access to higher electrical loads for industrial purposes, again a highly politicized ...... Industry, Britannia Foods, Modem Foods, Kwality Ice-cream, Sylvania ...
Neighborhood as Factory
CHAPTER 6: THE POLITICS OF SETTLEMENT TO LIVELIHOOD. Previous chapters have highlighted different themes of the 'Neighborhood a Factory': The importance offunctional linkages between .' -ms to make up a diversifted local economy and the mechanl"ms offinance as alJected by the organization of work and the development of land. All throughout these detailed descriptions, I have referred to the political context where these relations develop. This chapter speciftcally emphasizes the political processes that underlie the local economy to make two inter-related arguments: The fITst is to show that the political aspects of clustering firms form the very basis of their existence, since this politics largely addresses issues of IWld and infrastructure. The second, is to highlight role of the local state in this politics. This politics, although complicated, is essentially of poor groups pressure the Local State to be responsive to the neighborhood economy_ j
There are four dimensions of these political processes: 1)
First, andforemost. the processes affecting the economy of neighborhoods like Viswas Nager are not embedded in the official bureaucracy of the local governments along clear cut administrative or legal-illegal boundaries. Nor are they part of a random and WI-predictable political process. Instead, while being fluid, they have evolved out of an accumulation of bureaucratic and political experience since the early nineteen sixties, in the course of which more than 900 neighborhoods lilce Viswas Nager have undergone legalization. Over this time, the local governments and a variety of local groups have had to come together on issues of water, sewage, some fonn of legalized tenure, electricity, site filling, and roads. These discussions have thus evolved norms and administrative procedures to structure this political process.
2)
The politics is largely about civic development, centered around issues of the nature of legalization, to extend services and infrastructure. It is not however between labor groups and the management with a mediation role of the state -- although that might e..'Cist in some industrial clusters, nor is it about access to credit or training and technical aid.
3)
The political process is sustained not by a homogenous group with a single minded interest, but rather, represented by a complex alliance of local interests. Similarly, the local state, is represented by a combination
oj different public institutions, or different institutions at different times. This also means that as the neighborhood economy changes, as we see in Viswas Nager, the issues being discussed change affecting the 'mix' of both publir and private actors. However, since land is developed with infrastructure and service improvements following in reasonably well estahlished sequence, this does bring in some order in th.e transition of issues being sorted out. The important thirtg is that the lucal state does provide afarum to discuss ihese even if the process is a 224
Chapter 5: Financing the Neighborhood as Factory
a landlord will build extensions to their residential structures. It could be political. in the way a squatter during election time build up their Systemic aspects fann an over-arChing umbrella governing individual relationships. Not that this Is rigid nullifying space for individual action. Mahatma Gandhi helped at an individual level to change the form of this umbrella. backed by a social force (or riding on it some may argue). In other spheres however. he did confirm to traditional hindu conventions regarding his relationship to his wife.
My argument In this dissertation Is that the organization of work in a Neighborhood as Factory. as compared to a mere clustering of un-related indusUies in a industrial park. develops systemic aspects which govern individual behavior. Thus. one hypothesis would be that MaIV.. in Viswas, Nager would behave differently to other ethnic groups. as compared to situations where there is little or no as Factory characteristics. This could be due to the inter-relating production, as well as the need to unify politically in times of regularization. Related to 'Systemic aspects' is the concept of the 'neighborhood'. Conventionally, the physical planning focus on physical fonn and territory as the way to distinguish one neighborhood from another. I prefer to take a more complex view, focusing on the relationships between economic processes. in this case. defined by the Neighborhood as Factory. as \vell as that related to the politics of civic development. In the latter, the definition related to the regularization of particular blocks or administrative territory. If Viswas Nager was characterized by the ethnic concentration of social groups centered around a particular local economy (as in some Indian Cities like Aligarh -- famous for its lock industry). then one definition would have incorporated this aspect. The precision of definition helps us to frame issues more accurately. This is argued in an interesting \vay in Bo\vden & Kreinberg (1981) who argue that \vith the neighborhood economy disbanded over time, neighborhoods in some parts of that city are misnomers and only in the mind of the planners and architects concerned with the physical fonn rather than the social content.
g.
The alternative of getting such funds from banks may not be viable due to the real rate of interest one has to pay (over the official 20%). considering the bribes, inflexibility of operations. and the bureaucratic paperwork involved.
One entrepreneur. who had a gannent export business. mentioned to me that when faced with a serious financial loss due to delayed consignments. the only group \vho bailed her out was the organizer of the Chit Fund. and not the banks. Today. about 15 years later. she owns a general purpose store in an up-market shopping center in South Delhi. She still participates in the same chit fund company's schemes as a reciprocal gesture. as well as to retain the possibility of aVailing funds when required. Since she is a valued member with a good reputation. her participation brings credibility to the company. who can attract additional clients because of this. One infonnant told me that there are ways of using un-accounted wealth via undisclosed bank accounts to generate chit fund investments. This, however, is not that popular nowadays, since the income tax authorities have started targeting Chit Fund Companies to trace such cash flo\vs.
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The second case. of shifting more than 8000 industrial establishments out of Delhi, shows that when the political process is drawn into an arena involVing national level organizations and influences. with little local representation. the very suroival of local groups is at stake.
SECTION A: THE POLITICS OF PLANNING.
Chapter 4 highlighted the fact that most industrial clusters have evolved in 'unauthorized colonies,' and provided a description of tIle land development process, and regularization procedure. This regularization policy, evolved in 1978, is reasonably extensive incorporating efforts for public participation and site realities, and aims to integrate these neighborhoods into the mainstream process of civic development and life l . In many ways, if this policy were followed. many of the deficiencies of infrastructure and services in neighborhoods like Viswas Nager would generally be resolved. This, however, is not to be. Despite the 1978 pclicy, and that too under the 1962 policy of regularization. only five colonies out of 900, and possibly 1200
neighborhoods, have been fully regularized (DDA 1985; BaneIjee 1994)&\. Unlike
popular perceptions (mostly complaints from elite groups) about this status of regularization, it is also not true that residents of un-authorized colonies have been unwilling to pay for the services that are extended to them, and therefore stalled the regularization process. Under the 1978 and 1962 policy, residents did pay up for development of civic amenities2 • In fact, the key point of the negotiations in 1978
1 It is worth noting the obselVations of a working group of the DDA itself in 1979, who argued for a more responsive policy and noted: '.. The group noted that the development planJor those sub-standard areas will ultimately serve over 3/4th of the (Delhfs) population. ....The working group has also unanimously agreed that the Delhi administration must earmark a very substantial portion of all incremental.planftmding Jor the upgrading ojsub-standard areas so that they have an accelerated rate oj development. This means lhat as a matter oj policy, Delhi administration should transfer the thT1lSt oj development from existing development areas to the underdeveloped areas within the Union Tenitnry of Delhi.. ' (DDA 1985:97-98)
The 1978 DDA report on regularization. quoted :n DDA 1985, with detailed minutes of meetings provides an interesting insights into this case: (Pt.9) Some doubts were expressed whether the beneficiaries could be made to pay the
2
o••
226
Chapter 6: The politics of Neighborhood as Factory
complicated one.
4)
This politics can at times be critically important for local groups when they are faced with afonn of govelnance that threatens their lifesustaining economy, and as part of it, a regressive administrative and planning process. This CWl be a two way process. Since these crises often involve national level planning and administrative institutiorlS within a larger political the local political process sponsored by neighborhoods like Viswas Nager becomes usefulfor the local state to safeguard its autonomy. Thus the politics of Viswas Nager can at these times, be part of a much wider political arena.
In many ways this chapter ties in the themes laid out in previous chapters. In that sense, it is perhaps the most important chapter of this dissertation. It is also important because it frames the issue of the local economy in a larger political perspective, leading us to question how to think about local economies, and the implications for local governance for cities to work for poor groups. It can be seen above that this politics is a complicated one, covering a variety of issues and scales of actions. In this context, I deviate from my micro-level disclLSsion of tIle local economy of Vis was Nager. To introduce this chapter, and to develop a conceptual framework to gain a more accurate understanding of the politics involved, I take a broader perspective on the larger institutional politics of planning. This however, is not the main focus of this dissertation. This chapter has four sections:
Section A is a brief sketch of the politics of planning. After this introductory section, I dYJerentiate between three political processes described below: Section B describes the politics of regularization at a general level. This is relevant, because many fum.s of a cluster, especially those involved in services activities, are served quite adequately if the neighborhood or the blocJ( they locate in, is upgraded as a residential one. Their demands for civic development would be relatively un-distinguishable from that of other residents. Thus, the political process centered around conventional regularization, also implicitly represents economic interests. This is illustrated by two case studies. Section Cfocuses on the situation whenfirms have specific demands that go beyond conventional regularization. In the case of Viswas Nager, this centers around access to higher electrical loads for industrial purposes, again a highly politicized process. The mainfocus here is on the politics of licensing.
Section D ends this chapter by illustrating case studies of crisis situations. The Jlrst case of electricity load regularization develops IIlto a crisis because the local government is superseded. Thus avenues for policy change are seriously constrained. 225
Chapter 6: The politics ofNeighborhood as Factory
under the new go\'ernment, reported by the then CEO of the DDA, was to convince the residents that the DDA was serious to undertake improvements once development charges were collected 3 • I argue that to understand clearly this situation, one needs to understand the politics of regularization in terms of a broader politics of planning. Perhaps the most explicit indicator of the politics illvolved in the regulalization is that these almost always happen around election time -- highlighting their importance as political capital 4 • The second indicator relates to the nature of policy formulation.
III
general, administrators have consistently pushed for negative
measures centered around techno-legal arguments, and morally justified by those of planning centered around urban fonn, and city beautiful 5 • The most explicit and
development charges. The specific examples of Gautam Nagar, Krishna Nagar, Arjun Nager, Sant Nagar were (Juoted by the DDA to indicate that, where the authorities were firm, and the people were con.vinced that the development funds would not be the benefICiaries were prepared to pay the full amount. .. is indicative of the willingness oj the people to pay on condition that tangible results are obtained. ' (DDA 1985 Annexure 26:95). A more accurate reason for non-payment is the unilateral and bureaucratic policy ana procedures for non-recovery of development charges. The major problem is that all un-authorized colonies are treated (unilaterally) in policy even though (they display) a wide range ojphysical and socii-econOTnic characteristics. This could be also the reasonjor the resistance to payment ojregularizatiDn charges. It is WI-reasonable to expect that low incomejamilies would demand and payfor the high level oj seroices provided..
(Banerjee 1991:47). 3 Residents in these cases. were given an assurance that the money collected as development charges. would be used for civic development in their O\vn neighborhoods according to a strict time frame. The successful operation in one neighborhood brought many more associations to the DDA asking for similar ventures to be initiated. (Buch 1985:46-52) The DDA report of 1985 elaborates on that experience noting:
'..Experience oJthe last tlVO decades shows that we are not able to collect development charges except in 1978-79 an amount oj Rs. 47 lakh (Rs.4.700,OOO) was collected (details given in annexure 27) but later on the system (oj public participation) was changed and since then collection of amount was meager.. ' (DDA 1985:6).
4 The most explicit example of tile latter. are the timing of the dates to coincide with that of national or local level elections. For instance. these were announced in 1962, 1967, 1972. 1977, 1978, 1982, 1988-89, 1994 -- in all cases coinciding with election announcements, and in one case, after a major cholera epidemic. 5 See Jagmohan (1978) for a very explicit articulation of this perspective. See in particular pages 184 -185, and pg7. Popularly knO\Vl1 as the 'Indian Hausmann', Jagmohan as the Vice Chairman of the DDA during the emergency years. was notorious {or the forced resettlement of more than 1.5 million poor squatter into massive site and service camps at the periphery of the city. All this. largely supported by elite groups, was seen to restore the city to its pristine glory as it had been at the times of the Raj.
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Neighborhood as Factory
extreme illustration was the state of internal emergency in the country between 1975 and 1977 when the country was essentially governed by the bureaucracy and political dictatorship. This period saw the extensive demolition of un-authorized colonies.
squatter settlements, the subjugation of civil rights, press censorship including jail for local and national level politicians, activists, and journalists. A more recent example. in 1989. was legislation pushed by national level politicians (while the local
government remained superseded) making un-authorized construction a cognizable offence in Delhi. Viswas Nager, among other neighborhoods too, was affected by these larger trends, as discussed later in this chapter. In contrast. almost all positive measures with regard to un-authorized colonies have originated from political sources under pressures from local politicians (Banerjee 1992: 14). For instance, the 1978 policy for regularization was developed at the end of
the country's state of emergency. w·hen the previous Congress (I) goveITlment was voted out of power for its repressive policies dUIing the previous one and half years. Other more recent changes proposed in 1990-91 relate to the master plan incorporating the 'Infonnal Sector' implicitly deal with un-authorized colonies. These too, came from political sources rather than planners or administrators. The politics of regularization is complicated. relating to a broader politics c
planning. To define this more clearly. I discuss this politics in tenns of three broader themes. Within each. I make a brief mention about how this relates to the
de\relopment of Vis\vas Nager. These are discussed in a more detailed \vay in later sections in this chapter. a) Conflicts between social groups: The politics of planning. in its fundamental sense originates from conflicts between different social groups in society. For example, unauthorized colonies are commonly seen by elite groups as the seed bed of local politics, and strike at their very heartb • Not only do these neighborhoods encroach on plflI1ned development. but their see the residents of these 'slum areas' perceived as messing up the city. defecating in parks, breeding disease, dnIgs and 228
Chapter 6: The politics of Neighborhood as Factory
crime6 • For these elite and upper middle class groups, living in master planned
neighborhoods, un-authorized colonies are a blatant illegality protected by 'vested interests.' This refers to the political patronage that manifests itself around election time, and news reports of local politicians stopping demolitions or going on hunger strikes every time the authorities try to ensure planned development. Perhaps this is
why regularization is often treated as an 'illusion' to pacify different groups, but also in turn, driving a conservative approach 7 • TIle illusion argument applies therefore, as
to the masses of population in unauthorized colonies and squatter settlement, as
much to the elite in housed in legal neighborhoodsc • Some more perceptive ones also see these neighborhoods as the breeding ground of politics, which when stripped from its ideology is mostly accurate. For instance, some scholars have argued through detailed empirical analysis, that DDA has not been able to develop adequate land for poor groups due to the very process of land banking, reinforced by institutional greed (Jha 1984; Datta et.al 1981). Poor groups have received as a result, only 5.5% of the allocated land, and at times came down to 0.80/0 (Ibid: 19-20). This in effect, pushed people into private subdivisions. The policy of large scale land acquisition at below market rates pushed owners of agriculture land to sellout to colonizers. The latter aimed to counter the threat of demolition by authorities by getting these neighborhoods settled as rapidly as possible, and consolidating the political strength of the inhabitants. Many colonizers through this essentially political strategy, became local politicians, or close to one. For instance, almost all the local politicians in Viswas Nager, although not invol\Ted in Sarvaria's subdivision of the land in 1935, were closely involved in thwarting
For a vivid illustration of these view, see' Bombay Our City' a documentary film by Anand Patwardhan made about the eviction or pavement dwellers in Bombay Patwardhan (1985).
6
Banerjee writes that regularization implies that: ".. the illusion is kept up thatJuli regularization would take place according to the regularization nlan prepared by the laid. down procedure... the illusion is also kept up that all upgrading WId mprovement measures oj squatter settlements are tempoT'.=.ry measures .. '(Ibid:-l8-49). Fl, .ure detailed on this issue in the case of rich countries, see: 1) Bowden et.a1 1981 For a liscussion on social movements around civic action see Davis 1991.
7
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Neighborhood as Factory
demolitions, initiating regularization and the extension of services, all of which built up their political credibility. It is this growing political clout of un-authorized colonies that threatens higher income groups and their special access to (subsidized) land, services, infrastructure, that they have enjoyed all this time8 • Thus, a key issue is of the conflict between groups over access to resources. This however, as I discuss below, has important institutional dimensions.
b) Conflicts between Institutions at the local level: Institutions playa central role in the conflicts between groups. Rather than viewing them as neutral mediators, I see various institutions being used by different income groups in society through particular bureaucratic and administrative che:mnels to ensure access to public investments. This differential control of public institutions is most explicit when we look at the area of planning and urban development. In many ways, this is not surprising. Planning institutions, and Development Authorities in particular, control scarce commodities like serviced land and affect regulation and developmental policy in general. 'Ve have seen in previous chapters how access to serviced land is fundamental both for residence and employment.
In this arena, the aim of any group is to keep· the competition to the minimum by overt and covert means. Here, corporate and upper income groups find
Development Authorities and centralized agencies more supportive of their interests. It has been well documented by some scholars that these institutions have been notorious to protect the interest of the elited • A more implicit and diffused influence on
8
Such writes:
·,.iTl actual operation. all development authorities have beenforced into a spiral of making huge profits which are channelized into high visibility ventures such as parks, and other schemes oj city beautifICation., city highways which bear little traffic, expensive housing, comm.$rial complexes, and stadia. · (Buch 1984:5).
230
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