causal antecedents. However, because the late causal antecedent had the advantage of recency, it was more likely to be activated and integrated with the target consequent event. In contrast, when the early causal antecedent was elaborated to include additional information about Billy getting in trouble with his father for losing his keys, the degree of featural overlap between the early causal antecedent and the target consequent event was considerably greater than between the late causal antecedent
and the target consequent event. This in turn increased the likelihood that the early causal antecedent would be activated and integrated with the target consequent event.4 In Experiment 1A, elaboration of the early causal antecedent resulted in the activation of both causal antecedents following the sentence containing the target consequent event. Presumably, this occurred because the high degree of featural overlap between the early causal antecedent and the consequent event served to reactivate the early causal antecedent whereas the late causal antecedent simply remained active as a function of recency. The results of Experiments 2A and 2B are relevant to both the constructionist and minimalist positions. According to the minimalist hypothesis (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992), readers focus primarily on maintaining local coherence, that is, establishing connections between incoming text and information that is currently active in memory. Readers only attempt to establish connections between currently processed information and information from inactive portions of the discourse model when there is a local coherence break or when global information (i.e., information from inactive portions of the discourse model or general world knowledge) is readily available. In the current set of experiments, the passages were written to ensure that the target sentence was always locally coherent; it could always be integrated with the immediate preceding context, and it never required contact with distant portions of the text. However, within the resonance framework, traces that are currently active in memory resonate with other active traces as well as relevant inactive traces in the discourse model and relevant traces from general world knowledge. These reactivated traces become readily available and are then treated in the same manner as currently active traces; they are integrated into the active portion of the discourse model. Thus, the finding that distant causes are reactivated even when a text is locally coherent can be accommodated within the minimalist position. That readers reactivate distant causes for consequent events even when the text is locally coherent and a local cause is 4 In 7 of the 20 passages, the elaborated early antecedent shared an additional referential link with the target consequent event. For example, in the sample passage in Table 1, the elaborated early causal antecedent shares the referential link father mth the target consequent event that is not present for the unelaborated early causal antecedent or the late causal antecedent. To ensure that this difference did not account for the additional activation of the elaborated early antecedent, we compared the 7 passages containing the additional referential link with those that did not. The patterns for both sets of passages were the same, indicating that the additional referential link did not differentially affect the activation of the elaborated early antecedent. For those passages containing the additional referential link, the mean naming times for the early and late causal antecedents when the early causal antecedent was elaborated were 484 and 501 ms, respectively. When neither causal antecedent was elaborated, the mean times to name the early and late causal antecedent were 492 and 483 ms, respectively. For those passages in which there was no additional referential link, the mean times to name the early and late causal antecedent when the early causal antecedent had been elaborated were 477 and 484 ms, respectively, whereas when neither causal antecedent had been elaborated, mean naming times for the early and late causal antecedent were 495 and 480 ms, respectively.
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GLOBAL CAUSES
available is also consistent with the constructionist model (Graesser et al., 1994). However, according to the constructionist model, readers are guided by the search-after-meaning principle, in which readers establish both local and global coherence by continually seeking the answers to why questions. This principle implies that the search for meaning is a strategic problem-solving process in which the reader consciously searches both active and inactive portions of the discourse model for these explanations. At present, the manner in which the search proceeds is not well specified, nor are there any constraints on how much information a reader will access in order to satisfy the search-after meaning principle. The results of Experiment 2A indicate that readers did not simply search backwards through the causal structure. Otherwise the late causal antecedent would have been reactivated in all conditions; this did not occur. The results of Experiment 2A also indicate that the search was not exhaustive; participants did not activate both causal antecedents, even though both would have provided sufficient answers to why the target consequent event occurred. It is possible that within the constructionist model there is an initial activation stage in which information becomes available to the reader through a passive resonance process (see Singer et al., 1994, p. 430). Once available, the reader then searches through this information guided by the search-aftermeaning principle. Assuming that access to one causal antecedent satisfies the search-after-meaning principle, then the constructionist model can account for the results of Experiment 2A: When neither antecedent was elaborated, activation of the more recent (late) causal antecedent was sufficient to satisfy the search-after-meaning principle. Similarly, when the early antecedent was elaborated, its activation was sufficient to satisfy this principle. That global information can become readily available through a fast-acting, passive resonance process is consistent with the minimalist hypothesis and can certainly be viewed as consistent with the constructionist model. Under this view, the debate between the minimalist and constructionist positions shifts from whether readers have access to global information to questions concerning the factors that influence the availability of global information, the types of information that are likely to become available, and the extent to which readers make use of that information. References Albrecht, J. E., & O'Brien, E. J. (1993). Updating a mental model: Maintaining both local and global coherence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 19, 1061-1070. Albrecht, J. E., & O'Brien, E. J. (1995). Goal processing and the maintenance of global coherence. In R. F. Lorch & E. J. O'Brien (Eds.), Sources of coherence in reading (pp. 263-278). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Black, J. B., & Bower, G. H. (1980). Story understanding as problem solving. Poetics, 9, 223-250. Bloom, C. P., Fletcher, C. R., van den Broek, P., Reitz, L., & Shapiro, B. P. (1990). An online assessment of causal reasoning during comprehension. Memory & Cognition, 18, 65-71. Duffy, S. A., Shinjo, M , & Myers, J. L. (1990). The effect of encoding task on memory for sentence pairs varying in causal relatedness. Journal of Memory and Language, 29, 27-42. Fletcher, C. R., & Bloom, C. (1988). Causal reasoning in the comprehension of simple narrative texts. Journal of Memory and Language, 27, 235-244.
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Fletcher, C. R., Hummel, J. E., & Marsolek, C. J. (1990). Causality and the allocation of attention during comprehension. Journal of Experimental Psychology; Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 16, 233-240. Garnham, A., Oakhill, J., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). Referential continuity and the coherence of discourse. Cognition, 11, 29-46. Garrod, S. G, O'Brien, E. J., Morris, R. K., & Rayner, K. (1990). Elaborative inferencing as an active or passive process. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory, and Copution, 16, 250-257. Garrod, S. C , & Sanford, A. J. (1988). Thematic subjecthood and cognitive constraints on discourse structure. Journal of Pragmatics, 12, 519-534. Garrod, S. C , & Sanford, A. J. (1990). Referential processing in reading: Focusing on roles and individuals. In D. A. Balota, G. B. Flores d'Arcais, & K. Rayner (Eds.), Comprehension processes in reading. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Gillund, G., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1984). A retrieval model for both recognition and recall. Psychological Review, 91, 1-67. Glenberg, A. M.? & Langston, W. E. (1992). Comprehension of illustrated text: Pictures help to build mental models. Journal of Memory and Language, 31, 129-151. Glenberg, A. M., Meyer, M., & Lindem, K. (1987). Mental models contribute to foregrounding during text comprehension. Journal of Memory and Language, 26, 69-83. Graesser, A. C , Singer, M., & Trabasso, T. (1994). Constructing inferences during narrative text comprehension. Psychological Review, 101, 371-395. Hintzman, D. L. (1986). "Schema abstraction" in a multiple-trace model. Psychological Review, 93, 411-428. Keenan, J. M., Baillet, S. D., & Brown, P. (1984). The effects of causal cohesion on comprehension and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 23, 115-126. Mackie, J. L. (1980). The cement of the universe: A study of causality. OxfoTd, England: Clarendon Press. Magliano, J. P., Baggett, W. B., Johnson, B. K., & Graesser, A. C. (1993). The time course of generating causal antecedent and causal consequence inferences. Discourse Processes, 16, 35-54, McKoon, G., & Ratcliff, R. (1992). Inference during reading. Psychological Review, 99, 440-466. Myers, J. L. (1990). Causal relatedness and text comprehension. In D. A. Balota, G. B. Flores d'Arcais, & K. Rayner (Eds.), Comprehension processes in reading (pp. 361-374). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Myers, J. L., Shinjo, M., & Duffy, S. A (1987). Degree of causal relatedness and memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 26,453-465. O'Brien, E. J. (1987). Antecedent search processes and the structure of text. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13, 278-290. O'Brien, E. J. (1995). Automatic components of discourse comprehension. In R. F. Lorch & E. J. O'Brien (Eds.), Sources of coherence in reading (pp. 159-176). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. O'Brien, E. J., & Albrecht, J. E. (1991). The role of context in accessing antecedents in text. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17, 94—102. O'Brien, E. J., & Albrecht, J. E. (1992). Comprehension strategies in the development of a mental model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18, 777-784. O'Brien, E. J., Albrecht, J. E., Hakala, C. M., & Rizzella, M. L. (1995). Activation and suppression of antecedents during reinstatement. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 626-634. O'Brien, E. J., & Myers, J. L. (1987). The role of causal connections in the retrieval of text. Memory & Cognition, 15, 419—427. O'Brien, E. J., Plewes, P. S., & Albrecht, J. E. (1990). Antecedent retrieval processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 16, 241-249. Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85, 59-108.
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Ratcliff, R., & McKoon, G. (1988). A retrieval theory of priming in memory.JournalofVerbal Learning andVerbal Behavior, 95, 385-408. Sanford, A. J., & Garrod, S. (1981). Understanding written language. Chichester, England: Wiley. Singer, M., Graesser, A. C, & Trabasso, T. (1994). Minimal or global inference during reading. Journal of Memory and Language, 33, 421-441. Singer, M., Haildorson, M , Lear, J. C , & Andrusiak, P. (1992). Validation of causal bridging inferences in discourse understanding. Journal of Memory and Language, 31, 507-524. Singer, M , Revlin, R., & Haildorson, M. (1990). Bridging inferences and enthymeme. In A. C. Graesser & G. H. Bower (Eds.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 25, pp. 35-52). New York: Academic Press. Suh, S., & Trabasso, T. (1993). Inferences during reading: Converging evidence from discourse analysis, talk-aloud protocols, and recognition priming. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 279-300. Trabasso, T., Secco, T., & van den Broek, P. (1984). Causal cohesion and story coherence. In H. Mandl, N. L. Stein, & T. Trabasso (Eds.), Learning and comprehension of text (pp. 83-112). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Trabasso, T., & Sperry, L. (1985). Causal relatedness and importance of story events. Journal of Memory and Language, 24, 595-611. Trabasso, T., & Suh, L. (1993). Understanding text: Achieving explanatory coherence through on-line inferences and mental operations in working memory. Discourse Processes, 16, 3-34. Trabasso, T., & van den Broek, P. (1985). Causal thinking and the representation of narrative events. Journal of Memory and Language, 24, 612-630. Trabasso, T., van den Broek, P., & Suh, S. Y. (1989). Logical necessity and transitivity of causal relations in stories. Discourse Processes, 12, 1-25. van den Broek, P. (1990). Causal inferences and the comprehension of narrative text. In A. C. Graesser & G. H. Bower (Eds.), Inferences and text comprehension (pp. 175-196). New York: Academic Press. van den Broek, P., & Lorch, R. F. (1993). Network representations of causal relations in memory for narrative texts: Evidence from primed recognition. Discourse Processes, 16, 75-98. van Dijk, T. A., & Kintsch, W. (1983). Strategies of discourse comprehension. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Appendix A Example Passage for Experiment 1 Early Causal Antecedent Elaborated
The underlined concepts are the named causal antecedents.
Neither Causal A n t e c e d e n t Elaborated Jimmy was playing baseball with his friend. Jimmy's friend pitched the ball to him. The ball hit Jimmy in the arm. Because of this, Jimmy stopped playing and said he was going home. Jimmy hopped on his bike and sped down the street. Unfortunately, he turned too sharply and fell off his bike. When he arrived home, his mother asked him why he was bruised.
Jimmy was playing baseball with his friend. Jimmy's friend pitched the ball to him. The ball hit Jimmy in the arm. Jimmy could not believe how much the pitch hurt. His arm muscles began to feel very sore. Jimmy knew it would hurt for days. His arm even began to turn red and swell. Because of this, Jimmy stopped playing and said he was going home. Jimmy hopped on his bike and sped down the street. Unfortunately, he turned too sharply and fell off his bike. When he arrived home, his mother asked him why he was bruised.
Appendix B Example Passage for Experiment 2 The underlined concepts are the named causal antecedents. Neither Causal A n t e c e d e n t Elaborated Jimmy was playing baseball with his friend. Jimmy's friend pitched the ball to him. The ball hit Jimmy in the arm. Because of this, Jimmy stopped playing and said he was going home. Jimmy hopped on his bike and sped down the street. Unfortunately, he turned too sharply and fell off his bike. Consequently, Jimmy stood up and swept the dirt from his pants. As he was wiping his pants, Jimmy found a piece of gum in his pocket. He opened the wrapper and put the gum in his mouth. When he arrived home, his mother asked him why he was bruised. Early Causal A n t e c e d e n t Elaborated Jimmy was playing baseball with his friend. Jimmy's friend pitched the ball to him. The ball hit Jimmy in the arm. Jimmy could not believe
how much the pitch hurt. His arm muscles began to feel very sore. Jimmy knew it would hurt for days. His arm even began to turn red and swell. Because of this, Jimmy stopped playing and said he was going home. Jimmy hopped on his bike and sped down the street. Unfortunately, he turned too sharply and fell off his bike. Consequently, Jimmy stood up and swept the dirt from his pants. As he was wiping his pants, Jimmy found a piece of gum in his pocket. He opened the wrapper and put the gum in his mouth. When he arrived home, his mother asked him why he was bruised.
Received August 7,1995 Revision received January 12, 1996 Accepted January 17, 1996
