Accountability and Negotiator Behavior 1 - Science Direct

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND H U M A N

PERFORMANCE

11, 409-425 (1974)

Accountability and Negotiator Behavior 1 RICHARD J. K~IMOSKI 2 AND RONALD A. ASH

Ohio State University The need to resolve conflict between groups exists in numerous forms within and among organizations. However, the relationship between a representative and his constituency are seen to affect the ease with which this is done. The present study focuses on spokesmen or representatives as they attempt to reach an agreement that would be mutually acceptable to the parties involved. In a laboratory experiment, mode of representative selection (election by the team versus random selection) and the nature of accountability (no, continuous, or end of negotiation session review by constituents) were manipulated to assess their impact on bargaining difficulty. Consistent with previous research these two variables were found to interact, yet the specific results were unanticipated. Elected representatives did not appear to be systematically influenced by the various levels of accountability. In contrast, randomly selected spokesmen facing no review showed the fewest deadlocks, tended to reach agreement at a faster rate, and reported least pressure, frustration, and difficulty. Selected spokesmen facing either continuous or end accountability tended to react similarly and experienced the most difficulty in the study. The notion of a representative's man_date and the emerging literature on social facilitation were used to interpret the results. Ancillary data provided by subjects on their group (team) member interactions were found to be related to felt commitment to a team's position. This further emphasized the importance of intragroup processes to intergroup conflict resolution.

A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e or s p o k e s m a n is u s u a l l y t h o u g h t of as being concerned w i t h t h e i n t e r a c t i o n or n e g o t i a t i o n process itself a n d in d e a l i n g w i t h t h e influence or p r e s s u r e s e x e r t e d b y his c o u n t e r p a r t a t t h e b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e . Yet, t h e r e is e v i d e n c e (e.g., W a l t o n & M c K e r s i e , 1965; Stevens, 1963) t h a t a n e g o t i a t o r is also affected b y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t exists b e t w e e n h i m s e l f a n d t h e group he r e p r e s e n t s . T h i s is t h e focus of t h e p r e s e n t paper. T h e i m p o r t a n c e of s t u d y i n g a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a n d his r e l a t i o n s h i p t o his p a r t y h a s been r e c o g n i z e d b y s e v e r a l r e s e a r c h e r s , b e i n g i n c l u d e d in a 1Support for this study was provided by a grant from the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Ohio State University. Reprints may be obtained from Dr. Richard J. Klimoski, Department of Psychology, 404-C West 17th Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210. 409 Copyright © 1974 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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model developed by McGrath and ,his associates (e.g., McGrath & Julian, 1962; McGrath, 1966; Vidmar, 1971), and the focus of work by Druckman (1967, 1968), Bass (1966), and Klimoski (1972). These authors have demonstrated that certain factors which commonly exist in negotiation situations are related to actual and perceived difficulty in resolving intergroup conflict through representatives. For example, when groups formulate and adopt a position prior to negotiations by spokesmen there is less likelihood of a speedy solution (Druckman, 1968; Bass, 1966). Similarly, the greater the cohesiveness or attraction the representative feels for the group the harder it is for him to settle the issues in conflict (Fried,man & Jacka, 1969; Klilnoski, 1972; Vidmar & McGrath, 1965). Moreover, in the Klimoski study, accountability to the group was found to interact with cohesiveness to affect negotiations. Representatives who had to report the outcome of their bargaining to a highly cohesive team utilized more time to reach a settlement than either those reporting to a low cohesive team or those who were not going to meet their team again. And yet, the quality of solutions under these three conditions did not differ. The present research represents a more detailed look at the dynamics of the accountability phenomenon. Despite the importance of the principle of accountability in a democratic society, little theory or empirical data exist as to its actual role in negotiations by representatives. One version of accountability refers to the openness with which discussions are carried out. This openness, or its opposite, secrecy, has historically received mixed support as far back as the first American constitutional convention (Cooke, 1972). Its extremes are reflected in the phrase "open covenants openly arrived at" (a position held by President Wilson) or the alternative, "open covenants secretly arrived at" (subscribed to b y Dag Hammarskjold of the U. N.). Such equivocality has persisted and could be seen in recent discussions of the role of private versus public talks on Vietnam. In a theoretical paper dealing with accountability during negotiations, Turk and Lefcowitz (1962) acknowledge the conflict faced by a representative as he goes through the inevitable process of accommodation (compromise) which, from his constituency's point of view, " . . . is a direct refutation of its own standards and is likely to produce tension and dissent . . . . " (p. 340). In their viewpoint, the mechanism of secrecy has evolved to protect the negotiator in the representational situation. "First, secrecy permits the representative to convey his accommodative acts to the other group as having the support of his own group. Second, the likelihood of his acts appearing as a "sell out" to his

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own group (with the concomitant loss of power) is diminished. Third, he is better able to translate the result of his actions to his own group in terms which are in accord with its values [p. 340]." In secret negotiations, accountability is postponed and occurs after bargaining has taken place. In contrast, Katz (1959) argues for a more continuous accountability and favors "consistent reactive participation" by Constituencies at the time decisions are made, despite the fact that this would place great pressure on a spokesman (e.g., Walton & McKersie, 1965). In addition to providing a check on the power of leaders, Katz suggests that better quality, more acceptable decisions will be made under these conditions. (Thus, he is concerned with more than the criterion of quick agreement.) Under continuous monitoring the presumed increased acceptability of bargaining outcomes could be due to their improved quality, the involvement of the group, or the fact that the group has been kept informed and is prepared psychologically for the results. In the latter case, the group is moved gradually from an initial (often extreme) position to the compromise, rather than in an abrupt way as in secret talks. Furthermore, it is possible that the regular interplay between the group and its representative may not only facilitate outcome acceptance, but provide the basis for understanding and tolerating any "accommodative acts" that occurred in bargaining. Thus, contrary to intuitions, in reducing the burden of proof of bargaining difficulty typically placed on a spokeman, continuous accountability may actually facilitate negotiations. Experimental studies of negotiator accountability are few and tend to focus on the impact of an expected review at the end of bargaining (terminal accountability). In general, these studies have found that representatives facing such a review have had more difficulty reaching agreement and resolving the conflict. Representatives who were free from possible sanctions from their constituency for deviating were more likely to forsake their own group's positions and adopt proposals of the other side (Lamm & Kogan, 1970). In contrast, subjects who were required to defend the way they bargained on a resource allocation task to their teammates (with whom they shared winnings) tended to bargain longer and makesmaller concessions than those who were not required to defend their behavior (Gruder & Rosen, 1971). The papers by Benton (1972), Klimoski (1972), and Kogan, Lamm, and Trommsdorf (1972) have documented similar accountability effects; subjects typically reported more desire to win and showed less flexibility in bargaining when a review is expected. However, with one exception these studies have used a terminal

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review2 The present study was designed to incorporate both kinds of accountability and to assess their relative effects on ease of negotiating. Specifically, the behavior of representatives in continuous, terminal (end), or no accountability (control) conditions was determined and contrasted in a bargaining situation. Consistent with previous research it was predicted t h a t either form of accountability would lead to more difficulty in barganing than a no-review situation. No differential predictions were made for the two types of accountability. A second, cross-cutting variable examined was the manner in which a representative was selected. Research on leadership suggested that elected (versus appointed or dictational) leaders are more susceptible to the needs or demands of their group (e.g., Julian et al., 1969). Presumably, as Blake (1959) has suggested, if the group has the power to place so,meone in a leadership role, it may also remove them from that office. By analogy, it was felt that representatives who are elected by their group will find it more difficult to deviate from group goals or positions and hence be less effective in negotiations. Previous research has not addressed itself directly to this variable. In point of fact in many of the published studies (e.g., Bass, 1966; Druckman, 1967, 1968; Vidmar, 1971) there is no within-group differentiation as to who is the negotiator. T h a t is, it is known that all group members serve as spokesmen in bargaining; thus, there is no importance or significance attached to the role. In other studies, the mode of spokesmen selection is relevant but not manipulated. For example, representatives were elected in a paper reported by Fried,man and Jacka (1969) where the basis of voting was the potential of a group member as a negotiator. A similar procedure was used by Blake and Mouton (1961). Or, alternatively, as in the work of Klimoski (1972) and Benton (1972), spokesmen or representatives were chosen at random by the experimenter or in a theatrical fashion as in drawing numbers from a hat. Presumably, the subject in the former condition (as an elected representative) could legitimately feel and act differently than the subject selected at random or by chance. At a minimum the elected representative has a clear idea of how his group or constituency feels about him and to what degree he has their support. This would not be true of a randomly selected spokesman. However, these two conditions, election versus selection, have not been manipulated in the same experiment and their differential importance is not clear. While the Kogan et al. (1972) study did examine continuous accountability (observation by a teammate), it did so under all conditions in the experiment. This form of review, however, did have differential effects on representatives of differing status.


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One component or consequence of election is the conferring of status upon a person. Consistent with the suggestions of Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965), several studies have looked at the effect of the negotiators' status in their respective groups on negotiation outcome. Although status proved to be a critical variable in several studies, its effects have not been consistent. Although they predicted that higher status representatives (upperclassmen called leaders) would feel more commitment and responsibility to their group and hence experience more difficulty in bargaining, Hermann and Kogan (1968) found that it was lower status subjects (underclassmen) who were more constrained. Lower status subjects (delegates) sought compromise (a conservative solution) whereas high status negotiators manifested a greater freedom to adopt a variety of positions, including their opponent's. The latter seemed more responsive to what went on in negotiations than to what decisions were made while within their team setting. The opposite was true for low status delegates. It should be noted, however, that only delegates had to report back to their leaders concerning the result of their negotiations. Using a similar paradigm different results were obtained by Lamm and Kogan (1970). In this study high status negotiators (elected by their group) were more constrained and demonstrated more conservative or cautious behavior in bargaining than low status (unchosen) subjects. Because there were differences in operationalizing status in these two studies (one could be viewed as ascribed status, the other achieved), a third experiment was carried out with status assigned randomly (Kogan et aI., 1972). While the results are complex, in general they bear more resemblance to the Hermann and Kogan (1968) data. There was a tendency for subordinates (low status) to manifest greater difficulty (e.g., more deadlocks) in negotiations. Moreover, they were more prone to depend on a second consultation with their team partners during bargaining. It is relevant to note, however, in the Kogan et al. (1972) study that the presence of differing status observers tended to maximize negotiator status effects on some dependent variables (e.g., satisfaction) while eliminating them on others (e.g., risk taking), thus pointing out a possible interaction with accountability. While the direction of impact of mode of representative selection is not clear, the available evidence suggests that being elected reduces the freedo,m of a spokesman and produces certain constraints to resolving conflict. In the present study an election condition was contrasted to one in which the representatives were selected by chance. Elected spokesmen were predicted to experience more difficulty in negotiations. However, in view of the Kogan et al. (1972) data it was felt that mode of selection would interact with the nature of accountability such that elected repre-

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sentatives facing no review would find it easier to negotiate. Or, to put another way, elected spokesmen confronted with continuous or terminal accountability would find the most difficulty in resolving conflict with their counterparts from another team. METHOD

Procedure The present experiment could be described as a two (mode of representative selection) by three (nature of accountability) crossed factorial design with 24 subjects (12 negotiating dyads) per cell. One-hundredforty male undergraduates, fulfilling a course requirement, met in two three-man teams for a given experimental session. They were told ~hat the study dealt with resolving differences among decision making groups. Each person separately filled out his solution to a hypothetical problem facing astronauts shipwrecked on the moon. The task was to establish the priority of importance of 15 pieces of equipment by rank ordering them, given limited information. This task is quite involving and has been used in a variety of settings to study group processes (e.g., Cammalleri et al., 1973; Hall, 1971). These three-man teams were bhen given 25 rain to produce a group solution which would provide the basis for negotiations which would be carried out by one of them with a representative of the other team. During this discussion all subjects retained their individual solution forms. Next, in the election conditions, both teams went through a secret ballot for their choice of spokesman; they were told to vote for the person who could best represent them in bargaining. In the selection conditions, they were told that a representative would be chosen at random by the experimenter. Following this in all cases each subject was isolated and filled out a questionnaire that checked on the induction and on the "group processes" that occurred in their team. In actuality, all persons were informed they were ~he sole negotiator for their group (either elected or selected) and were paired with their counterpart from the opposing team. At this time, the accountability induction was performed. This proceeded as follows: No accountability negotiating pairs were told that they would not be meeting their team again due to time constraints and that their team would be working on another task as they bargained. End or terminal accountability meant their teams would be working on another task as they bargained, but they would meet them again at the end of the session to report on their performance. During this time their teams would have an opportunity to express their feelings with regard to their negotiator's behavior. Continuous accountability meant as they negotiated subjects would be watched through a one-way


415

glass by their teams (who were in separate rooms). At regular intervals they would have to report to their teams on a standardized "current position" form. And, after the end of negotiations, they would also face a review. These bargaining pairs were given 30 min (in 5-min periods or intervals) to discuss their teams' solutions and to come up with a final, mutually agreed upon ranking. Each possessed a copy of his own team's solution and each was told that a correct or ideal standard to the problem existed. Thus, beyond mutual acceptance, the desire for a high quality solution was stressed. All pairs were automatically interrupted every 5 rain to "gather thoughts" and to fill out the progress report form. In only the continuous accountability conditions were these forms delivered "to their teams"; other pairs placed their forms in an envelope provided for this purpose. As bargaining dyads reached a solution they were separated and isolated. Regardless of degree of agreement, after 30 min of bargaining all dyads were stopped. When all subjects were isolated they filled out a post-negotiations questionnaire and were then debriefed. The entire session lasted about 21/2 hr. Dependent variables. Both behavior and self-report data were gathered which would reflect the difficulty experienced in negotiations. For each negotiating pair (dyad) behavioral measures included: the number of bargaining intervals used, the number of deadlocks (where no agreement was reached in the time allowed), quality of the final solution (when compared to a standard generated by NASA), and rate of agreement. For each negotiator, perceptions and feelings of pressure, frustration, hostility, resistance of opponent, and difficulty in bargaining were also measured. RESULTS

Induction Checks Success of the experimental inductions were ascertained by having subjects indicate their perceptions of the extent to which a representative was to be elected and to what degree he would face accountability on separate nine-point scales. A 2 × 3 ANOV on the responses to the mode of selection item (obtained just prior to negotiations) resulted in only one significant main effect wherein subjects in election conditions reported that a spokesman was to be elected more so than in select conditions (7~ select= 2.90 vs 7~ elect = 8.17; F = 192.38, p < .001). Similarly, when asked (immediately after negotiations) to what extent their team will have an opportunity to evaluate their performance, subjects in the continuous accountability condition reported more opportunity (7~6.75) than end (7~ = 5.69) or no accountability (7~ = 4.67) groups (F = 10.61; p < .001). Thus, the inductions were felt to be successful.

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TABLE 1 NUMBER OF DYADS (OuT OF 12) NOT REACHING AGREEMENT IN TIME ALLOWED (DEADLOCKS)

Accountability Mode of selection

No

End

Continuous

Select Elect

1 1

3 0

4 1

Behavioral Data The effects of the independent variables on ease of negotiations were measured in several ways. An index of negotiating difficulty was the number of dyads which did not reach agreement in the time allowed (30 rain). The number of these deadlocks recorded is given in Table 1. More deadlocks occurred under selection conditions than under election conditions (8 vs 2; X 2 = 4.18, p < .05). Moreover, among the selection condition dyads the most deadlocks were obtained under continuous accountability (33%), followed by end (25%), and no accountability (8%). Another behavioral measure was the number of intervals used by negotiating dyads. Bargaining was broken up into six 5-min periods and the interval in which agreement was reached on all 15 items of the task was recorded. For deadlocked dyads the full six intervals were recorded. A 2 × 3 ANOV computed on the mean number of intervals used in each condition (presented in Table 2) yielded only one, marginally significant (p < .10), interaction. No significant main effects were found. From Table 2 it can be seen that the fewest number of intervals was needed by negotiators who were selected and who faced no review after bargaining. In the study, all negotiators had to reach agreement on the rank order of importance of 15 items provided in the problem. The number of items agreed upon during each interval could also be used to index the ease or difficulty of bargaining. The cumulative number of items agreed upon for each interval for all experimental conditions is given in Table 3. TABLE 2 MEAN NUMBER OF INTERVALS USED TO REACH AGREEMENT

Accountability Mode of selection

No

End

Continuous

Elect Select

5.00 4.33

5.17 5.00

4.50 5.17

F Ratio Significance level

Select-no Select-end Select-continuous Elect-no Elect-end Elect-continuous

Condition

I, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3,

1 1 1 2 2 2

Cell

2.64 p < .079

3.33 2.50 1.58 3.08 2.67 2.92

1

4.04 p < .022

7.41 3.42 3.66 5.50 5.25 5.34

2

5.46 p < .006

10.24 4.84 5.83 8.75 9.25 8.59

3

3.74 p < .029

11.91 9.42 7.50 10.58 11.58 11.76

4

C u m u l a t i v e n u m b e r of i t e m s / i n t e r v a l

4.08 p < .021

13.99 11.34 9.75 12.75 13.41 13.43

5

6

2.87 p < .064

14.57 13.42 11.58 13.33 14.99 14.01

]~/[EAN CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF ITEMS AGREED UPON FOR EACH INTERVAT, AND EXPERIMENTAL CONDTTION

TABLE 3

©

©

o

0

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Separate 2 × 3 ANOVs were performed on these scores for each of the six bargaining periods. Across the intervals a consistent pattern of results was obtained. Significant two-way interaction (p < .08) were found for each interval and are also reported in Table 3. Over the course of negotiations, representatives who were elected showed little differences in solution progress across accountability conditions. However, if they were selected, their rate of progress and agreement levels were poorest under continuous and end accountability conditions, in contrast to selected representatives who faced no accountability review. The superiority in negotiation ease reflected in the scores of the latter was maintained up until the very last interval where deadlocks threatened all dyads.4 Another index of bargaining of effectiveness was the quality of the final negotiated solution when compared to a NASA standard. Rank order correlations (rho) were computed for each 15-item solution for all dyads which did not deadlock. A two-way ANOVA was performed on the resultant means. Despite the varied degrees of bargaining difficulty reported above, no significant differences in this quality index were found across conditions. While the quality of all the team solutions before bargaining was already high (Xrho between team and NASA solution was .635), it was found that negotiations produced a consistent (although n o t statistically significant) increase in this quality (Xrho for final and NASA solutions was .719). This improvement in quality was greatest in the select-end accountability condition, a gain of .256 over the average quality score obtained before negotiations by the teams in that cell.

Self-Report Data--Dependent Variables Subjects' perceptions of the bargaining session, its difficulty and its outcome, were measured by responses (on a nine-point continuum) to a number of questionnaire items. A 2 × 3 ANOVA performed on each 4Ill this study, the starting positions for negotiating dyads were assumed to be their respective team's solution. The task was such t h a t disparate team solutions were likely to occur, and indeed this was the case. However, since difficulty of negotiations would be influenced by initial differences, a check of these values was made. R a n k order correlations were computed between team solutions and a three-way ANOV performed on the resultant means. For these data, only a significant accountability main effect was found (p .< .05). Negotiations in the no-accountability conditions had4closer starting positions (rho = .75) than end or continuous conditions (rhos = .66 and .63, respectively). Since team solutions were gathered before the accountability induction took place, it could be assumed t h a t the pattern of data was fortuitous. And yet, if one contrasts this supposed advantage of the noaccountability condition subjects with their behavior reflected in the intervMs data, it can be seen t h a t it made little difference for the elected representatives.


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item detected several two-way interactions. There were differential feelings of pressure in negotiations (F = 6.04; p < .003), perceived difficulty in obtaining an agreement (F = 5.16; p < .007), and in the extent representatives could characterize their discussions as frustrating (F = 4.06; p < .02). No main effects were obtained on these items. The means on each item for each cell are presented in Table 4. It can be seen that the lowest values listed were obtained by selected representatives who did not face review (i.e., they found the least difficulty in negotiations). While the feelings of negotiators in other conditions were somewhat similar to each other on these same items, selected representatives who faced end or terminal review perceived the greatest pressure, greatest difficulty, and greatest frustration. In contrast, no significant differences (p ~ .05) were found on other items which asked the respondent to describe the extent to which his opponent was hostile or resistant to compromise.

Ancillary Sell-Report Data In order to better understand the dynamics of negotiations and as an aid to interpreting results, responses to several additional items were obtained. These items were included on a questionnaire which was administered after each team had produced a solution to the problem but before each subject was informed he was to be the negotiator. Separate two-way ANOVs were computed on each item. No significant differences were found among experimental conditions in ~he way subjects responded to items indicating the extent to which (a) group members participated equally in team interaction (overall .Y = 7.36; 9 = participated equally), (b) worked efficiently (overall X = 7.49; 9 = very efficient), (c) he, the subject, agreed with the group's position (overall :~ = 7.61; 9 = very much), (d) he participated in discussions (overall :~ = 7.45; 9 = quite a bit), and (e) he felt the group's position coincided with his own (overall X = 6.09; 9 = coincided completely). However, several other items did show variation corresponding to the subject's experimental condition. Specifically, two items which reflected the subject's attraction to his team revealed significant accountability main effects. Despite the fact t h a t the accountability induction had not yet occurred, subjects in the no accountability conditions liked their teammates more (X = 8.21 vs 7.64 and 7.85 for end and continuous accountability, respectively; F = 3.21; p < .044), and had a greater desire to work with their team again (-~no = 8.01, Xe=a = 7.11, Xoonttnuo~s = 7.33; F = 3.77, p < .026). It might be noted that all these values reflect some attraction to ~he group (maximum = 9). Two other, related, items showed significant differences. Two-way interactions occurred on questions indicating the degree to which subjects felt that their team

- On nine-point continua.

" H o w m u c h p r e s s u r e . . . "t,,, " H o w f r u s t r a t i n g . . . ?"~, " H o w m u c h d i f f i c u l t y . . . ?"~ 3.71 2.88 3.25

Select-no 5.65 5.50 5.45

Select-end 4.97 4.30 4.48

Selectcontinuous 5.18 4.50 4.05

Elect-no

Condition

TABLE 4 MEAN POST-NEGOTIATION I~EACTIONS ACROSS CONDITIONS

3.83 4.22 4.17

Elect-end

4.92 4.33 4.04

Electcontinuous

o

t~


421

solution was correct (F = 3.34; p < .039) and the extent to which they felt committed to this solution (F = 3.39, p ~ .037). The pattern of means for both is quite similar in that subjects in the select-end accountability conditions felt least committed to their team solution which was felt to be least correct. This is a noteworthy contrast to the behavior of these same individuals in negotiations. Correlational Analysis

Correlations were obtained for questionnaire and behavioral data; several significant relationships were obtained. In general, the feelings of difficulty in negotiations reported by representatives corresponded to their actual behavior. Perceptions of frustration, difficulty, resistance, and pressure during negotiations were significantly correlated with the cumulative number of items agreed upon and number of intervals needed to reach agreement. Furthermore, these essentially negative reactions to the bargaining session were themselves intercorrelated. DISCUSSION Both accountability and mode of spokesman selection proved to be important variables that affected the ease of negotiations. Specifically, their interaction resulted in regularities in both behavioral and self-report data. Elected representatives did not appear to be systematically influenced by the various levels of accountability provided in the experiment. In contrast, when negotiators were selected at random, the nature of accountability made quite a difference. Those selected representatives who faced no review showed the fewest deadlocks, tended to reach agreement at a faster rate, and reported least pressure and difficulty. Conversely, selected representatives facing either continuous or end accountability tended to react similarly and experienced the most difficulty in the study. The similarity of behavior of the latter group is surprising because of the historical beliefs that continuous monitoring would be most deleterious to reaching an agreement whereas a terminal review was not only appropriate but desirable. The relative immunity of elected leaders from accountability effects is consistent with the results of the high status conditions of the Hermann and Kogan (1968) and Kogan et al. (1972) studies. Apparently, elected representatives, because of their mandate (stated group support through election), did not feel constrained by actual or expected reviews. They were more free to forsake their own group's feelings and adopt a new position. Perhaps this was due to the assurance they had that they were competent and could deal with the issues as they saw fit. Their freedom to deviate is similar to the "idiosyncracy credit" notion of Hollander

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(1958, 1960) where the elected representative may have felt he had earned the right to be flexible. In this regard it would be interesting to know if they felt they were elected based on competency or on some other attribute (e.g., liking). The only indirect evidence on this question in the present study comes from answers of all representatives to the following questionnaire item: To what extent do you feel you were the best spokesman for the group? Elected and Selected representatives did not differ significantly in their responses, that is, elected spokesmen did not feel they were significantly better due to their being elected (-~elect = 5.17, )~se~eot = 4.45; F = 2.06; p < .15). This, the issue of the impact of types of mandate (based on competence, liking, status, etc.), remains an open one. Equally interesting was the similar impact the two accountability conditions had on selected representatives. These spokesmen did not receive a vote of confidence and, when confronted with expected reviews, tended to have the most difficulty in reaching agreements; they also reported greater feelings of pressure, frustration, and difficulty during the bargaining session. While previous research was not clear as to why either review condition should have a similar impact, the emerging literature on social facilitation (e.g., Zajonc, 1965) would tend to predict this. Assuming that the negotiation process was novel to the subjects and that they did not have a well developed set of responses to the situation, the increased drive levels caused by the presence of observers in the continuous accountability condition (Zajonc & Sales, 1966) or even the anticipated review in the end accountability condition (Henchy & Glass, 1968; Paulus & Murdoch, 1971) may have caused the perceived pressure and the resultant deterioration of performance. 5 Furthermore, this phenomenon has been shown to be particularly salient under conditions where the task to be carried out is difficult (Sa]eh & Brown, 1972; Saleh, 1972), which is the case in the present study. Because these reactions to "audience effects" occurred in only the selection conditions, it might be assumed that ~he existence of a mandate (through election) mitigates their impact. This notion, however, remains to be tested. The pattern of results obtained on certain ancillary self-report data is somewhat interesting. First, the significant accountability main effect on the two group attraction items occurred despite the fact that the induction had not yet taken place. Furthermore, according to these data the no accountability subjects were most satisfied and attracted to their groups and yet a subset of these same individuals (those who were selected) showed the least difficulty in reading agreement. While not intuitive, this is consistent with the results of the study by Klimoski We are indebted to Robert Haccoun for his suggestion of this interpretation of the data.

ACCOUNTABILITY

AND

NEGOTIATOR

BEHAVIOR

423

(1972) which revealed that attractiveness of one's constituency (or cohesiveness) was a liability in negotiations, but only for those representatives who faced accountability. When no review was anticipated, representatives attracted to their groups spent less time and found it easier to reach agreement. Thus, this notion receives additional support in the present study. A second set of self-report data was paradoxical. Negotiator commitment to and support for team solutions varied across conditions. The data in Table 4 suggest that subjects in the select-end accountability conditions scored lowest on these items. And yet, these same individuals, despite their lack of conviction, displayed greater difficulty in negotiations. Perhaps having to fight for something you don't believe in is intrinsically difficult, and knowing when to give in, to compromise, to reach agreement is not clear. At least for these representatives their rate of agreement behavior would be consistent with this interpretation. The correlational analysis of antecedents of this commitment variable point out the importance of group interaction and group member integration for the adoption of a group solution. The literature that addresses this general issue is voluminous (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968), but it has not been systematically tied to the negotiation process or to the forces faced by a group spokesman. Certainly, the extent to which the representative believes in or is committed to the group's position has been recognized by a number of authors at least on a general level. For example, it has a place in the tri-polar model of McGrath (1966). However, very little bargaining research has been conducted which has looked systematically at this variable to manipulate potential causes and to map out its consequences. The data in the present study, at best, offer a starting point. Finally, the improvement in quality which occurred across all conditions is worth noting. It may be due to the situation where during negotiation the pool of potential information was essentially doubled (each representative bringing in the knowledge of their teammates) and hence be a special case of group enlargement (of. Davis, 1969; Shaw, 1971). However, the greater quality may in fact be an example of a positive outcome of conflict such as those which have been documented in other contexts (e.g., Coser, 1956; Weick, 1969). If this were the case, it would support the notion of some authors that conflict may be functional or desirable for an organization. Thus, the goal would not be to eliminate conflict, but rather to find effective ways to control or manage it and to maximize its positive potential (Bennis, 1966; Weick, 1969). In summary, the present study has demonstrated the existence of forces within the intergroup conflict situation which have an impact on the ease with which representatives can reach agreement. Mode of spokesman selection and the presence of accountability were found to interact and

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to differentially affect the negotiation process. While elected leaders seemed unaffected, secure with their mandate, the pressures and difficulty of selected leaders under either accountability condition were well documented. Moreover, these results appear to be consistent with a growing body of literature which stresses the importance of the relationship of the representative to his group for understanding and predicting the outcome of the negotiation process. REFERENCES B.~ss, B. M. Effects on the subsequent performance of negotiators of studying issues or planning strategies alone or in groups. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 1966, 80 (6, whole No. 614). BENNIS, W. G. Changing organizations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. BENTON, A. A. Accountability and negotiations between group representatives. Paper presented at American Psychological Association Convention, Hawaii, 1972. Reprinted in Proceedings. BLAKE, R. R. Psychology and the crisis of statesmanship. American Psychologist, 1959, 15, 87-94. BLAKE, R. R., & MOUTOn, J. S. Loyalty of representatives to ingroup positions during intergroup competition. Sociometry, 1961, 24, 177-183. CARTWaIOHT, D., & ZnNDER, A. Group dynamics: Research and theory. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Ed. 3. CA~MnLLE~I, J. A., HENDEICK, H. W., PITTMAN, JR., W. C., BLOUT, H. D., & PRATHER, D. C. Effects of different leadership styles on group accuracy. Journal o] Applied Psychology, 1973, 57,(1), 32-37. COOKE, A. America. National Broadcasting Corporation Television, December 26, 1972. C0SEE, L. A. The functions of social conflict. Glencoe, Ill. : Free Press, 1956. DAvis, J. H. Group per]ormance. Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 1969. DRUCKMAN, D. Dogmatism, pre-negotiation experience and simulated group representation as determinants of dyadic behavior in a bargaining situation. Journal

of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 279-290. DRVCKMA:~, D. Prenegotiation experience and dyadic conflict resolution in a bargaining situation. Journal o] Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 367-383. FRIEDMAN, M. I., & JACKA, M. E. The negative effect of group cohesiveness on intergroup negotiation. Journal o] Social Issues, 1969, 25(1), 181-194. GEUDER, C. L., & ROSEN, N. Effects of intragroup relations on intergroup bargaining. International Journal of Group Tensions, 1971, 1, 4, 301-317. ttnLL, J. Decisions, decisions, decisions. Psychology Today, 1971, November, 51-58. HENCHY, T., & GLASS, D. C. Evaluation apprehension and the social facilitation of dominant and subordinate responses. Journal o] Personality and Psychology, 1968, 10(4), 446-454. HERMAN, M. G., & Ko~n~, N. Negotiation in leader and delegate groups. Journal o] Conflict Resolution, 1968, 1~, 332-344. HOLLnNDEa, E. P. Conformity, status, and idiosyncracy credit. Psychological Review, 1958, 65, 117-27. HOLLANDER,E. P. Competence and conformity in the acceptance of influence. Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 365-369. JubIAN, J. W., HOLLANDER,E. P., & REOULA,C. R. Endorsement of the group spokes-

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man as a function of his source of authority, competence, and success. Journal o/Personality and Social Psychology, 1969, 11(1), 42-49. KATZ,D. Consistent reactive participation of group members and reduction of intergroup conflict. Journal o] Conflict Resolution, 1959, 3, 2840. KLIMOSKI, R. J. The effects of intragroup forces on intergroup conflict resolution. Organizational Behavior and Human Per]ormance, 1972, 8, 363-383. KOGAN, N., LAIVIM,H., & TROMMSDORFF,G. Negotiation constraints in the risk taking domain. Journal o/ Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 23(2), 143-156. LAMM, H., & KOGAN, N. Risk taking in the context of intergroup negotiations. Journal o] Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6, 351-363. McGRA~H, J. E. A social psychological approach to the study of negotiation. In R. Bowers (Ed.), Studies on behavior in organizations: A research symposium. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1966. McGRATH, J. E., & JULIAN, J. W. Negotiation and conflict: An experimental study. Technical Report No. 16, Group Effectiveness Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1962. PAULUS, P. B., & MURI)OCH, P. Anticipated evaluation and audience presence in the enhancement of dominant responses. Journal o] Experimental Social Psychology, 1971, 7, 280-291. SAWYER, J., • GUETZKOW, H. Bargaining and negotiation in international relations. In H. C. t(elman (Ed.), International behavior. New York: Holt, 1965. SALEH, S. D., (~ BROWN, M. Effects of intrinsic vs. extrinsic job orientation and reported anxiety under different task conditions. Canadian Journal Behavioral Science (Revue Canadienne des Sciences du Comportement), 1972, 4(1), 43-49. SALEH, S. D. Anxiety as a function of intrinsic-extrinsic job orientation. The presence or absence of observers, and task difficulty. Journal o] Applied Psychology, 1971, 55(6), 543-548. SHAW, M. E. Group dynamics: The psychology o] small group behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971. STEVENS, C. M. Strategy and collective bargaining negotiation. New York: McGrawHill, 1963. TURK, H., & LEFCOWITZ, M. Toward a theory of representation between groups. Social Forces, 1962, 40, 337-341. VIDMA~, N. Effects of representational roles and mediators on negotiation effectiveness. Journal o/ Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 17(1), 48-58. VIDMAR, N. J., (~ McGRATH, J. E. Role assignment and attitudinal commitment as factors in negotiation. Technical Report No. 3, University of Illinois, Group Effectiveness Research Laboratory, 1965. WAL$ON, 1%. E., & MCKERSlE, R. B. A behavioral theory o/ labor negotiations. New York : McGraw-Hill, 1965. WracK, K. E. The social psychology o/ organizing. Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 1969. ZAJONC, R. B. Social facilitation. Science, 1965, 149, 269-274. ZAJo~c, R. B., & SALES,S. Social facilitation of dominant and subordinate responses. Journal o] Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, 9., 160-168. RECEIVED: M a y 4, 1973