Feb 11, 2008 - resources for development projects at community level. 1 .... (IOs) in service provision, all have impact
AFGHANISTAN INSTITUTIONAL CASE STUDY: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS 11 February 2008 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 1. Introduction This institutional case study focusing on Community Development Councils (CDCs) comprises part of the Afghanistan portion of a five-country research program on rural local institutions initiated by the Agriculture and Rural Development Department (ARD) and the Social Development Department (SDD) of the World Bank. The purpose of the program is to assess and build on the potential of rural institutions to augment access to public and private services to the rural poor and improve sustainable livelihoods outcomes. This case study on the local governance sector is one of two Afghanistan cases covering the sectors, common to the five country studies, of livelihoods and markets, and local governance. The case study has been carried out by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, an independent, Afghanistan-based research organization. Its primary purpose is to conduct high quality research that informs and influences policy and practice in order to increase the efficacy and impact of aid-related programs in Afghanistan, and to improve Afghan lives. The case study is based on research carried out in 2007 on the sustainability of Community Development Councils, although it also draws on earlier AREU work on the National Solidarity Program (NSP) as a whole. 1.1 Goals and objectives of the institutional case study The focal institution treated in this case study is the Community Development Council, an elected body created under the National Solidarity Program (NSP). The NSP is a national level community-driven development (CDD) program introduced in 2003 and covering in some measure approximately two-thirds of the communities in the country at the time of writing. Community-driven development refers to programmatic interventions that emphasize community participation, empowerment, local contributions, and the development of community or social capital while providing 1 resources for development projects at community level. The National Solidarity Program is run by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and funded by various bilateral and multilateral donors, in large 2 part through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The program is implemented by Facilitating Partners (FPs) drawn from international and national NGOs and one UN agency (UN Habitat) that facilitate the election of Community 1 2
Derived from World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (2003). On the NSP program generally see Barakat (2004), Boesen (2004)and Kakar (2005) among others.
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Development Councils (CDCs), help them to identify community development priorities to be addressed by block grant funds delivered in three installments, and facilitate project implementation. Within the context of the broad research program, the overall goal of the Afghanistan country study is to examine the interactions of newly introduced rural institutions with existing institutions across the three mentioned sectors and their impact on governance and livelihoods outcomes in four settings. In pursuit of this goal, this case study has three inter-related objectives: 1. Mapping existing rural institutions in relation to introduced CDCs; 2. Examining the effects of context, institutional design features, and institutional relationships on governance outcomes (inclusion, representation, responsiveness, accountability and adaptability); 3. Examine the relationship between these governance outcomes and impact on access to private and public goods, and in turn on sustainable livelihoods. Drawing on earlier World Bank work influential in shaping the approach adopted throughout the multi-country study, the goal is to identify “what are the capabilities and functions of RLIs that can be expected – and enhanced – to increase the number, productivity and sustainability of livelihood opportunities,” and in turn to produce findings about the current status of those capabilities and functions, and recommendations to help improve them.3
1.2 Importance of the study This case study examines the most widespread and comprehensive local governance and development initiative in the history of Afghanistan. Community-driven development-type initiatives have in fact a considerable history in Afghanistan, including both government initiatives to form local councils in the 1960s and NGOdriven activity in the 1980s and 1990s, but none have matched the scope or resources allocated to the NSP. The NSP has the goal of covering all communities in Afghanistan, making it a truly national initiative with potentially important statebuilding implications. In addition, the resources channelled through the NSP are quite large, in comparison to community-driven development programming in other settings: the block grants comprise $200 per household, up to a maximum of $60,000 per community. A close examination of the dynamics of introducing such a significant new institution on such a widespread basis is therefore important in assessing likely governance and livelihoods developments throughout rural Afghanistan. In addition, the resources devoted to this program by international donors are significant, and independent analysis of their impact is important in evaluating the effectiveness of this assistance. As of the end of March 2007, NSP had expended US$431 million in assistance of which 3
Uphoff and Buck (2006), 1.
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approximately $192 million was funded through World Bank IDA grants.4 Finally, NSP itself is coming to an end over the next two years, and analysis of its governance and livelihoods implications is essential to understand the likely sustainability of the structures and benefits created, and to inform successor programs currently being introduced or considered. 1.3 Types of institutions being studied The case study focuses on the introduction of a new institution, the Community Development Council, into rural Afghanistan, where a range of more or less robust institutions already exist. It focuses on the CDC as an institution with an organizational form, but the Afghan context is populated by institutions ranging from behavioral to constitutive, and the study tries to examine the full range of these linkages. As will be clear from the discussion to follow, the emphasis is on institutions with some concrete organizational manifestation, following the distinction between the two overlapping categories of institutions – “complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time” – and organizations – “structures of recognized and accepted roles”.5 However, some important areas of ambiguity exist in regard to this approach in the Afghan context. In the first place, the organizations present in rural community settings are often mixed up with single powerful actors who nevertheless structure behavior by influencing institutional decision-making. In the second, the data shows that in some settings CDCs themselves have more organizational coherence in relation to a bounded set of functions relating to project selection and implementation than they do as a generally persisting institution. One challenge of this type of work is clearly to identify ways in which the benefits of CDCs as organizations can be improved and made more sustainable. This case study draws primarily from a set of approximately 80 primary semistructured interviews with community members, CDC members, local elites, government officials, and NGO and National Solidarity Program staff, as well as previously published material referred to in the text and references at the end of the case study. These interviews cover four study sites.
Table 1: Case study sites6 Province Balkh Bamiyan Herat Nangarhar
Districts Dawlatabad Sayghan Injil Behsud
4
National Solidarity Program Report (April 2007). As the Afghan fiscal year ends in March, this represents the most accurate figures on actual expenditure at time of writing. For a summary of the distribution of funds and projects by project type see MRRD (2006), 7-8. 5 Uphoff and Buck (2006), 4. 6 The addition of Behsud, Nangarhar beyond the sites originally anticipated was to ensure the inclusion of tribal Pashtun communities in the sample, and in this case has substituted for Kabul in the other case studies.
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There are some important limitations to the data used in this study. In the current Afghan context, the data has been collected through interviews in provincial and district centers, and through community visits over a period of a few days. Under such circumstances, direct observation of institutional functioning is not possible. Even if it were, as in a few cases of observed meetings, the presence of research teams can be assumed to distort the normal functioning of institutions enough to make direct observation alone unreliable. In such circumstances, the data must provide information on a number of issues that can stand as kinds of proxies for the institutional outcomes being measured. In this case study, the following approach to measuring the desired institutional outcomes has been adopted: •
Inclusion: the characteristics of the election held to choose members of the CDC, particularly in terms of the structure of the voting and its likelihood of including economically, tribally, or ethnically marginalized groups, and the provisions made to encourage the participation of women.
•
Representation: participation in and processes for holding meetings, both within the project selection process and in other areas of CDC activity.
•
Responsiveness: reported match between expressed community priorities and project selection, and reported responsiveness of CDC in responding to specific community problems.
•
Accountability: the strength of upward links in establishing accountability for projects, and whether re-elections have taken place according to the mandated calendar.
•
Adaptability and adaptive capacity: ability of CDC to take on new roles according to needs expressed by the community. To some degree a function of the preceding four performance indicators.
A final issue that requires highlighting is that there are typically two “lenses” through which the work of CDCs can be viewed. The first is in terms of its role in choosing and implementing the projects funded by NSP block grant funds. The second is in terms of its role as a community-based or community-development organization, or in the eyes of the program itself, as a nascent local governance organization. An awareness that institutional performance and in turn livelihoods impact may vary depending on the stage of NSP implementation or whether one is considering project impact primarily, is crucial in interpreting the findings of this case study.
2. Description of the context The governance context in Afghanistan is an inter-related complex of features relating to its condition as a “post-conflict state” increasingly experiencing continued conflict. The country suffers from prevalent poverty and vulnerability, heavily degraded infrastructure at both local, linking, and regional levels, very prominent illicit and war economies, weak state structures and porous borders, and long-standing
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fragmentation of power at subnational levels. These features combine with unique ethnic, tribal, religious and social dimensions to generate a challenging environment for institution-building at the local level.
2.1 Social, economic, political, and cultural context The persistence of armed conflict over the previous three decades in Afghanistan has had profound effects on Afghan society, driving many to leave the country, and leaving a population that is disproportionately young, uneducated and vulnerable.7 There are significant constraints on the availability of qualified Afghans to fill roles in formal governance structures, be they in the security forces, administration, public service organizations such as health and education departments, the National Assembly, or the judiciary. The conflicts in Afghanistan have contributed to a politicization of Islam and new institutional initiatives must consider interpretation by communities and religious figures in relation to local religious doctrine and practice. Historically, disputes are interpreted and mediated through Islamic lenses, and the increasingly internecine conflicts of the 1990s and beyond are no exception.8 The politicization of the multiple ethnic identities active in the country is also an important historical reality. Nevertheless, simple accounts of ethnicity in Afghan politics are insufficient, due to the complexity and variation with which ethnicity coexists with other tribal, communal, and patronage relations. Ethnicity itself is defined relatively, and has become increasingly mobilized through years of conflict – for example, the emergence of a Tajik identity is relatively recent and has been driven by conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s. Tribal identity is important among some ethnic populations and localities and not others, and operates in a segmented manner meaning tribal affiliation has different effects depending on the scale and type of issue at stake, or the degree of territoriality of the tribe in question.9 In general, the observation of Canfield in the mid-1980s that “the actual operating units of sociopolitical coalition among [rural Afghan] populations are rarely genuinely ‘ethnic’ in composition” remains true.10 Even the exception regarding the Hazara community, which displayed considerable political unity in the 1990s in the face of continued repression, has subsequently broken down somewhat, with competing factions evident in the post-2001 period. In addition, ongoing conflict has depleted the social capital of communities, as populations have been displaced or poverty and economic distortions brought about by 7
In 2004 estimates (necessarily rough) of adult literacy rates and population under age 15 were 28.7 and 50.2 % respectively: UNDP (2004), 275-276. Interpolation of data and subsequent data collection in the 2005 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment have not indicated significant change and in the case of literacy indicate lower numbers than used in 2004. It is important to note that these indicators draw on extremely uncertain population data. NRVA 2005 is probably the best current aggregate source of information. 8 Anderson (1984), 266. 9 For a useful discussion of the relationships between ethnicity and tribe and the Afghan conflicts of the 1990s see Glatzer (1998), 167-181. 10 Canfield (1987), 76.
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conflict as well as assistance have prompted migration within and outside the country. Despite these depredations, a wide range of social capital exists. In general, extended family and kinship, generally subsumed under the term qawm, underlie the primary forms of social capital in Afghanistan, and seen together “kinship norms, codes of honour (nang), and rules of Shar’ia as locally understood, together with language and religious-sectarian distinctions and loyalties represent the essence of traditional political culture and popular consciousness in contemporary Afghanistan.”11 The presence of foreign military forces in both offensive and peacekeeping capacities, the introduction of rights-based and democratizing institutional change, and the role of foreign non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and international organizations (IOs) in service provision, all have impacts on Afghan social dynamics in areas including religion, family life, gender relations and roles, and governance. The economic environment of Afghanistan is complicated by its geographic location and borders, the effects of prolonged conflict, the historical and continuing weakness of central or subnational state capacities in regulation, revenue collection and allocation, and intensive foreign involvement and assistance in the country. These factors have contributed to an economic context where the importance of patronage, non-monetized goods and services, remittance relationships, debt and credit structures, and involvement in informal or illicit economic activity, are very important in shaping incentives.12 Local and Community Governance Contexts Districts are currently the lowest level of legally recognized formal state institutions in Afghanistan – while CDCs exist in most of the country now, they are not established in law, and constitutionally-mandated village councils have yet to be elected. District administrative structure reflects that of the province and consists of district offices of some central ministries, a police department and a prosecutor, though not all districts have primary courts. Most important among local formal institutions is the district governor, or uluswal, who has been until very recently a representative of the Ministry of Interior, and formally speaking plays a coordinating role.13 The informal role of the uluswal varies depending on relations with the provincial authorities, local customary and informal power-holders, and often includes gatekeeping, dispute resolution and other problem-solving activities. Although in many areas during the 20th Century the central state would have a local interlocutor in the form of a khan or malik or qaryadar, the identification of that individual was based on different criteria and methods in different places. In some cases they would be appointed from the outside, but in most they would have a pre-existing leadership role through heredity, property or some combination of both.14 In most cases, uluswals maintain some kind of semi-
11
Shahrani (1998), 218. See Putzel, Schetter et al. (2003). 13 In August 2007 the newly formed Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) was granted responsibility for managing provincial and district governor’s offices, removing this function from the Ministry of Interior. See IDLG Strategic Framework (27 September 2007). 14 For discussions of local governance patterns in Afghanistan see for example Favre (2005) and Rubin and Malikyar (2003). 12
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formal advisory councils or liaise with maliks, arbabs or qaryadars where these remain significant figures.15 Historically, formal state structures extended at times to the subdistrict (alaqadari or hausa) level. In 2005-6, the concept of manteqa was reported by some district level officials as important in framing, for example, security policy at sub-district level.16 In addition, there has been throughout the 1990s and since 2001 a proliferation of “unofficial districts” dividing the centrally recognized ones, reflecting either claims for additional resources, or local management of tribal heterogeneity through multiplying the number of local government representatives via the informal authorities of the Provincial Governor’s office and that office’s access to resources provided via relatively unaccountable “hospitality” and PRT-based military assistance budgets.17 Community governance in rural Afghanistan thus remains largely informal and varies widely across the country. There are certain general types of institutions and actors that play a role in most but not all communities. These can be, roughly-speaking, divided into individual actors, collective decision-making bodies, and behavioral norms and customs, often mediated through individuals such as mullahs, or collective bodies such as jirgas, shuras, and jalasas. These are discussed in general terms next with some discussion of their configurations in the study sites. In some communities individual power-holders play important governance roles. These may be maliks, arbabs and qaryadars that retain authority through a combination of community acceptance and linkages to formal authorities. Historians and anthropologists have noted the wide divergences in the motivations, loyalties, legitimacy and effectiveness of such local leaders during other periods.18 In other areas local commanders have gained influence during two decades of conflict through their role in jihad or a combination of protection and predation. There has been much discussion of collective decision-making bodies in the Afghan context, and debate continues over the precise boundaries of concepts such as jirga, jalasa, and shura. Jirga is sometimes presented as an archetypical and immemorial “Afghan” institution, the central traditional means of local governance, particularly among sedentary Pashtun populations, but in some form among both nomadic and nontribal groups as well: “The jirga unites legislative, as well as judicial and executive authority on all levels of segmentary society. By means of its decisions, the jirga administers law.”19 A jirga is generally understood as a gathering of male elders to resolve a dispute or to make a decision among or between qawm groupings according to local versions of pashtunwali or tribal codes. It is thus a flexible instrument with an intermittent and varying rather than a persistent membership. Petitioners to jirgas may represent themselves or make use of advocates, and for disputes between family
15
For a discussion of contemporary consultative shuras at district level, see Nixon (forthcoming 2008). For a concise discussion of these concepts, see Favre (2005). 17 AREU interviews, provincial and district officials, Nangarhar, Paktia and Badakshan (2005-6). 18 For example, see the distinction between bay and venal arbabs drawn by Barfield in Kunduz during the 1980s: Barfield (1984), 175. 19 Steul (1981), 123. 16
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or larger qawm groups sometimes a third party, known as a jirgamar, is called in to assist in decision-making. Some key features of the jirga are its conformity to segmentary patterns, its generally ad hoc nature, and its reliance on local enforcement if necessary. However, it has been noted that during the twentieth century a pattern of contact between state institutions and jirgas began to appear – either as state functionaries used jirgas to communicate policies or as they referred disputes to them in place of formal institutions of justice, which remained highly suspect in the eyes of most local populations. In non-Pashtun areas, similar meetings may be known as jalasas or shuras, each conforming to the local types of customary law.20 In the latter case, there is conceptual overlap with the concept of a local council of elders with more persistent membership and leadership under a mullah, malik, wakil, or other figure. In addition, during the 1980s and the 1990s, many NGO programs established local shuras to manage local input to specific development activities, a new phenomenon that has frequently been conflated with more “traditional” structures. In addition, the Peshawar-based mujahedeen parties introduced varying changes to local selfgovernment, either along the lines of shuras or elsewhere through the imposition of more hierarchical party and commander-based structures.21 In part as a result of these dynamics, the traditional antipathy for the involvement of a centralized state in local areas by an independent periphery has been tempered by an increased recognition of the need for a strong state to counter-balance the local commanders empowered through years of conflict.22 In one sense the creation of CDCs has quite explicitly built upon this conflation of persistent local councils with intermittent dispute resolution and decision-making meetings by attempting to introduce representative and inclusive principles to the creation of local councils.
Table 2: Examples of Community Governance Institutions23 Institution/Actor Other Function/Meaning Names Local governmentQaryadar/ Representative between community community Nomayenda and central power/government. Can interlocutor / Malik resolve disputes; maintains communal property. Local Land Owner/Arbab
Zamindar, Beg, Arbab, Sardar, Nawab
Large landowner who controls resources in the community; may provide jobs to laborers and land to sharecroppers; may also arbitrate conflicts
Commander
Qumandan
Local leader with armed followers who
20
For a discussion of procedural and substantive variations in legal concepts by region, see International Legal Foundation (2004). 21 Carter and Connor (1989). 22 Noelle-Karimi (2006), 2. 23 The authors acknowledge work by Palwasha Kakar and Jennifer Brick in preparing earlier versions of this table.
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draws authority from defence of community or participation in jihad. Jirga/Elders
Majlis, Jalasa
Shura/Elders+
Mullah Local administration/uluswal
Council that meets as problems arise to solve them. Problems range from disputes to maintenance of communal property. Council, sometimes equivalent to Jirga, sometimes with more persistent membership and ongoing governance roles rather than ad hoc problem solving.
Imam
Religious interpretation District level government bodies and executive branch
It is important to emphasize the variation in the prevalence and influence of these actors and institutions throughout the country. This variation is not found only along regional or ethnic lines – the importance of various actors and structures is different depending on the situation and history of individual communities. The study sites demonstrate indicatively the range of configurations possible of this mixture of individually or collectively-based governance patterns. Sayghan, Bamiyan In Sayghan District of Bamiyan Province, in a community populated, atypically for the central region, by Dari-speaking Tajiks, the nomayenda retains authority in resolving disputes and retains a link to the uluswal who relies on them as his primary interlocutor. However, the nomayenda himself reported his role as much less significant than that of qaryadar under previous regimes – particularly in the area of tax collection. The main activity for livelihoods in the village was reported to be farming, together with wage labor and shopkeeping. The village appeared to be economically better off than the other villages studied. Behsud, Nangarhar The community in Behsud district of Nangarhar province was predominantly Pashtun. The respondents noted that problems in the community had previously been solved by gatherings of elders in a jirga which would meet when necessary. The relationship between this pattern of dispute resolution and the CDC role was not entirely clear, but seemed to involve consultation between both types of institution in the case of small problems, such as youth opium addiction, and perhaps less in more important cases. On the other hand, this community mentioned the role of maliks and uluswal as well, noting these institutions had played roles in dispute resolution, but usually in a negative way through their favouritism or likelihood to be corrupt. Moreover, the unpopularity of the malik and the uluswal could have resulted in a heightened awareness of responsibility for community issues.
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It may be that this unpopularity is related to the relative strength of community governance institutions such as jirga in this Pashtun area, and the already competitive relations between such institutions and more formal and individually-focused ones such as district governor and malik. Injil, Herat The community in Injil district of Herat province is comprised of Tajik and Pashtun ethnicities. However, the community respondents themselves divided the community in terms of three qawms: Tajik, Popalzai (a tribal grouping within the Durrani Pashtun confederation), and Farahi (people originating from the neighbouring province of Farah). In Injil arbabs were playing the primary role in resolving local disputes and carrying out local administrative functions in cooperation with the uluswal, through authority drawn from a combination of heredity, land-ownership, and community acceptance or selection. As a peri-urban district Injil also reported having wakils, an equivalent to malik but with a role subsidiary to that of arbab, which covered several communities. Dawlatabad, Balkh The community researched in Dawlatabad district of Balkh province was predominantly Hazara, with two settlements that were comprised of Tajiks. The Tajik settlements were too small to form a CDC of their own; therefore they asked the Hazara communities to join in their CDCs. The people are described prominently as uneducated and farming is the main source of livelihoods for almost all of the population. The village is described by multiple respondents as very poor, with a limited amount of land which does not completely accommodate the farming community, together with a situation of water scarcity that only allows for one planting in a season. Commanders of Hezb-e Wahdat (a predominantly Hazara political movement) and Junbesh (the militia of Uzbek commander Rashid Dostum) fought repeatedly over the area during the 1990s, and local commanders were important determinants of access to goods. An interesting variation observed in relation to pre-existing institutions in this community was the assertion that the head of the CDC now replaced the role of qaryadar, apparently the only case among the study sites where the CDC institution was seen at least by its own membership as replacing a pre-existing institution. Dawlatabad is involved in JICA’s Inter-communal Rural Development Program, clustering CDCs together for joint projects, though project implementation had not yet begun at the time of the study. A central concern of the case study analysis is to document this variation in local institutional context and the relationships between this context and the newly introduced CDCs, in order to draw out the impact of these relationships for governance and livelihoods performance. These relationships, as well as relationships between the focal institution, CDCs, and outside institutions such as district government, Facilitating Partners, and line departments, are outlined in the section on institutional mapping.
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2.2 People the institution is supposed to serve and their characteristics The formation of the CDC institution is intended to enable wider community involvement in both community development decisions, and eventually more generalized local governance decision-making.24 A crucial part of this effort rests on the electoral nature of the institution, with one representative to be drawn from each of a number of clusters of households throughout the community. This is meant to ensure that the views of potentially marginalized parts of the community are heard, through the organization of clusters to cover different groups in a community, whether defined economically, linguistically, or through group-kinship categories. The effectiveness of the electoral basis of the CDC in ensuring the inclusion and participation of people it is meant to serve is thus mediated by the sound implementation of a clustering of households by the Facilitating Partner. A particular challenge in the Afghanistan context is ensuring the inclusion and participation of women in decision-making in community contexts. The formal operating procedures of the NSP have provisions that are aimed at increasing the participation and benefits accruing to women. On paper these provisions include ensuring female participation as both candidates and electors during the election of the CDC, and by reserving a portion of the block grant funds for projects either selected by the women members or with specific provisions to target female beneficiaries. These provisions for both general inclusion and that of women contrast markedly with the characteristics of all other existing community governance institutions outlined above. In these other institutions decision-making is centered on a single individual or rests exclusively with male members of the community. In three of the sites studied the primary challenges for inclusion are gender equity and socio-economic status, while in the Balkh case the ethnic heterogeneity of the community meant that involving the minority Tajiks in the CDC process was also an important factor. In practice, there is variation in the degree to which inclusion and representation are improved via the provisions of the NSP. For example, in some cases elections for a male CDC among male electors are carried out in clusters as the program dictates, but female inclusion does not follow the same pattern, with a women’s council being appointed and seated separately. Nevertheless, among these variations it is fair to say that even imperfectly applied NSP election and CDC formation provisions represent a considerable increase in inclusion than most pre-existing forms of governance institution, at least with respect to women’s inclusion and representation, and under certain conditions of majority-minority communities also of the minority grouping. 2.3 Relationship with existing World Bank projects and relevant government policies As noted in the introduction, the World Bank is heavily involved in the National Solidarity Program under which CDCs are created. This involvement includes funding 24
National Solidarity Program (2004), 5.
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for NSP under the IDA grants mentioned and the Bank’s management responsibilities for the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) through which large amounts of other donor assistance for NSP is channelled. Furthermore, the World Bank has been involved in aspects of the design and funding of the successor program to NSP, known as “NSP II”. This program retains the core features of the NSP cycle at local level, but alters some of the management arrangements in favour of increasing Afghan government responsibility for the program and reducing the facilitation available by the partner NGOs. It is mainly focused on new communities where NSP had not been introduced by mid-2007. NSP II itself will only be implemented over three years to 2010, and in 2007 the World Bank published research calling for a renewed commitment to “secure a regular and reliable funding flow to resource the local level development activities” of CDCs.25 The nature and scope of such future programming is not yet clear at the time of writing, but clearly provides a powerful rationale for the World Bank’s examination of local institutions in general and CDCs in particular. Finally, at the level of government policy, there is significant disagreement among Afghan government actors about the future governance role of CDCs. In some quarters there are efforts to formalize them through a regulatory instrument stipulating that they become the key interlocutor for all government and development activity in communities. This “bylaw” debate has been ongoing for almost two years, but is increasingly central to the future development of the NSP and its CDCs as increasing attention has fallen on the challenge of developing a coherent subnational governance policy, in part through the formation of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) with responsibility in this area.
3. Institutional characteristics and processes The NSP has two stated objectives. First, the program is a local development initiative: through the formation of CDCs it supports community input into selection and implementation of “community-managed sub-projects comprising reconstruction and development”. Second, the program is a local governance initiative aiming to “lay the foundations for a strengthening of community level governance”.26 Despite these dual goals, the reality of NSP implementation and the political context of Afghanistan means that various ministerial actors, subnational state authorities, Facilitating Partners, and even communities and customary authorities have differently emphasized these two goals, and a tension among policy-makers has emerged that posits these as conflicting goals in part due to the speed and scale of the program’s implementation. Box 1: The origins of the NSP and progress to date The National Solidarity Program was introduced in June 2002 as a component of the Emergency Community Empowerment and Public Works Program, and in 2003 became 25 26
World Bank (2007), 45. National Solidarity Program (2004), 5.
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one of the six initial National Priority Programs (NPP) introduced under the National Development Framework (NDF). The program is based on a combination of customary Afghan practices (shuras, jirgas or councils, and ashar or collective community labour), reference to Islamic principles of consultation and participation, and international CDD experience (such as that of the Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia). By March 2007: • NSP had been introduced to 16,827 rural communities in 34 provinces, of approximately 24,000 total nationwide (defined as 25 families or more); • 16,343 Community Development Councils had been elected and 16,068 community development plans (CDPs) completed; • 25,525 subprojects were approved; • 10,001 subprojects were completed. Source: Status report of National Solidarity Program, NSP Quality Assurance Unit, 31 March 2007 3.1 Information about the functioning of institutions At the community level NSP ideally follows a fairly typical CDD implementation cycle. Initially the NSP Facilitating Partner introduces the principles of the program to the community. In the case of the NSP, a community is defined as a collection of more than 25 households, with smaller agglomerations being absorbed into neighboring groupings. Effectively, the program also divides larger groups of households through the imposition of a funding ceiling of $60,000 regardless of the size of the community. As the size of the block grant is calculated at $200 per household, there is a strong incentive to divide communities of over 300 households to maximize the available block grant per capita. In practice, this leads to some independent small groups of households being amalgamated with what locally may be viewed as a separate community, and the division of some larger communities somewhat artificially. This definition of community does not automatically therefore lead to congruence with locally imagined community identifications which, as noted in Section 2, may range from geographic to agnatic definitions, and may vary depending on the issues facing the community where identification patterns are segmentary. Following this civic education phase the FP organizes an election for the CDC, which then chooses its officers. Through a process of consultation with the community the CDC identifies community development priorities in a community development plan (CDP), and applies for funding for specific sub-projects to be implemented with the block grant, which is delivered in three installments. The sub-project(s) application is vetted by the NSP Oversight Consultant (OC) based on a set of eligibility criteria, and sometimes may need to be modified. The community is meant to handle local procurement and the management of funds during sub-project implementation. The completion of the sub-project(s) is subject to OC inspection, and unused funds are directed to other subprojects or carried over for a second cycle. 3.2 Institutional features, design, capacity
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The focal institution covered by this case study is the Community Development Council introduced under the NSP. As an elected council with a defined and persistent membership, mandate and set of written rules, it has many of the qualities of a formal organization. Its main activities are defined by the procedures in the NSP operations manual, as interpreted and applied by the Facilitating Partner organization. In its local contexts it relates strongly with a range of both informal and more formal organizational and individual actors. For example, CDCs are frequently linked to the customary practice of communal labour projects in Afghanistan, ashar. The CDC is essentially a deliberative body, and as such has much in common with customary forms of decision-making in Afghanistan such as jirga. However, it also has important differences to these customary institutions in respect to its elected basis, and access to resources through the NSP. One of the ways in which CDCs vary prominently in their institutional features is according to how they managing female participation in decision-making. The following variations have been observed in the full range of AREU’s research, not only the sites examined in this case study, which are noted next with the pertinent type. See Table 3 below for a summary of CDC elections and configurations from an earlier dataset comprising 29 communities. This categorization is meant to demonstrate the variation possible along a primary dimension of inclusion, that of women, not to suggest that other variations are not possible, for example in terms of age or ethnicity. •
Standard mixed CDC: The NSP operations manual indicates that ideally each community should have a single CDC and that measures should be taken to ensure that women are able to participate in both electing and being elected to that council. None of the four sites conformed to this configuration.
•
Segregated elected male and female shuras: While technically speaking a single CDC, in practice most CDCs have two bodies that meet separately, one for men and one for women. In some cases the women’s council is elected by women, in some cases it is selected with the social organizers in order to allow women’s participation where women were not elected. This is the most common outcome and in the study sites was observed in Sayghan District, Bamiyan, and in Injil, Herat, among the study sites.
•
Segregated elected male and appointed female shuras: In some cases the elections result in an all-male CDC, either because electors only elected males, or because the election only permitted males to vote and be elected to begin with. Often the FP and the community select a female shura in an attempt to meet the requirements of the program. In Balkh, Dawlatabad District, the male CDC members appointed two female CDC members after the election, who then provided input only occasionally and through interlocutors.
•
Male-only CDC: Sometimes a mixed election produces a single, all-male council. In other cases, very restrictive local norms may combine with FP practice to allow only the formation of a male CDC by selection. In Behsud, Nangarhar, it appeared there was a female CDC in name only, though some project funds had been allocated to them.
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The operational description of a CDC suggests a persistent institution with a fixed membership. In reality, however, this and other research show that this theoretical description significantly misrepresents the reality of CDCs in the Afghan context. For example, as just seen, the membership of CDCs varies. It is also clear that the degree to which they have a persistent existence (ie regular meetings) beyond the period of administering the block grant or being called to order by the FP, is very limited in some places. For example, in Dawlatabad, CDC members noted that the CDC did not meet regularly as it was still waiting for funds to manage. A CDC may look like an institution with an organizational form due to its mobilization in relation to outside resources and observation, but it is much more likely that its autonomous existence on the organizational level is less consistent. This picture of the actual functioning of CDCs must be considered when analyzing the capacity that CDCs may enjoy. While they have shown considerable capacity to enable female participation and community deliberation over development projects, this capacity is very strongly linked to the resources that the NSP provides via the block grants. Delays in the delivery of those resources, or project completion, are associated with reduced CDC capacity to produce the governance outcomes described in section 4. Variation in CDC capacity is related more to the capacity of its principal formal linkage, that with the FP. Where the FPs have more manpower, resources, and experience, the CDC generally displays more robust governance outcomes that where not. This variation is more important than regional differences, with the exception of strongly tribal areas of Nangarhar, where the context dictated that CDC activity would be more strictly delimited to selecting and managing the project associated with the block grant, and would not venture into other governance activities. 3.3 Leadership and membership, decision-making, resources The process for electing CDCs is well-defined in the operations manual for NSP, and is based on one person – one vote in a secret ballot in which men and women are eligible to be elected. Specific candidates are prohibited and 40% of the eligible voters must vote for the election to be valid. In addition, the program stipulates that the election be based on “clusters” of not more than “about” 20 families divided on a geographical (ie by neighbourhood) basis, each of which elects one representative. The manual outlines some steps to deal with especially large (>300 families) communities and allows flexibility in how the ballot boxes and ballots themselves are managed to best allow women’s voting and ensure secrecy of the ballot.27 However, research carried out by AREU has shown that the actual process of electing CDCs has widely varied. This variation was most often related to the way that women’s participation was handled, but also involved the use of clusters and candidacy to represent other groups. In the current and previous AREU research the following types of elections have been identified:
27
National Solidarity Program (2004), 15-17.
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•
Standard: In these cases the elections were conducted largely in line with the manual. The community was divided into clusters of families based on location, and each cluster elected one representative from amongst its number. All electors were able to vote for people of either gender, and candidacy and campaigning were prohibited. This was observed in Injil District, Herat among the present cases.
•
Standard with separate male and female elections: This method echoed the standard election, but in addition to dividing the community by geographic criteria the elections for men and women were separated – men voted only for men and women only for women.
•
Standard with consociational and gender-specific clusters: In some cases clusters may be organized by subtribe rather than spatial location, to ensure representation of all community groups at least among males. In addition, female clusters are identified to ensure female representation, and the outcome was a single mixed-gender CDC.
•
Male-only elections: A standard election but which only involved male electors electing an all-male council. Where this method is used a separate female council was later appointed. This was observed in Balkh, Dawlatabad district, where two females were appointed as members by the elected male council. In Behsud, Nangarhar, no female CDC appeared to be elected or appointed, though resources were directed to “women’s projects”.
•
Parallel elections: Two elections, one for a men’s council, and one for a women’s. Both men and women were for eligible for both elections, effectively casting one vote for men, then one for women. In the four present cases Sayghan District in Bamiyan, carried out separate election in which there was no secrecy for the female election.
•
Candidacy: Male election held with candidates, while the female election was based on clusters.
•
Cluster selection: In some cases, the FP’s social organizers identified a candidate for each cluster, and either through voting or selection this candidate was confirmed as the representative seemingly eliminating the element of choice through secret ballot.
•
Selection: In one case there was no election, the community and social organizers simply selected the council. This seemed to be related to both weak facilitation and took place in areas of considerable local insecurity due to insurgency.
Previous AREU research covering 29 communities did not find systematic regional variation in these election types, with each type being represented in more than one province. Neither did the identity of the FP prove decisive, with some FPs involved in more than one type. The probable explanation for variation involves some combination of local norms combined with the capacity and strategy of different provincial FP offices in confronting these.
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Table 3: Observed election and CDC organization in 29 CDCs28 Election Type
No.
Province/FPs •
Standard
14
Faryab/ACTED
•
Bamiyan/UN-H
•
7
Herat/DACAAR
•
•
Standard Separate
No. 4
2
2
Badakshan/ACTED
Badakshan/AKF
Herat/DACAAR
3
•
Faryab/ACTED
2
•
Nangarhar/BRAC
2
1
•
Faryab/ACTED29
1
Male-only Election
2
•
Nangarhar/BRAC
2
Parallel
1
•
Bamiyan/AKF
1
Candidacy
1
•
Herat/DACAAR
1
Cluster Selection
2
•
Nangarhar/BRAC
2
Selection
1
•
Nangarhar/BRAC
1
29
Segregated elected male and female councils
4
•
Mixed CDC
1
•
Male-only CDC (no females elected)
1
•
Mixed CDC
2
•
Segregated elected male CDC and appointed female council
2
•
Mixed CDC
2
•
Segregated elected male CDC and appointed female council
1
•
Mixed CDC
1
•
Segregated elected male and female councils
3
•
Mixed CDC
2
•
Segregated elected male and female councils
2
•
Mixed CDC
1
•
Segregated elected male CDC and appointed female council
2
•
Segregated elected male and female councils
1
•
Segregated elected male and female councils
1
•
Segregated elected male and female councils30
2
•
Male-only CDC
1
2
•
29
28
No.
•
4
Standard Consociational
Total:
CDC Organisation
29
Nixon (2008b), 20-21. This case combined the second and third election methods: there were clusters based on subtribes among men, as well as three separate female-only clusters. 30 These two CDCs were located in a large community that was split into two for implementation, but only one female shura was selected between them. 29
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This larger dataset demonstrates that a range of different election types and resulting CDC structures were found in provinces across the country. The standard model of CDC election defined in the NSP procedures was found in four of the five provinces where communities were studied, but at the same time this model only accounted for half of the communities overall. This variation is therefore due to local factors that cannot be generalized to the provincial level. A possible exception is Nangarhar, where no communities studied in the prior study held a standard election. The second most common model was a separate election among men and women for male and female members respectively. This model could lead to the creation of either mixed or segregated councils, except a single case where only a male council was formed. The more dramatic deviations from the standard NSP model were relatively infrequent. The forms of CDC formation that were least inclusive or participatory, or that were not elections at all, tended to be adaptations to restrictive gender norms at the community level – women’s councils were appointed (whether at cluster level or community level) to offset restrictions on women’s ability to vote. In Nangarhar the FP did in three cases forego an election altogether, although it is not clear if this is due to inability or lack of effort to overcome such restrictions.31 CDCs operate under the leadership of four officers, a chair, a vice-chair, a treasurer, and a secretary. The precise breakdown of roles among these offices is at times unclear, but they have a primary role in convening meetings, chairing them (particularly important during open community meetings, for example to draw up the community development plan), recording activities such as expenditures, and posting such information in public places. There is also variation concerning how the leadership of the CDC is selected: •
Selection by CDC consensus;
•
Selection according to vote totals: The CDC member who received the most votes became the Chair, the next highest vice-Chair, and subsequently Treasurer and Secretary.
•
Election by CDC: CDC members voted for officers in a secret ballot.
•
Election by community: Community members voted for the officers from among elected CDC members.
•
Officials elected one-by-one: The community elected each position in turn from among candidates, as part of a candidacy-based election for the CDC itself.
•
Appointed by community
A wide range of interpretations exist among FPs and regions about how to choose CDC officers, and the Operations Manuals give relatively little guidance on this issue. In the previous AREU work just mentioned these variations in leadership selection seemed to be most related to FP practice in a given province combined with the lack or presence 31
Other studies indicates that careful facilitation and use of Islamic teachings can be successful in overcoming these restrictions even in very conservative settings, but require time: Boesen (2004), 57.
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of particularly highly regarded individuals, or those seen as having particular skills. In one of the present cases, in Sayghan, Bamiyan, the head of the CDC was replaced after a short time with a new head when the community became dissatisfied with project progress and implementation quality. The new head was appointed without election, and had skills the community valued due to his work with another NGO: I was working with [NGO name] and in my absence people nominated me to be the head of the CDC. I did not accept, and other members were elected. After some time passed, the CDC members could not do their work very effectively. Projects were not successful and people feared that they would fail. People invited me to work as the head of the CDC along with my work with [organization name], where I would work only one day a week. Though I was not keen I accepted the position, when the four CDC members asked me to take over. (Male head of CDC, Sayghan District, Bamiyan) Upon the establishment of the CDC, FPs assist in facilitating a series of both CDC and community level meetings to establish a community development plan (CDP). This CDP consists of a list of sub-projects chosen and prioritized by the community. The operations manual disallows certain projects and at times certain types of projects have been added to those disallowed – for example this disallowed list included mosques from the outset and later diesel generating sets were added. This plan should also detail community contributions and the manner of inclusion of women and vulnerable individuals among project beneficiaries.32 In Balkh, the study site experienced two projects being blocked for this reason, in one case budgetary, and in another because the proposal was for agricultural implements. In a similar case among the present four, a Behsud, Nangarhar community selected a clinic, but this project was disallowed by the Ministry of Health due to its non-conformity with ministerial health planning. Upon the approval of the sub-proposals for projects, CDCs are meant to form project management committees comprising a subset of members. Block grant disbursements for one or more sub-project come via the oversight consultant to an account in the national bank, and are managed either through bank accounts held by the CDCs, registered hawalas, or in cash, and typically are made available in three installments of 50, 40, and 10% following the meeting of spending criteria reported periodically via the FP. A major issue nationwide during recent years has been the late disbursement of second and third tranches, significantly damaging the progress of projects and the legitimacy of the program, the FPs, and potentially the government in the eyes of the community members.33 In addition to the block grant of $200 per household, subproject proposals require a 10% community contribution in kind, cash or labor, and this should not include donations of land for projects by private individuals. Information is given in section 5 about the projects selected in the study sites and their potential and actual impact on livelihoods outcomes. These resources so far represent the primary motivation for the formation of CDCs, and the related determination of priorities, application for funding, and 32 33
National Solidarity Programme (2004), 11 and 24. For more information on the dynamics of this late disbursement problem see Nixon (2007), 8.
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implementation of sub-projects are the main activities that CDCs throughout the country pursue. In many cases, where CDCs take on additional roles, such as conflict resolution, these can often be traced to the imperative to meet program requirements for receiving the funds. The NSP’s dual objectives, of community driven development and improved local governance, are predicated on a transition from the legitimacy gained through access to and management of these funds, to a broader legitimacy for CDCs as local governance institution. The current state of this transition is outlined in sections 4 and 5. 3.4 Monitoring and evaluation, conflict resolution The formal monitoring and evaluation arrangements for CDCs are relatively weak. The NSP implementation cycle essentially casts the FP in the role of community “ally” in that the FP is responsible for ensuring the community meets program requirements at various points in the cycle. In addition, the FP’s own contractual position is conditioned by its success in helping CDCs meet these requirements – for example, FP contract extension or continuation is made contingent on 80% of sub-project submissions meeting NSP requirements, and similar requirements cover the implementation of sub-projects.34 Against this FP “ally” role is the provincial and district NSP/OC office role in appraising and approving sub-projects and monitoring CDC election, deliberation and implementation of sub-projects. This monitoring role for the NSP/OC is weakened by two factors. The first is that these offices only have capacity to do monitoring on a “sample” basis, even on paper, and therefore are not in most communities directly monitoring progress in an ongoing way.35 Secondly, the main route for such monitoring involves flawed incentives. Under the NSP procedures, the FP is responsible for monthly physical and financial reporting on projects by receiving monthly reports from the community, and then summarizing them in monthly reports of their own to the NSP office. However, as observed above, the FP is also the main facilitator of the CDCs ability to meet these requirements by filling in the forms, and has a vested interest in reporting successful project implementation. It is likely this system that has created a widely observed disconnect between the reported aggregate “success” of the NSP and many reports of flawed sub-project implementation by individuals or communities appearing in media or other sources. However, this is not to say that the program has not been largely successful in bringing rural development activities, but rather that current monitoring and evaluation arrangements may not fully support early recognition of problems. It is important also to note that several FPs have internal independent monitoring and evaluation systems that are well-suited to compensate for this shortcoming in program design, another indication that FP capacity is an important factor in determining the governance performance of CDCs in the area of community development. This configuration of monitoring actors will change in the course of transition to NSP II, with the loss of the community “ally” in the FP, and the fusing of the facilitation and 34 35
National Solidarity Program (2004), 21. Ibid., 25.
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appraisal functions in the CLDD department of the district NSP offices. This change in structure is likely to significantly realign incentives surrounding the relationships between the community and its organizational counterparts at district and provincial level, likely weakening monitoring functions. Community members are also meant to have a role in monitoring and evaluation of sub-project progress. There is some downward accountability built in to the system through the process of community meetings for determining the community development plan and the posting of budgets and progress notices in the community by CDCs. However, these mechanisms (provision of information, consultation) are relatively weak, and do not provide a clear avenue for monitoring problems to be communicated to authorities. In place of such a mechanism, as will be seen in section 4, communities have in some sites taken issues arising from CDC performance to local authorities such as District Governors or maliks. Such relationships are unforeseen in the NSP program design but constitute an important linkage with local governance structures, a linkage mediated by pre-existing community relations with those structures. For example, the degree of trust and legitimacy enjoyed by district authorities in the community will influence the likelihood of this relationship being formed. Conflict resolution among CDCs should be understood in relation to the dual goals of the NSP program. In respect to the community development function there is wide evidence of CDC involvement in conflict resolution relating to NSP implementation. One area of active conflict resolution among CDCs was in the selection of joint projects between more than one NSP community. For example, the study site in Dawlatabad, Balkh, had a conflict of interest concerning where the one school for it and a neighbouring village should be built, in the context of funding under JICA’s Inter-communal Rural Development Program (IRDP) which clusters CDCs for joint projects. They eventually settled on building the school in the middle of the villages, but that decision was made quicker because both villages were concerned that if they kept arguing and did not decide, the project would not be funded at all: People of our cluster had some problems about place of our school and they wanted that school should be in their village so finally we selected a place which is in the middle and everyone agreed. We told for people if we argue a lot and we can not make decision about school so we will miss our school and the JICA will never give the money for us. (Male CDC Member, Balkh, June 2007) Other similar cases from previous AREU research suggest that the resources available to the CDC through the program are an important incentive in generating some legitimacy for conflict resolution functions, and the role of CDCs in resolving conflict not related to NSP implementation was much more mediated by local governance institutions already in existence. 3.5 Changes since formation
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The formation of CDCs as described in this report reflects the situation under the first phase of the NSP. In 2007 a second phase was introduced, mainly focusing on the expansion of the program to new communities. In this second phase the oversight arrangements are altered to give more responsibility to the local departments of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, through the formation of a Community and Local Development Department (CLDD). This new department has staff at district level, but will likely not have the manpower of the FPs, and will be institutionally fused with the local implementation mechanism. Upward accountability is therefore likely to be weakened in this second phase. In respect to existing CDCs, the lack of longitudinal data in single sites limits the ability to assess change. However, there is evidence that early CDCs experience a decline in meeting frequency and participation upon the completion of sub-projects, reflecting the general finding that FP capacity and the resources of the block grant are important factors in the institutionalization process, and that the current NSP cycle perhaps does not entrench that institutionalization process sufficiently to ensure the formation of a persistent institution, as outlined in section 3.2. 4. Institutional design and governance outcomes 4.1 Inclusion Community Development Councils are designed to improve the inclusion of marginalized groups including women in decision-making processes concerning community development activities and over time in local governance processes more generally. One key indicator for the degree of this inclusion is the nature of elections that are held to form the CDCs. The level of involvement of the community in these elections, the adherence to the NSP manual concerning the formation of CDC councils and the subsequent power relations that characterize the relationship between the community and the CDC council determine the level of inclusion of those who are supposed to be covered by the institution as described in section 2.2. The CDCs are designed for the inclusion of all sections of a community into decision making processes through elections based on clusters of households as described in section 3 above. The clusters were selected with regard to geographic location, economic state and ethno-linguistic character. In all the case locations the male CDC council was formed with representatives from clusters, thus ensuring a higher degree of inclusion on the male CDCs than would be found in customary decision-making structures, whether focused on a malik or arbab, or on jirga or shura type structures. For example, in Dawlatabad two small Tajik settlements that were not involved with the majority Hazara community in previous governance arrangements were included through this household clustering process. A household survey carried out during the mid-term review of the NSP in 2006 found that a large majority of those surveyed, both CDC members and not, remarked on the “unity”, “solidarity”, and “working
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together” that had been brought about by the creation of CDCs, indicating that a perception of inclusion is widespread in NSP communities.36 However, this inclusion has limitations compared to the program design in one main area: the type of election held, in particular in relation to female participation. The formal procedures of NSP imply full inclusion of women in CDC formation as well as decision making processes. The standard model of CDC election defined in the NSP procedures was found among all the cases of election of male CDCs. However, the election by secret ballot of female representatives based on clusters was only found in Injil district in Herat province. The parallel elections for the CDCs in the Injil site were also held according to the NSP manual in both the first and the second rounds, and this is the only community among the ones studied where this occurred. These elections were held separately and resulted in the formation of separate male and female CDCs. The women’s CDCs was perceived by the community as well as the CDC members as a sub-committee of the male CDC. In the other three sites women were either selected by the male members of the community (Dawlatabad), elected in a non-secret ballot (Sayghan), or had an unclear status if any (Behsud). In one of the two cases where re-election had occurred (Sayghan), the second election for the CDC did not include women at all and the same female members remained members. This is clear evidence that even second-round CDC elections do not necessarily represent the institutionalization of women’s inclusion in selecting representatives. There were different processes for the inclusion of males and females into the CDC in Dawlatabad. The election for the male CDCs was held according to the NSP manual though secret ballots. However, the males did not allow for elections to be held for the women, and 2 female members were chosen for the CDC by the male members of the community. This implies a particularly strong cultural constraint in the involvement of women in CDCs here, and belies the notion that this is mainly a problem in conservative Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. The election for the male CDC in the village researched in Sayghan district of Bamiyan province was held by secret ballot. The head was chosen in absentia, however he did not accept the position as he was working for an NGO. When the subsequent choice for the CDC head was determined to be incompetent after some time, the CDC members and the community requested the person again to work as the head of the CDC. He subsequently agreed. This example illustrates the perception of communities of people that work for NGOs as capable of assuming the responsibility of a CDC head. Also, the head was first chosen by election, but then later by a consensus among the people on who would be best suitable for the job. This example occurs in other contexts as well, and the outcome is dependent upon the reputation, evidence of previous successful work and the availability of such persons in the community. In the second round of elections, ballot boxes were not used, and a raising of hands constituted of the election process, indicating that the procedures for inclusion had not been firmly institutionalized. 36
86% of those surveyed, and 90% of women, gave this description of CDC impact on governance: Barakat et al. (2006), 84.
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The women’s election was held by writing names on pieces of paper and putting them on a table in full view, therefore no secrecy was allowed for women’s elections. In the second round of elections, no election of any sorts was allowed, and the head of the women’s CDC was chosen at random. However, the same female CDC head was confirmed by this process, and some female members of the community expressed that there was some corruption in the selection of this particular female CDC head as well as in her activities. On the whole, the determination of the inclusion of women in the election and formation of female members or CDCs is dependent on the decisions of the male community members. However, the relationship between female participation in the election, and their participation in the processes of the council itself, was not a simple or linear one. While in some cases women were included fully in the electoral procedures, their participation in the actual meetings appeared to suffer through the formation of segregated councils in order to allow local norms regarding female participation to be observed while still meeting the requirement of the program to include women. Box 2: Addressing local norms of exclusion: The case of a non-study site in Dawlatabad district in Balkh points to the importance of the local Mullah in mediating these local customary norms, especially in relation to formation of female CDCs. A social organizer noted that the community was not willing to have a female CDC at all. By involving the local Mullah, who convinced the community through examples of the Holy Prophet’s wife and daughters being involved in their community, an election for the female CDC took place. This strategy for promoting the inclusion of women has been reported among other FPs in non-study sites in other parts of the country, including tribal Pashtun Paktia.37 This pattern echoes the earlier AREU work over 29 communities, amongst which the most common model was a separate election among men and women for male and female members respectively. This model could lead to the creation of either mixed or segregated councils. Most prevalent was the male CDC being the main CDC, and the female CDC being perceived as a sub-committee of the main CDC and meeting separately.38 However, it should be emphasized that even this degree of nuanced and truncated inclusion of women in either the community development or governance functions of CDCs is a considerable advance over reported female involvement through any other governance structure dealt with in this study, and the variation found probably reflects FP efforts to adapt to a variety of local norms regarding the inclusion of women. 4.2 Representation The main indicator available for representation as a governance outcome of CDCs is the participatory aspects of the process for selecting sub-projects and the structure of the CDC in organizing this process. A secondary indicator of representation is the 37 38
Kakar (2005), 26. See Nixon (2008b).
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continuation or not of regular meetings beyond the process of selecting and implementing sub-projects, with the implication being that regular meetings would indicate continued representation in potential wider governance functions for CDCs. Respondents across the sites stated that the projects were selected by the “people” themselves, with the Facilitating Partners acting as approvers of the decisions made. The procedures and practices used for meetings vary widely. While researchers did not directly observe the process of developing CDPs due to their short engagement with communities, qualitative accounts of project selection did provide interesting insight into the process of choosing development priorities within Afghan communities under NSP. In almost all cases in the larger study CDC members described a process of consensus-building in deciding on the sub-projects to be included in the CDP. This process always involved repeated meetings to achieve consensus, and sometimes a large number of meetings or considerable controversy: Discussion about the CDP took a long time, about three months of weekly meetings. We brought all the villagers together and we made a list of all the village problems, which were 18. ACTED suggested we reduce the number of projects to the most important. By comparing with the budget and referring the list back to the whole village, we gave priority to the three projects of greatest need. (CDC member of mixed CDC, Pashtun Kot, Faryab, 2005) The discussion for the CDP was very heated. Everyone presses for his/her specific project. After 21 days of long argument we all agreed. (CDC member of mixed CDC, Yawkawlang, Bamiyan, 2006) This process of consensus building appeared to aim at choosing projects that would benefit the widest range of community members, and its prevalence suggests that the attempts to build NSP on existing Afghan norms of consensus decision-making are quite well-founded. Even when project selection was carried out by a series of community votes, getting to unanimity seemed to be important. This process of consensus— building indicates some potential for pro-poor development represented by participation of the community in CDP development, to the degree that the deliberations are not directed by customary powerholders but rather genuinely reflect perspectives from newly included populations. In the Dawlatabad, Balkh case the CDC head noted that the Tajik minority in the community “might not have been involved in NSP as they were only a few families” and that the “people and the CDC” made the decision about projects, indicating that inclusion of minority groups may be facilitated by the structure of the program. This effect presumably may increase as clustering initiatives scale up project activities. In the Sayghan district study site the CDC chair of the Tajik community noted that the initiation of a clustered project for a dam with neighbouring Hazara communities has led to increased cooperation, despite a recent history of conflict and forced displacement between Hazara and Tajik groups in the area covered by the four villages involved in the cluster. It is probable that where local governance has previously been focused on institutions that consist largely of single actors, such as maliks, landowners or commanders, this increased representation is more significant due to the collective basis of the CDC:
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…the CDC works together and talks with each other and then decides, but the malik is one person and he decides by himself and does whatever he wants. (Male CDC member, Behsud, Nangarhar, 2007) The most significant example of this collective approach and its positive effects was in Injil, Herat. Here respondents stated that participation to the planning meetings was open to all members of the community and that the village elders attended the meetings regularly. All of these processes indicate a fairly formalized internal set of procedures relating to project selection, suggesting that in respect to the first goal of NSP – community development – the institution of the CDC has taken on a significant presence in the community. A partial exception was in Bamiyan, where some non-CDC community members noted that after the election “the CDC does not meet or consult with people. It only consults with people in their favor.” In this community some respondents claimed that this resulted in problems with water intake placement, and produced a failed training course and generator project due to the community’s non-acceptance of user fees for those projects. As noted above, the community and the CDC subsequently acted to replace the head of the CDC with another individual who was perceived to have more skills, outside NSP procedures. This indicates that informal problem solving may play a positive role in leadership selection, and that democratically-based selection procedures do not always produce the best final institutional outcomes. When there was a conflict with NSP rules, the Facilitating Partners intervened, and a different project was selected. In a village in Dawlatabad district in Balkh, for example, the CDC first decided on an irrigation project and an agricultural tools project. The CDC then decided on generators, road gravelling and animal husbandry for women after being informed that their prior choices presented problems of budget or conformity with NSP rules. At first glance then, the degree of representation both through male representatives from clusters, and popular participation, suggests a level of representation in project selection that is quite high and reported as satisfactory by most respondents, but which can be heavily mediated by program rules. As with inclusion, a principal problematic area for representation is the participation of female representatives in decision-making. The involvement of female CDC members in the decision-making process regarding project selection is significantly lower across all the sites studied than that of men. Decision-making and discussion in some cases took place in “male space”, such as during Friday prayers at the community mosque (Dawlatabad). Further to this, a female CDC member in the same district complained that they did not have guidance from the male CDC members, implying that the self-perception of female CDCs was that of a sub-ordinate committee to the male CDC. A male CDC member from the same village expressed that when the female CDC members came to him for advice, he provided them with assistance. This patriarchal relationship appears in different forms all over the areas studied, and is reflected in a common description of information flowing from the male council to females, but not the reverse. The decision-making potential of women also seems to be hindered by illiteracy of the female CDC members, tied with restrictions on communication with male CDC members.
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This pattern persisted during the implementation of sub-projects. In Sayghan district of Bamiyan, for example, a female CDC member complained that when they asked for their share of the project money from the male CDC members, they were told to not meddle in CDC affairs. A female CDC member in Injil district in Herat complained that the male CDC members had been keeping their money and would not let them have it. The male CDC member from the same village expressed that they were holding the money to build a public bath, which could be used by everyone. However, the female CDC members were not interested in a public bath, and appeared to be resigned to the fact that no public bath would even appear. Overall, there may be a counter-intuitive effect on representation that appears through the segregation of male and female councils. The creation of a separate female council may facilitate the participation of women in voting for, and sitting, on CDC bodies, by helping to diffuse the effects of local customary norms surrounding the participation of women in local governance. At the same time, this participation runs the risk of being directed only towards “women’s problems”, and the facilitation of the FP and the selection of projects with benefits across gender divides are important in conditioning the effects of this separation. Beyond the representation of women in decision-making processes, the design of NSP elections and project processes is intended to facilitate the inclusion of other groups. As noted above, in Dawlatabad district, Balkh, the inclusion of minority Tajiks living in the NSP community was facilitated, and it was reported that the project selection benefited this group and drew on their input. In Injil District of Herat, respondents confirmed the inclusion of all groups, but it was not clear from the respondents if this represented a dramatic change from customary processes, which had been centred on five arbabs previously. A possible explanation is that the community had three distinct qawm groups (Tajik, Popalzai, and Farahi) in relative balance, rather than a clearer minority-majority situation. In addition, the effect on ethnic or qawm representation is demonstrably stronger where scales are increased through clustering. The second indicator of representation examined is the pattern of regular meetings of CDCs beyond its functions of project selection and implementation, implying the degree of representation in other, perhaps wider governance activity. The frequency of CDC meetings appears to have decreased in the sites studied which had completed their first projects moved beyond the selection and implementation of the local development “sub-projects”. However, in the two sites where a follow-on program to NSP, the above-mentioned Intercommunal Rural Development Program (IRDP) was introduced (Dalawlatabad, Sayghan), providing funds for joint projects with other communities, this effect was less. Overall, there is strong evidence that the selection of projects and their implementation is an important driver of continued CDC activity, again reinforcing the finding that while they do bring important changes to local governance, this is still dependent on their other role as community development organizations. It also suggests that clustering should be linked to resources to produce such an outcome for representation by providing a reason for continued meetings. A potential, though not prescribed, wider governance function of CDCs as forums for community dispute resolution shows diverse variations across the sites. This variation is determined by the legitimacy of conflict settlement authority prescribed to
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mullahs, maliks, uluswals, elders and other shuras, and their individual interactions with the CDCs. These relations are reflected in the institutional mapping in 4.6 below and in the discussion of variations among the sites studied. This is not surprising as it is important to note that dispute resolution outside of project selection is not a role formally prescribed to CDCs at this juncture, though it has formed part of some FP’s supplementary programming. However, it can be presumed that it such activity would be considered locally as an important governance function should CDCs be prescribed as formalized governance bodies, to the exclusion of other entities. This matter is a crucial consideration for the future of policy towards CDCs, as the resolution of disputes is likely a principal local governance function beyond the management of common resources, whether endogenous or external to the community.
4.3 Responsiveness Responsiveness of CDCs as an institution again must be viewed through the dual goals of the program. The first indicator is thus the degree to which project selection appears to respond to the expressed needs of the community through their inclusion and representation described above. The responsiveness of CDCs to their constituencies in the area of local development has generally been reported positively, with all sites noting that the projects selected reflected mainly the views of the “people” of the community, barring the partial exception of Sayghan, Bamiyan. This partial exception is important, however, in that it illustrates the importance of canvassing non-CDC member opinion, something that has generally been underplayed in prior research. This responsiveness was mitigated in two ways. In two cases (Dawlatabad, Behsud) the first choice of project was refused due to either budget or NSP rules, thus decreasing the responsiveness of the institution to expressed community preferences. Secondly, two projects, both diesel generators, were viewed as relatively unsuccessful due to high running costs (Sayghan, Dawlatabad). More generally in AREU research, even though some CDCs may have less successful projects than other ones, there is a perception across the regions studied that the problems were not with the CDC per se, but with for example, late block grant disbursement. The second indicator of responsiveness in respect to wider governance functions is drawn from respondents’ description of the role of CDCs in responding to problems. In practice, this role appears most frequently in terms of conflict resolution, though as noted above this is not a prescribed CDC function at the time of writing. In the study areas conflict resolution is currently being undertaken by different institutions. Across the areas researched, these functions were conducted by maliks, uluswals, village elders or a combination of these varying across locality, with the involvement of CDCs cited in only a few cases, usually conflicts related to the community development aspect of the program. The seriousness of the conflict also determined which conflict resolving body was approached. In Sayghan District Center in Bamiyan, the involvement of CDCs in dispute resolution appears to be the highest among the cases studied. Multiple respondents stated that in some way, the CDC is involved. One of the reasons cited by a male CDC member was
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that because the uluswal was a good person, when villagers approached him for dispute settlement, he referred them to the CDC of their village. In general, variations in the role of CDCs in dispute resolution depended on locally specific relations between the uluswal, maliks (where present, as in Behsud), and customary dispute resolution institutions. Box 3: Dispute Resolution in Sayghan, Bamiyan This CDC appears to have had a conflict with the community which was taken to the uluswal for resolution. The uluswal was perceived as the legitimate body for solving the problem between the CDC and the community, while according to the NSP procedures, upward accountability of CDCs is towards MRRD through independent monitoring and evaluation. However, the uluswal was not able to solve the conflict between the CDC and the community, and eventually the problem was solved through discussion between the concerned parties, and everyone agreed that the uluswal had wasted their time. This could have had a positive impact upon the legitimacy of the CDC as a problem solving institution. Indeed, multiple respondents stated that the CDC was approached in various instances for problem solving. The uluswal was still another persistent avenue for this purpose, but since the uluswal was reported to have a good relationship with the CDC, he often referred the problem back to the CDC. Again, the degree of responsiveness to the female constituency is lower. Also in Sayghan, a male CDC member expressed the CDC’s commitment to solve the villagers’ problems as much as possible. However, the involvement of the female CDC was minimal. A female CDC member reported that when problems arose in the village, the head of the male CDC was referred to, and the female CDC was not involved at all. In the most extreme case responsiveness to female constituents appeared to be almost nil beyond the project cycle: CDC members should assist in us in the resolution of our problems. When we told them about the problems that us women face in our village, they told us that we should just sit at home and not try to get involved in these kinds of men’s problems and men’s activities. (Female CDC member, Dawlatabad, July 2007) There was also considerable disjuncture in three of the four sites between the main means of resolving problems and disputes reported by male CDC members and FP staff on the one hand, and other community members or female CDC members on the other. In Nangarhar, Behsud district, the malik and the male members of the community interviewed who did not sit on the CDC both said that disputes and community problems were dealt with by a shura of local elders. However, CDC members reported a preference for CDC involvement in problem-solving. The CDC in Behsud also displayed a significant difference between the CDC of this community and the others studied, in that it was involved in poppy eradication and security. In Bamiyan, while the CDC and male respondents referred to a CDC role, female respondents stated that elders or male CDC members were responsible for solving problems. Similarly, in Herat, Injil district, female respondents noted that the arbab resolved problems in the community, whereas the male CDC claimed that they did, possibly with the engagement of the district governor.
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These differences reflect a more general trend found in the larger dataset of divergences between different respondents reporting on the dispute resolution roles of CDCs against pre-existing institutions. These divergences have to some degree been obscured by previous research on CDCs that has tended to focus on CDC members as respondents, in part because much of it has been carried out by FPs themselves.39 Such research probably over-represents the autonomous CDC role in dispute resolution as it draws mainly on CDC members as respondents. However, these disjunctures may not reflect inaccurate responses alone. Rather, it appears that CDCs act in conjuction with the customary dispute resolution institutions in many cases, depending on the local institutional context and the nature of the dispute. In short, dispute resolution displays a hybrid form between introduced and customary institutions. There must be a distinction drawn between the institutional performance of CDCs in relation to their function as a manager and conduit of development assistance, and their potential functions as an established local governance institution. While the overall responsiveness on the former dimension can be assessed as positive, on the latter there is much more variation, and less evidence of a persistent or independent role. However, in areas where local conflict resolution capacity in customary institution is degraded, and there is a positive attitude from the uluswal, or other institutions, CDCs can play a significant role. This should be considered carefully when thinking about future CDC roles and programming. 4.4 Accountability CDCs are in theory, accountable to their constituency, as well as to the Provincial Rural Development authorities. Upward accountability is formally speaking established through the role of the provincial or district office of the Oversight Consultant. The issue of accountability of CDCs is complicated by the fact that Facilitating Partners are the sources of data through which monitoring is done, as well as facilitating the projects. However, in reality this role is largely limited to monitoring project progress through the Facilitating Partner. The primary channel of monitoring can therefore become conflated with the implementation activities of the Facilitating Partner. This problem for upward accountability is discussed in section 3.4 on monitoring and evaluation above. If problems arise during the implementation of projects, the CDCs are supposed to go to the PRRD offices at the provincial level, through the Facilitating Partner, again possibly confounding incentives for independent accountability to emerge. In addition, since PRRDs may be far away, more often the problems are referred to the uluswals. The reaction from the uluswal is highly dependent on the relationship of that uluswal with the CDC in the community. The constitution of a project management committee from the CDC members with a separate mandate to manage the implementation of sub-projects is intended to strengthen downward or internal accountability by setting this body apart from the
39
Though such research has valuable information on CDC composition and functioning as well. See for example, Ravnkilde (2007) and ACTED (2007).
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CDC as a whole. In practice, however, community members did not refer to this body, and its practical existence may be questioned. In fact, the accountability of the CDCs to their constituency for community development functions shows variations across the sites studied. For the most part, communities reported to be satisfied with the work that CDCs were doing in their communities, and seemed to have channels of communication open to raise issues to the CDC. However, they were not aware that CDCs were ultimately accountable to MRRD. The formation of CDCs across the sites studied show that the initial election seems to have been satisfactory for the people involved. Since CDCs were elected, there was a sense of legitimacy to it, which is of a different quality than that of a malik or arbab. In Injil, respondents noted positively not only the accountability of the CDC compared to the arbab, but this accountability had actually improved the responsiveness of the landowners to community concerns. Although these actors still possess some legitimacy in certain sites, the legitimacy seems to derive from personal qualities, social standing and past performance and is thus highly variable. The relative inattention found to re-election of CDCs nation-wide also means that community monitoring is not yet matched by an institutionalized electoral system of accountability that would support the effective functioning of the CDC through periodic election of members. In the two cases studied where a re-election took place, one (Injil) exhibited change of personnel, including the head and deputy head of the CDC, through re-election, showing a relatively positive tendency to downward accountability. In the second (Dawlatabad) this was not the case, and the CDC head was actually re-elected in absentia. It is not clear from the data if this difference was to do with endogenous community characteristics or institutional performance including FP performance. As noted above, the re-election process did not exhibit increased inclusion of women, and in one case a decline, indicating that electoral accountability of female representatives is not necessarily being institutionalized even in the case of a second election. 4.5 Adaptability and adaptive capacity All the four governance outcomes discussed above need to be strengthened for CDCs to become adaptable to the changing needs of their constituencies. While certain aspects of inclusion, representation, responsiveness and accountability can be viewed positively, particularly in relation to pre-existing institutions, it is clear from the evidence that these gains remain heavily dependent on the CDC’s role in community development and the financial and technical support this entitles them to under NSP or successor programs. The evidence from CDCs post-project meeting record and reelections do not suggest an institution that is yet persistent enough to adapt to changing circumstances easily. However, in the presence of additional resources and facilitation this weakness is considerably mitigated. The idea of introducing a bylaw to regulate CDC activities is an important political issue at the time of writing. This bylaw aims at granting CDCs formal legal status as the designated community governance institution and the point of contact for local government and other actors seeking to work in communities. The new CDC bylaw may
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play a major role in consolidating the CDC’s position in the communities. However, the problems pointed out by the Facilitating Partners on their consolidated position paper concerning the bylaw are pertinent to the ability of CDCs to transition from development oriented institutions to institutions of local governance. The problem of participation of female members of the community as well as female CDC members, the relationships between the uluswal, maliks, village elders and CDCs in dispute resolution, and the clarification and operationalization of measures of accountability are all unresolved.40 All these problems are reflected in the evidence from this study as well, as can be seen above. Overall, the adaptive capacity of CDCs is varied, but since the existence of CDCs as a persistent institution is probably still dependent on the level of support they receive, it is too early to speak in terms of an established institution with a high or low degree of adaptability, but rather we should speak in terms of how to increase the persistence of the institution first. The sustainability of the gains made in terms of inclusion, representation, responsiveness and accountability is thus still tenuous. Where these gains appeared to be being preserved, particularly in respect to inclusion and representation, it was through continued support in the form of clustering initiatives, which also showed the potential to expand that inclusion and representation to higher scales.
Table 4: Summary of variation on governance outcomes41 District
Facilitating Partner
Inclusion (election)
Representation (process and meetings)
Responsiveness (Project and problemsolving)
Sayghan, Bamiyan
UN Habitat
1st female election not secret
Female participation very limited in project selection and management
Mutual good relations and problem solving with district governor
2nd election done by selection Dawlatabad, Balkh
CHA
Female CDC members selected by men
Female participation strongly discouraged
Regular meetings, but only males
Injil, Herat
UN Habitat
Male and female separate elections but according to manual
Women’s CDC, viewed as subcommittee
Women note arbabs solve problems, while CDC says they do
Behsud, Nangarhar
BRAC
Female election did not occur
Conflict resolution with jirga members on small matters. Malik and uluswal negative and competitive relation with community institutions
40
NSP Facilitating Partners (2007). Columns for accountability and adaptability are omitted due to lack of major variations and the relative lack of adaptability discussed in section 4.5 above.
41
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4.6 Institutional Mapping The following maps display the focal institution and its governance relationships in the four sites studied across Afghanistan. The relationships between the institutions are displayed with the arrows which indicate whether a relationship exists (1), and a flow of information (1), influence (1), resources (1) or a combination of the three. The strongest relationship is represented by the thickest arrow which implies a relationship characterized by the flow of all three elements, whereas the thinnest arrow represents a relationship between the institutions that is not characterized by the flow of any of the three. A distinction is also made between organizations as defined above, denoted by squares, individual actors that act as agents of different institutions as denoted by triangles, and institutions that lack a defined membership, represented by circles. The variation across the sites occurs mainly along the relationship of CDCs with the pre-existing forms of governance in the community such as uluswals and the village representative (Malik, Arbab, and so on). The variations in the kind of relationships between institutions focused on individual actors such as uluswals and maliks and CDCs are numerous, and are largely dependent upon the public perception of the malik or uluswal, the respect awarded to the office and person, as well as their attitude towards CDCs, coupled with the capabilities of individual CDCs to solve problems of local governance. Other shuras also come in varying institutional contexts of their own, and their relationships to the CDCs are variegated. In the case of other shuras, it should be noted that community decisions, including the ones made by CDCs, invariably take into account the opinions of the community elites, such as the village elders and powerful residents. As such, other shuras and CDCs in many cases share the same people, elders and other elites who influence decisions as well as give legitimacy to them. The case evidence does not demonstrate systematic variation by province and it is important to emphasize this in describing some of the different institutional characteristics observed. Rather, local conditions of FP capacity, relations with district authorities, and pre-existing local governance institutions appear to be more important. In particular, pre-existing governance institutions focused on an individual actor appear more oppositional to CDC governance roles than those with a collective basis, such as jirgas or shuras, where a more hybrid form of governance may be emerging, combining the influence of these institutions with some for the CDC. The differences between the sites studied, in terms of the institutional context and other relevant factors, such as ethnic composition, and the capability of the facilitating partner, together with the constitution and activities of the CDCs are discussed below. The differences are examined as manifest in two sets of outcomes for the role prescribed to CDCs, namely as institutions to facilitate decision making concerning local development funds, and as the forums for local governance decisions.
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Community in Dawlatabad, Balkh
An interesting variation observed in relation to pre-existing institutions in this community was the assertion that the head of the CDC now replaced the role of qaryadar, apparently the only case among the study sites where the CDC institution was seen at least by its own membership as replacing a pre-existing institution. The head of the CDC also mentioned that he was the leader of the community and if another qaryadar was appointed, there would be a potential for conflict between the two leaders. Other respondents, however, stated that the head of the CDC also served as the qaryadar, thus prescribing a dual role to the same individual. The relationship of the CDC with the uluswal in the site studied appears to be civil rather than professional. The deputy of the male CDC expressed that the uluswal had been invited to social gatherings in the village. Also, the major problems cited by the male CDC members appears to be difficulties with the training process, problems with writing proposals in English, and other issues of a technical nature rather than areas of competition with other actors and institutions. On the whole, this map illustrates a tight network of relationships within the realm of the NSP program and its successor clustering initiative involving the newly formed
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district level planning body. The links to formal governance institutions are weaker, and largely mediated through the qaryadar role, which as noted already was seen to be contiguous with the CDC leadership.
Community in Sayghan, Bamiyan
In contrast to the preceding map, this network demonstrates greater integration between the NSP related nodes and the formal governance institutions, but via the role of the uluswal at the district level. This CDC appears to have had a conflict with the community which was taken to the uluswal for resolution. The uluswal was perceived as the legitimate body for solving the problem between the CDC and the community, while according to the NSP procedures, upward accountability of CDCs is towards MRRD through independent monitoring and evaluation. However, as described above the uluswal was not able to solve the conflict between the CDC and the community, and eventually the problem was solved through discussion between the concerned parties. This could have had a positive impact upon the legitimacy of the CDC as a problem solving institution. Indeed, multiple respondents stated that the CDC was approached in various instances for problem solving. The uluswal was still another persistent
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avenue for this purpose, but since the uluswal was reported to have a good relationship with the CDC, he often referred the problem back to the CDC. The uluswal himself stated that he prefers if the problems in the community were solved by the village elders rather than referred to him directly. The CDC head in this village appears to be a competent NGO worker from an elite landowner background. This may be a reason why the CDC has been able to maintain good relations with the uluswal. The uluswal in the district appears to be well liked and respected in the communities, and has linkages with various other institutions involved in community governance. He was instrumental in disarming the commanders in the district, as seen in the link towards the commander node. This could be one of the possible reasons for his high stature in the community. Members of the CLDD and DDA also stated that their relationship with the uluswal was a good one, illustrated by the network of relations between the uluswal and the higher level NSP-related nodes. The nomayenda in the site studied expressed that he had no power whatsoever in the community. As the representative of the people to the uluswal, this individual was only used as a messenger from the uluswal to the community. The villagers appeared to approach the uluswal directly for conflict resolution and did not seek the nomayenda’s input in conflict resolution. This minimal role for the nomayenda was unique among the sites studied. The nomination of a nomayenda as compared to qaryadar also seemed to have an impact on the authority prescribed to the individual. In the past, the villages had qaryadars who had official stamps whereas nomayendas do not, and thus no symbolic or official power. Out of the four sites studied, the religious leaders of the community were only mentioned in this community and in the site in Dawlatabad in Balkh province. The mullahs in the case of Sayghan district were reported to be not supportive of the work of FPs to establish CDCs, as opposed to the site in Balkh. The uluswal, despite being a powerful figure, also awknowledged the influence of the mullahs on the community. The network analysis suggests that the tight alternative networks may have mitigated the effect of these religious leaders.
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Community in Injil Herat
In Injil, Herat, there were many shuras that were active at the district level. There were shuras for defense of education (Shura-e-Amniat-e-Maruf), a shura made up of religious leaders (Shura-e-Ulema) and an environmental shura. These shuras are comprised of representatives from different villages within the district, together with officials from the police, primary court and law and security departments. Respondents stated that the relationship between the CDC and other traditional leaders such as the Arbab and the Uluswal were good. The Arbab is seen as the arbiter of conflicts within the community. Bigger problems were reported to be referred to the Uluswal by the Arbab. In minor matters, the CDC appears to be sometimes utilized. The uluswal also mentioned that the CDC was utilized for problem solving. In general the map represents this greater development of non-NSP related institutions that take on governance functions at district level, potentially displacing or keeping CDC activity in the realm of project selection and implementation. However, this displacement may be less important at the local level, where the CDC’s governance characteristics may in fact have had a positive upward effect on the responsiveness and accountability of the arbab level. The role of wakil at more local level seems to have been displaced by these links as well.
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Community in Behsud, Nangarhar
This CDC’s role in governance functions showed important relationships with several pre-existing institutions. On the one hand, the respondents noted that problems in the community had previously been solved by gatherings of elders in a jirga which would meet when necessary. The relationship between this pattern of dispute resolution and the CDC role was not entirely clear, but seemed to involve consultation between both types of institution in the case of small problems, such as youth opium addiction, and perhaps less in more important cases. On the other hand, this community mentioned the role of maliks and uluswal as well, noting these institutions had played roles in dispute resolution, but usually in a negative way through their favouritism or likelihood to be corrupt. In turn, both actors see the CDC as duplicate institutions for the role of conflict resolution that they fulfill. A village elder that was interviewed stated that he advises the community members to not approach the uluswal for problem solving. Moreover, the unpopularity of the malik and the uluswal could have resulted in a heightened awareness of responsibility for community issues, and thus facilitated the legitimacy of the CDC council as a forum for discussion on areas outside the mandate of project selection. In general, this map shows the least integration between the three dimensions of local governance: NSP-related institutions; the customary role of elders; and formal local
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governance institutions/actors. This lack of integration is compounded by the unintegrated network of links with PRT/USAID related programs, which are driven by the security and narcotics situation in Nangarhar province. 5. Institutional design and livelihood outcomes The link between the CDC and its institutional features and livelihoods outcomes needs to be viewed from the perspective of the two goals of the NSP, and the respective effects of each on the factors contributing to sustainable livelihoods. These factors include new capacities, activities and assets, which can be in turn classed as natural capital, human capital, financial capital, physical capital, social capital.42 The goal related to community management of block grant funds and sub-project implementation – community development – has the most immediate link to livelihoods through the connection to funding and projects. However, this effect is difficult to assess in isolation from the funds tied to the formation of the CDC. Beyond the funds made available through NSP, one important factor to examine here is to assess whether project selection and outcomes are different than they would be if arrived at via a different institutional arrangement. Secondly, it is important to assess the likely impact of such projects on livelihoods, as opposed to smaller scale improvements in living conditions, which in all cases are significant in themselves. In short, one must assess the effects of the project on endowments of natural, financial and physical capital.
Table 3: Project selection Site
First NSP subproject
Second NSP subproject
Third NSP subproject (where applicable)
Cluster-level project (where applicable)
Bamiyan, Sayghan
Irrigation
Generator
Drinking water
Hydro Power (proposed)
Balkh, Dawlatabad
Generator
Road repair
Animal husbandry (targeted female)
School (accepted)
Herat, Injil
School
Culverts
Bath (proposed)
N/A
Nangarhar, Behsud
Solar power
Tailoring (targeted female)
N/A
The evidence cited in section 4 suggests that project selection by CDCs generally encourages the program goal of inclusion of marginalized groups and the needs of women. However, the evidence was mixed between a norm of equity of benefits guiding deliberations, and the input of the FP and the restrictions of the NSP itself in producing these outcomes. Nevertheless, the outcome is projects that are more likely to benefit all groups in a community due to the provision of funds within the context 42
Uphoff and Buck (2006), 8.
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of a program like NSP. The important implication of this finding though is that the ability of the program to deliver this benefit is conditioned by the program and the FP as well as the institutional characteristics and functioning of CDCs themselves which have been discussed above. Where CDCs were viewed as less representative the implementation of projects experienced less success, as in the case of Sayghan discussed above. However, interestingly, the same case demonstrates through its progress over time that in terms of CDC leadership, competence is perhaps more important than inclusive or representative processes. There are additional potential links between the introduction of CDCs and improved livelihoods outcomes. These can be divided into benefits due to CDC involvement in wider community governance functions on the one hand, and the indirect benefits of CDC activities on community capacities and the environment for livelihoods creation. In the latter respect, training activities, either within or outside the projects delivered via NSP, can potentially lay the ground for livelihoods gains. However, the findings so far suggest that training is generally focused on NSP implementation and CDC staff, thus limiting the wider indirect effects on community capacities. The two main areas of activity found among CDCs related to wider governance functions are conflict resolution, and the organization of ashar (communal labour). As seen above, conflict resolution functions performed by CDCs themselves are often related to the NSP project itself, thereby its contribution to livelihoods is mediated through the projects. However, where conflict resolution capacities are increased by CDCs, they can contribute to livelihoods outcomes through indirect effects, which analysis elsewhere notes “can often be more important with more pervasive effects than direct contributions.”43 For example, the creation of “community spirit” can be a positive indirect effect on livelihoods in the creation of a favourable environment for economic activity. The key from the case evidence for this role appears to involve both positive links with supportive formal authorities and the institution of hybrid qualities with customary institutions when conflict resolution is involved. In relation to routine ashar outside the sub-project context, there is no strong evidence from the sites or from wider research of a substantive difference in the organization or outcomes of ashar if organized with the participation of CDC members or not. However, in the area of disaster response, there are some reports that CDCs may improve the efficacy of ashar. In previous AREU research, evidence was found of improved community responses (in terms of time and directed beneficiary selection) to local disasters (flooding) through CDCs than pre-existing institutions.44 This finding was also reflected in the comments of one respondent in the current study:
In the past when a canal was damaged by floods people would leave the canal in that state for ten days or more. Now, when a people have a canal and they can use the irrigation water whenever they want. Now when the canal breaks down, we can coordinate the people easier than we could in the past. The canal will not remain broken for very long. The people’s land is fifty percent more safe from the drought or from 43 44
Uphoff and Buck (2006), 2. Kakar (2005), 34-35.
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floods. Now people produce more crops than they could in the past.(Head of CDC, Sayghan, Bamiyan, July 2007) 5.1 Nature of improvements in livelihoods Following the dual perspective just outlined, the nature of improvements in livelihoods needs to be viewed from the perspective of NSP sub-projects and from the more general perspective of community governance features. In the first respect, the lack of longitudinal data on community livelihoods makes it difficult to discern changes at ground level. However, project selection and completion information does provide a picture of likely improvements in livelihoods. The projects selected in the study sites included electrification (one case of hydro power, two of diesel generation, and one of solar power), irrigation channels, road repair, culverts, a school, and two animal husbandry and tailoring projects aimed at women. Two of these projects were proposals related to the JICA funded Intercommunal Rural Development Program, which provides funds for common projects determined by “clusters” of CDCs grouped together. The general emphasis on infrastructure over livelihoods, education and health projects mirrors the pattern 45 found for all sub-projects nationally. The tendency in project selection towards local infrastructure no doubt reflects a lack of such infrastructure at community level, and projects like electrification and drinking water no doubt alleviate hardship and may reduce vulnerability to shocks. In some cases these effects are perceived as quite dramatic: Now we have clean drinking water. Malaria and other diseases have significantly decreased in our area due to the clean drinking water. I think people’s lives have improved in this area by 60%. (Head of CDC, Sayghan, Bamiyan, July 2007) The creation of infrastructure at community level is an important aspect of community development, and projects such as electrification can reduce costs for families as well as produce increased opportunity for productive activity during winter or in the evenings. However, the operations and maintenance of such projects is a considerable financial and technical challenge: the two study sites with generators both noted that their generator was already out of use due to lack of funds for fuel and repairs.46 In Sayghan some complained that the water intakes actually damaged their land excessively during floods, demonstrating that small-scale projects may not resolve vulnerability to particularly acute problems of seasonality in climatic conditions. In general, it has been found in studies of NSP that there are limits to community-level projects directly creating sustainable livelihoods opportunities due to the very localized and unlinked nature of projects, with these limitations significantly mitigated by joint planning and projects.47 Citing the example of electrification, 45
MRRD (2006), 7-8. It is important to note that diesel generators were removed from the list of acceptable projects by the NSP subsequent to the time of their implementation in these communities. 47 Barakat (2006), 97. 46
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clearly important in the current study sites, the NSP mid-term evaluation report notes that there is little linkage between electrification and activities that could add economic value to local production, such as mills or cold storage.48 However, the clustering activities seen in two of the cases seem likely to improve the link between projects and livelihoods. For example, in planning joint activities using water, the Sayghan community increased the value of its natural capital endowments in combination with neighbors. In short, the financial and physical capital introduced under NSP has an impact, but that impact on sustainable livelihoods can be limited by the scale of implementation. In this light, CDCs in a potential role as coordinators of assistance can indirectly support sustainable livelihoods through the provision of information and facilitated access to a range of resources that may otherwise pass communities by. The non-infrastructure projects included schools and one animal husbandry project (involving the provision of goats for female beneficiaries). The husbandry sub-project was the only one in which respondents spoke clearly of livelihoods benefits already realized as the animals were targeted at widows of poor means. 5.2 Extent to which adaptive capacity of rural poor and marginal groups enhanced While it is possible to observe, as did the mid-term evaluation team, that “NSP communities have far more tools than non-NSP communities for envisaging problems, linking priorities and planning”, it is more difficult to parse this increase in adaptability for poor or marginalised groups. While these groups certainly gained from CDCs in respect to inclusion and representation, their long-term capacity to respond to challenges is not clearly enhanced given the continuing dependence of their participation on support, technical and financial, for CDCs. This problem is especially true for the main marginalized group the introduced institution aims to serve: women. Nevertheless, with continued support, scaling up, and a more gradual development towards sustainability, there is every reason to believe that the outcome on this measure would be increasingly positive, as shown by the evidence above regarding natural capital endowments and disaster response.
6. Findings The evidence from the introduction of Community Development Councils implies a number of general findings that may be relevant to better management of rural local institutional interventions in relation to pre-existing institutional contexts. In Afghanistan, a number of hypothetical questions can be identified that are of particular interest. These fall into two broad categories. The first category involves the question of the relationships between newly introduced institutions and customary institutions, and between those that are more formal with those that are more informal. This category is of significance in Afghanistan due to the depth, pervasiveness, and variation in customary institutions in the rural setting, and has 48
Barakat et al. (2006), 16.
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implications for justice sector reform, gender programming, rural development, and social protection. 6.1 Relationships between introduced and customary institutions In relation to this category, the findings do support a general hypothesis that customary or traditional institutions are more likely to be less inclusive, less participatory, less representative, and less accountable than CDCs. However, there are important remaining challenges in these governance dimensions, in particular with respect to their applicability to women as well as men. Furthermore, the persistence of these gains must be questioned in light of the reality suggested by this data and supported by other AREU research: that actual participation in CDCs varies over time and across locations. CDCs as a concretely manifested organization do exist throughout the project implementation cycle of NSP, when meetings are frequently held addressing issues related to project selection and implementation. However, when CDC members address other governance tasks in communities such as dispute resolution, or the organization of collective action in other areas, they often do so in combination with other community members. Furthermore, the frequency and formality of CDC meetings declines after project completion, reducing their organizational form to one of occasional meetings, usually at the instigation of some external interlocutor. In general, the experience to date of CDCs supports the broader conclusion that “[t]he idea that institutions are all long-lived and essentially unchanging is becoming passé in a world of accelerated change.”49 Some of the factors that may mitigate this decline in the organizational status of CDCs are the introduction of new project activity, most markedly through initiatives and resources to cluster communities and develop joint projects. Other factors are the continuation of facilitation by FPs and the participation of communities in non-NSP programs run by FPs. One implication of these findings regarding how CDCs manifest themselves outside of their project activity is that the dichotomy framing this study of existing versus introduced institutions may artificially separate a reality which is in fact a hybrid one, and that this may be the more appropriate model to adopt for sustainability and for effectiveness. This effect is different depending on the nature of the existing institutions/actors, particularly along the dimension of whether there is a collective basis for the old institutions that can meld more easily with new collectively based institutions/organizations. It is also mediated by the effect of the support that the introduced institution can muster as incentive for cooperative institutional relationships. Formal or new institutions will combine with informal or customary institutions in hybrid forms combining processes from each type when new institutions carry easily recognizable benefits. This supports earlier World Bank conclusions that knowledge and potential co-optation or collaboration of pre-existing organizational forms at community level may contribute to successful livelihoods contributions of rural local institutions.50
49 50
Uphoff and Buck (2006), 36. Uphoff and Buck (2006), 23.
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The findings from the case study are unclear on their support of the hypothesis that institutions with closer and more formalized links with formal government authorities are more likely to be effective in the short term. However, such links, which seem to be mediated through positive relationships with individual power-holders in formal institutions, do seem to have a positive effect on the acceptance of CDCs and their ability to adapt and take on different functions. In turn this may have positive livelihoods effects as outlined in section 5. 6.2 Relationship between contextual factors and democratic or electorally-based governance systems The second category of findings relates to the institutional form of CDCs as elected institutions, and has wide implications for Afghanistan due to the constitutional provisions for elected government bodies at many levels. There appears to be a relationship between the elected nature of the CDCs and their inclusiveness, representation, responsiveness and accountability. This is particularly true in integrating the participation of minority groups in one or neighboring communities. However, this effect is heavily mediated by the variation in electoral models in use, and does not in itself guarantee responsiveness, as the institutionalization of participation in the processes of CDCs themselves still varies. It is also not clear that democratic inclusion alone can in all contexts produce superior outcomes. In practice, some version of democratic inclusion, the hybridism mentioned above, and a focus on leadership competence may produce the best institutional outcomes. Where support has ended, or where ineffective project implementation takes place, there is a risk that externally designed institutions are likely to be less effective due to their being viewed as transient. The formation of effective, not necessarily formal, links with other institutions, in combination with continued access to resources, is most likely to mitigate this problem. This finding is supported by a World Bank review which found that “most groups that are set up for social funds and CDD are not sustainable and often break-up after the group activity or project ends.”51
7. Recommendations A number of recommendations for institutional programming for CDCs in the Afghanistan context that can be derived from the evidence and findings presented in this case study, presented here in terms of policy and operational levels. 7.1 Policy recommendations Scale CDCs are currently constituted at a level where they cover small communities. While this model has allowed the creation of small manageable bodies and kept resource flows at a manageable level for a new institution, it means that the livelihoods impact of infrastructure or indirect capacity development is constrained to very localized settings. In addition, these settings are not necessarily in keeping with the scale of 51
Perrin, et al. (2006), 19.
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local conceptions of community or resource interdependencies, as expressed through concepts such as manteqa. It may be that over time the governance and livelihoods outcomes for CDCs may be improved through an increase in the relevant scale of operations, perhaps in combination with reduced funding levels but delivered in more reliable and persistent patterns. Beyond the possibility of introducing infrastructure with more linking potential and thus livelihoods impacts, the evidence suggests that clustering and joint projects, backed by resources, will leverage already evident signs of improved inclusion and representation found through the introduction of elected councils to manage development resources. Linkages The evidence suggests that CDCs vary in the pattern and density of linkages they enjoy with other providers of resources, as well as both customary and formal governance institutions. In some cases, the functioning of CDCs as development bodies appears to be aided by supporting relationships of this type, and in others a clearer distinction between them and local governance remains the norm. The positive effects seen where FPs implement a range of programmes, or where clustering initiatives are in place, suggest that linkages should be encouraged with a more diverse set of resource providers. At the same time, flexibility should be used in relation to governance linkages, recognizing that such linkages, particularly if imposed in relation to formal government, may disrupt the positive ones between those formal institutions and CDCs in the development realm. This recommendation implies that efforts to formalize CDCs should combine an emphasis on their role as conduits of development assistance while retaining a more open architecture for the nature of their links to formal government. The contraction of the CDC relationships away from NGOs and towards MRRD departments represented by NSP II needs to be balanced by more effort to encourage multi-agency and multiministerial involvement. Formalization may well form part of the equation, for example in further allowing CDCs autonomy in managing their financial affairs through fiscal relationships with other institutions and the financial institutions they deal with, but it is not the entire solution. Instead, sustainability need not refer to persistence in a single form, but rather the continuation of collective action over a trajectory of institutionalization.52 Sequencing and strategic policy environment The view of CDCs as a persistent institution or organization is premature at this point. As noted in other rural institutions evaluations, a dynamic view, and one that emphasizes sequencing, should be stressed over a static focus on a particular design.53 In order to successfully institute policy with such a sequenced approach, some consensus on long-term consideration of the role of CDCs must be sought among institutions concerned with the development of local governance in Afghanistan. At the present time, such consensus can emerge most effectively through the encouragement of the development of further resources, training and linkages with a range of institutions rather than through a sole concentration on formal status. 52 53
See Brick (forthcoming 2008). Uphoff and Buck (2006), 21.
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The current apparent contradiction between the development and governance goals of the NSP is in part a product of the speed and scale of resources delivered to CDCs via a single channel. Over time, and with the diversification of those channels, this contradiction is of less importance, since at root, local governance (as opposed to local government, which is also about administration and control) is largely about the management of common resources and the organization of collective action.
7.2 Operational recommendations The operational implications of these policy recommendations are in part a matter of more technical detail than this case study allows. However, they should be expected to fall in the following areas:
54 55
•
Efforts should continue and expand to allow CDCs to cluster, in a flexible manner, with the backing of resources for joint projects. These resources should be in addition to some aimed at continuing the work of individual CDCs.
•
Efforts at defining or formalizing CDC roles should emphasize their development functions, allow for somewhat open architectures for linking to other institutions, and be combined with appropriate programmatic changes to match these provisions.
•
These programmatic provisions should include “responsive and flexible capacity-building frameworks” which concentrate on building indirect capacities that contribute to livelihoods among communities as a whole, and not only the CDC institution.54 In effect, these should reinforce the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation that there “should be a period of consolidation” for CDCs.55
•
Programmatic provisions should also emphasise the broadening of CDC ownership, both across governmental and non-governmental sectors through the linking of sector approaches with the CDC institution, within the context of emerging national development strategy.
•
Strict adherence to a single set of procedures for CDC governance activity must be balanced with recognition of the hybrid reality of their interaction with preexisting institutions, for example by encouraging their flexible involvement in governance activity beyond their development function via locally-specific models. However, these flexible procedures should emphasize the particular, if limited, gains already seen in terms of intermediate governance outcomes.
Perrin, et al. (2006), 5. Barakat (2006), 3.
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References ACTED. July 2007. “Transition Strategy and Cycle 2+ Communities”. Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development: Kabul. Agarwal, Arun and Clark Gibson. 1999. “Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation”. World Development. 27: 629-49. Anderson, Jon. 1984. “How Afghans Define Themselves in Relation to Islam”. In Canfield, R. ed.. Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan. University of California: Berkeley. Barakat, Sultan, et al. May 2006. “Mid-Term Evaluation Report of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Afghanistan”. Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York/Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. Barfield, Thomas. 1984. “Weak Links in a Rusty Chain: Structural Weaknesses in Afghanistan’s Provincial Government Administration”. In Canfield, R. ed.. Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan. University of California: Berkeley. Boesen, Inger. 2004. “From Subjects to Citizens: Local Participation in the National Solidarity Programme”. Working Paper Series. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: Kabul. Brick, Jennifer. Forthcoming 2008. The Sustainability of Community Development Councils. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Canfield, Robert L. 1987. “Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian Alignments in Afghanistan”. In Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds. The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Vanguard Books: Lahore. 75-103. Carter, Lynn and Kerry Connor. 1989. “A Preliminary Investigation of Contemporary Afghan Councils”. ACBAR: Peshawar. Favre, Raphy. 2005. “Interface Between State and Society: Discussion on Key Social Features affecting Governance, Reconciliation and Reconstruction”. AIZON: Addis Ababa. Glatzer, Bernt. 1998. “Is Afghanistan on the Brink of Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration?”. In William Maley, ed. Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. 167-181. Glatzer, Bernt. 2002. “The Pashtun Tribal System.” In G. Pfeffer & D. K. Behera eds. Concept of Tribal Society. New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002, pp 265-282. Independent Directorate for Local Governance. 27 September 2007. Strategic Framework. International Legal Foundation. 2004. “The Customary Laws of Afghanistan”. September.
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Kakar, Palwasha. 2005. “Fine-Tuning the NSP: Discussions of Problems and Solutions with Facilitating Partners”. Working Paper Series. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: Kabul. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. July 2006. “The Expansion of the National Solidarity Programme”. Proposal. MRRD: Kabul. National Solidarity Programme. October 2004. Operations Manual. Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development: Kabul. NSP Facilitating Partners. 2007. “Consolidated Position Paper on the CDC Bylaw”. Undated document. Nixon, Hamish. April 2007. “Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding Paradox in Afghanistan”. Briefing Paper Series. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: Kabul. Nixon, Hamish. Forthcoming 2008a. “Subnational Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 20056”. Synthesis Paper Series. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: Kabul. Nixon, Hamish. Forthcoming 2008b. “The Changing Face of Community Governance?”. Working Paper Series. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: Kabul. Noelle-Karimi, Christine. 2006. “Village Institutions in the Perception of National and International Actors in Afghanistan”. Amu Darya Series 1. Centre for Development Research: University of Bonn. Perrin, Nicolas, Rex Van Der Riet, and Jens Sjorslev. 2006. “Stocktaking of Selected World Bank Projects Working with Rural Institutions for Sustainable Livelihoods and Equitable Development. DRAFT. Putzel, James, Conrad Schetter, Stefanie Elbern and Bettina Woll. “State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan”. Centre for Development Research, University of Bonn/Crisis States Programme, London School of Economics: Bonn/London. Ravnkilde, Adam. 2007. “Local Governance in Rural Afghanistan”. DACAAR: Kabul. Rubin, Barnett, and Helen Malikyar. 2003. “The Politics of Center-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan”. World Bank: Washington, DC. Shahrani, M. Nazif. 1998. “The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance in Afghanistan”. In William Maley, ed. Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. 212-242. Steul, Willi. 1981. “Pashtunwali”. Franz Steiner Verlag: Wiesbaden. United Nations Development Program. 2004. Afghanistan National Human Development Report. UNDP: Kabul.
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Uphoff, Norman and Louise Buck. 2006. “Strengthening Rural Local Institutional Capacities for Sustainable Livelihoods and Equitable Development”. Jens Sjorslev ed. Social Development Department. World Bank. (August). World Bank. 2003. “Community-Driven Development: A Study Methodology”. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department: Washington, DC. World Bank. July 2007. “Service Delivery and Governance at the Subnational Level in Afghanistan.” World Bank: Washington, DC.
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Commanders
Mayor
Other Shuras
NGOs
Qaryadar
Community 1,01,0
1,1,1,1
1,0,0,1
1,0,0,0
1,0,0,0
1,1,1,0
1,1,1,0
DDA
1,1,0,0
1,0,0,0
Uluswal
Village Elders
50 of 53
Mulla hs
1,0,1,0
1,1,1,1
1,0,1,0
Community
1,0,1,0
1,0,0,1
1,0,1,0
1,0,1,0
1,0,0,0
1,1,1,1
CDC
Mullahs
1,0,0,0
1,1,1,0
1,1,1,1
FP
1,0,1,0
1,1,0,0
1,1,1,0
PRRD
Village Elders
Uluswal
DDA
CDC
FP
PRRD
Balkh
1,0,1,0
Qaryadar
NGOs
1,0,0,1
Other Shuras
Appendix A: Relationships among rural institutions/organizations and CDCs in the four sites
Mayor
Commanders
Village Elders
Wakils
Community
Arbab/Qaryadar
Police Department
Various Shuras at District Level
Security Department
Primary Court and Law Department
Uluswal
CDC
FP
PRRD
Herat
1,1,1,0
PRRD
1,1,1,0
1,1,1,1
FP
1,0,1,0
1,0,0,0
1,0,1,0
1,1,1,0
1,1,0,1
CDC
1,1,1,0
1,1,0,1
1,0,0,0
Uluswal
1,1,1,0
Primary Court and Law Department
51 of 53
1,1,1,0
Security Department
1,1,1,0
1,1,1,0
Various Shuras at District Level
1,1,0,1
1,0,1,0
Police Department
1,1,1,0
1,1,0,0
1,1,1,0
Qaryadar
Arbab/
1,0,1,0
1,0,1,0
1,1,1,0
1,1,1,1
Community
1,1,1,0
Wakils
Village Elders
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USAID/DAI
1,1,1,1
Malik
Shura-eManteqa
Village Elders
1,0,1,0
Community
1,1,1,1 1,1,1,1
Community
FP
Village Elders
Shura-eManteqa
1,0,0,0
1,0,0,1
USAID/DAI
1,1,0,0
1,0,0,1
PRT
Malik
1,1,1,1
1,1,0,0
PRT
CDC
Uluswal
PPHD
1,1,1,0
CDC
FP
1,1,1,0
1,0,1,0
1,1,0,1
Uluswal
MOH/
PPHD
MOH/
1,1,1,1
PRRD
PRRD
Nangarhar
Commanders
FP
DDA
Police Department
District Governor
Village Elders
1,1,1,1
1,0,1,0
1,1,1,0
1,1,0,1
CDC
Mullah
1,0,0,1
1,0,0,1
1,1,1,1
CLDD
1,1,1,1
1,1,0,0
1,1,0,0
PRRD
Community
Nomayenda
Malik/
Uluswal
CDC
CLDD
PRRD
Bamiyan
1,0,1,1
1,0,0,0
1,0,0,0
1,0,0,0
Uluswal
1,1,1,0
1,1,1,1
Nomayenda
Malik/
Mullah
53 of 53
1,0,1,0
1,0,1,0
1,0,1,0
1,0,1,1
1,1,1,1
Community
1,0,1,0
Village Elders
1,1,0,0
District Governor
1,0,0,1
1,0,0,0
Police Department
1,0,0,0
1,1,1,0
1,1,0,1
DDA
1,0,1,0
1,1,0,0
1,1,1,1
1,1,1,1
FP
1,0,1,0
Commanders
