Agnes Heller

Agnes Heller

MANC HESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS

Agnes Heller Socialism, autonomy and the postmodern Simon Tormey

Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave

Copyright © Simon Tormey 2001 The right of Simon Tormey to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road. Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA http:/ fwww.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed exclusively in Canada by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall. Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 122 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

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Contents

Acknowledgements Notes on abbreviations and texts

page vii ix

Introduction: Agnes Heller, woman in 'dark times'

1

1

The 'Renaissance of Marxism' and the revolution in everyday life

21

2

Rereading Marx: 'value', 'need' and the humanisation of socialism

51

3

From humanism to critique: Radical Philosophy and the idea of the political

4

Socialism, democracy, modernity- after the end of 'history'

76 103

5

An 'incomplete' radicalism: Beyond Justice and the possibility of a post-metaphysical politics

134

6

The 'Universal' in question: contingency, decency and the postmodern political condition Conclusion: the future of a disillusion (revisited)

164 195

Select bibliography Index

208 216

v

Acknowledgements

This project has its origins in a footnote buried away on p. 2 31 of my doctoral thesis, where I foolishly lamented the lack of secondary material on the work of Agnes Heller, particularly given her prodigious output, the complexity of her work and the profound changes to her outlook over the course of her long career. Ever quick to spot an opportunity, my supervisor Neil Harding suggested that writing up a quick 'modern masters'-style text would make an interesting and worthwhile project for me to pursue over the next few months. Eleven years later it falls to me to acknowledge Neil's role in suggesting the topic, though unhappily his timescale for completion proved optimistic. Nearer the present I need to thank in particular those individuals and organisations who have provided the material support and backing without which the project would have remained on the drawing board. In particular I am grateful to the British Academy and the Research Committee of the University of Nottingham, both of whom have provided funds in support of this project on more than one occasion. The bulk of the research and writing for the book was undertaken during sabbatical semesters in 1996 and 1999, and so I would like to thank all my colleagues in the School of Politics for picking up my workload whilst I was absent. During both periods of study leave I stayed with my wife's family, and so my heaviest debt of thanks is to my parents-in-law, Dominique and Jean-Luc Petit, who fed and lodged my family and me for many pleasurable months. I should also acknowledge the kindness of my wife's grandmother, Mme Paulette Mangiapan, who put 'Villa Sophie' at our disposal in the spring of 1996. During the writing of the book I have learned to rely heavily on the generosity of a number of colleagues who diligently read and commented on various chapters of the book. In particular I would like to thank Mat Humphrey, David Stevens and Susan McManus, all of whom produced detailed comments on drafts. Special thanks in this regard go to Larry Wilde, who as well as following my progress with his usual interest and sympathy very generously read and commented on the entire draft of the book. I am vii

viii

Acknowledgements

grateful too to Jeremy Jennings, who has provided an endless stream of references for the various grants that have sustained this and other projects, and I am delighted to be able to acknowledge his help over many years. I would also like to mention the rather more intangible assistance of Anthony Forster, whose distinctive approach to the business of writing and 'time management' provided some sobering lessons for this author. I need to thank too Richard Purslow, who commissioned this book, and all at Manchester University Press for their forbearance and help in the completion of the book. It seems curious to acknowledge the help and guidance of the person whose work provides the subject-matter for the present study. Yet nonetheless it gives me great pleasure to offer my thanks to Professor Agnes Heller for her help since the inception of this project, and for offering an object lesson in meeting my responsibilities as an academic and as a person. Every email and letter was answered by return; my requests for interviews and drafts of material were all granted unequivocally; she was happy to check and correct anything I sent her to read; a speculative invitation to attend a conference I was organising in the UK was immediately answered in the affirmative without a glance at her diary. I could and probably should go on. I won't, however, because I suspect none of the above will come as a surprise to anyone who has known her for any length of time. Yet it came as a surprise to this particular 'hard-pressed' academic, unused to such generosity of spirit, and served as a timely reminder that there are at least some people for whom intellectual 'activity' is not a game or a job, but the very stuff of life. Finally, however, I would like to thank those blameless victims of an infatuation, my wife Veronique and our children, Max, Gabrielle, and Louis. This book is dedicated to them in the hope that they may come to forgive their ever-absent 'papa'.

Notes on abbreviations and texts

Where I have quoted from Heller's writings main references are given as abbreviations in the text, with minor references and references to shorter pieces confined to the notes. The following abbreviations are employed throughout:

Beyond justice (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 198 7) Can Modernity Survive? (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990) Everyday Life, translated by G. L. Campbell (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984). A Philosophy of History in Fragments (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993) PHF A Philosophy of Morals (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990) PM PPC (with F. Feher), The Postmodern Political Condition (Oxford, Polity Press, 1988) Radical Philosophy, translated by James Wickham (Oxford, Basil RP Blackwell, 1984) A Theory of History (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982). TH A Theory of Modernity (Oxford, Blackwell, 1999) TM TMTV 'Towards a Marxist theory of value', Kinesis, 5:1 (Autumn 19 72), pp. 7-76, translated by Andrew Arata TNM The Theory of Need in Marx, translated by Giangiacomo Feltrinelli (London, Allison and Busby, 1976) B]

CMS? EL

ix

Introduction: Agnes Heller, woman in 'dark times'!

This book offers an introduction to and assessment of the political thought of Agnes Heller from the publication of Everyday Life in 1968 to A Theory of Modernity, published in 1999. 2 Heller is perhaps the best-known of the 'Budapest School' of theorists whom Gyorgy Lukacs gathered around him in the early 1960s. 3 The School is in turn associated with the development of a distinct brand of 'humanist' Marxism, which sought to develop a critique of both capitalist and communist societies using the concepts and analysis developed by the 'early' Marx, which Lukacs was instrumental in unearthing. Since the folding of the School in 19 76 Heller has developed an array of projects in diverse fields and disciplines: sociology, social theory, philosophy, ethics, literary criticism, anthropology, aesthetics. Perhaps because of this diversity of output it is tempting for those with only a passing interest in her work to regard Heller as an eclectic thinker whose many interests and intellectual passions are only loosely connected by an always evident 'humanism' or concern with uncovering the potential contained in the human condition for developing forms of society in keeping with our 'species' needs. As I seek to show in this study, Heller is, on the contrary, a highly political thinker not only in the sense that her work is always informed by a strong sense of the political ramifications of the analysis of social phenomena, but also in the sense that the rationale of her ostensibly disparate projects is invariably to demonstrate the contingency of those phenomena, and thus, by extension, the possibility of changing them in accordance with different imperatives, norms and values. Nor, unusually, did the 'fall of the Wall' or the pronouncement of the 'death of Marxism' (by Heller herself among others) change the essentially critical orientation of her work. Unlike that of many from Central and Eastern Europe, Heller's hostility to 'actually existing socialism' was not matched by an enthusiasm for liberalcapitalism, but rather by a measured respect for the achievements brought about by progressive forces within liberal-capitalism. In this sense her work remains a resource of considerable importance for the ongoing evaluation 1

2

Agnes Heller

and re-evaluation of the direction of emancipatory critique and left radical theory and practice at a time when the future of both seems in question. Quite apart from one's sense that as a major social critic Heller has produced work that merits extended treatment on its own terms there thus arises the issue of the significance or pertinence of her contribution to contemporary debates within political thought. As is implied by the comments above, Heller has been one of the most persistently radical thinkers of the past four decades; radical in the sense of 'getting to the root of the matter', but radical also in remaining true to the ideal of a self-governing social order in which, to mobilise Marx, 'the condition for the free development of each is the free development of all'. 4 Yet despite its proximity at least to the spirit of Marx's enterprise it is a radicalism that is unafraid to turn a withering gaze at Marx's work and, beyond that, at Marx's legacy. The significance of Heller as a political thinker is thus in part bound up with her aspiration. shared with other 'Post-Marxists', to attempt to develop a form of left radicalism which moves beyond the classical Marxian paradigm while preserving a critical orientation to the contemporary political given.; As emerges particularly in the later half of the book, the affinity between Heller's thought and the work of those engaged in the project to redevelop and reinvigorate socialist theory 'after' Marx, such as Jiirgen Habermas, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Cornelius Castoriadis and Andre Gorz, is considerable. Merely to enumerate a list of such thinkers is, however, to be reminded of the disparate character of 'Post-Marxism' as an appellation, let alone as a political 'ideology' or programme with clear goals and aspirations. It is also to be reminded of the essentially 'foundational' and philosophical nature of her concerns. Like that of Habermas in particular, Heller's work is driven by a concern with the grounding of normative theory in a realist ethical or moral theory, and it is here, arguably, that the importance of Heller's thought for the development of political and social theory lies. It is for this reason too that in presenting her work I have concentrated particularly in the last three chapters on its foundational aspects, and why work which is more narrowly focused for example on the politics of 'actually existing socialism' occupies a relatively minor role in the narrative despite the considerable attention her work in this field in particular has received. As an introductory work, one of the assumptions underpinning this text is that many of those to whom it is addressed will have had limited prior contact with Heller's work and thus limited opportunity to study its progression. At the time of writing there is no book-length study of the evolution of her thought in any of its guises, nor any introduction to it. Those familiar with Heller's work may not find this entirely surprising. Heller is a writer of prodigious output. having over the course of five decades produced more than thirty single or jointly authored works and well over one hundred shorter articles or chapters. Thus, although I have adopted an exegetical approach to the discussion of her work, the exegesis is necessarily limited to the discussion

Introduction

3

of a number of 'key' works written in or translated into English. It is partly for this reason that work published before Everyday Life has not been included for discussion, even though it contains material of importance for the concerns addressed here, as my comments in the next section will show. These are, as her friend and colleague Markus laments, Heller's 'lost' works. Unfortunately, it does not fall to this author to attempt their 'rediscovery'. What follows is not therefore intended to be a comprehensive, let alone an exhaustive, survey of Heller's work. What it is intended to achieve is a sense of the way in which Heller's thought has evolved from the late 1960s onwards, i.e. at the moment when she achieved prominence as a humanist Marxist thinker outside Hungary, through her critical or neo-Marxist phase, to 'Post-Marxism' and. finally, to a 'postmodern' understanding of the political as exhibited in her most recent work. It should also be added that what follows focuses on texts in which Heller's normative and foundational concerns are fully expressed, leaving largely unexplored her not insignificant contribution to other disciplines, principally sociology, aesthetics and moral philosophy. Before moving to consider the development of her thought it is, however, worth attempting to summarise Heller's extraordinary life and career to date. The life in this instance is not quite the 'text', but there is a strong sense with Heller that knowing something of the context giving rise to the work can aid considerably understanding the intent, if not the 'meaning', it contains. In order to give the reader some orientation to what follows I indicate here those texts that form the subject-matter of more detailed consideration later in the book. In view of this study's focus on Heller's later work, I have said more here about her earlier life and career, with the aim of keeping repetition to a minimum. Life and work: a summary6 Agnes Heller was born to Jewish parents, both intellectuals, in Budapest in 1929. Heller enjoyed an unconventional upbringing in the sense that it was her mother who was the breadwinner for the family, her father being absorbed by activities and interests that were largely unpaid. Such was the pattern of the Heller household until the Second World War. With the war came disaster, as the Horthy regime signed up for Hitler's genocidal policies with an enthusiasm only matched by Romania's Iron Guards. Heller's family were, like all Jews in Hungary, hounded and harassed. Much worse was to follow, however, for her father, Pal, was finally arrested and subsequently transported to Auschwitz, where he was to perish. Heller and her mother were thus left to fend for themselves in devastated post-war Hungary. Immediately following the war, she enrolled at the University of Budapest to undertake a degree in physics or chemistry with the intention of becoming the Hungarian 'Marie Curie' and a beacon to womanhood in the chauvinist world of science. On the suggestion of a boyfriend, however, Heller attended

4

Agnes Heller

a lecture on the 'philosophy of culture' being given by Lukacs at an early stage of her studies. Although on her own confession she hardly understood a word of what he was saying, she was immediately gripped by the sense that what he was saying was of the utmost importance, and thus that she had to understand what he was saying. Heller's ambitious plans in relation to her scientific career were now shelved in her determination to decipher what were of course the brilliant if enigmatic utterings of one of the century's great thinkers. Shortly afterwards, Heller joined the Hungarian Communist Party, having flirted for a time with Zionism and the possibility of leaving for Palestine. The Party seemed to her to offer the answers for a Godless world: it offered sanctuary, hope and above all, redemption - the promise of a better world to come. This was hardly an unusual move at the time, and Heller's belief in the redeeming powers of communism were symptomatic of a feeling widespread among the young and disaffected of continental Europe that communism offered the glimmer of a better world they all so craved after the horrors of war and genocide. Nevertheless, even on joining the Party in 194 7 Heller had her doubts. At this point her uncertainty was less to do with the character of the organisation she was joining, which seemed to her open. democratic, even idealistic, than with the difficulty of reconciling her belief in communist redemption with a belief in the duty of the philosopher to preserve a critical orientation to the given, 'to think with your own mind'. As she puts it, she 'wanted to have a cause while also remaining an individual'. For Heller this was a 'double bind' that was only resolved for her by expulsion from the Party in the clampdown that followed the installation of a more hardline leadership under Matyas Rakosi in 1949. It was during this period that many of her hopes for communism in power were to be disappointed. Having installed itself on the basis of minority backing in the 1945 election and a rigged result in 194 7, the communist regime immediately set about the Stalinisation of the country. Farms were collectivised, production was placed in the hands of Party apparatchiks and mass arrests followed, including many who had welcomed the establishment of communist power. 'Good communists' like Heller were expelled if they showed any inclination to challenge the authority of the regime to appease its Soviet masters. Fortunately, Stalinisation was relatively short-lived, as with the death of Stalin in 19 53 and the emergence of more conciliatory figures within the Hungarian Communist Party reaction was followed by what in comparison seemed like a period of 'enlightenment'. 7 Rakosi was replaced in July 1953 (though he returned a year later) by the reform-minded Imre Nagy, who set about undoing the former's legacy. Industrialisation was reined back. the forced collectivisation of the peasantry was abandoned and the climate of fear that pervaded Hungarian society gave way to one of greater tolerance and openness as prisoners were released and critical opinion given greater leeway. Under such conditions Heller was able to proceed with her doctoral

Introduction

5

studies under Lukacs's supervision, and in 19 55 to take up a post as assistant and then associate Professor at the University of Budapest. Her doctoral work, which focused on ethics in the writings of Chernyshevsky, also provides an insight into the optimism of the period. One of the points Heller makes in her analysis of the ethics of Rakhmetov, the hero of Chernyshevsky's most famous novel What Is To Be Done?, is the necessity for selfsacrifice in the interests of the revolutionary cause. Such a stance, which became the inspiration for Russian populists, for anarchists and of course for Lenin, who named his early work on party organisation after Chernyshevky's book, was criticised by Heller as antithetical to the true spirit of Marx. Drawing on The German Ideology and the Grundrisse, works that were still regarded with some distrust by the ideologues of 'scientific' Marxism, Heller argued for a quasi-utilitarian ethic of 'rational egoism' as the basis for social revolution. According to Markus, such a line 'formulates and justifies what was in the years 19 53-55 one of the basic demands of the emerging Hungarian reform-communism (led by Imre Nagy) which politically failed even in this minimal criticism of Stalinist practices, but prepared the way for the much more radical critique of the regime in the short periods immediately predating and following the uprising of 1956.' 8 In short, Heller was arguing that Nagy's 'New Social Programme' launched in the same year questioned the legitimacy of a utilitarian ethics as the basis for an emancipatory or progressive programme! As Heller puts it, her main thesis in the book was that 'no social program can be realized without the participants' interest and that only consensus among individuals can lead to collective action'. 10 Carried on a tide of optimism Heller was thus encouraged to rejoin the Party in 19 54. Nagy's well-intentioned efforts quickly took on a momentum of their own, however, as an ever greater number of people, particularly students, began openly to question the legitimacy of the institutions and practices associated with communist rule. The climax of this new-found facility to criticise their masters was the revolution of 19 56, an event Heller refers to as 'the most important in my life' and one that much later formed the subject-matter for a book written with Feher. ll A cataclysm that shook the entire communist superstructure, the 19 56 uprising was confirmation for Heller of people's desire for political autonomy and collective determination of social life, exactly what, on her reading, Marx himself advocated as the basis of an emancipated form of existence. The uprising did after all result in the more or Jess spontaneous development of a network of councils for the ordering of social. political and economic life. They were non-sectarian, open to all and functioned on the basis of a thoroughgoing if crude form of direct democracy of the sort described so admiringly by Marx in his descriptions of the Paris Commune of 18 71, and indeed by Lenin in The State and Revolution. 12 Even Lukacs, not previously noted for his idealism or utopianism, retained enough faith in the powers of self-organisation to become attached to the council movement, a fact that Jed

6

Agnes Heller

him into political difficulties once the uprising was quashed. The fact that it was the Soviet Union, an ostensibly 'Marxist' regime, that put down the uprising in late 19 56 confirmed some important truths as far as Heller was concerned. These were, in particular, that there was a gap between the 'essence' and the 'appearance' of Marxism: between what Marxism stood for and what Marxists did on coming to power. From now on, therefore, Heller's 'Marxism' was reconfirmed as unambiguously 'critical' in character. counter-posing the reality of life in 'actually existing socialism' against the vision of 'the man rich in needs'. At the Berlin conference on freedom held in the same year Heller declared that the task of Marxists had 'become the founding of a new and qualitatively different socialism'. This of course meant different from the socialism found in the communist bloc or indeed anywhere else; for what also emerged from 1956 was a much clearer sense of the degree to which all communist parties, both in the East and in the West, were in thrall to the Soviet Union. 13 Such a stance inevitably set her and others like her on a collision course with the new Moscow-backed regime under the leadership of Janos Kadar and Ferenc Miinnich, which took over from the deposed Nagy. They immediately ordered a clampdown on the 'counterrevolution'. ushering in yet another period of reaction. In 19 57 all opposition was outlawed, and dissidents and revolutionaries were rounded up. Over 200,000 Hungarians fled the country, many of them never to return. Nagy himself was executed in 1958, an event which met with a resounding silence from the established left parties in the West. In the wake of the reaction Heller was again expelled from the Communist Party. prevented from holding a post in higher education or in one of the research institutes, and thus prevented from publishing her work. Forced to find employment of some kind, she was initially able to act as a research assistant to Lukacs, who, having held a post in Nagy's cabinet and thus publicly backed the 'renegade' regime, was now consigned once again to private contemplation and academic study. It was as an assistant that Heller was permitted to give a course at the University of Budapest entitled 'general ethics'. In an argument that will become a leitmotif of her work more generally, Heller put forward the thesis that the sphere of ethics is not reducible to the interests of the working class, and even less of the Party, and thus that just or right conduct does not equate merely to following the Party's view of 'necessity'. Ethics had to be thought of as ontologically rooted in the human capacity to act, to judge and to take responsibility for acting. The notion of 'interest' denies autonomy to the agent and renders him or her a mere extension of a collective will. Thus, while a given set of values might have an origin in class society and class struggle, those values are not necessarily themselves reducible to class interest; they may achieve 'autonomy' as universal values or norms and come to have validity as expressions of the universal. Again, the implied critique of communist ideology and practice lay only just beneath the surface of the text, the notion of an autonomous ethical realm running

7

Introduction

counter to the official view of ethics as merely the expression of class interest or power. As Markus notes, 'this theory of morality had a political relevance, because it refused to subordinate morality to some kind of political ends, whether they were apologetic or critical. A "non-political" morality, the ethical as an autonomous instance - precisely this was perceived by the authorities as a political danger and ideological heresy.' 14 Inevitably, such views put Heller further at odds with the authorities. Within a short time her robust 'revisionism' was being attacked in party organs, and in 19 58 she was relieved of her duties as Lukacs's assistant and forced to take a position as a teacher of Hungarian in a middle school. It was not until 19 70 that From Intention to the Consequences, the manuscript version of the lectures, was finally published. The only moment of relief at this time was provided by the offer of a hundred dollars from her sister-in-law, who lived in the United States, to allow Heller and her then husband to travel to the West. They used the money to visit Italy for two weeks. The visit evidently made a profound impact on Heller, so profound that it inspired her to write a book, Renaissance Man, eventually published in 19 6 7. The Renaissance seemed to her to embody the potential and possibilities afforded by the shift from the closed hierarchical societies of the late Medieval world to the more open fluid social structure of modernity, in which social life becomes a matter of choice and moral commitment. 15 The Renaissance was a time of great experimentation, of tolerance and pluralism. It represented creativity, innovation, openness to the new. Contrasted with the monotony of contemporary society, it seemed like a world of colour, boldness, genius. In this sense the Renaissance was a kind of metaphor for Heller's vision of what Marxism should aspire to being, and beyond that a metaphor for the kind of world that socialists should create. This motif of the 'renaissance of Marxism' would be one taken up by Heller, Lukacs and others as the more liberal conditions of the 1960s gave intellectuals in Eastern and Central Europe greater opportunities to meet and discuss. Reform and rehabilitation This gradual thawing of relations was however a slow, laborious process, certainly as far as Hungary was concerned. Kadar's regime stood somewhere between the Stalinist extremes associated with Rakosi and the reform communism of Nagy. Many promises were made concerning the liberalisation of the system, but Kadar's need to keep Moscow at bay meant that his room for manoeuvre was strictly limited. Nonetheless, as the regime stabilised, so conditions became progressively easier for dissident or critical intellectuals, reaching the point where, if not actually rehabilitated, a number of them were able to find work in research institutes, though not universities, lest they poison impressionable minds. In the wake of this 'reconciliation' between regime and intellectuals Heller was contacted by Andras Hegedus,

8

Agnes Heller

then head of the Sociological Institute at the Hungarian Academy. and invited to take up a post at the Institute. Grateful for being relieved of the tedious work she had been assigned by the Party as punishment for her earlier ideological deviance she joined the Institute in 1963. The move meant she was able to resume her research and writing (though not her teaching). which now focused not only on ethics but also sociological themes reflecting her interest in the cultural criticism of thinkers such as C. Wright Mills, Theodor Adorno and Erich Fromm, and also her desire to consider the world beyond Eastern Europe. As for her writing, a book on the ethics of Aristotle expanding on themes explored in her earlier work was closely followed by two works that more nearly matched her new position within the Institute, The Sociology of Morals and the Moral of Sociology and Social Role and Prejudice. 1" As before, the not-so-hidden sub text of these works was the failure of Western societies in general and communism in particular to develop the institutional and political practices that would enable genuine autonomy and self-determination- two demands that were to resurface in Everyday Life. It is at this moment that we see the emergence of what subsequently became known as the 'Budapest School'. formed by Lukacs to promote the renewal of Marxist critique in the face of 'real' socialism. Lukacs was evidently the kind of philosopher who needed 'schools', and the Budapest School formed in 1964 was merely one of numerous such groupings that Lukacs had maintained in previous decades. 17 This latest grouping initially consisted of Heller, her second husband Ferenc Feher. Gyorgy Markus and Mihaily Vajda, though other figures came and went over the next ten years. including Hegedus, who increasingly used his position as head of the Institute of Sociology to press for a 'critical' sociology, Sandor Radnoti, and Markus's wife, the Polish sociologist Maria Markus. What united them was the idea of an immanent critique of Marxism, a critique, that is, of what Marxism had become in the name of what it might be. In particular, and picking up an earlier theme, they were inspired by the idea of a 'renaissance of Marxism'. a flowering of the critical. oppositional potential they believed lay within Marxism and in particular within the 'early Marx', which Lukacs had in the 1930s and 1940s been so instrumental in unearthing. This was, in other words, the Marxism of the individual 'rich in needs', of solidarity and self-governance. 18 By juxtaposing essence with appearance, the actual and the rational. they hoped to precipitate a crisis in those systems that had the temerity to call themselves 'socialist'. In this sense there was a practical purpose to their discussions, and a practical end in view: the development of critical practices leading to the wholesale reform of communism and beyond that of contemporary society. The Budapest School were of course by no means alone in their belief in the potential afforded by an immanent critique of real socialism. Their formation coincided with a more general upsurge in critical intellectual activity throughout Central and Eastern Europe, spurred on by the more tolerant conditions found in the region in the mid-19 60s as

Introduction

9

reform once again moved on to the agenda of communist regimes in Central Europe. Symbolic of this relative thaw was the establishment of the Korcula Summer Schools where philosophers from all over Eastern and Central Europe, including Ernst Bloch and Lucien Goldmann and the members of the Budapest School, gathered in order to keep the flame of critical Marxism alive. The establishment of the journal Praxis under the auspices of the Yugoslav participants in the Korcula Group, to which Heller contributed in the late 1960s and early 1970s was another sign of the confidence that left intellectuals in the region had in the emancipatory potential of an internationalised 'critical' Marxism at this time. Thinking about the character of the School itself it is easy to assume that it must have been the equivalent of a School of 'Lukacsian Marxism'. Lukacs was a figure of incomparable stature, a hero of 'Western Marxism' and a dominant, occasionally overbearing, personality. In addition he was much older than the other members of the School, most of whom had been at one time or another his students. This assumption is. however, wide of the mark on several grounds. Firstly, the term 'school' here gives a misleading impression of the degree to which its members were tied to the same ideological or philosophical project. The Budapest School was by necessity a loosely assembled group of individuals who enjoyed each other's company, and shared certain political convictions as well as certain ideas about the role 'critique' must and should play. In this sense it never had- and could not have had - a formal character. The School was rather a testing ground for ideas. 19 Lukacs used his schools to test his ideas out on the brightest. most critical of his students. They in turn would bring pieces to read, ideas which they wished to test and philosophical or theoretical problems they wished to examine with others. None of this presupposed a common dogma or stance to be developed, let alone a new 'ism', Lukacsian, 'humanist' or otherwise. Nonetheless, what does become apparent is that certain clear themes and principles emerged from their discussions, which came to be common nostrums in the work of the School. From the point of view of developing an understanding of Heller's work through the 1960s and 1970s it is worth enumerating what they were. Firstly, whilst declaring their sympathy with Marx's project they explicitly questioned certain expectations Marx had about the character of modern societies and the potential contained within them for the development of communism. This is certainly the case with, for example, the idea of 'absolute abundance', which the School regarded as the basis of the schema outlined in The Critique of the Gotha Programme of 1875. 2" Markus, together with Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis, two political economists loosely affiliated with the School, set out their objections to the idea of an end of scarcity in an influential work eventually published in 19 70, Is Political Economy Possible? Their work reflected in direct terms the School's belief that any thinking about the nature of socialism had to start from the acceptance of scarcity as

10

Agnes Heller

part of the modern condition, if not the human condition per se. This in turn fed the rejection of the ideal of communism as a world 'beyond' conflict and antagonism, beyond classes and, ultimately 'beyond' politics. Marxists therefore had to attend to political theorising if their vision were not to be rendered irrelevant as well as unattainable. Perhaps even more controversially, they rejected the orthodox Marxian analysis of liberal democracy as inevitably or necessarily implicated with the maintenance of capitalism, arguing that the formal separation between state and civil society was a necessary basis for civil liberty in any advanced industrial society. Such liberties were not to be characterised as 'bourgeois' in character, but as essential constituents of civilised living in large, heterogeneous social settings. This was a common theme in the work of Central and Eastern European theorists, but nonetheless underlined the degree to which even as Marxists they felt the need to reject key aspects of classical Marxism. They also rejected, secondly, the implications and rationale of Marx's analysis of class. Whilst happy to acknowledge class as a useful descriptor for describing certain stages in the evolution of modern society, the implication that all conflict could in some way be attributed to class and hence that class struggle was the modus vivendi of the political seemed to most members of the School plainly wrong. 21 Emancipatory theory therefore had to be directed at the discrete, unencumbered individual, not to classes or other collective social agents. This highlighted the necessity for the development of ethical and moral theory, given, as they saw it, the subordination of both realms to material factors in Marxian analysis. What was 'good' could no longer be seen solely in terms of what was good for the class/Party, but rather had to be argued for on the basis of a vision of how we should live. There was in other words no avoiding normative theory, and by extension no avoiding ethical theory as the basis for emancipatory critique. This again reaffirmed the necessity for democratic institutions and thus for some account of how conflict is to be managed in a socialist society. The School also wished, finally, to reject the legacy of Bolshevism and indeed of all forms of revolutionary insurrectionism or 'Jacobinism'. In a move that mirrored developments within the New Left and counter-culture more generally, stress was laid on the necessity for changing political systems from the 'bottom up', that is at the level of 'everyday life', at the level of values, beliefs and norms. 'Change yourself might have been the slogan of the Woodstock generation, but it was also pertinent as far as the Budapest School was concerned. This is not to say that the School should be regarded as 'reformist' in outlook, as if reformism were the only alternative to - or even necessarily opposed to - 'revolution'. It is that. having rejected the theoretical basis of Bolshevism and with it all forms of 'vanguardism', they were persuaded that the only legitimate means by which change could be brought about was through the actions of ordinary people convinced of the necessity for change. The revolution the School urged was thus still 'total' in scope in

Introduction

11

the sense that only with wholesale change to the values and practices of existing societies could the hope of a better world become a reality; but they -like many sympathetic to the New Left project- argued that without a genuine popular basis any attempt at radical change would be most likely to lead down the same road taken by the Soviet regime in the wake of the October Revolution. Also implied in this rejection of the Bolshevik legacy was a complete rejection of the notion still harboured amongst elements of the 'old' left in the West that the Soviet Union and its satellites represented some form of socialism, however 'deformed' or flawed in actuality. Given the School's desire to generate critique on the basis of Marx's humanist work it is not difficult to see whence their hostility to socialist systems derives. Real communism was nothing less than the very antithesis of the form of society Marx anticipated emerging out of socialist revolution. In place of 'human wealth', there was misery and degradation. Instead of collective self-determination, there was bureaucratic allocation on the basis of command planning and administrative fiat. Instead of distribution according to need, there was, in the School's memorable phrase, a 'dictatorship over needs', reducing the individual to a mere extension of the system, rather than the other way around, as Marx insisted must be the case under communism. What the School aimed at was therefore a total critique of contemporary society that would encompass both capitalist and socialist versions of modernity. No aspect of contemporary existence would be spared the School's withering gaze. In view of the above themes, George Schopflin's description of the School (and indeed of the other critical Marxist groups that sprang up around Central and Eastern Europe) as a form of 'para-opposition' is apposite.22 This was, as Schopflin's term suggests, an opposition 'from within' in the sense that, as immanent critics of the system, critics, that is, whose complaint was that the system was in a sense insufficiently 'Marxist' (on a democratic, participatory reading), they had a stake in the process of reform to which Kadar was committed in the early and middle 1960s. Continued tolerance of such a para-opposition was thus implicitly tied up with the reform process. As long as the regime thought of itself as 'reforming', then the existence of those calling for greater reform could be tolerated. Given that the operative doctrine in Hungary, at least during the mid-1960's was the idea of 'he who is not against us, is for us' , and given the School's desire to promote non-violent reform of the system, some sort of tacit understanding was struck between School and regime. The moment, however, that events conspired to make the regime nervous about continuing down such a road then of course paraopposition would be likely to be viewed merely as opposition tout court. Unfortunately, the School's status as a para-opposition was comparatively short-lived. The events of 1968, in which a reform-minded regime in Czechoslovakia was swept aside by Soviet tanks, made such distinctions between forms of opposition redundant/ 1 As ever, the Soviets enforced a black-and-white vision of the world in which 'those who are not for us are

12

Agnes Heller

against us'. Having signed the 'Korcula Letter' condemning the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, Heller, the Markus's and others affiliated to the School were divested of the handily ambiguous status they had previously enjoyed. Hegedus was removed from his post, thereby underlining not only the strength of the regime's distaste for the School's actions, but also its determination to remove members of the School - and anyone associated with them - from positions of influence. From 1968 onwards, Heller's colleagues were to live the wearily precarious lives dissidents would endure throughout the Soviet bloc: one day 'tolerated', the next day ostracised - or worse. It is thus hardly surprising that Heller felt the need now to distance herself from the reform communist mindset. From here onwards, Heller would resist the notion that her work would have or could have any influence on the communist regime in Hungary. Her task as she now saw it was to develop a line of what she terms 'personal thinking', as opposed to the form of thinking that seeks to develop an orthodoxy or doctrine - as Lukacs attempted. 24 In short, it is in the late 1960s that Heller ceases to be concerned about developing critique in the sense of adding to, honing or refining the humanist analysis of contemporary society and instead attempts to develop new theoretical positions and arguments of her own. Everyday Life, which forms the subject-matter for the first chapter of the present survey of Heller's work, shows this transition clearly. Everyday Life is a work of great intellectual vigour and originality. While drawing heavily on the analysis developed by Lukacs in his recently completed Aesthetics it shows a characteristic willingness to move beyond Marxian categories of analysis. As well as Lukacs and Hegel there is a very evident engagement with phenomenological thinkers, particularly Heidegger and Husserl (whom Heller had been able to read), and with problematics more often associated with the work of Western Marxists than with those that preoccupied theorists in Eastern Europe. What it demonstrates is a desire to engage with an intellectual debate of broader significance and scope than that associated with the efforts of reform communists. In Markus's view this meant that Heller was now essentially a 'rootless' intellectual, in that her message had barely any applicability or appeal to the still traumatised Hungarians, scratching about for private solace in their otherwise thoroughly alienated lives.25 'Rootless' is a harsh description for someone who wished only to engage in debates that were common currency throughout the region and beyond. Nonetheless, what the description does signal is Heller's detachment from, if not disillusionment with, the reform 'process'. In the wake of the Prague Spring this was surely an understandable move, though it of course created a great many difficulties for Heller personally. Everyday Life was closely followed by the long article 'Towards a Marxist theory of value' and The Theory of Needs in Marx, which form the subjectmatter for Chapter 2. The object of these works is to assert a reading of Marx that challenges the dominant Eastern and Western interpretations that insist

Introduction

13

on a positivist interpretation of his work. For Heller, Marx's significance as a theorist and critic of contemporary society lay with his capacity to defetishise apparently objective social relations and to show that only with the humanisation of production, social life and the historical process more generally could alienation be overcome. Marx, Heller argued, is a deeply ontological thinker in that he constantly refers back to an originary subject as the basis for an emancipatory critique of the given. In this sense the idea that he can legitimately be seen as the progenitor of a system in which 'need' is reduced to a social or collective category and where individuality can be rendered within the category of interest is deeply flawed, and betrays not only Marx's analysis of alienation, but his account of emancipation. In short, Heller took here an idea at the heart of the 'humanist' reading of Marx and developed it to the extent of creating what might be regarded as an entirely new Marxism: one that stresses the ontic character of his critique of capitalism and thus his belief in the necessity for the immediate transition to forms of society sustaining many-sided 'wealth'. Again, the humanist tone and clear anticommunist message of these works did not escape the attention of the Party, and after biding its time in acting against those implicated in the critique of Soviet actions in 19 6 8 it finally moved against Heller and the other members of the School. At the Regional Conference on Agitation, Propaganda and Culture held in Budapest in May 19 7 3 the party finally made its move against seven members of the School. Gyorgy Aczel. one of the Party's principal spokespersons for cultural affairs. accused the 'renegades', 'pseudo-revolutionaries', 'romantics of the pettybourgeoisie', and 'anarchists of the New Left' as objectively representing 'reactionary forces' devoted to 'damaging the young', who, he claimed, were unable 'to fight against these phenomena intelligently and properly'. 2" Heller was directly cited in Aczel's speech and branded an 'anti-Marxist' for suggesting that the revolutions that had brought communists to power were essentially 'political' in nature and thus far removed from the 'total social revolution' informing Marx's understanding of revolutionary change.27 Aczel was in one sense right: Heller was indeed calling for the transcendence of the existing 'socialist' order. together with the regime that kept it in being. The only surprise, then, is that it took the Party's ideologues so long to act against Heller and her colleagues. Nevertheless, once action was initiated punitive measures quickly followed. Members of the School were once again summarily dismissed from their posts and told that further employment was conditional on their publicly recanting their views so that Hungarian 'youth' would be spared the task of working out how it was that Lukacs's pupils could have been led so far astray. Heller and the other members of the School refused, however, to appear at the 'Philosophers' Trial', and were consequently cast even further out into the dissident wilderness. As well as being prevented from working in positions of influence they were now banned from taking any kind of paid work. Moreover, they were put under police surveillance and

Agnes Heller

14

prevented for the most part from publishing their work. Indeed, Feher was briefly imprisoned when he attempted to smuggle the draft of a book by Markus on the young Lukacs out of the country. Outcasts in their own country, yet without the means to leave, the School lived hand to mouth, waiting for the regime to back down or hoping against hope for offers of employment from abroad that would take them away from their internal exile. Fortunately, it was not too long before help arrived, no doubt prompted by the international coverage of the 'trial' and the subsequent plight of the School. Ivan Szelenyi, who had earlier been allowed to leave for Australia, having previously himself been imprisoned for dissident activity, obtained permission to have Heller interviewed in Hungary for a post in the sociology department of La Trobe University in Melbourne. Having been offered the post Heller and Feher gratefully left Hungary in the fall of 1977 to join the growing legion of colleagues heading for a new life in Australia. Given the circumstances of their departure, they could scarcely imagine that they would live to see their homeland again. The 'God' that failed In the meantime the Budapest School's attachment to Lukacs's original ideal of a renaissance of Marxism had dissipated. This it seems has less to do with either the treatment to which the members of the School had been subjected or even with the death of their mentor in 19 71 than with the fact that members of the School no longer believed that Marxism was susceptible to the reconceptualisation they thought necessary to maintain its relevance. Marxism. for them, was to all intents and purposes 'dead', and thus efforts at resuscitation would only put off a final reckoning. If we think back to Heller's description of her intellectual orientation at the time of Everyday Life it should be apparent that in any case Heller had lost the will to develop a new doctrine or orthodoxy. Neither she nor her colleagues felt the need to be part of a large-scale intellectual or theoretical project. 'Personal thinking' for Heller had undermined the desire to develop a new humanist paradigm, rather than being a mainspring for it. Thus when, in 1976, Vajda told the others that: 'you cannot overcome capitalism, socialism is rubbish and so is Marxism', the School quietly folded. 2" For Heller Vajda's declaration was as if a child had blurted out to her religious father that there is 'no God'. As she notes, [I]f you say there is no God then that destroys the foundation on which the school rests. It means there is no 'renaissance of Marxism'. If you have some minimal common things and there is something we can juxtapose to them, and there is something that we can find in Marx which is of common interest, then maybe. But if you say 'nothing can overcome capitalism and socialism is rubbish', then there is no school."

Introduction

15

This was evidently a poignant moment, though in essence it merely signalled the end of a project that in reality had lost its rationale at the time of the Prague Spring. This was the idea of communist regimes as receptive to critique, as willing to engage in a discourse on the socialist ideal, as desiring fundamental change. Moreover, the passing of the School appears to have made little difference to Heller intellectually or politically. Indeed it might be said to have 'liberated' her in the sense that she now thought herself to be addressing a wider New Leftist audience. Her next work, and the subject of the third chapter, Radical Philosophy, shows this repositioning clearly. Written just after The Theory of Needs in Marx, Radical Philosophy engages not with the ideologues of the Second International, of the Communist Bloc or contemporary structuralism (as did the former) , but with the efforts of Western neo-Marxists, particularly Habermas, to develop an alternative grounding for historical materialism and emancipatory theory. Engaging directly with Habermas and Apel's investigations of the properties of communication and consensus, Heller seeks here to translate the School's long-running concern with the formal properties of the public sphere into an account of democratic 'value contestation' between substantively free and equal subjects. Though certainly within the spirit of Marx's enterprise, Marx's importance in terms of the background set of assumptions against which the project was to be pursued was minimal. Instead, Kant, Hegel, Aristotle and the radical republican tradition began to assume greater significance. In addition, her sociological and anthropological works, such as The Theory of Feelings and On Instincts, did not 'contain a word of Marxism', which is only marginally less than Radical Philosophy itself.l'' The 'renaissance of Marxism' seems to have become so much excess baggage to be left behind in Budapest. A Theory of History, begun in Hungary, but completed in Australia, completed the process of detachment, Heller now formally abandoning 'Marxism' as a badge of affiliation in favour of 'left radicalism'. Heller's attachment to Marxism is, as we have seen, less philosophical than political in orientation, and so her 'break' from the 'grand narrative' is less dramatic than it sounds. What does emerge, however, is a rethinking of the character of modernity and along with it the character of the possibilities open to us as modern, radically contingent beings. Here the Marxian idea of social development as driven by impersonal material relations is displaced by a theory of modernity based on the existence of complementary yet non-reducible logics: industrialisation; civil society and capitalism. In other words, Heller does away with the idea of an originary 'motor' of development in favour of a 'decentred' notion of interactivity between separate dynamics. The effect is a radical form of 'contingency awareness'. in which we regard ourselves not as constituted by pre-given identities, but as ourselves constituting identity in the manner described by existentialist philosophers from Kierkegaard onwards. Modernity is thus by definition a realm of potential and possibility. More pertinently it is an epoch of universality. The left radical project now

16

Agnes Heller

appears, not as the transcendence or 'sublation' of modernity, but as the continuous actualisation of the possibility latent within it. Alongside the critique of Marxism as a philosophical doctrine, Heller was now also free to turn her attentions to the travails of 'actually existing socialism' and beyond that to the issue of what form socialism should take. As regards critique, Heller joined forces with Feher and Markus, the latter now also based in Australia. The result, Dictatorship over Needs, published in 1983, is a penetrating analysis of the origins and morphology of socialist systems. This study was supplemented by numerous interventions in the debates on the nature and prospects for socialism, Heller retaining her characteristically critical stance towards the cherished assumptions of both Eastern and Western Leftists. The strident approach of Everyday Life, The Theory of Needs in Marx and Radical Philosophy is, however, displaced by a much more conciliatory tone when it comes to the assessment of the place of liberal-democratic institutions and practices. What the experience of living in Australia had taught Heller was that it was wrong to lump Western countries together for the purposes of political analysis. She now discovered that there was no such thing as 'the West', and that the differences between Western societies were, if anything, just as marked as their similarities. This realisation had profound implications for her analysis of capitalism and socialism. Instead of thinking in terms of a leap to an emancipated society she began to think, as was implied above, in terms of the expansion of existing democratic structures and practices to cover those areas hitherto untouched by developments within the modern imaginary. In a move that mirrored rather than presaged developments within the left more generally, Heller's call for 'total social revolution' gave way to the idea latent in the analysis in A Theory of History of the progressive actualisation of modernity's universal values and freedom as 'the radicalisation of democracy'. Heller was of course by no means alone even within her immediate environment in seeking to reorientate left critique away from the classic Marxian analysis. Many of her colleagues, students and friends in Melbourne were similarly disillusioned with the classical Marxist perspective, and from their discussions there emerged the idea for a new journal of socialist theory. It was out of these discussions that Thesis Eleven was born, together with a new 'school' or grouping of like-minded intellectuals. Despite marked differences in position within the editorial group, particularly over the question of the relevance of Marxism to the development of socialist theory, members of the group provided for Heller and Feher an important testing ground for ideas during their stay in Australia. In many senses the group replicated the same feelings of common purpose and friendship that they had enjoyed as members of the Budapest School. Fortunately, in the case of Thesis Eleven it was a sense of purpose forged in an environment of tolerance and academic freedom, rather than in adversity and collective suffering. Thanks in part to this congenial environment Heller's work flourished in Australia. As well as completing A Theory of History and Dictatorship over

Introduction

17

Needs she enjoyed the opportunity of working with Feher on a series of interventions on inter alia the future of the left, on the prospects for change in Eastern and Central Europe, on the 'peace movements', and Marx's legacy. She also pursued her abiding scholarly interest in the legacy of her mentor, Lukacs, particularly in the later. less well-known work which had been such an influence on the development of her own thought in the 1960s and 19 70s. As regards her large-scale theoretical projects, the major product of this period is Beyond Justice, a work examined in greater detail in Chapter 5. Arguably Heller's most important contribution to political philosophy, Beyond Justice attempts to ground the idea of a radical democracy which had been developing since Radical Philosophy with the actualisation of the universal value of life in terms of the equality of life chances. A bold and imaginative work, Beyond Justice shows clearly how, despite her abandonment of Marxism, she remained committed to a conception of justice and the good life whose realisation would require profound change to the operation of liberal-capitalism. Indeed, despite her energetic engagement with liberal and libertarian theory and her desire to build some of their insights into her own outlook, the book serves as a timely reminder of her deep attachment to the aims and ideals associated with the socialist tradition. In the sixth chapter and also in the conclusion of this book we examine the political ramifications of the work Heller has been engaged in since leaving Australia in 1986 for the Hannah Arendt Chair in Philosophy at the New School for Social Research, New York. This might be summarised in terms of the development of, on the one hand, 'an ethics of personality', and, on the other, an analysis of the difference between modernity and pre-modernity. With regard to the former project, we find Heller returning to the problems and issues of her doctoral studies and her early career within the Budapest School. General Ethics which, along with A Philosophy of Morals and An Ethics of Personality, forms a trilogy examining the nature of subjectivity in modern and pre-modern societies, revisits many of the themes first elaborated in her lectures of the late 19 50s. The importance of these studies in terms of the development of her political thought only becomes apparent, however. in the light of the studies she has made of modernity and 'the postmodern political condition', which forms the subject-matter of many of the most important essays written in the 1980s and 1990s. Many of the most important of these pieces are collected in The Postmodern Political Condition, Can Modernity Survive? and The Grandeur and Twilight of Radical Universalism. Together with the remaining volumes of the theory of history trilogy, A Philosophy of History in Fragments and A Theory of Modernity, these works enlarge on the suggestive analysis first developed in Part III of A Theory of History. What emerges is a view of the modern as the ground of radical contingency ('the postmodern political condition') and thus also a sense of the necessity for developing political theory from a study of responsibility, judgement, action. In a more Arendtian mode, Heller's thought now places great emphasis on the potential of the

18

Agnes Heller

individual moral actor as the bearer of what can still legitimately be termed the 'promise' of modernity, the promise, that is, of an actualisation of the universal values of life and freedom, and, by extension, of equal opportunity and self-determination. Gone for ever the pious hope of the metanarratives, particularly of the Hegelian-Marxist metanarrative, that humanity would be swept inexorably onwards towards bounty and redemption. As Heller has always been at great pains to stress, there is no extra-human agency, no relief from the burden of responsibility that contingency thrusts upon us. The hope of a better society does not rest with the flow of the historical. or with any other form of 'necessity', but with the very 'fact' of contingency, of our constitutions as subjects able to change the world for the better (and worse). In this sense Heller's latest work links back to many of the themes which we find in her earliest writings, which caused her so much suffering at the hands of the communist regime in Hungary: the stress on the individual as agent; the hostility to the justification of states of affairs by reference to non-moral or non-ethical criteria; the belief in 'human substance' as the origin of everything that is good or worthwhile; and the hostility to forms of theorising and political practice that deny equality, rationality and the possibility for self-determination in the name of 'our' interests or needs, however defined. Such sentiments are and always have been the non-negotiable basis for Heller's political thought. Notes 1 The allusion is to Hannah Arendt's collection Men in Dark Times (New York, Harcourt Brace and World, 1968) and, by extension, to the illuminating essay by Martin Jay, 'Woman in dark times: Agnes Heller and Hannah Arendt' in John Burnheim (ed.), The Social Philosophy of Agnes Heller (Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1994), pp. 41-56 which explores the overlaps and continuities between the lives of Heller and Arendt. 2 As will become apparent. despite the epithet Heller attaches to Everyday Life, the latter should not be regarded as Heller's first 'major' work. On the contrary, she wrote and published eleven books before Everyday Life. As Markus notes, however, these are works that for most purposes are 'lost'. Most of them were published in Hungarian in very limited editions (if at all), and none of them with the exception of Renaissance Man has been published in another major European language. Their impact and dissemination has thus been extremely limited. For a summary of the work of the 'lost' Heller, see Gyorgy Markus, 'The politics of morals' in Burnheim, The Social Philosophy of Agnes Heller, pp. 257-79 and also from the same collection Mihaily Vajda, 'A lover of philosophy - A lover of Europe', pp. 17-27. 3 The term 'Budapest School' apparently dates from Lukacs's letter to the Times Literary Supplement (2 February 1972), and does not appear to have been a term the School used to describe itself for most of its existence. 4 Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (Moscow. Progress Publishers, 1976 [1848]), bottom of s. II. 5 The term 'Post-Marxism' seems insuperably vague. Nevertheless, it is used here

Introduction

6

7 8 9

10 11

12

13

19

and throughout the book as a general description for those who were once Marxist, but who for whatever reason have felt it necessary self-consciously to 'leave' Marx behind in the quest for a new basis for emancipatory critique. My use is different, however, to that of, for example, Stuart Sim, who terms Post-Marxism a 'movement'. This seems to me to be overstating the sense of common purpose and identity between the writers who are most often regarded as being 'PostMarxist' in orientation. It also exaggerates the degree of mobilisation behind any common 'Post-Marxist' programme. See Stuart Sim, 'Introduction: Spectres and nostalgia: Post-Marxism/ Post-Marxism' in Stuart Sim (ed.), Post Marxism: A Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 1. A book-length account of Heller's life and career was published in 1999, but unfortunately at the time of writing is only available in Hungarian and German. See Agnes Heller and Janos Kobanyai, Bicik1iz6 Majom (Budapest, Mult es Jov6 Lap- es Konyvkiad6, 1999). The sources for the brief account that follows here have been provided principally by the interviews I undertook with Heller in July 1998. Full texts of these interviews have been published as 'Interviews with Professor Agnes Heller' in a special edition of Daimon: Revista de Filosofia, no. 17 Ouly-December 1998), pp. 21-50, with the second half following in no. 18 (May-June 1999), pp. 5-38. The interviews can also be found - in German over two issues of Sinn und Form starting with the March/ April 2000 edition, with the second part in the September/October edition, respectively nos. 2 and 5 of volume 52. A much briefer version of the interview also appeared in Radical Philosophy, no. 94 (1999) as 'Post-Marxism and the ethics of modernity', pp. 29-40, though this version gives little biographical information. Unless otherwise stated all reference to this interview in the text is to the version published in Daimon. Other useful sources on Heller's life and work are Markus, 'The politics of morals', Jay 'Women in dark times' and Vajda, 'A lover of philosophy' and Agnes Heller [and Laura Boella], 'Marxist ethics and the future of Eastern Europe: An interview with Agnes Heller' , Telos, no. 38 (winter 1978/ 79), pp. 153-74, translated by David J. Parent. I am indebted to Professor Heller for reading through and correcting this section of the typescript. See Heller's comments in 'Marxist ethics', pp. 154-5. Markus, 'Politics of morals', pp. 261-2. Heller, 'Marxist ethics', p. 156; A commentary on the work can be found in Markus, 'Politics of morals'. Heller, 'Marxist ethics', p. 156. Heller, 'Marxist ethics', p. 156; see also Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, Hungary 1956 Revisited: The Message of a Revolution A Quarter of a Century After (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1983). See Karl Marx, 'The Civil War in France' in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), The Portable Karl Marx (London, Penguin, 1983), pp. 505-556; V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Moscow, Progress Publishers, [1917] 1978). Agnes Heller, 'The legacy of Marxian ethics today', Praxis International, 1:4 Oanuary 1982); Heller, 'Marxist ethics', p. 156- Heller's hostility to socialist and communist parties, particularly to Eurocommunism, becomes a persistent motif in her later analysis of the fate of socialism in the West. See for example Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, 'The fear of power. A contribution to the genesis and morphology of Eurocommunism' , Thesis Eleven, no. 2 (19 81 ).

20

Agnes Heller

14 Markus, 'Politics of morals', p. 265. 15 A brief account of its principal themes can be found in Heller. 'Marxist ethics'. p. 158. 16 These are English translations of works only published in Hungarian. 1 7 Ferenc Feher gives a useful account of the origins and composition of the various Lukacs schools, including the Budapest School itself. See his 'The language of resistance: "Critical Marxism" versus "Marxism-Leninism" in Hungary' in R. Taras (ed.). The Road to Disillusion: From Critical Marxism to Postcommunism in Eastern Europe (Armonk. NY. M. E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 41-57: on the principal themes of the work of the Budapest School see in particular Johann P. Amason, 'Perspectives and problems of critical Marxism in Eastern Europe (part two)' Thesis Eleven, nos. 5/ 6 (1982) , pp. 215-45. See also Douglas M. Brown. Towards a Radical Democracy: The Political Economy of the Budapest School (London, Unwin Hyman, 1988). 18 See Markus. 'Politics of morals', pp. 267-8. 19 I should note here that I am largely relying on the account of the origins and character of the School Heller gave to me in the interviews cited above. For other versions of the origins and development of the School see in particular George Schopflin. 'Opposition and para-opposition: Critical currents in Hungary, 1968-78' in F. Tokes (ed.). Opposition in Eastern Europe (Baltimore, MD. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). The article is also helpful in locating sources both in English and Hungarian relating to the development of the School. See also Serge Frankel and Daniel Martin. 'The Budapest School'. Telos. no. 17 (Autumn 1973). pp. 122-33; Franois Riviere, 'L'Ecole de Budapest', Les Temps Modernes, vol. 30 (August-September 1974), pp. 2737-47: William Robinson. 'Who are the real Marxists now?', Index on Censorship, 2:3 (1973), pp. 71-7. 20 Karl Marx, 'Marginal notes to the programme of the German Workers' Party [Critique of the Gotha Programme)'. in Kamenka (ed.). The Portable Karl Marx, pp. 533-55. 21 According to Heller, Markus remained more convinced than the rest of the School of the utility of Marx's work, particularly for sociological analysis. See Part I of Tormey, 'interviews', pp. 36-7. 22 See Schbpflin, 'Opposition and para-opposition'. 23 A detailed account of the impact of 1968 on the Budapest School can be found in Schbpflin, 'Opposition and para-opposition'. pp. 15 7-61. 24 Tormey, 'Interviews' I. pp. 29-32. 25 Markus, 'Politics of morals'. p. 2 79. 26 Quoted in Frankel and Martin, 'The Budapest School', p. 123. A Text of the 'Resolution of the HSWP Central Committee' calling for the expulsion of those within the Budapest School who remained members of the party can be found in Robinson, 'Real Marxists', p. 73. ' 27 Anon, 'The position paper of the Cultural Political Work Collective operating next to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on the anti-Marxist views of several social researchers', Telos, no. 17 (Autumn 1973). pp. 137-8. 28 Tormey, 'Interviews' I. p. 36. 29 Tormey, 'Interviews' I. p. 37. 30 Tormey, 'Interviews' I. p. 37.

1

The 'Renaissance of Marxism' and the revolution in everyday life

As we noted in the Introduction, by the time she came to write Everyday Life Heller had already earned a considerable reputation in Hungary and Eastern Europe as one of the leading figures in the Budapest School, which had been formed in 1964. Nevertheless, what is apparent is that up to the publication of Everyday Life her work had only hinted at the possibility of a new emancipatory critique emerging from the Lukacsian project. This is partly due to her own interests, which until the middle of the 1960s remained orientated to developing her understanding of ethics, and also to the particular circumstances of the period, which made it virtually impossible to publish material critical of the ruling regime. With the laxer, more tolerant conditions of the mid- to late 1960s, however, Heller was free to concentrate on the task of translating 'personal thinking' into critical theory. Everyday Life was the first startling manifestation of this new-found liberty, and in some sense remains her most exciting and original work. It was here that we see what the renaissance of Marxism might entail in terms of a reconceptualisation of the core categories of Marxist analysis and a reimagining of the means by which that more generous and tolerant vision of socialism hinted at in the earlier Renaissance Man might be realised. 1 This chapter is thus devoted to an explication and assessment of Heller's first work of 'personal thinking'. Everyday Life is, it has to be said, an immensely rich, not to say complex, work. It is one that draws very heavily from Marx's earlier, more philosophical material; but there is also a strongly phenomenological current whose origins are more obviously Hegelian than Marxist - notwithstanding the crucial importance of Hegel in the formation of 'the early Marx'. Like many of her contemporaries (most obviously Jean-Paul Sartre, Goldmann, Bloch, Karel Kosik and Henri Lefebvre) Heller and the other members of the Budapest School felt that 'Marxism' had, through its debasement at the hands of those who wished to turn Marxism into a positivist social science. become increasingly moribund. What was needed, therefore, was a study of the subjective rather than the objective conditions of change to establish how best

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to confront both capitalism and communism. This meant a return to the subject of alienation and the constitution of social life more generally to establish where resistance and change were likely to come from. To put the matter in philosophical terms, the dialectical. radically historicised account of the formation of subjectivity supplied by Marx had to be combined with an analysis of the constituents of what phenomenologists such as Schutz and Husserl termed the 'life world' or, in Heller's usage, 'everyday life'. The aim of Everyday Life might therefore be regarded as the radicalisation of phenomenology to produce a social theory that would supplement the largely ontological account of alienation found in the early Marx. The hope was that such an account could establish where the points of weakness lay in the contemporary given and thus how resistance to that given could be developed. Little attention is given to the forms and modalities of emancipation as such, Heller for the moment retaining her Marxist suspicion of attempts to pre-empt revolutionary praxis through the elaboration of utopias or fully worked out blueprints for future 'happiness'. In short, the questions she wished to answer were: how is it possible to encourage the development of critical. self-aware individuals? What should the role of such individuals be in the process of social transformation? And finally, how and under what conditions could that transformation take place? As quickly becomes apparent, in an important sense Heller saw herself as building on Lukacs's work in this area. A brief resume of Lukacs's position on these issues is thus a useful place to begin. Lukacs's 'breakthrough': the primacy ofthe aesthetic Everyday Life was clearly inspired not only by Lukacs's project for the School. but also by his philosophy. Although this might sound an obvious connection, in reality, as we have already noted the ties binding the members of the School were loose ones, and based as much on friendship, respect and solidarity as on a shared sense of purpose or vision. Indeed what impresses in reading the work of the other members is the obvious sense in which each of them retained his or her own intellectual independence. Lukacs could by all accounts appear a fearsome figure; but he was also an indulgent one, and encouraged those he worked with to think for themselves. The Budapest School was no school of sycophants, but rather a loosely assembled group of intellectuals, with Lukacs as perhaps primus inter pares. Nonetheless. in considering Heller's work during this period it is apparent how close she was to the project and method Lukacs had developed in the course of the 19 50s and 1960s in his attempt to rethink the categories of Marxist discourse. Concerning the latter, this involved opening up a purely materialist and dialectical approach to the possibilities suggested by phenomenological thinkers in their quest for an understanding of the character of 'Being-in-the-world'. Lukacs had earlier devoted himself to the study of Kant and Hegel as well as

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Marx, and thus an engagement between a phenomenological and a dialectical approach was an obvious avenue to explore. Nor, it can be added, was this awareness of the necessity for some form of mediation between the two approaches a one-way process. As Heidegger noted in his 'Letter on Humanism', the study of ontology had to be combined with a more dialectical approach recognising the historicity of Being. It was not enough, in other words, to fix ontology in the life-world, as arguably Schutz and Husserl had done. The life-world had to be recognised as itself historically and socially constructed. Heidegger's attempt to destabilise ontological categories and pose the question of Being in relational rather than static or fixed terms thus brought the phenomenological approach into a similar orbit to that pursued by phenomenologically influenced Western Marxists. As Heidegger argued, once the category of Being is uncoupled from the issue of human nature (the animalitas), then it lacks that sense of necessity that underpins metaphysical attempts to secure 'Man'. 2 'Being' becomes a project for 'Man' rather than something inscribed on 'his' physical or natural self, and history becomes the story of the 'coming-to-be' of humanity. The move to a phenomenologically-influenced approach should not, however, just be seen in intellectual terms, but, as implied in the comments above. the response politically to the latest 'crisis of Marxism', which in the 1950s and 1960s expressed itself in two ways. On the one hand, 'official Marxism' of the sort found in the Communist Bloc had very evidently ossified into a debased and ritualistic set of formulae for justifying the domination of Soviet-backed puppet regimes. In order to mount an effective ideological critique of these regimes it was necessary to develop a vocabulary and approach which provoked the recipients to reflect critically on what was given to them as 'Marxism', so that they might re-engage with the 'negative' potential contained within it. This process was partly aided in Lukacs's example and in the example of the Budapest School more generally by the publication of Marx's earlier works, particularly the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and the Grundrisse, both of which provided a reservoir of 'humanist' material to provide a contrast with the later, 'scientific' work. It is evident, nonetheless, in both Lukacs's and Heller's work of the period how an engagement with Hegelian philosophy, existentialism and phenomenology liberated them - as they saw it - from an increasingly moribund language and perspective. The immanent critique of Marxist 'practice' began, in other words, from an opening up or reinvigoration of Marxism as a critical intellectual activity. On the other hand, in common with many Western Marxists, Lukacs was convinced of the necessity of revamping Marx's analysis of capitalism to take account of changes in the economic base and hence the class structure of the most advanced capitalist societies. It was a sine qua non of both Lukacs's and Heller's analysis that the relationships and forms of labour reproduced under capitalism were deeply alienated, and thus that capitalism had to be

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completely 'transcended'. But what was progressively less evident was that economic crisis would provide the catalyst for the sweeping away of the old order. Capitalism may well be crisis-prone, as per classical Marxist analysis, but this did not entail a final collapse of the sort which made the development of a new form of society necessary. Nor did it entail the development of the requisite level of generic consciousness needed to channel the negative energies produced by periodic crises along socially reconstructive paths. After all, the crises of the 19 30s, which saw every capitalist society rocked by mass unemployment and recession, had led not to socialism, but rather to fascism and social democracy. In other words, left radicals could no longer rely on the prospect of economic crisis as the catalyst for social change. People had to be convinced of the necessity for socialism, just as they had been convinced by those supportive of the status quo to stand by capitalism. The difficulty was, however, that the more capitalism developed the more intense the division of labour and hence the degree of alienation became. As Marx had argued, the growth in productive potential accompanies an ever-increasing degradation of the individual under capitalism. Marx's view was of course that this is an inherently unsustainable state of affairs and thus that the proletariat is effectively compelled to seek alternatives to it. What is evident in the writings of the Budapest School and indeed, of many other 'critical' or 'neo-' Marxists of the period is their lack of faith in the certainty that material factors or economic crisis would alone produce the conditions needed for revolution. They therefore sought some other trigger for the change in consciousness that would permit contemplation of a radical alternative to the given. The question was, where was this change of consciousness to come from? How were ordinary men and women to be made aware of the contingent, historically conditioned nature of the world they inhabit so that they might come to desire another world radically different to their own? This issue dominated the intellectual agenda of Western Marxism during the period, and led to a fundamental reappraisal of the process of 'defetishisation', which was seen as the key to unlocking revolutionary change. What became clear in the debates between some of the leading figures within Western Marxism was the importance of 'the aesthetic' as a medium or vehicle for defetishisation. In a world in which everything else seemed merely to be an extension of the logic of capital. and was thus subsumed within a culture of consumption, art, or at least certain forms of art, could retain its authenticity, otherness, and 'negativity'. Art, it was argued, gives witness to the world: it expresses the fears and hopes of those who are subject to the historical rather than in control of it. The aesthetic was thus seen as a vehicle for defetishisation, for access to some 'reality' unmediated by the otherwise all-embracing process of commodification. Given this potential Lukacs, like Walter Benjamin, Bertolt Brecht, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse (among others) devoted some of his most productive years to developing his account of the aesthetic as the basis for defetishisation and thus the key to

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unlocking radical social change. Lukacs's work on the aesthetic was finally published as Der Eigenart des Asthetischen (The Specificity of the Aesthetic) in 1963, which was of course just as the Budapest School was being formed. 3 In the Aesthetic Lukacs argues that art is the memory or reflection of a world which has been surpassed in the course of social development, but which nonetheless is part of what Lukacs terms 'the experienced present'. Though any given work of art 'belongs' to another era, the manner of its reception, its meaning is 'of the present' and in this sense is part of the 'selfconsciousness of humanity' .4 The quality that Lukacs is interested in in art is thus its capacity to invoke feelings, emotions or passions in the recipient. What differentiates the work of art from other non-aesthetic objects capable of arousing emotion (such as a photo of a member of one's family) is that in Lukacs's terms it evokes the 'experience of totality', the experience of a world. 5 The work of art takes a person out of his or her own world and transports him or her to another. It thereby provides a contrast between the norms, rules, values and expectations of the world of which he or she is a part and the world or totality of emotions and feelings portrayed in the work of art. It is this sensation of contrast which Lukacs terms 'catharsis', meaning in this context '[a] shaking of the recipient's subjectivity, such that the passions that manifest themselves in his life receive new contents, a new direction, and are purified in such a way that they become the spiritual basis of "virtual powers"'." Lukacs describes this reception as having a bearing on the ontological character of the subject, transforming him or her from der ganze Mensch ('the whole man') into der Mensch ganz ('the man-as-whole'). This distinction is intended to describe how, after the reception of the art work, the individual is transformed - if only temporarily - from a particularistic individual whose consciousness merely reflects the concerns of the world around him or her into a subject able to transcend this limited horizon and bring to bear a more critical orientation to his or her world. 7 In other words, art helps to transform subjectivity from something passive and given into something active and critical. Lukacs seems to be saying that aesthetic reception gives the subject the means to see through the rhetoric and falsity of the world around him or her and thereby to contemplate alternatives to the particular historically and socially rooted relationships that compose it. A corollary is thus that art induces reflection on the rationality and ultimate desirability of the recipient's own world. The aesthetic sensibility is a critical sensibility; but it is one that reaches beyond the merely aesthetic to encompass the totality of lived experience. Before moving to examine Heller's reception of Lukacs's work on the aesthetic we need just to note the radical implications of what he was saying. Firstly, Lukacs makes it clear that the development of a critical consciousness and thus of a critical orientation to the world can be promoted by the reception of art or, rather, 'great art' of the sort typified in his view in the works of 'realist' literature (Tolstoy, Balzac, Dostoevsky etc.). Thus, by contrast with

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Marx's account of the process, what comes out of Lukacs's investigation is that defetishisation can be achieved through contemplation of the given as well as through praxis." Secondly, the transition from a false or fetishised consciousness to a defetishised or true consciousness is one experienced on these terms by the individual, not the class or group. This suggests, thirdly, that given the continuing lack of a 'final' crisis of capitalism and thus of an apocalyptic moment which might provoke a change of consciousness in the masses and force them to overturn capitalism, opposition to the capitalist given is likely to manifest itself in the form of the individual rejection of the norms and values associated with and produced by capitalism. In other words, opposition will take place at the level of 'everyday life' and take the form of a rejection of the forms of 'consumerism' and 'individualism' that sustain the capitalist way of life. It might be expected that if enough people were to reject such values and roles communities would emerge based on a different. contradictory ethics. Rebellion would take the form of 'dropping out' of capitalism rather than overturning it. As Markus comments, Lukacs's idea of the 'renaissance of Marxism' thus invoked the notion of a 'renaissance ethics' rather than a crisis at the level of production as the basis for revolution. From art to life: Heller's revision of Lukacs In an article published in 1966 Heller describes Lukacs's work on aesthetics as 'a triumph for Marxism'." and from her description of the work which forms the basis of the article it is obvious how struck she was by Lukacs's 'breakthrough'. The effect in terms of Heller's own theoretical perspective was immediate. Even a cursory reading of Everyday Life confirms the profound impact that reading The Specificity of the Aesthetic had on her methodology and approach. 1" Not only is the vocabulary and manner of expression similar, but a number of the key arguments relate directly to the claims Lukacs makes about the nature of aesthetic experience. Nevertheless, it is also evident that if anything Heller was motivated by a grander, more complete vision than even Lukacs's. Lukacs was, after all, primarily interested in the category of the aesthetic, and his arguments were directed against those who failed to see the significance of the work of Kant and Hegel for social critique. There is little attempt to develop the analysis in terms of an alternative to Marxism. Heller, on the other hand, wanted to utilise this analysis of the potential contained in art for the reinvigoration of Marxist social theory and by extension of its account of revolution and the transition to communism. A summary of Everyday Life might be that it represents the generalisation of the categories used by Lukacs in his analysis of the aesthetic to the domain of social life per se. This is also, we can add, how Heller herself sees Lukacs's influence coming to bear on her own work. As she explains in a later interview, '[t]he treatment of art as a world of objectifications provided us [i.e.

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Lukacs's circle] with a universal methodology that enabled us to understand the question of historical continuity. In my book Everyday Life, I undertook to broaden this theory into a general theory of objectifications.''' This account still leaves the question of why Heller thought these categories needed broadening or radicalising, particularly given her otherwise favourable comments about his approach in the earlier article mentioned above. What seems evident, however, is that she thought his analysis fell short in several respects. Firstly, the concentration on the demystifying qualities of 'high art' inevitably gives Lukacs's analysis a narrow basis from which to generate critical forms of consciousness. If it really is only art which is capable of generating reflection then of course the implication is that only those capable of understanding the message contained in works of art are able to access the real. This in turn implies a level of education and culture which would inevitably exclude a significant element, if not the majority, of ordinary people. This does not appear to have been Lukacs's intention. Indeed, it was precisely his desire to distance himself from the notoriously elitist suggestions about the role of the Party he had earlier made in History and Class Consciousness which inspired him to explore the possibilities contained in the aesthetic in the first place. Nonetheless, Lukacs's analysis does have, as Philippe Despoix suggests, a 'neoclassical', even a Nietzschean tone to it, reflecting his belief that only 'great art' possesses the potential he describes. 12 Secondly, the form of defetishisation available to the recipient of art has a slippery quality, which makes it difficult to see to what purpose this exposure to the real might be put. As Lukacs describes it, the cathartic moment is necessarily a fleeting moment. It is a moment of pain and emotion that, precisely as such, is temporary in duration. Moreover, as a 'homogeneous' medium, as one requiring intense concentration in the form of absorption in the relevant cultural product (work of art, novel, music etc.), the moment concentration lapses the subject moves back to the sphere of everyday life, and to the particularity of the given. It was not clear, in other words, how the experience gained in reception could be translated back into action in the here-and-now or everyday. What was the subject to do with this glimpse of universality? Lukacs, having done the hard work of finding a means of reuniting the subject with the object, the particular and the general, left it to others to suggest on what basis this unity might express itself in terms of praxis. As regards the first element of Lukacs's argument, what is immediately different in Heller's approach is the opening-up of the category of the 'species essential' or 'for itself activity - as opposed to the particularistic or everyday realm of the 'in itself.' 3 In other words she wants other forms of activity or production ('objectivations') recognised for their ability to shed light on the universal or 'generic', and so returns to the formula described by Hegel in the course of his examination of the constituents of Absolute Spirit in the Phenomenology. Art is, as Lukacs argues, a major source of 'for

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itself objectivations, as art represents in clear terms humanity's universality; but so too, Heller argues, are science and philosophy, albeit in different ways (EL ll0-13; 191-3). Science represents the sum total of humanity's knowledge of 'reality', and thus access to science affords in literal terms a clearer view of the world and ourselves. Access to the products of science can thus play an important role in the defetishising of the world in so far as it remains bound by the norms of the scientific enterprise. Similarly, philosophy offers insight and knowledge of the human condition and as an inherently critical activity encourages a sceptical attitude to received truths. As Heller puts it, 'philosophy defetishizes man's world conceptually by showing us what sort of world we live in, and how to endow our lives with sense in this world' (EL ll2). 14 More than this, however, philosophy encourages an independence of thought and action which can provide an alternative model for those looking for an example of how to live their lives. As she reasons, it is simply inconsistent for philosophers not to adopt that way of life suggested by their philosophies. The philosopher who holds Epicurus's philosophy to be 'true' can be expected to behave in a manner consistent with that of an Epicurean; so too the stoic with stoicism or the sceptic with scepticism. It is in other words the unity of theory and practice that is important; the fact that one demonstrates the truth of a given philosophy in the way one treats others. The example of the philosopher is important. Heller argues, because it undermines the everyday attitude that people behave they way they do because they have to, because of 'necessity'. In other words, it shows that how one lives is fundamentally a matter of choice, and thus that norms and values are ultimately subject to the will. The philosopher thus provides a kind of paradigm of the critical individual Heller sees as at the cutting edge of the effort to undermine or transcend alienated social life. 15 They have the power and self-confidence needed to buck 'trends and tendencies' and to withstand the effort to integrate such individuals into the social totality or, indeed, to isolate them as 'outsiders' to be ignored. By contrast with Lukacs. therefore, for Heller it is not only the realm of the aesthetic that affords the basis for a defetishising experience, but a variety of intellectual and practical activities. This inevitably has a knock-on effect in terms of the manner and character of reception itself. We noted above how one of the limitations afforded by a pure identification of the aesthetic with defetishisation was the momentary or at least temporary character of 'catharsis'. Aesthetic reception, according to Lukacs, may produce a glimpse of the real; but it is just that, a glimpse. What the effect of catharsis on the subject is over the longer term is much less clear. For Heller, however, catharsis becomes 'illumination' and 'awakening', suggesting a more permanent transfiguration of consciousness (EL 192). As she notes elsewhere, 'the whole function of ... catharsis is to shake us out of complacency with ourselves and our world, and to adumbrate ways of changing both' (EL 252).

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The suggestion is thus that we should expect reception of 'for itself objectivations to lead to a change in the attitude of the recipient towards the given. Indeed this observation might be reversed: an objectivation failing to induce catharsis can be categorised as belonging to the realm of particularity rather than to that of the generic. 1" The significance of Heller's insistence on the depth of the effect of reception is felt at the immediate level on the issue of the availability of a nonalienated form of subjectivity within capitalist society. To recall Lukacs, the transformation of subjectivity accompanies the act of reception, and thus once the reception is over the subjectivity of the recipient is restored to its previous state. Der ganze Mensch switches to der Mensch ganz and back again with the act of reception. This is because the act of reception is, as he puts it, 'homogeneous' and all-embracing. 'Mimesis' is a form of transformation, not just another modality of contemplation. Thus, once reception ends and the subject returns to the heterogeneous sphere of everyday life, he or she is restored as the subject of everyday life. Heller, on the other hand, argues that, since the reception of 'for itself objectivations' makes a lasting impression on the subject, Lukacs's model needs to be revised so as to recognise the possible emergence of a critical form of subjectivity from within everyday life. This is what she calls 'the [I]ndividual', as compared with the subject of everyday life, which she terms 'the [P]articular' . 17 Whereas the Particular person rests within the confines of alienated everyday life, absorbed by the '!-consciousness' and egoism which bourgeois society in particular promotes as the normal model of behaviour, the individual is able to rise above this narrow horizon and attain a level of species essentiality. As Heller puts it: '[T]he individual, then, is the person who has a conscious relationship with the generic, and who 'orders' his everyday life on the basis of this conscious relationship. The individual is that person who synthesizes within himself the contingent singularity of particularity and the generality of the species' (EL 20). It should be stressed that Heller is speaking of 'types' of subjectivity in the sense familiar in the Continental tradition of theorising. Very rarely would any empirical person act in an entirely particularistic or entirely individualistic fashion. As she puts it, '[n]o hard and fast line can be drawn between the particularistic person, on the one hand, and the individuality on the other. Individuality is a development; it is the coming-to-be of an individual' (EL 22). What remains important, however, is that individuals have the possibility of developing themselves as individuals and thus of escaping the dominant, alienated forms of subjectivity promoted under the status quo. This distinction between subjectivities within the realm of everyday life has crucial ramifications for the development of Heller's social theory. Firstly and most significantly, it implies that the emergence of autonomous, self-reflexive individuals is possible within an otherwise alienated form of life. Autonomy is regarded by Heller as the quality possessed by those whose choices are fully informed by 'species essential' or 'universal' considerations.

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This is not to suggest that the Particular person does not exercise choice, only that the choices he or she makes are between options, actions and objects regarded as 'normal' within any given social setting. The Individual. on the other hand, draws from a wider sense of possibility and experience, and thus the choices he or she makes have greater depth to them: 'He chooses between alternatives, and places the imprint of his own individuality on the fact of choosing, on its content, its contours, etc.' (EL 22). What counts as a rational choice is not determined by the dead weight of 'tradition' or social consensus, but by the subject him- or herself. To Heller the Individual is thus distinguished from Particular persons by the possession of phronesis, or practical judgement. He or she bears responsibility for his or her actions, whereas the Particular seeks to pass off responsibility to 'society' or some other agent (EL 24). To push the distinction further, the Individual is 'in control' of him- or herself, whereas the Particular person typically feels him or herself to be subject to the will of others. If something goes wrong or expectations are not met, it is someone else's fault rather than his or her own. As Heller notes, '[F]or the particularistic person, fate is a sort of power floating in the air above his head, while the individual construes fate as his fate' (EL 24). On the other hand, as she is keen to point out, this is not to say that in practice Individuals always choose the good or that in broad terms we can equate the possession of autonomy with moral goodness. Rather. the possession of autonomy actually presupposes the possibility of choosing evil, as Heller argues in her discussion the case of Richard III. Richard, she thinks, clearly possessed autonomy in the sense that he was not limited in his moral or ethical conduct by dominant norms and values, but 'chose' his own framework in which to act. The fact that he is a 'bad man' is irrelevant from the point of view of establishing whether his actions carry the imprint of his own personality or are a reflection of current custom. Autonomy thus refers to the origin of choices, not to their moral character or virtue. On this reading Kantians are therefore wrong to insist that whether an action is autonomously made can be judged on the basis of whether it satisfies the criterion of 'universalisability'. What is important is whether an action originates from an agent who possesses 'self-consciousness of universality' and who has transcended the narrow horizon of moral discourse evident in his or her own social world. He or she is able, in other words, to reflect critically on norms and values which to the Particular person seem 'natural' and necessary to an ordered existence. As Heller puts it, for the Individual 'public opinion does not represent a limiting factor. The [I]ndividual may even take issue with the "invisible" particularistic motivation latent in public opinion, to the extent of endorsing as "right" desires or actions which public consensus has decided are "wrong"' (EL 82). This latter point is crucial for Heller's attempt to generate a critical social theory, for what it implies is that even in the most alienated of societies,

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where, as under capitalism, '!-consciousness' and 'egoism' seem everywhere the norm, it is still possible to access a realm of objectivations that make us potentially critical of the world around us and the relationships that compose it. On the other hand, it is a difficult step for any person to set his or her face against the world of which they are a part, and thus 'this sort of trans-alienated relationship with the alienated is only possible in the case of a relatively developed individuality' (EL 83). The transition is made even more difficult by the practical obstacles that exist to 'individualisation' or 'the coming-to-be of the individual'. Virtually by definition most forms of employment undertaken by the working class prevent them from accessing the sphere of 'for itself objectivations and developing a critical relationship to the norms and rules governing their daily lives. This is why, in Heller's view, it must be the primary goal of social revolution to ensure that work does not itself prevent ordinary people from transcending their particularity. Following Marx, she states, for example, that such a goal implies two developments: 'the alienation of the work process must be overcome, [and] mechanical means must replace human labour in all types of work which gives little or no scope for the development of personal talents' (EL 259). Nonetheless, she also stresses that whether someone seeks to develop his or her individuality can still be a matter of choice. As she reasons, most activities can be performed in a tedious, repetitive, uninspiring fashion, or they can be done with flair, creativity and imagination. Teaching (for example) can appear highly alienated not only to the teacher, but also to the pupils who are taught; but it can also be inspirational, spontaneous and inventive, all signs that the teacher has 'individualised' his or her teaching. What is crucial here is the attitude of the teacher: whether he or she wants to make what he or she does dynamic and challenging. It needs to be reiterated, however, that Heller does not wish to claim that everyone living in modern society has the occasion or opportunity to individualise his or her work or activity in this fashion, only that the fact that it is possible to develop in this trans-alienated condition must be seen as a source of considerable hope that radical change can be instigated from 'below' rather than from above (or 'without'), as in the Leninist model, which even in this highly abstracted argument remains the principal object of critique. More importantly, however, hope also stems from the character of the autonomy generated in the process of individualisation. In spite of her view that the achievement of autonomy is no guarantee that the Individual will choose good over evil, it is obvious that she does see a correlation between the development of autonomy and moral good. Precisely because of their capacity to access species essential objectivations Individuals are able to justify their actions by reference to universalisable norms and values, that is to norms and values that one would (in Kantian manner) prescribe for everyone. Thus: 'We can say that the moral individual is inhabited by the moral imperative. His actions are not necessarily designed to be of universal validity

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but they are seen as susceptible of generalization on the moral plane' (EL 86). Thinking about what will become a key element of Heller's moral and political philosophy, we get some clue as to the import of this suggestion in her discussion of 'reciprocity', a term she will return to repeatedly in later work. Citing Weber, she argues that reciprocity lies at the heart of every 'religious ethic', and thus at the heart of every society since language and morality were invented (EL 84). The idea of reciprocity is in essence a simple one, amounting to 'retaliation against offenders, and fraternal assistance to friendly neighbours' (EL 84). These precepts are supplemented by four apparently universal nostrums 'without which everyday life would be impossible', which are: 'keeping a promise, telling the truth, gratitude and elementary loyalty' (EL 84). What Weber is describing as empirically universal is thus in essence what Kant regards as the basis for autonomy, namely the maxim of 'treating others as one would wish to be treated'.1K For Heller the important point is that while for both the Particular person and the Individual such norms represent a form of moral default setting, only the Individual is in a position to see their universality or species essential character. The effect of what amounts to the enjoyment of a universalist perspective is that the Individual has a strong orientation to the good. The Individual does not regard his or her actions as in some sense determined or shaped by 'fate' - as does the Particular person. Moreover, because the Individual sees his or her actions as 'susceptible to generalization on the moral plane' he or she is pulled in the direction of acting in a manner familiar from Kant's description of the autonomous individual, which is to say that he or she would be guided by the moral imperative and by extension by the notion of reciprocity. With this proviso in mind Heller infers that it takes a tremendous effort of will not to be guided by universal moral imperatives of the sort outlined above. The Individual may, like Richard III, choose evil, but the expectation is clearly that he or she is much more likely to seek the good. 1Y As Heller puts it, choosing good is the path suggested by access to universal values, whereas choosing evil involves a 'double negation': turning one's back on the particular ethical or moral framework characterising the everyday in favour of 'generalisable' norms and rules, followed by turning one's back on the universal to achieve particular (i.e. selfish) aims and ambitions. In short, while greed and selfinterest are strong factors in developing motivation and may intervene to prevent the Individual from doing what he or she knows to be good, we can nevertheless expect those who have attained the status of Individuals to behave in a manner consonant with the 'universal' and species essential considerations that otherwise inform their actions. The individual and the revolution in everyday life

The relationship between 'individualisation' and universality for social critique is explored by Heller in the chapter 'The Personality in Everyday Life'.

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What becomes immediately obvious is that the concept of 'reciprocity' will play a key role in transforming the Individual from, as it were, a 'do-gooder' imbued with a sense of responsibility to others to, as it were, a revolutionary of everyday life. The reasoning is based on the likely reaction of autonomous individuals to the alienated character of modern society. Despite the very evident phenomenological and existentialist influences on the work, when it comes to the analysis of alienation Heller's sentiments are very much in sympathy with those of Marx. This is to say that alienation should not be regarded as ontological in nature, that is, as rooted in the 'human condition' as Heidegger insists. but is to be seen as a product of the way society is organised. 'I deny', she declares ' that everyday life must necessarily be alienated. In the final analysis, the reason for the alienation of the everyday world is not its structure, but those social relationships by virtue of which an alienated relationship with everyday life becomes the typical relationship' (EL 2 57). In an echo of the analysis found in the work of Kantian Marxists (particularly Otto Bauer whom Heller acknowledges as an influence) Heller characterises alienation as grounded in relations of instrumentality, and more specifically in relations based on hierarchy and domination. 2" Where a person is a 'mere means' for the satisfaction of the ends of another that person is alienated. He or she has no control over his or her existence for as long as this relation of dependency is maintained, and is thus denied any prospect of controlling or having an influence over his or her conditions of existence. Heller is not. it should be stressed, saying that all relations in which a person is a means for the realisation of the ends of another are alienated. In her view such an assessment would stamp as 'alienated' the sort of transactions without which life in a modern society would be difficult, if not impossible. My asking a shop assistant for a pair of shoes, for example, has the appearance of being merely 'instrumental' in the sense that my primary interest is not to engage with the assistant qua human being but to find a pair of shoes. The shop assistant is thus a means to this end, though not necessarily a 'mere' means, which would imply total indifference to his or her conditions of service. But what she does want to argue is that we can assess the degree of alienation extant in any given society by reference to the degree to which social relations are based on such instrumental forms of interaction. As she puts it: Everyday life becomes alienated when and to the extent that, all my human contacts are for me contacts with means: that is to say, when, in what is the most important form of contact, I do not relate to the other person as to an end in itself [sic] [thus] the more we are involved in contacts in which the second party is regarded as an end rather than a means the more humane our everyday life will be. (EL 221)

The important point to note here is that alienation is characterised in relative and relational terms rather than in terms of the individual's relationship

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to the labour process, as it is in the early Marx. in the latter alienation is seen as the product of a relationship that denies workers control over their labour power, their creativity and their individuality. In selling their labour power they thus in effect sell themselves not only as 'worker' but as creative, potentially 'many-sided' individual. Marx thus sees alienation as in the first instance caused by a loss of control over the manner in which the labour process is organised. It would follow that were the labour process to be wrestled back from the class of exploiters so that workers exercised control over it we could expect alienation to be overcome. It is thus the abolition of wage labour and commodity production that remains at the heart of Marx's conception of socialism. Heller's account, while remaining firmly within the orbit of Marx's understanding of the matter, nevertheless has a difference of emphasis, which will become more marked in later works. As the above quotation indicates, for Heller the key to understanding alienation is not the labour process as such, but rather the character of relations between individuals, in other words, the extent to which the 'contacts' people have with others are characterised by a means-end relationship. This in turn implies a critique of all non-reciprocal relations. i.e. of relations built on hierarchy and subordination. At this stage Heller is committed to the view that capitalist society is characterised by the predominance of instrumental relations because under capitalism 'the worker is a means in the business of making money' (EL 222).2l What becomes apparent, however, is that for her the abolition of commodity production in favour of 'workers' control' is regarded as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the creation of reciprocal relations and thus for the alleviation of alienation. If all that occurs in the wake of the abolition of commodity production is the creation of command planning and the allocation of resources through centralised control of the productive process, then it might be argued that one form of hierarchy (that exercised by the bourgeoisie) has been replaced by another (that exercised by the planners acting in the 'interests' of the workers). Even without addressing the matter head-on here, it is already clear that Heller is as much alive to the potential problems created by the ideal of 'workers' control' as to its attractiveness. To return to the initial problematic, what becomes increasingly clear is that for Heller alienation is in an important sense the antithesis of reciprocity. Reciprocity means equality or equal treatment: it means the absence of relations of hierarchy and subordination, and thus implies relations in which each person enjoys equal worth and standing. It follows that Individuals whose innate inclination is to be guided by the universal can be expected notwithstanding the already discussed caveats - to promote relations of reciprocity and to expose, confront and overturn relations built on hierarchy and domination, i.e. alienated relations. Alienation is a contingent, historically rooted phenomenon whose continuing existence is linked to the maintenance of particular forms of hierarchy and superordination. The attitude of

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the Individual is thus properly active and engaged towards the ending of alienation rather than passive and contemplative in the face of 'Being-untoDeath' , as in the Heideggerian model. 22 To put a Sartrean slant on the same issue, it is overcoming alienation rather than the development of an authentic stance towards one's own mortality that forms the projet of Individual existence. This in turn presupposes a shift in the way we view and treat others from seeing others as 'useful-for-me' to becoming 'useful-to-others' (EL 254-5). The proper stance of the individual concerned to promote relations built on reciprocity and respect for the other thus comes close to the form of 'mutuality' discussed by Kropotkin in Mutual Aid, which might in turn be characterised as a middle way between the concept of 'enlightened selfinterest' and pure altruism. 23 In other words, the desire to help others is neither 'selfish' nor motivated purely by love of the other, but rather by a recognition of the importance and centrality of mutual aid and support. Unfortunately, at this stage Heller's discussion of the matter is anticipatory rather than fully developed; but we can already here detect some elements of the later call to 'humanise' spciety which would become a strong motif of the Budapest School's writing in the late 19 60s and early 19 70s. While Heller's analysis of alienation therefore has much in common with Marx's early work, where it might be argued that she departs from the latter is, importantly, the sense in which in her work the process of 'individualisation' is seen as separate from, and prior to, the process of the overcoming of alienation. With Marx we get the impression that, to deploy Heller's language, the 'coming-to-be of the individual' is seen as contingent upon the 'coming-to-be' of the proletariat and ultimately the 'coming-to-be' of humanity through the abolition of alienation. In this sense individualisation and the overcoming of alienation are indissolubly linked as part of the same collective aujhebung or moment of transcendence. Moreover, the implication is clearly that since alienation gets worse as capitalism develops, so the opportunities for escaping the clutches of the system to cultivate oneself as a criticaL self-aware Individual recede. Heller, on the other hand, sees individualisation as a process linked to two factors: first the availability of 'for itself objectivations; and secondly the willingness or desire of people to develop their own individuality. As regards the first, Heller is evidently not persuaded that under capitalism access to art. science and philosophy becomes more difficult, and so we do not get the sense, in Everyday Life at least, that this factor should influence our thinking about the prospect of resistance to extant norms and values. As regards the second, Heller merely restates her belief that 'the need to become individual exists'. As she herself admits, she cannot answer why it exists (EL 258). What she is sure of, though, is that such individuals can and do exist and furthermore that they can and do make a difference. In short. Marxists are wrong to regard the 'will' to individualisation and indeed the will to emancipation more generally as necessarily tied to material factors and ultimately to 'crisis'. As Johann Amason

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notes, for Heller such drives are considered more like 'basic competences', if not of species man. then certainly of the subject of modernity. 24 This is to say that we, as (modern) individuals, want individually and collectively to be 'free', to be emancipated, to enjoy autonomy and self-determination. Nevertheless this still leaves the question of how such Individuals can together transform everyday life. Like many New Left and Situationist thinkers of the period, Heller argues. firstly that it is always open to the Individual to rebel against the existing order and in that way draw attention to the latter's irrationality. In an echo of contemporaries such as Vaneigem and Debord (who themselves can sound like the Ranters and early modern heretics) she argues that '[s]ubjective rebellion against alienation with the aim of creating an everyday life worthy of man, is in itself, a necessary precondition if man is to succeed one day in overcoming alienation socially, so that a subjectively non-alienated relationship with everyday life will finally become typical' (EL 2 58 - emphasis added)/ 5 This idea of the necessity for subjective rebellion is a key motif in the thinking of the New Left in general and shows their hostility to an 'insurrectionary politics' of the sort associated inevitably - if questionably with Bolshevism in general and Lenin in particular. 26 By contrast with the latter the capture of power is regarded by the New Left as of secondary importance when compared with a change in basic attitudes and values. Indeed, certainly within Everyday Life Heller discounts the institutional or systemic element of revolutionary activity, as if to underline the redundancy of a model of politics that is only concerned with capturing power and controlling 'the state apparatus'. More significant are, she thinks, the possibilities afforded by the emergence of defetishised individuals who act in accordance with species essential values in the context of everyday life. What this reflects is the strong normative basis of the revolution Heller has in mind, and also her lack of faith in the apocalyptic scenario painted by Marx in The Communist Manifesto and elsewhere. In a context where it is unlikely that capitalism (or indeed communism) will collapse of its own internal contradictions a politics of revolution built on the nineteenth-century model of the overthrow of the 'bourgeois' state is unlikely to lead to a more humane or civilised form of life. Instead it is for each individual to react against alienation by transforming him- or herself into a model of how he or she would like the rest of us to live. In short, it is the way of the philosopher, whose every action is consistent with and guided by his or her personally developed code of conduct, that must be our guide for reforming everyday life. The idea of the exemplary individual (embodied above in the 'everyday' guise of the 'inspirational teacher' or in 'generic' guise by the philosopher) is crucial because morality and values are, in Heller's view, transmitted through imitation. As Heller puts it: 'It is not unusual for the individual who has consciously formed his life from a species-essential objectivation "for itself' to become a model to emulate; and in such cases the individual hierarchy,

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the individual life-style becomes - or at least tends to become - the hierarchy and life-style of that community' (EL 261). The implication is clear: not only is the emergence of exemplary individuals a key to change; without them change is unlikely to come from below- from the 'community' rather than from above. In a dramatic summary of the role of the 'normative exemplar' or 'great moral personality' Heller tells us that 'he is able to humanize his own fortuitous and ready-made repertory of qualities, singular and unique as this repertory is, and turn them into paradigms for others, thus raising them to the generic level. the level of species essential representation' (EL 265). The measure of the greatness of the Individual is thus not merely that he or she should escape the clutches of particularity and become a 'moral personality' in his or her own right; it is that he or she should respond to the duty to raise others up to a similar plane and thereby generate the critical mass needed to create communities and practices built on relations of equality and reciprocity. Heller, it should therefore be noted, is highly critical of the Nietzschean stance that celebrates the achievement of individual transcendence from the world of particularity as an essentially aesthetic response to the problem. Of course those who are able to escape particularity may, as she puts it, enjoy 'happiness' or 'contentment'; but this is the happiness of those who follow Nietzsche in regarding aristocracy as humanity's 'natural' condition, and who thus regard the task of the individual as liberating him- or herself from the generality. For those whose attachment to universality runs deeper, however, there is a duty to ensure that everyone is equipped with the means for developing his or her species essentiality. Facing up to such a responsibility is the path to what she terms a 'meaningful life', which contrasts with happiness or contentment in its being other-directed; not so much 'beingfor us' as 'being-for-them'. As she puts it in the final ringing paragraph of Everyday Life: The consciously chosen and accepted task of those individuals who today lead meaningful lives is to create a society in which alienation is a thing of the past: a society in which every man has access to the social 'gifts of fortune' which can enable him to lead a meaningful life. Not a 'happy' life - for there can be no return to the world of limited fulfillment. True 'history' is pregnant with conflict and continually transcending its own given state. It is history, consciously chosen by men and moulded to their design - that can enable all men to make their everyday lives 'being-for-them' and that will make the earth a true home for all men. (EL 269)

Given the importance of the exemplary Individual in provoking change at the level of everyday life it is worth attempting to establish exactly what role she has in mind for him or her. Everyday Life is little help in this respect, concerned as she is here with developing philosophical categories; but she does consider the issue at greater length elsewhere, particularly in the contemporaneous articles 'Marx's theory of revolution and the revolution in everyday life', 'Theory and practice from the point of view of human needs' and the

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earlier 'Individual and community'. 17 In 'Marx's theory of revolution', for example, Heller discusses two examples of such 'exemplary' individuals who have had an influence on the development of radical movements, namely Che Guevara and the American sociologist C. Wright Mills. Guevara was of course an icon for every movement of discontent through the late 1960s and beyond, and was, as Heller argues, undoubtedly of Christ-like significance as a symbolic referent for such movements. Yet it is precisely because of this elevated status that Guevara's example is a problematical one, as is the example of Christ for Christians, and Luther for Protestants. 2" As Heller comments, '[t]he autocracy of the mythical ideal is linked with the real danger that those who accept this ideal on its own may tend to conduct their lives in the false appearance of an unobtainable image'. 29 In other words, they will become spellbound in attempting to reproduce in themselves the model of Guevara instead of seeking to change society. Mills's example is, however, a much more pertinent one for those living in capitalist as opposed to developing societies. Mills is, for Heller, the model of heroism as 'civic courage'. As Heller explains, '[w]hoever says no to the dominant prejudices and to the oppressing power, and when necessary ... to public opinion, and practices this throughout his life and in his life conduct, is someone who has the virtue of civic courage'. 30 Mills's example shows that there is no necessity for living according to the norms and values of an alienated world. Simply by refusing to compromise on his or her principles, an Individual turns him- or herself into a beacon for others to follow. What also impresses Heller in the case of Mills is that he was the model of a democratic personality, of someone who feels no need to claim special powers or insight, but who instead wishes to engage in public deliberation on the nature of injustice and oppression. We can add that Mills had no need of a movement or a party of his own, and yet he could bring his influence to bear, be heard, and change the opinions of others. Contrast the figure of Mills, Heller seems to be saying, with the men of mauvaise foi who so often find themselves at the head of revolutionary movements and indeed of 'Marxist' states.31 What, to conclude, should be apparent is that Heller's analysis represents a highly imaginative and original fusing of several distinct traditions of theorising, in particular, of course, phenomenology, existentialism and Marxism. As regards the last, she views alienation as a contingent historical condition rather than a fact about human existence. Moreover, she sees alienation as rooted in and sustained by the organisation of production, which prevents those sections of the working class engaged in deeply unfulfilling forms of work from 'individualising' themselves. The implication is thus that with a reorganisation of production along more humanistic lines alienation can be overcome for good on a universal basis, a state of affairs she is happy for the moment to describe as 'communism'. 31 Nevertheless, there is of course much that is novel in Heller's approach and which departs from Marx's account of capitalism and of the transition to the above schema.

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Generalising from the analysis given by Lukacs in the Aesthetic, she see the process of defetishisation necessary to reveal the truth of the alienated character of social life as an individually situated process. Only the individual, that is. can access the realm of 'for itself objectivations. which act as the repository for the Real as 'species essential' or generic truth. To put the same point differently. since defetishisation is a process that leads from the reception of art, philosophy and science it must of necessity be an individual 'act'. for one person cannot see, hear or listen to objectivations on behalf of another. Given the alienated character of both work and social relations in modern societies. however. it is to be expected that only relatively few people will have the training. time and inclination to develop themselves in this fashion as Individuals. Nevertheless. Heller is confident that not only will these Individuals emerge from the particularity of everyday life. but that when they do so they will feel themselves compelled to promote more reciprocally based norms and values, those in other words that demand the abolition of hierarchy and subordination. Assuming they do. then the transcendence of existing society can be made the act of the community or. rather, of communities generally. rather than the act of a self-appointed elite or vanguard. In this fashion everyday life may beget a revolution which will overcome that alienated form of particularity that Heller, like Marx, sees as an obstacle to individual and collective self-realisation. The revolution in/of everyday life: an assessment More obviously than much of the work that precedes it. Everyday Life is very clearly a product of its times. which is to say that it reflects the hopes of a period in which mass radical activity seemed the norm in Western liberaldemocracies and the fears of a world still cowering at the willingness of Cold War powers to throw their weight around their respective 'zones of influence'. The belief that the former might in some sense provide the key to unleashing the forces needed to overcome such fears was not therefore unusual at the time. In addition the notion that art. or culture more generally. could deliver the requisite change of consciousness in the masses was almost an article of faith among the non- or neo-Marxist radical left. The popularity and impact of the Situationists and Surrealists in France, the receptivity of students in Europe and the United States to a work like Marcuse's One Dimensional Man ('the book that outsold Mao's Little Red Book', according to Sphere Books' promotional blurb). the increasing importance of media criticism. 'deconstruction'. and semiotics are together 'signs' of the degree to which in the late 1960s many regarded the realm of 'the aesthetic' as the new terrain of revolutionary struggle. Thus. while many of the suggestions she makes now have a vaguely antique feel to them. it is important to bear in mind the context and expectations which gave rise to them.

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Notwithstanding the above caveat. there are elements in Heller's approach that resurface in her later work; and thus it is as well from the point of view of assessing her thought that some consideration be given at this point to their analytical utility. On these terms perhaps the key argument in the work concerns the distinction she takes from Lukacs's analysis of the realm of the aesthetic between the 'in itself and 'for itself characters of objectivations, consciousness and ultimately action. From this distinction she derives two 'types': the Particular person. whose thought and action remain within the confines of the 'everyday', and the Individual. who by virtue of his or her ability or willingness to learn from 'for itself objectivations' is able to access a realm of species essential 'truth' rather than one of a merely customary character. Heller's expectation is that Individuals, precisely by virtue of their access to a wider and richer perspective on human life, will be more likely to adopt a critical stance vis-a-vis the status quo. They can also be expected to generate norms and values which point the way to a non-alienated future. It is in this sense that Heller speaks of Individuals as potentially 'exemplary'. They at least are able to rise above the particularity of everyday life and demonstrate through their own actions the superiority of a radically different form of life. Put in these minimal terms it seems reasonable to conclude that in Everyday Life at least Heller is operating not so much with a Marxist or even a Hegelian epistemology as with one whose closest analogue may be the Platonic account of the Forms. Her account of the process of defetishisation certainly has a Platonic ring about it, in that we are presented with an account of, as it were, parallel 'realities'. one apparently alienated and 'false'. but the other universal and 'true'- just as in the 'allegory of the cave'.H We are also encouraged to think that, as in the Republic, only some people have the necessary qualities or learning to access the latter, and thus that only they may be regarded as possessing the knowledge, insight or perspective needed to prepare those less endowed for life in a better world. It can be assumed, however, that Heller did not intend the distinction she makes to be read in this light. Firstly, the point she wishes to make is clearly not about knowledge claims per se. but about the nature of the connection between knowledge of the species essential or universal and morality and (eventually) action. Heller's concern, in other words, is not about the epistemological status of the knowledge gained through 'for itself objectivations, but about the nature of 'right' in the Hegelian sense. For Heller (as for Hegel) insight into the universal means insight not only into the empirical world but, more relevantly. into the world of Sittlichkeit, the moral and ethical 'world'. This accounts for the view that the achievement of autonomy equates with the recognition of the universality of values associated with reciprocity, equality, and the 'coming-to-be' of the individual. Secondly, her concern is very obviously with the achievement of as it were 'universality' in all aspects of social life. It would completely defeat the point of her critique if we could conclude that all it

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would take to eliminate alienation and injustice is the displacement of one elite (the bourgeois or bureaucratic class) by another (the philosopher kings). The ambition is clearly to raise the condition of everyone to the level of the species essential, which would necessitate the progressive elimination of every instance of super- or subordination. It is for this reason that Markus, for example, believes that, despite appearances to the contrary, the schema outlined in Everyday Life is essentially 'democratic' in nature. 14 On the first point, the fact that she distinguishes between access to reality and access to a realm of objective moral truth cannot disguise the fact that her account is essentially Platonic in the manner it treats the moral and ethical realm. 'For itself objectivations are. after all, held to contain a higher 'truth'. Whether that truth be in the form of an insight into beauty, the human condition or the empirical universe seems secondary to the fact that a realm of authenticity and knowledge is posited as separate from, if not held 'above', that 'visible' world. The point is, that those who are able to access these realms have a clearer view of the universal than do those who remain at the level of particularity. The inference Plato draws, i.e. that those who have a privileged insight into 'right' should guide or rule those who for whatever reason have not is one that remains on its own terms a reasonable one unless it can be shown that other qualities are more important to ruling (or, more neutrally, 'leading') than the possession of the truth. Heller argues that it is not possession of the 'truth' in any absolute sense that we should be concerned with, so much as possession of insight into the ethical or moral universal. Since, however, it is access to a defetishised reality that gives us insight into the universal the two are related in the sense that we cannot gain insight into universals without having first transcended the realm of particularity. In addition, Heller's point, as indicated above, is that access to the universal can be expected to produce identification with the universal. 3' What this translates as saying is that the only consistent moral position is one that recognises the equal moral worth of each individual, and this in turn equates to a belief in the necessity for a 'humanisation' of society through the elimination of alienated relationships. Here, then. is the safeguard against an authoritarian outcome: those with insight into the universal (normally) act in the interests of the universal. Given that the interest of the universal is on Heller's Marxist reading of 'universality' the elimination of all relations built on hierarchy and domination, a Platonic outcome politically would be illegitimate. Even if we are prepared to accept that Heller's account of a just society differs from that of Plato's authoritarian blueprint, we might still worry about the issue of the means by which the outcome is to be secured, given the status Heller accords the 'great moral personality'. Again, Heller's intention is, as we have noted above, to provide the basis for a genuinely democratic revolution from the 'bottom up' rather than, as in the 'Leninist' vanguard model, from the 'top down'. Yet the omens are hardly encouraging. Given the

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nature of 'for itself objectivations (art, philosophy, science) it is to be expected that only relatively few would be in a position to transcend alienated particularity. So much is admitted by Heller in her comments on the difficulties faced by those who, because of the nature of their work or domestic arrangements, are prevented from escaping the drudgery of everyday life. It is precisely for this reason that Heller is insistent that a primary goal of the social revolution must be to ensure that work does not prevent people accessing those objectivations needed to defetishise the world (as per EL p. 259). This is to be a revolt led, if not by the middle class (Guevara, Mills etc.). then by those with unusually refined tastes and interests. These individuals are then expected by virtue of their insight into the species essential to act in conformity with universal norms and values and in such fashion to become an example for others to follow. One of the more obvious difficulties with this scenario is that the connection between universality and moral goodness is far from automatic even on the basis of Heller's own account of it. Firstly, we know that attaining the level of species essential is only a precondition for acting in the name of the universal. What access to the species essential gives the Individual is autonomy, which equates on Heller's reading to the capacity to choose from norms and values from outside the particular culture or society we inhabit. The autonomous individual can thus choose to promote the universal. or he or she can (as in the case of Richard III) choose 'evil' presumably it is not ruled out that such an individual could choose other options and outcomes that fall between these two poles. Secondly, we also know that the quality she respects in the philosopher is not 'goodness' per se, but consistency between philosophical outlook and action. In this sense, as long as what the philosopher does remains in conformity with what the philosopher says, he or she can equally be counted as acting as an authentic Individual. On this reading the utilitarian who argues that treatment as between individuals or social groups should be decided on the basis of utility is operating with motives that are just as 'authentic' as are those of the deontologicalliberal or the libertarian socialist. We are here but a short step from legitimating the views of those for whom Heller normally reserves the greatest opprobrium, namely the Bolsheviks, with their talk about having to 'break eggs to make an omelette' or to 'sacrifice a generation in order to build socialism'. It is surely curious that Heller, otherwise so vigilant about the uses to which theory can be put, should allow the possibility of such palpably illiberal forms of justification finding space in her own account of social transformation. As we shall see. the attempt to rule out utilitarian forms of discourse becomes a major preoccupation of her later work. More worryingly, however, it is also possible that the most appropriate means for creating a humanised society might be vanguardist in orientation. Of course, she is hoping that those who emerge as fully fledged Individuals will choose to adopt the model of the 'great moral personality', even if not to the extent of becoming a Guevara or a Mills. We can also infer that she hopes

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that such shining examples will encourage ordinary people to question the basis of their own lives and the alienated relationships around them. It seems just as realistic, however, to expect that those who claim special insight into social reality will band together to lead those unable to shrug off their 'particularity' to a just society. Why, after all, is it to be expected that those who claim a superior level of consciousness would choose to act alone (qua 'great moral personality')? If they were really concerned about promoting a movement for radical change, would it not make just as much sense to join together to ensure that their message is heard? Heller's desire to counter 'vanguardism' using the model of the exemplary individual is understandable; but this hardly erases a feeling that her outlook remains worryingly similar to that of those she wishes to criticise. As is becoming increasingly apparent, the difficulty we encounter in Everyday Life is the gap between the desire to secure a society based on equality and reciprocity and the means by which such a society is to be created. Heller clearly possesses libertarian instincts and is concerned to develop social relationships which allow 'the free development of all' under unconstrained conditions. The problem is that there is little getting away from the potentially elitist implications of what remains an essentially Hegelian model of consciousness, albeit mediated and adapted by Lukacs. What this means in this context is that the process of transcendence of the fetishised world moves back from the realm of praxis to the realm of theoria. In other words Marx is reinverted back to Hegel- or perhaps Plato -and the idea of defetishisation as an active, practical and, above all, collective process gives way to a passive, contemplative model in which those with the time, inclination and training to 'individualise' themselves are able to develop superior insight into the universal. As we have already noted, Heller was by no means alone at this time in seeking the origin of defetishisation in the appreciation or contemplation of 'objectivations'. Faced with the apparent strength of capitalism and thus with the prospect that material factors alone could not produce the necessary 'crisis' needed to mobilise a change in consciousness, the unravelling of the critical potential contained in cultural artefacts was, it seems, an obvious step to take. Indeed, in these terms Heller's analysis of the potential of culture shares many of the strengths and weaknesses of New Left and counter-cultural critique more generally. Like Adorno, Marcuse, Debord and of course Lukacs, Heller sees 'popular' culture as implicitly 'affirmative', helping to integrate 'the masses' into an alienated social totality and thus to reconcile them to their 'fate' as particularistic individuals unable to contemplate a confrontation with the given. This also implies a displacement of the site of alienation from work to consumption, consonant with a change from the kinds of overtly exploitative and degrading labour Marx describes to the 'post-Fordist' comfort of the office or shop. As regards the former argument, it now seems faintly absurd to suggest that only 'high' culture - let alone science or philosophy - possesses the negative potential required to generate

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a critical outlook on social reality. While few would deny that the study of art, science and philosophy may help us to develop a better understanding of the nature of the world and thus a better appreciation of the options open to us, the notion that the study of such 'objectivations' is the only or even the primary means by which a person can come to understand the forces shaping reality overstates the case. It surely also exaggerates the degree to which in their everyday lives people are sheltered from the experience of alienation, exploitation and social injustice. Contrary to the expectation of both left and right in the late 1950s and 1960s, industrial struggle, poverty and unemployment have not disappeared with the onset of consumer society. It may well be true that our society successfully manages to channel everyday frustrations into socially reinforcing activities such as shopping and watching television. It may also be true that such activities help reconcile otherwise alienated individuals to the social totality. 1" It is also a truism, however, to note that economic crises, unemployment and relative impoverishment are still at least part of life in all advanced industrial societies, and thus can be expected to play their part in translating disaffection and alienation into critical or oppositional activity, a fact Heller will herself later acknowledge in her discussion of the importance of 'radical needs' as the basis for social transformation. 37 Marx may of course have been mistaken to assume that revolution would come about because the proletariat was 'compelled' to overthrow capitalism, but in thinking that it was the experience of alienation that led to the demand for radical change he at the same time gave the lie to the idea that a successful revolution had to be produced for the proletariat. On the contrary, it was in Marx's view those who felt alienation the deepest who were most likely to be at the forefront of any movement for social transformation. It was for this reason that the 'gravediggers' famously referred to by Marx in the opening remarks of The Communist Manifesto were not intellectuals or those who had succeeded in 'individualising' themselves, but ordinary men and women, who had, he felt, little choice but to overthrow capitalism. The notion that economic crisis must be discounted as a factor leading to critical activity is also the key to understanding why Heller feels it necessary to invest in the idea that the creation of a more humane, less alienated society has to be led or, at the very least, inspired by the figure of the 'great moral personality' who by virtue of his or her access to species essential objectivations is moved to highlight the inequities of the existing social order. If it is taken as a given that such systems are able unproblematically to guarantee their own reproduction, then this would imply that the incentive to transcend them must be moral or ethical in character. In other words, people have to be convinced that another form of society would be fairer or more just than that which currently exists, and this requires people to carry the argument into the public realm where it can be heard and debated. Setting to one side the issue already mentioned about the role of crisis in precipitating radical

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change, her reliance on Individuals to carry this process forward seems weak in the context she describes. There are of course numerous examples of exemplary figures' having a disproportionate influence on social change. Merely to mention Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Vaclav Havel is to remind ourselves that sometimes the opposite is true: without a symbolic figurehead it is difficult to imagine real change occurring in circumstances where reactionary forces seem to hold the upper hand. Yet two points need to borne in mind when discussing the possibilities open to such individuals. Firstly, the most obvious examples of individuals successfully inspiring change (such as those above) are clearly in contexts of national liberation or national emergency. It is much more difficult to think of exemplary individuals in the context of a revolutionary change in 'everyday life', the examples of Christ and Luther notwithstanding. Bob Dylan, John Dewey and Simone Weil (among others) can all be regarded as in some sense 'exemplary'. 38 They were and are exceptionally influential to some; yet it would be difficult to argue that they were 'revolutionary' in the sense in which Heller uses that term, i.e. as presaging 'total social revolution'. Secondly, the success of any such figure is usually due to the efforts of a corresponding political movement able to mobilise support and engineer change. It is true that on occasion these movements owe their existence to the efforts of the individual in the first place; nonetheless, the point remains valid that without a movement able to pressure the state or elites to react to demands one person's influence is likely to be extremely limited. 1" Beyond a few isolated remarks in articles of the period it is curious how little Heller provides by way of an analysis of the interaction between Individuals and radical movements. 4 " This suggests that she is wary of giving the Individual a more potent platform from which to pursue his or her vision, presumably out of fear that he or she will use it as a vehicle for personal advancement or because, as in the case of Guevara, she is wary of the dangers lurking in the 'autocracy of the mythical ideal', a danger that may, as in the example of Lenin, eventually be translated into 'personal despotism'. 41 With regard to the former model, this would suggest an essentially romantic conception of political change, particularly given the constraints on critical activity evident in many parts of the world, and the ease with which such Individuals (as opposed to movements) can be subjected to surveillance, harassment and incarceration. With regard to the latter, this would show the importance of ensuring that Individuals are fully accountable to an active, democratically organised movement or party. It is one thing to assert that Individuals have a strategic role to play in the awakening of a critical consciousness, and quite another to imply that these same people must become 'Founding Fathers' or Rousseauian legislators of an enlightened social order. It is, to conclude, evident that Heller's intentions in Everyday Life are still in tune with the broader aims and outlook of the Budapest School as outlined in the previous chapter. As we noted above, Heller's analysis of contemporary society and her hopes for what communism can offer by way

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of salvation from the demeaning and alienated world of the former are firmly rooted in Marx's early work. Nevertheless, some of the key arguments clearly have a non-Marxist basis, which leads to certain tensions in Heller's account of how social transformation is to come about. This is particularly true with respect to the process of 'individualisation', which lies at the heart of Heller's emancipatory critique. What is evident in her account is, it is clear, Heller's desire to avoid the elitist and potentially authoritarian implications of the suggestions associated with the Lukacs of History and Class Consciousness that only the intellectuals of the communist party have access to the necessary truths needed to guide the proletariat to the successful overthrow of capitalism. Her suggestion might be seen as 'democratising' the issue of defetishisation by insisting on the availability of a 'universal' or species essential viewpoint to anyone with access to 'for itself objectivations. Moreover, Heller follows Hegel rather than Lukacs in defining such objectivations in such a way as to encompass a variety of intellectual and cultural goods, thereby again emphasising her desire to broaden 'individualisation' to encompass those, such as scientists and philosophers, left out of Lukacs's schema. 42 Her account thus stresses not only that it is possible to become as it were a critical, self-aware Individual under even the most alienated conditions, but also that we can expect the numbers of such individuals to grow with the increasing sophistication of the ordinary public due to advances in literacy and access to higher education, libraries, museums and the like. Yet, paradoxically, this uncoupling of the issue of 'individualisation' from the process of collective transformation may play into the hands of those who assert the necessity for an elitist or vanguardist strategy to undermine the status quo. After all, it was Lenin who in What is to be Done? described a scenario in which only comparatively few were able to develop the degree of consciousness necessary to defetishise reality and thus pose a challenge to the otherwise particularistic habits of mind of ordinary people. And it was precisely this analysis that encouraged him to argue that the appropriate form of organisation given this scenario would be one in which these select individuals join to inspire and lead those without the time, means or inclination to escape everyday habits of thought - for which in Lenin we read 'trade union consciousness'Y To come to Heller's defence, she does not imply that only 'comparatively few' are able to develop the requisite consciousness; but what she does imply is that the development of such a consciousness is a necessary precondition for radical social change, thereby privileging the attainment of a particular form of self-awareness. While such a move might have made theoretical sense in the heady days of the student uprisings of 1968 when rebellion seemed to be directed as much against the received 'truths' of an older generation as against the institutional basis of power and domination, as this movement ebbed so, arguably, did the sense in seeing individualisation qua defetishisation as the basis of resistance to power and domination.

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Notes 1 Philippe Despoix gives a useful account of the influence of the later Lukacs on the work of Heller and the other members of the Budapest School. particularly of the Ontology, whose influence is perhaps less immediately apparent than that of The Specificity of the Aesthetic. See Philippe Despoix, 'On the possibility of a philosophy of values: A dialogue with the Budapest School' in Burnheim (ed.), The Social Philosophy of Agnes Heller, pp. 29-39. 2 Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on humanism' in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell (London, Routledge, 199 3 ), p. 22 7. Heidegger later adds: 'Because Marx by experiencing estrangement attains an essential dimension to history, the Marxist view of history is superior to that of other historical accounts. But since neither Husser! nor - so far as I have seen till now - Sartre recognizes the essential importance of the historical in Being, neither phenomenology nor existentialism enters that dimension within which a productive dialogue with Marxism first becomes possible' (p. 243). 3 Gyorgy Lukacs, Der Eigenart des Asthetischen [usually rendered in English as The Specificity of the Aesthetic or The Specific Nature of the Aesthetic] (Neuwied, Luchterhand Verlag, 19 6 3 ). The reference given here is to the relevant volumes (l l and 12) of the Lukacs Werke. For critical commentary see in particular: G. H. R. Parkinson, Georg Lukacs (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), especially Chapters 7 and 8; Pauline Johnson, Marxist Aesthetics: The Foundations within Everyday Life for an Emancipated Consciousness (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1984); and B. Kiralyfalvi, The Aesthetics of Gyorgy Lukacs (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975). 4 Parkinson, Lukacs, p.l32. 5 Parkinson, Lukacs. p.133. 6 Lukacs, Eigenart I, p. 818, quoted in Parkinson, Lukacs, p. 136. 7 On the 'receptive experience' see also Johnson, Marxist Aesthetics, pp. 42-5. 8 It should be noted that there is little suggestion in Lukacs's work that contemplation can substitute for praxis. Lukacs's interest is merely the process of defetishisation, not the process by which class consciousness is transformed from the in-itself to the for-itself. 9 Agnes Heller, 'The aesthetics of Lukacs', The New Hungarian Quarterly, Year 24, no. 7 (1966) p. 94. 10 Heller's debt to Lukacs's Aesthetics is explicitly acknowledged at endnote 2 (Chapter 4) and again at endnote l l (Chapter 5) of Everyday Life. 11 Heller, 'Marxist ethics', p. 166. See also Markus, 'Politics of morals', p. 271. 12 Despoix's description of the later Lukacs as 'a neoclassical figure lost in modernity' is harsh, but on this basis at least not entirely inaccurate. See Despoix, 'Philosophy of values', p. 29. l3 As will become apparent, Heller's usage of the terms 'in itself and 'for itself is quite distinct from that of Sartre, despite certain similarities in their mode of expression. 14 See also Heller, Renaissance Man, translated by Richard E. Allen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. [1967]1978), pp. 101-3. 15 This sense of the philosopher as paradigm comes through more strongly in later works, in particular Radical Philosophy. Nonetheless, it is implicit in what she

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20 21

22 23 24 25

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Agnes Heller says in this context and even more so when she comes to discuss the role of the exemplary individual in social change. This way of putting the matter of course conforms more closely to the project developed by Lukacs in The Specificity of the Aesthetic, i.e. to establish a means of grounding the distinction between critical art and art that merely reflects the given. In order to avoid confusion I have capitalised the terms 'individual' and 'particular' where they denote Heller's technical usage. T,hese capitals do not appear in the original text. Immanuel Kant. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. translated by James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge, Hackett, [178 5] 1994), Section II, p. 35. The choice of evil is in this sense what Heller terms 'a double tension'. in that it effectively involves two movements, the first from particular to universal. the second from universal to evil. In other words, it involves transcending the sphere of everyday life to become an autonomous agent, and then. qua autonomous agent. turning one's back on universal norms and values: Everyday Life, pp. 26-7. Tormey, 'Interviews' I. p. 38. For obvious reasons Heller was unable to comment on the form social relations take in communist societies; but from what she says elsewhere we can readily surmise that she would be similarly critical of the manner in which individuals are reduced to mere means for the satisfaction of the bureaucracy. See for example 'Marxist ethics' and the later Dictatorship over Needs: An Analysis of Soviet Societies [with F. Feher and G. Markus] (Oxford and New York, Basil Blackwell, 1986). For discussion of Heller's critique of Heidegger on this point see Markus, 'Politics of morals' , p. 2 72. Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution (London, Freedom Press. [1902]1993), see especially Chapters 7 and 8, 'Mutual aid amongst ourselves'. Johann P. Amason, 'Progress and pluralism: Reflections on Agnes Heller's theory of history', Praxis International. 3:4 (January 1984), p. 435. Vaneigem for example writes in similar vein about the necessity for the shrugging ofT 'roles' (for which in Heller read 'particularity'). In The Revolution of Everyday Life he writes: 'Roles are inherently ridiculous. Do you see nothing but roles around you? Treat them to your nonchalance, to your dispassionate wit. Play cat and mouse with them, and there is a good chance that one or two people about you will wake up themselves and discover the prerequisites for real communication': Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution in Everyday Life. translated by David Nicholson-Smith (London, Rebel Press, [1967]1994), p. 150. The argument that Lenin can unproblematically be regarded as a proponent of insurrectionary politics is not without its critics. Space precludes an extended treatment of this topic here, but interested readers might consult Lenin's pamphlet 'Marxism and insurrection', published just before the October Revolution, where he criticises in the strongest terms those 'hotheads' who wished to seize power without the authority of the Soviets, one of two sources of sovereignty in the 'dual power' system operative in Russia at the time. See V. I. Lenin, 'Marxism and insurrection' in V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, vo!. 2 (Moscow, Progress Publishers. 1977), pp. 331-5.

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27 Agnes Heller, 'Marx's theory of revolution and the revolution in everyday life' in Andras Hegedus et al., The Humanisation of Socialism: Writings of the Budapest School (London, Allison & Busby, 1976); Agnes Heller, 'Theory and practice from the point of view of human needs', in Hegedus et al., The Humanisation of Socialism; Agnes Heller, 'Individual and community', Social Praxis, 1:1 (1973). 28 The examples of Christ and Luther are discussed in Heller, 'Theory and practice', p. 64. 29 Heller, 'Marx's theory of revolution', p. 53. 30 Heller, 'Marx's theory of revolution', p. 53. 31 The reference to maivaise foi is from the interviews I took with Heller, where we broached the question of the role of the intellectual in politics, in particular those of left radicals such as Noam Chomsky and Carole Pateman. Despite the apparent similarities between the cases of Chomsky and Mills, Heller thought only the latter deserved approbation. 32 She states that: 'Communism, as Marx conceived it, might be defined as that society in which the social conditions requisite if every subiectum is to make his everyday life "being-for-him", are met': Everyday Life, p. 266. 33 Plato, The Republic, translated by Desmond Lee (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1974), Part VII, s. vii. 34 Markus, 'Politics of morals', p. 273. 35 The weak qualifier is needed to account for the possibility of the autonomous person's choosing evil, as discussed above in the example of Richard III. 36 Being reconciled to the continued existence of the status quo is not the same as being unable to perceive the nature of the status quo. As, for example Vaclav Havel argues in his prescient essay 'The power of the powerless', it is quite wrong to read the compliance of individuals in performing the tasks of everyday life as a sign either that they are happy to continue performing such tasks or that they perform such tasks because they are unable to contemplate an alternative to the form of life they lead. Compliance can also be the product of fear. See Vaclav Havel, 'The power of the powerless', in John Keane (ed.), The Power of the Powerless (London, Hutchinson, 1985), pp. 24-7. A critical commentary on the work appears in Chapter 5 of my Making Sense of Tyranny: Interpretations of Totalitarianism (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1995). 37 See Chapter 2. 38 I'm grateful to Larry Wilde for the examples, though I suspect I disagree him concerning the degree of influence each has had on their respective spheres of activity. Wei! probably comes closest, however, to the model of the exemplary individual Heller is thinking of, since it is difficult to deny that her work has had a lasting and deep-rooted impact on feminist thought and action. 39 It should be pointed out that she admits as much in an article written just after Everyday Life possibly influenced by the events of 1968, where she states that 'today it is only within the framework of a communist movement that one can find and develop an individual life-conduct that also has a mass character': 'Marx's theory of revolution', p. 51. 40 Some discussion of radical movements may be found in Heller, 'Marx's theory of revolution'. pp. 52-7 and Heller, 'Theory and practice', p. 64. 41 Heller, 'Marx's theory of revolution', p. 52. 42 Heller's account of 'for itself objectivations almost exactly follows Hegel's dis-

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cussion of 'Absolute Spirit' in The Phenomenology. 43 V.I. Lenin, What is to be Done? (Moscow, Progress Publishers, [1902] 1978). At pp. 78-9 Lenin famously states that: 'Class consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without, that is, only from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers.' Lenin's formula is, it seems. a more generous formula than that given in Everyday Life, where critical consciousness is to be developed on the basis of access to 'for itself objectivations, which even on Heller's own account is a realm beyond the reach of most ordinary, i.e. working-class, people. While Lenin is thinking in terms of aiding the development of a critical consciousness in the working class itself, albeit with help 'from without', Heller is thinking, certainly within Everyday Life, in terms of ordinary people being led by exemplary individuals - a seemingly less democratic model even than Lenin's.

2

Rereading Marx: 'value', 'need' and the humanisation of socialism

Given the striking originality of Everyday Life and Heller's evident willingness to supplement or displace Marxist categories with those drawn from phenomenological analysis, it would be fair to assume that within a short space of time Heller's commitment to the Lukacsian project described in the last chapter would quickly dissipate. What, however. becomes quickly apparent from a brief survey of the material that immediately follows Everyday Life is that Heller's attachment to the spirit and ideals of the 'renaissance of Marxism' was if anything strengthened during the latter half of her Budapest School career. Indeed, the two major pieces of work that follow directly on from Everyday Life, 'Towards a Marxist theory of value' and The Theory of Need in Marx demonstrate a surprisingly fierce determination to reclaim Marx for the cause of libertarian socialism. There is even a defensiveness and sensitivity about Marx's legacy, which is barely apparent in Everyday Life and which suggests that she had become inured to the danger of allowing 'Marx' to be deployed either as a legitimating emblem for communist regimes or as a totemic figure caught in the narrow sectarian battles that sporadically broke out amongst the Western Left. The consequences of such a position would be critical not only in the narrowly scholastic terms in which this dilemma was often posed, i.e. in the debates on 'Marx's legacy' (with which Heller has always been reluctant to engage directly), but also in political terms. After all. if it could be conclusively shown that the logical outcome of implementing a 'Marxist-inspired programme' is a Soviet-type regime then of course this would have served to aid the legitimation of those regimes falling within the Soviet orbit. It would also give socialism's ideological adversaries all the arguments they needed to tar everything that was written or argued in the name of Marx with the brush of 'totalitarianism', in turn justifying repressive measures against those advocating radical change. The stakes were very high in Heller's mind, and account at least in part for the palpable sense of urgency we find in these texts. Thinking about Heller's approach at this time it is quickly evident that her main aim was to counter what seemed to her the growing consensus which

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held that it is possible to locate an 'epistemological' -and possibly ontological- break within Marx's oeuvre. It is of course to be expected that someone so readily associated with 'humanist' Marxism would want to take issue with this thesis, particularly given the obvious affinity Lukacs's students had with the early, more anthropologically centred Marx. As we have seen, the material Heller draws upon in Everyday Life is almost exclusively from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts; and we also noted the strong Hegelian influence displayed not just in the principal arguments of the work but in the manner and vocabulary in which the arguments are expressed. Yet what becomes increasingly obvious is that for the Budapest School in general, and Heller in particular, Marx's 'humanism' was less a quality to be found in any given text, than a quality of Marx's work in toto. The idea of a break therefore either between the 'early' and the 'late(r)' Marx or between the 'humanist' work and the 'scientific' - the distinctions not always referring to the same material - is one they found anathema both philosophically and politically. In addition to the macro-politics of the figure 'Marx' mentioned above, the localised struggle over the 'real' Marx was thus also important given the different outcomes which this debate would have in terms of analysing the character of capitalism, the form struggle should take against oppression and the nature of the 'victory' socialists sought to secure. If those urging the necessity for reading Marx in terms of a break between the early and the mature Marx won then this would open the way, she seemed to be arguing, to the ghettoisation of the latter in favour of a quasi-positivist social science. This would in turn provide the ammunition for those who argued that social planning, rational administration and the determination of production by reference to 'true' needs and interests was the correct interpretation of Marx's account of the nature of socialism and thence communism. This would be a bureaucratic 'Marxism' in which those with 'true' insight into the nature of social reality, namely the planners, lead the hapless masses to a totally administered society in which all spontaneity and imagination is rendered superfluous. If, on the other hand, the 'humanists' could demonstrate the centrality of alienation to Marx's account of capitalism, of an 'act-centred' as opposed to a 'process-centred' conception of social development to historical materialism, 1 and of 'self-determination' and democratic participation to his account of socialism, then this would lead the way to the establishment of a very different Marx. It would be a 'Marx' who could inspire radical change along genuinely reconstructive and progressive lines, not just in capitalist systems, but in socialist systems as well. Far from descending into the 'jargon of authenticity', thereby losing its critical, emancipatory thrust, the 'renaissance of Marxism' had entered its most crucial phase. What was at stake was, arguably, nothing less than the struggle for a new orthodoxy.

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The primacy of the ontic or 'Towards a Marxist theory of value' As is clear from the comments above, Heller's goal could not have been more ambitious, given the domination, not only within official Marxism, but increasingly even in Western Marxism, of a deterministic reading of Marx's social theory. Of course, the ambition to claim Marx for the 'empirical social sciences' was one that stretched back to Engels's valedictory comments on Marx's legacy. Nonetheless, it is evident that with the emergence of structuralist readings of Marx filtered through Saussure and formulated by Althusser in the 1960s, the threat of positivist absolutism seemed real enough, certainly as far as Heller was concerned. What this meant in practice was a Marxism that concentrated on 'trends and tendencies', on the social over the individual. on process over praxis. It meant a concept of science in which the accidental. the haphazard, and the contingent are eliminated in the quest for certainty and precision. A dichotomy was thus created, on Heller's view, by Engels- and maintained by certain Second International theoristsbetween the realm of ethics, which was to be considered the realm of rhetoric and 'ideology', and the realm of the scientific, the realm of 'the real'. If Marxism was to be science rather than ideology it therefore had to derive value empirically rather than assert a claim to normative validity based on the needs or interests of humanity. The 'ought' had to be derived from the 'is', rather than vice versa (TMTV. 16). According to Heller, one way in which this ideal of 'scientific' Marxism was promoted by theorists following Marx was through the displacement of the idea of communism as a value freely chosen by those who seek universal emancipation by the idea of communism as in accordance with the 'objective' interests and needs of the proletariat. The distinction between these two accounts of value might on the surface seem an academic one, in that what we are presented with is essentially rival versions of 'necessity', one ethical (we ought to choose communism), the other rooted in an understanding of history, class and collective action (communism expresses the interests of humanity); but the difference, as Heller argues, is enormous. It is the difference between regarding communism as a goal that is chosen by us, and communism as an outcome that is chosen for us; it is the difference between regarding us as the authors of our own destiny and regarding us as a passive carrier of 'necessity'; it is therefore the difference between regarding history as an open-ended historical process permitting different outcomes and possibilities, and a view of history as a causal relationship between objective social and economic elements beyond praxis. Heller's view, developed in the course of 'The Marxist theory of value', is that it is mistaken to assume that Marx would wish to derive value from the category of interest in the fashion described above. This is because it is clear that for Marx 'interest' is by definition the expression of 'particularity' rather than universality. It is a category belonging to class societies, as it is only

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where there is antagonism between different classes that different interests are to be found. If such conflicts were alleviated by the achievement of abundance, then this would eliminate not merely clashes of interest, but interests per se. Humanity, as Heller puts it, does not have an 'interest' because it is not, in Marxian terms, opposed to or in competition with any other living entity for mastery of nature. The category of value is, on the other hand, quite different. No matter how abundant a society may be or how emancipated its institutions and practices, whether such a society will be regarded by any given individual as good or bad is a matter of value. Moreover values are never merely the expression of the social relationships in which the individual is enmeshed. If they were, if values were the mere expression of social life, then Marx would be wrong to pin his faith on individuals being able to overthrow existing society or take control of the conditions of their own existence. Revolution is possible, in other words, because individuals are ethical beings able, potentially at least, to weigh up the value of existing social relations and to contrast them with other 'ideal' sets of relations. It follows that for Marx '[v]alue is a universal category of social ontology' (TMTV 16). The appearance of values is not historically contingent, but reflects the character of human thought and action. In addition, it is clear that Marx himself operates within a clear hierarchy of values in which the highest of all values is that of abundance, 'the many sided unfolding of the essential power of the species' (TMTV 19). Precisely because it is a value, whether one recognises communism as a worthwhile goal is a matter of conscious choice. As Heller puts: 'In most of his writings Marx regarded communism as a necessity. Yet. he does not opt for communism because it is necessary, but because it overcomes the fundamental value conflict of history (pre-history) culminating in capitalism. Of course the objective possibility (and not the necessity) of communism is the basis of this choice' (TMTV 21). To Heller it is clear that ultimately the only consistent way to read the idea of the 'necessity' of communism is on the basis of ethical necessity, on the basis that we ought to build communism. That Marx regards communism as a value should not. however, be taken to imply that Marx regards other visions of the good life as equally valid and hence that the choice between values might be regarded as an arbitrary one or as merely a matter of personal taste. This, according to Heller, is the mistake of bourgeois theorists after the overthrow of feudalism. As she notes: 'Within bourgeois thought the renunciation of the absolute insistence of bourgeois values meant also the giving up of a claim toward totality. This in turn led either to the denial of the validity of all social value systems - as in existentialism - or the equalization of all social value systems on the basis of relativism (as in historicism)' (TMTV 60). Regarding Marx's account, it is clear that the choice in favour of communism qua human wealth is treated as the only guarantee of the full and free development of each individual. Communism is the only form of society that transcends value conflict. for with the establishment of communism the conflict

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between values ends, and so too, with it, the conflict between individuals. The implication, therefore. is that it would be inconsistent for someone committed to universal human happiness not to be a communist, because only under communism would the material basis without which the full and free development of each individual is possible be placed at the disposal of society. Of course those not interested in developing the potential of the 'species' (to invoke Marx's category), but only of certain groups or classes, would hardly be expected to regard abundance and communism as universal values, but would instead choose values that reflect their particularistic interests. By contrast. a lack of consistency between values or a failure to realise that only communism permits the full development of the potentiality of each individual might in turn be taken to indicate the presence of 'false consciousness'. The idea, for example. that those valuing the development of overall species wealth should regard capitalism as the best means of attaining that end are on these terms clearly in thrall to bourgeois ideology. While capitalism generates in objective terms greater wealth for the 'species' in stressing the virtue of 'having' over 'being'. it perpetuates an endless cycle of competition between individuals which merely accentuates the inequalities between them and thus the overall sense of resentment and alienation (TMTV 45 ). By contrast, non-alienated values reflect the choice in favour of a 'rich'. 'multi-sided' existence, and are thus 'qualitative' in character. They are values that see people and their 'objectivations' as ends rather than means. Here again, then, we encounter the importance of 'for itself objectivations. Not only do such objectivations give us access to a defetishised world-view and an insight into the character of species essential values; they offer a means of measuring the alienation of a particular social reality. As Heller explains. such objectivations embody species essential values; thus whether or not such objectivations are valued in themselves gives a clear measure of the degree of alienation present in society. A high degree of respect for art. philosophy and science indicates that that society is less alienated than one where there is widespread apathy, contempt or indifference to cultural production. and where the only measure of 'wealth' is quantitative in nature. As she argues: In the hierarchy of indispensability. for itself species objectivations such as art and philosophy hold a relatively undistinguished place, while in terms of the highest values they are ranked with the most distinguished value-objects. The relation in which these two hierarchies of value-objects stand to one another says a good deal about any historical era, especially from the point of view of alienation. When the hierarchy of indispensability approaches that of the highest values, when goods belonging to the highest values tend to become fundamental. the degree of alienation is relatively slight. (TMTV 36: see also s. viii)

Ancient Athens and Renaissance Italy are both mentioned by Marx as societies that embraced this concept of wealth, and thus both can be considered less alienated than capitalism, where 'production and money have a place of distinction even in the hierarchy of the highest values' (TMTV 36).

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The same goes for 'personality types'. As we saw in the last chapter, Heller underlines the connection between authenticity and a personality-type that upholds and seeks to universalise species essential values. Although of course Marx regarded individuals in an alienated society as being themselves alienated, Heller interprets this as meaning that it is impossible even for Individuals to escape alienated relations, given that these are produced and reproduced as a function of the mode of production. However. this would not exclude the possibility of acting according to values which themselves bring into question the rationality of particularistic values, the values of everyday life (TMTV s. xii). Indeed. as we saw in the preceding chapter, the emergence of such individuals is a prerequisite for the successful transition between capitalism and communism. Marx's personality-types may not be in the form of an ideal-type found in the works of realist literature. for example; but it is certainly implied in his criticisms of the personalities found in bourgeois society that some character-types have greater value for the promotion of universality than others. To return to the initial problematic, it is wrong in Heller's view to argue that Marx's method seeks to conform to the norms of a Weberian social science. According to Heller, not only was it never Marx's intention to conform to such norms. but to imply that it was misses the point of his critique of bourgeois social science more generally. Marx wished to defetishise social reality, not to treat it as if it were a 'given' in the manner in which the natural sciences regard the physical universe as a given. Studying the intentions and motivations of social actors as they are gives insight into the character of the alienated totality as it is. not the character of the social world as it must become. As Heller comments: 'Marxism cannot strive for a "value free" social science without surrendering its basic principles. The essence of such a striving from the point of view of values is precisely the acceptance of the established value preferences' (TMTV 59). What is - or should be - novel in Marxism is that it acknowledges and upholds certain values as being fundamental to the overall progress and development of the species. It holds out its value commitments to potential challenge by those who would regard their own study of social phenomena as contributing to the creation of eternal or immutable 'laws of nature'. Thus. as Heller argues, 'Althusser's attempt to see in Marx's science some kind of special scientific method, ideology-free is completely mistaken. Marx's science is "ideological"; it is the result of choosing the values of the species-being which can be realized only by the class-struggle of the proletariat' (TMTV 58). The message is clear: in order for Marxists to be effective in advancing their demands they have not merely to admit the ideological character of their own undertaking but make a virtue of it. They should not hide, as apologists for particularistic values do, behind the veil of 'science' or 'truth'. but should instead seek to expose the value content of their opponents in order to flush them out on to the terrain of ethical and political struggle so

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that their particularistic, partial biases can be exposed for what they really are: manifestations of class power. Given the significance the shift back to universal categories of social ontology appears to have had on the rest of her account of Marx's social theory, we need also to be clear about how Heller translates the Marxian position on value back to the character of the historical process. From what she says about the former it should now be obvious that any attempt to claim that the teleological progression that Marx describes as leading to communism is 'inevitable' or necessary in historical terms is one that Heller would strongly challenge. More or less paraphrasing the famous paragraphs of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, she states that: History has no goal: its achievements are always the result of a correlation or relationship between the goals that men set for themselves and fight for. and the possibilities presented by the given objectifications (human creations). Social development - and individual activity within it - implies alternatives; but the sphere of movement within which alternatives play themselves out is determined by the objective possibilities (dynamis) provided by the objectifications. (TMTV 62)'

This is not the same as saying that it is impossible to speak about social development in value-free terms. As Heller makes clear, there are at least some senses - 'moments' as she terms them - in which development can be regarded in objective terms. The first is the concept of 'irreversibility', which is implicit in historicity. An action can be undone; but not erased. In this sense there is 'development' in the obvious sense that temporal advance is part of the human condition. The second, more significant sense is implied in the concept of a 'dynamis' mentioned above, which Heller also terms 'unfolding' (Entwicklung). This refers to the aspects or categories of any given society having a logic of their own. Heller mentions the manner Marx discusses the dynamis of 'exchange' in the development of capitalism. Exchange, according to Marx, unfolds according to a dynamis that is implicit in the character of exchange itself rather than in the judgements of particular actors. Exchange can thus be said to develop according to an internal dynamis and be judged on this basis, that is as an objective process. Thus a category either does or does not unfold according to a logic internal to it. The same is true more generally of society, though here our judgement of whether or not a society is developing is complicated by the association development has in this specific context with 'progress' - the 'forward' movement of the species. By contrast with the idea of a dynamis, progress inevitably implies a relation with some fixed and known standard. For Marx this standard is 'abundance', which, as we have already learned. is itself a value commitment. This in turn implies that the notion of progress (and also of 'uneven development') with which Marx is operating is itself a value standard rather than a dynamis or 'unfolding' of the form found in the concept of exchange.

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For Heller the importance of the above distinction is that it serves to underline how confusing it is to regard the 'necessity' underpinning the transition from capitalism to communism as anything other than ethical in nature. On the other hand, she does concede that Marx is at least partly to blame for the spread of the idea that the form of necessity underpinning his conception of the transition to 'higher' forms of society is deterministic or teleological in a Hegelian or non-ethically orientated sense. On several occasions he states. for example, that humanity is 'forced' to move beyond capitalism, not merely because of the contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production which render capitalism unsustainable, but because humanity is effectively compelled to pursue higher forms of social life. In other words, 'for Marx, communism was not one possibility, but was also the only alternative' (TMTV 6 7). In this sense, Marx came into conflict with his own ontology ('the ontology of praxis') 'according to which every new social phenomenon and formation is a vector of decisions between historical alternatives' (TMTV 68). Marx was inconsistent: while his analysis makes it clear that the superiority of communism rests on a value commitment to abundance and the individual rich in needs, he also insists that communism is the only alternative to capitalism. This confusion has crucial ramifications for the development of Marxist political theory, for if communism can be said to be the only alternative to capitalism then this means that the choice in favour of any other form of society must be regarded as irrational and thus illegitimate. The problem in Heller's view is that capitalism has not collapsed and, moreover, is unlikely to collapse in either the near or the long-term future. 'It is an obvious fact', she states, that the relations of bourgeois production (modern capitalism) are not hindrances to the development of the forces of production in the sense of Marx. Capitalism found the mechanism by which the forces of production could, in a certain respect, develop freely. At the same time - again for the time being capitalism has successfully tried out ways of integrating the proletariat. Hence it is just that today both the ontology of praxis, and the choice of communism as a universal value are thrust into the center of Marxian theory. (TMTV 68-9)

This passage should not, however, be read as an indication of Heller's defeatism. or as implying that she feels Marxism is any less valid because of the continuing strength and vitality of the capitalist mode of production. On the contrary, the message she wishes us to draw is that only by noting Marx's attachment to a hierarchy of value categories will his analysis remain compelling at a time when the predicted 'final crisis of capitalism' seems far off. The idea that capitalism is inevitably doomed and that therefore the transition to communism is an automatic or necessary one in the determinist sense is clearly wrong. What Marxists have to learn is that they, no less than their ideological adversaries, are committed to the realisation of a form of life commensurate with a given hierarchy of values. The difference between Marxists and others is - or rather should be - that the former accept that

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their world-view is informed by a conscious attachment to values as opposed to 'facts' about social and individual development. It is also that Marxism is the only ideology that seeks the genuine realisation of individual potential. All other ideologies are flawed either because they are particularistic, nonuniversal and hence lack value rationality per se, or they are inconsistent in their failure to choose the appropriate means to realising universal values, which is to say they lack goal rationality. The appropriate stance of the Marxist towards the prospect of radical change in an era of capitalist consolidation is thus one of 'faith' rather than expectation. In a passage which presages the philosophical shift of her later work, Heller states 'faith is inseparable from Marxism, since it is inseparable from the perspective of communism, from the standpoint of the proletariat, of the new materialism' (TMTV 76). If faith in the indestructibility of 'human substance' and the values of the species were to disappear, then Marxism would itself be redundant. The only certainty that Marxists may fall back on is that afforded by the justice of the cause: universal human emancipation. From value to needs; from faith to hope Heller's desire to reinvest Marxism with the potent ethical element she believed Second International theorists downplayed was built not merely on a reassessment of the category of value in Marx's work, but also on the concept of need, which she argued had been neglected by Marx himself, who had never attempted a definitive discussion of the concept (TNM 23). The result of this investigation, The Theory of Need in Marx, represented a crucial intervention in the development of neo- or critical Marxism, published as it was at the high tide of Althusser's influence and the influence of those who went under the structuralist banner. More pertinently, it was also read by the Hungarian authorities as an attack on the communist regime and as an incitement to revolt. Unsurprisingly, the book was banned from being published in Hungary and its author invited to recant her 'findings'. Nevertheless, it was published in Italy and Germany, and was evidently instrumental in securing her a reputation outside Hungary as a leading dissident Marxist. 3 In many senses, not least personally and politically, The Theory of Need in Marx marks a watershed in Heller's career. We have already noted that Heller's animus during this period was directed less at non-Marxists than at those within the Marxist tradition (particularly Engels) who insisted that the scientificity of the Marxian project lay in the derivation of objective laws of development through subsuming the individual within the social. In the case of the concept of need it hardly appears illegitimate to assume that 'need' is treated by Marx as an objective social category rather than an ontological one. As Heller admits, he almost always discusses need under the umbrella of 'social needs', which for most purposes include the needs of any given individual. It is clear, for example,

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that before a need can be felt the object towards which the need is directed has to have been produced, so that in this sense needs are created by the system of social production rather than being innate to the individual. Moreover, even those needs that are universal and 'physical', such as the need to eat and the needs for warmth and shelter, become social by virtue of the fact that the satisfiers of such needs are produced in the course of social reproduction. What we eat to satisfy our hunger is produced socially and in accordance with a hierarchy of values which we enter in the process of socialisation. The individual thus enters into a 'system of needs', which is to say that what the individual feels as a need might be said to be determined by the particular system he or she is introduced to in the process of socialisation (TNM 71). In short, the concept of need in Marx does indeed seem to be a social category rather than a category of ontology. Ever aware of the political ramifications of the manner in which Marx's categories are deployed, Heller shows how this particular rendering of Marx's account of 'social needs' can be easily deployed to support an elitist account of the transition and the character of the 'society of associated producers'. If the needs of the empirical individual are determined by the system of needs operative in a given mode of production, then it appears inconceivable that he or she would develop needs that challenge the rationality of that system. If my needs are dictated by my position in the division of labour, then it is unlikely that I will develop needs whose satisfaction would necessitate the transcendence of existing society. If, in other words, I cannot logically develop a need for something that does not yet exist then it might be expected that my need structure will tend towards the reinforcement of the status quo. What is implied in this view is thus that it is only 'structural' factors that can cause a disruption of the magnitude needed to force the proletariat to accept its role as the 'gravedigger' of capitalism. The proletariat should not, in other words, be regarded as the source of disruption or as the instigator of revolution. Revolution is, on this view, in the interests of the proletariat in so far as it is only with revolution that the overall system of exploitation can be dismantled: but it is not likely to be precipitated by the needs of the proletariat. It is for this reason that, as Lukacs famously argues. their needs will have to be 'imputed' to them by those who are in a position to recognise their 'true', but as yet 'unrecognised' needs and interests. It is with such reasoning that the vanguardist conception of the party is sustained, and with it the 'legitimacy' of disregarding the views and needs of real individuals. Of course, the dangers of such a reading do not stop there, for if it can be legitimately argued that need is an objective social category then there seems little reason why under socialism the process of production should be subject to democratic control. If needs are objectively discernible then rationality would seem to dictate a system of planning in which production is matched to satisfy those 'objective' needs. From such apparently benign premises there springs a panoply of elitist assumptions about the relationship between those who

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'know' and those who follow. To Heller, however, such an account represents a serious misreading of Marx's account of social needs. It also follows that those who deploy Marx for elitist ends do so by mistaking not only his intentions (as had long been argued by libertarian Marxists such as Luxemburg), but also the meaning of 'need' within Marx's texts. It is evidently for this reason that she feels that the humanist cause is best advanced by attending to the texts rather than by elaborating a new, alternative account of need. According to Heller, Marx discusses the concept of social needs only as an adjunct to the discussion of individual needs. 'Social need' should not, in other words, be regarded as a primary category of Marxian analysis, but rather one derived from an analysis of the manner in which individual needs can be discussed and accounted for. Her reading insists that Marx always implies that needs are individual, not social, in character. It would thus also insist that need, like 'value', is a category of ontology and therefore not reducible to or explicable in contingent historical terms. Although it is true, as she insists, that Marx discusses social need for the reasons given above, i.e. because there is no 'outside' of the process of social production and reproduction, this is not to say that individual needs can only be discussed as part of a larger aggregate or collective entity. On the contrary, Marx is all the time working from the model of subjectivity developed in his critique of alienation, and as she argues 'alienation' makes no sense as a concept unless it is possible to locate a point of origin (or arrival) that is 'non-alienated'. As we saw above, for Marx these are value categories, in particular the value of 'abundance' (communism), which in this particular context we read as the 'Man rich in needs'. Heller reminds us, in other words, that Marx's critique of alienated needs works from the basis of a model of non-alienated needs; but these non-alienated needs are always individual in character ('the Man rich in needs'). They are never in the form of non-alienated social needs, as some within the Marxian tradition insist. This has a number of important consequences for how we should read Marx on the fall of capitalism and the nature of the transition. Firstly, the notion that the 'crisis' of capitalism can be explained exclusively or even predominantly in terms of objective, structural factors ignores the key role that Marx attributes to the effects of capitalism on the proletariat. According to Marx, as capitalism develops so, paradoxically, it impoverishes the proletariat whilst generating an ever-growing catalogue of new needs and desires. While, in other words, capitalism is enormously successful at creating an ever greater quantity of objects and thus of needs, it at the same time diminishes the quality of the existence endured by the proletariat. This process in turn generates what Heller terms 'radical needs', whose outlet necessitates the transcendence of the system. 4 A brief example will illustrate what she means. Marx drew great satisfaction from the demand of some trade unions at the end of the nineteenth century for extra time indicating that their concern was to improve the quality of life of their members as much as their spending power (TNM 90-1). Yet the demand for extra time reduces the

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profitability of labour power and thus militates against the logic of capital. The only means of ensuring a constant increase in free time and thus of opportunities for ordinary people to develop their talents and interests is over the long term - to abolish capitalism. This indicates to Heller that it is these radical needs rather than any 'objective' or structural factor that holds the key to the transcendence of capitalism (TNM 74-9). Indeed, she states that for Marx alienation 'must' produce the need to transcend capitalism, though it is not clear in this context whether the force of this 'must' is normative or historical, i.e. whether the proletariat must transcend capitalism because it should transcend it or because it has literally no other alternative but to transcend it (TNM 48). Whichever reading is correct, it is clear that far from ruling out the development of needs antithetical to the reproduction of the existing system, Marx sees the development of such needs as a necessary product of the system and the means by which the masses will be led to overthrow it. Revolution cannot therefore be said to be in the 'interests' of the proletariat, but is rather the product of the proletariat's need for a humane existence. Heller adds that Marx speaks of the proletariat as the 'universal' class because in abolishing classes they abolish the particularity of interests per se (TNM 63; see also pp. 76-7). By extension, it is equally misguided to regard Marx as arguing in favour of a post-revolutionary settlement based on the 'class interests' of the proletariat or even on the Rousseauian concept of the 'general interest'. If rule on the basis of 'interest' were to be made permanent this would imply the necessity for the continuation of class society and the maintenance of the state rather than, as Marx hoped, the abolition of all forms of domination and hierarchy. Secondly, while Marx does discuss the concept of social need and thus would appear to subsume individual needs within objective collective needs, the sense in which he uses this term is clearly on the basis of an aggregate of individual needs. Marx, Heller tells us, discusses social need in four separate senses, all of which demonstrate his attachment to the primacy of an ontologically rooted notion of need. It would be as well to enumerate briefly these separate senses to give the full force of Heller's case on this key point. The first and 'most important' is in relation to what Marx terms 'socially produced' needs (TNM 69). These are needs of the form discussed above, i.e. the needs of individuals qua members of a society. This category is intended to convey the way in which in an important sense all needs are 'social', even those which might otherwise be regarded as 'natural' or 'necessary'. Heller is insistent, however, that even speaking in these aggregate terms about social needs all that is being described is the sum total of individual needs. The second sense of 'social need' appears in the third volume of Capital, and refers to the needs of 'socially developed human beings' or 'socialised man' (TNM 70). 5 As a positive value category this version refers to the needs of the individual for communism and for the form of life that communism represents, in other words a genuinely human sociality. Here it must be the

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individual to whom Marx is referring, because in the sense being used here 'social need' refers to the needs of those who have overcome alienation and are thus 'rich in needs'. 'Richness' or 'wealth' refers in Marx to the diversity and multi-faceted nature of individual needs, so that a society is said to be 'rich in needs' when the individuals within it display many different needs; when, in short, their needs reflect their individuality as opposed to their position in the division of labour. A third meaning found in Marx is the description of average needs for material goods 'in a society or class'. In this sense social need can either mean 'demand', in which case the phrase appears in inverted commas to indicate the fetishised nature of the needs being expressed, or without commas, in which case he refers to needs which do not find an effective outlet in exchange. In Heller's view, it is easy to be confused into thinking that in the latter sense social need does refer to an objective or 'true ' need of the proletariat and as such can be looked upon as an 'autonomous structure' suspended above the empirical working class (TNM 71). This interpretation would, however, be quite mistaken in Heller's view because here Marx is in both senses referring to the average of individual needs. or 'the empirical and sociological content of necessary needs' (TNM 71). Since Marx deploys the concept of necessary needs to indicate needs that are universally felt, he cannot be referring to the hypothetical or imputed needs of a class, but to needs that are genuinely felt by everyone. Finally, 'social needs' can refer to those needs only satisfiable by social institutions, such as the need for healthcare and education. By their nature these needs are 'individual' in the sense that provision is directed towards those individuals who require education, healthcare, etc., rather than to 'society' as such. In summary, it is quite wrong in Heller's view to ascribe to Marx the view that needs can be 'imputed' to individuals. It is therefore equally wrong to assume that he provides support for the idea that the needs of empirically existing individuals could be disregarded or ignored for the sake of promoting class or collective needs. On the contrary, in Heller's view Marx recognises 'no needs other than those of individual people' (TNM 70). To imagine that he does is to misread his intention, which is to provide a contrast between the needs felt by individuals under communism and the needs felt by individuals in alienated societies, a contrast which in The Poverty of Philosophy is expressed as 'that between being and not being, between realising and not realising, between what is satisfiable and what is not satisfiable' (TNM 71). It is also to misread or ignore the radically dialectical nature of his analysis, which is all the time working on the basis of a set of antinomies serving to highlight the discrepancy between capitalism and communism. These antinomies ('freedom vs necessity'; 'necessity vs chance'; 'teleology vs causality'; 'wealth vs impoverishment' (TNM 81)) express the opposition between the 'social' and the individual in a way which makes clear Marx's preference for the humanisation of the social rather than for the socialisation of the human.

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Finally, as regards the 'society of associated producers', for Heller it is clear that Marx thought in terms of the satisfaction of the needs of each given individual rather than in terms of the satisfaction of an abstract social need. Again, the tendency of Marxist analysis according to Heller has been to suppose that Marx must have been thinking in terms of the satisfaction of an overall 'homogeneous' social need ('true needs'), for how else could production be organised along the 'rational' lines he demanded? Does society not have to impute a basic set of material needs so that plans can be drawn up for their satisfaction? According to Heller, however, this is not the main tendency of Marx's thought. She does concede that he may well have been operating with a 'roughly' egalitarian model in Capital, despite his welldocumented loathing of 'egalitarianism' (TNM 122). This is only because in this text he is preoccupied with ensuring the expansion of free time, and did not want to admit the possibility that the creation of new goods and thus new needs would carry on expanding at the rate it had in capitalist society, thereby undermining the prospect of a reduction in time spent on socially necessary labour. Yet in all his other works the assumption is clearly that the onset of communism presages 'a complete restructuring of need' in which qualitative and non-material needs will assume a much more important place than the quantitative, material needs found in capitalist society. In the Grundrisse, for example, Marx talks in terms of people giving up the consumerist habits they would otherwise develop in capitalist society as their lives become qualitatively richer. Elsewhere he talks about society's being 'able to wait' for the development of material goods because of the ability of the new, more rational system of production to generate greater wealth in the same time (TNM 124)." According to Heller, this indicates that Marx presumed that production would 'saturate' material. necessary needs to the extent that it is possible to envisage the majority, if not all, of material needs being satisfied. This is not the same as saying that needs will be homogenised into one overarching system of needs, but just that Marx expected the emphasis within communist society to switch from material needs, which he thought were limited in variety and character, to qualitative needs, which by contrast demonstrate the rich diversity of individual existence. To return to the original point, in Heller's view there is little if any basis for the claim that Marx's analysis of need subsumes the individual within the social and thus makes the former a mere adjunct of the latter. The various senses in which Marx deploys the concept of social need can all be explained in terms of an origin in individual needs. In this sense, on the basis of Marx's analysis it is illegitimate to talk in terms of 'unconscious' or 'unrecognised' needs. because, as Heller makes clear, to Marx needs are by definition felt by someone. It follows therefore that it is equally mistaken to impute 'true' needs to all members of a class, whether its members 'feel' them or not. Needs, it should be clear, pertain to the feelings of real, empirically existing

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individuals, not to philosophically abstracted models of 'Man'. As Heller points out, the distinction is a vital one in political terms, as it implies that any attempt to act on the basis of the 'objective' needs or interests of the proletariat is ruled out by Marx. The revolutionary transcendence of society is, rather, regarded as the task of the proletariat itself, rather than that of a selfappointed elite or vanguard acting on the basis of either their 'interests' or their 'true' needs. Alienation and needs Before leaving the subject of needs it is important to make clear at this point what the consequences are of Heller's humanist reading of the category of needs. What should be underlined in particular is that the commitment to an ontologically rooted conception of needs still implies an evaluative stance visa-vis the overall system of needs. This might not have been apparent from the discussion above, unless it is recalled that this analysis supplements and reinforces her discussion of value in Marx. In her view Marx is not arguing that because a given need is felt (which by definition a need is) this makes the given need authentic, which in this context translates as a need conforming with the imperatives of species existence. If Marx were arguing along these lines, then there would be little to differentiate his argument from that associated with those classical liberals who argue that there are no grounds for arguing that one need can be - or should be - regarded as more 'rational' or authentic than another. Neutrality with regard to needs - and, more familiarly, interests - is in this sense an expression of the classical liberal's neutrality with regard to values. In a value-plural universe it has to be expected that needs will differ as between individuals, and thus whether any given need is to be satisfied must be left for the market to determine. This is not what Marx is arguing, as Heller makes clear in both The Theory of Need in Marx and more directly in her article of the same period 'Theory and practice from the point of view of human needs'. Marx, she insists, regards needs as either 'alienated' or 'non-alienated' depending on the 'value orientation' they express. For Marx, then, there is no contradiction between holding that needs are ontological in origin, and holding that needs can be considered in terms of their degree of alienation. An alienated need is still a 'true' need in the sense that it is felt by the individual; it is just that it is a need which has to be considered antithetical to the 'full and many-sided' development of that individual. Unlike the classical liberal, therefore, Marx does not want to accord all needs equal status. Far from it: this would imply that that the needs people feel under alienated conditions are just as 'rational' as those that arise under non-alienated conditions, which obviously would undermine the larger point about the nature of alienation that Marx wishes to make. But what is still to be established is whether the categorisation of needs in such fashion helps or hinders the overall project to develop a humanist or libertarian Marxism.

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As should be clear, then, for Marx needs can be either alienated or nonalienated. What determines whether they fall into one category or the other is the degree to which they embody or arise from values consonant with the goal of 'human wealth' or abundance. It is this perspective that, as Heller argues, informs Marx's strikingly emotive comments in the section on alienated needs in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Revealing the profoundly moral quality of his condemnation of capitalism, Marx rails against the constant expansion of new objects and hence of new needs under capitalism. The result is a ceaseless yet quite artificial 'craving' after the latest fad and fashion, with the individual as helpless with temptation as a fly confronted by a 'lime twig'. 7 Here, as Heller puts it, Marx discovered the problem of the 'manipulation of needs' (process) and hence of 'manipulated needs' (outcome), which forms the basis for his critique of the consumerist ethic. In abbreviated terms, Marx argues that those needs whose function is largely the 'valorising of capital' rather than satisfying the need for individual wealth must be regarded as alienated. Needs that serve capital and profit maximisation are an 'essentially alien force', and thus while the individual may feel 'wealthier' and 'more satisfied' he or she is in actuality reduced to a mere means for the reproduction of capital. As Heller, paraphrasing this section of Marx's argument, puts it: 'Individual freedom is therefore mere appearance: the individual chooses the objects of his needs and moulds his personal needs in a way that conforms not with his personality, but with their position in the division of labour' (TNM 52). In short, the 'enrichment' of the individual under capitalism is 'one-sided' and reduces the individual to a 'slave' ceaselessly driven by the necessity for 'having'. In 'Theory and practice from the point of view of human needs' Heller underscores the analysis given in The Theory of Need in Marx in considering the consequences of this critique for the development of socialist praxis. Here she refines Marx's critique of needs by describing 'quantitative' needs as alienated and 'qualitative' needs as non-alienated. She further adds that we should not regard Marx's description of communism as the system based on the satisfaction of needs as implying that it is possible or desirable to satisfy literally all needs that it is possible to feel. This is because, as can be seen from the comments above, Marx is clearly saying that that we should attempt to satisfy non-alienated rather than alienated needs. This equates to a demand to concentrate on the satisfaction of qualitative needs that express human 'wealth' rather than quantitative needs that merely express people's degree of alienation from each other. To paraphrase Marx's comments in The Critique of the Gotha Programme, the slogan on communist banners should therefore read: 'From each according to his or her ability, to each according to his or her non-alienated, i.e. qualitative, needs'. Assuming this interpretation is correct, this in turn implies that for the revolution to be successful the needs of all subjects will have to undergo radical transformation for the transition to be successful and democratic. As Heller comments: 'Revolution in the sense

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in which Marx meant the word, is a total social revolution that therefore presupposes or implies overcoming the structure of the relationship between theory and practice in bourgeois society, and the capitalist structure of needs in its totality.'" This seems a stronger formulation than the measured appreciation of the nuances of Marx's thought in The Theory of Need in Marx. There the suggestion was that Marx was operating with a 'saturation model', which posits, if not the complete satisfaction of all material needs, then the satisfaction of such needs to the degree that it remains possible to speak in terms of the achievement of 'abundance'. Here, however, Heller is arguing that the structure of needs has to be transformed before the transition is complete, which implies something different. Instead of quantitative needs giving way to qualitative needs as the former needs are 'saturated'. the system of needs is to be 'overcome' in the course of 'total social revolution'. The difference is surely important: in the former case, it is assumed that it is not the structure of needs that changes so much as the ability of the system to meet them. In the latter case, on the other hand, it is the needs that have to change so that production can operate on a different basis and according to a different logic. This is the same in essence as saying that for the former model we can assume that the system will adapt to meet the needs of the people; whereas in the latter it is the people who will have to change to meet the imperatives of a system now run on the basis of 'communist values'. If it is the latter model Heller prefers in terms of her reading of Marx's position on this important matter, then it certainly worth asking at this point whether the basis upon which this categorisation of needs work really aids her attempt to develop a 'libertarian' Marxism. If after all it were possible to distinguish between alienated and non-alienated needs then it would surely be legitimate for a society based on communist values to discriminate in favour of the satisfaction of non-alienated needs rather than attempt to satisfy literally all needs, as might be implied in the model given in the Grundrisse. A moment's contemplation of the matter shows that such a scenario cannot be what Heller has in mind. The point is that alienated needs, which in 'Theory and practice' Heller refers to as 'money, power, possession'. are needs whose satisfaction cannot by definition be the object of a system of production. Such needs are merely expressive of the desire to be in relational terms superior to one's fellow beings. 9 They are needs that reflect the desire for greater esteem or worth and thus belong to a social order in which scarce goods are allocated on the basis of competitive criteria of 'merit' and 'productivity'. Heller's argument thus concerns the ethical standpoint of the future citizen, not the manner in which his or her needs are formed. Her point is that we have to think differently about ourselves and our relations to others in order to overcome the 'logic of capital'. A society that regards the need for unlimited amounts of money, power or possession as rational and valid is one that is prepared to consign some people to servitude and subordination. The need for power, for example, is the expression of the need for

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power over others. This logically implies positions of hierarchy and subordination and thus is inconsistent with the goal of promoting the development of 'species wealth' and the 'many-sided individual'. These on Heller's account are the true 'universal' values, and thus those needs reflecting a different. alienated value hierarchy should be ignored before they pass away. It is a sign of our current alienation and the alienated character of contemporary political discourse that we accept the validity of values whose realisation involves the subordination of some to others. Jean Cohen puts the matter succinctly when she notes that in Heller '[a]lienation refers to the split between the development of productive capacity, cultural values and needs. for the species as a whole and the individual's impoverished, one-sided development. The tension between species and individual development. between cultural wealth and individual impoverishment. is indicative of alienation both for past history and. in its most extreme form. for capitalism.' 1" It is here, then. that Heller shows her distance at this point from the liberal model of needs and by extension the liberal model of individuality. She, following Marx, is resolutely judgemental about what constitutes a worthwhile 'model' of subjectivity. The capitalist form of life celebrated by liberals as offering the greatest liberty to pursue whatever form of life or model of behaviour is deemed virtuous or worthy by the individual is a mere sham papering over the extreme alienation and exploitation of the majority by the bourgeois class. Nevertheless. it is also clear that only with the transcendence of the ethical system giving capitalism its semblance of legitimacy will communism become a genuine possibility. Without a change in underlying values a future society would be trapped within the same logic as capitalism: forever promising the alleviation of scarcity whilst at the same time fuelling the source of discontent. 11 The politics of humanist Marxism If there was any doubt about the strength of Heller's attachment to the pre-

suppositions of Marxist doctrine then the work of the early 19 70s comes as valuable reminder of the degree to which Marx remained her primary source of inspiration. Indeed, the fact that the two major pieces of work of this time were both devoted to the task of correcting the many 'errors' she perceived in the otherwise dominant interpretations of Marx should be proof enough of the importance she placed on a careful reading of Marx. Together these works constitute a major assault on what Heller perceived to be the stultifying influence of Second International Marxist theory and every other variant of Marxism which attempted to reduce the richness of Marx's thought to a neo-positivist approximation to bourgeois political economy. They also constitute the most systematic exposition of the humanist position offered by a member of the Budapest School. At a time when many who were otherwise sympathetic to the broad aims and ideals of Marxism were casting around

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for alternative sources of inspiration, Heller was reaffirming the emancipatory and universalist thrust which she argued lay within Marxist theory. The outcome is indeed a radically 'humanised' Marx, one moreover utterly foreign to the communist authorities of Hungary. As Markus notes, The Theory of Need in Marx 'explicitly rejected the whole legitimating ideology of the regime', which. as he adds, explains 'the impossibility of its publication in Kadar's Hungary'. 12 This ideology was of course based on the idea of the 'leading role' of the party in the period of the transition. As the arbiter of social interest and the vehicle for the expression of collective needs. Heller's rejection of the idea that communism promoted the interests of the collectivity and that individual need could be subsumed by the category of social need thus cut away the ground from under the feet of the ruling elite. It would be as well to note that the works of this period can also be regarded as, apparently, a corrective to the analysis given in Everyday Life. As we noted in the last chapter, one of the features of Heller's approach there is the reliance on an essentially contemplative model of defetishisation, which appears to divorce the emergence of critique from the material conditions confronting ordinary people. On this account people were expected to rebel against capitalism not because of the depth of alienation or exploitation they encountered in their daily lives, but because exposure to 'for itself objectivations in the form of great art, philosophy or science had persuaded them that capitalism's values and morality had to be replaced. Such a perspective might have been appropriate at a time when and in a context where intellectuals and students were at the forefront of 'revolutionary activity' (as in the counter-culture of the late 1960s); but where their interest in radical social change began to wane, so too, arguably, did the logic of promoting a view of revolution that accentuated the critical function of 'objectivations'. The works of this period, however, introduce an important change of emphasis, reflecting Heller's renewed interest in the reinvigoration of a specifically Marxist as opposed to New Leftist critique. This is particularly evident in The Theory of Need in Marx, where transformation is clearly located in those 'radical needs' that emerge in the course of the unfolding of capitalist development, but whose satisfaction requires the abolition of capitalism. In invoking the idea of radical needs as the vehicle for social change we see Heller reestablish the link between defetishisation and material conditions, and thus the link between alienation and praxis. To the question, 'why do people seek the overthrow of existing society?' Heller now reasserts the centrality of people's experiences of life under capitalist conditions and the degree to which their desire for a genuinely human life in which the individual's 'contact with others' is as an end rather than as a means to an end is frustrated by the demand for profit. In short, Heller invokes a notion of 'crisis' strongly resembling the classical Marxian view of the causes of social transformation. Revolution proceeds from the development of radical needs, not from the process of defetishisation or the contemplation of 'for itself objectivations', as

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implied in Everyday life. In turn, the entire schema outlined there in which those with access to such objectivations are regarded as the avant-garde of the rebellion against the old order, is displaced, if not supplanted, by the return to alienation as the factor precipitating social change. Little mention is made here of the particular qualities of 'for itself objectivations or the insights afforded by them for the 'coming-to-be' of the Individual: which, again, implies that we should expect rebellion to be led by those whose radical needs are most frustrated. From the sympathetic account she gives of Marx's comments concerning the desire of working people in the nineteenth century for greater free time we can assume that, like Marx, Heller is thinking that it is likely to be the most exploited and alienated elements of the population who will lead, rather than those with access to species essential objectivations, such as intellectuals and students. With regard to the latter point, the identification of radical needs as the motor of social transformation therefore has an important knock-on effect in terms of identifying who the agents of change are and how the postrevolutionary regime is to be organised. The impression we get from Heller's account is that 'radical needs' is a universal category that transcends class and group identity. This is to say that anyone and potentially everyone in capitalist society may develop radical needs in response to the deep-rooted, all-pervasive alienation that characterises such systems. Managers and 'owners', for example, are on Marx's terms deeply alienated within capitalist society, for even they are products of the system and just as subject to its logic as are the poorest or most exploited elements of the workforce. In this sense they too may develop radical needs whose lack of satisfaction might lead them to query the basis of their own existence and beyond that the legitimating values of the capitalist system.'l This in turn would imply that it is mistaken to believe that it is only the working class which can be expected to develop needs threatening to the normal functioning of the system. Given the manner in which alienation comes to permeate all aspects of life under capitalist conditions, radical needs can potentially arise in any member of society, and thus any member of society can become. as it were. a revolutionary of everyday life. The above analysis of course further undercuts the view that it is the 'objective' needs and interests of the working class that must form the basis for revolutionary organisation and activity. Even if it were true that the working class has interests or needs separate from the interests and needs of empirically existing members of the working class (which according to Heller it does not), this would not give the working class alone the right or duty to overturn existing institutions and structures in the name of a better society. Herein of course the importance of Heller for a movement aiming to change the attitudes, values and aspirations of every member of society. Without a 'total social revolution' of this sort the political revolution, that is the capture of state power, will of necessity be regarded as illegitimate by those

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whose values and beliefs remain supportive of the old order. Unless, therefore, it can be shown that the vast majority desire revolutionary change, then inevitably the overthrow of extant institutions and structures will be perceived as being carried out for the people and not by the people. As Cohen argues, such a position is therefore 'inherently democratic and selflegislating', placing as it does the onus firmly on mass participation in social transformation and the creation of structures enabling people to govern themselves.' 4 Heller, it should be said, says little at this stage about what the transition will be like or what institutions and structures are best suited to realising her aim of broadening the democratic involvement of ordinary people in social functioning. What is evident. however, is an awareness of the importance of not allowing a lack of attention to the institutional dimension of emancipatory theory to become a hostage to fortune. Posing the problem in The Theory of Need in Marx, she asks who makes the decisions about how productive capacity should be allocated? Who decides. for example, how long the production of goods directly serving consumption can 'wait'? Marx's reply, of course, is everyone ... But how can every individual make such decisions? Marx did not answer this question, because for him it did not arise. For us, however, in our times. it has become perhaps the most decisive question of all. The focal point of contemporary marxism is to work out models for this (or at least it ought to be). (TNM 124)

One difficulty raised by Heller's analysis needs still to be addressed, which is the connection between radical needs and the development of capitalism. In Marx (or at least the early 'humanist' Marx) radical needs emerge in response to the increasing alienation and exploitation that accompanies capitalist development. The assumption is clearly that with the intensification of capitalist exploitation so alienation too intensifies, eventually reaching levels that the working class find intolerable. At this point the objective crisis of capitalism fuels the subjective crisis, with the effect that the proletariat is forced to overthrow capitalism. In common with other neo-Marxists, however, Heller appears to question the inevitability of capitalist crisis and thus the assumption that systemic crisis will provide the motor for the mass uprising expected by Marx. Indeed, as regards the latter, it is obvious from comments she makes in 'Towards a Marxist Theory of Value' in particular that Heller sees capitalism as, in purely objective terms, able to sustain itself indefinitely. Considered merely in terms of the logic of reproduction capitalism has, she argues, 'found the mechanism by which the forces of production could ... develop freely' (TMTV 68-9). In an echo of Marcuse's similarly pessimistic verdict in One Dimensional Man she even notes that 'for the time being - capitalism has successfully tried out ways of integrating the proletariat' (TMTV 69). In the more optimistic analysis of The Theory of Need in Marx Heller even wonders aloud about the prospects for the development of a 'consciousness exceeding its bounds' of the sort described by Marx as the necessary prelude for genuinely revolutionary change (TNM 95). Whereas,

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therefore, Marx's analysis is one based on a sense of certainty derived from insight into the factors propelling capitalism towards eventual collapse, Heller is confronted by the likelihood that, while some will develop radical needs leading them to reject 'the system', many others will not, such as those who are 'fully integrated' within it. This is of course a sign of the weakness of Heller's attachment to Marxism as 'historical materialism', and also of the ease with which she will be able to slip off the mantle of Marxism altogether once she is no longer convinced of the merits of attempting to sustain a purely 'ethical' Marxism. But it is a stance that appears difficult to reconcile with her conviction that only a total social revolution involving a change in the values and beliefs of the vast majority of people could justify the transcendence of liberal-capitalism. If it is true that the working class is becoming integrated into the capitalist system, this in turn would imply that their radical needs are effectively channelled into 'affirmative' activity or even dissipated altogether. To then call for 'total social revolution' based on the activity of the vast majority might be regarded as a rather futile gesture. Better, surely, to resign ourselves to modest reforms of the existing system through parliamentary activity or, as in Everyday Life, to focus on raising the consciousness of those with the education and training to 'lead' the rest to emancipation. To put matters thus is of course to assume that the function of Heller's critique is to provide a basis for understanding how and why capitalism might eventually be overcome and replaced by a form of society more in keeping with our species needs. On this view it would be difficult not to conclude that the analyses given in both texts do indeed display a particularly futile air. It is almost as if Heller feels herself obliged to offer the prospect of socialist 'victory' to keep her readers interested, while knowing full well how unlikely such a prospect is. This is, however, a one-dimensional reading of the text, and arguably ignores the subterranean function of the critique offered. Firstly, Heller's argument concerns not merely what radicals should seek to bring about, but how they should bring it about. There is a very evident concern here with the legitimacy of political action, with what it is that people can do for and in the name of others. The message that comes through very strongly in The Theory of Need in Marx is that it does not matter how 'rational' or how 'well grounded' any given account of emancipation might be: the process by which that vision is realised must be democratic to be legitimate. In making this point Heller is, as far as she is concerned, doing nothing more than reiterating a central tenet of Marx's own politics, which is that the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism must be the self-activity of the proletariat, which in turn means that it must be the activity of the vast majority. But, as Heller shows, it is all too easy to read Marx in such a way as to make 'vanguardism' or 'substitutionism' seem logical strategies for revolutionaries to adopt. As she argues in 'Towards a Marxist theory of value'. Marx himself was prone to overstate the 'necessity' for communism, turning

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necessity from an ethical into a historical category and thereby encouraging such readers to treat socialism as historically foreordained. As we shall see, it is the ambiguous character of Marx's analysis of the historical process that will ultimately convince Heller of the difficulty of reconciling a libertarian politics with Marx's historical method. On the other hand, the effect of Heller's insistence on a libertarian reading of Marxist revolutionary theory is to generate what might with some justification be seen as a mixture of 'impossibilism' and utopianism. With regard to the latter, there is no doubt that what she finds attractive in Marx is the sheer utopian radicality of an approach that singularly refuses to recognise the permanence of the world as it is, and which nurtures the promise of another wholly different world as its political antonym. Heller almost revels in the impossibility of Marx's vision; but for her this does not invalidate it as an 'ought' to inform action. Her point is thus almost diametrically opposed to that of Popper, who famously criticised utopian thinking as inherently 'aesthetic' and thus inherently dangerous when placed in the hands of those foolish enough to attempt to realise the utopias described. 15 Popper's point is of course a fair-minded, 'commonsensical' - and tautological - one. Putting 'utopias' into action is, as he argues, bound to lead to failure. Utopias are 'the no-place that is good', and thus by definition impossible to realise. So much is obvious. Heller's point, however- developed at greater length in Radical Philosophy and A Theory of History - is that in stripping bare the ethical underpinnings of all forms of sociality Marx dissolves the 'impossibility' of utopias; or more accurately he dissolves the boundary between what is and what should be by showing that what is is itself grounded in value, in a common Sittlichkeit. By extension, what Marx's critique demonstrates is that all political theorising is utopian, since all political theorising can be reduced to a view of how people should live. The 'anti-utopian', quasi-empiricist theorising of 'classical liberalism' which Marx analysed in considerable detail in Capital and elsewhere is on this view just as utopian as the wishful thinking of the utopian socialists or first International anarchists, even if the former's view of the 'ought' seems more 'sensible' or 'rational' to critics like Popper (among the multitude of other critics of left utopianism). In Heller's view Marxists should not therefore avoid or disown the charge of utopianism, but rather celebrate it as the likely basis of its appeal. Without a utopia, in other words, Marxism is merely an account of social change; with it, however, Marxism becomes a revolutionary project or collective 'ought' that may inspire people to seek a better world. As Marx himself argues, in a world that is radically contingent all societies are utopian in that they all present themselves as rational and fitting 'human needs': they all express an 'ought' of Being which the contingent subject is required to embrace in order to prosper. The ground of the political is thus 'utopian' in the sense that, without an alternative vision of the world, politics is reduced to mere administration rather than, as Heller believes it to be, a contest of values and by extension a contest of 'worlds'.

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The other function of the schema offered in the texts being considered here is perhaps of greater moment certainly to Heller's subsequent career, for what she offers is of course a devastating immanent critique of the basis upon which communist rule rested throughout Eastern Europe. What Heller offers is not merely a humanist Marx or a utopian Marx of the collective 'ought', as she puts it. but a democratic and participatory Marx. In doing so, what she shows up is the emptiness of the rhetoric by which the communist rulers sought to maintain their own privileged position and keep their own populations at bay. Stripped of a resort to the concepts of 'class interests' and 'social need', these rulers lost in turn the basis for maintaining themselves in power without recourse to democratic elections or popular participation, and also the basis for the entire monolithic system of command planning. In short, the invocation of a libertarian Marx prompted a crisis in 'real' Marxism in a manner analogous to the crisis of the established Church in the early modern period faced with heresy. This was an immanent critique, one which a 'true believer' offered as an antidote to the institutionalised cynicism and self-serving of bloated bureaucracies. Whether or not one perceives Heller's reading of Marx to be entirely sound (and there are those who question whether it is) seems a secondary issue. What matters is, as Markus notes, that the Hungarian authorities themselves recognised the incendiary potential of Heller's treatment of Marx's texts and the uses to which such arguments could be put by those lacking appropriate 'guidance'. Within months she would be invited to appear at a specially prepared show trial to recant her views. Having failed in their attempts to force Heller or her Budapest School colleagues to do so, it was left for the regime 'to take the pen from her hand' before finally allowing her to leave for Australia. Needless to say, the regime's actions merely served to confirm the political significance of her (re)reading of Marx. Notes 1 The conventional binary used to distinguish humanist from scientific Marxism, that is 'voluntarist' and 'determinist' approaches. does not quite convey the nature of the debate. For this reason I have substituted a slightly different formula for them. 2 Compare with Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works in One Volume (London, Lawrence and Wishart. [1852] 1968). p. 98. 3 As Laura Boella notes, there was considerable interest among Italian radical groups in the potential contained in The Theory of Need in Marx for the reinvigoration of Marxist critique. though according to her there was considerable controversy as to how the text was to interpreted. Either it was read as 'a philosophical legitimation of post-Stalinist revisionism' or as a support for 'spontaneism and the immediate activities of radical movements ... to the point of inventing a theory of so-called "new extremism"': Laura Boella. 'Radicalism and needs in Heller', Telos, no. 35 (Autumn 1978). p. 113. On the politics of the book's reception see also Markus, 'Politics of morals', pp. 2 79-80.

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4 As she notes: 'According to Marx's formulation in the Manuscripts, "The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world'": The Theory of Need in Marx. p. 58. 5 Heller is referring to the 19 61 edition of the Moscow edition of Capital vol. III, p. 253. 6 Heller is here quoting from the Penguin edition of Grundrisse. p. 707. 7 Karl Marx, 'Economic and philosophical manuscripts' in Early Writings, translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, [1844]1975). p. 359. 8 Heller. 'Theory and practice', pp. 72-3. 9 Heller, 'Theory and practice', p. 67. 10 Jean Cohen. 'Review of Agnes Heller. The Theory of Need in Marx', Telos, no. 32 (Autumn 1977), p. 172. 11 Again, Cohen is instructive on this point. See her review of The Theory of Need in Marx, pp. 176-7. 12 Markus, 'Politics of morals', p. 279. 13 See The Theory of Need in Marx Chapter IV, 'Radical needs', particularly p. 86. 14 Cohen. 'Review', pp. 177-8. Cohen is referring here to Heller's account of needs; but given the centrality of the analysis of needs to the politics of humanism it is legitimate to generalise from Cohen's point. 15 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies vol. I 'The Spell of Plato'. fifth edition (revised), (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), especially Chapter 9.

3

From humanism to critique: Radical Philosophy and the idea of the political

The period immediately following the writing of The Theory of Need in Marx was an immensely difficult one for Heller, as indeed it was for all the members of the Budapest School. With this work and 'Towards a Marxist theory of value' Heller had further cemented her position as one of the major figures of the humanist movement (if this is not to overstate the degree of coalescence 'humanism' engendered at that time) and of the opposition to 'official' Marxism, which by the early 19 70s had become a major thorn in the side of the communist regime in Hungary. However, the regime's hope that banning her from publishing her work would prevent her from developing her critique of the philosophical and theoretical basis of the regime was, predictably, to prove unfounded. Notwithstanding the extreme hardship she, Feher and her family endured at this time, The Theory of Need in Marx was closely followed by Radical Philosophy, a work she herself regards as the last of her 'New Left' period. 1 It is also in an obvious sense the last of her Budapest School career, as her next work, A Theory of History, marks very self-consciously the moment of her break with the 'renaissance of Marxism'. Although evidently less well known than some of her other work of the same period, no doubt because it was only published in English in 1984, Radical Philosophy is nonetheless of considerable importance in terms of understanding the development of her political thought, marking as it does the transition from her humanist Marxist phase to a neoor critical Marxist one. Finally, it is here where we see for the first time many of the motifs and themes that characterise her later work, among them the idea of a 'rational utopia', the goal of 'radical democracy' and the regulative ideal of 'symmetric reciprocity'. Attention to this text thus provides a good basis for understanding how and why her thought develops along the lines it does. At one level Radical Philosophy clearly represents the culmination of the project developed in the course of The Theory of Need in Marx and 'Towards a Marxist theory of value'. This might be summarised in terms of the development of a humanist reading of Marx in which the categories of 'need' and 'value' are ontologised, that is, rendered as ineliminable elements of individual 76

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as opposed to social existence. The concern here is thus still an anthropological one, in the sense that Heller's aim is to build on Marx's exploration of alienation and human essence for the development of an emancipatory critique. There is, as we shall see, the same commitment to the revolutionary transcendence of existing forms of society, capitalist and communist alike, and an attempt to reach out and address those radical movements and groups first identified in Everyday Life as the likely bearers of change. There is also the same concern with the control over the conditions of existence and the development of forms of social life that enhance and promote a vision of 'rich individuality'. This is still, in short, the work of an uncompromisingly radical political theorist operating within the Marxist tradition. The idea of Radical Philosophy representing some sort of departure is, however, just as compelling. This strikes one immediately and in a quite tangible way, for perhaps the most striking feature of Radical Philosophy is the sense in which the project underpinning The Theory of Need in Marx and 'Towards a Marxist theory of value', which might be summarised as the defence of a particular reading of Marx, gives way to an engagement with a much broader discourse on, as Heller will put it, 'the true and the good'. What this might be taken as indicating is Heller's growing conviction that the battle for 'Marx' had been lost. Between the structuralists and the apologists for actually existing communism, the 'real' Marx unearthed by Heller and her Budapest School colleagues had finally succumbed to the positivist, empiricist Marx lauded by Engels. Gone, it seemed, was the prospect of resurrecting Marx as a 'humanist' figure; gone also the rationale for a 'renaissance of Marxism' of the sort promoted by Lukacs. There would be no renaissance; but nor would there be an immanent critique of 'Marxist' regimes, nor a social transformation based on a common acceptance of Marx's vision of the world as it 'ought to be'. Characteristically, however, there is little sign of regret in the work that follows. While Heller had, perhaps naively, staked a great deal on an acceptance of her reading of Marx's work, once it was apparent that such a reading would fail to find favour with those who mattered, namely the members of radical social movements, then the next step was to move to a different terrain of struggle. In Heller's case this meant engaging with the work of those who, like her, had become convinced of the necessity for leaving the figure 'Marx' behind in the name of the ideals and principles Marx stood for and defended. It is for this reason that the targets of critique in her work will no longer be primarily other Marxists such as Korsch, Engels or Althusser, but rather those engaged in developing emancipatory critique along democratic, humanist lines. Notwithstanding the 'failure' of her reading, there is nevertheless clearly a sense in which Radical Philosophy marks the end of Heller's attachment to any kind of Marxist orthodoxy. We have already seen that Heller's Marxism was in any case of a specifically humanist variety, with great emphasis placed on the philosophical and anthropological aspects of Marx's work. Now, however,

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her doubts about inter alia the value of basing critique on the value category of abundance, the sociological value of class, the lack of an institutional or structural basis for the protection of liberty and autonomy and finally the prospect of collapse in the capitalist world begin to manifest themselves more tangibly and guide her away from Marx back to those thinkers whom she regarded as showing greater sensitivity to the complexities of the human condition and the nature of the political. It is for this reason that we see Heller increasingly writing on the Western philosophical canon familiar to her from her earlier study of moral philosophy and ethics, in particular Plato, Aristotle's Ethics, Kant's critiques, and Hegel and post-Hegelian phenomenology. This gives Radical Philosophy a more academic tone than the texts we have so far considered. Indeed, her erstwhile Budapest School colleague Mihaily Vajda is drawn to comment that Radical Philosophy 'shows the growing gap between her activity as a philosopher and her activity as a politically engaged person'. 2 This is, however, an over-harsh verdict, as the discussion of Radical Philosophy in this chapter will show. What it signals, rather, is Heller's acceptance of the fact that the terrain of struggle was now no longer within Marxism, but rather between a more loosely constituted 'left radicalism' and the hegemonic texts and ideologies of 'bourgeois society'. With Radical Philosophy. therefore, the struggle for an emancipatory critique moves on to the main stage of Western philosophical discourse. After pragmatics: the ontologisation of value discussion Radical Philosophy is a surprising work given the author's earlier concerns and affiliations. On the surface there seems little linking it to the work that immediately precedes it, and the feel and texture of the writing seems much more like that of her work of the 1980s than that of the early to mid-1970s when it was in fact written. Nonetheless, it is not too difficult to discern the same basic project as is delineated in the course of 'Towards a Marxist theory of value' and The Theory of Need in Marx - hence the earlier suggestion that Radical Philosophy should be read as the last work of the Budapest School phase rather than as the first work of her 'post-Marxist' phase. It is apparent, however, that this book marks a transition, and that a number of new themes readily associated with Heller's work emerge. Perhaps the key change for those coming from the earlier studies is, however, the changed status of Marx and Marxism. While Marx might be the chief inspiration for the development of a radical critique of advanced industrial society, it was clear to Heller that that critique had to be augmented, and where necessary supplanted, so that the overall project of developing the normative foundations of emancipatory theory might be sustained. It is for this reason that we see for the first time Heller's engagement with the work of Karl-Otto Apel and the later Frankfurt School, in particular that of Habermas, who shared her belief in the necessity for a significant reformulation of Marxist theory. Given

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her interest in their work and the frequent recourse to it in Radical Philosophy, it is useful to outline briefly the direction Habermas's work had taken

by the mid-19 70s. Habermas and Apel were concerned with what they regarded as the overly ontological character of Marx's account of the formation of the subject in which labour is given a privileged place in determining the character of social existence. They therefore wanted to reverse the relative importance of the social and the ontological to stress the importance of social life and particularly language in the constitution of subjectivity. Mirroring the 'linguistic turn' that was taking place in many avenues of social inquiry at this time, both were convinced of the need to place language at the heart of social theory and thus at the heart of the critique of capitalist society. They also wanted to show that the conditions for emancipation must also be intersubjective rather than subjectively based, as suggested in the early Marx. Emancipation, it was argued, cannot be achieved merely by returning the fruits of the labour process back to the individual qua member of the species, but has to reflect the constitution of domination in language or 'speech'. Exactly how this was to be achieved was a matter of considerable debate, not least between Apel, who developed the idea of a 'transcendental pragmatics' to show the possibility for the distillation of a model of undistorted communication from everyday speech acts, and Habermas, who sought to utilise Apel's insights within a critical historical framework. This highly original marriage of what he termed 'universal pragmatics' and Piagetian genetic theory produced an intersubjective version of Marx's historical materialism in which speech, not labour - the intersubjective rather than the subjective - played the constitutive role. 3 On these terms alienation was characterised in terms of 'distorted speech', or in other words, communication that served to perpetuate relations of hierarchy and domination. The 'rational utopia' of the 'non-alienated' was accordingly seen as the model of 'undistorted communication' taking place within an 'ideal speech community'. By contrast with Marx's account of emancipation, which stresses the centrality of the satisfaction of needs and the freeing of time for self-development, here the stress is on the perpetual reconstitution of sociality. Emancipation is not theorised as an 'event' or moment in the development of the species, but rather as the regulative ideal of a process demanding the active participation of all members of the community in 'consensus formation'. Attention therefore had to be paid in particular to the institutionalisation of this process and to ensuring the participation of all members of the community in the determination of public policy. Universal participation rather than the satisfaction of needs was thus considered the hallmark of an emancipated society. Heller was obviously struck by the findings of Apel and Habermas, and was keen to respond to the development of the 'paradigm of intersubjectivity', which placed debate and deliberation at the centre of radical critique. Thinking back to the last chapter, it is clear why such an approach might

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have seemed attractive in political terms. Despite Heller's desire to push the ontological dimension of Marx's analysis, there was always a degree of scepticism about the prospect of the final alleviation of need or scarcity which Marx treats as the condition for the realisation of an emancipated world. The concepts of 'abundance' and 'the Man rich in needs' were, we should remember, treated as 'values' or 'ideals' against which to measure the alienation of the given. There is rarely ever if any suggestion that abundance is in fact realisable, which is of course part of the reason why Heller opens the question of the institutional form which the future society will take in The Theory of Need in Marx. 4 Heller was thus aware of the necessity for developing institutions in which questions of the allocation and distribution of resources could be debated and determined. Yet it could reasonably be argued that this insight alone does not take us past the findings of Marx, Engels or even the Lenin of The State and Revolution. After all, even the 'administration of things' requires some discussion on who will do what, even if that discussion is not to be poisoned by the conflicts of class interest found in parliamentary systems. The underlying factor behind Heller's curiosity over the intersubjective basis of emancipation was much more profound and far-reaching in terms of the development of her thought, for what becomes apparent in the course of the opening chapters of Radical Philosophy is that her position on ethics and ethical universals had changed in a crucial respect. Without going too deeply into arguments we have already had occasion to examine, Heller's stance from Everyday Life onwards is, bluntly, that value is a category that admits of realist definition.; It is possible, in other words, to establish a basis for 'universal' values, which can be interpreted to mean those values that reflect our species essence. Similarly, it is possible to talk in terms of 'alienated' values that serve or reflect the interests of only part of humanity, whether that be a class, nation or other grouping. The task of Marxist critique is, according to Heller, to defetishise or unmask the values that serve particular interests such as these, and to demonstrate the connection between 'species essential' values and communism, between holding humanity as the highest value and drawing the conclusion that only through 'total social revolution' can such values be realised. 'Value pluralism', on the other hand, would be construed as a rationalisation serving to perpetuate an alienated form of existence in which individuals are encouraged to pursue their own vision of the good life at the expense of humanity as a whole. In the discussion on the category of value which forms the basis of the discussion in the third chapter of Radical Philosophy ('Philosophy and Everyday Experience') we find a subtle, yet nonetheless crucial, reformulation of the issue - one moreover which will have a significant impact on her later work. Heller tells us that all systems of 'social objectification' or moralities are composed of what she terms 'value orientation categories' (RP 53). These are pairs or binaries of the form good/bad, useful/useless, beautiful/ugly, good/evil. In other words, ethical systems are composed of judgemental

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binaries possessing a positive and a negative term. Beyond these formal terms there are also substantive universals, that is, values having 'universal validity'." Within this latter group Heller includes two types of 'universally valid value ideals'. The first type consists of those values which historically have formed the basis of ethical systems, and are thus 'universally valid' . These are values such as courage, honour - i.e. those values which it would, Heller argues, be difficult to imagine any given ethical system not regarding as 'positive'. To speak of the 'objectivity' of such values is thus merely to note that when such terms are invoked it is rarely to question the desirability of the value or 'virtue' itself, but rather its applicability in particular cases or instances. Thus we are, she thinks, less interested in what wisdom is, than whether person x can be considered 'wise'. This in turn implies that there is a certain common or shared basis for the meaning of the term 'wisdom' amongst the members of any given community or society, such that use of the term is 'always-already' understood. The second category of 'universally valid value ideals' (or sometimes just 'value ideals' [RP 89]) is more important for our purposes. These are what might be termed 'interpretable' values, such as equality, justice and freedom. Again, such values can be said to be universal in the sense that it would be difficult to imagine an ethical system based on the values of inequality, injustice and slavery, though Heller is prepared to accept that certain 'devilish' individuals might regard these 'negative' values as valid (RP 89). Here we find the sense or meaning of such values to be highly, possibly even 'essentially', contestable in the sense that it is valid for two people to contend that they believe in freedom and yet for them to have completely different ideas about what a free society looks like. We can also contest not only what is important to the realisation of each value, but also what the relative priority of each value is in the overall system of values, the priority changing from epoch to epoch and society to society. Is it more important to be free, for example, or to live in a just or equal society? Such is the stuff of political philosophy from the Ancient Greeks onwards. Heller notes, for example, that though 'happiness' was once the highest value, the 'bourgeois revolution' firmly established 'freedom' as the highest value in modernity, so that models of society in which freedom is held to be secondary to another value such as equality are now unlikely to be found attractive. Thus, while it is acceptable to argue that freedom would be advanced if equality were limited, diminished or even displaced altogether, the view that freedom should be diminished to secure equality would in our society provoke hostility. What we find in modernity is a hierarchy of values with freedom at the top, other values such as justice and equality just below, and others, such as, it could be imagined, tolerance, health and well-being, below them/ From this point onwards, however, matters become more complicated because she is still insistent that we should distinguish between 'true' and 'false' values, or values that advance the cause of humanity as a whole and

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values that serve particular needs and interests. She does not, in other words, want to admit that a recognition of the plurality of values should lead one to a view of ethical incommensurability and the view that all values have, as it were, equal value. At this stage at least, Heller is keen to avoid setting foot on this particularly slippery slope, and it is not too difficult given her background to see why this would be the case. Admitting that all values have equal value would be to surrender the idea that any given model of society is more rational than any other. Nevertheless, what emerges is that the exercise she is engaged in is not, despite her confusing terminology on this point, the delineation of true values from false values, but rather the delineation of true interpretations of 'universally valid value ideals' from false interpretations of 'universally valid value ideals', which is quite a different matter. 8 Thus the problem she sets herself is to show that some interpretations of value ideals are superior to others. How, in other words, can it be demonstrated that one interpretation of, say, equality and hence one model of an 'equal society' is more rational than another? To be clear, this is a different task to the one she set herself in, for example, 'Towards a Marxist theory of value'. There what she argued was that the values held by Marxists, such as 'abundance' and the 'Man rich in needs', were not only different from those held by ideological adversaries, but inherently superior because of the ambition they reveal to develop species universality rather than to serve the 'particular' interests of a dominant class. Now, however, we are faced with the idea of ethical discourse as composed of the contest between different interpretations of the same values, rather than as a contest between different values, some universalist in aspiration and some clearly particularistic and elitist. The problem for the left radical is thus showing that the interpretation he or she gives of universal values and thus the model of society he or she wishes to advance is superior to some other interpretation. If, for example, two people both profess to believe in equality, on what grounds can one claim that his or her view of equality is 'true' whilst the views of the other are 'false'? Heller's solution is expressed in the following terms: 'I characterise as true value that value which in particular can be related without contradiction to the universally valid value ideals, and whose claim to validity does not at the same time conceptually exclude the claim to validity of any other value that can equally without contradictions be linked to the same value ideal' (RP 95). What Heller offers here is a noticeably different formula from that advanced in 'Towards a Marxist theory of value', for what it implies is that the test of the truth or falsity of values is relative rather than absolute. Before going any further, however, it may well be helpful to consider briefly the example Heller supplies to illustrate her point. Heller mentions that if someone defends slavery in the name of freedom then, as she puts it, 'without any more ado one can explain that this value is untrue' (RP 95). The reason we can dismiss this claim is that this interpretation conflicts with other possible interpretations of the value of freedom.

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In other words. if I believe that everyone has a right to freedom then this conflicts with the view that only non-slaves have a right to freedom. On the view so far expressed this would be enough to make slavery 'untrue' or 'false' because slavery 'conceptually excludes' the idea of everyone's having a right to freedom. However, we still need to know on what basis my belief in freedom for everyone is superior to the view that only some people are entitled to freedom. What is it about the former belief that makes it 'true'? Heller answers as follows: 'Every person has an equal right to freedom' is indeed not one interpretation amongst many of the value idea of freedom, but rather a universal justification of the value idea. As interpretation this interpretation has been elevated to the level of consensus. We therefore prove the contradiction between value and value ideal by comparing either an interpretation of the value ideal or a value to which the value ideal is related with the social interpretation of the same value idea. In this way the contradiction can be pointed out between the value and the value ideal- the fact that the value is untrue, mistaken, false or lost. (RP 96)

The key, in short, to establishing the truth or otherwise of a given interpretation is the background consensus operating at any given moment in time. Whilst slavery might have been a 'true' interpretation of the value idea of equality in Antiquity it is now 'false'. This is because in modern societies most people are repelled by the idea, famously advanced by Aristotle in Book I of the Politics, that some people are 'naturally' inferior to others. 9 It should be immediately added, however, that as far as Heller is concerned to recognise the importance of a background consensus in establishing the truth or falsity of values is not necessarily to open the way to the form of ethical relativism that insists that whatever beliefs and values are extant in any given culture have to be respected as 'valid'. Heller is too much of a Hegelian to fall for a view which insists on treating cultures and societies as hermetically sealed entities meriting respect on the grounds of their 'difference' or uniqueness. The 'background consensus' she is referring to is that belonging to the modern Geist. It is the overarching mood of the modern, not the expressions of local, culturally, spatially or linguistically differentiated groupings, that interests her. What she is hoping at this point is that left radicalism will come to be recognised as the expression of what might be termed a 'deep universalism', a universalism that is so thoroughgoing that by contrast other ideologies and beliefs are revealed as particularistic and, by extension, supportive of hierarchy and subordination. The outcome of these deliberations on the nature of 'true values' (for which we read 'value interpretations') is that while some beliefs and values can be regarded as false and thus disregarded, a great many others can presumably be regarded as 'true', notwithstanding Heller's confidence in the eventual hegemony of socialist ideals and principles. As Heller acknowledges, virtually every modern ideology recognises the universality of the value ideals of freedom, justice, and equality, and so must be considered as true in

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some sense. Plurality of interpretation is, it seems, to be welcomed, not rejected merely because the existence of plurality makes more difficult the task of agreeing the outline of a freer or more rational form of society. As she puts it in a different context, just as we 'will' different interpretations of Hamlet, so we 'will' different interpretations of the value ideals (RP 176 ). What this means in practice is that virtually all modern systems of thought and most religions can be regarded as equally true, there being no degree of truth as between different interpretations of 'true' values. Most varieties of liberalism, conservatism and socialism hold that every person has an equal right to freedom, justice and equality, but they differ as to what the belief in each of these value ideals commits the state to doing. 10 Each system of thought operates with a different model of how society should look: but each model must on these terms be regarded as a legitimate interpretation of the relevant value ideals. Communism is itself no 'truer' than its arch ideological rivals, because they are all in some sense committed to the universalist ideals associated with modernity. If this were all Heller had to say about the matter then it might be tempting to conclude that she had forsaken her earlier radical stance and joined Isaiah Berlin in the celebration of ethical incommensurability and value pluralism. 11 Though Heller is prepared to accept that one universalist system of value interpretations (i.e. ideologies) can be argued as more rational or truer than another, this does not imply (as of course Berlin argues it does) that liberal-democratic or 'bourgeois' political institutions are the rational counterpart to a belief in value plurality. On the contrary, the discovery of the ineluctability of contestation between interpretations of value ideals requires a full-scale critique of bourgeois institutions. The reasoning here is the same as we find in Marx, Weber and, latterly, Habermas, whose account of the failings of liberal institutions to develop the 'public sphere' she closely follows at this point. This is to say that Heller sees part of the function of liberal-democratic institutions as the containment of genuine discourse on the character of social, economic and political arrangements in the interests of the hegemonic class. As Heller makes clear, the vaunted pluralism of liberal-democratic systems is merely illusory. Instead of encouraging genuine discourse on the rationality of values (Wertrationalitiit), bourgeois rule is characterised by a discourse on the rationality of the means by which already determined ends are to be secured or advanced (Zweckrationalitiit). 12 Such systems require the illusion of an open discourse on values because, as Heller explains, it is part of the ideology of the bourgeois revolution that values are a matter of private conscience, not state diktat. For a state to threaten to impose values on civil society would be to breach the 'contract' between rulers and ruled and provoke a legitimation crisis.ll Accordingly, the hegemonic class is required to dress up as 'value discussion' matters that have in reality been rendered 'administrative' in character. By contrast, real value discussion, discussion, that is, predicated on the necessity for allowing collective needs and desires to determine the shape of

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social existence, requires a radically different political system and a radically different account of citizenship. As Heller argues: An existential basis for value rational action. which places people in a position where they become conscious of the universal validity of values without any fixed value hierarchy and without any religious guarantee, can only be laid when the determination of values is the common affair of all people. So long as this is not the case, then there will always be a justification for interpreting value rationality as analogous to purposive rationality, for the appearance that value choice is irrational has not been removed. (RP 93)

In short, no real value discussion takes place under liberal-democratic conditions, and public discourse is orientated to servicing the needs of a system whose own value basis is largely beyond query or challenge. There is, therefore , a gap between the promise of the bourgeois revolution and the reality of the system created by it. The promise is the recognition of value plurality as an essential fact of life within modernity and thus of the contingency of all institutions and procedures on a consensus concerning the ends of those institutions and procedures. The reality, on the other hand, is a narrowly delimited public realm which not only excludes the vast majority from any sort of input into the process of consensus formation, but that channels public deliberation into the means by which tacitly established ends are realised. The liberal ideal of a world in which the discussion of values extends to the discussion of the values underpinning the practices of the liberal state is still, it seems, some way off- as Heller will from now repeatedly insist in her analysis of the shortcomings of liberal-democratic practice. Radical democracy and the contest of values Thinking back to the opening of the last section, it should by now be becoming clearer why Heller had become interested in the Apel/Habermas project of grounding emancipation in an intersubjective as opposed to a subject- centred framework. As for them, so for her the quest for an ultimate reconciliation of subject and object, of individual and species as described in Marx had now to be abandoned in favour of the recognition of the non-reducibility of ethics to species essential or universal goals. 14 Recalling 'Towards a Marxist theory of value' Heller earlier posited only certain values, for example 'abundance' and the 'Man rich in needs', as fully expressive of 'species essentiality' and the good life for all. With Radical Philosophy, however, the identification of 'communist values' with the universal is displaced by the idea of the universality of the core values of modernity: freedom, justice, equality. Given the different ways in which such values can be legitimately interpreted, Heller is compelled to recognise in the idea of value plurality a source of non-identity with the collective. It is this recognition which then opens the way to the reception of a Kantian conception of difference as constitutive of autonomy and an Aristotelian conception of the political. The individual had, in this

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reconceptualisation, become zoon politikon: separate, yet at the same time dependent on his or her fellow creatures for the maintenance and regulation of social life. We should also add that such a move also opened a sphere of contestation, an agora in which the agent can act and where he or she can express the non-identical without being seen as 'self-interested'. If there are no grounds for assuming the possibility of identity between self and other, then contestability is the given from which every other aspect of social existence is marked. From now onwards, the institutionalisation of a formal publicpolitical sphere marked by a permanent dialogue on the nature of 'the good and the true' would be just as much a sine qua non of Heller's political thought as it has been of Habermas's. In view of the enormous ramifications that such a shift in outlook brings, it is difficult not to see this as a crucial moment in the evolution of Heller's thought. Yet the task of elaborating a social and political theory consonant with these developments still lay ahead. In particular, Heller had to augment and develop Habermas's model of 'the ideal speech community', which she clearly felt lacked sufficient colour and texture to inspire praxis. If, she seemed to be saying, social movements were to take up an intersubjective model of emancipation they had to be motivated by something more than the promise of the reign of Reason, but had to develop and explore entirely new ways of thinking and acting. What Habermas clearly had in mind is a model that approximates to a form of republican practice in which political matters are regarded as properly public matters for public debate and deliberation. What was still needed, according to Heller, was the elaboration of as it were a republican 'being-in-the-world'. Habermas's abstract philosophical schema of the ideal speech community had to be augmented by a vision of a distinct way of life in which individuals are confronted with obligations and duties as well as the opportunity to 'participate' in some way. The remaining chapters of Radical Philosophy are taken up with exploring the potential of this new opening for developing what she terms a 'rational utopia' that would move critique beyond the elaboration of a philosophically satisfying 'ideal-type' towards a model of a society it is possible to imagine operating on the basis of the 'radical needs' manifested in the social movements proliferating throughout Western society. Value discussion and contestation is, it is clear, an inevitable and desirable feature of social life. certainly in modern societies, where the bourgeois revolution opened up space for the individual to contemplate alternatives to the given. What still requires clarifying, however, is why bourgeois institutions need to be displaced in order to permit this value discussion to take place on a permanent basis. Notwithstanding the tendency of bourgeois thought to reduce matters of virtue to matters of utility and matters of value rationality to matters of purposive rationality, it is not clear why the practices of bourgeois rule cannot do the same. What, in other words, prevents us converting the promise of the bourgeois revolution into the reality of a genuinely plural. tolerant society of the sort Heller has in mind?

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It is apparent that, as for Ape! and Habermas, so for Heller, value discussion cannot meaningfully take place where the exercise of power is unequal, where, in other words, there is any form of hierarchy or subordination. As much can be inferred from the view that all value interpretations have equal value in so far as they do not exclude or contradict other value interpretations. If one person is in a subordinate position to another then his or her 'voice' will by this very fact alone carry less weight. Genuine value discussion therefore presupposes what Heller terms 'symmetric reciprocity' between participants in a political discussion. This contrasts with the 'asymmetric reciprocity' that exists between, say, expert and layperson, or tutor and pupil." The obvious way in which hierarchy and inequality manifest themselves in bourgeois systems is as mentioned above in regard to the tendency found within such systems to reduce issues of value rationality to those of purposive rationality and thus to consign matters which should be the concern of the community to the realm of 'experts' and administration, and thus by extension to a realm where 'asymmetric reciprocity' is the norm. Heller is, we should note, keen not to dispense with the notion that there is a distinction to be made between value and purposive rationality. There are matters which can only be dealt with by those with the skill, knowledge or training to make a given choice of outcomes meaningful (RP 112; 157). Only 'primitive' forms of society, therefore, can manage without a division of function between the value rational and the purposive rational. Bourgeois institutions reflect this narrow horizon of value discussion by limiting such discussion to parliament and to the state apparatus, whereas, by definition, to be legitimate value discussion must take place at the level of the communities which are to be affected by the outcome of the discussion. In other words, parliamentary systems are by their very nature unable to satisfy the demand that value discussion be inclusive and mass participatory in nature. Such institutions serve to delimit discussion by ensuring a distance between the community and the exercise of political power, and by hiving off important 'value-orientated' matters into the realm of administration and bureaucracy. Heller's aim is thus to ensure that what concerns the public, namely the discussion of the values by which communities and beyond them society are regulated, be conducted by the public. Matters that are essentially ethical or moral in nature should be the subject of collective discussion, whereas those that are instrumental or properly speaking 'administrative' in character should be dealt with by those who have been properly trained to handle them. We already get a sense that, unlike Marx, Heller is by no means hostile to the idea of a state apparatus separate from 'civil society' or the 'body politic'. Indeed, as we shall see, she comes to see the state and its attendant bureaucracy as mere appurtenances of modern governance. Heller is no enemy of the state. despite the tone of her comments at certain moments in Radical Philosophy. More radical, however, are the suggestions Heller makes in discussing the structure of a democratic system, which are intended as an enlargement of

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the measured abstractions of Apel and Habermas on the same topic (RP 15 6 ). Just as with the latter. here democracy is theorised as a system in which all domination has been eliminated, the reasoning being that where a person is dominated he or she cannot by definition participate as an equal in the discussion regarding those values that will determine the form life takes within the community (RP 156-7). But it is also theorised as a system in which the boundaries between the public and the private are rendered relatively porous (certainly as compared with liberal-capitalist systems) so as not to limit the scope of collective discussion. It is an obvious point, but one worth making here, that if all interpretations of universal values are regarded as at least potentially valid so that any given interpretation could be enacted as the basis of the socio-economic system, then this presupposes that the state (or other agent of public policy) is able to act without consideration to any boundaries between the public and the private, between state and citizen. As Heller puts it in a starkly Rousseauian moment: The total realisation of democracy is identical with the abolition of all domination. It therefore involves an equal distribution of power, for that presupposes that every person disposes over the material goods and people of the society; it presupposes that there is no sphere over which or in which people cannot take control. In a society free of domination all people decide - as reasonable beings - questions of administrative power in the course of distinct and concrete value discussion. (RP 157)

Thus. as the above quotation makes clear, for meaningful value discussion to take place equality through the 'positive abolition of private property' has to be regarded as a prerequisite. What this translates as demanding is still in essence the same as we find in Marx, that is. the wholesale (re)appropriation by communities of the forces of production, distribution and exchange. The 'positive' element (which is a constant refrain in Heller's left radical phase) refers to the placing of the power to dispose over productive power in the hands of the community. as opposed to the 'negative' abolition of private property, which (as in the Soviet Union) places property in the hands of the state and. if the experience of communist rule is anything to go by, in the hands of a distant apparat. What still needs to be clarified, however, is why collective control over productive forces is a necessary precondition for value discussion. Part of Heller's case bears a similarity to that made by Rousseau in his discussion of citizenship and more recently by radical civic republicans in response to Aristotle's discussion of dependency. 1" Heller's view is that the person who is dependent on another lacks autonomy not only as an economic but as a political agent. as one who participates in the value discourse of society. As she argues, a genuine participatory democracy could only work where people are not 'subject to the will of another'. as Rousseau puts it, and where people feel such a deep sense of duty to the community that they are prepared to commit themselves to participation, contestation and collective determination of social life in the first place. 17 To be successful a radical

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democracy requires a 'democratic personality', and such a personality can, Heller thinks, only be formed in a context where people are not compromised because of their dependency on others. This in turn implies that wage labour is incompatible with political equality and further that everyone must be considered co-proprietor over the productive life of the community. Citizenship demands universal equality: but that equality cannot merely be formal, but must be substantive as well. Abolition of wage labour and the communal-collective control over the means of production must thus be considered the basis for developing citizenship in a radical democracy. What is interesting in Heller's account of Radical Philosophy is that such a move does not appear to be necessitated by considerations of substantive justice so much as by the need to foster in each individual a sense of obligation or duty to all. The key issue, therefore, concerns the constitution of a subject able to sustain a highly interactive and mutually supportive community. 'Equal power' is necessary as much to secure equal respect for each citizen as for allowing the community to dictate the terms and basis of productive life or to give each his or her 'due'. Two further conditions are required, however, in order to bring about a radical democracy. The first is interesting as much for the willingness Heller demonstrates even here to confront apparently redundant aspects of Marx's schema as for the light it sheds on her thinking about the character of radical democracy. What Heller now demands is the 'recognition' rather than the satisfaction of all needs, as called for by Marx in the Critique of the Gotha Programme (RP 159). Heller, to be clear, is replying here to Apel's claim that for a need to be legitimate it has to be rationally justifiable, which in her view puts the onus on the individual to justify in intellectual terms what might be felt at the level of emotions or desire rather than on society to satisfy the need (RP 1 59). 1" The notion, for example, that I should have to justify 'rationally' the statement 'I need you' mistakes, she argues, needs for claims. Needs do not require a justification as such, whereas claims do. Making a claim implies that the need to which it relates should be satisfied, that the collectivity ought to satisfy this need and not some other need. On the other hand, some needs (such as that for another person) do not relate to resources that the community or collectivity should have the power to dispose over. After all, such needs could only be satisfied by reducing the other person to a mere means, thereby denying that person's autonomy. Heller agrees with Kant, therefore, that without the norm prohibiting the use of another as a 'mere means' for the satisfaction of someone else's ends a society of genuine equals is impossible. On the other hand, while no one can demand that their needs be satisfied, no one's needs should be ignored or disregarded merely because they are not rationally justifiable in Apel's sense. Rather, the reverse should be the case: needs should be satisfied except where it is rationally justifiable not to satisfy them (RP 166 ). Heller's reasoning relates to a point made in the last chapter, but which is rendered somewhat differently in the context of the argument pursued in

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Radical Philosophy. Needs have an ontological basis (as we learned in her discussion of Marx's thinking on the subject), which is to say that they are rooted in the felt experience of empirically given individuals, not in abstract subjectivities, collective or otherwise. It is for this reason that it makes little sense to talk about 'false' or 'unrecognised' needs. On other hand, according to Heller all needs 'have an affinity to values' (RP 16 7), which is to say that ultimately all value discussion involves a discussion about which needs the community will endeavour to satisfy. In this sense the failure to recognise an otherwise legitimate need (i.e. a need whose satisfaction does not involve the use of others as mere means) is equivalent to the failure to recognise the legitimacy of a (true) value interpretation for the purpose of value discussion. Both actions represent the denial of the individuality of a constituent member of the community. Of course it might be objected that this is a formula for encouraging people to dress up their desire to satisfy their own needs in the clothes of 'value discussion'. Yet, as before, Heller is insistent that the operation of such a society presupposes a change in the basic outlook of members of the community. It presupposes in this context that they will want to act as 'moral personalities' as well as democratic personalities, which in this sense means that they will want to do their utmost to ensure that needs in general are satisfied, not just their own (RP 169). People must, in short, endeavour to act in accordance with imperatives determined by collective deliberation. Heller is insistent that she is not turning her back on Marx's appeal to the satisfaction of needs as the basis for just distribution, only adapting it in a manner that protects the individual from exploitation while recognising that there are finite limits to the satisfaction of needs. We might add that such a view is entirely justified when it is considered what a departure even her model of needs satisfaction is from any market-orientated conception where needs satisfaction is a function of supply and demand rather than collective deliberation. Indeed, we can add that on this account Heller's view of 'just distribution' is still deeply informed by the same logic as that informing Marx's critique of Lassalle and Western European 'Social Democracy'. Not to attend to any given need is not to attend to an individual; and not to attend to an individual is, in Heller's view, to deny his or her essence as a being, for if I disregard your needs I am in essence disregarding you. Even with the caveats and qualifications Heller builds into her account this is still a model which draws sustenance from her reading of Marx's radical individualism. The third and final condition for the realisation of radical democracy is what Heller terms 'the duty to perfect oneself (RP 169). If the subject and object are non-identical in Heller's sense, then Marx's value of abundance or 'wealth', which Heller still holds to be in a sense the master value and the essential dynamic of human development, necessitates, she thinks, the internalisation of the desire for wealth. This is of course wealth understood in the qualitative terms discussed in the last chapter, that is, the unfolding of the

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'many-sidedness' of human potential: of intelligence, taste, enjoyment, not material wealth. It presupposes, in other words, 'the development of people's entire material, psychic and spiritual abilities' (RP 170). Once again, this posits a duty for the individual: the duty associated with the 'beautiful person' to develop one's talents and abilities in a way that does not reduce others to a mere means for the satisfaction of one's own ends. Those who lust after money or power cannot in this sense ever be regarded as 'beautiful', because such desires are quantitative in character and thus incompatible with the ideals of a radical democracy which promote what might be termed the 'rich plurality of qualitative needs', as opposed to the 'alienated plurality of quantitative needs' found in bourgeois society. This is a plurality of those who feel that their self-development is a benefit not just to themselves, but to the community, which in turn is dedicated to the promotion of the wealth of all its members. Heller is keen to emphasise that in invoking beauty as a regulative ideal she is not at the same time undermining the availability of different models of beauty, different ways in which human and social wealth can be encouraged. Rather, the opposite is the case: nothing is presupposed on these terms except that beauty is to be interpreted in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. Thus it is to be expected that myriad communities will develop in accordance with the myriad interests, passions and tastes available to the 'rich' individual (RP 174). Yet they will develop out of concrete rather than abstract forms of plurality, a plurality in other words already latent in the radical needs found in existing society. In this sense the leap to a rational society is possible in the here and now; but it is one that individuals have to take for themselves. Philosophy, as Heller explains, cannot make the leap for us (RP 17 5-6). In conclusion, what Heller wishes to impress on us is that a 'rational utopia' of the sort she describes should not be regarded as an 'end state' or blueprint for perfection. Nor is it a world divested of obligations and duties or where Reason renders the contestation and passion of politics nugatory, as Habermas seems to suggest. Indeed, we can note here that, while broadly sympathetic with the Habermasian project, Heller is nevertheless critical of the lifelessness of his account of the political. According to Heller, his citizens 'have no bodies, no feelings and equally they have no interpersonal relationships. Their relationship to each other is constituted exclusively by value discussion. They do not need to be human beings at all - they could just as well be angels' (RP 158). Habermas's model remains at the level of the abstract rather than at the level of the concrete, where we could see what changes to the fabric of individual and social life are required to bring it to realisation. Heller, by contrast, feels it is incumbent on the political philosopher to explore the consequences of the attempt to implement any normatively valid model at the level of everyday life. Any rational utopia must, she argues, take account of the needs people have now, rather than being constructed on the basis of an ideal or originary individual. As far as Heller is concerned, then,

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even utopias have to assume that their citizens come from the same 'crooked timber' Kant used to construct his ethical imperative. Each move towards universality and the realisation of the ideal of freedom involves the acceptance of a duty on the part of the citizen. Autonomy therefore comes at a price, for each person has to be committed to value discussion and to collective deliberation of the means by which the society is to be ordered; he or she has to be committed to sharing power and in turn exercising power as a moral and democratic agent; he or she has to be committed at the very least to recognising the needs of all others with whom he or she shares communal space; and finally he or she has a duty to perfect him- or herself, to realise his or her potential so that he or she may contribute to, as well as benefit from, the wealth of humanity. In short, to be meaningful, autonomy implies reciprocity; the reciprocity of equals equally committed to the development of others as well as themselves. As Heller puts it, the citizen of a radical democracy would have to be guided by the following maxim: '[c]ontribute to the development of the wealth of society how, when, and in whatever context it is your duty to do so; develop your abilities how and where you ought to, develop them in whatever context, in relation to whomever or whatever and for whatever purpose you ought to' (RP 181). On the rationality of a 'rational utopia'

Radical Philosophy is testimony to Heller's unwillingness to compromise in the quest for a rational resolution of key philosophical and political questions. What should now be evident. however, is that these questions changed between The Theory of Need in Marx and Radical Philosophy, and that Heller's commitment to a humanist reading of Marx had begun to wane. Unusually for an intellectual with doubts about Marx's thought, this is a waning of an attachment to the philosophical and anthropological aspects of Marx's work rather than to his vision of an emancipated society, which arguably, in this work at least, remains substantively intact. No one could, for example, be in any doubt about the radical character of the measures that would have to be taken in order to realise merely the institutional components of the radical democracy delineated in the last two chapters of the work, calling as she does for the positive abolition of private property, the institutionalisation of a radically participatory form of decision-making and the acceptance by all of an ethic of solidarity and cooperation far removed from the self-satisfied atomism of contemporary liberal-capitalism. What, however, is just as striking is that sense we get of a growing distance between Heller and Marx, and her growing willingness to discard aspects of the latter's legacy that no longer seem pertinent or defensible. This of course still leaves us to decide whether the revisions she makes and indeed the normative model she generates from the revisions represent an improvement on the vision of emancipation that they are designed to supplant.

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The major revision we see in the text is the breakdown of the subject/ object identical. which is at the same time the most idealistic aspect of Marx's philosophical anthropology, and its displacement by the notion of the subject as bearer of values that, if not sui generis, then at least resist reduction as a mere epiphenomenon of other social forces. In short, the idea we find in Marx - and found until just recently in Heller too - that with the achievement of communism the gulf between the values of the particular and the values of the universal is transcended is now regarded as ontologically untenable. As for Hegel and Kant. so for Heller, without 'value autonomy' individuality is rendered meaningless. That is not to say that Heller is content to concede that as expressions of individuality all value interpretations must, simply on this basis, be tolerated for the purposes of public-political deliberation. This would in turn imply a political system that was neutral with regard to the issue of valid or 'true' values, and which would permit in principle the construction of any model of society as long as the 'background consensus' sustained it. Heller wishes to avoid such an outcome, because she wants to limit the availability of potential models to those whose implementation would not threaten the other measures she regards as necessary to secure universal autonomy. It is this requirement which would presumably necessitate the construction of a filter allowing those 'value interpretations' (or social models) that uphold what might be termed 'the principle of universality' to pass into the sphere of public deliberation, but which also allows the exclusion of those interpretations that do not. 1" It is worth taking this point in isolation from the larger argument about the nature of ethical rationality of which it is a part, because the political consequences of her argument are significant. Heller, to be clear, is arguing that while a plurality of interpretations of universal values such as equality and freedom is inevitable, not all interpretations are equally valid. Indeed, some interpretations. such as those calling for slavery, should be regarded as 'false' and excluded as a basis for public decision-making. Only 'reasonable', that is universalisable, interpretations of 'universal values' should be admitted to the public realm. Now at least part of Heller's thinking on this point is informed by the nature of the 'background consensus', which gives validity to certain beliefs and ideas. Though the idea is only implicit within Radical Philosophy, what will become apparent in her later works is that the 'consensus' she refers to is closely related to Hegel's account of the development of Geist given in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History and elsewhere. 2" This is to say that she is thinking in terms of changes between the pre-modern understanding of humanity and the social world, which stresses the particularity of castes. nations and epochs and the modern understanding which stresses universality, contingency and the linearity of human history. Thus when she invokes the idea of a 'background consensus' here it should not be thought that she is referring to the consensus existing within discrete forms of life, but rather the overarching trend or tendency of modernity. Nonetheless, Heller is, in

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Radical Philosophy at least, clearly presenting an analytical as well as a historical schema in which criteria are given for distinguishing between true and false values, and therefore between values and beliefs that should be considered legitimate for the purposes of public-political discussion and those that should not. To return to the original point, then, it is a major step for anyone who regards 'freedom' as the highest value to legislate against the expression of certain values, beliefs or argument. We only have to think of the painful debate that periodically breaks out in Western societies over whether neo-Nazis or racists should be allowed to express their views in public to understand what is at stake here. Yet Heller's filter would provide a much stricter criterion than the principle of 'harm' that underpins the contemporary liberal justification for the exclusion of views such as those just mentioned. To recall the key argument, only 'true values' can be considered valid for the purposes of public discussion and deliberation. A true value is one which regards all 'value ideals' such as freedom, justice and equality as 'universal', that is, as applying to the whole of humanity. On the face of it, such a criterion might be regarded as a reasonable one; most of the major systems of thought and thus the views of most individuals inhabiting modern societies would surely pass as 'true'. Yet consider the following examples: a 'deep green' environmentalist argues that the 'universality' of humanity should not permit the advancement of humanity's 'interests' over the interests of other species ('speciesism'); a radical feminist argues that 'universal rights' are a cover for the exercise of power by men over women, and hence that women need their 'own' rights to reflect their particular needs and position in society; a nationalist argues that the interests of his or her own country should come before the interests of 'humanity' as a whole. The point about these cases is that in one sense or another they challenge the notion - central to Heller's outlook - that species 'universality' must be regarded as the basis for rational social and political conduct. Some argue for a different basis of universality; others for 'difference', 'otherness' or 'alterity' as basic categories for understanding human existence. 11 Whether one finds sympathy with any of these positions is a secondary matter when set alongside the issue of whether such views should be permitted expression in the public realm at all. 21 Of course, it might be argued that Heller wishes to exclude them for the 'best' of reasons: to promote the autonomy and liberty of every individual within society. Yet no matter how noble the goal, we can surely without further discussion query the libertarian credentials of a model of emancipation that denies the ecologist, the feminist or the nationalist, among the many others whose view of the world does not accord with her Enlightenment universalism, the opportunity of advancing their views in public. It might also make us doubt the depth of Heller's commitment to those radical social movements that she repeatedly identifies as the agent of social transformation. After all, feminism and environmentalism were (and are) amongst the most powerful and effective of the

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social movements to have emerged out of the post-1968 realignment. To imply, albeit indirectly, that the views of such groups- or even those of just certain individuals within them - might prove to be an obstacle to the realisation of autonomy in a post-revolutionary 'radical democracy' is ironic. 2 3 On this point it is difficult not to agree with Vajda and conclude that what is on offer is a peculiarly intolerant form of 'tolerance' at the heart of this model of communal deliberation. 24 Problems arising out of Heller's commitment to upholding the rationality or legitimacy of certain values (universalist) against certain others (non-universalist) do not end with the acceptability or otherwise of the criterion by which valid positions are included and excluded. A further difficulty is presented by the demand that 'true values' support and sustain those conditions Heller regards as essential for the autonomy of the individual. Among such conditions are, as we saw above, ensuring that individuals have 'equal power', which means in effect an equal right (albeit with a corresponding duty) to dispose of the productive wealth and resources of society. Just on the basis of this condition whose achievement would, as Heller is still happy to admit, require a 'total social revolution', it is difficult to see how even the value interpretations Heller considers 'true' could be allowed potentially to determine the outcome of public deliberations. 25 'Individualism', for example, can be regarded as prima facie a true value on Heller's terms.'" Individualists regard 'value ideals', such as justice, equality and freedom, as universally valid, that is, as applying to humanity as such. They are thus firmly inside the camp of those struggling for the hegemony of a universalist account of human happiness. No individualist would be prevented from entering the public discourse on the determination of policy; indeed, he or she would have a 'duty' to take part in 'value discussion' and make his or her voice heard as part of the ongoing process of preference formation. There are, however, few individualists who would regard it as prerequisite for the enjoyment of autonomy that each person be given 'equal power' over social wealth: and of course there are many who would be hostile to the idea that we can discuss 'social wealth' at all, seeing it as, to invoke Hayek, a 'mirage' induced by collectivist do-gooders to legitimate meddling in people's affairs. 27 Without going any further in the discussion, it is not difficult to discern that there is a fundamental problem with Heller's account of a radical democracy. Heller wants democracy to be 'radical', by which she means that little if anything must be allowed to impede the ability of the community to run its own affairs: but she also wants the members of the community to determine for themselves how and on what terms those affairs are managed. Assuming she really is committed to the latter, i.e. to collective decisionmaking, then it has to be assumed that the members of the community might, for whatever reason, decide in favour of some other arrangements, permitting, for example, wage labour or, say, limited private ownership of the means of production. Before it is objected that such arrangements

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militate against the values Heller identifies as having a place in her 'rational utopia', what should be remembered is that we are here discussing values which by her own criteria are 'true', meaning that they are values it would be legitimate for a member of the community to appeal to, attract support for, and seek to realise. These are values that should be tolerated within a public-political setting, unlike the call for slavery, for example, which would not. What should also be remembered is that she has now provided in effect an ontological basis for value pluralism. It would thus entirely defeat the logic of her own carefully constructed argument to say that in the future everyone's interpretation of universal values will be the same, i.e. socialist. If they were. then permanent institutionalised 'value discussion' of the sort Heller describes would surely be unnecessary, and the community could get on with 'the administration of things', albeit on a democratic, participatory basis. In short, Heller would merely be endorsing the Marxian expectation that with the abolition of classes and the private ownership of the means of production the division between particular and universal, individual and species would be overcome. Yet the objection might also be made in her defence that Heller is describing a scenario in which there will inevitably be a great variety of communities reflecting the different values and value interpretations that people hold. It might therefore be expected that individualists would choose to live in a different way to, say, anarcho-communists or conservatives. Individualists would live amongst individualists; conservatives among conservatives, with each community co-existing in a spirit of mutual respect and tolerance. Why therefore would the principle of autonomy necessarily conflict with the principle of radical democracy? If communities could decide for themselves the model of existence they wished to emulate. would this not itself constitute a form of collective autonomy? It is true that at certain moments the vision outlined in Radical Philosophy can sound much like this, which is to say much like Nozick's account of the 'utopia of utopias' (to which we shall be returning) in which each individual is encouraged to find or construct a community of his or her choosing. 2 " Consider, for example, this passage from towards the end of the work: For us radical utopia involves a plurality of forms of life. Hence we are not positing a single homogeneous community. but rather a multitude of differing communities which vary amongst each other in terms of their systems of needs and affinity to the corresponding values. In this context. 'chosen community' means every person can freely choose to which community they want to belong and to which they do not. In other words. they can select values with a particular affinity to particular systems of needs which they promise to observe in their own form of life. (RP 180)

There are strong reasons, however, for thinking that any resemblance between this schema and that presented by Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia is a superficial one, at least as far as the argument advanced in Radical

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Philosophy is concerned. To compare her directly with Nozick on this point, Heller's view is that the ability (or, perhaps more accurately, the propensity) to choose values does not itself constitute autonomy. Rather, autonomy is the product of what might reasonably be termed 'empowerment' in the sense of being in control of the conditions of one's own existence. The capacity to choose values is, on the other hand, merely an aspect of what it means to be human; it is part of our Being or essence qua members of humanity. By contrast, Nozick follows Kant in thinking in relational rather than absolute categories, which is to say that he is concerned that individuals do not become 'mere means' for others. Not being a mere means for others is equivalent to enjoying a degree of choice over my own actions and thus a degree of selfdetermination, particularly as regards matters to do with how I will live. Thus, while Nozick is, following Hobbes, happy to describe the individual able to exercise choices as in essence autonomous, Heller's vision insists that choice be exercised over every aspect of an individual's existence, a much more radical suggestion. 2' It is for this reason that she is so critical of bourgeois society, which, while legitimating itself by reference to choice qua 'social contract', prevents citizens from having any real influence on the decision-making process. 'Choice' is a mere consumerist slogan rather than the very substance of everyday life, which she clearly believes it should be. To return to the original point, it would make little sense to interpret Heller's enthusiasm for plural forms of life as implying that she would be content for people to decide in favour of surrendering their own autonomy as, on her terms, they would be doing if they decided to abolish 'equal power' in favour of the sort of economic arrangements favoured by liberal individualists. This would be to get the relationship between autonomy and democracy back to front. Autonomy is not for Heller a means for ensuring democracy; rather, democracy is a means for ensuring the realisation of autonomy, and it finds its justification in the extent to which that autonomy is developed and enhanced for every member of society. The pluralism Heller has in mind is thus what might accurately be termed 'socialist pluralism'. 3" Not for her the Nozickian free for all in which anyone may pursue any vision of commodious living as long as he or she does not infringe the (Lockean) rights of anyone else. Her vision is one of economic, social and political equals coming together for the purpose of social reproduction but otherwise remaining as members of communities with their own identities, needs and traditions. The difficulty persists that the sort of values needed to sustain the vision outlined by Heller are not the same as those permitted at the level of 'value discussion'. The values needed to sustain what is clearly a socialist form of society (though, interestingly, it is never described in such terms) are socialist values, whereas within 'value discussion' a much wider discourse is possible, including discourse on the merit or value of socialism itself. Clearly, such an arrangement lacks viability. Either the defenders of autonomy will be forced to curb an ongoing discourse the parameters of which include the

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very institutions and practices the discourse is designed to promote, or people must be allowed to experiment with models of social living which may, on Heller's terms, diminish or minimise individual autonomy. As is clear from the discussion above, Heller in Radical Philosophy attempts the difficult, perhaps impossible, trick of accommodating two quite separates demands which arise out of her desire to maintain the radical thrust of Marx's critique of capitalism, but without as it were collapsing the individual into the 'species' for the purpose of describing an emancipated society. The problem is that this creates a tension between the demand to give expression to the individual's sense of non-identity through the institutionalisation of an ongoing value discussion, and the demand to protect him or her from those forces or practices (such as wage labour) she thinks will undermine his or her capacity to function as an autonomous individual. Of course, Heller is not the first to grapple with the difficulty of reconciling these ends. Indeed, one might hazard the generalisation that behind the terms in which this debate is couched lies one of the key problematics underlying modern political thought in general, namely how individuals equipped with ends and values of their own can be reconciled to, and participate effectively in, collective life. As was implied in remarks made earlier, Radical Philosophy can be seen as the moment Heller discovers 'the political' in the sense that with the surrendering of the project to (re)construct the unity of subject and object the expression of non-identity becomes inevitable in one form or another. For the present, however, it is a deeply idiosyncratic view of the political that Heller is offering. It is, after all, one in which all 'interests' and particularistic demands have been banished; where individuals are asked to eradicate from their thoughts and actions everything that manifests their own selfish ends as opposed to the ends of the community; and where much that constitutes 'political' action as that term has been understood from Aristotle onwards has been displaced in the course of the ethical revolution Heller describes. It is a view of the political in which fundamental antagonism or domination has disappeared, and thus where 'politics' is purified of the sulphurous influence of self-interest, partiality, rhetoric, guile, and self-aggrandisement. 11 This is a view of the political that, like Rousseau's, has one foot in Athens and the other in Sparta, which is to say that it is at times difficult to discern whether a 'civic religion' (for which read 'socialist pluralism') is needed to sustain liberty, or whether liberty (as the contest of values) is needed to sustain a civic religion. Notwithstanding the difficulty in sustaining the analytical model that informs her view at this point, Radical Philosophy marks an important moment in the development of Heller's political thought. It clearly shows that her ambition in relegating Marx to a bit part in the development of a rational utopia was in essence to safeguard rather than to forsake the radicalism underpinning his analysis of contemporary society. In Heller's view the recognition of value plurality and of the impossibility of abundance, and

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thus of the necessity for elaborating political institutions together with an account of the obligations and duties owed by citizens to each other is the minimum needed to prevent Marx's broader vision sinking into irrelevance. What this in part shows is of course that Heller's own account of modernity was changing in ways quite distinct from the expectations held by Marx. Production would not resolve 'the political question'; modernisation would not erase the differences between individuals, but rather make them constitutive of individuals; the institutionalisation of liberties and procedures was not a threat to autonomy, but the safeguard of them. Merely enumerating some of the myriad ways in which Heller's analysis had changed gives an indication of the enormous distance Heller had travelled theoretically in a relatively short space of time. The moment of a final 'break' from Marx and the 'grand narrative' was evidently not far off. Notes 1 The publication details for the English-language version of Radical Philosophy do not reflect the fact that the text was written during her Budapest School period. According to Heller she wrote it in 1972-73. i.e. 'directly after The Theory of Need in Marx'. See Tormey, 'Interviews' I. p. 41. Owing to the difficulties she faced at that time the work did not appear at all in Hungarian, being first published in German as Philosophie des Lin ken Radikalismus in 19 78 and thereafter in French. Italian. Portuguese and Swedish before finally appearing in English in 1984. 2 Vajda, 'Lover of philosophy', p. 22. 3 See in particular Jiirgen Habermas. Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by Thomas McCarthy (London. Heinemann, 1979) and Jiirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1. Reason and the Rationalization of Society, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston. Beacon. 1984). 4 See The Theory of Need in Marx, p. 124. 5 I'm following Terry Eagleton's account of a realist ethical theory in his Ideology: An Introduction (London. Verso, 1991). 6 Heller describes Aristotle as creating 'a substantive value ethic', which is why I have modified the term for use here to describe values that remain from era to era substantively valid. See Radical Philosophy. p. 56. 7 The latter examples are mine. 8 Thus, as Nanette Funk points out, 'a "true value" is not true in any common sense in which rejection of a truth constitutes ignorance'. So much will be clear to readers who have followed the argument from earlier chapters. See Funk's review of Radical Philosophy in Philosophical Review, 96:3 (198 7), p. 463. 9 Aristotle, Politics, revised edition translated by T. A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth, Penguin. 1981). s. I (iv). 10 The use of the term 'ideologies' to illustrate the point is, it should be noted, contentious in this context. because on Heller's definition an ideology puts forward as universal ideas and values that serve merely particular or class interests. See Radical Philosophy. p. 125 and in particular the contemporaneous article: Agnes Heller. 'Is radical philosophy possible?, Social Praxis, 5:1-2 (1978), pp. 7-8. No ideology could therefore be considered as offering a 'true' interpretation of value

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ideals, because by definition such ideals are 'universal'. Yet at Radical Philosophy p. 100, for example, she states that both 'individualism' and 'collectivism' can be considered as valid interpretations. i.e. as 'true'. Indeed, even Nietzsche can, according to Heller, be regarded as offering a valid interpretation of value ideals. Given that what we ordinarily term ideologies do not have to be 'ideological' in Heller's terms, her stance should not necessarily be regarded as implying that. for example. liberals should be prevented from putting their views forward in value discussion. In reading the matter in these terms I am aware that I am putting a more generous slant on the matter than a strict reading of the text may warrant, i.e. I am implying that Heller has a broad rather than a narrow view of 'true values' and thus of what it is permitted to express in public discourse. In order not to antagonise the matter I use the 'system of thought' to refer to (as it were) ideologies that are not necessarily 'ideological' in the sense used by Heller. See in particular Isaiah Berlin. Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press. 1969). The notion of 'value pluralism' and the incommensurability of ideas of the good is one that underpins all the essays collected in the book; but it is in 'Two concepts of liberty' that the political ramifications of denying such plurality are most fully explored. The critique of bourgeois value rationality can be found in Radical Philosophy at pp. 91-3. As Heller notes in the discussion of value orientation categories. the tendency of bourgeois thought is to attempt to extract the good from the useful. so that everything that is useful or that 'works' is good, whereas that which involves risk to the efficacy of systemic reproduction is 'bad'. On Heller's terms such a move is analytically untenable, because one value category (the useful) cannot be derived from another (the good). The allusion to Habermas's analysis of capitalist systems is mine rather than Heller's; but it seems too obvious to ignore, despite her rarely citing the relevant works. See in particular Jiirgen Habermas. Legitimation Crisis. translated by Thomas McCarthy (London. Heinemann. 1975), Part III 'On the logic of legitimation problems'. An explicit rejection of the Marxian model of the identical subject/object is given on p. 169 of Radical Philosophy. On this point see also the comments Richard Wolin makes on p. 201 of his review of the work. His suggestion is that in problematising the relationship between subject and object Heller leaves the Marxism at least of the early Marx behind in favour of a more overtly Kantian outlook in which autonomy is theorised as difference not identity: Richard Wolin. 'Review of Agnes Heller, Radical Philosophy', New German Critique, no. 38 (1986). The terms 'symmetric reciprocity' and 'asymmetric reciprocity' would appear to come from Karl Polanyi, though his use differs from that of Heller. See Karl Polanyi. The Great Transformation (Boston, Mass. Beacon Press. 1957). pp. 47-9 . See Aristotle. Politics. s. III (v), where he discusses the desirability of allowing 'workers' (i.e. those dependent for their livelihood on others) to be citizens. See Bill Brugger, Republican Theory in Political Thought: Virtuous or Virtual? (London. Macmillan, 1999) for an overview of modern republican thinking on this matter. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract, translated by Maurice Cranston (Harmondsworth, Penguin. [1762) 1968), Book I. No reference is given by Heller for the quote from Ape!.

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19 My hesitancy on this point reflects the lack of any extended treatment of this matter within the text. 20 G. W. F. Hegel. The Philosophy of History, translated by J. Sibree (New York. Dover, [1830]1956). Part IV. s. III. 21 Seyla Benhabib. we can note. refers directly to this potential difficulty raised by Heller's strong universalism in her review of two of Heller's works that immediately follow Radical Philosophy. See Seyla Benhabib. 'Review of Agnes Heller's On Instincts and A Theory of Feelings' , Telos, no. 44 (Summer 1980), pp. 211-21. 22 The point should not be lost that Heller's remarks concerning the public deliberation of values and value interpretations by no means extend to their expression outside the public realm. In this sense I would not want to claim that Heller is in favour here of banning objectionable. 'particularistic' views altogether: she only maintains that such views should not be allowed to influence public-political deliberation. To paraphrase her own example, I am perfectly entitled to hold that some people are 'born slaves', but I am not entitled to argue that slavery should be reintroduced, even if it is for the 'benefit' of the community. 23 We can note at this point that Heller has always displayed a deep ambivalence about whether feminism and environmentalism should be regarded as 'radical' and 'progressive' at all. The problem with both movements is. in her view. their hostility to universal emancipation and thus their attachment to particularistic. 'ideological' demands serving the needs and interests of certain groups, not humanity as a whole. On this point. see for example. 'Is radical philosophy possible?' which reiterates some of the main arguments or Radical Philosophy, pp. 8-9. 24 Vajda notes that '[t]here is no possibility of concealing the fact that within this conception of philosophy there is no room for an actual tolerance either [sic]. At the end it turns out ... that among the contradictory ideas there is only one which is true': 'Lover of philosophy'. p. 25. 25 As Heller notes. '[o]nly total social revolution itself can mediate between what is and what ought to be. for concrete deeds ... dissolve in practice the vicious circle here and now': Radical Philosophy, p. 186. 26 'Individualism', to be clear, is the example Heller herself uses to illustrate the broad stratum of possible, that is permissiable, value interpretations. See her comments in Radical Philosophy. p. 100. 2 7 Hayek goes as far as claiming that placing the word 'social' before any concept corrupts the original meaning of the term. thereby directly contradicting Heller's claim about the possibility of reconciling different interpretations of universal values. See F. A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, edited by W. W. Bartley III (London. Routledge, 1988). in particular Chapter 7. 'Our poisoned language', in which Hayek rails against the 'weasel word "social"'. 28 The goal of a 'utopia of utopias' can be seen as the underlying ideal behind the analysis presented by Robert Nozick in his Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford and New York. Basil Blackwell, 19 74). See in particular the discussion in Part III. 'Utopia'. 29 Though he never puts it in such terms, it is apparent from, for example, the notorious marriage bureau example, that Nozick shares with Hobbes the view that 'the will cannot be coerced'. See Anarchy. pp. 262-4.

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30 Richard Bernstein suggest the term 'rational pluralism' for the position advanced by Heller. This seems to me to underplay the substantively socialist manner in which 'rationality' is to be defined at this point in her work. See Richard Bernstein, 'Agnes Heller: Philosophy, rational utopia and praxis'. Thesis Eleven, no. 16 (1987). p. 30. 31 Paul Hollander argues in his review of Radical Philosophy that '[t]his is an outlook that refuses to be reconciled with the world as it is, as it has always been. and is likely to remain, namely one of disharmony, fragmentation, imperfection, conflicting values. clashing interests. limited gratifications and scarcities of all kinds (least of which are material)': Paul Hollander, 'Review of Agnes Heller. Radical Philosophy', Partisan Review, 54:4 (1987) p. 622. Heller's riposte would undoubtedly be that part of the function of radical critique is to force us to rethink the 'given' Hollander describes. The irony is, therefore, that in submitting to a more 'realistic' appreciation of the possibilities afforded by social transformation (when compared with earlier work), she is being accused in effect of lack of realism.

4

Socialism, democracy, modernity after the end of 'history'

The period immediately following the completion of Radical Philosophy proved to be a highly productive one for Heller despite the continuing upheavals she, her family and her colleagues in the Budapest School were forced to endure until finally finding their feet in the unfamiliar though welcoming setting of Melbourne, Australia. In the ten years that followed the Philosophers' Trial she produced a major trilogy of works (which Heller describes as a 'theory of anthropology' (TH 75)). Dictatorship over Needs, examining the nature of 'actually existing socialism' written with Feher and Markus, and a great many papers and articles dealing with diverse topics and themes. 1 Nonetheless, it is not too difficult to discern a core problematic running through many of these works which might be summarised in terms of exploring the possibilities for a 'Post-Marxist' or left radical critique after the end of the Marxian 'grand narrative'. Her faith in the redeeming qualities of Marxism as an explanatory and unifying ideology now finally dissipated. necessitating the development of a new theoretical and philosophical paradigm. Heller's tremendous productivity at this time was in this sense a foreseeable response of a thinker who feels that what was once, as it were, 'solid' had 'melted into air'. It should of course be added that now, having moved to Australia, she had far more opportunities for writing and publishing her work, in particular the work left over from the period of ostracism towards the end of her career in Hungary. In effect, Heller had to dredge back through the various elements that composed her former 'position' testing and retesting ideas that seemed fixed and certain; rejecting those found wanting and developing new positions and 'foundations'- if of an 'antifoundational' or 'postmodern' (as she was to later come to term it) kind - where none were left standing. It was therefore an exciting period, a period of intellectual innovation, of trial and experiment, and above all of engagement in debates they had only recently been prevented from participating in. It was also one at the end of which Heller would evidently feel that she had the secured the basis for a new politics.

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There were other changes too, and in particular a highly productive working relationship with her partner Ferenc Feher. Together they wrote a large number of pieces concerning, in particular the fate of the Soviet Bloc and the politics of. to borrow Alec Nove's phrase, 'feasible socialism'. 2 This was a period in which some of the more pious expectations that Heller had held in her humanist phase were made to give to way to considerations of a 'concrete', 'realistic' nature. Along with the 'discovery' of politics, therefore, came an appreciation of the complexity of organising society along lines that recognised the distinctiveness of the subject and the multifarious, sometimes capricious, nature of his or her needs and wants. The 'subject' to which Heller addressed her theory was no longer. after all, 'species man', but rather the modern individual, who on Heller's own analysis could be expected to be independently minded, unconstrained and socially mobile. This mirrored a major realignment of her politics, which were now formally 'left radical' , 'socialist' or, on occasion, 'neo-Marxist', but certainly not 'Marxist' - not even Marxist of a 'humanist' variety.' It was not, it should be added, that by ceasing to be Marxist Heller ceased to be politically radical; it was rather that on her terms in order to be politically radical one had to give up being 'Marxist' as that term now had to be understood. The 'Marxism' of the 'Marxists' was now to be regarded as an eschatological quasi-faith in which praxis gives way to process and the belief in the 'inevitable' victory of communism. As Heller was now to argue, 'History' as process was dead, and so therefore was the moment of redemption and reunification. The task that lay ahead was thus the filling out of the sketch of the political contained in Radical Philosophy in response to her rapidly evolving views on the nature of the modern. The 'break': from the philosophy of history to A Theory of History Before finally leaving Hungary in the autumn of 19 77 Heller had already completed the draft of a 'trilogy' composed of On Instincts, A Theory of Feelings and A Theory of History (TH 75).' For reasons that should by now be clear, none of these works were published in Hungary. Indeed, it was not until1982 that the last of the volumes appeared, the delay being at least partly caused by Heller's determination to rewrite the work in English for her new Anglophone audience. Despite the 'trilogy' epithet referred to above, it is obvious that between the first two volumes and A Theory of History Heller's outlook had undergone a significant shift which the 'trilogy' reference may disguise. We can add that it would now be more accurate to follow Heller's more recent evaluation of the last of these works as the first volume of a trilogy examining the nature of historical consciousness and modernity, the other two volumes of which are: A Philosophy of History in Fragments (199 3) and A Theory of Modernity (1999 ). ' On Instincts and A Theory of Emotion are. by contrast, works that still recall Heller's earlier project of developing a humanist paradigm. They are both. that is, concerned with the defetishisation of

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theories of the human subject, or, more familiarly, of 'human nature', the aim being to demonstrate that the only 'necessity' governing human action is that which we create for ourselves in the form of moral commands or ethical norms of conduct. All other versions of necessity are thus regarded by Heller as 'ideological', in that they seek to suggest that only certain forms of society are rational from the point of view of our nature or needs. In this sense Heller's 'radical anthropology' can be seen as an attempt to apply the method and formula developed in Marx's earlier work to certain prominent sociological and psychological theories of subjectivity. These works also show Heller's affinity with the work of other members of the Budapest School, most notably that of Gyorgy Markus who was similarly interested in the idea of developing a Marxian anthropology." With A Theory of History, however, not only do we see the object of critique change, but also the theoretical and philosophical presuppositions which Heller will work with as Kant's influence comes to have greater sway. Nevertheless, the significance of the argument presented in the first two-thirds of A Theory of History lies less in what is being said, than in who is doing the saying. It is only towards the end of the book. and in particular in the final Part ('Introduction to a theory of history') that Heller develops her own account of the historical process, modernity and socialism. As for the earlier parts, in which philosophies of history are examined and their methodological flaws exposed, the main arguments follow the line of critique hinted at in earlier work, in particular 'Towards a Marxist theory of value' .7 What now becomes evident is the degree to which Heller's unease about the methodological underpinnings of Marx's account of historical materialism will bring her into proximity with the line developed over the twentieth century by post-Kantian anti-historicists, particularly Heidegger, Popper. Arendt, and Berlin, and, most recently, by postmodernists, most notably Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard. A brief resume of the first two parts of the A Theory of History will therefore demonstrate the degree to which this mistrust had germinated into outright hostility to the Marxian understanding of social development." A philosophy of history. according to Heller, is an attempt to explain the historical process. It meets the need, that is, for understanding where we have come from, where we are and where we are going as a discrete civilisation, but more pertinently as a species. as 'universal humanity' (TH 218). It answers the need for a solution to the 'riddle of history', to history's 'sense' or 'direction'. As such, philosophies of history are products of modernity, and more specifically of the Enlightenment when 'Man' began to reflect upon himself as a universal subject ('world-historical consciousness'). A philosophy of history proceeds by positing some element. activity or aspect of human existence as determining all other aspects of social life (see TH Chapter 16). It is therefore intrinsic to such philosophies that they claim to have discovered a 'master narrative' or point of determination from which all other facets of human life flow. It does not matter for the purposes of delineating the b