May 20, 2018 - U.S. Army Manual for the Medical Department to describe Russian ...... many more women from the lower gentry and middle classes ...... Burnham wrote Jane Delano and explained after Helen Scott Hay's resignation âwe felt ...... Despite mounting pressure from Americans in Russia, U.S-based Red Cross.
American Humanitarian Volunteerism in Russia’s Military 1914-1917
by Joshua E. Segal
B.A. in History, May 1990, Emory University B.A. in Political Science, May 1990, Emory University M.A. in History, May 1990, Emory University
A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
May 20, 2018
Dissertation directed by Professor Muriel Atkin Professor of History
The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Joshua E. Segal has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of January 31, 2018. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.
American Humanitarian Volunteerism in Russia’s Military 1914-1917
Joshua E. Segal
Dissertation Research Committee: Professor Muriel Atkin, Professor of History, Dissertation Director Professor Hugh Agnew, Professor of History, Committee Member Professor Thomas Long, Professor of History, Committee Member
ii
© Copyright 2018 by Joshua E. Segal All rights reserved
iii
Dedication
This dissertation is dedicated my father, Jerome G. Segal, an eternal scholar, you live in our hearts forever.
iv
Acknowledgements
This dissertation is the end of a long journey. The project transcended the change of a millennium, two careers, and had to be halted temporarily as the world changed around me. Throughout it all, my advisor, Professor Muriel Atkin, stood by my vision and believed in my determination. For that and more than two decades of friendship and support, I am eternally grateful. I can write with absolute certainty that the research, analysis, and perspective contained herein benefited tremendously from the experiences I acquired during the intervening period in numerous combat zones and in the midst of several humanitarian disasters. Much of this document was written under unconventional circumstances in myriad locations. It started when I was still a civilian foreign policy professional and concluded as I near retirement as a military officer. During this personal transition, American-Russian relations deteriorated from a place of great hope to the lowest point since the Cold War. One can only pray that these two great nations once again focus on their common goals versus destructive competition. The most important force in carrying me through the past decade has been my wife and kids. Their sacrifice and support has been essential to this endeavor. They remain my single greatest inspiration. I have also been fortunate to receive support and from a number of other scholars including most prominently Professor Norman Saul and Luba Ginzburg. Dr. Ginzburg’s guidance and collaboration were invaluable to my research and saved me countless days of hunting for sources and information. Similarly, I deeply appreciate the assistance of Professor Marian Moser Jones, who shares my dedication to revealing the lost story for these humanitarian volunteers. She continues to v
serve as an irreplaceable source of knowledge and perspective. I am also grateful for selfless support of Committee members Professors Hugh Agnew and Thomas Long who provided guidance and feedback, often on their own time under extremely tight deadlines. I am thankful for the perspective of Professor Dane Kennedy who provided invaluable comments that greatly enhanced the value of my final product.. Much of this research would not have been possible without the assistance of Ann Viall who graciously shared private letters and diaries of Philip Newton. George Aghjayan provided equally enthusiastic support related to Floyd Smith. Marianne Hansen Curator/Academic Liaison for Rare Books and Manuscripts at Bryn Mawr College was also of great assistance in providing materials related to Clara Carey Case. I am also thank you for the encouragement guidance and feedback provided by fellow historians Professors Laurie Stoff, Ben Whisenhunt, and Matthew Miller. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not mention the support from my civilian leadership. Finalizing my research and writing would not have been possible without the encouragement and understanding of Dr. Mark A. Livingston and Shannon Lorimer.
vi
Table of Contents
Dedication...........................................................................................................................iv Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... v Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: The American Red Cross and the Challenge of Neutrality in Russia: The Decision to Deploy.................................................................................................... 43 Chapter 2: Americans Join the Russian Persia Expeditionary Force ………………… 135 Chapter 3: The Battle for the Home Front in Russia and the United States. Rivals Emerge................................................................... ............................................. 197 Chapter 4: Ambulances for Russia…………………..................................................... 233 Conclusion…………………………………..………………………………………… 296 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………….…….. 303
vii
Introduction
In the wave of patriotism following the end of the First World War, Americans who served in the Allied forces before United States entry into the war attained almost legendary stature. Edwin Morse wrote in his 1918 history of American volunteers during the Great War that: NO historian of the future will be able to ignore the important part which that small but heroic band, the Vanguard of American Volunteers, played in the great war to make the world safe for democracy. For it was they who were the voluntary leaders along the path which the people and the government of the United States, after more than two years and a half of hesitation, were to follow; and it was they who, by the inspiring example of their self-sacrificing devotion to the cause of the Allies, were largely instrumental in creating and in crystallizing public opinion among their own countrymen in favor of the entrance of the United States into the war.1 Exploits of the American Field Service (AFS) ambulance drivers and the several hundred members of the Lafayette Escadrille and Flying Corps in France are well known among military historians. Ross Collins, in his examination of the propaganda value of American volunteers in France, writes: Of the estimated 3,600 volunteers, the majority served around Verdun. Most came from the upper classes, usually from prestigious universities. They served in three principal roles: as ambulance drivers behind or close to the front, as soldiers for the Foreign Legion at the front, and as aviators flying above the front. Of about 128 in combat roles, 90 served in the Foreign Legion—and only about 38 as
1
Edwin Morse, The Vanguard of American Volunteers in the Fighting Lines and in Humanitarian Service: August 1914-April 1917 (New York : C. Scribner's Sons, 1918), 3. 1
aviators in the Escadrille Américaine. The fame of these volunteers likely played a propaganda role in the United States.2 The majority of these volunteers served in the AFS. The group was inaugurated by the American Colony in Paris in the summer of 1914 and supported operations on the frontlines in France and Greece. AFS volunteers “ participated in every major French battle, and carried munitions, supplies, and more than 500,000 wounded soldiers from both sides of the war. By the end of the war, 2,500 men had served in the American Field Service with the French Armies.”3 While the volunteers in the AFS and French aviation are famous, less widely known is the fact that many thousands of other Americans served in both humanitarian and military roles on the Western front prior to U.S. entry into the war. Michael Neiberg notes that: The Lusitania sinking led to a marked increase in both money and volunteers going to France to help the Allied cause. More than two thousand local relief committees across the United States contributed $45 million in cash and $60 million in supplies to French hospitals in the ensuing weeks. By the summer of 1915, at least forty-five thousand Americans were serving in Allied hospitals or in the Allied armies themselves.4 Serving almost exclusively in France, these Americans included almost 533 Harvard graduates, three of the first four hundred Rhodes scholar recipients, and other
Ross F. Collins, “Myth as Propaganda in World War I: American Volunteers, Victor Chapman, and French Journalism,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 92, no. 3 (2015), 648. 3 AFS-USA, “The AFS Story,” https://www.afsusa.org/host-family/communitycollege/guidance/the-afs-story/. 4 Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 110-111. 2 2
representatives of elite U.S. universities.5 Almost forty Americans joined the French Foreign Legion, and another 300 flocked to the British Royal Flying Corps. Many thousands more served in British and Commonwealth armies.6 Despite Morse’s belief that the contributions of American volunteers should not be ignored, the work of American volunteers on the Eastern front was completely forgotten, lost in the aftermath of Russia’s inglorious departure from the conflict and overshadowed by the Revolution and subsequent civil war. In total, approximately fifty volunteers served with Russian forces during the entire period of American neutrality. 7 Histories of American-Russian relations and World War One are devoid of almost any mention of efforts by the American colony in Petrograd, the U.S. Red Cross, and other private citizens to alleviate Russian suffering. This dissertation recovers their story and puts it in its historical context, thus filling the gap in the overall story of American involvement in Russia during the period of U.S. official neutrality. It also provides insight into the perspectives of the volunteers themselves and the motivations of their sponsors back in the United States. Like many aspects of U.S.-Russian relations, the full story is more complicated than that of its Western-front counterparts. American volunteers and humanitarian aid to Russia were intertwined intrinsically with the desires of U.S. policymakers and business 5
Morse, 7 and Neiberg, 111. Also see Arlen Hansen, Gentlemen Volunteer: The Story of American Ambulance Drivers in the Great War(New York: Arcade, 1996). 6 . By some accounts almost 30,000 served in the British armed forces during the course of the war. Rose, 5. 7 This total does not include American Red Cross and YMCA volunteers supporting Central Powers prisoners. 3
interests for a renewed bilateral commercial treaty, and hopes of filling the void left by Germany’s removal as Russia’s largest trading partner. Humanitarian aid became a visible means of earning Russian trust and promoting bilateral goodwill. Noted Red Cross scholar Julia Irwin writes, “In these formative years of American global power providing material relief and assistance overseas became a principal way for Americans to interact with the wider world and provide a living demonstration of the country’s new international identity.”8 The American Red Cross was the government’s preferred mechanism for much of this informal foreign policy. Irwin explains that during this timeframe “foreign relief functioned as a facet of U.S. foreign relations,” and the “organization’s activities are central to the histories of both U.S. humanitarianism and U.S. foreign policy, and as such merit further consideration from both fields.”9 This dissertation answers that call, examining American Red Cross and privately sponsored volunteers and relief efforts in war-torn Russia before and immediately after U.S. entry into the First World War. From 1914-1916 American relations with Russia were almost singularly focused on trade, and a major vehicle for bolstering that relationship was the privately-funded activities of the American Red Cross and other humanitarian volunteers. This dissertation sheds light on this relationship opening the door to a fuller understanding of the underpinnings of U.SRussian alliance during the war and revolution.
Julia F. Irwin, Making the World Safe; The American Red Cross and A Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) and Marian Moser-Jones, The American Red Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2013), 3. 9 Ibid., 4. 4 8
The Allure of Russian-American Trade In May 1916, the U.S. business community greeted a new journal entitled Russia: A Journal of Russian-American Trade with a masthead boldly encapsulating the prevailing optimism of the time: “Russia-America’s Greatest Export Opportunity!”10 Its editors explain: THE largest single buying population in the world — equal to that of Britain, France, Germany, and Austria- Hungary combined, is contained within the great un broken [sic] territory of the Russian Empire — 180,000,000 of people, who are increasing in number at the rate of 3,000,000 each year. This whole vast population is stirred by a new spirit of efficiency, and by a new desire for the conveniences, and for the comforts of modern civilization. It is a new Russia which now turns to America as the natural supplier of many of the manufactured goods the Empire urgently requires to-day. America alone of all the nations, and herself the greatest manufacturing nation of them all, remains unhampered. America is able, if her business men so will, not only to supply a very large proportion of Russia's present needs in many lines of manufacture, but to build up a Russian trade that may increase steadily for decades, and that will prove both directly and in its value as a steadier of business, of the highest benefit to the prosperity of manufacturing and of labor in the United States.11 American business interests hoped to exploit the gap left by the disruption of commercial relations between Russia and Germany, her largest trading partner. Before the war, Russia's trade with Germany constituted 47 percent, and by some estimates as high as 52 percent of its total foreign business by value.12 The war also disrupted U.S-Russian trade relations. In December 1914, the Petrograd embassy noted most affected U.S. exports were: cotton, cottonseed oil, lathes and other machine tools, hardware, automobiles, 10
Russia: A Journal of Russian-American Trade 1, no. 1 (May 1916). Ibid. 12 Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War; A Social and Economic History (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2005), 5 and “Russia’s Expanding Foreign Trade,” Russia: A Journal of Russian-American Trade 1, no. 6 (October 1916), 14. 5 11
agricultural implements, petroleum jelly, typewriters, and carbon paper. Fighting in Europe eliminated traditional trade networks where American merchants used German middlemen to move their exports to Russia to avoid costly duties. Before the war, by one contemporary estimate, the U.S closely trailed behind Germany as Russia’s leading source of imports.13 A Russian study in 1910 estimated 36.8 percent of Russian imports of agricultural machinery came from the U.S., and 60 percent of all American exports of farming implements to Germany were re-exported mostly to Russia. In fact, overall Russia accounted for 31.5 percent of all U.S. exports of agricultural machinery during that same period.14 The following table from a contemporary source compares U.S. and German exports to Russia before the conflict:
Table from the article 1916 “Russia’s Expanding Foreign Trade” in Russia: A Journal of Russian American Trade.15 American commercial representatives took up residence in Russia in record numbers. Examples included bankers, insurance representatives, and of course railwaymen. This latter group hoped to expand their penetration into the expanding Russian railroad market. Russian railways increased track distances by a third between 13 14 15
Saul, 6-7. Ibid., 7. “Russia’s Expanding Foreign Trade,” 14. 6
1900 and 1913. However, its rolling stock was aging and wearing out. Putting aside military considerations, in 1913 three-fifths of all Russian freight was transported over the rails.16 Before the war, Germany dominated the Russian automotive market. Given Russia’s almost complete lack of domestic automobile manufacturing and a predictable increase in wartime demand, the U.S., hoped, despite its physical distance, to increase its market share to fill the more than seven million dollar void left by Germany’s departure. Ford and other manufacturers sent agents to promote their products to Russian customers. These commercial representatives joined other businessmen hoping to cash in on the perceived Russian bonanza in the American colonies in Petrograd and Moscow. Volunteerism and Humanitarianism in Russia Unlike similar efforts in the West, American humanitarian aid to Russia did not immediately stir the national imagination. Ivy League graduates did not flock to the Galician front like their AFS counterparts in the West. The earliest efforts were part of a broader European initiative, evolving into more localized individual and organizational support. Before American entry into the First World War, humanitarian assistance to Russia never received official American governmental financing but was the topic of deliberations at the most senior levels due to its potential impact on trade relations.17 After U.S. entry in 1917, Washington utilized the American Red Cross, as its official
16
Gatrell, 5. See for example Baker to Pratt, August 28, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, Group 1, ANRC, NACP. 7 17
representative to implement a large-scale relief effort. Plans envisioned both humanitarian and military relief, including building a large-scale ambulance service similar to the AFS. However, the Bolshevik revolution dashed any hope of implementing these initiatives. At the start of the war, the same wave of patriotism that inspired Americans to aid France and Italy also included support for Russia. Amid an extensive outpouring of altruism, small groups of Americans came to the aid of the embattled Russians. Before the outbreak of the conflict, American-Russian relations were strained, due in large part to Tsarist restrictions on visas for American Jews as well as the prevailing anti-Semitic policies of the Empire and the subsequent cancellation of the bilateral 1832 Treaty of Commerce. On December 13, 1911, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 301 to 1 to end the Treaty. The Senate followed suit, and the Treaty was terminated on January 1, 1913.18 Restoration of the pact became a primary U.S. foreign policy objective, and in the eyes of many American commercial representatives, humanitarian assistance served as an incentive to bring Russia to the negotiating table. American business leaders viewed Germany's exit from Russia's market as a tremendous opportunity and clamored to exploit the gap. Immediately after the conflict began, the American Red Cross developed plans to provide medical support to all warring factions. Consistent with the provisions of the 18
Russia and the U.S. were unable to negotiate a new treaty before the First World War and Russian Revolution. U.S. Department of State, "United States Relations with Russia: Establishment of Relations to World War 2," https://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85739.htm . 8
Geneva Conventions and the principles of the International Red Cross, American medical teams and hospital equipment were sent to England, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Serbia.19 Aid to the European combatants represented the first major deployment of “untried” American Red Cross assets.20 This initial act of American engagement represented the first inroads of national involvement in support of Russia's failing war effort. It planted the seed of a tree that eventually grew into the more extensive and better known American Red Cross missions of Dr. Frank Billings, Raymond Robins, and William Boyce Thompson in 1917. However, the roots of the American Red Cross movement in Russia have never been exposed, and its links to national commercial interests are absent from any existing scholarly works. These roots and other historical gaps will be addressed in the current dissertation. In particular, one aim is to add information to incomplete examinations of American Red Cross activity in Russia during the pre-war period and correct inaccuracies in other scholars’ treatments of the topic. Also, this dissertation will provide insight into the operational shortfalls of the Red Cross missions, document the evolution of the American ambulance movement in Russia, and uncover the strategic and commercial motivations behind humanitarian assistance. Overall, this dissertation is unique in its focus on the foreign policy and business aspects of humanitarian aid to Russia during the entire period
19
Lavina Dock, et al. History of American Red Cross Nursing, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), 141. 20 Ibid., 138. 9
of the Great War and revolution, as opposed to existing scholarship focused primarily on the on the military and political aspects of the period 1917-1921. The initial 1914 American Red Cross mission, based in Kiev, lasted less than a year. Its cancellation became a cause célèbre for American business representatives in Petrograd and Washington who viewed its demise as a great blow to “American prestige” and feared the impact its cancellation could have on commercial relations and the prospects for re-negotiating a new Treaty of Commerce. 21 Eventually reaching the desk of President Woodrow Wilson, the issue of how to continue American support in an era of neutrality became a point of discussion at the highest levels of the U.S. government and Red Cross.22 Rapidly changing conditions on the Eastern Front surpassed the speed of bureaucracy in Washington, and events on the ground overtook the debate over whether to continue the Kiev Red Cross mission. American business representatives residing in the Petrograd colony stepped into action and raised money to keep medical aid for the faltering Russian military. German advances and Russian requirements on the Caucasus front led to the dissolution of the Kiev unit before Washington could make any final decisions. American Red Cross personnel in Russia divided into two camps, some went home, and others joined the Tsarist Army to provide support on the front lines.
21
See for example Baker to Pratt, letter, August 28, 1915, File 591.4, "Medical UnitsRussia," RG 200, ANRC, Group 1, CDF 1881-1916, NACP 22 Boardman to Wilson, letter, September 15, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 10
Those who went to the front participated in two parallel efforts. The first, supported by the American Petrograd colony, went to Persia at the behest of recently transferred Eastern Front Commander Grand Duke Nicholas. The others went on to establish American Ambulance in Russia, which Norman Saul describes as a notable development, yet he was unable to discover additional information.23 He also acknowledges, “its subsequent deployment is unknown.”24 This historical gap is addressed as part of this study. American Ambulance in Russia was the catalyst for the official humanitarian response, the Billings Red Cross Commission that arrived in late 1917. This dissertation exposes the story of this pre-war U.S. engagement in Russia's war effort. It fills the void left by George F. Kennan and Norman Saul in describing the roots of American humanitarian involvement in Russia before U.S. entry into the First World War, and demonstrates the critical role that the foreign policy priority of renewed commercial engagement played in these initiatives. It uncovers the foundation of postRevolution American Red Cross activities, thus completing the currently incomplete story of American humanitarian assistance from the onset of the conflict through the war and intervention. It also provides insight into Russia’s forgotten theater of war in the Caucasus and Persia, and makes significant contributions to burgeoning attempts by scholars of American-Russian relations to capture and preserve eye-witness accounts of the period of 23
Norman E. Saul, War and Revolution: The United States & Russia, 1914- 1921 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 119. 24 Ibid., 119. 11
war and revolution. Accounts captured in this study are from significant, but previously unexplored American participants in Russia’s First World War. These witnesses include doctors, nurses, and members of the American Petrograd colony. Background Peter Gatrell writes in Russia’s First World War, “Military action on Russia’s various fronts exposed soldiers to great danger. How, to put it crudely, did Russia pick up the pieces?....During the war nearly 5.2 million men were hospitalized in the rear…Around 2.8 million of them required treatment for war wounds….36 per cent died from the wounds.”25 It was common knowledge that Russia’s mobilization for the war was fraught with difficulties and delays. Similarly, infrastructure and plans for providing medical care for its soldiers were taxed to the breaking point by the scale of the mobilization. Jude Richter describes the scope of Russia’s challenge in sustaining its war effort: “During the first two months of the war, Russia sent more than 4 million men into battle. By the end of March 1917, this number had risen to over 13 million. Many of these men suffered from disease or from wounds and injuries received in battle. During the course of the war over 4.8 million sick and wounded men were evacuated from the front.”26 Like many other developments in Russian society overall, the military medical system did not apply lessons learned from the Russo-Japanese War. British General Staff Officer Colonel W.H.H. Waters observed in his unfavorable report on the Russian Peter Gatrell, Russia’s First World War; A Social and Economic History (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2005), 65. 26 Jude C. Richter, “Philanthropy and Welfare in Russia, 1914-1918,: in Russia’s Home Front in War and Revolution, 1914-22, ed. Adele Lindenmeyr, Christopher Reed, and Peter Waldron (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2016), 11. 12 25
Medical Service in The Russo-Japanese War, Medical and Sanitary Reports from Officers Attached to Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field: “There is only one remark needful to make is that the arrangements are too small a scale for modern great battles.”27 Reports from Allied observers such as American Colonel Valery Harvard cite innumerable cases where medical efforts faltered due to logistics, supply, and personnel shortfalls.28 Russia faced similar struggles during the First World War. Its outbreak caught Russia unprepared for modern warfare. Despite some initial success, the Empire's military was ill-equipped to address the challenges of military operations on a massive scale. Russia lacked the logistics and support capabilities required for sustained operations along a nearly 1000 mile front. Overwhelmed by modern firepower, bogged down by antediluvian transportation infrastructure and a shortage of adequately trained medical personnel, Russia struggled to transport and care for its wounded. The vast majority of transport for the wounded consisted of horse-drawn carriages, rather than the motorized ambulances increasingly in use on the Western front. Compared to many thousands of motor ambulances in the West, Russia only had several hundred to cover vastly greater distances.
Colonel H.H. Walters, “Report on Russian Medical Service” in Russo-Japanese War, Medical and Sanitary Reports from Officers Attached to Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field (General Staff, London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1908), 539. 28 Reports of the Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria During the Russo-Japanese War, Part II; Reports of Colonel Valery Harvard, Colonel John Van R. Hoff, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), 54. 13 27
The 1914 American Red Cross mission in Kiev could only care for the smallest fraction of Russia’s wounded. However, its value was magnified many times over by the modern medical and sanitation techniques it introduced and passed on to their Russian colleagues. More important was not what Americans did, but what they represented. Their presence was perceived as a sign of American support for the embattled Empire at a critical time. As essential as its symbolic contribution to “American prestige,” its summer 1915 cancellation during a period of Russian military reverses led to fears that withdrawal might damage bilateral relations at the very time Russian needed it most. On September 24, 1915, Tsar Nicholas relieved his popular cousin, the Grand Duke, from overall command of the Russian military forces, and made him Viceroy of the Caucasus. As challenging as Russian medical capabilities were on the Eastern Front, the conditions in the Caucasus are best described as “spartan.” Poorly developed railways, roads, and the terrain made the movement of personnel and supplies slow and dangerous. A team of eight American Red Cross personnel, formerly assigned to the Kiev hospital, volunteered to join the Grand Duke in the Caucasus. Upon arrival, they were sent forward to support one of the least-known Russian military operations, General Nikolai Baratov’s Persian expedition. In this capacity, they participated in and were eyewitnesses to Russia’s failed attempts to link with British forces in Mesopotamia. Scholarly examination of the Persian Expedition is virtually non-existent, especially in English-language sources. Aided by American missionaries, they also provided much
14
needed medical care to Russian soldiers, Ottoman prisoners, and refugees in Khoy, Qazvin, Hamadan, and Kermanshah. The American Embassy in Petrograd under the leadership of Ambassador George T. Mayre and the David R. Francis provided strong support for American humanitarian endeavors. The Embassy, however, suffered from a fundamental bifurcation of its mission and focus. Divided into two staffs, one for American affairs, another focused on protecting German and Austrian interests, including prisoners of war, it faced the constant challenge of defending Central Power’s equities while still promoting overall U.S. policy interests. Top among American priorities was enhancing U.S. commercial standing in Russia. In 1915, the U.S. sent its first commercial attaché, Henry Dunster Baker, to support this vital objective. Baker served as a vocal and forceful advocate for American aid, arguing that such actions served overall U.S. foreign policy and commercial objectives in the region. As American citizens living abroad, residents of the Petrograd colony demonstrated concrete support for their host country. They worked tirelessly to promote U.S.-Russian relations. According to historian Lyubov Ginzberg, “Americans involved in large-scale relief operations contributed immensely to the cultural and social milieu of their hosting environment, promoting ‘good feeling among Russians.’”29 Transplanted Americans such as David Leavitt Hough, an engineer, and specialist in railway infrastructure, made
Lyubov Ginzburg, “Confronting the Cold War Legacy: The Forgotten History of the American Colony in St. Petersburg, A Case Study of Reconciliation,”( Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 2010), 199. 29
15
concerted efforts to promote American business interests, while simultaneously leading projects to support humanitarian causes, including American Red Cross efforts in Persia and a local Petrograd clinic and refuge sponsored by the colony. Matters were complicated by the arrival in Petrograd of a team of American medical personnel who previously served with the “Mercy Ship” mission in Germany. This group came as part of what was originally a bilateral agreement between Germany and Russia to provide reciprocal care for prisoners of war in their respective countries. However, Russia abandoned its part of the deal, and the arrival of the German support group, seemingly at American Red Cross behest, sent confusing messages at precisely the moment the Kiev hospital closed. On the surface, the team appeared to be closely tied to German interests and stirred some controversy speaking that forbidden language in public. This poorly timed initiative was a public relations and foreign policy disaster and loomed large over subsequent deliberations on the fate of other American Red Cross efforts in Russia. After the dissolution of the American Red Cross hospital in Kiev, Doctors Edward Egbert and Philip Newton followed their own path toward ensuring continued medical support for Russia. They returned to the U.S. in a failed attempt to convince the American Red Cross to reverse its decision on closing its facility in Kiev. Egbert recruited Dr. Malcolm Grow to provide medical care for the Tsar’s forces. Together, they traveled to Russia, and after Grow transferred to the front, Egbert joined forces with Newton to return to the States to raise funds for an American field hospital and ambulance service in Russia. This “American Ambulance in Russia” was founded with 16
the assistance of prominent Americans like politician Hamilton Fish Jr. and sponsored by the Tsar’s daughter Grand Duchess Tatiana. It became the only US-Russian operation directly integrated into the Russian armed forces. The organization eventually had, by some accounts, almost fifty ambulances, with the largest concentration along the Galician front.30 During its operation, from mid-1916 to late 1917, it is credited with saving the lives of thousands of Russian troops and their adversaries.31 The American Ambulance was eventually swept up by the revolution along with the military it supported. Historiography This study fills historical gaps in the evolution of American humanitarian aid to Russia before U.S. entry into the First World War and completes the story of American Red Cross involvement during that transitional period. It captures many lost observations about the Russian war effort and answers Saul's question about the operations, activities, and ultimate disposition of the American Ambulance in Russia. It also adds to the extensive research of Saul and Ginzburg, who wrote about the American Petrograd colony’s charitable efforts, especially their Lazaret to care for wounded soldiers and the American Refuge to care for refugee children. Despite extensive scholarly writing on Russia during the late Tsarist period, the historical record and current historiography are replete with gaps and inaccuracies. Current scholarship lacks a coherent and complete description of the evolution of American humanitarian assistance to the Russian military in the early war years. These 30 31
“The American Ambulance in Russia,” pamphlet. Ibid. 17
first American volunteers were the only individuals directly integrated into the Russian Red Cross and armed forces, but are mentioned only in passing in a couple of sources. The role of individual Americans in this tumultuous period of Russian history has received scant treatment in existing works. Diplomatic historian William Allison writes, “While others offer detailed examinations of events and place the Russian experience in historical perspective, they do not sufficiently discuss the role of individual Americans in Russia.”32 Allison focuses on American diplomats and recognizes the importance of investigating the role of individuals rather than simply larger historical events and themes. He notes George F. Kennan’s comment that “the men on the spot are important to the story, and should be examined with the same vigor as the broader picture.”33 In almost all cases, with the notable exception of Norman Saul, historians examining US-Russian relations during the First World War focus their studies on the period from the onset of the Revolution through the Allied intervention. Historians who address relations in the early stages of the conflict focus primarily on the political, diplomatic, or organizational level. Capturing the story of the 1914-1916 Red Cross Missions and the American Ambulance in Russia provides a unique opportunity to gain insight into the operational shortfalls of its medical services, explore the motivations behind the humanitarian activity of the Petrograd colony, and acquire a better understanding of challenges faced by the Russian military itself. Additionally, it assists in filling the historiographic void regarding the methods by which American officials and 32
William Allison. American Diplomats in Russia. Case Studies in Orphan Diplomacy, 1916-1919. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997, 2. 33 Ibid., 3. 18
commercial interests furthered their objectives in Russia, and the role humanitarian aid played in furthering those economic goals. It also provides heretofore missing insight into the first American Red Cross activities that established the basis and framework for the well-documented and studied Billings American Red Cross Commission and followon activities under Raymond Robins and William Boyce Thompson. Jennifer Polk, who’s dissertation “Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary and Civil War Russia, 1917–24” provides a comprehensive review of American Red Cross activities after U.S. entry into the war writes, “The political activities of Raymond Robins, a Red Cross agent and crucial diplomatic gobetween relied on by both the American ambassador to Russia and high officials of the new Soviet government during the first few months of Bolshevik rule, have been wellcovered. The same is true of the efforts of Robins’s Red Cross boss, William Boyce Thompson.”34 This statement is certainly true of scholarly examination of the two
34
Polk, Jennifer. "Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary and Civil War Russia, 1917-1924"Ph.D. diss. University of Toronto, 2012, 5-6. On these same pages she provides a very thorough overview of scholarly works on Thompson and Robins. "William Appleman Williams’s unpublished Ph.D. dissertation from 1950, which focused on Robins’s Russian career, is excellent: "Raymond Robins and Russian–American Relations 1917–1938," (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1950). See also another dissertation written 35 years later, which narrated in detail the activities of Robins and others involved in Russian–Soviet relations, and particularly those of the men in Petrograd: Joan Doverspike Davison, “Raymond Robins and United States Foreign Policy toward Revolutionary Russia” (PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 1984), chapters 5–6, and 7, which covered “Robins’ Recommendations to [Secretary of State] Lansing” once he was back in the United States. Williams’s later published study puts Robins’s work into a wider context: William Appleman Williams, American–Russian Relations, 1781–1947 (New York: Rinehart, 1952). Robins is the subject of a biography: Neil V. Salzman, Reform, and Revolution: The Life and Times of Raymond Robins (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991). Hermann Hagedorn’s biography of Thompson is dated but still useful: The Magnate: William Boyce Thompson 19
personalities. However, academic examinations have not revealed the full background behind the decision to send Billing’s Mission to Russia. The catalyst for its departure can be traced back to the withdrawal of the Kiev American Red Cross mission, subsequent attempts to provide adequate replacements, and the lobbying efforts of the Petrograd American colony, Newton, and Egbert. Historians of America’s “Great War” experience are focusing increasingly on documenting eyewitness accounts of events in Europe from the Americans who experienced them. Ed Klekowski and Libby Klekowski’s Eyewitnesses to the Great War: American Writers, Reporters, Volunteers and Soldiers in France, 1914-1918, examines the Western front “through the eyes of Americans who were there, telling the story of the famous and not so famous who played a part in the Great War.35 More recently Kenneth D. Rose released The Great War and Americans in Europe, 1914-
and His Time (1869–1930) (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1935). For more on Robins, Thompson, and the political side of the mission see George F. Kennan, Soviet–American Relations, 1917–1920, vol. 1, Russia Leaves the War; vol. 2, The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956 and 1958); Claude E. Fike, “The Influence of the Creel Committee and the American Red Cross on Russian–American Relations, 1917–1919,” Journal of Modern History 31, no. 2 (Jun 1959): 93–109; David W. McFadden, Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans, 1917–1920 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); McFadden, “Hiram Johnson, Raymond Robins, and the Struggle for an Alternative American Policy toward Bolshevik Russia, 1918,” Peace & Change 18, no. 1 (Jan 1993): 50–77; and Saul, War and Revolution, 167–69, 209–10, 219, 224–26, 239, 250–51, 254–57, 272–73, 30 1n 258. See also this study of Robins’s translator and collaborator: James K. Libbey, Alexander Gumberg and Soviet– American Relations 1917–1933 (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1977). 35 Ed Klekowski and Libby Klekowski, Eyewitnesses to the Great War: American Writers, Reporters, Volunteers and Soldiers in France, 1914-1918 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, Inc, 2012), 1. 20
1917.36 Unlike the Klekoskis’ work, Rose weaves the experiences American civilians and military volunteers into the narrative of the entire European war. Rose spends the vast majority of his book on the West, and the attention paid to the East is almost exclusively derived from well-known published sources. The perspectives of American eyewitnesses in Russia’s war and revolution recently achieved greater prominence with the introduction of the publisher Slavica’s “Americans in Revolutionary Russia” series. The effort is “focused on bringing back into print the observations and experiences of Americans who were witnesses to war and revolution in Russia between 1914 and 1921….These men and women offer a rich perspective on the tumultuous events that gripped Russia during this time.”37 A central focus of this study is an examination of the work, associations, and perspectives of the American Red Cross doctors, nurses, and their supporters who aided Russian forces before American entry into WWI and the revolution. It also explains national U.S. and Petrograd colony support for these varied efforts. It falls directly in line with the two vibrant emerging trends of both Americans in Russia and Great War studies-American eyewitnesses and Russia's Great War. These medical personnel were unique in their thorough exposure to conditions in the Russian military in the critical first half of the war. They were not simply observers of the Russian military but commissioned officers in the Tsar's army and nurses in the Empire’s Red Cross. Their
36
Kenneth D. Rose, The Great War and Americans in Europe, 1914-1917 (New York: Routledge, 2017). 37 “Americans in Revolutionary Russia,” https://slavica.indiana.edu/series/Americans_in_Revolutionary_Russia 21
accounts of the campaigns, conditions, and individual Russian soldiers have never been assessed comprehensively in a single source or put in its historical context. Additionally, most of the documents included in this study are unique. This examination is the first attempt to connect these sources to Russian Great War-related studies. Perhaps most useful is Christian Advocate, the monthly bilingual publication of the American colony in Petrograd. This invaluable source is used to great effect by Lyubov Ginzberg in her research on the Petrograd colony. Her efforts, however, focus on the colony itself, rather than its involvement in the broader war effort. Fortunately, Christian Advocate preserves correspondence between the colony and some of the Americans they sponsored in the field. In late 1915, it became the official news organ of the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, and therefore carried the authoritative reports and news of its activities in Petrograd and the American medical personnel with the army in Persia. Records of the American Red Cross, not generally associated with Russian history, also proved essential. Two recent works by American Red Cross scholars Julia Irwin and Marian Moser-Jones are significant contributions to the Society's history. 38 Irwin, in particular, demonstrates how American Red Cross (ARC) “voluntary civilian relief…constituted a major part of the nation’s foreign relations. The ARC’s extensive program of foreign civilian assistance advanced both the strategic and social interests of
38
Marian Moser-Jones, The American Red Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2013). 22
the United States.”39However, both are focused on the broader American Red Cross movement, and appropriately give little attention to developments in Russia. Accounts of the American volunteers make a valuable contribution to the historical record. To access their accounts, historians must first know who they were, what they did, and what they saw. Until now, their names and roles have been lost to history. Through a detailed review of thousands of pages of archival information and period news publications, their story can be reconstructed, and their lost accounts brought to light. Identification of these individuals and their contributions opens the door to further study by fellow historians. The American “eyewitnesses” writings about broader issues reflect their misperceptions about larger social and political questions, but their observations about conditions and the deterioration of the Russian military are useful in understanding the internal forces that ultimately led to its collapse. For example, American Russian historians have long been aware of American doctors Malcolm Grow and Eugene Hurd. Their accounts and stories were captured in the first case in Grow’s published memoir and the second in wide media coverage and commonly read primary sources such as Orin Sage Wrightman’s Diary of an American Physician in the Russian Revolution, and Florence MacLeod Harper’s 1918 Runaway Russia.40 However, this study is the first time that Grow and Hurd are put into their broader historical contexts, 39
Irwin, 6. Malcolm C. Grow, Surgeon Grow, an American in the Russian Fighting. New York: F.A. Stokes, 1918. An updated version of Grow’s book will be published with index and introduction by Laurie Stoff as part of the Slavica “Americans in Revolutionary Russia” project.Wrightman, Orin Sage. The Diary of an American Physician in the Russian Revolution, 1917. Brooklyn, NY: Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1928. Donald Thompson, Blood Stained Russia. New York: Leslie-Judge, 1918 and Florence MacLeod Harper, Runaway Russia, 1918. For Harper see Chapter 5, 79-93. 23 40
their relationships to the humanitarian aid movement defined, and, at least in the case of Grow, his subsequent wartime work with the Red Cross documented. John R. Schindler in his book Fall of the Double Eagle; The Battle for Galicia and the Demise of Austria-Hungary notes: In the first place, histories of the Great War in the English-speaking world focus overwhelmingly on the Western Front. In popular accounts, other fronts, where millions fought and died, customarily make an appearance only if they feature interesting English speaking characters, The Eastern Front, in particular, has been underserved by historians both popular and academic, and despite some progress in recent years it remains much too the ‘unknown war' that Winston Churchill termed it back in 1931.41 Schindler’s work, despite its Austro-Hungarian focus, sums up the challenge confronting studies of the Eastern Front. Hew Strachan's comprehensive single-volume treatment of the conflict provides a high-level examination of the entire scope of the war's military actions, strategy, and theaters of operations. Despite the fact that its coverage of some of the lesser studied theaters of war, its treatment of Russia follows conventional norms providing a general overview of the Empire's significant military developments in the context of the broader Great Power struggle.42 Norman Stone, in his 1975 groundbreaking work on the Eastern Front acknowledges the lack of scholarship in both the West and Russia on that theater of World War One. More than two decades later, author of the Brusilov Offensive, Timothy Dowling, writes, “developments on the Eastern Front during the First World War have received scant attention in the general English speaking
41
John R. Schindler, Fall of the Double Eagle; The Battle for Galicia and the Demise of Austria-Hungary (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2015). 42 Strachan, Hew. The First World War (New York: Penguin Books, 2004). 24
public.” 43 On the Russian side, the subject was neglected during the Communist era. Examination of the Tsarist army from either a positive or negative perspective was illadvised politically.44 Scholars have dissected every aspect of developments on the Western Front both before and after American entry into the conflict. The stories of the AFS in France, the Lafayette Escadrille, and volunteer ambulance drivers in Italy during US neutrality are well documented in both scholarly works and popular culture.45 Their American counterparts in Russia are mostly absent from modern scholarly research. The centennial of the First World War has reinvigorated interest in the Eastern Front. However, almost without exception, current scholarship focuses on the strategic and operational levels of war. Prit Buttar’s Collision of Empires examines the conflict at a geopolitical level during the opening stages of the conflict in the East and his most recent work, Russia’s Last Gasp; The Eastern Front 1916-1917, conducts a detailed study of strategy and operations from a heavily Central Powers-based view of military theater developments. 46 Michael Neiburg and David Jordan focus on the military and strategic aspects of the war in the East.47 Similarly, Sean McMeekin’s Russian Origins of
43
Timothy C. Dowling. The Brusilov Offensive ( Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), xii. 44 Ibid., xiii. 45 As an example, much of Ernest Hemingway’s early writing was inspired by his time as an ambulance driver in Italy. His experience and experience after his battlefield injury served as the inspiration for A Farewell to Arms. The Lafayette Escadrille has been depicted in three feature films including the 1928 Legion of the Condemned. 46 Pritt Buttar. Collision of Empires. New York: Osprey, 2014 and Russia’s Last Gasp; The Eastern Front 1916-1917, New York: Osprey, 2016. 47 Michael Neiburg and David Jordan. Eastern Front (1914 to 1920). London: Amber Books, 2012. 25
the First World War examines the roots of the conflict from, as its title suggests, a St. Petersburg-based examination. 48 Other works examine particular theaters of operation and battles, including the Tannenberg and the Romanian Front.49 Recent examples include Gordon Tunstall’s Written in Blood: The Battles for Fortress Przemyl in WWI and his Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915.50 These “war studies” reflect the traditional focus on the strategic and operational level of history, rather than providing insight into the social, cultural, or economic aspects of the conflict. Fortunately, Peter Gatrell’s Russia’s First World War, a Social and Economic History remedies this gap, providing an indepth examination of these topics, as its title suggests, as well as military challenges that confronted all levels of Tsarist society and administration.51. The ongoing Slavica publishing Russia’s Great War and Revolution series is perhaps the most significant scholarly attempt to encourage study on the broader spectrum of topics. Slavica is sponsoring an ambitious effort to publish a wide-ranging array of papers on previously neglected topics dealing with Russia in the Great War.
48
Sean McMeekin. Russian Origins of the First World War. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2011. 49 See for Example Dennis Showalter. Tannenberg, Clash of Empires, 1914. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1991 or John Sweetman. Tannenburg 1914. London: Cassell, 2004. Glenn Torrey. The Romanian Battlefront in World War I. (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1914) 50 Gordon A. Tunstall, Written in Blood: The Battles for Fortress Przemsyl in WWI (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016) and Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010). 51 Peter Gatrell. Russia’s First World War. A Social and Economic History. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2005. 26
This program provides a rallying point for scholars across the discipline to conduct research and identify gaps in the history of the period. Slavica describes the effort this way: For most of the twentieth century Russia’s Great War was a historical afterthought. Overshadowed by the Bolsheviks’ revolution, Civil War, and consolidation of power, the War took a back seat within professional scholarship as both Soviet and Western experts focused their energy on explaining the origins and rise of Russian Communism. In recent years a new generation of researchers has begun to re-examine and re-evaluate the significance and meaning of the War. Buttressed by new archival findings and freed from the ideological baggage of earlier historical debates they have begun to analyze Russia’s Great War not as a prelude to “Red October,” but as the fulcrum which set into motion a chain of events that transformed Eurasia and much of the world.52 This ambitious series is: A decade-long multinational scholarly effort that aims to fundamentally transform understanding of Russia's "continuum of crisis" during the years 1914-1922. The project incorporates new research methods, archival sources, and multiple media formats to re-conceptualize critical concepts and events and to increase public awareness of Russia¹s contributions to the history of the twentieth century.53 Studies of U.S.-Russian Relations Scholarship on US-Russian relations during the First World War is a significantly more developed field. The vast majority of those studies focus almost exclusively on the period from the eve of the Russian Revolution through U.S. intervention. These works focus on the political and diplomatic level of the U.S. -Russian relationship. Benson Grayson’s Russian American Relations in World War I provides an overview of U.S.Russian relations during the entire war at a political level, while William Allison’s
52
“Russia’s Great War,” https://slavica.indiana.edu/series/Russia_Great_War_Series
53
“Russia’s Great War & Revolution, http://russiasgreatwar.org/index.php. 27
American Diplomats in Russia, provides, as the title suggests an overview from the Embassy perspective, but only beginning in 1916.54 George Kennan’s Soviet American Relations, The Decision to Leave the War, transcends the focus on the policy level and examines the role of individual Americans at the political, organizational, and personal level, as well as their activities in Russia during the turmoil of 1917.55 David Fogelsong’s The American Mission and the “Evil Empire”: The Crusade for a “Free Russia” since 1881 contains some discussion of individual American contributions during the war, but focuses mainly on the religious (evangelical) and economic aspects of the relationship.56 Similarly, Matthew Miller’s American YMCA and Russian Culture provides a broad overview of the efforts of Y workers in organizing assistance for Russian soldiers and prisoners of war.57 Lyubov Ginsburg's recent dissertation comes closest to filling the gap. She provides an in-depth analysis of the American colony in St. Petersburg from 1890 thru 1920 but does not delve into any of the
54
Benson Lee Grayson. American-Russia Relations in World War I (New York: Ungar, 1979) and William Allison. American Diplomats in Russia: Case Studies in Orphan Diplomacy, 1916-1919. Westport, Ct: Praeger, 1997. 55 George F. Kennan. Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920. Vol. 1, The Decision to Leave the War; Vol 2. The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958). 56 David Fogelsong. The American Mission and the “Evil Empire”: The Crusade for a Free Russia Since 1881. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 57
Matthew Lee Miller. The American YMCA and Russian Culture, The Preservation and Expansion of Orthodox Christianity, Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013. 28
Red Cross-military interactions.58 Jennifer Polk’s dissertation does examine these relationships, but only after 1917.59 Norman Saul is the first author to provide a detailed study of Americans in Russia throughout the war. His War and Revolution provides a historical examination which addresses all strata of American and Russian political, business, and individual relationships, in both private and official capacities.60 The current dissertation adds to his work, providing additions, clarification, elaboration, and in some cases correction to his comprehensive body of work. Sources and Methodology This dissertation focuses heavily on first-hand accounts. Some memoirs and other accounts were written immediately after the First World War. These documents provide detailed narratives from the participants’ perspectives, but it was not until History of American Red Cross Nursing, published in 1922, that details of the Red Cross Expedition of 1914 and some of the subsequent efforts were documented more thoroughly. While this volume contains some valuable primary source material and useful background information on the establishment of the American Red Cross Hospital at Kiev, its value is
Lyubov Ginzburg. “Confronting the Cold War Legacy: The Forgotten History of the American Colony in St. Petersburg, A Case Study of Reconciliation,” Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 2010. 59 Polk, Jennifer. "Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary and Civil War Russia, 1917-1924"Ph.D. diss. University of Toronto, 2012 60 Saul, Norman E. War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914-1921. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001). 29 58
limited because of its broad scope, the history of all American Red Cross nursing efforts since its founding. Several American medical volunteers left memoirs or wrote articles about their experiences. However, as was common at the time, most were written as travelogues, instead of focusing on the historical narrative. A notable exception, however, is Surgeon Grow, An American in the Russian Fighting.61 A colleague of Egbert and Newton, his account contains a considerable amount of detail, documenting his movements and actions with the Russian military. Another colleague, H.H Snively, left The Battle of the Non-Combatants: The Letters of Dr. Harry Hamilton Snively to His Family from Russia, Poland, France, Belgium, Persia, etc., which provides a very brief overview of his work during the First World War.62 Other participants wrote accounts in medical and professional journals. Dr. Dean Winn detailed efforts at the hospital in Kiev in the periodical Military Surgeon.63 Several of the nurses shared their stories in The Journal of American Nursing. Similarly, American Red Cross Magazine, the Society’s Annual Reports and other publications also contain a wealth of information about activities in Russia in the period 1914-1917. Others used their experiences in military medicine to instruct other U.S. Army doctors. 61
Malcolm C Grow. Surgeon Grow, an American in the Russian Fighting. New York: F.A. Stokes, 1918. 62
Marjorie Snively, comp. The Battle of the Non-combatants: The Letters Dr. Harry Hamilton Snively to His Family from Russia, Poland, France, Belgium, Persia, etc., Assembled by His Daughter New York: Business Bourse, 1933. Dean F. Winn. “Statistical Report of Five Hundred and Seventy Cases Treated in American Red Cross Hospital at Kiev, Russia.” Military Surgeon 38, no.1 (1916): 56-63. 63
30
Kiev and Persia American Red Cross veteran Dr. Brown McClintic developed at least one educational monograph for the Army medical training program.64 He and his wife, Eleanor, wrote numerous articles for various publications. His colleague in Persia, Dr. Lyle Hazlett, wrote an account of his experiences for Military Surgeon.65 Newspapers, mainly from the doctors’ and nurses’ hometowns, carried reports of their activities and occasionally letters home documenting key observations and events from their service in Russia. As noted earlier, perhaps the most valuable publication is the monthly bilingual Christian Advocate, described by Lyubov Ginzburg thusly: Such a “modest bilingual monthly” as Kristiansky Pobornik played a unique role. It sought to serve all Americans not only in Petrograd but also in Moscow and other Russian centers. This Russian-American periodical published in Petrograd served as a newsletter carrying the news of the American colony, the life of the community, major events, appointments, obituaries, as well as the updates on social events and gatherings in the capital.66 In addition to first-hand accounts, this dissertation extracted evidence from State Department and American Red Cross official records. This approach involved a comprehensive review of relevant National Archives and Records Administration holdings. The research included American Red Cross Record Group (RG) 200 (Gift Collections- American National Red Cross) as well as RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, and RG 84 Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State. As any scholar working with U.S. State Department records from this period
Brown S. McClintic. “Russian Retreat Across Persia.” Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Advanced Course, 1935. 65 T. Lyle Hazlett, “Experiences with the Russian Army of the Caucasus in Northern Persia,” Military Surgeon Vol. 41, no.4 (October 1917): 445-449. 66 Ginzburg, 204. x 31 64
knows, the holdings are incomplete and poorly indexed. According to National Archives historian and archivist David Langbart: The files maintained at overseas posts, however, have suffered significant loss and damage over the years. The vagaries of both nature (fire, earthquake, volcano, hurricane, vermin) and man (war, revolution) have all taken their toll. This is particularly true of posts in Russia. These losses have limited scholars of U.S.Russian relations in their ability to fully understand and explain what occurred in the years leading up to the revolutions of 1917 and the subsequent Bolshevik consolidation of power. 67 Locating information in the State Department records required a review of all incoming and outgoing correspondence from Embassy Petrograd and the Consulate, as well as the posts in Tiflis and Tabriz from 1915 through the end of 1917. Using both State Department source cards and page-by-page review of volumes of diplomatic correspondence, it was possible to reconstruct much of the mission, deliberations, and rationale behind the various Russia-based American humanitarian initiatives during the war. Additionally, available manuscripts and papers of critical participants were reviewed for relevant content. Particularly valuable were the Egbert Papers at the Hoover Institution, the David Roland Francis papers at the Library of Congress, and the holdings of the Methodist Archives at Drew University. Perhaps the most abundant source of information, and the one that contributes most to the historical record is the unpublished diary and letters of Philip Newton, as well as a manuscript documenting his time in
67
David Langbart, No Little Historic Value: The Records of Department of State in Revolutionary Russia, Prologue 40, no. 1 (Spring 2008), https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2008/spring/langbart.html 32
Russia, compiled by his family. The family has generously provided me copies of this material. Diaries, letters, and articles written by Presbyterian missionaries in Persia provide accounts of the Russian occupation and their association with their American Red Cross counterparts. Similar content is found in documents left by members of the Armenian and Syrian Relief Committee. Both of these sources rarely, if ever, have been exploited by Russian historians.
Introduction to Russian Medical Operations in World War I The following section will assist readers to understand American military medical terminology and concepts used throughout this study. It also provides essential background and roles of organizations involved in transporting and treating Russia’s wounded. This understanding is essential since American efforts “plugged-into” existing Russian processes and organizational infrastructure. The Petrograd Colony and American Ambulance in Russia emerged as humanitarian responses to Russia’s antiquated war-time medical care. Indeed, the organization and delivery of medical service had changed little in the decade between the Russo-Japanese conflict and WWI. Battlefield wound dressing was haphazard at best, with soldiers themselves often responsible for their initial first aid. Most wounded then crawled or were dragged by comrades to a dressing station. Furthermore, these dressing stations did little more than bandage wounds -- disinfection and prophylaxis were not 33
prioritized. Finally, transportation from dressing stations to field hospitals was inefficient and unreliable, given that the Russian front moved often, and at greater distances than either the "flying columns" or ambulances could consistently and quickly reach. In the case of the American Red Cross hospital in Kiev, for example, patients often had to travel three to five days before they reached the hospital. Time, coupled with the absence of disinfection, meant that many wounded eventually died from infection that took firm hold before reaching a hospital. From these challenges arose the clear need for medical intervention. Initially, Russian military medical care was provided by three distinct organizations: the medical service, the Union of Zemstvos and Towns, and the Russian Red Cross. Initial plans called for the Union of Zemstvos to serve in a support capacity under the Russian military and Red Cross, to provide capabilities in the interior while the Army and Red Cross evacuated wounded from the front. However, these plans quickly disintegrated because of the unforeseen scale of medical requirements.68 This was especially true in the Caucasus and in Persia, where evacuation of the wounded was solely a Zemstvo responsibility. The decision to assign that region to the Zemstvos was made when “immediately after the declaration of war against Turkey, the Prince of Oldenburg69…requested the Union of Zemstvos and Union of Towns to take upon themselves the whole work of rendering assistance to sick and wounded soldiers in the
Russian Union of Zemstvos; A Brief Report on the Union’s Activities During the War (London: P.S. King and Son Ltd., 1917), 7. 69 Prince Alexander of Oldenburg was the Commander in Chief of the Russian Sanitary Corps. 34 68
Caucasus.”70 The Grand Duke approved the plan, and care of all sick and wounded soldiers became the sole responsibility of the Zemstvos.71 The Russian Red Cross was established in 1867 and served under the patronage of the Imperial Family and Dowager Empress. Laurie Stoff writes in Russia’s Sisters of Mercy and the Great War: “The Russian State Duma ratified the Geneva Convention and established its own agency….and began establishing additional sister of mercy communities. In November 1871, the Ministry of War established regulations for the assignment of sisters of mercy to the care of the ill and wounded in military hospitals.”72 Colonel Valery Harvard, one of the U.S. Military Observers in the Russo-Japanese War, reported that "The chief function of the Red Cross Society in war is to assist the medical department of the army first in the rear, and when necessary and possible also at the front."73 Malcolm Grow captured the contribution of the Russian Red Cross while serving as a member of the Billings Commission in 1917: A large part of this work – particularly at the front-was done by the Russian Red Cross, which in the early part of the war was the only organized body, outside of the army, which had been trained and equipped for such service. In the first four months of the war it…. established at or near the front seventy base hospitals and twenty-two field hospitals, with an aggregate capacity 50,000 beds. It also put into the field six automobile divisions, a sanitary division, and epidemic division,
“Brief Report,” 31. Russian Union of Zemstvos, 7. 72 Laurie Stoff, Sisters of Mercy in Russia’s Great War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 29. 73 Reports of the Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria During the Russo-Japanese War, Part II; Reports of Colonel Valery Harvard, Colonel John Van R. Hoff, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), 96. 35 70 71
a disinfecting division and two sanitary trains, and established back of the fighting lines seventy-eight bandaging and feeding stations.74 During the Russo-Japanese War, military and civilian personnel from all of the Great Powers observed Russian and Japanese forces and provided information and lessons learned for application in their home countries. In addition to combat arms, they also reported on medical and sanitary issues. Colonel Harvard’s observations are particularly valuable in understanding the state of Russian military medical care in both the Russo-Japanese War and later the First World War. Russia’s organization, challenges, and responsibilities changed little in the nearly ten years that separated the two conflicts. His reports, like the accounts of American medical personnel serving with the Russian army in World War I, utilize U.S. Army terminology taken from the standard U.S. Army Manual for the Medical Department to describe Russian doctrine associated with hospital and medical operations. The most essential components of medical evacuation and treatment included the: dressing station, field hospital, evacuation hospital, and base hospital. Malcolm Grow captured the first experiences of a Russian soldier after being wounded in the field: The wounded after using the first-aid packet which every soldier carries is picked up from the field or trench and carried to the first regimental dressing station by the orderlies or stretcher bearers attached to his company. This regimental dressing station is located five hundred yards to one kilometer in the rear of the first line of trenches. After inspection by the regimental surgeons if found “Red Cross Bureau of Information, Russia, Early Russian Red Cross Work,” October 1917, File 948.101 “Commission to Russia W.W.I,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 36 74
necessary new dressings are applied, splints placed on fractured limbs, morphine and stimulants are given, and he is placed in an ambulance usually horse-drawn, two-wheeled affairs called dukolki, and conveyed to the divisional hospital located from four to eight kilometers in the rear.75 Russian soldiers in the First World War, like their counterparts ten years earlier, faced uncertainty when they were wounded on the battlefield. In most cases, after the initial application of first aid, the soldier had to find some means of getting to a dressing station. The small outposts provided limited first aid; their main purpose was to prepare a patient for transport to a field hospital. Provisions for the trip included bandages, splints, and other measures to stabilize injuries. In the Russo-Japanese War, “At the dressing station the wounded were given such professional treatment as was absolutely necessary, were fed, and finally transferred back to the division field hospitals by the transport section of the lazaret, or received religious consolation and were buried.”76 Notably absent was effective disinfection and prophylaxis. Harvard describes Russian dressing stations: Whatever may have been the activity of the bearers, a majority of the wounded would still find their way to the dressing station on foot, helping each other or helped by sound comrades who left the ranks for the purpose, and resting in every sheltered spot…. In Manchuria the first dressing stations are almost always near roads and readily accessible. Unfortunately ambulances were absent and the vehicles used of the most unsuitable kind; every wounded man who could walk or in some manner drag himself along avoided them.77
Malcolm Grow,“Report on the Ambulance Transportation of Wounded on the Front in Russia; Methods of Transportation Now in Use,” File 948.101 “Commission to Russia W.W.I,” RG 200, ANRC, Group 1, NACP. 76 Reports of Military Observers, 138. 77 Ibid., 45-47. 37 75
A “flying column” retrieved lucky soldiers. These units, “peculiar to the Russian Army” cared “for wounded during and after the battle.”78 Not attached to any regiment, according to Grow flying columns were a valuable capability: “Wherever there was an engagement, it rushed to that point, carried the wounded from No Man’s Land, dressed the injuries, operated on the seriously wounded, and rushed on to the next danger point.”79 Violetta Thurston, an English nurse, served in a Russian flying column, and provided a concise summary of its purpose and suitability to the conditions on the Eastern Front: A flying column works directly under the head of the Red Cross, and is supposed to go anywhere and do anything at any hour of the day or night. Our Column consisted of five automobiles that conveyed us and all our equipment to the place where we were to work, and then were engaged in fetching in wounded, and taking them on to the field.80 The Russian front changes so much more rapidly than the Anglo-French front, where progress is reckoned in metres, that these mobile columns are a great feature of ambulance work here. Our front changed many miles in a week sometimes, so that units that can move anywhere at an hour s notice are very useful. The big base hospitals cannot quite fulfill the same need on such a rapidly changing front.81
Surgery and stabilization of patients occurred at an ambulance hospital in an intermediate location. Harvard reported that “The second line of help is formed, as in most European armies, by the ambulance hospital, an organization composed of two
“Russian Red Cross,” Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 156 (May 17, 1917): 716. “Over the Top with the Russian War Dogs; Experiences of a Philadelphia Surgeon, Dr. Grow,” Book News Monthly 36 (May 1918), 325. 80 Violetta Thurstan, Field Hospital and Flying Column : Being the Journal of an English Nursing Sister in Belgium & Russia (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1915), 125-126. 81 Ibid., 126-127. 38 78 79
distinct elements, a large dressing station and a bearer company.”82 These hospitals were temporary facilities established to provide intermediate care to prepare a patient for expeditious transport to a field better-equipped field hospital.83 Field hospitals moved with the forces they supported.84 Inherently mobile, these hospitals were staffed to provide more advanced care and surgical support. Russian field hospitals functioned much like their American counterparts as defined in the 1916 U.S. Army Manual for the Medical Department: “A field hospital can meet these requirements only when it is relieved so promptly by the sanitary units in the rear that its mobility is not interfered with. Prompt evacuation of the sick and wounded is necessary also to secure for them the facilities for treatment and the comforts which are available on the line of communications.”85 When possible, Russian forces attempted to install field hospitals close to railways for faster transport to more permanent facilities in the rear.86 The Army Medical Manual describes the mission of an “evacuation hospital”: 795. The primary function of the evacuation hospital is to replace field hospitals so that the latter may move with their divisions, or to take over their patients with the same object in view. 796. An evacuation hospital is preferably established on a railway or navigable stream, but this preference must, of course, yield to the military situation. Care should be taken to choose a site accessible to wheeled transport and with an
82
Reports of the Military Observers, 40. Ibid., 46-47. 84 According to Harvard: “The personnel of the field hospital consists of 1 chief surgeon in command, 4 surgeons, 1 pharmacist, 2 line officers as quartermaster and commissary….”Ibid., 40-41. 85 Contained in Colonels Charles Lynch, Joseph H. Ford, Frank W. Weed. The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War, Volume 8 Field Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925), 1033. 86 Reports of Military Observers, 50-51. 39 83
abundant supply of water and fuel. When suitable buildings are available they will be utilized. 799. The duties of an evacuation hospital when opened are similar to those of a field hospital in combat… and corresponding departments will be created. 801. Serious cases requiring protracted treatment and all patients permanently incapacitated should be sent to the rear from evacuation hospitals as soon as their condition permits. (b) During battle all patients in evacuation hospitals who are fit for transportation should be hurried to the rear as soon as possible to make room for new cases from the front. It will rarely be possible for evacuation hospitals to send slightly wounded back to their organizations during combat, but every opportunity should be taken to do so in order that such wounded shall not become further separated from their commands.87 Evacuation hospitals functioned as key nodes in the distribution of wounded for further treatment. Their purpose was to process wounded sent to the rear from the field hospitals or the front itself, provide intermediate care, and determine whether patients should be sent to a more capable “base hospital” for further treatment and recovery. Base hospitals were stationary units that resembled a well-equipped civilian hospital. These were often the final stop for a soldier to go on his path to treatment and recovery. According to the U.S. Army Medical Manual:
762. The base hospitals are designed to receive patients from the field and evacuation hospitals, as well as cases originating on the line of communications, and to give them definitive treatment. They should be well equipped for such treatment and there should be sent to the home territory only those patients who require special treatment or whose condition is such that they may be regarded as either permanently disabled or likely not to recover within a reasonable time. If, however, the number of new cases from the front is taxing the base hospitals beyond their capacity or the facilities thereof are inadequate from any cause to
87
Medical Department of United States Army, 1046 40
meet the demands upon them, more extensive evacuation of patients must be effected.88 One of the greatest challenges facing wounded soldiers was the often the amount of time and the physical distance between injury and treatment. In the case of the American Red Cross hospital in Kiev, patients often had to travel three to five days before they reached the hospital. Extended transportation periods exacerbated the threat of infection. Throughout the Russian medical system much of the day-to-day care fell to nurses, sanitars, and feldshers. Before WWI, Russian nurses, also referred to as “sisters,” were drawn from one of the 150 professional nursing orders. The outbreak of the conflict resulted in a severe nursing shortage, so the Russian Red Cross established expedited training programs to fill pressing wartime requirements.89 Sanitars can best be compared to the western concept of orderly. These soldiers were drawn from among those exempt from frontline services and provided support to better-trained hospital staff. Feldshers are a uniquely Russian concept. They were individuals with basic medical knowledge, not necessarily training, who could provide varying degrees of care based on their personal experience. Harvard writes, “The feldsher, or aid-surgeon, is special to Russia. He is found not only in the army, but all over the Empire, practicing medicine
88
Ibid., 1043. Susan Grant, “Russian Nurses, 1917-22,” in Russia’s Home Front in War and Revolution, 1914-22, edited by Adele Lindenmeyr, Christopher Reed, and Peter Waldron (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2016), 255. 41 89
and minor surgery wherever doctors are not available…. In the army the feldsher's services are invaluable.”90 The majority of care, however, fell to the nurses.
90
Reports of the Military Observers, 38. 42
Chapter 1: The American Red Cross and the Challenge of Neutrality in Russia: The Decision to Deploy
In September 1914, with Europe engulfed in war, the American Red Cross sent a relief ship carrying medical personnel and aid for each of nations involved in the conflict. The mission, specificly tailored to assist the wounded, was carefully crafted to maintain an appearance of complete neutrality. Entente and Central Powers benefited equally from American Red Cross genorisity. In Russia, the mission’s American personnel established a modern hospital in Kiev to care for wounded from the Galician front. These American doctors and nurses comprised the very first wartime aid mission to Russia and set the foundation for all future humanitarian initiatives. Their efforts eventually became entwined in U.S. commericial and foreign policy objectives, and caused humanitarian aid to become a vital consideration in American business and diplomatic strategy. The preeminent modern historian of the U.S.-Russian relations, Norman Saul, writes in his book War and Revolution that “The most significant medical relief for Russia…came through the auspices of the American Red Cross, which sent a unit of eight surgeons and twenty-four nurses and a considerable quantity of medical supplies in September 1915.”1 Despite the significance of this mission, no comprehensive account of its activities and accomplishments exists. Additionally, Saul’s statement contains errors; the most significant is the date. The American Red Cross mission set out from New York in September 1914, in the early months of the First World War, and arrived in
1
Norman Saul, War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914-1921 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 40. 43
Petrograd two months later.2 This first American relief effort, initiated at the outset of the war, was a harbinger and catalyst of broader aid movements that gained traction as the conflict progressed and established the precedent that humanitarian assistance could serve as a basis of improved U.S.-Russian commercial, political and military ties. Most of its veterans became vocal advocates for and participants in the Russian-American relief movement. The expectations and scope of American humanitarian assistance expanded as the U.S. drew further away from neutrality and deeper into the conflict. Americans living in Russia developed close ties with their host country and established “colonies” in several cities. American businesses invested heavily in Russia, and the small colony in Petrograd supported their activities. Lyubov Ginzberg wrote a comprehensive study of the St Petersburg/Petrograd colony, and describes this close and symbiotic relationship between the American guests and their Russian hosts: “The American experience in St. Petersburg reflected numerous attempts to persuade populations of both countries that the interdependence of Russia and America has always been strong and could not be
2
Saul’s information is a bit inaccurate, not with regard to significance, other facts including date, composition, numbers, and leadership. The original Red Cross departed New York in September 1914 with team was 6 doctors, three additional doctors arrived during the period December 1914 –February 1915, and a new overall director later that spring to fill the void left by Dr. William Magill who was relieved in November 1914. Of the overall total only five were surgeons, the others were non-surgical doctors. Saul also writes that it was under the direction of Phillip Newton and Lucy Minnigerode. While Newton eventually assumed a leadership role, he was a director of one of the two units, never of the overall mission. Similarly, Lucy Minnigerode was not the overall Russia mission nursing lead. That role fell to American Red Cross Veteran, Helen Scott Hayes. 44
ignored.”3 When war came to Russia, despite the official U.S. government policy of neutrality, the colony in Petrograd viewed the conflict from a less than neutral perspective. Many of the staff of the American Red Cross hospital in Kiev held similar views. Writings by members of the colony and American Red Cross medical personnel in Kiev refer to the Central Powers in clearly negative terms and conversely decisively laud their Russian host’s national struggle. These perspectives could be considered reflective of the views of their compatriots back in the States. Norman Saul notes: America’s view of Russia’s war, at least on the East Coast, was somewhat the same as the attitude toward Japan at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-sympathy for the underdog, a generally regarded weaker country being taken advantage of and attacked by a superior military force; a peaceful, pacifist ‘Tolstoyan Russia’ confronting a Napoleonic demon.4 Jennifer Ann Polk studied American Red Cross and YMCA efforts after the revolution, but her observations apply equally to the early-war period. She noted that “American relief workers saw themselves as contributing directly to relations between Russia and Russians on the one hand, and the United States, the Allies, and the American people on the other. They were moved to carry out their work because they saw the importance of it for the present and future of relations between the two countries.”5 Personal experience with the Russians and their war effort shaped the perspectives of the American Red Cross doctors and nurses in Kiev, and these experiences shaped their actions as the war progressed. 3
Lyubov Ginzberg, “Confronting the Cold War Legacy: The Forgotten History of the American Colony in St Petersburg, A Case Study of Reconciliation” (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 2010), 31. At the start of the First World War, Russia re-named the city to remove the words “Saint” and “burg” that had German connotations. 4 Saul, 28. 5 Jennifer Ann Polk, “Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary Russia and Civil War, 1917-24” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 2012), 2. 45
Despite its humanitarian character, the American Red Cross was a de facto military body. The organization received its initial federal charter from the United States Congress on June 6, 1900. The charter assigned it responsibility for ensuring the care and humane treatment of wounded combatants consistent with the provisions of the 1864 Geneva Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field and also designated it the official American disaster relief organization. The 1900 Charter also required the American Red Cross Society to serve as the “medium of communication between the people of the United States of America and their armies.”6 The follow-on 1905 Congressional Charter brought the organization, already under Congressional oversight, even closer to the government. The U.S. president became “president” of the American Red Cross, and he, in turn, appointed the chairman of the executive body (the Central Committee) and another five of its eighteen members, to represent the federal departments of Justice, State, Treasury, War, and the Navy.7 Placed under the supervision of the War Department, a vital element of the mission remained “to furnish volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armies in time of war.”8 U.S. military, the federal government, and American Red Cross ties tightened in the period between the Spanish American and the First World War.9 In 1912, Congress gave the Red Cross a monopoly on the voluntary provision of aid to the American armed forces. That same year, Congress passed a law permitting mobilized Red Cross workers to be treated as “civilian employees” of the armed forces, ensuring their subsistence and 6
Charter of the American Red Cross, 1900. John F. Hutchinson. Champions of Charity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 48. 8 The American Red Cross, Bulletin no. 4. Issued by the Central Committee, October 1906, 95. 9 Hutchinson, Champions of Charity, 44. 46 7
transport at government expense.10 By the time the first American Red Cross deployed to Europe in 1914, the organization was integrated fully into U.S. military operations and plans. These facts become crucial at the start of the First World War when the United States was officially neutral. On December 9, 1914, while chairing the General Board of the American Red Cross, President Wilson issued a statement that captured the nation’s philosophy on the provision of humanitarian assistance: It is really the medium of the whole world, that part of it, at any rate, which is disengaged from the terrible present conflict in Europe in ministering to those who need the ministrations of comfort and relief in these distressing circumstances….It is more necessary, therefore that we should cooperate with that spirit which I believe we all think to be characteristic of America, the spirit of absolute disinterestedness; not thinking of ourselves, but thinking of the results we wish to achieve.11 Wilson’s statement is clearly in keeping with the American policy of neutrality that required aid be offered to all warring parties on an equitable basis. Despite U.S. government oversight, funding of American Red Cross activities came solely from private sources. Official governmental financing of any American Red Cross effort risked violating America’s strict policy of neutrality.12 At the start of the war American policy towards Russia was focused less on the fighting and more on commercial considerations. Saul wrote the “primary American diplomatic goal in 1915 and 1916 was…a new treaty of commerce to replace the one
10
Ibid., 236. “President Wilson on the Relief Situation, Red Cross Magazine 10, no.1 (January 1915): 9. 12 Julia F. Irwin, Making the World Safe; The American Red Cross and A Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 57. 47 11
abrogated by the United States in 1911.”13 The previous agreement, in place since 1832, was terminated in response to Russian’s religious persecution of its Jewish minority and restrictions placed on American Jews visiting the country. Despite these differences, there was considerable positive American public sentiment towards the Russian Empire. Washington wanted a more robust trading relationship, viewing the U.S. as a market for Russian raw materials and the Empire as a consumer of American finished products, a role previously dominated by Germany. Saul elaborates: With the possibility opened for a great postwar commercial expansion, due to the expectation that Germany would not regain its former dominant position, Washington pushed for a renewed commercial expansion in Russia and a new treaty to assist it….As the war continued and popular hostility toward Germany grew, a new agreement seemed even more urgent for the United States.14 David Leavitt Hough, an American businessman and well-known member of the Petrograd colony captured the urgency he and his fellow commercial representatives felt regarding the need for enhanced bilateral trade: There will be no question whatever that Germany will be shut out of Russia for some years to come…. America should act quickly in preparing herself to take advantage of the next years to ship its home products and at the same time to its works and consequent good will so as to forestall the necessity or the possibility of having to meet German competition.15 Hough saw a window of opportunity, and urged Americans to gain a firm foothold as quickly as possible. He viewed “goodwill” as a bulwark to protect American standing, and thus became a vocal advocate of humanitarian aid to Russia. He told journalists in March 1915 in a separate interview that “American business needs to prepare for the 13
Saul, 17. Ibid., 17 15 David L. Hough, “Russia from the Point of View of an American Engineer and Business Man,” reprinted from Iron Age, March 1915, in Russia in Transition; the Diplomatic Papers of David Rowland Francis, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, 1916-1918, Reel 3, Library of Congress. 48 14
period of reconstruction in Russia succeeding the European war. The volume of business will be far larger than is generally apprehended…, but the business man here will probably have to go at least halfway if he expects to get the share which is practically his for the asking.”16 Hough described Russia as “’The Land of Great Possibilities.’ So vast are the possibilities that they arouse the interest of those looking to broaden their markets, to introduce their inventions or to investigate developable properties.”17 In other words, Hough urged using altruism as a means to an end: American economic and commercial gain. American humanitarian aid became an integral component of diplomatic and political efforts toward stronger commercial ties. Maintaining and sustaining a hospitable business environment was foremost on the mind of key members of the American colony in Petrograd. As part of its effort to enhance commercial ties, on May 1, 1915, the United States appointed its first Commercial Attaché to Russia, Henry D. Baker. Responsible for promoting American commerce and facilitating trade, he established his office on the premises of the Russian Chamber of Export in Petrograd rather than the actual American Consulate. Baker, who later became a significant advocate of American humanitarian aid to Russia, argued in one of his first official statements that “the conditions…are at present especially opportune for laying a foundation for highly important trade.”18 Baker viewed the Americans in Petrograd as “the successful advance guards of a probable great 16
“American Opportunity for Russian Business, An Interview with Capt. David L. Hough,” Iron Age 95, no. 11 (March 18, 1915), 616. 17 David L. Hough, “Russia from the Point of View of an American Engineer and Business Man,” reprinted from Iron Age, March 1915, Russia in Transition; the Diplomatic Papers of David Rowland Francis, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, 1916-1918, Reel 3, Library of Congress. 18 “An Epoch-Making Event,” Christian Advocate 79 (July 1915): 10. 49
future movement for immense trade, and very satisfactory and mutually profitable relations between the United States and Russia.”19 The Mercy Ship Americans to Kiev The establishment of the American Red Cross hospital in Kiev in late 1914 was a major demonstration of “American goodwill.” It provided a ray of hope in the early battles of the First World War when Russian military medical capabilities were rapidly overwhelmed by the volume and severity of casualties. Unprepared for war, Russian planners had severely underestimated German firepower, resulting in military medical capabilities ill-prepared for the massive number of causalities.20 Available army resources were unable to keep up with the deluge of wounded. Historian John F. Hutchinson writes, “Many of the wounded were loaded into straw filled freight cars and abruptly dispatched to the rear.”21 Russian Eighth Army Commander General A.A. Brusilov lamented how poorly equipped the Russian army was during the first days of the war. The Russian Medical Service and Sanitary Corps were relatively new and he wrote, “The position of our wounded after the early battles was pitiable in the extreme.”22 Overall medical care for Russian soldiers was the responsibility of three organizations: the Army Medical Service, the Russian Red Cross, and the Union of Zemstvos and Towns. A 1916 report captures how capabilities were overwhelmed, and existing 19
“American-Russian Business Cooperation; Remarks of Henry D. Baker, Commercial Attaché of the United States of the United States of America, at Testimonial Dinner Given for Him by American Business Men in Petrograd, May 24, 1916,” Henry Dunster Baker Papers, Rubenstein Library of Duke University, 2. 20 John F. Hutchinson, Late Imperial Russia 1890-1917 (London: Longman, 1999), 73. 21 Ibid., 77. 22 Aleksei Alekseyevich Brusilov, A Soldier’s Notebook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 33. 50
medical infrastructure was insufficient to address the mounting causalities: …during the first few weeks of the war, the influx of wounded was so great that the number of hospitals at the disposal of the Army Medical Service and Red Cross Society proved to be wholly inadequate to provide accommodations for all of those who were in need of it. A vast number of hospital beds were needed in the interior of the country, and the Army Medical Service and the Red Cross Society, chiefly devoting their attention and energy to the work at the front, were unable to solve this problem.23 Bruce Lincoln concurred, describing how little progress the Russian army had made since the Russo-Japanese War: “The situation was even worse in 1914…because Russian soldiers faced even more devastating weapons and hospitals had to cope with far more casualties.”24 The man who eventually became director of the entire American Red Cross Hospital at Kiev, Dr. Henry Hamilton Snively, noted his frustration with the inferior nature of Russian medical infrastructure during his service in 1915: One thing was borne in on me as a result of my observation-and that is that if a man must give his services to his country in battle he deserves to have intelligent officers lest he sacrifices his life to no avail; another that it is his due that he be assured of prompt, ample and skilled attention in case he is sick or wounded. These things Russia was not able to give early in the war….many suffered and died while the Russian Medical Department and its Hospital Corps were getting their training. It is the old story of the difficulty of getting trained Hospital Corps men at the beginning of the war and the great need of their services from the first day of mobilization.25 American humanitarians, including the Red Cross, worked diligently to distribute medical support to all of the European nations involved in the conflict on an equitable basis. Despite official neutrality, the American public rallied disproportionately to Allied causes. Norman Saul explains their generally sympathetic view towards Russia: 23
Memo to Mr. Emmett White, Bureau Insular and Foreign Affairs, American Red Cross, March 12, 1919, File 948.08 “Russia-General,” RG 200, ANRC, Group 1, Central Decimal File. 24 W. Bruce Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution, 1914-1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 96. 25 H.H Snively, “Base Hospital Work in Russia,” Military Surgeon 38, no. 6 (June 1916): 629. 51
Combined with the modest but effective Russian publicity campaign in the United States was a genuine and somewhat spontaneous movement to mitigate the horrors of war on the Russian side. Similar to their sympathy for the victims of the German ‘rape’ of Belgium, many Americans responded to the need to alleviate the suffering in Russia caused by a very large refugee problem and the inadequacy of medical facilities to handle an overwhelming number of battle casualties.26 These contributions to aid Russian war sufferers usually came from small private donors. They usually went to the Orthodox Church, charities established by the Russian embassy, and in some cases directly to Americans living in Russia.27 However, in the summer of 1914 large-scale American Red Cross efforts launched by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and Chairman of the Board for the American Red Cross Mabel Thorp Boardman eclipsed these still somewhat meager efforts. Boardman proposed chartering a ship packed with hospital supplies and medical personnel to support all of the European belligerents on an equitable basis.28 To support this effort, Boardman and her Red Cross Board worked to raise enough private funds to send a hospital with surgeons and nurses to each of the countries engaged in the counflict.29 A well-publicized August 5, 1914, joint meeting of the National and War Relief Boards of the American Red Cross developed initial plans to meet the growing medical needs in Europe. The session was held at the War Department under the auspices of the Surgeon General of the US Army, William Gorgas, and presided over by Chairman of the 26
Saul, 36-37. . Ibid. 28 Rhea Foster Dulles, The American Red Cross; A History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 130. 29 Marian Moser-Jones, The American Red Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2013), 158. Units went to Germany, AustriaHungary, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Serbia, and Russia. 52 27
International Red Cross Committee, Counselor to the Department of State, and future Secretary, Robert Lansing.30 The resulting appeal stated “…the American Red Cross, …the sake of humanity…has decided to charter a ship and send to each country involved, doctors, nurses, and hospital supplies.”31 Boardman described how “assistance will be given to all in the true spirit of the Red Cross represented by its motto ‘NeutralityHumanity.’”32 To avoid any misperception regarding the mission’s neutrality, only native-born American physicians and nurses were selected to deploy.33 Within a month, the Red Cross raised enough funds to send its first European relief ship to with thirtythree surgeons and 137 nurses.34 Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan firmly supported Red Cross efforts to provide equitable assistance and felt the mission was compatible with the August 9, 1914, U.S. Declaration of Neutrality.35 As discussed previously, despite being perceived by many as a “private” organization, the Red Cross served as the official representative of the U.S. Government for the provision of humanitarian and medical assistance. Therefore, aid to any of the belligerents required great caution. According to historian Julia Irwin in “1914, neutrality was contested terrain, the United States had to tread carefully to avoid becoming embroiled in world turmoil.”36 On August 7, in preparation for the Russian portion of this mission, the State 30
“The Appeals for Europe’s Wounded,” The American Red Cross Magazine 9, no.4 (October 1914): 215-216. “General News,” Military Surgeon 35, no. 3 (September 1914): 307. 31 . “The Appeals for Europe’s Wounded,” 216. 32 . Quoted in Dulles, American Red Cross, 131. 33 “General News,” Military Surgeon 35, no.3 (September 1914): 307 34 Several similar groups departed over the next few months, Irwin, 56. 35 Irwin, Making the World Safe, 56. 36 Ibid., 57. 53
Department transmitted a carefully worded offer of assistance to Russian Ambassador Georges Petrovich Bakhmetev, informing him that “we will be able to send a very fine unit of trained nurses and physicians properly equipped to be of great assistance….We most sincerely hope that the offer will be accepted, as it gives us a chance to actively express our deep sympathy in this terrible war.”37 On August 19, the American Embassy in Petrograd notified Washington that the “Russian Red Cross gratefully accepts the offer of the American Red Cross.”38 By August 27, Boardman informed Ambassador Bakhmetev that the American Red Cross was able to increase their offer to Russia from one medical unit to two, for a combined total of six surgeons and twenty-four nurses.39 On August 13, 1914, President Woodrow Wilson, in his capacity as symbolic head of the American Red Cross, issued an appeal for funds to support the European mission: “The American Red Cross is earnestly desirous of assisting its sister societies in their endeavors to alleviate distress and suffering among the combatants, and therefore appeals for funds to be expended impartially for the relief of sick and wounded soldiers of the nations at war.”40 This first American engagement in the Great War, according to Marian MoserJones, author of The American Red Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal, constituted
37
Letter to Russian Ambassador, Letter, August 7, 1914, File 591.4, "Medical UnitsRussia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 38 Lansing to Magee, Letter, August 19, 1914, Ibid. 39 Boardman to Bakhmetev, Letter, August 27, 1914, File 948.001, RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 40 “The Appeals for Europe’s Wounded,” 216. 54
“a bold act of neutral humanitarian engagement.”41 She contends that exploration of the Red Cross missions sheds new light on the contested issue of U.S. neutrality in the first months of the war. Moser-Jones explains, “The Mercy Mission represented a particular ‘Red Cross’ brand of neutral humanitarian engagement, which occurred in parallel with American diplomatic decisions on how to operate as a neutral nation during this period.”42 One first step along this new path was the selection of the ship to carry the medical staff and their supplies. Breaking numerous precedents, by special act of Congress, a German registered vessel was placed under American registry and flew both the American and Red Cross flags. The ship, Hamburg, was provided at no-cost by Germany’s Hamburg-American Line. For purposes of this mission, her name was changed to Red Cross.43 Major Robert Patterson, U.S. Army Medical Service, and Chief of the Red Cross Medical Bureau was tasked with recruiting surgeons, and founder of the American Red Cross Nursing Service Jane Delano was responsible for nurses. All applicants had to be American by birth and agreed to deployments of at least six months. Unit Medical Directors were paid $250.00 per month, while other physicians received $160.00.44 As an additional precaution, because many of the surnames of the doctors and nurses were “distinctly continental…they agreed to follow the European custom and to be known as 41
. Marian Moser Jones, Sister Soldiers: American Red Cross Nurses in Europe’s Great War, 1914-1915, https://history.umd.edu/sites/history.umd.edu/files/Sistersoldiers_draft_mmj_feb2.pdf, 2. 42 Moser Jones, Sister Soldiers, 1. 43 “The Story of the Ship,” The American Red Cross Magazine 9, no. 4 (October 1914): 209. 44 “Information For Volunteers For American Red Cross, European Service,” Military Surgeon 35, no .3 (September 1914): 305. 55
‘Sister Donna’ or ‘Sister Charlotte’….”45 Medical staff were divided into eleven units, each composed of twelve nurses and three surgeons. France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Germany were each assigned two units. Austria, Serbia, and Hungary were each given one.46 Of the eleven total medical units that the American Red Cross organized for the Europe-wide mission, Russia was assigned two. The first, Unit C, was headed by Dr. William S. Magill, former director of a New York State Hygienic Laboratory, and an inactive member of the Army Medical Reserve Corps. His background included considerable experience in clinics in the U.S. and Europe.47 His deputy, Dr. Philip Newton of Washington, D.C., was an Assistant Professor of Anatomy and 1910 graduate of Georgetown Medical School. Previously Newton worked as a surgeon in some of Washington’s largest hospitals, and also served as the Assistant Director for the American Red Cross for Mexican Relief.48 Dr. Paul Hudson Zinkhan, another Georgetown Medical graduate, was chosen as second assistant, A member of the medical staff at the Washington, D.C Asylum Hospital, he also studied at Johns Hopkins.49 Dr. Edward Egbert headed the other Kiev-bound group. A graduate of Dartmouth Medical School and Baltimore Medical College, Egbert had considerable surgical experience, and previously worked with the Red Cross caring for civil war veterans at the 1913 Grand Army of the Republic reunion in Gettysburg, PA. 45
Lavinia Dock, History of American Red Cross Nursing (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1922), 142. 46 Dock, 141. All of the groups were transported on SS Red Cross, except for the Serbian unit which went on a vessel bound for Piraeus, Greece. 47 Memorandum Listing Personnel, File 591.4, “Medical Units General,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 48 “American Red Cross Doctors and Nurses in Russia,” Christian Advocate 82 (October 1915): 14. 49 Ibid.,. 56
His first assistant was Dr. Brown McClintic, a graduate of Western Reserve University. The second assistant was Dr. Paul Zinkhan’s brother, Arthur, who also graduated from Georgetown Medical School.50 Within a month of their arrival in Russia, Magill was relieved from his position, and Newton became the new Director of Unit C.51 He and his Unit H counterpart, Edward H. Egbert, formed a partnership that lasted throughout the war and eventually set in motion some of the earliest attempts to rally the American homefront to provide aid for Russia. American Red Cross pioneer Helen Scott Hay supervised the Kiev nurse cadre. Hay is first among the pantheon of renowned First World War Red Cross nurses. A wellknown personality among American humanitarians at the time, her activities attracted considerable interest among the charitable elite. Lucy Minnigerode, Newton’s nursing supervisor, is also quite highly regarded among Red Cross historians.52 50
Memorandum Listing Personnel, File 591.4, "Medical Units General," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 51 . The reasons for Magill’s removal are not clear. However, after being removed, he reportedly offered his services the Russian Army eventually becoming a Lieutenant General in the Medical Service under the 3rd Army and General Ratko Dimitriev. Magill returned to the United States in June 1915 and told reporters that he saw considerable frontline action in Galicia. While in Russia, he married a Russian Princess he met at the front. She was a first lieutenant in the Medical Service, Camille Grandclement, Princess of Graves. However, Mary Farley’s diary suggests they were together in Petrograd: “Dr. McGill came in with Camille! She is to go along as interpreter! Seems an outrage to have a man behave as he is doing, especially an American. This could explain his dismissal.” “Arrives in Uniform,” Washington Post, June 15, 1915, 2. News Journal (Wilmington, DE), September 3, 1928, 3. Mary Frederika Farley. Papers, 1881-1987; diary, October 17, 1914, 29, MC 446, Folder1. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 52 . Minnigerode was another Red Cross pioneer. During the First World War, she organized an recruited a large number of nurses for service on the Western front, and also became one of the founding members of the U.S. Public Health Service. 57
On September 11, the United States Department of State certified the neutrality of the SS Red Cross mission “for the purpose of carrying surgeons, nurses, and hospital supplies to the battle fields of the countries unhappily involved in the present conflict.”53 Great Britain and France provided assurances they would not detain the vessel under provisions of their maritime blockade.54 American and Red Cross flagged by an August 20, 1914, joint resolution of Congress, SS Red Cross departed Brooklyn on September 13, 1914, and sailed away with much fanfare on the first leg of its journey to Europe.55 First stop was the United Kingdom, where it debarked the Russia and Britain-bound personnel and supplies before continuing to the European continent. 56 A week after arriving in Falmouth, United Kingdom, Russia-bound units C and H left the ship for London, before proceeding north through Scotland, Sweden, and finally Finland.57 A representative of the Russian Red Cross met them in Raumo, Finland and escorted them on the final leg of their journey to Petrograd.58 On October 14, upon arrival in the Russian capital, they were escorted to the Emperor’s private room at the station where they received an official welcome from the local Head of the Russian Red
53
. Lansing letter, September 11, 1914, File 811.142/295, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement, The World War. Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914Supp/d1334. 54 During the First World War, the Allies maintained a blockade of the Central Powers directed at restricting military, commercial, and other sea-based commerce. Since several of the American Red Cross units were bound for Germany and Austria-Hungary, special arrangements were made to permit them to proceed without being detained. 55 Tenth Annual Report, 21. 56 Dock, 141. All of the groups were transported on SS Red Cross, except for the Serbian unit which went on a vessel bound for Piraeus, Greece. 57 Dock, 145 and 155. 58 Ibid. 58
Cross, Count Bobrinsky.59 They also received an official welcome from American Ambassador George T. Mayre and Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna ( the symbolic head of the Russian Red Cross) in the royal residence. 60 Nurse Mary Farley described this first of numerous brushes with the Imperial family. She wrote that the American contingent went into the audience room, and then each member was introduced to the Dowager Empress. After shaking hands and speaking with Dr. Magill, who was still Director, the Dowager Empress greeted each member of the unit individually. Egbert kissed her hand, an action repeated by all of the other doctors.61 He later recalled a somewhat humorous aspect of this encounter: “we were presented to the Dowager Empress. I kissed her Majesty’s hand so loud that some of the nurses…got the giggles. They were all sort of hysterical anyway, suppose, as it was actually…a great honor.”62 This high-level welcome seems to indicate the value Russia placed on the American Red Cross mission. American press reported that the Russians attached “importance to the American expedition as likely to add to the cordial relations between the two countries.”63 The Americans, like many of their medical counterparts in the Russian military forces, received army commissions through the Russian Red Cross. The American doctors were commissioned into the Tsar’s Army, while the nurses were inducted into the 59
Lucy Minnigerode, “Experiences of Unit C at Kief,” American Journal of Nursing 16, no. 3(December 1915): 221. 60 Ibid. 61 Mary Frederika Farley Papers, 1881-1987; diary, October 14, 1914, 28. MC 446, Folder 1. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 62 Letter, October 14, 1914, Edward H. Egbert Papers, Box/Folder 1:14, Hoover Institution Archives. 63 “Russians Greet American Nurses,” New York Tribune, October 12, 1914, 3. 59
Russian Red Cross.64 This process was similar to the relationship between the U.S. military and the American Red Cross. Civilian medical services provided pathways to the Red Cross, which in turn provided personnel to the American military medical forces. Newton and Egbert, as Directors, were given the Russian rank of General Officer, while the four assistant surgeons became Lieutenant Colonels. On October 16, the General Military Secretary of the Inspector General in Petrograd conveyed the following Imperial Order from the Emperor to the “Director Manager” of the Russian Red Cross: Order 2025 3 October 1914 BY THE IMPERIAL ORDER: On the first day of October65- His Imperial Majesty granted to the American Physicians who came to work on the battle fields under the flag of the Red Cross the uniform of the Russian Military Physician with the rank:___ For the one who executes the duties of consultant or head physician, the rank of brigadier general; for the physician who fulfills the duties of head director or first assistant, the rank of Colonel; and for the senior physicians, the rank of lieutenant colonel. THE ORIGINAL IS TRULY SIGNED: Director of the Inspectorial Branch of the Headquarters of the Russian Society of the Red Cross66 According to Moser Jones, “There seemed to be less concern with maintaining the appearance of neutrality for this unit – perhaps because they were so far from the U.S. and the Anglo-American press.”67 Newton and Egbert were delighted with their new Russian uniforms, and had their photos taken by the Associated Press. Western press and U.S. Red Cross periodicals carried many pictures of the American neutral doctors in the 64
Malcolm Grow was taken to the Red Cross to apply for his Commission in 1915. Malcolm Grow, Surgeon Grow: An American in the Russian Fighting (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1918), 31. 65 October 1 is Julian; October 14 is Gregorian (by 20th century) 66 Translation of Copy of Imperial Order, October 1, 1914, from the Dr. Newton family. Also original in Russian. 67 Moser Jones, Sister Soldiers, 25. 60
military uniforms of a belligerent nation.68 During their brief stay in Petrograd, the American doctors and nurses visited various military and civilian medical facilities, studied at the Kaufman Hospital to learn Russian medical equipment and procedures,.69 They also met many members of the Petrograd American colony who would later play a critical role in sustaining American medical support to Russia. Petrograd’s Methodist minister Dr. George A. Simons, the de facto dean of the colony and eventual head of the American Committee of the Russian Red Cross, even presented Nurse Mary Farley a bible.70 After waiting three weeks for their equipment to arrive, Units C and H finally departed Petrograd on October 28, 1914.71 Augmented by thirty-six members of the Russian Sanitary Corps, known as “sanitars,” they embarked on the five-day, 900-mile journey to Kiev. 72 Sanitars were soldiers who could not deploy to the front but instead served as orderlies, carrying and transporting the wounded to rear echelon locations. Russia could have established two separate hospitals with their two American Red Cross medical units. Instead, they chose to combine them into a single large entity that
68
American personnel were issued distinctive Red Cross uniforms when they departed New York. Given the extreme caution taken to avoid a perception of favoritism and support for any belligerent, the wearing of a Russian military uniform by American Red Cross personnel is somewhat questionable. 69 “Russians Greet American Nurses,” New York Tribune, October 12, 1914, 3. 70 Diary entry, October 25, 1914, Farley Papers. 71 Sophie Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” “Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Convention of the American Nurses’ Association.” The American Journal of Nursing 18, no. 11 (1918): 1037. 72 “Russians Greet American Nurses,” New York Tribune, October 12, 1914, 3. 61
would serve wounded evacuated to Kiev.73 Russian plans initially called for a 200-bed hospital that could eventually be expanded to hold 700 patients.74 Fortunately, the nineteen car train transporting the Americans to Kiev carried enough American and Russian medical and surgical material to support a 400-bed facility. The Russian Red Cross filled ten cars from their warehouses in Petrograd, while the Americans’ equipment occupied five more. The remaining cars carried the American and Russian staff.75 They reached Kiev the first week of November 1914 and inspected numerous buildings before agreeing to establish the hospital at the largest building in Kiev, the massive Polytechnic Institute established by order of Nicholas II on a hill overlooking Kiev, located just outside the city. Part of a fifty-four-acre site, the building was constructed in 1898 and could accommodate six thousand students.76 Assuming control over a full wing of the Institute on November 13, the staff worked arduously to convert the university into a sanitary military hospital.77 Staff living quarters were ready by November 20, and the American staff moved into the facility. While the initial plan was only 200 beds, almost immediately requirements changed, presumably because of the volume of causalities from the Galician front, and the team had to prepare to handle 400 patients.78 Doctors, nurses, and sanitars worked for several
73
Bicknell, E. Percy. (1936). In war's wake, 1914-1915: the Rockefeller Foundation and the American Red Cross Join in Civilian Relief (Washington, D. C.: American national Red Cross, 1935), 252. 74 Ibid., 3. 75 “American Red Cross Nurses Royally Treated in Russia,” New York Sun, September 5, 1915, 45. 76 Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 623. 77 Possession was delayed due to previous occupants remaining in the building. 78 Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1037. 62
weeks completing the Institute’s transformation79 Living quarters, a pharmacy and administrative offices were on the first floor. The second and third floors housed operating rooms, dressing stations, and wards.80 A shed was constructed behind the hospital to serve as a storehouse and kitchen. The facility could prepare enough food to feed up to 800 people a day, including patients and hospital personnel.81 The Russian hosts provided medicines and a pharmacist for the hospital. According to a 1915 account, from Henry Hamilton Snively, the pharmacy was stocked with equipment and medicine “to furnish a good drug store” in the U.S.82 In his opinion, the hospital was well-equipped, except for thermometers and rubber gloves. However, for logistical reasons to be explored later, supply deliveries were not dependable. As an example, at some point, the staff had to save all bandages with iodine for “redistillation.”83 In addition to the American staff, there were several Russian doctors, including a consulting physician, some dentists, over a dozen Russian nurses and the several dozen Russian sanitars.84 The Polytechnic Institute’s Department of Electrical Engineering
79
. “Russia Honors Americans,” The American Red Cross Magazine Vol 10, no. 1. (January 1915): 39. 80 Ibid. 81 Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 626. 82 Ibid., 627. 83 Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 628. 84 Not much documentation exists about the Russian doctors. Mary Farley provides some information. She mentions three different individuals in her diary. A December 26, 1914, entry includes the following mention: Dr. Cadey the new Russian Doctor came today. Have seen him before and he does nice interpreting. Poor Ginzton is in bad all around.” She also makes several references to a Dr. Kadetz and Moelinsky. Mary Frederika Farley. Papers, 1881-1987; diary, December 26, 1914, 65. MC 446, Folder1. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 63
provided the experts and equipment to support an X-Ray capability.85 Upon first taking possession of the space for the hospital, American Nurse Sophie Kiel wrote, “We had a wonderful time getting that building ready for a hospital. We had to clean away twentyfive years’ accumulation of dust. It took us a whole month to get that building ready.”86 Anecdotes from American journalist Ernestine Evans captured the extreme amount of cleaning she observed during a visit to the hospital. She wrote, “‘Never’ said the Russian from Petrograd ‘have I seen so much scrubbing. They wear the floor away these Americans.’”87 One Russian even said that Helen Scott Hays “eats brushes” and Evans wrote, “She does indeed.’”88 A similarly humorous observation described how a group of sanitars remarked “We go to fight the enemy of America….If the nurse says scrub it twenty times, why no matter. We will scrub.’”89 After a month of preparation, the hospital was finally ready to receive patients on December 5, 1914. At 2:30 PM on that first day, the patients began to arrive, reportedly from the vicinity of Krakow.90 Under the watchful eye of Egbert, the patients were processed, cleaned, and treated. The following day, a religious ceremony commemorated the hospital’s official opening. Three priests, two deacons, and a group of twenty singers conducted a mass and blessed the beds with holy water, while dignitaries from the 85
Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 626. Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1037. The reference to “twenty-five years accumulation of dust” was likely a figure of speech since the building was only sixteen years old. 87 Ernestine Evans, “Russia’s Women Lovable in War Times: Miss Evans Visits Petrograd and …..” New York Tribune, January 31, 1915, B13.The term “Sister” was used as a title for nurses. Correspondence often refers to American and Russian nurses as “Sister” and their first name. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Evans, “Russia’s Women Lovable in War,” B13. 64 86
community observed the spectacle.91 Transporting the Wounded, Kiev during Time of War They tell us stories of the war, but never speak of their experiences as a hardship. One man described having been wounded at a place the soldiers call "the mountain of death." He lay among the bodies of his company on the field for five days, giving himself First Aid, before the firing lifted enough for anyone to bring him in. Another owed his life to a peasant woman, to whose shell-rifled hut he had crawled. A third was buried in a trench for dead, but managed in three days to dig himself out. 92 Kiev, the third largest city in Russia, with a population of more than half-amillion, housed the closest “base hospital” to the Southern front. 93 Approximately 200 miles from the Galician frontier, the city was the critical link in processing and treating Russia’s wounded during the First World War. After the disastrous Russian retreat of Summer 1915, Newton told the New York Times : “Kiev is the centre to which all of the wounded have been brought…from the battlefields of South Russia; on many days as many as 10,000 patients a day have been handled at the big receiving hospital in the railroad yards.”94 Snively observed the volume of wounded processed at Kiev railway station and their care: sanitary trains with their red flags flapping in the wind, slowly brought in their great burden of sick and wounded…to evacuation station and there classified. Those able to stand transportation were fed, the wounds dressed, and they were sent back to the heart of Russia-to Moscow, to Rostov on the Don, or to one of the other numerous cities having hospitals-while those unable to bear such transportation were conveyed by means of specially prepared street cars to the hospitals of Kiev.95 91
Ibid. Dock, 157, 93 A base hospital was a semi-permanent facility to provide more advanced medical care than available at the front. 94 “Russian Wounds Serious,” New York Times (New York, NY), October 3, 1915, 2. 95 Major H.H. Snively, “A National Guardsman on the Galician Front,” National Guard Magazine 13, no. 7 (July 1916): 132. 65 92
As the war continued, almost every building in Kiev served as a hospital.96 Even its historic catacombs, the Pecherskaia Lavra, were converted to serve the wounded. American Doctor John Mann, who joined the American Kiev hospital staff in February 1915, told reporters that the historic burial chambers housed a hundred bed hospital.97 British physician James Young Simpson visited the caves in the summer and wrote, “There in the niches lay the dead who are alive.”98 During the early stages of the war, transport from the frontlines to Kiev took an average of three to five days. 99 This lengthy journey was obviously risky for wounded soldiers. Patients received basic first aid from front-line medics and then were transferred by sanitars, medical assistants (feldshers) or other personnel with limited training to dressing stations, usually located between a quarter and a couple of miles behind Russian positions. Once behind the lines, patients were stabilized and prepared for the journey to more capable medical facilities located further in the rear. An American doctor noted one of these facilities handled 1700 patients in a single night.100 According to American Red Cross Nurse Alma Foster, some Russian soldiers told her that their only painkiller at the front was a cigarette.101 Soldiers fit for duty were returned to the front, while those requiring additional care were transported to railheads by carts, two-horse military ambulance, peasant 96
“Thinks Russian Soldier is the Bravest,” Des Moines Register, August 16, 1915, 3. “Virginia Surgeon Tells of Marvels of Surgery,” Times Dispatch, October 31, 1915, 9. 98 J.Y. Simpson, The Self Discovery of Russia (London: Constable and Company, 1916), 153. 99 Egbert to Creel, March 12, 1918, Box/Folder 1:8, Edward H. Egbert Papers, Hoover Institution Archives. 100 “Guardsman,” 132. 101 “Nurses Tell Stories About European War,” Decatur Herald (Decatur, Illinois), November 10, 1915, 3. 66 97
wagon, or if lucky by automobile or truck.102 If lengthy travel was required to reach the nearest railway, then sub-care and treatment stations were placed along the route. According to Egbert in a letter to George Creel, Head of the American Committee on Public Information, early in the war, there were “100,000 ambulances on the western front, while there were only 6,000 in the entire Russian Army. 103 Sometimes the wounded had to be transferred as far as twenty miles in springless carts.”104 Nurse Sophie Kiel estimated by 1915 Russia had only 340 to 360 ambulances on the entire Southern front.105 At the front, patients were normally in the care of the military, with occasional supervised assistance from the Russian Red Cross, until transfer to a hospital train. Once at railway stations, wounded were evaluated, segregated by the seriousness of wounds, and evacuated to hospitals several hundred miles from the fighting. Hospital trains were specially designed to provide care for the long journey, and by some accounts, had space for 650 wounded, as well as the entire medical support staff. These unique trains were maintained by the military, the Union of Zemstvos, or the Russian Red Cross, as well as by wealthy patrons. Facilities included berthing for staff and crew, dining facilities, wards, operating theaters, disinfection stations, administration and patient records, as well as a pharmacy.106 While traveling, despite the facilities, little attempt was usually made 102
Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 623. The Committee on Public information was an organization created by President Wilson for domestic information and overseas propaganda. 104 Egbert to Creel, letter, March 12, 1918, Edward H. Egbert Papers, Box/Folder 1:8, Hoover Institution Archives. 105 Sophie Kiel, “Experience in Russia,” Pacific Coast Journal of Nursing Vol 14, no. 11 (November 1918): 659 106 Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 624. 67 103
to clean or operate on the soldiers.107 Only “imperative” surgery occurred during these journeys.108 Once at Kiev, wounded were unloaded onto designated railway platforms converted into medical receiving stations for intermediate care before transfer to more permanent and capable hospitals. Sheds were constructed for medical purposes, and used for dressing wounds, feeding, operating rooms, wards, etc. At these medical receiving stations, patients were once again evaluated and separated according to the severity of their injuries and the required level of care. Nurse Sophie Kiel described the process once patients arrived at the Kiev medical receiving station before transfer to local hospitals: It was a massive depot with twenty-nine dressing stations arranged on the platform….The trains backed in one side of the platform, patients were brought in the waiting room on one side, their temperatures taken, food brought to them, or soup if there was any. Then the Russian doctor came to look at the patient and decide whether he was to have a dressing or go on, to stay in the city or be sent to an evacuation station…. On the other side of the platform were tramways; there were no automobiles there then.109 Patients who could withstand more travel were forwarded to Moscow, where in September 1915 there were over 100,000 beds for military use. Those requiring immediate surgery or additional care were sent to local hospitals.110
The American Red Cross Hospital in Kiev The American Red Cross Hospital established in Kiev in late 1914 became the 107 108 109 110
Ibid., 625. Snively,”Guardsman,” 132. Sophie Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1040. Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 625. 68
most visible symbol of U.S. humanitarian support for Russia, and as such became an enormous source of prestige for the Petrograd American colony. Representatives from the colony wrote that it “has assumed such substantial importance in promoting goodwill and deep respect on the part of the Russian Government and Russian people for the United States of America.”111 An article in their local Russian-English publication, Kristiansky Pobornik (herein referred to as the Christian Advocate), described the Kiev American Red Cross Hospital as follows: “Kieff has come to enjoy the reputation of being one of the model hospitals for Russia, and many of the most difficult cases have been brought here for operation.”112 The work of the doctors and staff received universal accolades, visits from dignitaries, and local Russian community support. Its work received recognition from the Tsar, the Dowager Empress, and Prince Oldenburg, the Head of the Russian Red Cross, as well as many other essential State officials.113 The American Red Cross hospital in Kiev, officially termed by the Russian military as a “base hospital” because of its substantial medical capabilities, was, despite its scale and location, in essence, a stationary surgical evacuation “field hospital.” It was designed to receive patients, treat them, and then move them to more permanent facilities in the rear.114 Soon after, according to Nurse Lucy Minnigerode, “patients arrived rapidly in batches of from twenty-five to seventy-five or a hundred until our hospital was full,
111
“Conserving America’s Prestige in Russia,” 13. Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 “American Nurse Tells Graphic Story,” Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette, November 14, 1915, 29. 69 112
and from that time on it was kept full.”115 Despite its location in a major city, like much of the antediluvian infrastructure in Russia, the building was poorly suited to support a medical facility, further highlighting the difference between American and Russian standards of medicine. The only source of hot water was in the basement, and all running water(both hot and cold) ceased above the first floor. Hot water supported the basement’s use as a receiving area for patients, and contained “an efficient system of baths, which awakened the interest of many other hospitals in Kief.”116 The scarcity of running water remained a "chief anxiety" of the staff. According to Nurse Minnigerode, frequently there was no running water after 10 AM. Hot water always had to be carried from the basement. Improvisation was key to success; the Americans used a system of large tanks on each floor, filling them every morning. This ensured a source of cold water when the running water was cut off. Smaller tanks of boiled water for drinking were available on each corridor.117 Despite the plumbing shortfalls, the hospital's baths and accompanying preparation procedures were of particular interest to Russian audiences. In fact, other local hospitals replicated American processes and infrastructure.118 Not surprisingly, the hot and cold war baths were located in the basement. All ambulatory patients were bathed there, under the supervision of a doctor, while more severely injured patients were 115
Lucy Minnigerode, “The Heart of a Hospital in Russia,” American Red Cross Magazine 20, no. 9 (September 1915): 311-312. As wounded arrived, they were interviewed by Russian administrative staff and issued an identity tag with their patient tracking number. Only after a bath and shaving were they moved to the dressing station or wards. (“Miss Reinhardt, Nurse,” Hickory Daily Record (North Carolina), January 2, 1916, 3.) 116 Dock, 156. 117 Minnigerode, “Experiences of Unit C at Kief,” 222. 118 Ibid., 223. 70
sponge-cleaned by nurses in an adjoining room.119 All of these procedures were an attempt to establish sanitary standards in a culture and facility ill-equipped to sustain them. Not all patients appreciated the value of these enhanced hygienic conditions. American Nurse Helen Reinhardt recorded how one Russian patient insisted he was “clean enough” and he would rather be “back at the front or in the hands of the Germans,” than properly bathed.120 American sanitary procedures were so noteworthy that Acting Chairman of the Central Committee of the American Red Cross Eliot Wadsworth recorded them in his observations after a short visit to the Kiev hospital: American women took them in hand, clipped their hair short, killed off any uncomfortable accompanying animals they had, gave them a bath, for the first time, perhaps, in months, took their uniforms, in which they had lain in the trenches or in the hospitals, and then traveled for days on a hospital train, cleaned them as much as they could and put them away in bags. At last those men were put to bed, carried upstairs into wards, and perhaps for the first time in their lives, they lay between two clean sheets in the most perfect comfort that they had ever enjoyed.121 Wadsworth was just one of many distinguished visitors to the facility. The hospital hosted frequent civilian and military visitors of all ranks and social standing who wanted to observe modern American medical and sanitary practices. Representatives of local Russian hospitals marveled at the American techniques, improvements, and capabilities. They frequently came to watch and learn from their American counterparts. Nurse Minnigerode described how groups of twenty to thirty medical students from a nearby nursing school routinely visited to learn from the American surgeons and 119
Ibid. “Miss Reinhardt, Nurse,” 3. 121 . Eliot Wadsworth, “The Work of the Red Cross in the Event of War,” American Journal of Nursing 17, no. 12 (September 1917): 1153-1154. 71 120
nurses.122 Soon, the Kiev hospital received “as many visitors as patients.”123 Russians officials viewed the American model worthy of emulation for both civilian and military medical care. Commercial Attaché Baker saw this as an added benefit of the American Red Cross Kiev hospital. The facility served as a showcase to market American medical technology. He explained, “The American Doctors and Nurses in Russia have already imparted much useful knowledge to this country as to up-to-date American methods and appliances.”124 In addition to medical practices and technology, there was also a difference in quality of care. Nurse Minnigerode captured the perspective of the Russian soldier: “The patients themselves were quick to realize the difference in the nursing service given them in the American and in the Russian hospitals. Neither patient, sanitar, nor Russian sister would have been willing to return to the way of caring for the wounded to which they had been accustomed.”125 The hospital also attracted the interest of the Royal Family and senior military officials.”126 Such notoriety created an atmosphere of “dress parade nursing” where everyone and everything always had to be at its best.”127 Despite the fact that Kiev hosted one of the largest Russian military hospitals in the country, medical students from local schools visited the American hospital, and expressed their desire to to go to the U.S. for post122
. Minnigerode, “Heart of a Hospital in Russia,” 314 . Dock, 76. 124 Baker to Chief, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Dept of Commerce, Letter, November 8, 1915, File 591.4, "Medical Units-Russia," RG 200, ANRC, Group 1, CDF 1881-1916, NACP. 125 . Minnigerode, “Experiences of Unit C at Kief,” 223. 126 Minnigerode, “Heart of a Hospital in Russia,” 314. 127 . Ibid. 72 123
graduate studies.128 The now fifty-plus sanitars and Russian Red Cross nurses came from all walks of life. American Nurse Hettie Reinhardt described her colleagues: “The women are very patriotic and from the latter class we had eight or ten princesses as poor as the peasants…and Baronesses and the like.”129 There were by some accounts nearly a dozen women of noble birth working at the American Kiev hospital. Marriage between the American doctors and the Russian noblewomen was common. In fact, doctors Philip Newton and Dean Winn both married Russian noblewomen. On January 23, 1915, Newton married Princess Helene Schahofskaya.130 Winn married head-nurse, noblewoman, and interpreter Alexandra Hartmann before he returned to the United States.131 Nurse Minnigerode, described the composition of the nurse cadre as “daughters of merchants and priests all trying to make their contribution to Russia’s war effort.132 The Americans admired their Russian counterparts’ intellect and were impressed that many of the Russian “sisters” spoke English. These women, in addition to caring for the wounded, served as interpreters for the American staff. 133 While such high profile rank and file nursing staff may seem somewhat out of place, it was quite common to find Russian nobility among the ranks of their Red Cross. 128
Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 631. “Miss Reinhardt, Nurse,” Hickory Daily Record (North Carolina), January 2, 1916, 3. 130 “Sad Romance Behind is Behind Marriage to Princess of Washington Doctor,” Washington Times, January 23, 1915, 4. 131 “No Cuts by Saber, Asserts Dr. Winn,” Atlanta Constitution. October 3, 1915, 4. 132 " Minnigerode, “Experiences of Unit C at Kief,” 222. 133 “Russian Army Largest; Nation Regenerated, Pittsburgher Asserts,” Pittsburgh PostGazette, August 2, 1916, 1. 73 129
The Empress herself trained as a nurse in the Russian Red Cross. The Czar’s younger sister Grand Duchess Olga served as a nurse on a hospital train that operated between Kiev and the Galician Front.134 Egbert relayed a story about Olga dressing and feeding the wounded, and since her identity was concealed, the soldiers did not recognize her. According to the account, she told a soldier that she desired to go closer to the front to be of "greater service in her mission of mercy. ‘However,’ she remarked, ‘my mother and brother will not allow me to go.’ Not knowing who she was, the soldier said “It is all right to mind your mother’s command, little girl, but you may tell your brother for me to go to the devil.’”135 The most famous sisters of mercy were Empress Alexandra and her eldest daughters. The women of the imperial family tried to serve as examples of appropriate wartime service for Russian women and hoped to inspire enlistment in the Red Cross. According to historian Laurie Stoff, the Empress and her three daughters “worked as sisters of mercy caring for the wounded in the hospital established on the grounds of the palace of the palace at Tsarkoe Selo.”136 Nursing was not restricted to the upper classes; many more women from the lower gentry and middle classes volunteered for wartime medical service. Wives and daughters of professionals and merchants, as well as career women, including doctors, academics, school teachers, members of the intelligentsia, and even revolutionaries, entered the ranks of the various civilian organizations dedicated to
134
“Grand Duchess Olga is Nurse on Hospital Train,” El Paso Herald, April 24, 1915, 4. “Rough on Her Brother,” Red Cross Magazine 9, no. 7 (March 1915): 132. 136 . Laurie Stoff, Sisters of Mercy in Russia’s Great War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 78, 74 135
caring for the wounded.137 As the war dragged on, and the requirement for nurses increased, the training for nurses was abbreviated accordingly. Snively believed many of the Russian nurses in the American Hospital were initially not very effective.138 However, their hands-on training working with the severely wounded served as invaluable practical experience, but the “wounded soldier suffered until they got their training.”139 In December 1914, the hospital received additional staff and expertise with the arrival of Dr. Dean F. Winn, a lieutenant in the Georgia National Guard. A doctor with extensive intern experience, he graduated from the Atlanta School of Medicine (now Emory University Medical School), where he also served as an assistant instructor in gynecology.140 The addition of another experienced doctor was particularly helpful because by January 1915, according to Egbert, the Kiev American Red Cross hospital had already admitted 340 patients. Of this group, 192 recovered, only one died, and the rest were transferred. Additionally, the Americans performed over fifty surgical operations and approximately 2500 “re-dressing” of wounds.141 According to Nurse Anne Hansen, patients were brought from the battlefield, and as soon as they could be moved, were sent
137
Laurie, Stoff, “Sisters of Mercy in Russia’s Great War,” “Russia’s Great War and Revolution,” http://russiasgreatwar.org/media/homefront/sisters_of_mercy.shtml 138 Snively, “Base Hospital Work in Russia,” 624. 139 Ibid. 140 Memorandum Listing Personnel, File 591.4, “Medical Units General,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 141 “Russ Soldiers Survive ‘Fatal’ Battle Wounds,” Winnipeg Evening Tribune, January 11, 1915, 5. Egbert does not specify the fate of the other 147 patients, but presumably, they were still being treated. 75
further into the interior to permanent military hospitals.142 Evacuations occurred an average of three times a week. Soldiers either returned to the front, to their families or were transported to the interior to permanent military hospitals.143 American Nurse Martha Moritz described the process for determining which patients should be transferred: “Every Wednesday is evacuation day…and every man who is well enough to move on is sent away. An evacuation committee determines whether a man shall be sent home for a rest or shall go back to the front, depending of course, upon the nature of his wound and the extent of his recovery.”144 Despite the difference in American medical practices, the hospital was very much a Russian military medical facility. The American doctors wore their Russian military uniforms at all times.145 The Americans’ letters were subjected to the same censorship as their Russian counterparts. They were notified after first arriving in Kiev that any letters they sent would undergo censorship. Oddly, the American Red Cross did not object to this requirement and it never became a source of tension. Instead, founder of the American Red Cross Nursing Service, Jane Delano, wrote in a January 1915 report, “This sounds all very business-like and assures us that the Russians have taken our units really as their very own.”146 Newton noted the Russian’s mistaken belief that the American Kiev hospital had 142
“American Nurse Tells,” 29. “Miss Reinhardt, Nurse,” 3. 144 “She Thinks Russian Bravest Soldier,” Webster City Freeman (Webster City, Iowa), August 17, 1915, 4. 145 “Busy in Hell,” 2. Paul Zinkhan, in a letter home to his father, carried in the Washington Post, wrote the “hospital was entirely uniformed, he even wore his in the operating room.” 146 “The Red Cross, In Charge of Jane Delano, European Service,” American Journal of Nursing 15, no, 4(January 1915): 302. 76 143
superior dental capabilities because of the “high esteem” they had for U.S. technology. Accordingly the hospital received a large number of face and dental wounds. However, these cases were treated by Russian doctors brought in specifically for that purpose.147 Dr. John Mann, a specialist in facial reconstruction, who arrived in February 1915, told reporters in his native Richmond, Virginia that “In many instances, it was really a case of making faces while you wait. Some Russian soldiers came to us with their faces literally blown off. They were supplied with artificial jaws and were sent away looking almost entirely new. They were the best classes of operation I have ever seen.”148 However, things did not always end so well; the hospital had many cases where the lower jaw and tongue had been shot away. Snively wrote that patients suffering from such horrific wounds usually died during the operation, which he considered a “mercy.”149 During the winter months, frostbitten feet was a common injury for soldiers from the Carpathian front. Russian soldiers wore poor fitting leather boots and triangular cloths as socks. Frozen feet proved a significant cause of soldiers' permanent removal from service.150 Nurse Anne Hansen recalled that soldiers’ feet were “frozen until they practically decomposed and dropped off.”151 Tetanus developed in some soldiers from exposure to soil after the snow melted. Russian medics did not use prophylactic measures against tetanus, a standard precaution in the West. Once soldiers developed lockjaw, the Americans made no effort to treat them. They were promptly evacuated to 147
“ Dr. Newton Would Establish Hospital in Russia,” Washington Times (Washington, D.C.), January 13, 1916, 4, 148 “Virginia Surgeon Tells of Marvels in Surgery,” October 31, 1915, 9. 149 Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 29. 150 Dean F. Winn, “Statistical Report of Five Hundred Cases Treated in the American Red Cross Hospital at Kiev, Russia,” Military Surgeon 38, no.1( January 1916), 56. 151 . “American Nurse Tells, 30. 77
Russian specialty tetanus hospitals.152 Baltic German Nurse and noblewoman, Marie Louise Koskull, wrote that the medical staff at the American hospital could do little to help beyond providing the patient reassuring words, and quickly call for transport to the tetanus hospital.153 Meeting the Tsar On the morning of February 9, Tsar Nicholas made a short visit to Kiev and despite not knowing whether he would visit the hospital they made extensive preparations.154 When they discovered the Tsar was not coming they were extremely disappointed. However, it was short-lived. They received an “Imperial decree” to report to the railway station for an official audience. The doctors donned full Russian military uniforms, and nurses wore everyday hospital garb.155 They loaded into sleighs for the journey to meet the Tsar at the railway station. Once there, they were escorted to a richly decorated room, and waited an hour and a half before the Tsar’s finally arrived. Strangely enough, the Tsar was wearing the uniform of a Colonel, and so he saluted Egbert, who held the rank of General. Nicholas then proceeded to talk individually to each of the American Red Cross representatives and expressed his gratitude for caring for “his soldiers.”156 He even kissed the hand of Nurse Martha Moritz.157 Nurse 152
Winn, “Statistical Report,” 57. Marie Luise Baronin Von Koskull, Damals in Russland (Leipzig: Berleght bei Koehler& Umelang, 1931), 47. 154 “Capital Doctors Received By Czar,” Washington Post, March 19, 1915, 8. 155 “Illinois Nurses Busy Day,” The Pantagraph (Bloomington, Illinois), November 10, 1915, 12. There is also descriptions of the event in a letters from Egbert and Helen Scott Hay to the American Red Cross contained in Mabel T. Boardman, Under the Red Cross Flag at Home and Abroad (Philadelphia and London: J.B. Lippincott Co, 1915), 203208. 156 Hay, “Meeting the Czar,” 187-188. 78 153
Minnigerode described the encounter: As he came into the room where we stood, he stopped a minute, then came forward and shook hands with each of us, apologized for having kept us waiting, and said he had heard of our hospital and wished to thank us for caring for his soldiers. He wore the service uniform of a colonel in the Russian Army, just like the one our doctors wore, and was the most plainly dressed person in all that brilliant assemblage. His English was perfect and his courtesy and kindness to us very marked.158 The Zinkhan brothers, in a letter to their father, wrote the Tsar’s “face was the sweetest and saddest we have ever seen, a smile that would charm a lion, and a voice that completed the perfect whole.”159 Brown McClintic noted a slightly uncomfortable, yet humorous interaction when the Tsar realized the doctors were Americans, and not Russians: “Suddenly it dawned on him that we men, in Russian uniforms, were Americans. He stuck out his hand and shook hands with each of us, and in perfect English said ‘Oh I thought you were Russians.’ He smiled as he said it and seemed to enjoy his own mistake.”160 Americans Treat the Russian Wounded In February, Dr. Lyle Hazlett of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, an X-Ray expert and Major in the Pennsylvania National Guard, arrived along with already mentioned Dr. John Mann, of Richmond, Virginia, to augment the hospital staff. Hazlett previously worked for Pittsburgh’s large steel mills.161 He wrote in a letter to a colleague at Pittsburgh’s South Side Hospital about what he found in Kiev: “We have all kinds of 157
“Iowa Girl’s Hand Kissed by Nicholas,” Ottumwa Tri-Weekly Courier (Ottumwa, IA), November 15, 1915, p. 4. 158 Minnigerode, “Experiences of Unit C at Kief,” 225. 159 ”Were Greeted by Czar,” Washington Post, May 19, 1915, 7. 160 “Indianan Sees Czar and Says He Likes Him,” Indianapolis News, March 26, 1915, 20. 161 “American Red Cross Doctors and Nurses in Russia,” Christian Advocate, October 1915, No. 82, 14. 79
work, a great many compound fractures, some brain work, not many amputations, but plenty of holes in all parts….Our cases are three to seven days old and we seldom see a clean case and no simple fractures….There are 15,000 beds in this town, so you see we are a very small part.”162 As the war continued into 1915, American domestic support for humanitarian endeavors overseas waned, and a “widespread feeling that Europe’s war was really none of our affair and that we should carefully hold aloof, was making it increasingly hard to raise relief funds.”163 Nevertheless, in February 1915, the hospital received direction to double the number of beds, without a corresponding increase in staff. At this time, the team comprised seven American doctors and twenty-five American and eighteen Russian nurses. Fighting was intense as the Russians made significant gains in Galicia and were on the verge of capturing the key Austrian fortress of Przemyśl.164 Nurse Sophie Kiel described the ensuing increase in activity at the Kiev hospital: “It wasn’t long before we had 600 patients and 240 beds. We put up stretchers between the beds and laid matresses on the floor.”165 Nurse Anne Hansen recalled that she had responsibility for an entire ward assisted by only three sanitars to care for 400 patients.166 Egbert and Newton worried about a potential personnel crisis since the original American nurses signed contracts binding them for only six months. A message transmitting Egbert’s report on personnel status forwarded and signed by Secretary of State Lansing, indicated the vast 162
“Disease Adds to Dr. Crookston’s Work Abroad,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 31, 1915, 6. 163 Dulles, 132. 164 The fort was under Russian siege, with a few exceptions, from September 1915 until it finally surrendered on March 22, 1915. 165 Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1038. 166 “American Nurse Tells,” 29. 80
majority of the original American nurse cadre agreed to remain, while a number opted to return to the States. Egbert’s message noted that most of those returning to the U.S. were doing so on their volition, except two, and added, “Work heavy, replace all.”167 Another note, on a telegram, addressed to Jane Delano, implied that two nurses were being sent home involuntarily. Ambassador Mayre indicated, “Deemed best to send Hartman and Linderman with other nurses.”168 Soon after the nurses departed, an outpost that was key to Austrian prestige and strategy, the San River fortress of Przemyśl, fell to the Russian Eleventh Army on March 22, 1915, ending the longest siege of the First World War. The Russians captured 130,000 Austrians and almost 1,000 guns. The Russia’s Eleventh Army, previously assigned to the siege, became free to fight in the Carpathians.169 Capture of Przemyśl was met with jubilation across Russia, including the Americans at the Kiev hospital. Nurse Mary Farley wrote in her diary on March 22: “We captured Peremishe [sic] today. Great rejoicing! That will about finish the Austrians.”170 On March 23, she wrote, “A lovely day but worked all day. Everybody is hoping that the Peremishe [sic] victory will soon end the war. The 3 generals commanding then were Selivanor, Popovich and Sipovitz. They’ll be decorated. A lot of our men are from the vicinity of Peremishe [sic] 167
Lansing to Red Cross, telegram, February 17, 1915, File 811.142/527, U.S Embassy Russia, RG 59: CDF, NACP. 168 Mayre to Department of State, telegram, February 25, 1915, File 811.142/544, U.S Embassy Russia, RG 59, NACP. One possible explanation of why these two nurses were sent home, despite a potential personnel shortage, was the documented Russian sensitivity to those with Germanic sounding names. As indicated earlier, special care was taken to avoid sending nurses with German names on the Russian mission. It is not clear how they became members of the original Kiev staff. 169 David R. Stone, The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2015), 144. 170 Mary Frederika Farley Papers, diary, March 22, 1915. 81
and take great pride in having been in the attacks on it.”171 These comment provide insight into both how factors on the battlefield effected life at the hospital, and also how the Americans viewed themselves as part of the Russian war effort. It is clear from her statement that Farley felt a kinship with her Russian colleagues and celebrated their victory on the front. Russian success on the battlefield hid the fundamental shortfalls of Russia’s transportation and logistics capabilities. Increased military casualties required the commensurate amount of consumable medical material to treat them. Obtaining supplies was a formidable challenge. The port of Archangel was inaccessible for much of the winter, and its transportation infrastructure was inadequate to support the increased influx of military, humanitarian, and consumer supplies. SS Dwinsk, part of the Russian American shipping line, sailed the Archangel-New York route and provided the lifeline between the Kiev hospital and its suppliers back in the States. In early 1915, she was carrying much needed medical supplies that got caught in the backlog at Archangel. Newton wrote to the American Embassy in Petrograd in an attempt to expedite receipt of the shipment: “We are very much in need of these supplies and are unable to purchase them here….At present time we have over 400 seriously wounded soldiers in the hospital. We long ago got rid of the all of the slightly wounded in order to make room for the seriously wounded.”172 March was a challenging month, not only because of the significant influx of patients but also because the supply challenge continued. By this time, the American Red Cross already sent three supply shipments. Four additional 171
Ibid., March 23, 1915. Newton to American Embassy Petrograd, Letter, March 23, 1915, File 814.2, U.S. Embassy Russia, RG 84, RFSP, NACP. 82 172
shipments were provided to the Russian Ambassador but were unable to be delivered due to the closure of the port at Archangel.173 During this same period there was discussion of moving some or all of the American Kiev medical staff to the Warsaw front. On March 24, Egbert sent a letter to Ambassador Mayre to raise this possibility. The discussions grew out of a visit by Egbert and several colleagues to Warsaw presumably to provide temporary support. 174 During their stay, they visited hospitals in the city and in the field at the front. As they prepared to return to Petrograd an unidentified Russian colleague asked them to remain a little to longer to provide emergency surgical support northwest of the city. As a result, Egbert wrote to the U.S. Embassy in Petrograd requesting that some or all of the American Red Cross contingent move to the front to meet what he perceived as a pressing need for additional experienced surgeons. According to Egbert: In Warsaw all of the 30,000 beds are occupied all of the time, the personnel of the hospitals are very much over worked, and by going where we are needed and welcomed, we will be fulfilling the objects of our stay in Russia. First, to help the Russian Red Cross, and Second, to help cement the friendly relations between the two Governments and peoples.175 Recognizing the medical needs in Warsaw, Egbert contacted the Russian Red Cross to investigate the possibility of transfer: Following your esteemed advice concerning the matter of transferring our organization to some point where we would experience more active surgical service. I called on Mr. Allyn…. After talking to us, he wrote a letter to Senator Ivanisky who is chief of the Red Cross of the District of Southwest Front in which we are now located…. Accordingly, I went to headquarters at Lublin where a cordial welcome, quite a contrast from same hands, was given. After a long 173
. Letter to President of Russian Red Cross, April 22, 1915, File 900.2 “Russian Red Cross,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 175
Egbert to US Ambassador, Petrograd, letter, March 24, 1915, File 814.2 U.S Embassy Russia, RG 84, NACP 83
conference the Senator agreed in writing that if possible he would give us the desired change of service.176 On March 29, Ambassador Mayre indicated Egbert’s “desire to have the American Red Cross Units in Russia stationed where they will do the most good and render the most effective service.”177 Mayre informed Egbert that he would discuss the proposed transfer to the Warsaw military district with the relevant official in the Russian Red Cross. However, on May 12, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the potential move because they believed the American hospital at Kiev: Is doing very useful work and rendering great service in such an important evacuation point as Kiev. On either hand Warsaw is already well provided with stationary hospitals and there is at present no special need for the transfer of the American hospital there; besides it would be difficult to secure necessary premises for such an extensive hospital.178 However, the Ministry provided assurances that the issue would be reconsidered should a requirement for a large hospital develop in the Warsaw region.179 At the time of the proposed move the American Red Cross hospital in Kiev was quite busy. Elliot Wadsworth, future Chairman of the Central Committee of the American Red Cross, but at the time serving as a relief commissioner for the Rockefeller Foundation in Europe, visited the Kiev hospital in spring 1915. He was accompanied by his Foundation colleague, Ernest Bicknell, who was on unpaid leave from the American Red Cross. The head of the Russian Red Cross informed Wadsworth that over 8,000 patients arrived in that city by train over the previous two weeks. Wadsworth calculated that those numbers were similar to the entire number of American soldiers recently 176
Ibid. US Ambassador, Petrograd to Egbert, letter, March 29, 1915, File 814.2 U.S Embassy Russia, RG 84, NACP. 178 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to US Ambassador, Petrograd, letter, March 24, 1915, File 814.2 U.S Embassy Russia, RG 84, NACP. 179 Ibid. 84 177
mobilized for Mexican Border service.180 At the time of his visit, the hospital contained 600 beds supported by ten doctors and twenty-two nurses. He related how “they brought out one hundred and sixty cases at nine o’clock the night before, and five in the morning the day we arrived, and the morning after we arrived they brought sixty men out on street cars. Those who could sit up were in an ordinary car; those who were on stretchers were pushed on the side of an open car in two tiers, the way we push a bread pan into an oven.”181 Patients were often transported from the railway station to the hospitals by converted streetcars. Racks were constructed permitting patients to be piled high like cordwood. Bicknell, after his visit, wrote Boardman noting his satisfaction with the performance of all of the physicians, nurses, and the hospital staff. However, he expressed his concern about the “friction which has existed among members of the units…. In fact, the differences had existed so long and had grown so bitter that it seemed … quite unlikely that peace could be finally restored until some of the members of the units had taken their departure.”182 Bicknell believed much of the problem stemmed from lack of leadership and friction between the conservative values of Helen Scott Hay and those of her less traditional younger subordinates. However, he thought the new incoming General Director, Dr. Hamilton H. Snively would provide oversight over the 180
. Wadsworth, 154. Russian medical capabilities suffered severe strain, and as the requirements for Warsaw demonstrated, the need for surgeons at the front was just as pressing as in the rear. Documents do not provide any insight into how hospital beds were allocated or information on why some went to the American facility versus any other Russian facility. 181 Ibid., 1153. 182 Bicknell to Boardman, June 7, 1915, File 900.2, RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 85
entire hospital and provide the missing direction, leadership, and management.183 Snively left New York for Russia on March 21 with eleven desperately needed replacement nurses. The trip ran into complications caused by the British maritime blockade. He and his nurses were held for short period as “prisoners of war” by the British. Under the provisions of the blockade the entire party was seized by the British Navy on the high seas, transported to an English port, and detained for a short period, before being permitted to continue their journey.184 Nurse Aurel Baker, who was part of this group, wrote her parents that “we were held up at Kirkwall…. They seemed to forget we were there so after tarrying almost a week we sent protest to the American ambassador at London and as a result we were allowed to proceed to Bergen.”185 Once finally in Petrograd, the new arrivals met Egbert and members of the Petrograd colony. The plan, was to have an official audience with the Dowager Empress, as had their colleagues before them, but due to her Majesty being ill, the visit was cancelled. On April 23, Snively and the nurses arrived in Kiev.186 A native of Columbus, Ohio, Snively was a professor of obstetrics at Ohio State University, a Major in the Medical Corps of the Ohio National Guard, and served on the staff of the Protestant Hospital in Columbus.187 Like his predecessor, he promptly
183
Ibid. “Ohioan Made Prisoner of War,” Chronicle Telegram, April 24, 1915, 11. 185 Letter to Parents, April 7, 1915, Aurel Baker Pardee Papers, 1910-1949, Wisconsin Historical Society Archives. 186 Baker Diary, Baker papers, 43-50. 187 “American Red Cross Doctors and Nurses in Russia,” Christian Advocate, October 1915, No. 82, 14. 86 184
assumed the rank of Brigadier General in the Russian Army Medical Service.188 He arrived with enough nurses to replace those who left in March, as well as five more to support the hospital’s increased capacity. 189 Despite the stress on the current hospital staff, discussions were underway to increase capacity to 1000 beds.190 In Kiev, Snively estimated there were a total of 28,000 beds and half a million across Russia by mid1915.191 The American Red Cross mission continued to be overwhelmed by the number of casualties. Arthur Zinkhan told reporters back in the U.S. that “As soon as the Carpathian campaign was in full swing we were swamped with wounded. The fatally wounded were left upon the field to die….many of them falling as a result of exposure.”192 Standing instructions required the hospital to "evacuate" eight percent of all patients each day.193 On May 10, 1915, thirteen trainloads of wounded arrived in Kiev, and the next day another thirteen came.194 All available staff went to the Kiev railway receiving station to assist, and processed the wounded in groups of between fifty and sixty.195 There was so much stress on hospital resources that patients who were strong enough to travel an additional twenty-four hours were forwarded to other locations in the interior to make 188
Harry Hamilton Snively, The Battle of the Non-Combatants; the letters of Dr. Harry Hamilton Snively to his family from Russia, Poland, France, Belgium, Persia, etc., assembled by his daughter, Marjorie Knowlton Snively; edited by J. George Frederick. (New York, The Business bourse, 1933), 16. 189 Dock, 158. 190 Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 22. 191 Ibid., 23. 192 “American Nurses Return from War Zone; Worked Under Guns,” Oakland Tribune (Oakland, CA), November 9, 1915, 6. 193 Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 22. 194 Ibid., 29. Each train consisted of twenty to thirty cars, with medical amenities and staff. 195 Ibid., 3. 87
room for more wounded.196 At the time, the American staff consisted of nine doctors and twenty-seven nurses. Additionally, there were servants, clerks, and Russian nurses, as well as sixty-five sanitars.197 Newton discussed conditions in the city during that tumultuous time and the level of activity at the medical handling facility at the railway station: “At Kief, where I was stationed during the Carpathian campaign for seventeen days, an average of 10,000 wounded Russians passed through the receiving hospital.198 Just think of it, 170,000.” 199 The wounded were generally in poor condition after the long journey and lack of proper first aid before being sent to the rear. During Bicknell’s May 14 visit to Kiev he noted on that “Dr. Shively [sic],200 director of the hospital, and Miss Hay, the chief nurse are trying to make arrangements with Russian military authorities to establish a branch hospital near the front in order that patients may have proper first care before being sent on to Kief.”201 Snively visited Lemberg (Lvov) to investigate the feasibility of placing a small American contingent closer to the Carpathian front to provide faster intermediate care.202 Typically it took three to four days for the wounded to reach the American hospital in Kiev for proper treatment.203 Lack of appropriate early treatment often resulted in ordinarily treatable injuries becoming infected and potentially deadly. Damage to an arm or a leg, adequately prepared, would not necessarily take a soldier out 196
Ibid., 24. Ibid., 18. 198 Presumably at the Kiev Railway station. 199 “Views of World Travelers Met in Capital Hotel Lobbies,” Washington Post, January 4, 1916, 6. 200 Snively. 201 Bicknell, In War’s Wake, 253. 202 Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 21. 203 Ibid., 28. 88 197
of combat for the rest of the war. However, insufficient first aid in the field, compounded by travel time to a capable hospital, often resulted in the requirement for life-saving amputation versus a less extreme outcome.204 Winn wrote in a letter to National Guard colleagues: “I have had abundant opportunity to learn a great deal about wounds and surgery and base hospital work, but very little about field work. However, I expect to leave shortly for the real front, where we hope to get some real excitement.”205 It is not clear whether this forward unit ever deployed; work at the Kiev hospital during the period may have made it impossible. With intense fighting in the Carpathians, plans were underway to care for an additional 600 patients.206 The hospital’s intake was stretching its existing capacity. Illustrative of this increase, Snively participated in twelve operations on May 10, and on May 11, he performed fifteen. Almost a week later, at the height of the Carpathian campaign, he wrote, “We had two hundred patients admitted in one day last week. Our largest enrollment to date has been six hundred and ninety-five. That makes a big hospital. Every one a dressing of one or more wounds. So you can understand I have work to keep everyone busy.”207 Hazlett cared for fifty to sixty patients and sometimes performed four leg amputations in one day.208 Nurse Aurel Baker wrote on May 13 that “we are getting a good many patients these days. 108 came last night, and we are expecting 40 more today. Our wards are full and we have a good many in the corridors. 204
Ibid., 29. “Young Atlanta Physician To Serve with Russian Army in the Carpathian Campaign,” Atlanta Constitution, April 25, 1915, 5. 206 Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 27. 207 Ibid. 208 “Dr. T. Lyle Hazlett Very Busy in Russia,” Pittsburgh Press, July 28, 1915, 7. 89 205
They are going to put up tents soon.”209 In a letter to Dr. E.F. Simpson, Head of the U.S. National Council for Defense, Egbert transmitted a proposal from Prince Georgi Lvov to address an urgent need for trained surgeons at the front. At the time, Lvov was the President of the Union of Zemstvos, and eventually became the first Prime Minister of the Provisional Government in 1917. The requirement for trained surgeons became so acute by May 1915 that he proposed that two hundred American surgeons come to Russia and replace their Russian counterparts, so they could leave their posts in the rear and go to the front. The plan was “vetoed” by other senior members of the Tsar’s government and never implemented.210 In May and June, there were many deaths. Nurse Marie Luise Von Koskull211 wrote that ten days in May started the “grosse sterben” or “great death,” a period in which two to three soldiers died each night, and the dead were lying in their beds and on the floor.212 Nurse Anne Hansen blamed the numbers on the “the fact that many of the wounded were forced to lie neglected during the fighting and their wounds became infected.”213 Dean Winn, describing his experiences, explained, “Kiev was 100 miles back from the Galician front, and their cases reach them five to eight days after having been wounded, usually with the first aid dressing still in place…..Tetanus antitoxin had not been used and nearly impossible to obtain in the country, most of the wounds were
209
Letter from Aurel Baker, May 13, 1915, Aurel Baker Papers. Letter from Egbert to E.F. Simpson, May 14, 1917, Edward H. Egbert Papers, Box/Folder 1:8, Hoover Institution Archives 211 . Von Koskull was a member of Baltic German nobility. 212 Marie Luise Baronin Von Koskull, Damals in Russland (Leipzing: Berleght bei Koehler & Umelang, 1931), 50. 213 “American Nurse Tells,” 29. 90 210
badly infected...”214 According to Snively, “At least ninety-five percent of the wounded we receive at Kiev are badly infected, dripping pus. We hope to give them such care at the front that we may obviate some of that infection.”215 The infections often advanced rapidly. Winn captured the pervasiveness of these infections in a study he published after the war: Eighty-one per cent of penetrating shrapnel wounds were infected; Only 8 per cent of perforating bullet wounds were clean…First aid packs were used by soldiers, and probably some secondary infection was prevented, but the majority of infected wounds were infected from the beginning owing to factors largely beyond control-infrequent baths, dirty clothing, natural tendency to uncleanliness, lowered vitality on account of long campaigning, etc.216 Compound fractures were X-rayed before operation. Their treatment was unsatisfactory and constructive treatment was impossible owing to the acute infection always present….On account of the close-ranging fighting, mutilating wounds were the rule…..Most fractures of the arm and leg were literally bathed in pus at the time they reached us.217 Dean Winn wrote that “All of the wounded were suffering injuries inflicted by the explosion of large projectiles, and the cases were all surgical in character.”218 Gunshot or shrapnel wounds after infection often resulted in the loss of a limb,219 which could have grave implications for peasant soldiers who depended on their strength in agriculture or manual labor to feed their families. Commercial Attaché Henry D. Baker described the American doctors' contributions as, “Thanks to their earnest suggestions and to certain practical 214
“Local Medical Societies, Journal of the Medical Society of New Jersey 14, no.12, (December 1917,) 470. 215 Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 21. 216 Winn, 56. 217 Ibid. 63. 218 No Cuts By Saber, Asserts Dr. Winn, Atlanta Constitution, October 3, 1915, 4. 219 Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 31. 91
demonstrations which they have made, the Russian Government seems about to introduce the use of American serums for preventing and curring tetanus. If this is done, it seems likely that the saving of human life amongst those who otherwise die, will be enormous.”220 While Russian medical personnel understood the value of prophylactic measures, the problem was medication was not available in quantities sufficient to meet the needs at the front. One American doctor who served at the front considered gasoline to be an excellent antiseptic, however, Snively noted, he usually relied on iodine.221 Nurse Alma Foster, during a conference for fellow nurses in her native Chicago, noted that Russian soldiers were anxious to get to the American facility since it was known for its sanitary conditions. Up to the time of her departure from Kiev in July 1915, she claimed that the hospital treated only ordinary soldiers, not prisoners or officers.222 Foster echoed the accounts of her colleagues in noting the increase in activity in the spring and summer of 1915, and in lamenting that almost all of the cases were infected. In one example, since infected wounds were dressed once a day, she explained that she had to change the extraordinary number of two hundred dressings in a single
220
. Hough to Boardman (From Yale Club), October 4, 1915, File 591.4, RG 200, ANRC, NACP. The message also mentions a letter sent by Secretary of Commerce William Cox Redfield endorsing the project that may have helped secure Red Cross approval. 221 Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 630. Iodine is proven to have some value in combating infections. Kerosene also can be used as a disinfectant. Use of gasoline is dubious at best. 222 “Nurses Busy Day,” 12. This claim is supported by other accounts. There are, however, occasional references to German/Austrian wounded being brought to the hospital in the summer of 1915. However, generally, the Russian Red Cross required prisoners to be segregated from their former foes, except at infectious disease hospitals. Although not stated explicitly in any of the sources, considering class divisions, Russians likely segregated officers from the enlisted soldiers. 92
twenty-four hour period.223 In other words, the workload was intense; the hospital was always busy during periods of activity on the Southern Front.224 Ernest Bicknell observed during his May 14 visit that the wounded were “lying on floors or wherever it is possible to place them.”225 Paul Zinkhan wrote his father that “I couldn’t operate any more unless I had spurs on” 226 and that the hospital received patients in lots of ten to two hundred and fifty during the early summer of 1915. He estimated that the hospital performed almost four hundred operations and ten thousand dressings month.227 Lyle Hazlett’s caseload during this time was between fifty and sixty patients, including amputations of as many as four legs in just one day.228 Nurse Alice Gilborne summarized the demands on the hospital as Russian military fortunes declined in the summer of 1915: The wounded came in endlessly, trainloads every day. They stayed with us a few days or weeks, and then we passed them on to other hospitals farther from the front. At first, most of the wounded came from around Lemberg. Later they came from the Warsaw front. In the early months of our work, when the Russians were rolling back the Germans and Austrians in their drive across Galicia, the Russians brought in were not so badly wounded, mostly suffering from rifle fire. Then came a change, the Russians began retreating all along the Polish front and a great many of the men brought to us were suffering from terrible shrapnel wounds, wounded not in one place, but all over their bodies. Some of them were literally hacked to pieces by flying shreds of metal.229 223
Ibid., 12. . In 1914-1915, “Southern Front” referred to an organizational delineation of forces to an area of operations where the primary adversary was Austro-Hungarian forces in southern Poland. Northwestern front focused on East Prussia. 225 . Bicknell, In War’s Wake, 252. 226 “Busy in Hell,” Washington Post, August 2, 1915, 2. 227 Ibid. 228 “Dr. T Lyle Hazlett Very Busy in Russia,” Pittsburgh Press, July 28, 1915, 7. 229 “Chicago Nurses Back from War Tell of the Horrors in Hospital,” The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 29, 1915, 5. 93 224
And yet despite the workload, the Kiev hospital was about to lose a significant portion of its skilled staff. On June 2, the American Red Cross directed the hospital’s head nurse, Helen Scott Hay, to go to Sofia, Bulgaria. Her departure, along with a group of experienced nurses, deprived the unit of some of their most qualified personnel. The transfer was in response to a personal request by Queen Eleanor of Bulgaria. Before she had accepted the assignment in Kiev, Hay had been slated to establish a nursing school in Sofia. The war delayed the plan.230 Also that month, Unit C head nurse Lucy Minnigerode and two other veteran members of the group returned to the U.S., as their six-month commitments expired. Additionally, Nurses Charlotte Burgess, Alma Foerster, Rachel Torrance and Alice Gilbourne departed Kiev for Serbia to assist in typhus relief efforts. The remaining staff was left to pick up the slack as the hospital increased from 400 to five 500 beds in anticipation of operations in Poland.231 These departures took a toll on the remaining staff. On July 12, Nurse Mabel Burnham wrote Jane Delano and explained after Helen Scott Hay’s resignation “we felt as though the very foundation of the whole expedition was shaken and tottering.”232 She conveyed how the recent departure of four nurses for Serbia left only eighteen American nurses and “our constantly increasing number of patients, and our decreasing number of nurses-we are almost a Russian hospital.”233 Nurses struggled to work no more than a nine hour day, and were in desperate need of vacations. They felt the quality of work was 230
Dock, 158. She remained in Bulgaria until February 1916. The specifics of the arrangement between the American Red Cross and the Queen are discussed in detail in Bicknell, In War’s Wake, 131-132. 231 Ibid. 232 Burnham to Delano, letter, July 12, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 233 Ibid. 94
suffering, with no end to the punishing workload in sight.234 By June 19 all beds at the hospital were occupied. At the Kiev railway medical receiving station as patients were processed before being sent to the various local hospitals, Snively observed there were only thousands of wounded, where once there had been tens of thousands.235 While such numbers may seem staggering, in fact they testify to Russian reverses on the Eastern Front. According to Snively, “That means the retreat of the Russians and their inability to get their severely wounded.”236 German forces advanced so rapidly that wounded Russians either fell into enemy hands or were left to die where they fell. Double Disaster-Summer of 1915: Withdrawal of the Mission and Disaster on the Battlefield By mid-July 1915, the hospital’s capacity was nearly 800 beds.237 However, according to Moser Jones, “As the war dragged on...Americans retreated into isolationist indifference, and the ARC’s fund-raising effort petered out.”238 The increasing scope of the war conspired with loss of interest back in the United States to create conditions where the American Red Cross decided to close the Kiev hospital as part of its larger draw-down of European operations due to financial constraints. For the Russians this could not have come at a worse possible time, from a political, military, and medical perspective.239 The American staff by now identified with the Russian soldiers and the 234
. Ibid. Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 31. 236 Ibid. 237 Kiel, “Experiences in Russia, 1039. 238 Moser-Jones, Making the World Safe, 159. 239 Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 625. 95 235
Russian war effort, and took it hard. Nurse Sophie Kiel described the decision to discontinue the European mission as “the greatest blow I have ever received.”240 American Red Cross Chariman Boardman’s rationale for terminating the European relief mission was: The cost of transportation of these surgeons and nurses going and coming makes a constant and considerable demand upon the Red Cross treasury. The monthly payroll is also a large item of expense. Given these facts and because funds are rapidly becoming exhausted the American Red Cross has decided by October 1 to withdraw the personnel now in Europe, except the units in Belgium. Much as it regrets this necessity, it realizes that no Red Cross of a neutral country ever before rendered so long and extensive service in the way of personnel to nations engaged in war.241 By the late summer of 1915, the European medical relief mission expanded from the original eleven units that came over on the SS Red Cross to sixteen. Since the initial offer of assistance came through official State Department channels, Boardman asked the Secretary of State to notify the host nations of the withdrawal. On July 21, the Secretary of State sent a message to all host governments that the “American Red Cross regrets the necessity of recalling on October 1, 1915, the units of surgeons and nurses now in Europe….The constant demands upon its funds, which have become largely exhausted, necessitate this withdrawal and the curtailment of these expenses.”242 The Work Continues in Kiev According to Snively, the mere routine of receiving and evacuating patients at the 240
Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1038. “Red Cross Aid Ends Oct.1,” Greenville News (Greenville, SC), August 30, 1915, 4. 242 Lansing to the Ambassadors and Ministers in European Belligerent Countries, July 21, 1915, Circular telegram, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement, The World War (Washington, D.C,: Government Printing Office, 1928), 1044. 96 241
Kiev receiving station in May, June, and July 1915, was difficult when some ten to twelve thousand patients arrived each day for days at a time. Very few days passed without processing 2,000 wounded. The total medical capacity in the city of Kiev including both the American hospital and the Russian facilities, at the time was about 30,000 beds. The main military hospital maintained 10,000 of those spaces, so it was necessary for the city’s hospitals to keep patients moving.243 Paul Zinkhan informed his father that by summer 1915, the Red Cross hospital employed eight American doctors, twenty American nurses, and fifteen Russian nurses. There were also eighty sanitars. It received patients in groups ranging between ten and two hundred and fifty, and it kept them for the shortest possible time. During that same period, the American Red Cross hospital alone conducted over 400 procedures and averaged approximately 10,000 dressings.244 From the day it opened until July 1, the hospital had already processed between 3500 and 3700 patients and was continually running near capacity, as it had been since its founding.245 The contribution of the Kiev American Red Cross hospital received broad support in American and Russian diplomatic circles. At a time when Russia’s military reverses overwhelmed its already fragile medical and transportation infrastructure, the American hospital represented a bright light of outside support. Its symbolic value far outweighed its actual contribution to the Russian war effort. To many, its presence was a tangible demonstration of “neutral” America’s support. The American colony in Petrograd felt that its closure would suggest to Russia that that 243 244 245
Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 625. Ibid. Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 31 and 34- 35. 97
support was in question. 246 Newton and Egbert abhorred the thought that the Red Cross would abandon Russia during such a critical time. Egbert decided to return to the States to lobby for a reprieve for the Kiev Mission. The two doctors traveled to Petrograd to discuss with Ambassador Mayre how to continue the work of the American Red Cross hospital, and also ask the Petrograd colony for support. The Ambassador was sympathetic to their concerns, and agreed to send a letter to Army Quartermaster General Carroll A. Devol, the newly appointed General Manager of the American Red Cross: I desire to avail myself of this occasion to inform you of the high estimate I have of the American Red Cross Units now working in Russia and the very great value I attach to the work they are doing. Those feelings are shared, I assure you, by the Russian military authorities and by the Russian people, and I can think of no agency better calculated to promote kindly sentiments and friendship between our own country and Russia, than the great services the American Red Cross Units are at this time rendering in the hospital under their care at Kieff to the wounded of the Russian armies.247 Egbert and Newton organized a luncheon in Petrograd and made their case to representatives of the American colony. Surely understanding the message the closure would send, these U.S. business leaders responded by sending a letter on July 5, through the U.S. Commercial Attaché to the American Red Cross, imploring the Society to send more resources to its Kiev Hospital. They also requested that the Red Cross increase efforts in the States to rally public support behind Russian aid. According to the letter, written on the Commercial Attaché’s stationery: 246
The core principle in the subsequent establishment of the American colony in Petrograd’s “Russian Committee of the American Red Cross” was “to provide means for expressing the sympathy and good feeling of the American people to the Government and people of Russia.” “Russian Committee of the American Red Cross,” broadside, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 247 Mayre to Devol, letter, July 15, 1915, RG 200, ANRC, File 591.4, “Medical UnitsRussia,” NACP. The letter is also reproduced in an unpublished manuscript from the Dr. Newton family, 81. 98
We know that the important responsibility of caring for over 650 patients many of them cases of a very serious nature has been met by the American doctors and nurses in Kief in a spirit of untiring devotion and self-sacrifice coupled with great professional skill, and that, as a result, the American hospital at Kief now ranks in reputation first among the great number of hospitals in that city, where thousands of wounded men from the front must be constantly cared for. We doubt if the American public appreciates the great urgency and enormous field for Red Cross work in Russia. We know that the Russian authorities are very grateful for the assistance rendered by the American Red Cross and if possible would like to have this society still further increase its beneficent work in this country….We think, therefore, that every effort should be made to arouse public sentiment in America toward giving greater support for this Red Cross work in Russia. There can be no finer way of strengthening the friendly bonds of sympathy between the two countries and promoting good relations both sentimental and commercial, than for Americans to interest themselves actively and liberally in the work which is being so splendidly carried on by the American Red Cross organization in Kieff.248 The signers of the letter included a veritable who’s who of American business interest in Russia. These included the Commercial Attaché Baker, representatives of significant business interests including American Express Company; Seattle Car and Foundry Company; the Russian-American Corporation; Gisholt Machine Company; Cincinnati Mining Machine Company; Cincinnati Milling Machine Company; Firestone Tire and Rubber Company; Studebaker Corporation; H.K. Mulford Company; the Knickerbocker Club of New York; Harley Davidson Motor Company; Rodger Ballast Car Company and Pressed Steel Car Company, among others.249 Many in the American colony believed closing the American Red Cross hospital would be perceived negatively in Russia, and interpreted by their hosts as a decline in U.S. support for the empire. They hoped continuation of medical aid could bolster bilateral commercial relations and feared the impact that termination might have on 248
Copy of letter contained in Christian Advocate 80 (August 1915): 11. Also quoted in Minnigerode, “Heart of a Hospital,” 311. 249 Minnigerode, “Heart of a Hospital,” 311. 99
prospects for increasing their commercial profile in Russia.250 Americans in Petrograd were not absorbed solely by commercial interests. They also participated in genuinely philanthropic causes. The American colony in Petrograd established and maintained in that city a tiny hospital (or lazaret) and orphanage at personal expense. A separate enterprise from its larger counterpart in Kiev, this small charitable effort was a fraction of the size of its American Red Cross counterpart. Journalist Ellwood Hendrick described the small Petrograd American community as "few in number, but no means inert."251 However, despite the colony’s philanthropic record and local American diplomatic support, its attempt to express “pride and satisfaction” with the “splendid work which is being done” by the staff of the Kiev hospital did not bear fruit.252 In Washington, decisions were already made to end the almost year-old American Red Cross mission to Europe. The war that had initially been expected to be over by Christmas 1914 was continuing with no apparent end in sight. Battles raged, and the competition for scarce resources increased. Despite demands for assistance but Americans in Petrograd, by summer 1915, Boardman determined there was “no other course” than to end its medical support to all of the belligerents by October 1.253 The original European mission support fund of over a million dollars had been long since exhausted. In the end, it paid for seventy-one surgeons and 253 nurses across the 250
Ibid. Ellwood Hendrick, “Eight of them in Persia,” American Red Cross Magazine 11. no.8 (August 1916): 279. 252 Copy of letter contained in Christian Advocate, August 1915, 11. 253 “American Red Cross to Recall Workers,” Washington Times, July 26, 1915, 2. There were two exceptions. Work continued in Belgium and Serbia. 100 251
continent, as well as the forty-three members of the Serbian Sanitary Commission dating back to September 1914. Support to the units in Kiev already included nine separate supply shipments and expenditures of approximately $89,613.00 by July 1915.254 In response to the recall of the Red Cross mission, Egbert left Russia on July 15, hoping to convince the American Red Cross to continue its support for the Kiev hospital. On July 16, 1915, Mabel Boardman informed the Secretary of State about of their intention to withdraw from Europe by October 1. She blamed the move on the expanding requirements from the ongoing military conflict and the challenges posed by transportation in a war zone. However, the most critical factor was funding. The American Red Cross believed that many of the units were not being utilized fully or operating at a capacity necessary to justify continued funding and support. Its leadership felt it could do more by purchasing and sending medical and surgical supplies directly to the war zone.255 In Kiev, the final decision met with considerable consternation. To The Front An anticipated Russian summer offensive on the Galician front never materialized. The resulting break in military activity provided a much-needed respite for the Kiev medical staff.256 But the urgency of the Kiev hospital’s work was about to fade. Towards the end of July, the fighting moved further away from Kiev, and the number of patients reduced to a trickle. Nurse Aurel Baker wrote her father on July 19, that the “line of battle is getting farther away from us so the wounded are going to other hospitals 254
Ibid. Boardman to Lansing, Letter, July 16, 1915, File 811.142/851, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement, The World War,” 1042-1043. 256 Dock, 158. 101 255
… making work quite light just now. We are going to have 7 hrs duty per day until more patients come.”257 A week earlier she wrote a friend that the doctors and nurses who arrived in September were each getting two weeks of vacation and that some doctors were going to the front.258 The decrease in activity provided an opportunity for the American doctors to observe Russian combat medicine first hand. Time at the front undoubtedly shaped the American doctors' perspective on the effectiveness and needs of the Russian military medical system. Since they spent most of their time in the rear, experience at the front provided the American doctors with exposure to the everyday operational challenges facing their Russian counterparts in the field. These visits likely were the venue where they observed the shortfalls and conceived of the remedies that became the basis of aid initiatives after the Kiev hospital closed its doors. Subsequent initiatives to provide motor ambulances and forward deployed surgical capabilities likely took shape during these visits. Available sources indicate that at least Newton, Egbert, the Zinkhans, McClintic, and Snively saw service at the front during their tenure. Egbert, the Zinkhans and Newton spent time in Warsaw.259 However, it was Newton’s service at Lemberg that most shaped his future endeavors. He served as Surgeon for the 42nd Infantry Regiment during the disastrous retreat of the summer of 1915. He explained, “My division was
257
Letter from Aurel Baker to Father, July 19, 1915, Aurel Baker papers. Letter from Aurel Baker to “Alice,” July 12, 1915, Ibid. 259 “American Nurses Return from War Zone,” 5. There is little-detailed information documenting their activities. 102 258
decimated largely in the retreat from Warsaw.”260 According to Newton, the “unit was almost wiped out…was withdrawn from the front in order to fill its depleted ranks.”261 They started “with 45,000 officers and men, and only 3500 survived the march. All the rest were either killed, wounded or captured.” One can assume that during this time Newton must have experienced frustration at Russia’s ineffective systems for handling and transporting wounded soldiers. Newton and Egbert both made clear that their time at the front helped stimulate their subsequent campaign to provide motor ambulances to Russia.262 These medical personnel were on the frontlines at a critical juncture. They witnessed the opening salvos, both literally and figuratively, of the collapse of Russian defenses near Tarnopol, which eventually became a rout from which their forces never completely recovered. American Red Cross nurses did not get the same opportunities as their male counterparts. Nurse Aurel Baker noted that foreign nurses were never allowed at the front, but were permitted to serve in hospitals well behind the lines.263 Snively made several trips to the front in Galicia during his tenure as Director. However, it is only possible to reconstruct his summer 1915 journey. Snively wrote, “We hear of the great German-Austrian drive in Galicia, and were anxious to know
260
“Views of World Travelers Met in Capital Hotel Lobbies,” Washington Post, January 4, 1916, 6. 261 “He is General Newton,” Nashua Reporter (Nashua, IA), February 10, 1916, 9. 262 “Russia has 9,000,000 Soldiers in Reserve,” Poverty Bay Herald (Poverty Bay, New Zealand), February 12, 1916, 3. 263 Letter from Aurel Baker to Mr. Strong, February 13, 1916, Aurel Baker Papers. There are some stories of foreign nurses serving at the front with flying columns. 103
something of it firsthand.”264 Accompanying him on the trip were well-known British physician James Young Simpson who regularly visited Russia), and Dr. Brown McClintic,265 Snively’s group departed Kiev bound for the Russian military lines in Tarnopol around August 6, at a time when the situation on the Galician front was deteriorating for Russian forces. Expelled from Warsaw earlier in the week, the Russian military was in the midst of the “Great Retreat.” During this “defensive withdrawal,” it suffered an estimated two to three million casualties over the year, with at least 500,000 captured or missing.266 Tarnopol was only a short distance from the rapidly advancing GermanAustrian forces. Upon entering Galicia the doctors “saw in many places the evidence of the ravages of war in this land which had been fought over about a year before-burned and destroyed bridges; and houses, large mounds of earth, with many wooden crosses planted on them.”267 As they approached Tarnopol, they observed women digging zigzagging Russian trenches.268 Upon arrival the Commanding General’s son drove them seventy-five miles to his father’s headquarters just behind the front lines.269 Along the road, the doctors once again observed women digging trenches, as well as numerous reserve camps, supply dumps, and refugees. There were also long lines of 264
Major H.H. Snively, “Guardsman,” 132. They likely traveled with Russian Consulting Surgeon Professor Nicholai Markianovich Volkovich who was well-known in Russian medical circles and often worked at the Kiev American Red Cross hospital, Volkovich served as Head of the Kiev University’s surgical clinic before the war. 266 Stone, 176. 267 Snively, “Guardsman,” 132. 268 Sponsored by the Union of Zemstvos, trench preparation was performed by both men and women. 269 Snively, “Guardsman,” 132 104 265
Red Cross ambulances, and a horse-drawn sanitary train heading to Bialystok.270 Simpson described the scene: “A long line appears on the road towards the horizon. It draws nearer and nearer and resolves it into ‘Sanitary Train No. 303’ en route for Byelostock [sic]. A bandaged head, with a deep red stain in the centre of the bandage, rises up out of the telygas to gaze wearily at the passing car. Three and fifty of these covered carts and wagons move past, bearing their human pain and sorrow.”271 When they arrived at their final destination, they were twenty miles from the Austrian lines and visited a monastery converted into a medical receiving station for prisoners of war. McClintic wrote that according to Russian law, prisoners could not be treated in Red Cross hospitals to avoid conflicts erupting between the wounded of former foes. 272 Accordingly, prisoners fell under the jurisdiction of segregated military hospitals.273
The doctors took particular note of how the Russians were attempting to control the spread of infectious disease which had previously taken a heavy toll on Russian military readiness. Commanders limited operational unit size to minimize the risk of spreading cholera and typhus among Russian army personnel, limiting crossorganizational infection.274 As part of the General’s review of his forces, the doctors were allowed to inspect the field medical units. Simpson recorded during one such inspection that after first field 270
Simpson, 128. Ibid. 272 “Doctor Brings Bride from Thick of Fire on Russ Front,” Indianapolis Star (Indianapolis, IN), February 25, 1917, 66. 273 Ibid. 274 Snivey, “Base Hospital Work,” 629. 105 271
dressing, the wounded were transferred to the village located near the castle for further treatment, then on to the hospital in Tarnopol before eventually being transported by train to Kiev.275 The village school house was taken over by medical personnel, and fitted with a tent (converted into divisional field hospital). At the time there were accommodations for 280 wounded evacuees.276 The Russians established a dentist’s office in a nearby peasant house. As was typical of all of the divisional hospital equipment, it could be packed up and moved on short notice. In a park, near the village, was the Russian Red Cross. Unlike its American counterparts, the Russian Red Cross operated separately from the Army Medical Department but were under military command and control. The General spoke highly of its services and explained that in just four days their Red Cross had carried 800 patients from the front to medical facilities in the rear.277 Their additional carrying capacity was crucial. Usually, each regiment of 4000 men was only allocated eight carts for medical use. The Red Cross detachment maintained thirty-five carts, including some specially designated for infectious patients. During a visit to a first aid station a mile from the front, the General informed the American doctors about the harrowing conditions facing his troops and their medical support during the Carpathian campaign: “In on night I had 1700 wounded to look after and my transport was gone…. I lost 75 per cent of my medical personnel…. Of my 22 felchers, 8 only are left.”278 The doctors also learned that the Russians stockpiled almost 40,000 masks to 275
Simpson, 132. Ibid., 132-133. 277 Snively, “Guardsman,” 133. 278 Simpson, 133. Snively also refers to this conversation but writes that there were originally 48 feldshers, and only 8 remained. Snively, “Guardsman,” 133. 106 276
protect against chemical weapon attack.279 These simple devices, insufficient both in quantity and effectiveness, were primitive by today’s standards and consisted of multiple layers of gauze treated with prophylaxis against chlorine with only open slits for the eyes.280 Germany had first used poison gas in January 1915 on the eastern front. It remained a significant concern for the remainder of the war. Arthur Zinkhan spoke to reporters back in the U.S. about the horror of gas attacks: “I cannot undertake to describe the suffering of the wounded. The torture of the Russian soldiers who fell victims to gas was something terrible.”281 Sophie Kiel recounted the American nurses’ efforts to protect Russian soldiers against the chemical threat: …the Russian Red Cross asked us to make one thousand masks in a week, which we did. They were crude at that time. There were several thicknesses of gauze sewed together, a little rod sewed in for a nose-piece, another layer of five thicknesses of gauze turned over on that, and elastic sewed on either side to fasten to the other side. It was fitted with a pad dipped in a solution to keep the gas from going through the mask.282 The river Zlota Lipa served as the primary defensive line between the advancing Austrian-German forces and their Russian foes. Snively and inspected the trenches along the river and were forced to take cover on numerous occasions due to incoming artillery fire. Despite six weeks of relative calm, artillery from both sides was a constant threat. Russian positions along the Zlota Lipa fell to the Germans shortly after Snively and Simpson departed for Kiev. During their return journey to Kiev, they stopped and visited hospitals at the 279
These Russian gas masks were among the first generation of protection against inhalation threats. Similar to their Western front counterparts, they proved unreliable and ineffective. 280 Simpson, 133; Snively, “Guardsman,” 133. 281 “American Nurses Return from War Zone,” 6. 282 Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1040. 107
frontier town of Proscura. On the train, they had a twenty-minute discussion with a nurse who spoke perfect English and explained how one of the hospitals was using American anti-tetanus serum with excellent results. They soon realized that this nurse was Grand Duchess Olga, the sister of the Tsar.283 As previously mentioned, Grand-Duchess Olga served as a nurse on the Kiev-Tarnopol hospital train.284 Petrograd American Colony to the Rescue By the end of August it became clear that there would be no reprieve for the American Red Cross hospital in Kiev. Plans to close the facility continued unabated, and Commercial Attaché Henry D. Baker and other members of the Petrograd American colony received news of the decision to close the American Red Cross Hosptital at Kiev with a “great feeling of sorrow and humiliation.”285 They feared cessation of the mission would undermine the credibility they worked so hard to achieve, and ultimately could negatively effect future bilateral commercial transactions. He and a small group of fellow Americans sprung into action to save the hospital. On August 28, according to Snively’s account, “Certain American Gentlemen in Petrograd, after the recall of the American Red Cross units, raised a fund to maintain a part of our personnel.”286 Baker, in a letter to Dr. E.E. Pratt, Chief of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, provided additional information on the meeting: The Americans here consider it a great misfortune that the American Red Cross 283
“Doctor Brings Bride from Thick of Fire,” 66. “Tell of War’s Ruin on Battle Front of East,” Indianapolis News, November 26, 1915, 4. 285 Commercial Attaché to Chief, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Dept of Commerce, November 8, 1915, File 591.4, "Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 286 . Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 632. 108 284
work in Russia is to be abandoned and feel that the withdrawal will cause unpleasant questions….I had a few Americans in my room last night and we talked the situation over with Dr. Snively….We decided that if the American Red Cross could not continue the work we would try to have it kept up by organizing an American branch of the Russian Red Cross….it is certainly humiliating and damaging to American interests here to have this great work of good will to Russia so suddenly abandoned and at a time when it was more necessary than ever.287 His impromptu meeting had half a dozen participants, including Snively and David L. Hough, representative of American Locomotive and Head of the Russian American Corporation. Baker's goal was to "prevent the catastrophe to American prestige in Russia” that might occur after the cancellation of the U.S. humanitarian mission. 288 These Americans, many of whom had considerable wealth, represented the vast financial stake the United States had in Russia. Already running the small “City Hospital of the American Colony,” the group had ties to some of the most influential American firms operating in Russia including, among others, International Harvester, National City Bank, New York Life Insurance, and International Harvester. Snively’s presentation on the work of the Kiev hospital was likely pro forma since this group was already positively disposed towards sustaining the medical unit. They voted to provide enough funds, out of their own pockets, to keep the hospital operating through October, and to solicit additional funds from their American-based firms to support the effort longer term.289 The decision only took half an hour.290 Hough later recounted there was
287
. Excerpts of Baker letter to Pratt, August 30, 1915, contained in letter from Secretary of Commerce, September 23, 1915, File 591.4, "Medical Units-Russia," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 288 ." Commercial Attaché to Chief, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Dept of Commerce, November 8, 1915, File 591.4, "Medical Units-Russia," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 289 Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 43. 109
concern that money raised for the Red Cross effort might divert resources from the colony’s small hospital. Hough, who also served on the board overseeing the smaller hospital, reassured his colleagues that any new financial contributions would be solicited solely from “large American firms” and only come from the States.291 One condition of the agreement was that Snively would remain in Russia to oversee implementation of the Kiev effort.292 Baker’s initial meeting raised $2,000, enough to keep the hospital running through November, and introduced a strategy to rally American firms with Russian business interests to collect an additional $25,000 to sustain operations for a full year.293 Ultimately, the group hoped to raise as much as $50,000 through “national subscriptions in the United States.”294 The representatives from the American colony felt it was their duty to “make known to our fellow citizens at home, our strong opinion to the effect that the skillful and uniting hand of American Red Cross doctors and nurses in saving life and alleviating suffering in Russia” and highlight the value to overall American-Russian 290
Commercial Attaché to Chief, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Dept of Commerce, November, 8, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 291 Hough to Boardman, February 8, 1916, and January 4, 1916, File 591.4, "Medical Unit-Russia," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. Hough later wrote that “As a matter of fact not one dollar has been solicited from the members of the Colony, our money has all been collected from large American firms and has come from America, and when soliciting subscriptions in American(sic) I was careful to say that a subscription to the Red Cross must not affect a subscription to the hospital of the American Colony of Petrograd, and I am glad to say that not one cent has been diverted and that the hospital here has been doing splendidly.” 292 Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 43. 293 Excerpts of Baker letter to Pratt, August 30, 1915, contained in letter from Secretary of Commerce, September 23, 1915. File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP and “Conserving America’s Prestige in Russia,” 13. 294 Ibid. 110
relations. 295 Baker’s “Ad Hoc” gathering soon evolved into a formal committee tasked with “devising, if possible, ways and means for securing the continuance of this work, either under the auspices of the American Red Cross or in any other way which may be properly representative of popular American goodwill toward Russia.”296 Presumably, the urgency felt by the American colony was heightened, if not driven, by the deteriorating military situation on the Eastern Front. In August 1915, Russia suffered the devastating loss of Warsaw, and her armies were in full retreat. The withdrawal of the most tangible symbol of American support, at a time when Russian military fortunes were fading, could easily have been interpreted as a sign that the U.S. had lost faith in the value of the bilateral relationship. The colony hoped the committee could maintain an effort on a “scale befitting the pride, dignity, and Christian charity of the people of the United States of America.”297 Complicating matters, the American Red Cross negotiated an elaborate agreement to allow a group of U.S. surgeons and nurses to provide reciprocal relief and medical support to German, Austrian, and Russian prisoners of war. The group, composed entirely of Americans was supposed to visit prisoner of war camps and hospitals in the respective countries to verify the well-being of the captured soldiers. Unfortunately, the portion of the mission to assist Russian prisoners in Central Powers countries never materialized, and the team that arrived in Russia previously served in Germany and Austria-Hungary as part of the original American Red Cross European relief mission. 295 296 297
Ibid. “Conserving America’s Prestige in Russia,” 13. Ibid. 111
That unit, under Dr. Cary Snoddy, was reassigned to Russia after suspension of the overall relief effort.298 American officials in Russia and members of the colony feared negative reactions from their local counterparts because of the unit’s previous ties to the Central Powers. Rumors swirled about the actual nature, source of funding, and details of this mission in both American and Russian circles. However altruistic the intent, the damage was done. The team’s arrival caused a political firestorm in Russian official and diplomatic circles. Petrograd’s Americans and Russians alike believed that the American Red Cross was not telling the truth about lacking resources. They believed Snoddy’s unit, composed of Americans of German heritage, was receiving scarce American Red Cross funds to assist German and Austrian prisoners while Russia’s wounded were left to suffer.299 Baker personally criticized the American Red Cross on a visit to Chicago because “at the time the Red Cross was withdrawing units from Russia because of lack of money, forty Red Cross Agents, presumably members of units from Germany, were sent by us to Petrograd without the consent of the Russian Government.”300 To make matter worse, they resided, at American Red Cross expense, at a costly Petrograd hotel, and frequently spoke German in public despite the fact that during the war, Russia had made it illegal to speak that language in public.301 According to British 298
. For additional information on this mission see: “In the Prisoners’ Behalf.” American Red Cross Magazine 10, no. 11 (November 1915): 359-360. 299 Dock, 167. 300 Letter John O’Conner to Ernest Bicknell, October 30, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 301 “Conserving America’s Prestige in Russia,” 13. The political firestorm over the assignment of the former German American Red Cross Mission to Russia is beyond the scope of this study, but it became the source of a significant diplomatic row between Russia and the United States in 1915-1916. The group was sent to Russia solely to check on the condition of German and Austrian prisoners in Russia. Germany offered 112
Nurse Violetta Thurstan, German was widely understood in Russian society, but “it is absolutely forbidden now to be spoken under penalty of 3000 roubles fine. In all the hotels there is a big notice put up in Russian, French, and English in public rooms ‘It is forbidden to speak German.’”302 Despite official American Red Cross intransigence and the unfortunate timing surrounding the arrival of the prisoner aid mission, the supporters found encouragement because Hough planned to use a business trip to the U.S. to raise money for the Kiev American hospital. He departed Russia soon after the Baker’s meeting at the Astoria. While in the U.S. during the early fall of 1915, Hough worked with the American Red Cross to solicit funds to continue the valuable work of the American doctors and nurses in Kiev.303 Hough had first arrived in Russia in 1910. Before moving there to supervise construction of a large railway terminal in Moscow, he had been responsible for the construction of much of the underground rail infrastructure in New York City. 304 Just before the outbreak of the war, he had worked on developing water and sewage infrastructure for St. Petersburg.305 The conflict postponed these infrastructure projects, and Hough became a vocal advocate for U.S-Russian commercial engagement and American support for Russia’s war effort. The challenge Hough faced in the fall of 1915 transcended his engineering reciprocity, but despite a Red Cross plan to send a mission to Germany, it never materialized. 302 Violetta Thurstan, Field Hospital and Flying Column; Being the Journal of an English Sister in Belgium and Russia (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1915), 112. 303 “Bravo, Captain Hough,” Christian Advocate, November 1915, 16. 304 “Has Organized Russian Trading Co,” Exporter’s Review (April 1915): 32. 305 “American May Have Russian Business,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Mar 21, 1915, 24. 113
prowess, he had to rally the American Red Cross and national business interests to support medical relief in Russia. He arrived in New York on September 19 and told the awaiting press that “Unless substantial financial assistance is received from America the valuable work which has been carried on at Kieff for several months will have to be abandoned. A large corps of American Surgeons and nurses are engaged there under the direction of Dr. Snively, of Ohio, who has been commissioned a General in the Russian service.”306 During his trip., Hough corresponded with Mabel Boardman and requested her assistance with his fundraising efforts. He felt confident he could secure enough resources to keep four doctors and eight nurses in Russia.307 While hoping to receive American Red Cross support and cooperation, he assured Boardman that his committee of Americans in Petrograd assumed all obligations and expenses.308 Snively had already informed Hough that the requisite number of doctors and nurses had agreed to remain, and the estimated cost would be $1600.00 a month.309 An appeal carried in the New York Times on September 20, 1915, explained that Hough had come to the U.S. on behalf of prominent Americans in Russia, bearing autographed letters from the Dowager Empress and Head of Russian Red Cross. The Dowager Empress’s letter expressed her gratitude for the work of the Kiev hospital and noted that she was pleased “that the American surgeons and nurses not only rendered medical assistance to the wounded soldiers, but also gave them moral support in the highest degree by their humane and cordial 306
“Funds for Hospital,” Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept 20, 1915, 2. . Hough to Boardman (From Yale Club), October 4, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical UnitsRussia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 308 . Ibid. 309 . Ibid. 114 307
relations.”310 The other letter, dated September 18 and addressed to David Hough, was from Prince Boris Vassilchicov, head of the Russian Red Cross. It carried the Prince’s endorsement of continuing the work of the American Red Cross in Russia “which has always been of the greatest use to our wounded,” and expressed his regret if that work should be interrupted.311 Hough, referring to the entirety of the Russian war effort, informed prospective donors that the Kiev hospital treated more than 700 soldiers a day. To halt its work “would be nothing short of a calamity at this time, owing to the fact the that the long extended lines on the eastern battle front from the Baltic the Caspian Seas have produced ‘more cases of dreadful agony than have probably occurred in any war in history.”312 The appeal continued, “The running expenses of the hospital are heavy… and the original fund has been exhausted….Those who are interested in the hospital call attention to the traditional friendship of Russia and the United States.”313 According to Baker, Hough received Red Cross support and cooperation.314 Hough raised at least $7000.00 during his trip, short of his goal of $25,000.00 needed to fund the hospital for a full year, but enough to keep the unit viable for the interim until identification of a more reliable source 310
. “Copy of letter from Headquarters, Russian Society of the Red Cross, Under the Supreme Protection of Her Imperial Majesty, Empress Marie Feodorvia, August 3, 1915.” To Executive Officer, from Senator Evanitsky, Chief Executive, contained in Christian Advocate, October 1915, 14. 311 “Copy of letter to Captain D.L. Hough, transmitted by Baker, contained in Christian Advocate, October 1915, 14. 312 “Appeal by Americans,” New York Times, September 20, 1915, 9. 313 Ibid. 314 Hough to Boardman (From Yale Club), October 4, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical UnitsRussia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. The message also mentions a letter sent by Secretary of Commerce William Cox Redfield endorsing the project that may have helped secure Red Cross approval. 115
of income.315 On October 1, 1915, a formal “Committee” was established in Petrograd to manage the affairs and finances of the American Red Cross hospital. Chaired by Reverend George A. Simons, the Organization’s Vice Chairman was David Hough, and its Secretary was Commerical Attaché Henry Baker. Its membership included twentyone members of the American business community in Petrograd. Boardman and her colleagues in Washington eventually approved it being called the “Russian Committee of the American Red Cross.” Journalist Ellwood Hendrick described the group as “The Russian Committee of the American Red Cross as the twenty-one are called may be unconventionally referred to as live wires.”316 Its main purpose was to use local business representatives as conduits for financial assistance from their American firms with ties to Russia to provide support for the Kiev Hospital.317 Its official charter described its objective as “to gain the support of all Americans resident either permanently or transiently in Russia and through them the financial support of individuals and institutions in America.”318 The Russian Committee of American Red Cross’s goals and approach were to: provide means for expressing the sympathy and good feeling of the American people to the Government and people of Russia. In view of the international significance of the responsibilities by this committee…it should not be obliged to depend for financial support on contributions from the small American Colony at Petrograd….Instead it should receive from the United States itself contributions sufficiently generous to be worthy of a nation that received marked support in its 315
Ibid.. Hough only raised only $7000 during his trip to the US. Hendrick, “Eight of them in Persia,” 79. 317 "Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, A Statement Concerning its Organization, Purpose, Work, and Needs," Petrograd April 1916, File 794.8, "Petrograd Committee," RG 200, ANRC, NACP." 318 Ibid. 116 316
own time of need.319 On October 4, Hough wrote to Boardman requesting her support in formalizing the mandate of the “Russian Committee of the American Red Cross,” and asked her permission to initiate key members of the Petrograd group into the U.S. national Red Cross Society itself. Hough hoped initation into the officially sanctioned national Red Cross would enhance his and his colleagues’ legitimacy and thus boost fundraising efforts. Specifically, Hough requested admission for himself, Simons, Baker, Petrograd Consul North Winship, M.McAllister Smith, C.L. Preston, and E.A. Brittenham.320 A little more than a week later, Ernest Bicknell, who by this point returned from his relief work in Europe and was serving as the National Director of the American Red Cross, approved Hough’s request. He agreed to permit the national society to serve as a clearinghouse for funds raised in the U.S. for work in Russia, and provided details on how the money would be transferred from the State Department to the American Committee in Petrograd.321 Transfers would carry a specific notation from the American Red Cross to ensure proper allocation-“for use in Russia.” By October 22, Hough already raised an additional $5,000.00, and the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross achieved official national Society support.322
319
Ibid. Hough to Boardman, October 4, 1915, File 591.4, "Medical Units-Russia," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 321 . Bicknell to Hough, October 11, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 322 . Hough to Bicknell, October 22, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP and Bicknell to Hough, October 23, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical UnitsRussia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 117 320
Washington Deliberates Discussions on the fate of Red Cross efforts in Kiev extended beyond Americans with direct finanical interests in Russia. Senior U.S. government officials became concerned about the potential damage the mission’s termination might cause to overa. bilateral U.S.-Russian relations. Deliberations on the fate of the Kiev hospital eventually reached the highest levels of the Executive branch with both the Commerce Secretary William Redfield and even President Woodrow Wilson participating in the discussion. The Department of Commerce became engaged after an August 28 telegram from Commercial Attache Baker expressing his fears of: …seriously harmful consequences account American Red Cross work Russia to be abandoned in October. Convinced business prestige will be jeopardized by unfavorable comment. Red Cross work Russia promoted trade by stimulating good will Russia government and people toward America. It will not be understood why wealthy country must abandon work lack of funds. Suggest Secretary Redfield ask President Wilson make popular appeal for two thousand dollars per month necessary continuance Red Cross work Russia. American firms should subscribe toward averting prejudice. Commerical Attache Baker323 In response to Baker’s inquiries, E.F. Sweet, the acting Secretary of Commerce, contacted J.F. Tumulty, President Wilson’s Personal Secretary. Sweet sent Tumulty a copy of Baker’s cable and asked whether the President would act on it. Sweet believed Baker’s ominous assessment was accurate, and that continued support of the American Red Cross in Kiev would promote the “great Russian trade which we think we can see coming?”324 President Wilson responded to the Commerce Secretary’s request by writing to 323
. Baker to Pratt, August 28, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 324 Sweet to Tumulty, September 3, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 118
Mabel Boardman and soliciting her input. On September 15, she replied to the President’s September 7 letter.325 Neutrality played a definite role in her response: “It would not do, of course, for us to maintain them in one country and not all. To do this, we would have to raise an additional fund of $200,000.00, a very difficult proposition in view of the innumerable appeals that have been made to the public for relief in Europe, and also because of our own difficulty in obtaining the necessary funds to carry on relief work in Mexico.”326 Recruiting personnel also posed challenges, in Boardman’s view. “Securing the older medical personnel” to head the units was particularly difficult: “The American surgeon of maturity of judgement, of experience in hospital administration, of character and professional ability, who is able to drop his own practice and means of livelihood for six months or a year is a rare avis.”327 She believed it was better to bring the units home versus putting what she defined as substandard personnel in the field. Additionally, Boardman argued, governments of the warring parties already appropriated billions for the care of sick and wounded and were now capable of caring for their own soldiers. She believed any Americans who wanted to stay, could be funded from host government coffers. Wilson found her arguments convincing and forwarded her response to the Secretary of Commerce.328 Commerce Secretary William Redfield responded that Russia was a special case, 325
Wilson’s letter is not in the records of the Red Cross housed at the National Archives. Boardman refers to the letter and some of its contents in her response. 326 Boardman to Wilson, September 15, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 327 Ibid. 328 Wilson to Boardman, September 20, 1915, Boardman to Wilson, September 15, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 119
and should not be measured by standards applied to the other belligerents. He explained that on the Western Front there were sometimes numerous American aid organizations providing aid, so the loss of the Red Cross support “would not deprive that field of all American help”329 – but that that was not true on the eastern front, where there was no large scale U.S. assistance. Most compelling, Redfield explained what a dramatic improvement the Western powers’ hospital equipment was for the Russians, and how many lives could be saved: …the need for this particular service in Russia is vastly greater now than it has been before and all the reasons that properly led to the establishment of the service would seem to cry out for its continuance with double force. Furthermore, it appears to be the fact that the Russian service is not able to cope with the conditions as are those of England and France and that there are not other American organizations making a similar contribution to the Russian problem as there are farther west. It would seem, therefore, that the two cases should normally be differentiated and that the place of greater need with the lesser help might well be considered separately.330 As a final argument, Redfield highlighted Baker’s concern that while Russia was buying millions of dollars in U.S. goods, that it would look ugly if “we should plea of poverty and withdraw this work from among them. Our motive is are likely to be misinterpreted and serious damage done to our fair name which in turn will react upon our commerce and upon our influence.”331 The next day, President Wilson forwarded Redfield’s reply to Boardman.332 The Department of Commerce, Redfield, and Baker, never agreed with the Red Cross decision to terminate the Kiev mission, but as it happened, the events in 329
. Redfield to Wilson, September 21, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 330 Ibid. 331 . Redfield to Wilson, September 21, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 332 Wilson to Boardman, September 22, 1915, Redfield to Wilson, September 21, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 120
the war itself decided the final fate of the hospital. Emergency in Kiev Snively recorded in September 1915 that it “was thought possibly a military necessity would require the evacuation of Kiev.”333 The Red Cross had scheduled the hospital to close on October 1. But on September 12, the Russian military gave the hospital staff orders to evacuate all equipment, patients, and personnel by the 15th because the Germans were rapidly advancing. The hospital was ordered to move to Makarov further east in the Kiev district. Some of the American staff remained at Makarov, while others who decided not to stay evacuated to Moscow, and then returned to the U.S.334 Nurse Sophie Kiel described the confusion as news of German advances reached the Americans in Kiev: Suddenly, one day, the rumor started that the Germans were approaching, that the churches and schools were being evacuated, and that everybody that could possibly leave Kiev was leaving. Then there was chaos. People were tumbling over each other to get out of the city….Suddenly an order came that the American hospital would have to be evacuated, that they were foreigners, and had to be the first to leave the city. That saved our faces, because if that order hadn’t come, the eighteen nurses left there would have walked out of a hospital full of sick patients … it would have been a terrible humiliation to us. This order came, and we had to gradually evacuate our patients, because we knew the blow would come shortly, from the condition of the city.335 Hospital staff stripped the building to its bare walls, removing all hospital equipment and infrastructure. The staff evacuated anything that might be of use to the Germans. However, soon after the complete dismantlement of the hospital, information came that the Germans were in retreat, and the evacuation could halt.336 But the 333
Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 632. . “American Nurse Tells,” 30. 335 Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1039. 336 Ibid. 334
121
Americans were told they could not return to their previous facility. The Russians decided that the Polytechnic Institute would become military staff quarters. After closing the hospital in Kiev on September 15, 1915, the doctors and nurses worked at the Kiev railway station freight yard’s receiving hospital until October 7. 337 Two American doctors managed this bare-bones operation. (McClintic and Hazlett) along with five American nurses.338 Snively remained in Russia, and also provided occasional medical support. The fact that the unit’s support originated with donations from wealthy Americans earned it the nickname “Rockefeller Hospital.”339 Nurse Aurel Baker described their new circumstances: At that time Kiev was in danger of German invasion and the plan was to move our hospital supplies and ourselves to some other town farther from the front. Now the danger is over but our hospital and patients are scattered to the four winds. We are not idle, however. As we are nearer the front, more wounded pass through, the town than ever before and we have been assigned to a dressing room station which accommodates 500 soldiers. You see Russia is so huge that it takes five or six days to get the wounded from the front to the interior hospitals consequently is necessary for them to stop off the train for dressings before the journey's end. They are only with us a day or so and are then sent ton meanwhile they are given a bath, clean clothes and their wounds are dressed.[***] I like the work but not as well as our hospital because most of the cases are very superficial wounds of hands or fingers. No patients are sent who cannot walk. We still have our living apartments in the same place so each morning we have a jaunt on the street care for about an hour. The buildings where we do our work are most picturesquely located on a high hill. In 1912 Kiev held an exposition something like our Pan American I imagine, in these buildings.340 On September 13, Aurel Baker wrote her sister after it became clear that the city was safe: 337
Red Cross Central Committee to Secretary of State, July 26, 1916, File 591.4 #649 “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 338 Koskull, 56. 339 Ibid., 59. 340 Aurel Baker, Diary Entry, September 22, 1915, Aurel Baker Papers. There is no record of an exhibition in Kiev. She could be referring to celebrations of the 300th Anniversary of the Romanov’s or a Trade Fair that occurred in 1913. 122
so we shall be here … a week or two longer at least. Our patients were all sent away farther into the interior last Friday. Now we are making masks which the soldiers wear to prevent them from inhaling gases when certain explosives are used. We aren't earning our salt as we only work a few hours each day but it isn't our fault that they sent our patients away. [***] Few of the nurses and two doctors are leaving here Wednesday for America, some via Atlantic, others by Pacific.341 Five of the nine nurses offered to remain in Russia, hoping American domestic support could be reinvigorated to provide a fresh funding source, and they could re-establish the hospital.342 In the interim, the staff continued working at the large medical receiving station at the Kiev railway station. Newton wrote his mother: The Hospital here is closing next month and I am not sure where I will be. Egbert and Snively are going to try to cross the Atlantic, while the Zinkhan brothers are coming home across Siberia and will sail from Japan. Drs. Hazlett and McClintic are going with five nurses to the Caucasus to take charge of a Russian Red Cross Hospital there. Only three nurses are staying on in Kiev. The last patients will be moved from our Hospital in next few days.343 The remaining American medical staff either returned to the U.S. or joined the Russian forces at the front. The Zinkhan brothers and six American nurses returned to the U.S. via the Siberian and Pacific route. They were forced to take an eastern route because of the proximity of fighting on the Galician front. It took them a month to reach Yokohama, Japan by way of Moscow and Vladivostok. It took another month for them to reach their American homes.344 Despite the recall by the American Red Cross, all of the belligerents were “eagerly seeking skilled American surgeons and nurses for field and hospital work.”345 Snively received permission to release his ambulances and some supplies to Newton. 341 342 343 344 345
Letter to Aurel Baker to her sister, September 13, 1915, Aurel Baker Papers. Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1039. Unpublished manuscript from Dr. Newton family, 89. “American Nurses Return,” 7. Ibid. 123
Some of the sanitars signed on to support Newton’s flying column. Letters were sent to the Russian War Ministry requesting regular army status so Newton could receive compensation for his services. He along with a seven-man staff, two ambulances and a considerable amount of medical supplies formed a flying column that likely supported the 42nd Infantry Regiment. The unit formed the nucleus of what would eventually become the American Ambulance in Russia. Chapters 3 and 4 will discuss the evolution and history of the American-Russian ambulance movement. Mann returned to the U.S. in early August. Dean F. Winn, wearing his Russian military uniform, planned to return home via neutral Sweden but was turned away at the border due to his choice of clothing. Eventually permitted to proceed, Winn, accompanied by his noblewoman Russian nurse bride, arrived in New York in late September.346 Snively recorded in his letters that the hospital was packed and loaded and four doctors and eight nurses agreed to remain until at least October to help to evacuate the wounded from the Galician front.347 The Russians placed the remaining Americans in charge of one of the dressing stations at the railway station where they cared for three to four hundred patients a day. After fifteen days, they were reassigned and took over one of the “pavilions” at an evacuation station located in an Amusement Park in the center of Kiev.348 Temporary wooden structures housed six hundred patients laying on racks awaiting transport further into Russia’s vast interior. Each day the Americans performed dressings on an estimated 346
“U.S. Doctors Must Be Neutral in Sweden,” Pittsburgh Daily Post (Pittsburgh, PA), September 30, 1915, 1. 347 Snively, “Base Hospital Work, 623. 348 Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 632. 124
three to five hundred patients, and evacuated three hundred. The station was continually functioning at capacity; as each patient left, another filled the empty rack.349 Rumors and speculation swirled regarding the final disposition of the American Red Cross hospital equipment from the Polytechnic Institute and its U.S. staff. Early in September, Snively heard the hospital material might move to Kharkov, two hundred miles to the East of Kiev, or even to the Winter Palace in Petrograd.350 In early October, Egbert returned from the U.S. and brought bad news; there would be no additional funding from Washington. All future efforts had to rely on private donors.351 In the month-long period since the closure of the Kiev American Red Cross hospital, the remaining staff cared for and evacuated almost three thousand patients, sending them further to the rear, or returning them to the front.352 After performing this service for twenty-five days, Snively informed the remaining three doctors and five nurses of their reassignment to the Army of the Caucasus under Grand Duke Nicholas.353 In November 1915, tasked with establishing a two hundred-bed hospital in Khoy, Persia, Snively, Brown McClintic, Lyle Hazlett, Sophia Kiel, R. Lee Cromwell, Florence Farmer, Clara Barndollar and Eleanor Soukup transferred to the Caucasus under the auspices Russian Red Cross.354 The activities of Americans in Persia will be discussed in Chapter 2. Nurses Edwina Klee, Mary Hill, Aurel Baker, and Margaret Pepper parted from their colleagues and left the country. Their Russian nurse colleagues from the 349 350 351 352 353 354
Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1040. Snively, Battle of the Noncombatants, 45, 49. Unpublished manuscript from Dr. Newton Family, 89. Snively, “Base Hospital Work,” 632. Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1040. Dock, 159. 125
American Red Cross hospital continued to provide care at the medical receiving station.355 In a rare honor, after their departure, Helen Scott Hay, Lucy Minnigerode, and Charlotte Burgess received the gold cross of St. Anne, Russia's highest award for distinguished civilian service. The remaining nurses, earned the same honor, in a lesser grade.356 Overall the work of the American Red Cross hospital before September 1915 was entirely medically laudable. It had a mortality rate of 3.7 percent out of 4050 cases admitted. The Annual Report of the American Red Cross Medical Bureau recorded that "This mortality rate is most creditable, particularly so in view of the fact that the vast majority of the wounded (80 to 90 per cent) received at Kief, were badly infected. Many reached the hospital in very depleted condition, as often they did not arrive from one to two weeks after they had been wounded.”357 Staff conducted 976 major surgeries and performed 53,233 minor operations and dressings.358 At its peak, the hospital had 750 beds, treated more than 4000 patients, including over 1000 surgeries involving anesthesia. Most of the patients received wounds on the Galician front, but some arrived from as far away as Poland.359 While the hospital operated for a little less than a year, its impact was immense. Once Americans became aware of the significant gap between Russia’s medical needs 355
Koskull, 59. “American Nurses Decorated for Valor,” Red Cross Bulletin 3, no. 2 (January 6, 1919): 357 Eleventh Annual Report of the Central Committee of the American Red Cross Annual Report, 1915, Annual Report of the Bureau of Medical Service for 1915, 18. 358 Ibid. 359 Snively, “Base Hospital Work, 623. 126 356
and capabilities, they could not ignore the obvious chasm without being complicit with the resulting suffering. The positive impression left by the work of the doctors and nurses in Kiev could not be taken for granted. Termination of the mission compounded with additional aid for enemy prisoners put the goodwill generated by American Red Cross work at risk. American commercial interests in Russia had the most to lose, and their representatives in Petrograd worked hard to continue to demonstrate their support and loyalty to their host nation by continuing humanitarian assistance in vastly more remote and challenging military theater of operations.
127
Chapter 2: Americans Join the Russian Persia Expeditionary Force
From October 1915 until September 1916, a small group of American doctors and nurses played an integral role in Russian military operations in Persia, including failed attempts to link with British forces in Mesopotamia. Sponsored by business interests in the Petrograd American colony, this small team of American personnel made a significant contribution to medical care for the entire theater of operations. Eventually, their work expanded to include countering infectious disease, caring for Ottoman prisoners of war, and assisting survivors of the Armenian genocide. Petrograd colony’s Russian Committee of the American Red Cross hoped to use the humanitarian and medical aid, financed by U.S-based commercial interests, to enhance “American prestige” and thereby establish a stronger foothold in their host country’s commerce. While the Eastern Front may be generously called a second thought for Western historians, the Russian experience in the Caucasus and the expedition to Persia are usually forgotten and neglected by modern historians. From both Russian and American perspectives, this period is important in reflecting significant American contributions to Russian relief. For example, the Americans’ experience in urban Kiev differed sharply from that confronting them in rural Persia. The contrast was summed up by American Red Cross Surgeon Dr. Edward Dickey: “deserts, mountains, magnificent scenery, mosquitoes, malaria, camels, donkeys, orange, fig, date, apple and cherry trees,
135
nightingales, crows, wild dogs, wild Kurds, caravans, bazaars, Mohammedans, beggars, liars, thieves, robbers, veiled ladies, superstitions, and sons of the prophet.”1 David Stone, in his comprehensive study of the Russian army in the First World War, writes, “If the Eastern Front is the neglected theater of the First World War, the war in the Caucasus is the neglected theater of the Eastern Front.”2 He notes that Norman Stone, who wrote one of the first modern in-depth military studies of Russia in WWI, did not even address the Caucasus, and his Soviet/Russian contemporaries also give little attention to the topic.3 While the Caucasus has been neglected, General Nikolai N. Baratov’s Persian Expedition is largely ignored. Sean Mcmeekin in his 2011 Russian Origins of the First World War writes,“The Baratov expedition to Persia remains a largely blank page in the history of the First World War.”4 This dissertation attempts to fill in some of the details on that “blank page.” Existing studies of Baratov’s expedition focus primarily on the operational and strategic levels of the war. They document strategy, tactics, and Allied coordination rather than soldiers’ experiences or the operating environment. Examinations from the “top level,” by definition, provide little information on lives of average soldiers, prisoners, and refugees. To date, no study has touched on this topic in any detailed manner. Making matters more challenging, almost without exception, authors examine Russian military
1
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 7, 1916, 4. David R. Stone, Russian Army in the Great War; The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 178. 3 Ibid., 330. 4 Sean McMeekin, Russian Origins of the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2011), 189. 136 2
activities in Persia through the lens of foreign involvement in the region or as part of the broader story of the unprecedented British humiliation at Kut rather than the events on the ground or the experiences of individual participants.5 This same paucity applies to WWI in Persia overall. It was a period of immense political and social upheaval that led to unprecedented suffering and ultimately set the foundation for the rise of Reza Shah Pahlavi. Mohammad Gholi Majd, one of the first scholars to examine early twentieth century Persia using American State Department records, writes, “The history of Persia in WWI is practically a void about which little has been written in sixty years….Scholarly books on the history of Persia in the last sixty years contain practically nothing on the subject.”6 Michael Zirinsky, a noted scholar on Iran and American missionaries, concurs with both the importance and the current lack of meaningful study. He writes, “Although these Iranian events have largely been ignored by western historians of the Great War, they were of vital importance to Iran itself.”7 Given the lack of historical examination of the broader topic, it is not surprising that the story of the American medical personnel assigned to Baratov’s Persia expedition and their accounts remain undocumented beyond the original letters, diaries, and articles published in contemporary newspapers and magazines. Other copies of their accounts
5
In April 1916, British forces under General Charles Townsend surrendered the Ottomans en masse after a nearly four month siege. 6 Mohammad Gholi Majd, Persia in World War I and its Conquest by Great Britain (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 1. 7 Michael Zirinsky, “American Presbyterian Missionaries at Urmia during the Great War,” http://www.iranchamber.com/religions/articles/american_presbyterian_missionaries_zirin sky.pdf, 2. 137
survive in the Petrograd colony’s bilingual Russian-English publication, The Christian Advocate, as well as in the letters and diaries of the American missionaries who assisted them in Persia. Crucial pieces of the puzzle are preserved in the monthly and quarterly reports submitted by the American staff to their financial backers at the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross. The reports were dutifully published in the monthly Christian Advocate in the hope that highlighting these humanitarian contributions would bolster colony fundraising and Russian goodwill. This chapter is first scholarly examination of these sources and integrates them into their Russia’s Great War historical context. Working Conditions While primitive working conditions posed significant challenges compared to the Kiev experience, the scope of the American Red Cross mission in Persia was an even broader contrast. It included care not only for Russian soldiers, but also Turkish prisoners, and Armenian and Assyrian refugees. The American missionary community was an essential partner in their humanitarian efforts. In many areas, before the war, American missionaries were the sole sources of western medical care. Persia hosted numerous well-established American missionary hospitals, staffed by U.S. doctors and nurses. The missionary hospitals and clinics were envisioned as a form of outreach to local Christian communities, and served as natural pathways for religious teachings. Ahmad Mansoori in his dissertation, “American Missionaries in Iran, 1834-1934” writes: “Medical work occupied an important place in the missions’ program in Persia. Foreign 138
missionaries did a remarkable job in relieving the physical sufferings of the Persian people. They opened hospitals and dispensaries for treating the ill. They worked hard during famines, epidemics, and plagues to rescue people from the threat of death.”8 The Annual Report for Presbyterian missionaries for 1915 contains the following passage from Tabriz: There is much opportunity for evangelistic work in the medical department (Tabriz) and since the Russian occupation, there is less restraint on the part of the Moslems in discussing religious subjects. The difficulty is that the medical missionary is so busy with his professional work that often he himself is not able to take advantage of opportunities offered or to follow up the influence of the medical work with evangelistic effort.9 Faced with infrastructure and resource shortfalls, American medical personnel assigned to the Russian Persian Expedition relied heavily on their compatriots in the missionary community for support and expertise. Until the establishment of the American Red Cross hospital at Khoy the sole source of local medical care was a local Presbyterian mission. American missionaries had a natural affinity for the Russian occupiers. Zirinsky writes, “American missionaries allied themselves with other Christian groups and saw the Russian army, and its locally recruited Assyrian and Armenian levies as ‘our army.’”10 Similarly, Dr. T.E. Lawrence, an American medical missionary in Qazvin wrote, “We no longer hear any complaint of Russian occupation. European civilization is coming, and almost everyone seems willing, if not anxious that it
Ahmed Mansoori, “American Missionaries in Iran, 1834-1934,”(Phd diss, Ball State University, 1986), 63. 9 The Seventy-eighth Annual Report of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America May, 1915, 29. 10 Zirinsky, 3. 139 8
should.”11 Given this natural affinity and close working relationship in was inevitable that local American missionaries played a key role as participants in and witnesses to the fortunes of Russia’s Persia Expedition and its eventual failure. The American Red Cross Hospital in Persia The American colony’s bilingual monthly Christian Advocate served as the official media organ of the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, and is an invaluable source for information about the activities of both the American medical unit and its sponsors in the Petrograd.12 The paper’s editor in chief was Petrograd-based Methodist missionary and de facto Dean of the colony, Reverend Dr. George A. Simons, who also served as titular head of the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross. The November 1915 edition carried the following brief announcement: “Surely every American sojourning in this hospitable country will be genuinely glad to know that the splendid work of our American Red Cross surgeons and nurses, who…had charge of the large hospital for wounded soldiers in Kiev, is to be continued.”13 It reported the group of “loyal” Americans, under the leadership of Dr. Harry Hamilton Snively, was transferred from Kiev to Tiflis in early November. 14 The party consisted of veterans of the American Red Cross hospital including Snively, Dr. Brown McClintic, and Dr. Lyle
11
The Seventy-eighth Annual, 30. Hough to Bicknell, Letter, May 29, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, Group 1, CDF 1881-1916, NACP. 13 “Vivat American Red Cross in Russia,” Christian Advocate 83 (November 1915): 15. 14 Ibid. Tiflis is modern-day Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia. 140 12
Hazlett accompanied by five American nurses, eight Russian sisters, and almost fifty sanitars. The group also included a Russian doctor and his assistant.15 The group’s assignment was to provide medical support to the Russian Army of the Caucasus under Grand Duke Nicholas. Relieved of Command on Russia’s Western front on September 5, 1915, Grand Duke Nicholas arrived in Tiflis as Viceroy and Commander in Chief of the Caucasus front on September 24. Before the war, prospects for an increasingly pro-German Persia forced Russia and the United Kingdom into a closer military regional partnership. Aware of German efforts to sow internal discord, Russia and Great Britain mobilized forces to counter adversary ambitions and destroy the opposition based in Kermanshah. One of the first actions taken by the Grand Duke at his new command was to instruct General Nicholai Yudenich to form a special expeditionary force for Persia.16 Already taxed for forces, Yudenich could only spare a Caucasian Cavalry Division, the 1st Caucasian Cossack Division, and two mixed Kuban Cossack regiments for the task. The force totaled 6,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry under the overall command of General Nikolai N. Baratov.17 Snively and the other American medical personnel joined Baratov’s expedition. However, when the Americans departed Kiev on October 23, 1915, they did not realize their ultimate destination was Persia. The thirty-five car train loaded with hospital supplies and carrying the former staff of the Kiev hospital battled congestion and delays
15
Ibid. W.E.D Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921 (Nashville: Battery Press, 1953), 322. 17 Ibid., 324. 141 16
before ultimately reaching Tiflis on November 3.18 The city served as headquarters for Russian armed forces in the Caucasus. Well-equipped and with enough material to establish a 600-700 bed facility, Snively expected “to establish a big hospital there.”19 Instead, after eleven days of travel, when they arrived in Tiflis, the Russian Commander asked “Are you Americans afraid of typhus?” They replied “no,” and were directed to cross the frontier and establish their new hospital near Khoy in Persian Azerbaijan where the disease had been rampant.20 In peacetime, the trip took four days, but due to military movements clogging the rails, delays, and other disruptions, the journey took more than two weeks. The train transported them as far as Julfa, the railhead on the Russo-Turkish border.21 The town was Khoy’s closest railhead so the party was forced to travel the remaining seventy-five miles by horseback, donkey, camel, and carriage to their new base of operations. Nurse Eleanor Soukup McClintic described their arrival: 22 “On November 11, a sad tired and dirty crowd, covered with sand from our heads to our feet, we came to the hospital…we found many changes were necessary, which were to be made immediately, for our own
H.H. Snively, “Base Hospital Work in Russia,” Military Surgeon 38, no. 6 (June 1916): 632 and Eleanor Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” American Journal of Nursing 18, no. 1 (October 1917): 34. 19 Harry Hamilton Snively, The Battle of the Non-combatants; Letters of Dr. Harry Hamilton Snively (New York: The Business Bourse, Publishers, 1933), 50-51. 20 Sophie Kiel, “Experiences in Russia” in “Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Convention of the American Nurses’ Association, “American Journal of Nursing 18, no. 11 (August 1918): 1041. and Snively, “Base Hospital Work in Russia,” 632. 21 The Julfa Railhead was built by Russia in 1907 as part of the larger Trans-Persian line project. 22 Nurse Eleanor Soukup married Dr. Brown McClintic in June 1916. 142 18
welfare as well as for the soldiers.”23 Conditions were a far cry from the facility in Kiev. Closer to the front, lacking basic infrastructure, and further removed from major lines of communication, the hospital was responsible for surgery, basic medical aid, and contagious disease. Supply was a challenge; material also had to travel from Julfa railhead by camel or other animal transport. On the Caucasian front, lines of communication and supply sometimes extended 400 miles or more between Russian supply depots and their ultimate destination.24 Similarly, basic combat medical support capabilities were sparse. Behind the front lines, it might be twenty five miles to the nearest dressing station. The closest field hospital could be 200 miles, and base hospital more than 400 miles from the front.25 Transportation for the wounded was even more treacherous and support was subpar compared to the unsatisfactory situation on the Galician front. In Persia, road infrastructure was not conducive to allow transportation from the front to Khoy by automobile, and railways were virtually non-existent. The Union of Zemstvos had exclusive responsibility for transporting wounded in the region. However, all of their supplies, support, and infrastructure were designed for the European campaigns and were poorly suited to work in the mountainous Caucasus and Persia. These conditions: induced the Union to supplement considerably its equipment to provide it with means of transport for the hilly roads….The wounded and the forage had to be Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 34. Despite the fact that Persia is not technically part of the Caucasus, it fell under the command and control of Grand Duke Nicholas, and was considered part of his front. 25 “Russian Army Officer, Pittsburgh Man, Home,” Pittsburgh Press, January 16, 1917, 17. 143 23 24
transported by pack animals along mountain tracks, as the ordinary means of conveyance proved quite unfit for that purpose. The provision of pack-transports proved to be a very difficult and complicated task. A few hundred mules and pack-horses had to be purchased wherever possible in the Trans-Caucasus and also in Persia, Russian horses not being used in the mountains.26 A specially designed “pack-stretcher” was developed for horseback use. This method, suspending the stretcher between two pack animals, suited the primitive camel, mule, and horse caravans required to move people and supplies, which was the “only practicable”27 means of transport in the region. A report by the U.S. Department of State found: transportation of the wounded in the Caucasus presented very many difficulties. Often on a journey of 100 to 200 versts [66 to 132 miles], all means of conveyance were utilized. From the snow-fields of the mountains down towards the roadway (where it was so hot that motor-cars had to be kept under sheds in the open air) the wounded soldiers were carried on the backs of pack-animals. Over the roadway until the next summit was neared they were conveyed in motor-cars or in wagons, and then across the summit on sleighs, snow-fields being of course impracticable for motor-transport.28 Despite Russia’s limited preparedness, Nurse Clara Barndollar was impressed by its medical personnel, explaining that “it’s remarkable how they patch up the wounded before they reach the hospitals, and how even the most desperately wounded look forward eagerly to the time when they can again go to the front.”29 In the same interview, she described conditions in Persia as “plague ridden….where disease is still more deadly than the big guns.”30
26
Memo to Mr. Emmett White, Bureau Insular and Foreign Affairs, American Red Cross, March 12, 1919, File 948 “Russia-General,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 27 Ibid. 28 Memo to Mr. Emmett White, Bureau Insular and Foreign Affairs, American Red Cross, March 12, 1919, File 948 “Russia-General,” RG 200, NACP. 29 “Visitor From the Front,” Altoona Tribune (Altoona, PA), September 20, 1916, 6. 30 Ibid. 144
On November 15, Snively rode to Tabriz with the local Khoy Russian military commandant to try to arrange support for his personnel. After the 100-mile automobile journey, he met American Consul Gordon Paddock who arranged for him to stay with two American missionaries, Mr. Burt S. Gifford and his wife.31 During his short stay, he visited local missions, schools, and hospitals. Paddock and the missionary community in Tabriz supported the American doctors throughout their deployment. 32 On November 19, after a week in Khoy, Snively sent a letter to Commercial Attaché Henry Baker, who served as the secretary of the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross. In the document he mentions his visit to Paddock, and describes the Khoy’s hospital’s initial challenges and impressions of his staff: 33 We are pleased with our situation here, although we are well to the front and have no comfort, and few of the supposed necessities of civilized life. As the days go by we shall dig in…it is remarkable how doctors and nurses are accepting the rough conditions making the best of it all and taking a splendid interest in the work. We found about 100 patients sick with typhoid fever, erysipelas, malaria, etc. The sanitary conditions are such as to make life here very dangerous, but we are working to improve things.34 Snively also described the abhorrent condition of displaced Assyrians; to alleviate their suffering, the Americans had established feeding stations. He closed by informing Baker, “you may tell your Committee that we are placed where for the time being we can do the 31
This visit may be the root of some of the cooperation between the Khoy hospital and the Tabriz mission. Gifford was not a medical doctor, but rather a priest. He worked with Dr. W.S. Vanneman who served temporarily with the Red Cross hospital at Khoy. Tabriz was also the base of Dr. Samuel Wilson, well known for Armenian and Syrian relief. He died of typhoid in 1915. 32 Snively, Battle of the Non-Combatants, 55-56. 33 Snively’s business card and a handwritten note listing all of the American nurses are still preserved in the Tabriz consular records. 34 “American Red Cross Helping Russia,” Christian Advocate 84 (December 1915): 17. 145
most good for Russia and humanity, and also where we can dwell in the greatest harmony.”35 Khoy had two military hospitals, one under the auspices of the army, the other, run by the Americans, administrated by the Russian Red Cross. Therefore, unlike Kiev, where patients were exclusively battlefield casualties, in Persia medical personnel were confronted with typhoid, typhus, malaria, dysentery, and other infections in challenging sanitary conditions.36 According to Nurse Eleanor Soukup McClintic, the only available disinfectant was kerosene, and flies were a constant problem. Staff and patients alike had to make fly swatters to deal with the nuisance. Killing flies kept “every able-bodied person in the hospital…busy all the time.”37 Flies were such a problem that the staff initiated a reward system whereby patients were even given a cigarette for killing a specified number of the pests.38 Some of the staff actually found the austere conditions as something positive. Nurse Sophie Kiel wrote, In all my training the one hope I had was that someday I would get a chance to be in a place where I could improvise and do things when I had nothing to work with. We had a chance there. We gave away everything we had in Kiev, we had
35
Ibid. H.H. Snively, “Base Hospital Work in Russia,” 632. 37 “Tells of Life With Army,” Huntington Herald (Huntington, IN), March 22, 1917, 8. 38 T. Lyle Hazlett, “Experiences with the Russian Army of the Caucasus in Northern Persia,” Military Surgeon 41, no.4 (October 1917): 447. 146 36
a big equipment and passed that all along to the Russian Red Cross, thinking we were going to be put in a small hospital properly equipped.39 In Khoy, she got her chance to improvise. Sanitarian in the town of Khoy was abysmal, and conditions were far from optimal for infection control. Khoy served the base of operations for Baratov’s forces throughout the winter of 1915-1916. Before granting permission for Russian soldiers to live in the area, military sanitary personnel had to clean up the stagnant water, dead animals, and refuse. Hazlett captured his impressions thusly: “The surroundings, as well as the place itself, were most desolate, the great sandy desert [sic], stretching out in front and the bald, bleak mountains of Kurdistan in the distance.”40 According to Nurse Sophie Kiel, Khoy’s single-story main Russian Red Cross hospital was a “long adobe building with mud walls. We had thought the Polytechnical Institute dirty, but we found the Persians a bit dirtier. The floors were cobblestones, or just plain earth.”41 The building previously served as a caravanserai, where travelers spent the night, while their animals were tended outside. The compound was converted to include six large wards and an operating room (also used to perform dressings). There were a dining room, drug storage, and four other rooms used by the American and Russian staff. The kitchen, along with the nurses’ quarters, were in a separate building. A large area between the wards and a yard served as a receiving area where staff undressed the patients and sterilized their clothes. Sanitary procedures similar those instituted in Kiev were enforced: On arrival, medical personnel clipped patients’ hair, 39 40 41
Sophie Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1041. Hazlett, “Experiences,” 445. Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1041. 147
then bathed and scrubbed them with kerosene to kill any vermin. Prisoners were sent to isolation wards for periods of three days to three weeks to reduce the spread of typhus.42 Dickey described some of his experiences combating the infectious disease challenge: Lessons of permanent value on the care of troops will be learned from the war. The enemies mostly feared within the army’s own lines are typhoid, cholera, and dysentery. All of these are usually communicated from infected drinking water sources. Vaccination has been adopted generally as a proved preventive of the first two scourges. In malarial districts the troops get daily dosage of quinine. Typhus is combated by the use of petroleum in the quarters of the soldiers. In cases requiring unusual treatment the men bathe in the fluid.”43 Living and working conditions were far from ideal from an illness prevention perspective. The operating room was the only chamber with wood flooring. Nurses lived in two rooms over that stable and actually mowed the grass on the mud-covered floors.44 Other floors were mud brick, and the roof was straw. Infection control was a constant battle. The 175-bed facility had separate wards for clean cases, infected patients, and those with typhoid and dysentery, as well as another for convalescent soldiers. A mile from the town the Americans established a separate typhus hospital. That facility was run by a Russian feldsher. These soldiers usually had a year of medical work, and served numerous roles in the main hospital, including administration of anesthesia, performing dressings and sometimes assisting with surgery. Prisoners with contagious diseases
Hazlett, “Experiences,” 447. “Russian Army Largest; Nation Regenerated, Pittsburgher Asserts,” Pittsburgh PostGazette (Pittsburgh, PA), August 2, 1916, 1. 44 “Tells of Life With Army,” Huntington Herald (Huntington, IN), March 22, 1917, 8. 148 42 43
stayed at the typhus hospital. Nurses or feldshers who became infected would also be treated at that facility.45 During summer 1915, well before the arrival of the American Red Cross, the main hospital building housed 1750 cholera patients under the care of an orthodox priest.46 When the Americans arrived and took over the month-old Russian Red Cross hospital, they found about a hundred patients under the care of a single doctor and no nurses. Many of the patients were poorly nourished and sick with typhoid.47 The building had no toilets, so trenches were dug. Nurses fumigated, cleaned and scrubbed the building. Sanitars, who previously served in Kiev said “‘We will clean this place in the American way.”48 They soon had 250 medical cases. Patients did not exhibit the horrific battlefield wounds like those encountered in Kiev, but rather, severe hemorrhages, scurvy, and pneumonia. Despite experience treating the wounded from the Galician front, Nurse Sophie Kiel found the new cases quite shocking: “I never saw medical conditions such as they were there; they were of the worst type.”49 Water was a greater challenge than at Kiev. The hospital had no running water, and the only source was a mountain spring located a half mile from the facility. It was carried from the spring in barrels and transferred to a larger boiler in a corridor of the hospital. Sanitars built small tanks to support the kitchens and bath. Drinking water was
45 46 47 48 49
Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 36. Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1042. Hazlett, “Experiences,” 445. Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1042. Ibid. 149
stored in earthenware jugs by beds for patient use. Hazlett noted the Russian custom of only drinking boiled water helped prevent a serious cholera epidemic among the 13,000 troops then in Persia.50 Disposal of sewage posed particular challenges. Because supplies had to be transferred long distances by camel caravan, they did not have large amounts of kerosene to burn the waste. Instead, they developed creative solutions to bury and dispose of this potentially hazardous material. 51 The hospital treated the highest number of typhoid cases in the fall of 1915, 165 patients, before Russians received appropriate vaccinations. Later, as one would expect, numbers dropped significantly after prophylaxis and the application of sanitary measures.52 In the Americans’ ten months of service, they treated 177 cases with a mortality rate of twelve percent.53 Also charged with responsibility for the entire Turkish prisoner quarantine station, the Americans supervised the care of all of the captured soldiers. In the Khoy, Turkish prisoners remained in quarantine for at least twenty-one days before transfer into Russia and could not enter the main hospital for Russian soldiers. The spread of contagious disease necessitated the establishment of a large tent hospital in March 1916 at the Turkish prisoner of war camp to care for infected prisoners
Hazlett, “Experiences,” 447, Ibid. 52 Hazlett, “Experiences,” 449. 53 This mortality rate is within norms of the First World War. For example, the U.S. Army suffered a 14.5 percent mortality rate., Lieut. Col. Joseph F. Siler, M. C., and Maj. John S. Lambie, Jr, “Typhoid and the paratyphoid fevers,” U.S. Army Office of Medical History, http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwi/communicablediseases/chapter1.html. 150 50 51
away from the general population.54 Again, unlike Kiev, Ottoman prisoners sometimes shared quarters with their former adversaries when both posed an infection risk. Hazlett explained that patients recuperated together: “Enemies the day before, roommates the next day, each expressing his best wishes for recovery of the other. Russian and Turk lie side by side in the American Hospital in Khoi.”55 When surgery was required, American staff packed sterilized tools and went to the prisoner of war “Tent Hospital” to perform procedures. Due to the intense heat, operations at that facility occurred “under the sky” on a wooden bench that served as an operating table. According to Nurse Sophie Kiel, “All kinds of operations were done right out in the open, with very curious patients standing around and looking on. We tried to go into a tent one day, but it was too small, and flies were terrible. A circle of men stood around waving palms to keep the flies off.”56 Hazlett wrote in August: “At the prisoner’s hospital, which is entirely a tent hospital, we maintain a dressing room, but we have been compelled to operate under the trees, when necessary, we do so early in the mornings.”57 McClintic and Hazlett eventually settled into their routine in Khoy. Soon another American doctor came to fill Snively’s vacancy. Before returning to the U.S. on what was supposed to be a short vacation and business trip, Snively traveled to Petrograd to meet with members of the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross. The trip to 54
Ibid., 448. “Dr. Hazlett Tells of Turks and Russians Side by Side,” Pittsburgh Post Gazette (Pittsburgh, PA), December 5, 1916, 3. 56 Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1043. 57 “Good Samaritan Work,” Christian Advocate 92 (August 1916): 10. 151 55
the U.S. was to be a temporary visit to see family and discuss Red Cross business, but, he never could return to Russia because of emerging military medical requirements related to American involvement on the Mexican border.58 As primitive as conditions were in Khoy, everyday life was even more trying. Disconnected from their compatriots and living in a somewhat alien culture, maintaining morale was a struggle. During his November 1915 visit to the American Consulate in Tabriz, Snively expressed his concern to Paddock about the “somewhat uncomfortable conditions” in Khoy. 59 Subsequently, Hazlett wrote to Paddock about his frustration that “Americans here at Xoi [sic: Khoy] feel that we are very much isolated from the world and we do not receive but very little news.”60 In response, Paddock promised to forward Reuters telegraphic news, and provide them with an update on local developments. One report included information on the regional military situation and speculation with implications for Hazlett’s workload: Russian forces have occupied Souj-Bulak, to the south of Lake Urumia, and…they have entered Sultana-bad, and it is reported that they have also entered Kermanshah, but this last is not confirmed. It is also reported that the Russians have defeated the Turks at Hassan-Kala and are proceeding to Erzurum. It seems quite possible that later on there may be military operations on a larger scale on the Caucasian and Persian frontiers, in which case, should your Unit remain at Khoi, you will probably find considerable demand for your services.61
“Dr. Hamilton H. Snively’s Interesting Letter from Khoi,” Christian Advocate 84 (December 1915): 20. 59 . Paddock to Hazlett, letter, January 25, 1916, File 300/814.2, RG 84, Vol. 8, RFSP, Tiflis, USSR, NACP. 60 Hazlett to Paddock, letter, January 4, 1916, File 814.2, RG 84, Vol. 8, Tiflis, USSR, NACP. The handwritten letter is penned on Hospital Units “C” and “H” stationary. 61 Paddock to Hazlett, letter, January 25, 1916, File 300/814.2, RG 84, Vol. 8, Tiflis, USSR, NACP. 152 58
Despite their frustration, the adventure of military life did break the monotony. In a December 2, 1915, letter to his father, McClintic described the celebration of the Tsar’s name day. General Nikolai N. Yanushkevich, the Grand Duke’s Chief of Staff, and local Commander General Chernyzubokov held a review of Russian troops. The American doctors and nurses were given “places of honor” among the other officers and Garrison Commander General Voronov. After an Orthodox service and blessing of the troops, the American staff met the generals, and the Russian soldiers marched in the review. That afternoon the generals inspected the American hospital and were pleased with what they observed, especially considering the austere environment and lack of resources.62 A mid-December letter from McClintic to his father portrayed a less laborious side of the mission. According to McClintic, “Everything is running very smoothly. We have enough work to keep us busy. Social duties take up some time here as everyone who passes through stops to see the American hospital, and we try to make them welcome. I really believe we met half the officers in Persia.”63 In addition to the earlier visit by General Yanushkevich, the Persian governor, accompanied by a large retinue, came to visit on Christmas (December 25), which he referred to as the “great American holiday.”64 The Petrograd Committee sent the staff a gift of one hundred rubles, which they used to treat the now fifty-seven sanitars to a fine meal.
“Resplendent Uniforms Worn by the Persians,” Indianapolis News, March 8, 1916, 11. “American Hospital at Russian-Persian Front,” Christian Advocate 86 (February 1916): 21. 64 Ibid. 153 62 63
From a military perspective, the period from December 1915 through February 1916 marked a consolidation of Russia’s position in northern Persia. During this timeframe, Baratov captured Hamadan, Qom and Kangavar. The Turks abandoned Tabriz in January 1916 and Kermanshah fell the following month.65 The end result, according to Mcmeekin was Baratov “achieved the long-standing Russian goal of occupying Persian Azerbaijan.”66 Baratov later boasted, the “Russian sphere of influence in Persia was entirely in our hands.”67 However, life continued as normal in Khoy. In a January 2 letter to the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross treasurer MacAllister Smith, Hazlett described the sanitars’ New Year’s dinner, writing that the soldiers were thrilled to eat a truly American meal. Their Russian military hospital food was normally bland and lackluster, but their American New Year’s feast was special. The staff prepared an even larger celebration for Orthodox Christmas. Hazlett reported that at that time the hospital had 175 patients, mostly medical cases, but a few requiring surgery. 68 The typhus patients were reduced to only four, but by then the Americans also were required to care for the Turkish prisoners. Hazlett closed his summary report to the Committee: “We are getting along very well here and we feel we are really needed. We are really at the front here.” 69 The monthly summary report to the Petrograd Committee for the period ending
65
Sean Mcmeekin, Russian Origins of the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 180.and 189. 66 Ibid, 189. 67 Ibid. 68 The term “medical” refers to work that could be performed by a doctor without surgical training and experience. 69 Ibid., 21-22. 154
December 7, 1915, documented 120 patients, of whom twenty-one were surgical cases, fifty-nine typhoid, four typhus, and fourteen with malaria. The hospital admitted (versus only treated and released) 147 patients, of whom nineteen were discharged, and seven died. They treated 152 refugees and provided 1809 hospital days of patient care. Unlike Kiev, where dressing wounds nearly overwhelmed the staff, Khoy performed only 100 dressings.70 Raucous Julian New Year’s festivities gave the Doctors a much-needed break from their dreary daily existence. McClintic captured the colorful events in a January 29 letter to his father describing in very elaborate terms a party at the Russian Consul’s residence. He and Hazlett, along with the generals, were tossed in the air by Cossacks in traditional Russian fashion. On a more somber note, he recounted the death of a sanitar who had served with the unit since it first arrived in Petrograd in October 1914. The soldier died from accidental blood poisoning contracted at the hospital. His death and military funeral “hit hard.”71 The letter also captured the fact that, in marked contrast to their work in Kiev, a considerable amount of effort was devoted to the medical needs of the community and refugees: “Have been out a great many times in the city in consultation with native ‘harems’ or doctors, and operated quite a number of times.”72 McClintic informed Petrograd Committee chairman George Simons that “We have done
70
Ibid. “Hoosier Doctor Relates his Experience Among Persians,” April 19, 1916, Indianapolis News, 13. 72 Ibid. 155 71
considerable consultation work with the native Persian doctors. They take us out several times a week to see patients, and we have been able to relieve some greatly.”73 In one of his regular updates to his father, McClintic wrote the Americans were not receiving many wounded during the winter period. The mountain passes between Khoy and the front were choked with snow, prohibiting the transfer of patients from the battlefield. Tending to the large Russian garrison, Turkish prisoners, and Armenian refugees did, however, keep them occupied. At one point, the hospital even housed fifty Armenian orphans who survived a Turkish massacre. Journalist Ellwood Hendrick highlighted this event in a popularized magazine article on the American activities in Persia: “Cossack cavalry picked up a number of refugee children from devastated homes and brought them to be cared for by the American nurses. The Syrians were sent to the Armenian Relief Committee at Tiflis, but the two ‘enemy boys’ (little Turks) were sent to the American refuge at Petrograd.”74 However, the Americans longed to be closer to the military action. Hazlett predicted that “From the looks of things there will be something doing out on our front in the spring. In which event this hospital will have enough to keep us busy, without looking after the refugees or civilians.”75 He informed Committee chairman Simons that the assistance of American missionary medical personnel was essential in providing care to the community. Many of the Armenians were sent to the hospital by American. “Graphic Account of Good Samaritan Work of American Hospital with Russian Army,” Christian Advocate 88 (April 1916): 13. 74 Ellwood Hendrick, “Eight of Them in Persia,” American Red Cross Magazine 8, no 11 (August 1916): 282. 75 “Hoosier Doctor Relates his Experience Among Persians,” 13. 156 73
Armenian volunteers. But, he stressed, the main focus of their work remained the Russian soldier, for whom they were still providing basic medical care including daily office hours and other services as necessary.76 Life remained, however, extremely tedious and according to McClintic, “Our American nurses feel the monotony the most. When off duty there is no place to go, and nothing to do for recreation.”77 However, there was soon relief from that drudgery, for at least some of the staff. Baghdad or Bust However, their next objective was more challenging. Since December 12, British General Charles Townshend and his force of almost 10,000 soldiers had been surrounded and under siege by superior Ottoman forces in the Iraqi town of Kut. Allen and Muratoff write: The rescue of Townshend absorbed all the attention of the British headquarters in Iraq during March and April 1916. As a natural enough consequence the idea of collaboration with Russians took the form of proposals for combined action to relieve Kut, and from the moment of Baratov’s capture of Kirmanshah [sic] (26 February) the question became a major issue.78 On April 1, the Grand Duke tasked Baratov with staging a diversionary attack against Baghdad. On April 20, Baratov and 5,000 men moved against the Iraqi border, hoping to draw Turkish forces away from Kut to reduce resistance against a last-ditch
76 77 78
Ibid. Ibid. Allen and Muratoff, 385-386. 157
British rescue attempt. Sadly for Townshend, Baratov reached Karend too late to prevent the surrender of the British garrison at Kut.79 McClintic later summarized his time in Persia as “All spring we advanced across Persia, driving the Turks before us, every soldier and every subaltern firmly convinced that we would join the British around the walls at Bagdad and together storm the city’s walls.”80 However, the small Russian force was not equal to the task. Qazvin The Americans’ involvement in this operation started on February 12, 1916, when McClintic received orders to send part of the medical unit to Tiflis. There they learned their destination was Qazvin, a region experiencing an uptick in military action as part of Baratov’s final push to crush the resistance of Turkish forces and Persian irregulars held up in Kermanshah. By the end of January, Baratov concentrated eight to ten thousand men in Hamadan in preparation for a final push on Kermanshah. Russians captured Kermanshah on February 26, 1916.81 On February 15, McClintic, enthusiastic about the prospects of linking up with the British, was traveling by train via Tiflis to Anzali.82 Once there, they waited several days for a truck to Qazvin, where he arrived on February 20. They found, like in Khoy, the
79
Ibid., 386-388. “Capture of Bagdad Regarded as Important for the the British,” Indianapolis News, March 14, 1917, 7. 81 W.E.D Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921 (Nashville: Battery Press, 1953), 373-374. 82 “Hoosier Doctor Relates his Experience Among Persians,” 13. 158 80
town already had a military and Red Cross hospital. Expecting to advance with the Russian army to Hamadan, they thought their stay was only temporary. Eleanor Soukup McClintic recounted the mood of her colleagues in early 1916: Work was getting very dull and monotonous and the doctors were discouraged, when one day word came from Red Cross Headquarters in Tiflis, that two American doctors, two sisters, and a Russian sister were to be sent to the central part of Persia; the others remaining at the Russian-American hospital at Khoi, until further notice when they too were to be sent.83 Ultimately, McClintic, his future wife Eleanor Soukup, and Russian Nurse “Sister Golden” were selected for this mission. McClintic expected the rest of his colleagues to join him after six to eight weeks and recognized that: Military hospitals must be prepared to move and follow the advance or retreat of armies and our whole desire is to be at the place where we can do the most work. Spring is about to begin and with it I believe the triumphal campaign of the Allies, and we having all been in this from the start want to have our part in it. Russia has come to mean a great deal to us, and the friends we have made among her people only strengthen our pro-Ally sympathies.84 During American Commercial Attaché Henry Baker’s visit to the Caucasus, Russian Red Cross officials explained that due to a lack of surgeons and an increase in wounded from central Persia, they required the services of McClintic, recently arrived Dr. Edward Dickey, and Eleanor Soukup to support medical needs closer to the front. 85 According to Baker, the work of the forward-deployed unit, now assigned to the Russian Fifth Hospital Detachment, was entirely surgical and supported several hospitals in
Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 36. “Graphic Account of Good Samaritan Work of American Hospital with Russian Army,” 13. 85 “My Visit to the American Hospital at Khoi,” Christian Advocate 88 (April 1916): 13. 159 83 84
Qazvin. 86 Division of the American medical unit was intended to be only temporary. Fighting shifted to the south and east, resulting in a decrease in military casualties arriving in Khoy. This reduction made it possible for Hazlett to run the Khoy hospital with reduced staffing.87 However, as Nurse Sophie Kiel explained, “But they were no sooner gone than the hospital filled up with medical cases and Turkish prisoners were brought in.”88 According to Kiel, the prisoners were in abhorrent condition, often suffering from frost-bite, lice-infested clothes that often had to be burned, and worst of all, typhus.89 In contrast, McClintic and his staff in Qazvin, despite being closer to the front, were caring less frequently for wounded Russian soldiers than for local inhabitants. McClintic described his living conditions during that period as “hand to mouth.”90 Impassible roads kept the Russian garrison bottled up in Qazvin and a major snow-storm delayed their departure onward to Hamadan. McClintic spoke with General Baratov, using broken Russian and French, and requested to be sent where he could perform actual surgical work. Baratov replied that there was a need for surgeons “further on” and, as soon as conditions allowed, they would “go to Hamadan, clean up the work there and then on to Kermanshaw [sic]. Our hospital may follow us if the need for
“Nurse Back from War Zone,” 6. “Graphic Account of Good Samaritan Work of American Hospital with Russian Army,” 13. 88 Sophie Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1042. 89 Ibid. 90 “Doctor Brings Bride from Thick of Fire on Russ Front,” Indianapolis Star, February 25, 1917, 66. 160 86 87
surgeons continues-all depends on how much fighting occurs.”91 A week later McClintic wrote the Petrograd Committee expressing his frustration with the wait and lack of meaningful work. By this point, the local hospital was closed. He and the additional Russian medical reinforcements from Tiflis had to await orders to move. Food supplies were limited, as was firewood. He wrote that he was not sure how he would have fared if not for the assistance of two American missionaries, Dr. E.T. Lawrence and his wife.92 It is clear that the Presbyterian mission played an integral role in the lives of the American and Russian military personnel. Examples included accounts by Lawrence that Zemstvo staff regularly attended his religious services. Lawrence even exchanged language lessons with a Russian surgeon.93 Finally, when road conditions cleared, the sanitars departed Qazvin on foot, and McClintic hoped to leave soon after. Aware the Petrograd Committee used their monthly reports to encourage financial support, he summed up the situation as follows: “As the Corps military surgeon informed me, they can’t manufacture wounded men in order to gain work, nor command the elements to settle down and let us proceed. If we get down to Kermanshaw[sic] and work becomes heavy they will call on the rest of our hospital, otherwise, we will be returned.”94
91
Ibid. Dr. E. T. Lawrence and his wife were both doctors and medical missionaries in Qazvin. In addition to medical care, they ran a pharmaceutical dispensary in the town. 93 The Eighty-first Annual Report of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America May, 1918, 281. 94 Ibid. 161 92
Hamadan McClintic and his colleagues finally departed Qazvin for Hamadan on March 20. The journey took four grueling days. Battling hunger, the thirty-person party traveled over mountain passes and desert plains in rain and snow by truck, sleeping in the vehicles or caravanserai. When they arrived on March 24, they established two hospitals. One facility was previously a carpet factory; the other was originally the American missionary Lily Reid Holt Memorial Hospital for men run by Dr. J. A. Funk.95 As a missionary hospital, it had housed twenty-four patients but to meet the demands of war under the Russian and American Red Cross was converted to serve 180 sick and wounded. Funk and his colleagues moved their activities to the other local American missionary medical facility, the Whipple Memorial Hospital for Women.96 At the newly established Red Cross hospital, nurses worked with sanitars to care for patients, but in the absence of the Russian sisters, feldshers assumed that role.97 Initially, McClintic worked in the carpet factory hospital, but soon transferred to the former American mission, where he assumed responsibility for all surgical work. By April 2, the hospital housed twenty-five seriously wounded patients, with many more requiring surgery. Procedures included amputations, resections, and other 95
It seems likely that this was the American Hospital run by Presbyterian Missionary and medical Dr. J. A. Funk. He wrote in the missionary publication Women’s Work that the Lily Reid Holt Memorial Hospital in Hamadan was used as a Russian Red Cross hospital until their final evacuation in 1917. Funk, Dr. J.A, “Hamadan Under British Occupation,” Women’s Work 24, no. 11 (December 1919): 244. 96 Willem Floor, “Hospitals in Safavid and Qajar Iran” 72 Hospitals in Iran and India, 1500-1950s, Ed. Fabrizio Speziale, 2012. 97 Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 40. 162
minor operations utilizing cocaine as anesthesia. Patients included soldiers, prisoners, and civilians. In a letter to his father, McClintic documented that at times he was caring for 125 wounded. Cases included several cases of appendectomies, bullet wounds, and blood poisoning. In one instance, McClintic even rode four miles on horseback to treat a newly arrived Russian colleague from Qazvin who was thrown from his mount.98 As in Qazvin, from time to time McClintic augmented the local American Presbyterian mission to provide medical care to the local population. He, as well as his missionary colleagues, often had to improvise because of their austere environment. In one telling anecdote, he described observing Hamadan American missionary, Dr. Arthur Funk, operate on a cataract on the dirt floor of a native home. 99 Every day American missionaries, Englishmen, and Russian officers visited the hospital to socialize with the staff. Conditions and morale were thus improved, when compared to their previous, isolated condition in Khoy.100 On April 24, McClintic received a telegram informing him that typhus debilitated Hazlett, and Nurse Sophie Kiel was running the Khoy hospital in his absence. The message also transmitted a request that McClintic’s unit return to Khoy as soon as possible to fill the void left by Hazlett’s illness. McClintic captured his Russian 98
“Bread and Butter Is Treat,” Indianapolis News, June 17, 1916, 11. “Bread and Butter is Treat,” 31. The article also provides some insight into how the spouses of military leaders traveled with their husbands, and served in “nearby” Russian Red Cross facilities. The husband of the Russian head nurse was the Colonel of the prewar regiment from Tiflis, the Nizhni Novgorod Dragoon Regiment, then based at Kermanshah. McClintic struck up a close friendship with the Colonel, and promised to reconnect once the hospital moved to Kermanshah. 100 “American Hospital Helps Russian Army,” Christian Advocate 90 (June 1916): 11. 163 99
superior’s reaction to this request in his report to the Petrograd American Red Cross Committee: I showed the telegram to the Russians and the head physician said he was going to try to have us retained here. They have no surgeons here at all and seemed very much vexed. Gen. Baratoff, commanding at this front, also may refuse to grant our departure. In which case the Red Cross at Tiflis will be helpless. Personally, I shall regret very much if we go back, as I’ve had a dream of being present at Bagdad’s fall. More than that there is a certain satisfaction in this pushing forward constantly through Persia, seeing the Russians victorious, cleaning up batches of wounded soldiers under difficulties and seeing them get well enough to return to the front or be sent back to Russia. I am hoping a later telegram will come assuring us of Hazlett’s recovery. At present await orders from Tiflis. It will be a great shame if we give up this branch of the work when it is going so nicely and after so long a delay in getting started.101 Mcclintic and his colleagues remained with the frontline operating forces, and Khoy was left to explore other options. McClintic understood the strategic value of the Committee’s required monthly and quarterly reports. Because every the Christian Advocate printed every update, these documents and the data they captured justified the Committee’s very existence to the American Red Cross and provided legitimacy for its overall fundraising efforts. After more Russian advances, on April 27, McClintic and a Russian sister went forward to Kermanshah, leaving Dickey and the remaining staff in Hamadan. Nurse Eleanor Soukup followed McClintic several days later.102 Dickey complimented the Russian nursing staff on capabilities and alacrity, noting how well they filled the void previously occupied by their American counterparts: 101 102
Ibid., 12. “American Hospital Helps Russian Army,” 11. 164
“The women of Russia’s aristocracy have responded splendidly to the need for their cooperation. There were no American nurses with our division, although earlier in they were required because the country lacked trained young women for the work. All of this changed now, and princesses are so frequently met in the hospital corridors that their rank ceases to be the exception.”103 Work Continues at Khoy The announcement that three American nurses received military decorations for their service in Khoy surely boosted Petrograd Committee’s standing in the eyes of their donors and the American Red Cross. Nurses Florence Farmer, R. Lee Cromwell, and Sophie Kiel were awarded the Russian Order of Saint Anne in recognition for their contribution to the Army of the Caucasus.104 Their recognition was well-deserved. Working with little assistance and even less material support, they expertly handled a large volume of work. In his required monthly report for February to the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, Hazlett noted the constant flow of sick and wounded, twenty-one on February 2 alone. Since opening its doors, the hospital had cared for a total of 460 patients. Most of the wounded were from the Van and Urmia districts and traveled an average of two to three days over the mountains in rickety carts converted into field ambulances. 105 In some cases, the carts
“Russian Army Largest; Nation Regenerated, Pittsburgher Asserts,” Pittsburgh PostGazette (Pittsburgh, PA), August 2, 1916, 1. 104 “Three American Red Cross Nurses,” Christian Advocate 88 (April 1916): 16. 105 Van remained under Russian control until 1918. 165 103
could not complete the journey, and patients continued to Khoy on stretchers suspended between two horses.106 According to Hazlett’s February 7 quarterly report to the Committee, the hospital housed 112 patients. The staff, before McClintic and Dickey’s departure, consisted of three American and two Russian doctors, as well as five American and seven Russian nurses. Patients came from a broad range of nationalities. By one account, ten different languages were spoken in a single ward. The Americans had three separate facilities under their supervision: the former mission, a tent hospital for prisoners, and a facility solely for infectious cases in an old mansion on the outskirts of Khoy.107 There was little fighting that winter due to impassable road conditions. Many of the Russian wounded who did arrive were victims of attacks by roving bands of Kurds who roamed the mountains. When combat surgery was required, it was often to treat frozen feet. Like McClintic’s forward-deployed unit, much of the medical effort focused on the local population. According to Russian regulations, local residents were not permitted in the same hospital as its soldiers, so they were treated at the separate tent hospital. The Americans supervised the medical and sanitary needs of the Turkish POWs, and therefore the Turks also received their care at the “tent hospital.”108 Nobody
“American Hospital Helps Russian Army,” 11. At the hospital for contagious cases, typhus and skin infections were the most common ailments. 108 “Quarterly Report of the American Field Hospital Caucasian Front, Temporarily at Khoi, Persia,” Christian Advocate 89 (May 1916): 13. During that month, the hospital treated 436 patients, performed 9973 hospital days of patient care and 1192 dressings, as well as 100 surgeries, twenty of which were major. There were also twenty deaths. They cared for eighty refugee children, ninety prisoners, and at one time up to 125 typhoid 166 106 107
was turned away. In one instance, the Americans even provided care for sixteen children rescued by Cossacks in the war zone.109 In March, after an official U.S. trade promotion visit to Tiflis, Commercial Attaché Baker, who also served as secretary of the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross visited the hospital at Khoy. He hoped to gain a first-hand understanding of the entire scope of American medical personnel’s contributions to the Russian military and gather information to support the Committee’s fundraising efforts. After the arduous journey from Julfa and arrival in Khoy, he knew he found the hospital when he saw the “Stars and Stripes” and Russian flag in front of the doorway. Coincidentally, Baker’s visit occurred at a unique moment; there was both lull in hospital operations, and uncertainty over whether the staff and equipment would be packed and sent to Erzurum in eastern Turkey or another location closer to the fighting. By this point, Khoy’s small staff included Hazlett, four American nurses, and eight Russian sisters. Greeted by Russian military quartermaster and liaison officer A. Petersen and the American staff, Baker received a tour of facilities funded by Russian Committee of the American Red Cross donations. General Fyodor Chernozubov, at the time Commander of Russian Forces in Northern Persia, as well as other military officers, met with Baker’s during his time at the hospital. Because the Americans supervised the sanitary conditions and
cases, as well as a significant number of malaria, bone disorders, hemorrhages, and other common army ailments. From February 7 to March 6, the hospital housed 135 patients, treated 236 over the month, and performed 3267 hospital days of work. There were seven deaths, seventy-five surgical cases, nine operations, as well as 533 dressings. They also cared for fourteen refugee children and treated 195 patients outdoors (local populace and prisoners). 109 “My Visit to the American Hospital at Khoi,” Christian Advocate 88 (April 1916): 14. 167
welfare of the Turkish prisoners of war, Baker, like his colleagues from Embassy Second Division back in Russia, took the opportunity to inspect the prisoner of war camps and determined that conditions and standard of care met requirements of the Geneva Conventions.110 Other local initiatives funded by Russian Committee of the American Red Cross coffers included an officially sanctioned dispensary to provide cost-free medical care and pharmacy services to the local population.111 Part of the reason the Russian Red Cross forbid the local population from visiting the main hospital building was to reduce exposure of Russian soldiers to infectious diseases. According to Nurse Sophie Kiel, the dispensary was quite busy. The “Persians just swarmed in for treatment.”112 To the American staff, most heart-wrenching was the constant stream of Armenian refugees, especially the children. Often, survivors of the genocide, they were literally destitute. Nurse Sophie Kiel described one encounter: We had the Armenian refugees. Massacres had been going on not far from us, and they brought in sixty-eight little Armenian children, they looked like little skeletons and were nearly naked. The doctors gave some of their underwear to make clothes, and we had a little of the cloth left from uniforms which we cut up and made underwear and nightgowns for these little kiddies. They were sent on to Tiflis into an orphanage.113 Baker concluded his visit noting: It seemed to me at comparative little cost, American prestige is being very much upheld at this Hospital. Because it is under American direction, it is also known as the American Hospital and has become famous all over the Caucasus, and yet 110 111 112 113
Ibid. Ibid. Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1043. Ibid. 168
our Committee only pays the salaries of three doctors and five nurses, together with a few incidental expenses, while the average expense of the Russian Red Cross in connection with the hospital is Rs 10,000 per month, which would be very much larger except for the excellent management of Mr. Petersen.114 It eventually became clear that the remaining American hospital staff would remain in Khoy for the foreseeable future, and not, as expected, join their forwarddeployed colleagues. In a telling statement, Hazlett lauded the contribution of the American hospitals in Persia because in contrast to Kiev where their work only a small piece of the overall medical effort, he felt that in Khoy the Americans were major contributors: “Although we if we can carry on the work in the two places it will be all the better for our reputation on this front. There are no large hospitals on this front and that perhaps at Tiflis and that is too far back from the line of action.”115 During Hazlett’s illness, Nurse Sophie Kiel performed daily oversight and administration of the hospital, including the monthly reports for the Petrograd Committee. In her report for April, she informed the Committee that “The month of April was our busiest since the hospital opened the work was heaviest; more surgical work and more seriously ill patients to care for, and our staff was smaller than at any
“My Visit to the American Hospital at Khoi,” 9. “Dr. Hazlett writes from Khoi under the Date of April 10, Report of the Month Ending April 6, 1916,” Christian Advocate 90 (June 1916): 12. Overall, in the month ending April 6, the hospital treated 271 patients and performed 3871 days of hospital work. They had nine deaths, 114 surgical cases, and performed seventeen operations. They treated 294 “outside patients”(unclear what this means) and had 121 patients in the hospital on that date. “Report for Month: April 7 to May 6,” Christian Advocate 90 (June 1916) 12: According to their monthly report to the Committee, from April 7 to May 6, the Khoy hospital treated 385 patients, including ninety-three surgical cases, and twentytwo operations. There were a total of nine deaths. They performed 1005 dressings and treated five refugees, 162 natives, as well as 171 prisoners. On May 6, there were 177 patients in the hospital. 169 114 115
other time-only one American doctor on duty.”116 Typhus, which was spreading in the town, eventually took hold of the staff. Both Hazlett and Russian Nurse Voronov, the wife of the Khoy Garrison Commander were stricken with the disease. Head of the American Hospital and Presbyterian Mission in Tabriz, Dr. W.S. Vanneman went to Khoy to assist Kiel until another former missionary, Dr. Floyd O. Smith arrived from Tiflis to provide more permanent support. Before his assignment in Russia, Smith served as a missionary in Turkey until his expulsion in 1915. Soon after, with the approval of the Missionary Board, he volunteered with the American Red Cross to work in the Caucasus and Persia. He spoke fluent Turkish and French, skills that proved invaluable with the Ottoman prisoners. Smith, a physician, served as a member of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief. Before arriving in Tiflis, Smith expected he would be: providing seed grain, animals and plows to rehabilitate refugees able to return from North-Western Persia to their homes in Eastern Turkey. The peoples involved were Armenians, Syrians, and Assyrian Christians. The Russians refused to allow me to go into the area where we were carrying on relief work, viz, Northwest Persia, with a center at Khoi….It seemed that as far as I was concerned that we were stymied.117 Smith, a well-known figure in the history of American aid and documentation related to the Armenian genocide was essential to maintaining uninterrupted support during and after Hazlett’s illness.118 The typhus that incapacitated Hazlett allowed Smith to obtain the Russian military authorization to enter Persia as the new American head Red “Sister Sophie Kiel writes from Khoi, under the Date of May 3/16,” Christian Advocate 90 (June 1916): 13. 117 F.O. Smith, MD, A Hawkeye Abroad, (Privately published, no date), 16. 118 See for example George, Aghjayan,“Portrait of Bravery: The Life and Times of Dr. Floyd Smith,” The Armenian Weekly, http://armenianweekly.com/2014/04/28/smith/ 170 116
Cross doctor in Khoy and then serve “double duty” providing relief to refugees.119 He normally finished his hospital duties around noon and then rode to the relief station where two assistants purchased and shipped seed grain, animals, and implements, mostly in the Van region, following the Russian advance.120 As Dr. Smith planned, he served both the interests of the American Red Cross and Armenian Relief during his time in Khoy. As will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief viewed support of the Red Cross hospitals in Persia as an opportunity to get around Russian military entry restrictions and assist the embattled Armenian and Assyrian communities. During his four months in Khoy, Smith travelled frequently to other locations, including Urmia, presumably on behalf of the Armenian-Assyrian Relief.121 His contribution to humanitarian aid in the region was described by the American Colony as “invaluable.”122 After officially receiving his American Red Cross commission, Dr. Smith arrived at the now 150-bed Khoy hospital. Because Smith spoke Turkish, he was also assigned the prisoner of war “tent hospital.” Hazlett was still seriously ill, and delirious.123 Aided by three Russian nurses, Dr. Smith’s background, experience, and lingual proficiency proved invaluable in caring for the Ottoman prisoners.124
119
Smith, A Hawkeye Abroad, 2 and 17. Ibid, 17. 121 Letter, Hazlett to Smith, Letter, August 17, 1916, File 814.2, Vol. 8, RG 84, Tiflis, USSR. 122 “Dr. Floyd O. Smith,” Christian Advocate 93 (September 1916): 14. 123 Smith, A Hawkeye Abroad, 17. 124 “Good Samaritan Work,” Christian Advocate 92 (August 1916): 10. 171 120
Normally, the hospital performed operations every day, but the capability to maintain its normal workload was thrown into doubt by Hazlett’s illness. Initially, it was far from certain whether he would even survive. Nurse Kiel informed Baker, “he was very near death’s door, we have been very anxious about him.”125 Hazlett was often in a state of delirium. By May, both Hazlett and Voronov were out of danger, but still not fit to return to work.126 In addition, there was another setback. Four of the best sanitars were stricken with typhus simultaneously, and one died. Treating typhus in Khoy’s primitive conditions was challenging. There was not even ice to control fevers. Nurse Sophie Kiel was exceptionally frustrated. Something as simple as ice, easily obtainable in Kiev or any other modern city, was impossible in this under-developed portion of Persia: “we had no ice. I don’t think in my life I ever put in such a time as mental worry as those six weeks because of not having things to do with. We couldn’t get any ice, except a piece about the size of a goose egg, and after a while we couldn’t get that, with these people just burning up with fever, no ice to be had and very little food.”127 However, they received word that Dickey would return to provide assistance. He was expected by early June. Dickey and Nurse R. Lee Cromwell departed Hamadan for Khoy as soon as they could, but the journey took two weeks.128 Since the hospital lacked a dentist, Smith sometimes improvised to provide this service. A story of an aching tooth captures the culture of making do with what they had:
Kiel to Baker, letter, May 13, 1916, File 798.4 “Committees-Petrograd,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 126 “Sister Sophie Kiel writes from Khoi, under the Date of May 3/16,” 13. 127 Kiel, “Experiences in Russia,” 1043. 128 “Infection is General, War Surgeon Says,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 6, 1916, 9. 172 125
The doctors were impressed into rendering dental services. The operating room nurse was the capable Miss Farmer….One day I was called to give dental care to a Russian Red Cross official. He and I had no common language. He was already in the improvised dental chair we used….The tooth was undoubtedly a bad one. With a little skill and more strong-arm tactics, I soon had the offending member out.129 Hazlet began to anticipate another potential transfer to a location closer to the front, as a new military road was constructed and patients from Van were diverted to other facilities, decreasing Khoy’s workload and thus the necessity for the hospital itself. Taking these factors into account and aware of the necessity of medical support closer to the fighting, Hazlett believed it was imminent.130 Nevertheless, in early June, Hazlett telegraphed the Petrograd Committee to request two new doctors and two new nurses. By early July, he grew increasingly frustrated with Russian Committee of the American Red Cross unresponsiveness. The American medical staff continued to believe Snively might still return, but received no updates.131 On July 26, Consul Smith acknowledged receipt of a telegram from David Hough on behalf of the Committee. The telegram read, “Please cooperate with doctors to discover preferences of Russian Red Cross with regard to disposition of our unit when decided will secure additional force also please telegraph both doctors Snively not yet left America. Will substitute another if they prefer urgently beg Hazlett remain until another comes.”132 Consul Smith in Tiflis informed Hough that
129
Smith, Hawkeye Abroad, 19. . “Good Samaritan Work,” 10. 131 . The letter from Hazlett to Consul Smith reads in part “….I was sorry to hear that Dr. Dickey has caused unpleasantness in Tiflis. I cannot understand why he should do anything like that. As you know, it was impossible for me to come to Tiflis at that time. I have never received any information regarding what took place….” Letter, Hazlett to Smith, July 10, 1916, File 814.2, Vol. 8, RG 84, Tiflis, USSR. 132 Smith to Hough, dispatch, July 26, 1916, File 814.2, Vol. 8, RG 84, Tiflis, USSR 173 130
the Russian Red Cross representative with authority over such decisions was away performing inspections and Hazlett did not know when he would return.133 By mid-August, Hazlett’s responsibilities were increasing rather than decreasing. He became the senior Russian Red Cross representative due to the extended absence of the actual appointed official. Hazlett wrote Consul Willoughby Smith in Tiflis on August 17: The longer we stay here the more work I seem to get into. Recently the Russian Red Cross sent me two thousand rubles to establish a cholera hospital here so now we will soon have three branches here besides our main hospital. Typhus hospital, Cholera Hospital, and the Tent Hospital that we have for the prisoners so by that it looks that they wish us to stay here for a while at Khoi.134 According to Hazlett, the Committee in Petrograd still had not responded to earlier correspondence. In fact, by July 1 he became so frustrated that he submitted his resignation. Even then he still had did not received an acknowledgment or any guidance. The American nurses desperately needed a vacation. Complicating the personnel challenges, he learned that Snively was not returning, but rather had joined U.S. military medical efforts on the Mexican Border.135 Fortunately, there was no large-scale cholera outbreak, which would have made an already difficult situation untenable. The only outbreak was among the local population who served as transport drivers. Malaria was the most common disease. According to Hazlett, of the 1390 cases admitted to the hospital between November 1915 133
Ibid. Hazlett to Smith, letter, August 17, 1916, File 814.2, Vol. 8, RG 84, RFSP, Tiflis, USSR. 135 Ibid. 174 134
and September 1916, there were 260 cases of malaria. The second most common infectious ailment was the 249 cases of a vector-borne disorder that led to frequent high fevers. This latter disease was generally not fatal. However, the poor condition of the patients led to some deaths. Typhus was the next most frequently encountered disease. During the outbreak of the fall of 1915, the hospital handled the largest number of typhus cases-165. Infections occurred before troops received vaccinations against the disease. However, presumably because of these protections, Hazlett did not encounter a single case in his last six months. Similarly, Russian prophylactic measures resulted in a marked decline in cholera and malaria.136 Despite the prevalence of infectious disease, the hospital treated a wide array of medical conditions. In the end, its final death rate was five percent from all causes.137 Smith and Hazlett continued their work through summer of 1916, and the Committee in Petrograd still lobbied for the unit’s relief and replacement as quickly as possible. On August 23, Consul Smith cabled David Hough in Petrograd that “I judge at least two doctors and four nurses required….Hazlett and nurses at Khoi[sic] require leave and should be relieved at earliest date….Unit will probably remain there as Hospital enlarged. Smith still assisting Hazlett….Good men should be sent out.”138
Hazlett, “Experiences,” 449. Ibid. 138 Consul Smith to Hough, Dispatch, August 23, 1916, File 814.2, RG 84, Tiflis, Volume 8, Tiflis, NACP. 175 136 137
Kermanshah As Baratov’s forces advanced on the border town of Kerend on April 27, 1916, McClintic, Nurse Eleanor Soukup, and a Russian sister departed Hamadan to establish a surgical capability in Kermanshah, the advance base for operations in Mesopotamia. Dickey and the remainder of the staff stayed at Hamadan. The Nurses rode to Kermanshah in a two-wheeled horse-drawn ambulance, accompanied by several officers and three heavily armed mounted soldiers. Security was paramount, as stories of Kurdish attacks on small parties of Russians continued to circulate. On one occasion, while crossing a high mountain pass in the early morning, the unveiled western women were harassed by a group of about 100 or more Kurdish road workers who almost tipped over the ambulance as they ran alongside trying to look at the women. The Russian soldiers were unable to control the situation, but fortunately the crowd dispersed on its own. 139 The following day their entry into “Kurd Territory” was described by McClintic in a May 1 letter to his father: things are a joke no longer. Instructions were issued yesterday morning for all horsemen and carts to stick close together, and our drivers were armed. The officers looked after their revolvers, as did I also, and we buckled on our swords instead of leaving them in the carts. The Kurds have a habit of attacking lone horsemen and carts, and sometimes larger parties. And when they get a man, they cut his throat, and in that cut they place the little cross which hangs about every Russian orthodox neck.140
Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 40, and Christian Advocate 90 (June 1916): 13. 140 “Surgeons Heavily Armed When Working in Kurds’ Territory, Indianapolis News, July 17, 1916, 16. 176 139
Unlike the journey from Qazvin to Hamadan, on this trip the group was well provisioned. The head nurse in Hamadan, Madam Natiev, provided enough food to stave off any hunger. They carried their beds, and slept in the open each night. Arriving in Kermanshah on May 3, the group immediately got to work. The initial hospital location was a large mud-walled and floored building with no windows. Due to the large influx of wounded, the hospital had to be relocated to another facility, a former Khan’s palace in Delgosha, a deserted Kurdish village, a mile outside of town. To maximize its capacity, wooden beds were built along the garden walls and covered with an awning, as well as mosquito protection. After the modifications, the facility accommodated 200 beds.141 McClintic recorded, “There were no sanitary provisions….As a result the sick far exceeded the number of wounded in this campaign.”142 As always, improvisation was not only a necessity, but a rule. Sterilization of instruments was accomplished using gasoline lamps, and dressings were wrapped in paper and baked in ovens. Since there were no rubber gloves, operations were performed with clean, but bare hands. Carbolic acid, permanganate of potash, and small amounts of alcohol served as the only antiseptics. As before, chloroform was administered by feldshers for general anesthesia. Ether could not be used because it rapidly evaporated as a result of poor quality or the local atmosphere.143 The hospital was equipped with
141 142 143
Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 102. McClintic, Russian Retreat, 3. Ibid., 4. 177
granite plates and basins, which were sterilized by burning with alcohol. Clean water had to be carried nearly two miles from a spring.144 Russian wounded typically traveled three to six days to reach care in Kermanshah. Many received only rudimentary treatment at a field dressing station from a doctor or feldsher before the journey. Others were not so fortunate, and received nothing at all. Transportation consisted of only the most primitive methods, including two-wheeled cart, stretcher strung between two horses, or tandem horseback, with the wounded soldier holding on to the rider in front. Patients with infected bullet wounds were kept at the hospital to recover, and when strong enough, returned to their units. Other, more severely wounded, were provided surgical care and remained at the hospital until they were stable enough to be transported back to Russia. Their convoys consisted of a chain of carts twenty to fifty vehicles long, with a field kitchen and dressing cart. Sanitars, feldshers, and nurses traveled with the wounded to maintain care throughout the journey.145 Wounded who could endure travel were transferred as rapidly as possible by two-wheeled cart to Hamadan, 110 miles in the rear.146 By May 7, McClintic was deeply engaged in surgery.147 Welcomed with twenty wounded the day after their arrival, the Americans cared for all the surgical cases, while the Russians, who were not surgeons, managed the purely medical patients.148 Kermanshah was the closest hospital to the front, and Hamadan, a week’s journey, was 144 145 146 147 148
Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 102. Ibid., 103. McClintic, Russian Retreat, 5. “Kermanshaw, Persia,” Christian Advocate 90 (June 1916): 13. Presumably in the vicinity of Karend. 178
the second. McClintic was the only surgeon at Kermanshah. Dickey, until his dismissal, held a similar position at Hamadan. The workload was compounded by the challenging conditions in the field. On May 24, Dickey wrote to the Superintendent of the Southside Hospital in Pittsburgh: Military surgery-much like emergency work at the hospital-mill and railroad accidents-with the exception that patients are received late, always infected, in a state of exhaustion and low resistance and foreign bodies present….Amputation required more frequently than civil cases, patients succumb quickly to infection….Patients in no condition to withstand re-amputation…149 Since McClintic and Dickey were the only surgeons, the local Red Cross Chief, Mr. Smither, objected vociferously to any suggestion that either American should depart their posts for positions further in the rear. Smither hoped to keep one American surgeon at each of the hospitals, and move one up, as the other moved forward.150 In May, many of the patients came from the battle of Kerend and the hospital served as the front’s first aid station, since it was the closest medical facility to the field. Russian forces fell back to defensive positions in Kerend after the disaster at Khanaqin in early June.151 On June 1, McClintic married his head nurse, Eleanor Soukup. Presiding over the ceremony was the American Presbyterian missionary Reverend Dr. F.M. Snead. The couple worked up to one in the afternoon of their wedding day.152 A proper military
“Infection is General,” 9. “Kermanshaw, Persia,” 13. In their report to the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross for May, McClintic recorded that from May 4 until early June, the Kermanshah hospital cared for 225 patients, performed 1369 dressings, conducted twenty-three minor operations using cocaine as an anesthesia, and nineteen major ones using chloroform. Only three patients died. 151 Ibid. 152 “Graphic Letter From Dr. B.S. McClintic,” 15. 179 149 150
wedding, the bride wore a Persian silk gown and McClintic his Russian Red Cross uniform. Music, including the wedding march, was provided by a Cossack band, resplendent in their traditional long red coats.153 The first week of June, McClintic reported to the Committee, he had only forty patients, and it was impossible to send them to Hamadan because they were severely wounded. Typically, the hospital averaged between four and eight wounded each day from skirmishes between Russian and Turkish forces.154 Pressure on Turkish manpower and resources was relieved somewhat after the British failure at Gallipoli. A renewed push into Persia was conceived during a Turkish-German conference at Bagdad in early May. With their flank secured, Turks mustered a force of 25,000, many times greater than Baratov’s meager expedition. Russian forces concentrated in the vicinity of Khanaqin on the Persian border. On June 3, Baratov opted to seize the initiative and attack the Turkish forces, hoping to inflict a defeat before they reached their anticipated troop strength. The attack failed, and the Russians were driven back, with a loss of 500 infantry. In retreat, Russian forces established defensive positions at Kerend.155 The steady stream of wounded became a deluge as the fortunes of Baratov’s expedition faltered with the disastrous Battle of Khanaqin. Russian defenses at Kerend collapsed and, on June 28, after heavy fighting, Baratov’s men were forced to withdraw. Two days later, he ordered an evacuation of Kermanshah.156 McClintic wrote his father,
153 154 155 156
“Ellsworth Girl Wedded in Persia,” Salina Daily Union (Salina, KS), July 28, 1916, 2. “Kermanshaw, Persia,” 13 Allen and Muratoff, 432. Ibid. 180
“We went down to Kermanshah in April labeled ‘Bagdad or bust.’ We came back ‘busted’ by heck. We retreated in advance of the Turks riding for six days in the blistering sun and with very little food.”157 The battle’s first wounded (twenty-three men) arrived on June 8. They travelled for six days still in their original first aid dressings. The hospital received 153 on June 9, fifty more on the June 10, and then, according to McClintic “in diminishing numbers for a week.”158 Cholera, typhoid and dysentery dogged the retreat. As in Khoy, the Americans maintained separate facilities for contagious patients. McClintic recorded that the “other two hospitals were being filled with typhoid and dysentery patients. Cholera cases usually died en-route to the hospital.”159 The hospital lost a clerk to cholera and a Russian nurse to typhoid. Two of the physicians were unable to work, one because of typhoid, another due to an acute insect borne fever, leaving only three doctors, and the commanding officer to manage the patients and administrative requirements.160 Despite on-going medical requirements, the hospital staff was ordered to evacuate in response to advancing Turkish forces. Russian Red Cross representative Snitkin passed the order that all personnel depart by 4 am the next morning. The hospital was “stripped of all equipment and a skeleton” crew remained to staff what was now, in effect, little more than an aid station. Four doctors, a pharmacist, a feldsher, and six
“’Bagdad or Bust’ Was Their Cry, But it Was a Case of Bust,’” Indianapolis News, October 21, 1916, 31. 158 McClintic, Russian Retreat, 4. 159 Ibid., 6. 160 Ibid. 181 157
sanitars stayed behind to deal their equipment and care for any new or remaining wounded.161 According Nurse Eleanor Soukup McClintic: The patients were to be sent first, then household and hospital supplies, and lastly sisters were to go; the doctors were to remain with the retreating army. All went to their various duties, some into the operating rooms, dressing the newly wounded, while others packed the supplies or prepared the sick and wounded for the trip back….The most important things were moved…..The covered vans were piled high with articles and upon these convalescent soldiers, who were too weak to walk, sat holding on….Each person was armed with a rifle bayonet or revolver and all of the cartridges we could carry. 162 Despite Nurse Soukup McClintic’s pleas to remain with her husband, the two separated, and she departed with the initial convoy, while her husband remained in Kermanshah. McClintic informed his father of their parting in surprisingly matter of fact manner: “So we went back into the dressing room, dressed some thirty newly arrived wounded, amputated an arm, and then went to our room to pack up. Nobody slept all night. We got 290 wounded into the wagons and horse litters and sent them on, under escort….It was my first separation from Eleanor since the wedding.”163 During the Russian retreat, McClintic noted Kermanshah’s streets clogged with caravans, small and large, made up of a variety of carts, and other modes of transport, loaded with equipment, possessions, and even camels mounted by dragoons.164 He reported to the Committee in Petrograd that the Russians were “fighting every inch of the way” and the first day after the evacuation they received only a few patients, but the next, June 30, sixty wounded arrived. Fighting was just west of the town, and all day, McClintic heard artillery, rifle,
161 162 163 164
Ibid. “‘Bagdad or Bust’ Was Their Cry, But it Was a Case of Bust,” 31. Ibid. Ibid. 182
and machine-gun fire, as the town filled with retreating infantry and artillery. 165 He could hear the enemy artillery getting closer, and soon received an order to leave in ten minutes. McClintic threw his remaining possessions in a saddlebag and discovered transport wagons already loaded, every sanitar equipped with rifle and ammunition, and all of the officer's horses saddled and ready to depart. Medical personnel prepared patients for the long journey and made them as comfortable as possible in wagons and horse stretchers. While waiting for final orders to move, McClintic rode to see American Missionary Dr. Snead, and found the American missionary compound full of Christian refugees. Snead insisted on remaining to protect his wards against expected Turkish revenge.166 Back at the Red Cross hospital, equipment that could not be evacuated was set alight in a massive bonfire. McClintic described the event to his father: “We went around and smashed every breakable article, and made a big pile of surplus stuff we could not carry and poured on the kerosene….A big crowd of Persians was waiting outside to begin looting as soon as we should leave. When the last wagon departed our first sergeant lit the fire.”167 At 6 pm, the remaining staff evacuated Kermanshah. As they departed, McClintic noted fires burning through the city as retreating Russian troops destroyed equipment to prevent it from falling into enemy hands. Much of the local population celebrated the withdrawal. Rumors spread that Afghanistan declared “Jihad” to drive the “infidels from Asia,” Persia would rebel, and all Islam would unite against the Allies. Ottoman forces 165 166 167
McClintic, Russian Retreat, 6. “Graphic Letter from Dr. B.S. McClintic,” 15. “‘Bagdad or Bust’ Was Their Cry, But it Was a Case of Bust,” 31. 183
arrived in Kermanshah only ten hours after McClintic’s departure. Russia’s retreat was slowed by traffic, terrain, and congestion, By day-break, McClintic stopped with the Russians at Behsitun to prepare a defensive position against the Turkish advance. The town was key terrain, located at a gap where the road entered the mountains. Trenches were dug, the cavalry arrived, and artillery emplaced.168 McClintic described the reversal: Now the pursued became pursuer, and for 500 miles we retraced our steps, our backs always guarded by the brave dragoons who were ever the last Russian to evacuate a position. And ever in my work as a surgeon I was receiving these men, recognized by the maroon stripe. At one time twenty officers were brought in after one fight, all known to me personally and my friends.169 Medical personnel spent the night in the town, but then continued to move further to the rear. On the third night, Kurds attacked a squad of soldiers transporting prisoners. Russian soldiers thwarted the attack after cavalry arrived from a nearby unit.170 Despite Turkish forces approaching ever closer to the retreating Russians, the greatest threats were attacks from Kurdish tribesman. McClintic informed the Petrograd Committee that “Our fear was attack from the tribesman along the way, who would seize the opportunity for loot. And I kept wondering if my wife and the other nurses had gotten through safely.”171 Eventually, the retreat lasted almost three months, and along the way, Russian ranks were continuously depleted through battle and disease. McClintic estimated that by
168
McClintic, Russian Retreat, 7. “Capture of Bagdad Regarded as Important for the British,” Indianapolis News, March 14, 1917, 7. 170 “‘Bagdad or Bust’ Was Their Cry, But it Was a Case of Bust,” 31. 171 “Graphic Letter from Dr. B.S. McClintic,” 15. 184 169
the time Behsitun fell the Russians were down to eight battalions against the Turkish eighteen.172 Despite McClintic’s hopes for his wife’s safe transit, on the second night of her journey, leading elements of their column were attacked by Kurds. Nurse Soukup McClintic described the attack for which she was subsequently decorated for her bravery, writing of the Kurds: removed all of the dressings and bandages, thinking money was concealed under them. One sanitar was seriously injured, all of the soldiers were in a state of collapse, and the march was delayed until the next afternoon. The sisters acted very bravely, working hard to quiet the soldiers, and because of this had the St. George medal conferred upon them.173 Many of wounded, who were armed for the journey, fought as long as they could, but the Kurds were ultimately driven off by dragoons from a nearby aid station. As soon as conditions allowed, the four nurses immediately calmed the patients and provided care to those injured in the assault.174 Despite the austerity and privation of the almost one week retreat from Kermanshah to Hamadan, there was one ray of hope. Nurse Soukup McClinitc described the contribution of the Unions of Zemstvos which maintained “wayside stations” to provide a brief respite from the drudgery of the retreat: “What a treat to the half-sick,
172
McClintic, Russian Retreat, 8. Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 105. The St George Cross is awarded for combat bravery. The awards for the four nurses were based on a recommendation from General Baratov. 174 “Graphic Letter from Dr. B.S. McClintic,” 15. 185 173
distressed soldiers who had to walk! With their boots off, they would struggle along, nothing to eat or drink all day, to these places, which would provide for them.”175 The Union of Zemstvos held a unique position in the Caucasus and Persia. Unlike Russia proper, where the Russian Red Cross, military, and Zemstvos worked in concert, all activities related to supporting the wounded in the Caucasus was delegated, in its entirety, to the Union. According to a 1919, United States Department of State Report: The activity of the Union of Zemstvos in the Caucasus has a somewhat special character. The absence of Zemstvos establishments in the Caucasus could hardly permit the Union to maintain local organizations there….Immediately upon the declaration of war against Turkey, the Prince of Oldenburg, the Chief of the Sanitary and Evacuation Departments, requested the Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Towns to take upon themselves the whole work of rendering assistance in the sick and wounded soldiers in the Caucasus.176 The Russians retreated an average of fifteen to thirty miles a day, and McClintic “leapfrogged” with another aid station, sometimes remaining at a location several days to a week, depending on the speed of the withdrawal, and moved forward when another medical unit took his place.177 Back to Hamadan Nurse Soukup McClinitic arrived in Hamadan on July 5, followed by her husband two days later. Her convoy carried the Russian Red Cross, military, and Zemstvo hospitals evacuated from Kermanshah, which posed something of a challenge, since all
Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 104. Memo to Mr. Emmett White, Bureau Insular and Foreign Affairs, American Red Cross, March 12, 1919, ANRC, Group 1, File 948 “Russia-General,”NACP. 177 McClintic, Russian Retreat, 8. 186 175 176
three entities already had facilities operating in the town. Reports suggest the evacuees from Kermanshah simply augmented their respective organizations’ existing capabilities, rather than establishing redundant facilities. The reunited McClintics remained in Hamadan in a month, living in a tent and working at the surgical hospital. 178 McClintic and his wife left very few records from their time in Hamadan. However some insight into their lives and uncertain existence were captured by the Clara Carey Case Edwards, wife of A. Cecil Edwards, manager of Oriental Carpet Manufacturers, a large British Persian carpet concern in Hamadan. 179 Her husband included several of her key journal entries in his article “German Intrigue in Russia” written for the Yale Review in 1918.180 Edwards served as a nurse alongside McClintic, dressing wounds, extracting bullets, and caring for the patients. She wrote in her journal that she answered “readily to the call of ‘Sestreetsa,’ Little Sister, from the patients on all sides. And I am becoming terribly familiar with all the different ways in which a man expresses pain.”181 However, the Russian position in Hamadan was tenuous. Turkish forces halted for a short period during Ramadan, but once the advance resumed, it was clear the Russian position would not hold. A.C. Edwards wrote his mother of the Ottomans: For a whole month after the evacuation of Kermanshah, he was content to sit tight until everybody thought that he would not take the risk of advancing further into 178 179 180 181
Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 105. A. Cecil Edwards went on to become a well-known Orientalist. A.C. Edwards, “German Intrigues in Persia,” Yale Review 7, no. 3 (April 1918). Ibid., 626-627. 187
Persia. Possibly he was waiting until Ramazan182 [sic] was over, or perhaps he was resting his troops after their rapid march from Karind in the middle of summers. Also he may have been waiting for reinforcements. Whatever the reason was, he waited just a month before renewing the attack….The Grand Duke must have…the soundest reasons for allowing the Turks to take Hamadan, as the evacuation will undo most of the work which our Allies have accomplished in Persia during the last nine months.183 By August 5, it was clear evacuation was imminent. Clara Edwards recorded: The town is full of rumors of the Russian retreat, but we really do not know what is happening fifty miles away. We are told that five thousand new Russian troops are on their way from Enzeli with ten heavy guns. 184 We are also told that there are no troops coming, because the Grand Duke has refused to send reinforcements. We hear that General Baratoff is to be superseded by a general who is on the way from Enzeli; we also hear that he has received a telegram of congratulation from the Grand Duke because he has drawn the Turkish army so far into Persia. One takes one's, choice! It is rather like living on the top of a volcano—a volcano which may blow us to Kazvin before we know it.185 In a letter to her mother the same day she wrote: The hospital work has decreased somewhat, as a lot of our patients have been moved to Kazvin[sic:Qazvin]. Still the number of doctors has decreased too….We expect to receive a large number of wounded from the front within a few days, but of course we don’t really know.186 Mrs. Edwards knew for over a week that evacuation was imminent; On April 7, McClintic notified all Red Cross personnel to evacuate that afternoon.187 Edwards and her husband were reluctant to leave Hamadan, especially since neither actually saw any evidence of fighting, however, “To be sure, guns had been heard for the last two
182
Turkish pronunciation of Ramadan. A.C. Edwards, letter to Mother, August 23, 1916, Series I, Correspondence, Clara Cary Case Edwards Papers. 184 . A port on the Caspian Sea. 185 A.C. Edwards, “German Intrigues in Persia,” 627. 186 Clara Cary Case Edwards, letter to Mother, August 5, 1916, Series I, Correspondence, Clara Cary Case Edwards Papers. 187 Ibid., August 15, 1916. 188 183
nights…and a hostile aeroplane had flown over the city that morning.”188 McClintic and his colleagues treated wounded for almost two days after the bulk of the Russian army evacuated Hamadan. At eight in the evening, a division surgeon informed him that the Ottoman forces were making a flank attack to the northwest. The remaining medical personnel abandoned their aid station equipment and concealed themselves from Turkish reconnaissance by galloping through a dried stream bed for seven miles to safety. Riding nearly all night, they only stopped at daybreak.189 The following day A.C. Edwards wrote that they: arranged with the other members of our little community to start early the following morning. At a little after midnight….a note was brought in from the English bank manager, suggesting that we leave in an hour, so as to get ahead of the crush. At 2 a. m. on the ninth of August 1916, our little cavalcade started from Hamadan on a one-hundred-and-forty mile ride to Kazvin. Our party consisted of four Englishmen—two from the Imperial Bank of Persia, my chief accountant, and myself—one Frenchman, a master in the school of the Alliance Israelite, and one Armenian clerk. My wife was the only woman. There were half a dozen servants in addition to the muleteers who trudged behind the pack animals…Turkish guns boomed in the distance. Nor had we barely started before a long row of ambulance carts with winking headlights passed us. They were bringing in the wounded from the Assadabad pass, twenty miles away, where the Russian rearguard was holding off the enemy to give Baratoff time to get away his stores and clear his hospitals. That afternoon the last Russian troops marched out of Hamadan, and the Turks entered the following day. 190 When Russian defenses collapsed, it was sudden and emblematic of how the tables turned after the Ottoman forces reorganized and reallocated forces upon the British pullout from Gallipoli. The American Legation in Tehran reported that:
188 189 190
Ibid. McClintic, Russian Retreat, 10. A.C. Edwards, “German Intrigues in Persia,” 628. 189
The evacuation of Hamadan by Russian forces has caused great astonishment in Tehran, as the Russian Commander, General Baratoff, had assured the Russian and other Allied Legations that the reports of the Turkish advances and successes were exaggerated and that he apprehended no further advance on the part of the Turks. Then, without warning, he telegraphed that for strategical reasons he was evacuating Hamadan. This news was followed by reports of his defeat and the rapid movement of Turkish troops in this direction.191 News of Russian defeat caused panic in Tehran. Allied representatives and residents prepared to escape. It was feared that if the Ottoman forces reached Qazvin, it would cut off the evacuation route to Anzali.192 Civilians and military parties soon separated along the long road of retreat. The McClinitcs, based on their previous experience, where the retreat was characterized by hunger and thirst, prepared well, ensuring that they were well provisioned for what might lie ahead, but they still suffered “intense thirst.”193 After Baratov left Hamadan, he “took the only reasonable decision left open to him. He marched towards his principle intermediary base, Qazvin (120 miles from Hamadan and eighty from Tehran).”194 By August 25, Baratov telegraphed that his troops still maintained their defensive positions at the Sultan Bulak pass seventy-five miles from Qazvin and Turkish forces were opposite him.195
“Abstracts from Recent Despatches to the Department,” American Legation, Tehran, Persia, August 30, 1916, File 860.1, Volume 29a, Tabriz, General Correspondence, RG 84, NACP. 192 Ibid. 193 McClintic, Russian Retreat, 8. 194 Allen and Muratoff, 434. 195 “Abstracts from Recent Despatches to the Department,” American Legation, Tehran, Persia, August 30, 1916, File 860.1, Volume 29a, Tabriz, General Correspondence, RG 84, NACP. 190 191
McClintic and his team continued their “leap-frogging” back to Qazvin, alternating medical care for the wounded with the Zemstvos. Both organizations established aid stations along the route to treat Russian soldiers tortured by the long journey in the hot sun. Lucky soldiers were able to hitch a ride with automobiles coming from Qazvin with supplies.196 The path for those continuing on foot was bleak. McClintic painted a picture of the horrors confronting the retreating soldiers: “The road of retreat was well marked by little wooden crosses, where soldiers had been buried along the lines of communications. Also by dead horses, unburied, whose carcasses were odiferous and frightened our mounts.”197 A.C. Edwards described the congestion and chaos of the Russian retreat: But with the rising sun, the army appeared; horse, foot, and artillery joined the road until it was crowded with troops and transports of every kind: great motor lorries—made in Detroit—lumbered past long strings of camels, indifferent, contemptuous. There were carts of every size and description; there were pack animals of every kind to be found in Persia. It was not until I saw this whole army on the march that I began faintly to understand the colossal efforts which the warring nations are putting forth. Of all the war fronts, this was perhaps the least important as regards numbers engaged, and yet this army extended in a more or less continuous line for sixty miles. It was amusing to watch the Russian soldiers riding camels and having all the trouble in the world to manage their strange, stubborn mounts. Most painful to see were the lumbering, springless carts full of; sick and wounded—it was a terrible journey for those poor fellows over the burning plain in the August heat. Many a new wooden cross was added to the little graveyards which have sprung up since the war at almost every stage on the post roads of Persia.198
Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 105. She also relates a story that captures some of the chaos of the retreat. A doctor working alongside of her lost three fingers when he opened a first aid pack, and instead of grabbing iodine ignited an explosive device. 197 McClintic, Russian Retreat, 8. 198 A.C. Edwards, “German Intrigues in Persia,” 629. 191 196
The size and scope of the retreat was captured by Nurse Soukup McClintic: “One vivid picture will always be remembered, when in the evenings could be seen various regiments with their tents, across the desert, for miles around….It was like a stage scene, the mountains in the background, the horses picketed near the tents to long ropes and the cannon at either end….and everywhere, in all directions were camp fires burning.”199Nurse Soukup McClintic reached Qazvin on 21 August.200 In September, McClintic contracted malaria. He continued to work, alternating with another surgeon suffering from the same ailment. After two weeks they were both sent back to Russia to recover. McClintic and his wife left Petrograd for the U.S. in November 1916.201 In July, the Major General (ret) Arthur Murray, Acting Chairman of the American Red Cross Central Committee in Washington, wrote the Secretary of State requesting the Department approach their Russian counterparts to determine whether they were willing to accept an additional three nurses and two surgeons to augment the units already supporting the unit in Khoy and Qazvin. Murray requested a response in the most expeditious manner possible. Seemingly unaware that Snively was no longer available, Murray identified him as one of the proposed replacements along with another Ohio surgeon, Dr. Earl B. Downer. A veteran of the original American Red Cross European
199 200 201
Soukup McClintic, “With the Russians in Persia,” 105. Ibid. McClintic, Russian Retreat, 13-14. 192
Relief mission to Serbia, Downer agreed to a follow-on assignment in Russia.202 On July 29, the American Embassy in Petrograd was instructed to forward the inquiry to the Russian government.203 Closing Up Shop As late as August 23, plans were in place to retain the American presence in Persia. Consul Smith contacted Hough and conveyed Hazlett’s request for leave for himself and four nurses. Replacements were requested for Hazlett, Floyd Smith, and the nurses. Consul Smith believed a newly enlarged hospital would remain in Khoy.204 On August 30, Consul Smith cabled Hough and informed him that the Caucasian Front Commander, Grand Duke’s Adjutant, and Russian Red Cross Official, Count Stefan Tyskiewicz, informed him that the hospital “at Khoi will be transformed into infection wards and that change in condition at this front does not justify retention of unit here, suggests arrangements should be made with Red Cross Petrograd.”205 He also informed Hough that Hazlett and others were expected in Tiflis shortly.206 On September 2, Tyskiewicz notified Consul Smith that “All American Red Cross contingent here is to be
202
Murray to Lansing, Letter, July 24, 1916, File 811.142/1684, Central Decimal File, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State and Murray to SECSTATE, letter, July 26, 1916, File 811.142/1689, RG 59, CDF, NACP. 203 Phillips to Murray, Letter, August 2, 1916, File 811.142/1684, RG 59, CDF, NACP and Department of State to U.S. Embassy Russia, Dispatch, July 29, 1916, File 811.142/1684, RG 59, CDF, NACP. 204 Consul Smith to Hough, Telegram, August 23, 1916, File 814.2, Volume 8, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, NACP. 205 All American correspondence refers to Tyskiewicz as “Count Tishkevitch. Consul Smith to Hough, Telegram, August 30, 1916, File 814.2, Volume 8, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, RFSP, NACP. 206 Ibid. 193
withdrawn period,” and, after Hazlett made leave arrangements, the rest of the unit should be transferred to the European front. 207 McClintic and his wife were summoned for consultation in Petrograd. Remaining American staff departed Russia for a much needed break.208 Before they could return to Russia, the United States entered the First World War, and, as hoped, McClintic and other members of the team were able to put their extensive combat experience to use in supporting their own nation. Back in Russia, the path toward military collapse was well underway, the Tsar abdicated, and the country descended into chaos. However, by the time word reached the U.S. that American support was no longer needed for Caucasian and Persian hospitals, Dr. Earl Downer and three nurses were already en-route to Russia. Their mission was funded by New York railroad magnate, Edwin Gould, the son of the notorious Jay Gould. Upon arrival in Petrograd, Dr. Downer and his nurses were assigned to the Imperial Lazaret at the royal residence of Tsarskoye Selo, and provided medical care to the Tsarevitch and the Imperial family. Present for the abdication of the Tsar, Downer’s experience was in many ways more dramatic than any he may have encountered in Persia.209 Ambassador Francis informed a colleague that David Hough relayed that “the Unit…on the Russian front in Persia is to be given or has been given an indefinite leave 207
Smith to Hough, Telegram, September 2, 1916, File 814.2, Volume 8, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, RFSP, NACP. 208 Hazlett returned home on the Equador, on what he believed to be a four means leave. (San Francisco Chronicle 15 Nov 16, 3. 209 “Lansing Man Saw Tsar’s Abdication,” Lansing State Journal (Lansing, MI), April 20, 1918, 9 and “Dr. Earl Downer and Three American Nurses, Christian Advocate 95 (November 1916): 11. 194
or furlough, and while there has been no friction with the Russian Government he can see very clearly that the Russian Red Cross... thinks the Russian Government prefers the American Red Cross should not work in this country.”210 Perhaps the best summation of the work of the American Red Cross team in Persia is provided by Baker to the magazine Chicago Commerce: This little American group cleaned up the whole district which contained wounded Russian soldiers, Armenian Refugees and several thousand Turkish prisoners. Typhus and typhoid were raging about the city….Mr. Baker offers the highest praise for the Russian Red Cross organization, which he has frequently observed in his travels through the districts affected by war, but particularly the little group of American Red Cross doctors and nurses….he declares through the entire Caucasus and northern districts of Persia, wherever they went, the problem of general sanitation was placed in their charge and solved it as far as zeal and facilities made it possible. Grand Duke Nicholas has advised that this group receive imperial decorations for their service.211 Departure of almost all of the remaining veterans of the American Red Cross hospital in Kiev marked the beginning of the end of one vision of humanitarian aid to Russia and the start of another. Downer and his team, although not veterans of Kiev were still sponsored by American commercial interests, but this last group of medical personnel was small in size and profile. Downer and his team were a far cry from the large Kiev hospital and the Persia mission. However, the last two remaining Kiev Red Cross hospital veterans, Doctors Phillip Newton and Edward Egbert continued to open the aperture on humanitarian support for the Russian military. Their efforts eventually led to large-scale national Red Cross sanctioned attempts to redress Russia’s military 210
Francis to Philip B. Fouke, Letter, September 16, 1916, Reel 2, David R. Francis Papers, Russia in Transition, Library of Congress. 211 “American Red Cross in Persia,” Chicago Commerce 12, no. 16 (August 18 1916): 16. 195
shortfalls, including the initiation of a campaign to correct the lack of motor ambulances on the Eastern Front.
196
Chapter 3: The Battle for the Home Front in Russia and the United States...Rivals Emerge
While the story of the American medical support to General Baratov’s Persian Expedition is compelling on its own, it cannot be isolated from efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to support Russian humanitarian causes. Before U.S. entry into the First World War and the accompanying wellspring of charitable giving, a small group of Petrograd-based American commercial representatives struggled, internally and externally, to resolve three challenges: First was the fight for recognition as the legitimate agency for American aid to Russia. Second was obtaining desperately-needed resources in the face of increasing American disinterest. Third was competing against the aggressive fundraising of other competing organizations. The resulting evolution of the Petrograd-based Russian Committee of the American Red Cross serves as a microcosm from which to understand overall U.S. national attitudes, priorities, and policies toward Russia during this period. It embodied the fusion of a genuine desire to help Russia with a hope that such efforts would bilaterally benefit commercial relations. This chapter details the correspondence with U.S. officials, and heavy private campaigns surrounding the competition that emerged between the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross and the American Ambulance in Russia. It describes the unfortunate ill will which grew from this competition, and the ultimate demise it brought to the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross.
197
Gaining Legitimacy The Committee was initially funded solely by American private benefactors, but after a period of uncertainty, eventually acquired official American Red Cross sanction and financial support, becoming the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross. Correspondence between U.S. government representatives, the American Red Cross, and members of the Petrograd colony capture the priority American commercial representatives in Russia placed on the successful execution of the Kiev follow-on medical support mission, and their hope that it would bolster bilateral trade and business relations. Deliberations on the continuation of humanitarian aid to Russia reached the highest levels of the U.S. government and American Red Cross. As discussions in Washington and Petrograd continued, the scope of the mission in Persia increased, eventually covering care for Russian soldiers, Ottoman prisoners, and victims of the Armenian-Assyrian genocide. However, the Petrograd colony was not the only effort to maintain American prominence in Russia through medical assistance. When the American Red Cross hospital in Kiev closed its doors, one group of doctors went to Persia, the other mobilized to support Russia’s European front. Spearheaded by Doctors Phillip Newton and Edward H. Egbert, this “American Ambulance” effort would eventually eclipse the tenuous Persian initiative.
198
Commercial and Industrial Interests on the Caucasus Front In a May 1916 speech to American business leaders in Petrograd, Commercial Attaché Henry D. Baker highlighted the inherent link between future commercial opportunities and humanitarian assistance to Russia: I think it is up to our American business men in Russia, comparatively small in number, to always appreciate the great personal responsibility through friendly dealings, courtesy, and generally considerate treatment of this country, of helping cultivate American prestige here, to promote the cooperation of our Russian friends which means so much to our international relations in the future. And I believe there is not one American here tonight who is not living up to his responsibility in this regard….the Red Cross work cooperating with the Russian Red Cross on the Persian-Turkish front you have given evidences of good-will and sympathy which I feel sure that the Russian nation appreciates.1 His March 1916 visit to Tiflis stimulated considerable regional interest in U.S.-Russian commercial engagement. Petrograd Embassy Secretary and later acting Consul at Tiflis W.P. Cresson believed the Departments of State and Commerce failed to exploit initial enthusiasm generated by Baker’ visit. He went to the region for two purposes; one was to inspect the American Hospital and provide the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross with an accurate picture of the effectiveness of their medical unit's operations. Second, in his capacity as Commercial Attaché, he hoped to stimulate interest in bilateral trade, and assess local infrastructure, including riding the recently built Tabriz railway spur from Julfa railhead.
“American-Russian Business Cooperation; Remarks of Henry D. Baker, Commercial Attaché of the United States of the United States of America, at Testimonial Dinner Given for Him by American Business Men in Petrograd,” May 24, 1916, Henry Dunster Baker Papers, Rubenstein Library of Duke University, 11 199 1
Although not documented in any sources, there is reason to believe that this train ride was part of a broader effort to identify American commercial opportunities and interests related to the planned construction of Russia’s long sought Trans-Persian line. In April 1917, in an article for The Geographical Review on “The Proposed Connection of the Russian and Indian Railway Systems” Baker wrote regarding British-Allied views of the topic: There might…be a disposition to encourage construction which would link the Indian with the Russian system by way of the Caucasus railway. It may be mentioned in this connection that a Russian railway…at the frontier of TransCaucasia to Tabriz…was completed in March 1916, a distance of about 150 miles. The writer was a passenger on the first train that entered the city of Tabriz.2 This new railway line was the only one in Persia with the same gauge as their Russian counterparts. At the time, it was strictly for military purposes, but Baker believed it could eventually serve commercial interests and eventually become a line from "Petrograd to Tabriz.”3 David L. Hough viewed Russian railway construction and development as a particularly lucrative opportunity. He wrote in the railway trade publication Iron Age in 1915: “Russian railroad and ship building will take American products because home supply will long be inadequate.”4 He hoped their efforts to expand their railway infrastructure would promote a “programme for extensions and new constructions, necessitating additional equipment….Western Europe and American Henry D. Baker, “The Proposed Connection to the Russian and Indian Railway Systems,” Reprinted from Geographical Review 4, no. 2 (August 1917): 98, in the Henry Dunster Baker Papers, Rubenstein Library, Duke University. 3 Ibid. Russia’s plans for a Trans-Persian line were interrupted by the revolutions and subsequent chaos. 4 David L. Hough, “American Engineer and Business Man,” Iron Age 95, no. 12 (March 25, 1915): 667. 200 2
railroad supply people were urged to establish plants in Russia and this is really the best way for Americans to take advantage of the prospective business.”5 Similarly, Ambassador David Francis wrote Secretary of State Robert Lansing that: Russia seems to have become aroused to her woeful want of transportation facilities and is planning the construction of many lines of railroad for which she will have to buy a large quantity of material. She has within her borders boundless forests and immeasurable deposits of iron, ore, and coal, but demands of the people are immediate and will have to be supplied to a great extent from other countries. We should be prepared to take advantage of the situation.6 American officials believed the “Caucasus will be the distributing centre for new and wide fields formerly in Turkish territory, and increasingly so for the provinces of Northern Persia.”7 In late 1916, Secretary of the American Embassy in Petrograd, W.P. Cresson, who was acting as Consul during Willoughby Smith’s absence from Tiflis, recorded that, “The renewal of Russo-American business relations offers a great permanent field….I have found in the Caucasus gives every reason for especial interest….the United States and Russia are on the way to the closest and most friendly commercial and financial relations and I feel sure that these are destined to be durable.”8 American representatives hoped commercial relationships built during the war would carry over into peacetime. Cresson believed that the U.S. had a significant interest in
5
Ibid., 666. Francis to Lansing, letter, September 23, 1916, Francis Papers, Reel 5, David R. Francis Papers, Russia in Transition, Library of Congress. 7 Cresson to Francis, Letter, November 9, 1916, File 865, Volume 10, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, RFSP, NACP. 8 "The United States and the Caucasus, An Interview with the Secretary of the American Embassy at Petrograd,” Undated, File 865, Volume 10, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, NACP. 201 6
building inroads into the Caucasus to ensure markets for U.S. goods and establish more sustainable bilateral financial relationships for the future.9 Mis-managed Perceptions: U.S. Department of Commerce Versus the American Red Cross In the December 1915 issue of the Christian Advocate, Reverend George A. Simons, head of the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, wrote from Petrograd that he was Thankful…that our small American colony has taken such an active and generous interest in doing what it can to assist suffering and distress…. The American Colony is indeed a radiating centre of sunshine here , and the only pity is that the colony is not very much larger, so that the sunbeams might be far more powerful for good than our small numbers and resources now permit….And thanks to Captain D.L. Hough, we have enlisted the special aid of friends in America to enable the American Red Cross doctors and nurses to continue their magnificent work for hundreds of seriously wounded and sick soldiers in Southern Russia, thus enabling the American flag to continue to fly over one of the most successful undertakings of the kind in Russia.10 The permanent abandonment of the American Red Cross Hospital at Kiev and transfer of the remaining staff to Persia did not detract from the Petrograd colony’s fundraising efforts. Hough’s time in the U.S. was especially fruitful, collecting $7,000; he hoped eventually to receive total pledges of $25,000.11 At the time, he thought the funds were sufficient to keep the American unit in Persia operating through June 1916. On Oct 4, 1915, Hough requested official American Red Cross recognition of the Petrograd Committee as their agent in Russia. He hoped official sanction would legitimize the 9
Ibid. “A Tribute to the American Colony,” Christian Advocate 84 (December 1915): 14. 11 “Bravo, Captain Hough,” Christian Advocate 83 (November 1915): 16. It is unclear how close Hough came to raising for the full $25,000. 202 10
Committee’s work and open new avenues for funds.12 The American National Red Cross agreed to provide their support, but the official blessing Hough desired was not immediately forthcoming due to uncertainty over the viability of the colony’s efforts.13 In the interim, the Petrograd colony appointed officers for a provisional American Red Cross Committee: Reverend George Simons, chairman; Commercial Attache Baker, secretary; McAllister Smith of Guarantee Trust, treasurer; and David Hough, Consul North Winship, and Mr. Charles Preston of Walk Over Shoes and International Harvester’s E.A. Brittenham also became members.14 Against all the odds, the provisional committee sustained an American Red Cross presence with Russian forces. Throughout its existence, there was “considerable doubt as to whether the broad scope of its work could be carried out in view of the natural difficulties of arranging at such a distance from Petrograd a campaign for funds.”15 By January 1916, the American Red Cross gave “full and cordial support” and agreed to
Hough to ARC, October 4, 1915, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, Group 1, CDF 1881-1916, NACP. 13 "Copy of Telegram Received from Captain D.L. Hough from New York, Dated October 4, 1915," Christian Advocate 82 (October 1915): 14. 14 Walk-Over Shoes remains a major American shoe company. During the war the company purchased a significant amount of leather from Russia. A 1917 add in the Los Angeles Herald reads, “As it has been increasingly difficult to obtain Russian skins since the outbreak of the war, this superior leather in American shoes represents a great triumph for the big Walk-Over organization. Practically all the shoe-leather that has been brought from Russia since hostilities began has gone into Walk-Over shoes.” Los Angeles Herald, October 20, 1917, 20 and "Bravo, Captain Hough,” 16. 15 "Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, A Statement Concerning its Organization, Purpose, Work, and Needs," Petrograd April 1916, File 794.8, "Petrograd Committee," RG 200, ANRC, NACP 203 12
cooperate to the greatest extent possible.16 The Committee officially became known as the “Russian Committee of the American Red Cross,” and despite the group’s growth and formal charter, its fundamental objectives remained the same, “to provide means for expressing the sympathy and good feeling of the American people to the Government and people of Russia” and raise funds “sufficiently generous to be worthy of a nation that received marked support in its own time of need.”17 Avoiding solicitation within the Petrograd colony, which already supported a local small clinic for Russian wounded, fundraising focused almost exclusively on gaining sponsors in the United States. By the end of December, the Committee raised enough funds to support the Persian effort through April 1916. Supporters included, as hoped, firms with strong commercial ties to Russia, including the American Locomotive Company, the Forged Steel Wheel Company, the National City Bank, the Pressed Steel Car Company, Middletown Car Company, and William Sellers machine tools company.18 Funds raised in the United States passed through the American Red Cross and then into a special fund for the Petrograd Committee. Once a month, donations were converted into rubles and forwarded to the Petrograd Branch of Credit Lyonnais.19 After transfer to Russia, the money was forwarded from the Committee to the medical personnel in Persia using the good offices of the United States Department of State.
“Russian Committee of the American Red Cross,” Christian Advocate 85(January 1916): 15. 17 "Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, A Statement Concerning its Organization, Purpose, Work, and Needs," Petrograd April 1916, File 794.8, "Petrograd Committee," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 18 “Russian Committee of the American Red Cross,” 15-16. 19 Ibid., 15. 204 16
During the May 1916 testimonial dinner honoring Baker and promoting U.S.Russian trade at the Astoria Hotel in Petrograd, the Commercial Attaché highlighted American support for local causes, and once again pressed for the business community to do everything possible to “cultivate prestige.”20 Even after American medical personnel settled in Persia, Baker fought diligently for Washington’s support of humanitarian aid to the Russian military. He wrote to his superior, E.E. Pratt, Chief of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce: I personally believe that America by showing a practical sympathy for the sufferings of Russia's wounded soldiers, can overcome the serious prejudices occasioned by previous unfortunate abrogation of the commercial treaty, moreover that what the American Red Cross may or may not do in Russia has a highly important bearing on American trade, and may exercise even a greater influence on Commercial relations that would a new treaty or absence of a treaty.21 In the letter, Baker lamented a perceived lack of coordination between the American Red Cross and the Embassy in Petrograd “before deciding upon serious policies which have a diplomatic bearing upon our foreign trade relations.”22 He was particularly irritated by the poorly executed transfer of the American Red Cross units from Germany and Austria-Hungary to aid Central Powers prisoners in Russia, and the ensuing damage to U.S.-Russian relations. The units, led by Dr. Cary Snoddy, were previously based in Germany and Austria as part of the original 1914 American Red Cross European Relief Mission. Snoddy and his colleagues arrived in Petrograd at almost the exact moment the American Red Cross closed its Kiev hospital, against the “American-Russian Business Cooperation,” 11. Baker to Chief, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, November 8, 1915, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 22 Ibid. 205 20 21
wishes of the Ambassador, George Marye. Baker firmly believed the Russians perceived the presence of the group as a slap in the face: the Russians saw the U.S. helping their enemies, seemingly at American Red Cross expense, while the desperately-needed Kiev hospital folded due to an alleged lack of funds. Baker wrote regarding the ill-timed Central Powers aid mission, “All of the Americans here regret that they should have come…at a time when it had just been decided to withdraw the entire staff which had been working for the Russian wounded.”23 Russian officials already looked askance at the considerable energy and resources American officials devoted to prisoner of war relief efforts. Norman Saul wrote, “There was a natural resentment by Russians at having to cooperate in admitting and transporting aid and relief throughout the country, while their own military units and civilian populations were in desperate need….Americans recruited for this mission were necessarily German-speaking, thus leading to initial suspicions of their being spies.”24 Baker believed the arrival of Snoddy’s Red Cross unit reinforced the Russian perception that Americans were more concerned about the well-being of German and Austrian prisoners than the fate of Russia’s wounded. Exacerbating this perception was the planned arrival of American Red Cross sponsored sanitary engineers tasked with
23
Ibid. Norman Saul, War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914-1921 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 46. 206 24
improving conditions in the prisoner of war camps.25 The group never arrived, but its mere conscription compounded an already deepening resentment. Hough offered his Committee to serve as a bulwark against further damage. As they moved forward the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross had “two purposes to fulfill, first to continue the American Red Cross unit at the modest expenditures now being made and with very considerable value that is resulting, and perhaps in so far as it can, to overcome the impression that apparently exists that the American Red Cross seems to have especial interest in the prisoners.”26 Both the German and Austrian prisoner aid missions were in stark contrast to American Red Cross claims of insufficient funds for its Russian support activities. In the meantime, Russia’s need for medical assistance had never been greater.27 Closure of the American Red Cross hospital at Kiev hurt the U.S. in other less tangible ways. Baker highlighted the fact that all of the physicians at the American hospital at Kiev hoped to remain in Russia, not only to assist the wounded but also to fulfill a patriotic duty, improving their combat surgery skills to help America’s soldiers in any future conflict. Baker believed the medical experience acquired in aiding Russia’s
25
Baker to Chief, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, November 8, 1915, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP 26 Hough to Bicknell, Letter, March 28, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP 27 Baker to Chief, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, November 8, 1915, File 591.4, “Medical Unit-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 207
wounded enabled “a surgeon to gain more practice in six months than probably for ten years at home.”28 Baker's crusade ruffled more than a few feathers at American Red Cross headquarters in Washington. American Red Cross head Mabel Thorp Boardman wrote to Secretary of Commerce Redfield to refute Baker’s claim that the Red Cross had failed to coordinate with the Embassy in Petrograd. As evidence, she documented collaboration between the Red Cross and the diplomatic establishment but stressed: "Red Cross is not run for commercial purposes, and there should be no reason for consulting with commercial representatives as to its humanitarian work."29 She also made clear the withdrawal of European units was “universal" in application across the continent, and that the cost of maintaining all of the units for an additional six months would have been prohibitive. 30 Sustaining the Russian units, and not the others, was out of the question. The American Red Cross maintained a policy of strict neutrality and "could not do it for one country and not for another."31 She also clarified that, despite local Russian perceptions, the American Red Cross paid “not a penny” for Snoddy’s team to support German and Austrian prisoners of war. 32 The arrangement was originally part of a reciprocal agreement; however, the Russian government decided not to support work
28
Ibid. Boardman to Redfield, January 4, 1916, File 591.4, “Medical Unit-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 208 29
with their prisoners held in German and Austrian held territories. Germany would have also financed the American sanitary engineers mentioned in Baker's earlier letter.33 On February 8, Hough extended an olive branch to Boardman and now American Red Cross Director-General for Civilian Relief, Ernest P. Bicknell. In a conciliatory letter, he acknowledged Baker's less than diplomatic tone, but reaffirmed his belief that the U.S. should be represented in Russia by "some National Hospital Unit.”34 He highlighted the value of the work in Persia, and that British doctors based in Petrograd noted “their preference to be where our Unit is placed [rather] than in the Capital.”35 Hough expressed confidence that members of the Petrograd colony could raise sufficient funds for the work in Persia, but Baker advocated for the American Red Cross to reallocate resources spent on Russian humanitarian supplies to pay the salaries of the American doctors and nurses. He believed provision of supplies “deprives American manufacturers with agents in Russia from securing this business.”36 Both Hough and the Committee disagreed with Baker's view and continued to fund all aspects of the hospital work from external donations.37 Hough highlighted the fact that tensions remained within the colony and Embassy over the impact of fundraising for Persia on their own Petrograd-based small charity hospital. However, he explained to Boardman that the small hospital in Petrograd did not have the same stature as the efforts in Persia: “This 33
Ibid. The American Red Cross attempted to recruit some of the American doctors departing Kiev to support work with Russian prisoners in Germany under a “Dr. Spearman.” The Russian government did not support the endeavor. 34 . Hough to Boardman, February 8, 1916 and January 4, 1916, File 591.4, “Medical Unit-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 209
hospital is not known outside of Petrograd while our Unit, known as the American Red Cross Unit is known all over Russia and no Russian knows anything of this little local antagonism, and all Russia is in sympathy with our movement.”38 One of Hough’s highest priorities was obtaining official American Red Cross blessing for the “Russian Committee of the American Red Cross.” He feared that without a formal mandate the Committee's authority and credibility were somewhat questionable.39 In the first affirmation of official Washington Red Cross recognition, received on January 27, 1916, Bicknell, on behalf of the American Red Cross, requested the Secretary of State to notify Hough through the Embassy that, “Your committee hereby authorized act for American Red Cross Russia.”40 The letter also indicated that the American Red Cross agreed with Hough’s suggestion that the Committee serve as the clearinghouse for all national Russia-bound relief supplies. On February 9, the Department of State formally notified Hough the Committee was officially authorized to represent the American Red Cross. The notice also confirmed that the “Committee of American citizens at Petrograd…acts as consignee of relief supplies sent by the American Red Cross.”
41
Separately, Bicknell wrote to Hough communicating the decision but
made clear that the designation specifically excluded any association with the
38
Ibid. Hough to Bicknell, Letter, January 3, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 40 Bicknell to Hough, January 27, 1916, File 794.8, "Petrograd Committee," RG 200, ANRC, NACP and STATE to American Embassy Russia, Telegram, February 9, 1916, File 811.142/1336, RG 59, CDF, NACP. 41 Bicknell to Hough, January 27, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 210 39
controversial German prisoner of war mission, to avoid any of the "misunderstandings" that accompanied that controversial group.42 Despite mounting pressure from Americans in Russia, U.S-based Red Cross chapters, as well as the headquarters in Washington, remained uncertain over whether and what, if any, financial support should be provided to the Petrograd Committee. In some cases, Baker’s lobbying efforts yielded results: Several Red Cross directors urged the Chicago chapter to raise money for the Russia-based unit. John O'Connor, Director of the Red Cross Central Division, had been previously forbidden by Bicknell to solicit funds for the Petrograd Committee presumably after doctors Newton and Egbert publically questioned the utility of the Persia mission and qualifications of the staff. O'Connor was not sure the Chapter could ignore Baker’s lobbying any longer and wrote Bicknell expressing his concern about the “wisdom of appealing for a project in any one country.”43 Bicknell replied that he did not want to discourage anyone from contributing to the Committee in Petrograd.44 Hough attributed the Chicago Chapter’s initial reluctance to provide financial support for the Petrograd Committee to negative information gained when “two of the doctors who returned home had questioned the professional training and abilities of the
42
Ibid. O'Connor to Bicknell, Letter, February 1916, File 591.4, "Medical Units-Russia," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 44 Bicknell to O'Connor, Letter, February 7, 1916, File 591.4, "Medical Units-Russia," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 211 43
doctors who remained behind.”45 Dr. William Crookston, who previously served with American Red Cross Unit E in Hungary, and was then in Russia caring for Central Powers prisoners, corrected any misperceptions about his colleagues’ qualifications. He knew doctors Lyle Hazlett and Edward Dickey personally and reassured the Petrograd Committee that both had stellar qualifications and reputations.46 Hough firmly believed that Brown, McClintic and Hazlet's former colleagues from the Kiev Hospital, Newton and Egbert, intentionally undermined their credibility with potential donors to curry favor for their own initiative.47 A more fundamental misunderstanding between the Committee and U.S. donors was equally counterproductive to fundraising efforts. Initially, many believed fundraising was somehow for the defunct "Kiev hospital.” Philanthropists and the American Red Cross did not understand that solicitations were actually for the successor unit in Persia, versus the disbanded hospital in Kiev. Hough explained to Bicknell: It seems apparent that the impression has gotten abroad, at least in Chicago, that very little is left of the Kiev unit, and what there is left has been scattered and that you are prepared at present to advise any further contributions to our particular fund….I am sure there must be some confusion or misunderstanding…my letter will clear up the situation and reawaken your enthusiasm.48 Hough wrote to Bicknell, hoping to put any misunderstandings behind them. Looking to the future, Hough once again requested American Red Cross financial support for their efforts in Persia: 45
. The two doctors were Newton and Egbert. Hough to Bicknell, Letter, March 28, 1916, File 794.8 “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 212
What we want to do is to forget what has taken place and to keep this Red Cross unit going and it should be supported from America because the local Colony has its hands full with its local hospitals and its refuge for destitute children. But we American business men…want to keep this going and all of us are asking our principals at home to support it. 49 Bicknell realized the negative effects of the ill-conceived Central Powers prisoner aid mission led by Snoddy. Both he and by Hough understood that interactions between the Petrograd Committee and Snoddy group were not helpful. Hough did confirm, however, that the Committee would coordinate with Ambassador Francis and serve as the clearinghouse for all Russia-bound Red Cross supplies.50 Financial Security for Continued Humanitarian Success Hough hoped increased revenues would permit the Petrograd Committee to hire more doctors and nurses which he viewed as “materially offsetting the misunderstands [sic] that have arisen with regard to Red Cross activities by continuing this work. We certainly can’t afford to let these men be withdrawn.”51 Hough stressed he was equally concerned that the Red Cross might decide to withdraw its "moral support."52 He viewed such an outcome as devastating. The Committee still had serious concerns in the aftermath of O'Connor's unexpected skepticism, “if the rumor that comes from Chicago is true it would look as though the props were knocked out from under us.”53
Hough to Bicknell, Letter, March 28, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 213 49
Competition for scarce resources between locally-based Petrograd colony charitable endeavors (the forty-bed hospital and the crèche for destitute children) versus fundraising for the medical unit in Persia increased tensions within the small community. However, Hough believed that colony institutions were “more the expression of the good-will and sympathy of the American colony than that of the American nation as a whole.”54 He stressed to Bicknell that the Persia unit was a national-level effort drawing its moral and financial support from the U.S. itself. Despite his considerable fundraising in support of the group, Hough stressed that the Petrograd Committee had no reason to exist without the "moral support" of the American Red Cross.55 Plans were underway to formalize the provisional Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, and Hough requested confirmation from national headquarters before reorganizing into a more permanent structure. He asked Bicknell if the American Red Cross could reaffirm its support in the wake of the Chicago debacle. If a negative response was received, he wrote: “we will close up our accounts, see that the doctors and nurses return home and send you a certified statement of our receipts and expenditures.”56 Baker’s visit to Khoy was part of the effort to shore up any remaining concerns about the legitimacy of the project. Hough informed Bicknell that the “enthusiastic report which he brought back and the comments that were made both by the doctors and nurses and their work started us immediately upon our permanent organization, which is
54 55 56
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 214
again, for the minute, delayed because of this rumor that comes from Chicago."57 Hough requested final confirmation that American Red Cross “enthusiasm has been reawakened” and that the Chicago Chapter be notified that Petrograd Committee was authorized to solicit funds from their constituents.58 In a strategic move to expand its attractiveness to donors, by April 1916, the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross increased in size by electing as new members a veritable “who’s who” of American industry in Russia. Hough hoped to use receipt of a clear official American Red Cross mandate to expand fundraising efforts outside of the small circle of Petrograd-based business interests and to attract the support of other American industrial representatives from across Russia.59 In a letter to Bicknell, Hough transmitted an article for inclusion in Red Cross Magazine to publicize their charitable work and stimulate donations.60 He noted that although the Committee now had twenty members, it had only enough funds to continue operations through July 1916.61 To fuel interest from a greater variety of potential donors, Hough described the expanding scope of Red Cross activities: “This is a very neutral kind of work, being for the benefit not only of Russian wounded, but also of many Armenian and Syrian refugees, and Turkish prisoners of war.”62
57
Ibid. Ibid. 59 Hough to Bicknell, Letter, April 6, 1916, File 794.8, "Petrograd Committee," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 60 Presumably, the article was "Eight of them in Persia." 61 Hough to Bicknell, Letter, 20 April 1916, File 794.8, "Petrograd Committee," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 62 Ibid. 215 58
Although the Russian Red Cross bore the vast majority of expenses for its hospitals in Persia, the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross was able to cover only some medical supplies and the American staff salaries. The Russian portion of hospital operating expenses averaged 10,000 rubles a month. Of that amount, 1300 rubles went to salaries of the Russian doctors and nurses.63 In March, new Committee member Consul Willoughby Smith in Tiflis wrote to James Barton, Chairman of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, to appeal for support to the American medical mission in Persia. Consul Smith served on both the Petrograd Committee as well as Barton’s group. He informed Barton that the total costs associated with maintenance of the unit were: 5 American Nurses at $75. each per month $375. 3 American Doctors @ $175. per month, one head doctor @ $250. per month…….$725. For both doctors and nurses Incidental expenses
- $100. per month
$1000. [sic] 100 [Total] $110064
Hough to Bicknell, Letter, April 6, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 64 Consul Smith makes clear in the document that “In all $1100 per month,” but the math seems to be inaccurate. However, the amounts for the doctors and nurses could include incidental expenses in the cost, and the second section could also be his attempt to further delineate the expenditure. Consul Smith to Barton, Letter, March 11, 1916, File 814.2, Volume 8, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, NACP. American doctors and nurses received different compensation from their Russian counterparts. Russians were paid directly out of their Red Cross funds, while the Americans were paid through the colony’s fundraising efforts. 216 63
The Russian Red Cross took responsibility for remaining expenses including the hospitals themselves, several nurses, 50 sanitars, and a commissary. Consul Smith explained that the “work done by both doctors and nurses has been magnificent and I cannot too strongly emphasize the importance and desirability of keeping it up.”65 Obviously concerned about the future of the relief work, Consul Smith explained to Barton that the Petrograd Committee’s financial reserves could last only until May (the following month). Appealing for the support to the Armenian and Syrian Relief Committee and their donors, Consul Smith informed Barton that the unit in Khoy cared for fifteen sick orphans, Armenian and Assyrian refugees, including some infected with typhus.66 Similarly, Tiflis was a major center for American Armenian relief in the Caucasus and in desperate need of funds. The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian relief planned to send Dr. Floyd O. Smith and Dr. William Cressy to Tiflis under the joint sponsorship of the American Red Cross and the Armenian Relief Committee.67 Dr. Smith, who eventually served at the Khoy American Red Cross hospital, wrote Barton that he felt that $1200 to $1500 allocated for his mission was an insignificant sum and too small to obtain any results. He expressed his fear that he would not be able to accomplish much without being assigned to the more mature effort.68 Dr. Smith got his wish, and accepted an assignment to the American Red Cross hospital in Khoy. In April, Hough arranged with Russian Customs for the entry for Dr. Smith, Dr. Cressey, and their
65
Ibid. Ibid. 67 "Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs on Armenian Relief, June 21, 1916 (Sixty-Fourth Congress),House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, 8. 68 Smith to Barton, Letter, March 1, 1916, unpublished, Smith family. 217 66
medical supplies for Armenian relief in the Caucasus.69 In mid-May, Baker wrote to Consul Smith thanking him for Dr. Smith’s help in Khoy filling in for the typhus-stricken Hazlett. In May, 1916, Baker’s assignment was nearing its end, and he planned to return to U.S. within a few months. He hoped to visit his hometown, Chicago, to raise funds to care for Russian troops in Persia. Although he was not optimistic, he was determined to try, as he feared that in the best case, existing reserves could be stretched to support medical work only until July or August 1916.70 Consul Smith wrote back a week later informing Baker that Barton was working with wealthy benefactors to try to raise additional funds for the Petrograd Committee.71 Consul Smith believed they could “rely on the support” of Barton and the Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief “either directly or through the contributions of its members to the Red Cross at Washington.”72 Consul Smith also noted that “To make up for the Dickey incident I sent Dr. Floyd Smith of our Relief Committee to take charge of Dr. Hazlett and of his work at Khoi during his illness.”73 It is not clear from any of the sources what Dickey did, but it is clear that it led to his dismissal in the middle of 1916.
Boardman to Hough, Letter, April 20, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 70 Consul Smith to Barton, Letter, May 13, 1916, File 814.2, Volume 8, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, RFSP, NACP. 71 Consul Smith to Baker, Letter, May 22, 1916, File 814.2, Volume 8, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, NACP. 72 Consul Smith to Hough, Letter, June 26, 1916, File 814.2, Volume 8, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, NACP. 73 Ibid. 218 69
Funding Challenges Averted Baker’s task of raising funds from American companies with ties to Russia proved challenging. The Petrograd Committee’s financial reserves were rarely enough to guarantee operations for more than a few months at a time. A passage in a May 2 letter from Hough to Mabel Boardman is indicative of the Committee’s “hand-to-mouth existence.” In the letter, Hough pleaded with Boardman for additional support, noting that without her backing there would be “no hope for us,” and requested help in gathering donations. 74 Additionally, he asked that the American Red Cross reallocate funding from other sources to support the Committee’s efforts. American representatives in Petrograd had hoped the expansion of their Red Cross Committee membership would increase outreach to American industry and enhance their donor pool. These efforts were less than successful.75 On May 3, Consul Smith reached out to James Barton for additional financial support for the American Red Cross hospital in Persia.76 Barton replied that he had already communicated with the Red Cross in Washington and urged them to support the unit for at least a few months until more reliable funding could be secured. He requested Bicknell contact Consul Smith to allocate Red Cross funds to the Persian hospital.77
74
Hough to Boardman, Letter, May 2, 1916, File 794.8, "Petrograd Committee," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 75 Funding from American industry and local American Red Cross chapters remained a challenge. 76 Consul Smith to Baker, Letter, May 3, 1916, File 814.2, Volume 8, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, NACP. 77 Ibid. 219
On May 9, Bicknell contacted Hough, notifying him that “the American Red Cross heartily indorses[sic] the work of your Committee in its support of the Red Cross medical units and also authorizing you to draw upon the Secretary of State for $5,000 to be applied to that work.”78 Bicknell regretted the Red Cross’s inability to provide more resources, but hoped the funds would provide sufficient breathing space for the Committee to develop a more reliable donor pool.79 Almost a month later, Boardman wrote Hough to offer her apologies for all of the missteps that almost certainly undermined the work of the Petrograd Committee, and offered to assist future fundraising efforts. Her letter is an obvious attempt to clear the air, informing Hough that Bicknell and O'Connor were never authorized to restrict the Petrograd Committee's ability to raise money in the name of the American Red Cross, and that all future correspondence should be sent directly to Washington. Hough also learned that Colonel Jefferson R. Kean, Director-General of Military Relief, was given oversight over the Persia operation.80
Funding Achieves Legitimacy and Recognition: Too Little Too Late The Red Cross money served two key functions; it provided much needed financial support to operations in Persia, and ended the period of uncertainty over national-level support for and commitment to the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross.. Immediately after receipt of the funds, the full Russian Committee of the
Bicknell to Hough, Letter, May 9, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 79 Ibid. 80 Boardman to Hough, Letter, June 7, 1916, File 594.1, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 220 78
American Red Cross, including the newly inducted members, met for the first time. The Christian Advocate carried the following official announcement, “The Russian Committee of the American Red Cross held a meeting May 9-22 for the purpose of completing a permanent organization as the continuance of the American Red Cross Hospital is now assured through donations already received.”81 Once the long-awaited reorganization was complete, the committee worked more aggressively to raise funds and rally support for the Persia unit. The new permanent structure included Reverend Dr. George Simons (formerly chairman of the provisional committee) as president; Commercial Attaché Baker stayed as secretary; Guaranty Trust Company Representative Ralph Dawson became treasurer; A.M Hamilton was assistant treasurer, and Frank Heyer served as assistant secretary. Hough was elected Chairman of the Executive Committee, a group that could make decisions without calling together the full membership.82 A partial list of the elected general membership included: W.C. Whiffen of the Associated Press, Lee Hagood of General Electric, H.P. Childs of Westinghouse Machine Company, L.B. Reed of John Deer, A.W. Hinger of Baldwin Locomotive, J.A. Moody of Goodrich Rubber, A. Hamilton of American Locomotive Company, George M. Day of the International YMCA, and American Consul at Tiflis Willoughby Smith.83 In the letter transmitting news of the Red Cross funding, Bicknell explained the causes of the earlier divisiveness and confusion and how it was finally resolved: “The Russian Committee of the American Red Cross,” Christian Advocate 89 (May 1916): 16. 82 Hough to Bicknell, Letter, May 29, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 83 “The Russian Committee of the American Red Cross,” Christian Advocate 79 (July 1916): 10-11. 221 81
Your thoughtful and frank explanation of the status of the American Red Cross in Russia is much appreciated and is thoroughly understood in the spirit in which it was written. Immediately following the closing of the hospital at Kief and return of a majority of the members of the Red Cross unit…we were for a short period in much doubt as to the status of the work which you had undertaken…, and were by no means certain that you would attempt to continue it. Apparently no one thought of sending us a statement of exactly what was happening in the weeks following the closing of the Kief Hospital, and we were entirely in the dark…for a while. As soon, however, as we received information of the manner in which affairs had been readjusted and learned that the remainder of the unit had been transferred to the Southeast for active service was removed. We have not at any time doubted the wisdom or good faith of your committee, and I assure you are very grateful for all that you are doing.84 Bicknell recognized the damage to American credibility caused by the termination of the Kiev Red Cross mission and simultaneous arrival of the Central Powers prisoner aid unit. He wrote the “Red Cross has suffered in prestige and esteem in Russia and has been a source of great regret to us, the more so as the misunderstandings have not been the outgrowth of any initiatives of our own.”85 Bicknell expressed the American Red Cross hope “to be of some real service to Russia and to demonstrate our friendliness in some tangible form,” and noted his sorrow at the organization’s failure to “carry out this desire fully and freely is a source of the most profound regret.”86 Bicknell blamed much of the friction on poor American governmental decision-making exacerbated by the arrival of Snoddy’s Central Powers prisoner of war aid mission. In early June, the Committee investigated how to relieve and replace the existing American medical staff in Persia. All expected Snively to return, and the Red Cross
Bicknell to Hough, Letter, May 9, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 222 84
planned to cover his travel expenses and salary.87 However, Snively turned down the Persia assignment to command an Ohio National Guard field hospital at the U.S. Mexican border.88 In late June, Consul Smith wrote to Hazlett, informing him that he “received assurances of further support from friends in the United States so that the continuance of your good work can be looked for with confidence.”89 He also informed Hazlett that local Russian Red Cross representatives expected the Khoy hospital to close, and the staff to be split in two. Since the American objective was "not only to help the sick and wounded, but also to show our sympathy with the Russian Red Cross," he requested members of the detachment to "cheerfully" support any change of venue.90 On the same day Consul Smith wrote to Hazlett, he also corresponded with James Barton. Consul Smith informed Barton that despite American Red Cross promises of additional money after the initial $5,000 contribution, it had become clear that Washington’s resources were over-extended, and it was “far from certain that it can entirely support this detachment.”91 As such, he implored Barton to continue to support the work of the detachment in Persia.92
87
Murray to Secretary of State, Letter, June 7, 1916, Embassy Russia, File 811.142/1623, RG 59, CDF, NACP. 88 “Gen. McMachen Will be in Command of Troops at ‘Camp Frank Willis,’ Zanesville Times Recorder (Zanesville, OH), June 20, 1916, 3. 89 Consul Smith to Hazlett, Letter, June 26, 1916, File 814.2 Volume 8, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, NACP. 90 Ibid. 91 Consul Smith to Hazlett, Letter, June 26, 1916, Volume 8, Tiflis, General Correspondence, RG 84, NACP. 92 Ibid. 223
On June 28, Bicknell wrote to Hough and requested he communicate to other members of the Committee appreciation from national officers of the American Red Cross. He once again expressed regret: not able to control the American Red Cross, while desiring most earnestly to express its friendship for the Russian people and to be of some real assistance to them, has…fallen into some disfavor. I know that you and all the members of your Committee will do everything in your power to set us right with the government and people of Russia and to prove to them that we have been victims of untoward circumstances for which we were in no sense responsible. 93 Two weeks later, Hough cabled the Red Cross in Washington formally requesting replacement personnel. The Red Cross acknowledged that new doctors and nurses, as well as funds to pay their salaries and expenses, were all available.94 These replacements eventually included Dr. Edward Downer, as well as Nurses Bessie Scanlon, Alice Holmes, Nellie Bundy, and Margaret Murday. These replacements became known as the “Edwin Gould Mission,” presumably because a large portion of the funding originated with the railroad magnate and philanthropist of the same name. All of the staff were previous members of the 1914 “Mercy Ship” mission to Serbia. Funded by Gould and other wealthy business leaders, Downer brought to Russia: elaborate equipment of surgical instruments and appliances, most of the electromotive type, for the purpose of extensive research work in implanting living bone tissue, whereby bone tissue may be taken from one portion of the body and grafted to another for the purpose of replacing lost bone tissue that may be torn away as the result of gunshot wounds or other injuries.95 93
Bicknell to Hough, Letter, June 28, 1916, File 794.8, "Petrograd Committee," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 94 Murray to Secretary of State, Letter, July 24, 1916, American Embassy Russia, Telegram, February 9, 1916, File 811.142/1684, RG 59, NACP. 95 Buffalo Nurses Going to Russia,” Buffalo Commercial (Buffalo, NY), September 7, 1916, 26, and “Red Cross Nurse to Go to Russia,” Buffalo Commercial (Buffalo, NY), August 23, 1916, 26. 224
Planning the mission took three months. The Gould Mission’s first stop was to be Petrograd, followed by the Caucasus.96 In fact, the team never made it beyond Petrograd. Once in the capital, they were assigned to the hospital at the Imperial Palace at Tsarskoe Selo where they remained for seven months. In addition to caring for wounded soldiers, Downer personally cared for members of the Imperial family, and was scheduled to perform surgery on the Tsarevitch, but the revolution intervened and ended his service for the royal family.97
Rivals Emerge Tension is inevitable when competing for scarce resources from the same relatively small donor pool. The doctors who previously served together in Kiev fractured in the aftermath of its dissolution: The Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, versus American Ambulance in Russia. The two factions advocated different visions of how best to support Russia’s medical needs. Fissures only grew greater as Hough struggled to keep the Persian mission solvent. He attributed many of the misunderstandings that stymied his attempts to attract donors to an emerging rivalry between the Petrograd Russian Committee of the American Red Cross on one side, and on the other side, highly publicized efforts by Doctors Egbert and Newton to establish an American Ambulance and Field Hospital.
“Dr. Earl B. Downer to Join Hospital Forces of Russians,” Lansing State Journal (Lansing, MI), August 30, 1916, 10. 97 “Michigan Man Saw Russian Revolution,” Detroit Free Press (Detroit, MI), September 2, 1917, 9. 225 96
Despite apparent similarities between the two efforts, there were stark differences. Hough recognized early-on in the formation of his committee that physical distance between his group and potential donors was a challenge. He hoped that the wellestablished business ties between his membership and their employers back in the States, as well as American Red Cross support, would overcome this impediment. However, American news outlets rarely covered the contributions of either the Petrograd Committee or American Red Cross medical unit on the Persian front. If covered at all, it was only in the doctors’ hometown news. Reports of their accomplishments were featured in the Christian Advocate but rarely promulgated beyond that limited audience. Newton and Egbert, conversely, presented a compelling story that received wide national circulation. Both were personally decorated by the Tsar and held the rank of brigadier general in the Russian army. Their affiliation with New York and Washington, D.C. elites ensured news outlets carried their message to national audiences. Public support from prominent New York personalities ensured a stable pool of support. In January 1916, Newton left Washington for New York to raise funds for establishing a hospital in Russia. Before his Russian wife’s death from tuberculosis (contracted while serving with him as a nurse at the front), they hoped to establish a hospital in Warsaw. Newton, like his compatriots in Petrograd, believed such humanitarian efforts were essential to developing strong U.S.-Russian bonds. Newton thought the war would last an additional year or longer, and focused his fundraising efforts on collecting resources sufficient for sustaining a hospital until the end of the conflict. Egbert was responsible for acquiring supplies and making preparations for the 226
planned hospital. After a short visit to the U.S., Newton expected to return to Russia in February 1916 to resume his duties as a surgeon at the front. Upon Newton’s departure from the U.S., Egbert assumed his fundraising role. They planned to raise funds from “among the wealthy interests who have benefited from tremendous war orders already placed and still being shipped from this country to Russia.”98 All of the elements of their planned hospital, its supplies, and staff were assembled in the U.S., and once complete, shipped over for deployment in Russia. According to the Washington Times, Newton, Egbert, and their colleagues in Persia were the “only representatives of American sympathy for Russia’s distress.”99 Newton viewed all relief efforts, including hospitals, established by other neutral countries, as a “reproach to American humanitarian sympathies” and hoped his efforts would remedy this perceived imbalance. 100 On February 18, the two doctors issued a well-publicized appeal in New York on behalf of the “American Hospital and Ambulance in Russia.” They hoped to raise $225,000 for ambulances and “a well equipped building and a year’s maintenance.”101 Prominent citizens signed the appeal, including Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. The essence of their call was: “that an unfortunate impression exists in Russia that the people of the United States are unfriendly towards Russia and that this impression is largely due to the substantial aid given to the wounded of all the other belligerent countries, while next to
“Dr. Philip Newton Would Establish Hospital in Russia,” Washington Times (Washington, D.C.), January 13, 1916, 4. 99 Ibid. The article also mentions the presence of Dr. Malcolm Grow and Dr. Hurd. 100 Ibid. 101 “U.S. to Give Russia $225,000 Hospital,” The Sun (New York, NY), February 19, 1916. 227 98
nothing has been given to Russia, the historical friend of the United States.’”102 An example of one provocative headline read “Russia is Hurt at Our Neglect, Feeling Growing in Russia that We Don’t Like Them.”103 This February appeal was the cornerstone of all of Newton and Egbert’s subsequent efforts. The story read: We beg to call your attention to the fact that, although Americans have given money for the aid of the wounded in England, Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Serbia, they have given next to nothing to their country’s historical friend Russia. Other neutral nations, such as Holland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark whose business relations with Russia have not greatly increased on account of the war, have maintained either hospital or ambulance units in Russia from the beginning of hostilities whereas the only aid furnished by for the wounded in Russia from America whose merchants are making large profits on Russian business was the services of the surgeons and nurses of two American Red Cross units and certain surgical supplies. The American Red Cross withdrew its units in October 1915, owing to lack of funds. The Russian people know what Americans have done and are doing for the other belligerent nations; therefore an impression exists that the citizens of the United States are unfriendly disposed toward them. Owing to this fact, the committee thinks that something should be done immediately to dispel this unfortunate impression. It is believed the best way to do this is to present to Russia, under the patronage of her Imperial Highness the Grand Duchess Tatiana, the extremely popular daughter of the Czar, a well-equipped hospital to cost $225,000, including transportation and one year's maintenance. The hospital will be equipped to administer the most modern treatment for lockjaw and gunshot injuries to the brain, which treatment is greatly needed.104 Potential donors received notices that a special committee would provide oversight over the spending in the States, and an American representative would provide in situ control over the allocation of resources in Russia. Unlike their colleagues in Persia, American 102 103
“Hospital for Russia Sought,” Baltimore Sun (Baltimore, MD), February 19, 1916, 3. “Russia is Hurt at Our Neglect,” Argus-Leader (Sioux Falls, SD), February 18, 1916,
1. “U.S. to Give Russia $225,000 Hospital,” The Sun (New York, NY), February 19, 1916. 228 104
Ambulance in Russia had little difficulty raising money. As an example, on February 28, they received $12,500 from the Carnegie Endowment alone.105 American Ambulance planned to serve in the same capacity as a Russian “Flying Column.” They hoped to provide motorized transport for Russia’s wounded to ensure expeditious evacuation and care. Prominent personalities joined their effort, including future congressman Hamilton Fish. Jr. and prominent New Yorker Philip M. Lydig. A Spanish American War veteran, Lydig saw service in the Russian army in 1915. In 1916, he deployed to Russia to serve on the Ambassador’s staff as senior representative to the prisoner of war effort. During his time in Petrograd, Lydig worked diligently to promote the American Ambulance initiative and became one of its most prominent representatives. Competition for scarce resources increased the friction and mistrust between the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross and the two former members of the Kiev hospital staff. Mabel Boardman wrote to Hough on March 18, informing him that she was aware of the efforts by Newton and Egbert to establish a hospital in Russia, but had no further information.106 The continued operation of the unit in Persia was far from certain due to the unreliable funding stream. Blaming Newton and Egbert for the debacle with the Chicago Red Cross chapter was inevitable. Hough made clear to the national Red Cross that the Petrograd Committee had no affiliation with Newton and Egbert’s
105
Year Book, 1916, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C: Press of Byron Adams (1916), 72. 106 Boardman to Hough, Letter, March 18, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 229
project. After the cancellation of the American Red Cross effort in Kiev, both Committee physicians went to Petrograd to obtain commissions from the Russian Red Cross and assignments in the field, whereas Newton immediately returned to service at the front with the rank of general. He was supposed to serve without pay but requested the thennascent Russian Committee of the American Red Cross to provide him a salary of $250 a month, explaining that his service would benefit their goal to restore Russian faith in U.S. goodwill.107 The Committee did not support his request. At the time, Hough was not even confident that the Committee would be able to raise funds necessary to support their efforts in Persia. They believed Newton's project to be a "sporadic venture." 108 The Committee also held Newton responsible for disparaging Brown, McClintic, and Hazlett to potential donors in the States.109 Contempt deepened when, in a May 2 letter to Mabel Boardman, Hough expressed his frustration and described Newton and Egbert’s fundraising efforts as “prejudicial.”110 He believed they hoped to undermine American Red Cross efforts in Persia in favor of their initiative. Hough explained the damage caused by the competing effort, “What I meant by saying this might possibly be prejudicial, was that funds which should come to us, an established and widely-known undertaking might be diverted to
Hough to Boardman, Letter, May 2, 1916, File 794.8, “Petrograd Committee,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 230 107
them causing the failure of our project which the establishment of no other project could counteract.”111 This general mistrust may have begun earlier, when the Petrograd Committee hoped to recruit Egbert to raise funds in the U.S. on their behalf to support his former colleagues in Persia. When he refused, Hough and his colleagues perceived that Newton and Egbert had no interest in collaborating with the Petrograd Committee; rather they were more concerned with advancing their agenda and reputations -- building a hospital would establish their humanitarian roles. Moreover, Hough did not grant legitimacy to the competing effort: “there is no role in my opinion so execrable as to solicit subscriptions for an unauthorized charity and you will remember that I refused to ask for subscriptions or try to continue the Red Cross unit in American until I had American Red Cross sanction and approval.”112 Hough believed it best for the Russian humanitarian cause that Egbert and Newton raise money for the Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, and “should they be successful in raising sufficient funds we would be very glad to have them come back and cooperate with our present staff who have done very well.”113 In June, Boardman wrote to Hough that: “Personally I have heard little of Doctors Egbert and Newton since they have been in this country save through the press. I fear with them also it is a case of some selfish interests. The papers have said that they
111
Ibid. Ibid. 113 Hough pleaded with Boardman for additional support, noting without her backing “is no hope for us,” and requested help with obtaining subscriptions or provide actual funding. 231 112
have raised a good deal of money, but do not know anything about this or what the plans are for the utilization of such money.”114 Ultimately, the Persia mission declined, while American Ambulance gained prominence. American medical support to Baratov’s Persia Expedition ended in August 1916. The next month, Newton was on the front page of American newspapers presenting the Tsarina with a field hospital and fifteen new ambulances. The broad news coverage captured the imagination of the American press and public setting a solid foundation for future fund raising and generating enthusiasm for ambulances for Russia.
Boardman to Hough, Letter, June 7, 1916, File 591.4, “Medical Units-Russia,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 232 114
Chapter 4: Ambulances for Russia “If I told the Russian officers with whom I became intimately acquainted…that you were going to send ambulances to Russia they would have picked me up and carried me on their shoulders, not only because there is a great need…but because the spirit of the world wide fellowship that the arrival of the ambulances would indicate.”1 Reverend A.B. Rudd 1917
American Ambulance in Russia represents a marked shift and expansion in efforts to provide humanitarian relief to Russia and her soldiers. After closing the American Red Cross hospital at Kiev, responsibility for aid fell to organizations and individuals with direct ties to the beleaguered nation. Fundraising by the Petrograd-based Russian Committee of the American Red Cross focused primarily on attracting resources from U.S. businesses with direct commercial links to Russia and from national Red Cross chapters. Other organizations, like American Ambulance in Russia, recognized a broader potential pool of donors. Norman Saul describes this expanded population: "many Americans responded to the need to alleviate the suffering in Russia caused by the large refugee problem and the inadequacy of medical facilities to handle an overwhelming number of battle causalities. In small amounts, Americans contributed indirectly to Russian relief through religious organizations…and fund-raising events.”2 Previous U.S.-based Russia-centric charity efforts were limited in scope and local in nature. Adopting a more aggressive approach, American Ambulance was the earliest 1
Arthur B. Rudd served as a special assistant to Ambassador David F. Francis. He wore the uniform of a Russian Major or Captain and decorated by the Tsar’s government. “Russia Will Appreciate Help From United States,” Star-Gazette (Elmira, NY), July 7, 1917. 2 Norman E. Saul, War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914–1921 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001). 37. 233
national war charity focused solely on Russia. It targeted a broad swath of the general public and societal elites, as well as catalyzed other more extensive and more farreaching fundraising efforts. Its publicity and lobbying efforts eventually led to officially sanctioned national attempts to alleviate Russia's severe military ambulance shortage. Dr. Edward Egbert, former director of one of the two units assigned to the Kiev American Red Cross hospital and an early supporter of American Ambulance, was a vocal advocate for the establishment of a Russian version of the much publicized American Field Service (AFS) in France.3 He and his colleague, Dr. Philip Newton, the former director of Kiev’s Unit C, worked tirelessly to raise money for specially equipped motor ambulances for the Russian front. Secretary of American Ambulance, Philip Meister Lydig, a well-known member of New York society, also simultaneously served as head of American Embassy Petrograd’s “Second Division,” the special staff devoted to Central Powers prisoner of war affairs. Lydig was on the Embassy staff from his arrival in Russia in August 1916 until his departure in early March 1917.4 Before joining the Embassy, Lydig, an early advocate for enhanced U.S.-Russian trade, wrote in May 1915 in the Washington Times that "Now is the time for America to step in and take its share of the tremendous trade of Russia. It must be done now and not later, or else after the war American trade with Russia will fall off to such an extent that it
3
Egbert’s papers and letters suggest he may have been acting as an agent for the newly chartered Hammond Arms, presumably selling war munitions to Russia. Edward H. Egbert Papers, Hammond Arms payment voucher to Edward Egbert October 1916, Box 1:8, Hoover Institution Archives. 4 Philip Meister Lydig, Harvard Office of War Records, Harvard University Archives. 234
will exist only in certain specialties."5 Before his work as a “special assistant” to American Ambassador David R. Francis, Lydig served with Russian forces on the Warsaw front where his charitable vision for Russia was already evident. He hoped that his time in Poland would “set forth conditions there clearly enough to move some of my philanthropic countrymen to come to the assistance of that suffering land.”6 The period between January 1916 and September 1917 was characterized by an expansion of American national awareness and accompanying action to address Russia’s critical ambulance shortage. First, to sound the clarion call, Newton and Egbert started a movement that culminated in large-scale nationally-sanctioned American Red Cross efforts to send ambulances to aid Russia’s wounded. U.S. public interest stimulated by their campaign opened the door for other highly publicized fundraising efforts. One organization was the "Siberian Regiments American Ambulance Society" affiliated with the Russian Red Cross but based in New York. Its Commissioner General was Colonel Andrei Kalpashnikov, a Russian officer who later worked along with Newton, Malcolm Grow, and the Billings American Red Cross Commission to establish a robust military ambulance capability in Russia. In late 1916 and early 1917, he traveled throughout the U.S. to raise money for ambulances to support his forces back in Russia.7 American entry into the war led to a commensurate increase in governmental and 5
Philip M. Lydig, “Sees Big Chance to Win Russian Trade,” Washington Times, May 30, 1915, 7. 6 Ibid. 7 Kalpashnikov was Malcolm Grow's commanding officer. George F. Kennan devotes an entire chapter to his post-revolutionary arrest and detention in Russia Leaves the War. George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920. Vol. 1, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), 191-218. 235
Red Cross support for Russia. Motivations expanded beyond purely humanitarian and commercial interests, to more strategic and immediate concerns. Jennifer Polk described the basis of enhanced American Red Cross support in 1917: Several motivators were present in the minds of these Americans, including a commitment to helping guide Russians through their democratic revolution; keeping the eastern front alive to hasten the defeat of Germany, and strengthening the bonds between America and Russia through goodwill and good works. The lines between diplomacy and unofficial contacts were often blurred.8 By the time the Billings Commission arrived in summer 1917, Russia's ambulance shortage had garnered national attention, and dozens of individual Americans and organizations lined up to donate vehicles.9 American Ambulance harnessed the nation’s interest in Russia and used the press to mobilize support. The public affairs landscape was already fertile enough to achieve their objectives. Norman Saul explains the simple fact that “news from Russia sold newspapers and journals in the United States.”10 Ultimately, American Ambulance in Russia and the Red Cross Commission's fates were tied intrinsically to political, military, and social developments that eventually manifested themselves in the revolution and collapse of the Tsar’s armed forces. Accounts from Newton and other colleagues provide transparency into Russia's decline into chaos and show that instability undermined their missions. Birth of the Ambulances for Russia Movement Characteristic of the American Ambulance’s penchant for publicity, the initial 8
Jennifer Ann Polk, "Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary Russia and Civil War, 1917-24" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 2012), 30. 9 An illustrative example of this movement is the donation of an ambulance by the employees of the Smithsonian Institution in August 1917. “The Smithsonian Sent Healing Wheels to WWI, https://siarchives.si.edu/blog/smithsonian-sent-healing-wheelswwi. 10 Saul, 48. 236
American “roll-out” of the cars was no less spectacular. On April 10, 1916, the entire City of New York took notice, as the fifteen ambulances paraded down Fifth Avenue to Washington Square, where the vehicles were transferred to the Russian Consul General after a blessing by an Orthodox priest. Prominent members of American Ambulance in Russia drove the vehicles, including Hamilton Fish, Jr, Vice Chairman of the National Allied Relief Committee John Moffat, and of course Newton and Lydig.11 Photos of the parade and the blessing of the ambulances were carried on the national news wire services, undoubtedly stimulating enthusiasm across the country. Later that week, the ambulances, accompanied by Newton and Lydig, left for Russia. Egbert remained in the States, giving talks and conducting other fundraising efforts feeding the growing national support for a U.S. Russian volunteer ambulance force similar to the Western Front’s American Field Service. Dr. Malcolm Grow’s wife told a reporter after her return from Russia in June 1916 that “I have heard many persons express the wish that an American Ambulance Corps could be established in Russia as well as France, but recently nineteen ambulances were sent by Americans to the hospital, and they proved a great help.”12 On July 13, American Ambassador David R. Francis wrote to Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips: “Dr. Phillip Newton is here with sixteen ambulances of the Studebaker make which he has tendered the Russian Government and which have been accepted. The corps will be called the Princess
11
“To Bless War Ambulances,” New York Tribune, April 9, 1916, 8. She is presumably referring to the American Ambulance in Russia vehicles. “Praise for Czar’s Men,” Delaware County Daily Times, July 22, 1916, 10. 237 12
Tatiana Ambulance Corps and will be directly under the control of Dr. Newton.”13 Malcolm Grow believed strongly in the value of bolstering Russia’s military ambulance capability. After U.S. entry into the war, he became more steadfast in his conviction that sending ambulances to Russia was beneficial to both nations: “Nothing will so serve American boys in France as the generous bolstering up of the Russian Relief Service in the east. Generosity to the American Red Cross will as surely shorten the war as the purely military appropriation.”14 Grow previously served in the Russian Army’s First Siberian Corps, as the surgeon with the 21st Flying Column under the command of Colonel Andrei Kalpashnikov. Grow was brought to Russia by Egbert to augment Russian medical capabilities at the front, and obtained his military medical commission through the Russian Red Cross. He went on to spend more than a year on the Galician front, including service during the Brusilov Offensive. In mid-August 1916, the Committee for the Maintenance of the American Ambulance Hospital in Russia and the Russian War Relief Committee issued a fundraising appeal.15 Robert L. Bacon, the former Ambassador to France, was chairman of the Ambulance and Charles B. Bigelow, Jr headed the Russian War Relief Organization. The group included other prominent figures including, among others, former ambassador to Russia Charles Guild, Charles R. Crane, and Phillip M. Lydig.
13
In the letter, Francis also writes regarding the medical personnel who came to help to Central Powers prisoners that "Dr. Newton tells me that the American Red Cross with which he was connected never got into disfavor with the Russian government." Francis to William Phillips, Letter, July 13, 1916, Reel 2, David R. Francis Papers, Russia in Transition, Library of Congress. 14 “Russia Needs Red Cross Help,” Lima News (Lima, OH), June 22, 1917, 6. 15 An early name for "American Ambulance in Russia" 238
Before this latest appeal, the two groups already raised over $60,000.00.16 September 1916 marked the end of one chapter and the start of another in American humanitarian assistance to Russia. As the American Red Cross medical mission in Persia disbanded, Newton was in Russia preparing to present the Tsarina a field hospital and ambulances purchased with donations from sponsors back in the States. These contributions, along with similar initiatives, marked a shift from simply providing medical personnel to Russian Red Cross hospitals, to a recognition that the Empire needed to establish more "flying columns" supported by motor ambulances. Formerly called "American Hospital and Ambulance in Russia,” it was not the only charitable effort raising money for motorized transport for the wounded, but it was certainly the largest. Starting in spring 1915, a group of American and English women in Petrograd, led by Mrs. McAllister Smith, raised 6000 rubles to purchase and donate a single motor ambulance to the Russian Red Cross. Funds came from drives in the American and British Petrograd colonies.17 Charitable events included lectures and concerts “of the highest musical quality” featuring well-known members of the community. 18 Support for such efforts is evident from the Christian Advocate: “it would be a source of genuine satisfaction to…know that there would soon be another Red Cross ambulance on the front and at least one American flag to be seen on the firing line…. there would be many more such motor ambulances dispatched to the battle-fields to help
16
“Russian Sufferers to Get Assistance,” New York Times, August 13, 1917, 5. Crane was offered the position of Ambassador to Russia after Guild’s departure, but declined 17 “Items of Interest,” Christian Advocate, May 1915, 11. 18 “American-British Motor Ambulance,” Christian Advocate, June 1915, 14. 239
expedite … relief among the wounded.”19 This donated Ambulance, with an American flag on one door and Union Jack on the other, was displayed in Petrograd with much fanfare, before formal presentation to the Russian Red Cross on September 20, 1916. The vehicle, as well as all of the associated medical equipment and supplies, was destined “for immediate service at the front with the 29th Field Hospital under Dr. Eugene Hurd.”20 Hurd, an American doctor, supported the Eighth Siberian Division along with American nurse Marian Prince.21 Four days later, Newton was back as a military field surgeon and took command of the “American Ambulance in Russia” in the field. He, along with Lydig, formally presented the unit to Tsarina Alexandra and Grand Duchess Tatiana. Composed of a field hospital and fifteen motor ambulances, photographs and news stories of the event received nation-wide news coverage in the U.S. The Decatur Herald carried the following account: The ambulances were lined up in front of the palace at Tsarskoe Selo, when the Empress and Grand Duchesses Tatianna and Olga, dressed in the simple costume of hospital nurses, appeared and inspected them, expressing their appreciation and thanks many times. Following the ceremony, the Ambulances passed in review before the members of the Imperial family and then returned to Petrograd.22 Newton provided a more detailed account in a letter to the American Ambulance’s governing committee in New York: Our fifteen ambulances, completely manned and equipped were yesterday 19
Ibid. “The Ladies Motor Ambulance,” Christian Advocate, August 1916, 10, and “The American-British Motor Ambulance,” Christian Advocate, September 1916, 14. 21 Marian Prince to Francis, letter, May 23, 1916, Reel 4, David R. Francis Papers, Russia in Transition, Library of Congress. Marian Prince is the only American Nurse in Russian service known to have worked on the frontlines. 22 “Motor Ambulances Presented to Russia,” Decatur Herald (Decatur IL), September 26, 1916, 1. 240 20
presented to the Empress and the Grand Duchess Tatianna and Olga. Her Majesty was very enthusiastic, and when I told her that we hoped to have more ambulances (and they are so badly needed) she was more than pleased….Capt Lydig, with several officers of the automobile corps, my Lieutenant and myself were lined up on the left end of the company. At a command from the Adjutant, the sixty-four soldiers making up my company let out a yell of welcome and then Her Majesty came directly to where we stood, and we were presented to her. Her Majesty then asked me to show her the ambulances and the small field hospital we carry. She was very much interested in the American surgical instruments and the other apparatus. She had me explain everything in detail and be she and the Grand Duchess were quick to comment on the advantage of having everything so compact.23 Fundraising for the fifteen 1916 Studebaker "Six" ambulances specially equipped for service on the Eastern front took only two months. Some ambulances were sponsored by individual donors. For example, millionaire William Vanderbilt and RussianAmerican import-export businessman M. Sergey Friede each donated a vehicle.24 The total fleet consisted of “two repair cars, one pilot car, a hospital car with a tent, and twelve ambulances.”25 Each vehicle could carry four stretchers. Immediately after the ceremony, the ambulances went to the Carpathian front. 26 On November 22, on the letterhead of “The American Ambulance of Her Imperial Highness the Grand Duchess Tatiana Nicolaevna,” Newton described conditions in the Carpathians: “After the mud of the first week, winter came along with snow and freezing temperature.”27 He added, “We have been delayed a bit in getting away to Roumania 23
“Presented to Czarina,” New York Times, November 5, 1916, 99. “Ambulances For Russian Service Consecrated Before Leaving,” Palladium-Item (Richmond, IN), 12. Friede’s wife was a significant advocate for financial assistance for Russia. She was one of the initial supporters of the American Petrograd colony's local hospital for wounded Russian soldiers. Sergey Friede's son, Sydney, represented Ford Motors in Russia and was Newton's close associate. 25 “15 Studebaker Sixes are Sent to Slavs,” Santa Ana Register (Santa Ana, CA), April 27, 1916, 10. 26 Ibid. 27 Newton to Mother, Letter, November 22, 1916, Newton family. 241 24
[sic], I leave here day-after-tomorrow with nine of my cars. My lieutenant stays here with the other cars. I have learned to speak a lot more Russian, so I can get along all right.”28 Less than a month after the much publicized and celebrated presentation of ambulances to the Imperial family, American Ambulance in Russia, now chaired by Hamilton Fish, Jr29. issued an appeal that read: Fifteen motor ambulances and a field hospital of the American Ambulance in Russia are now doing active work directly behind the Russian battle lines on the eastern front….Up to the present time Russia has not adopted as elaborate hospital and sanitary organizations as are to be found with armies of most of the belligerent nations of Europe, and as a result the suffering the Russian wounded is in numberless cases terrible. The American Ambulance service, by providing speedy transportation to the base and field hospitals and also expert surgical and medical treatment at those hospitals, is doing its part in remedying the present situation. The Russian people deeply appreciate what we are doing for them, although it is but little when compared to what the United States has done for the other allies. An appeal has come to the American committee from our volunteers in Russia for more ambulances and medical supplies, such as gauze, bandages, and chloroform. The great offensive, we are informed, is taking a tremendous toll, and the need is both urgent and immediate.30 Within a month, railroad magnate Arthur Curtiss James, Kodak founder George Eastman, Andrew Carnegie, philanthropist Edward S. Harkness, and Ford Motors agent Sydney A. Friede, each donated an ambulance. The Committee hoped the latest appeal would raise enough funds to equip twenty additional ambulances for presentation to the Tsarina early in 1917. By mid-November, total contributions received by the organization since its founding totaled $70,624. Hamilton Fish, Jr. served as chairman and day to day operations were run by treasurer William H. Hamilton. To bolster their 28 29 30
Ibid. Also known as Hamilton Fish III. “Ambulance Work in Russia in Need,” New York Times, October 15, 1916, 94. 242
efforts, American Ambulance publicized that Lydig planned to bring back motion pictures and photos capturing its vehicles in action at the front. The films and photos were for display, along with two fully equipped ambulances, at the most ambitious fundraising event for Russian relief to date—The Russian Bazaar.31
The Russian Bazaar Spearheaded by Mary Bakhmetev, the American-born wife of Russian Ambassador George Bakhmetev, the goal of the “Russian Bazaar’s” was “to assist in collecting funds to be turned over to the Imperial and officially recognized organizations in Russia, for distribution among the various needy sufferers of the War. The sick the wounded, the widows and orphans.”32 Held under the auspices of Mrs. Bakhemetev’s Russian-American Relief Association, American Ambulance in Russia played a prominent role. Bakhmetev's relief association held a significantly smaller Russian Bazaar in April 1915 at the same location, the sizeable 71st Regiment Armory in New York. An announcement in The Russian Review advertised the follow-on gathering: The Russian Bazaar will be helped under the auspices of the Russian-American Relief Association with the participation of the American Ambulance in Russia. All funds raised through the Bazaar will be forwarded to Russia through the Russian Embassy in Washington and they will be used in relieving the needs of the Russian War Sufferers without any regard to race or creed.33 “Patronesses” of the event included the wives of Theodore Roosevelt (senior and junior), 31
“Ambulance for Russia,” New York Times, November 12, 1916, 35. “Russian-American Relief Association, Letter, undated, Reel 2, David R. Francis Papers, Russia in Transition, Library of Congress. 33 “Russian Bazaar in N.Y.,” Russian Review 2, no. 6 (December 1916): 334-335. 243 32
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Curtis Guild, and William Boyce Thompson, among others. Promised a view of "real Russia," the Armory became a "veritable bit of the Muscovite Empire."34 In addition to Russian architecture, there was local music, dancing, art, and entertainment. The hall contained replicas of the Tower of Riga that resisted repeated German assaults, and was staffed by women in native costumes and filled with local crafts.35 American Ambulance and American Friends of Prisoners were the only other war charities represented at the event. Few details survive regarding Ambulance fundraising at the Bazaar, but one activity included charging five dollars for a lecture by Lieutenant Maxim Peshkov, the war-hero son of writer Maxim Gorky.36 Newton Returns to the United States Dr. Phillip Newton arrived in New York in mid-January 1917. Announcing his arrival, the American Ambulance released a statement that read: Newton, Commandant of the American Ambulance in Russia, has just returned from the Russian front where the automobiles of the American Ambulance are working with the Eighth Army. During one period of six days the sixteen ambulances carried 2200 wounded soldiers, working night and day. Dr. Newton reports an urgent need for more ambulances, and has come to America for the purpose of taking to Russia a second ambulance flotilla which is now being formed by the Executive Committee of which Hamilton Fish, Jr., is Chairman. The American Ambulance is the only American organization working directly with the Russian Army.37 Highlighting their motto “For the Soldier!,” the organization used Newton’s arrival to issue another fundraising appeal. Contained in a professionally produced pamphlet, complete with donation coupon and photos of the ambulances in action, it implored its donors to: 34 35 36 37
“Real Russia at Bazaar,” New York Times, November 13, 1916, 8. “Russian Bazaar Opened,” New York Times, December 5, 1916, 8. “It’ll Cost Only $5 to See Mr. Petchkoff,” Chicago Tribune, December 15, 1916, 17. “American Ambulance, Russia,” New York Times, Jan 28, 1917, 29. 244
HELP US! To-day, far away on the desolate Galician front just behind the firing line, the motor ambulances of the American Ambulance are saving the lives of brave Russian soldiers, and showing them that in this, their hour of need, America has not completely forgotten. We need more ambulances. We need gauze, bandages, chloroform-all in large quantities. Constant appeals are coming from our men in the field. Will you not help us?38 It continued, "DR. PHILLIP NEWTON, Commandant of the American Ambulance in Russia, has just returned from the Russian Front to try to get more motor ambulances, which are urgently needed."39 Newton described how American Ambulance was responsible for 55,000 men and that after each big battle they were overwhelmed by casualties. Wounded who could not fit in the few ambulances had to be transported in carts and hay wagons, with almost half requiring nighttime transport along roads exposed to enemy artillery fire. Newton continued, “Our little hospital is doing more than was expected of it, but we are very much in need of supplies….When I tell you that men have died before my eyes from lockjaw when sixty cents worth of tetanus antitoxin would have saved them you will understand how much we are in need of supplies.”40 The pamphlet ends with: The American Ambulance in Russia is the only American organization working with the Russian Army….It is known throughout the Army as a gift from the American people, and I have been requested to convey the thanks of everyone from the Imperial family down to the most humble soldiers to the American people for the kindness in sending help.41 Soon after his arrival in the U.S., Newton reunited with Egbert and negotiated with automobile manufacturers to purchase additional ambulances. He placed orders with Studebaker and Ford, and followed the status of each vehicle through the production 38
“The American Ambulance in Russia,” Pamphlet, author’s collection. A digital copy can also be viewed at https://collections.nlm.nih.gov/ext/kirtasbse/101522805/PDF/101522805.pdf. 39 “American Ambulance in Russia,” Pamphlet. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 245
cycle.42 On February 3, the U.S and Germany severed diplomatic relations, an event that fundamentally changed U.S. views on Russia for the remainder of the war. On February 7, Newton took a night train to Washington for a meeting the following day with Russian Ambassador Bakhmetev to arrange the shipment of the newest ambulances.43 On February 9, Lydig, accompanied by Ambulance treasurer William Hamilton participated in a much-publicized audience with the Tsarina where they presented her a book containing the names of the American donors to the ambulance fund.44 By February 25, Hamilton Fish expected shipment of ten ambulances and a significant quantity of surgical supplies to be shipped as soon as the Port of Archangel reopened after the winter.45 The Russian Revolution in March 1917 opened the floodgates of support. The radical change reduced the reluctance of many Americans about any connection with the autocratic Tsarist regime. It also, more importantly, heightened the requirement to improve Russia’s reliability as a potential ally. Jennifer Polk writes that Russia was not at all fit to keep fighting against Germany and the rest of the Central powers. The United States put a great deal of importance on the Russian situation, and pressure on itself to solve Russian problems. Americans worried that failure to do so would result in the downfall of the Provisional Government and possibly the end of the Russian war effort.46 Similarly, Norman Saul writes, “The ‘democratic’ revolution in Russia and American entry into the war inspired an increase in other assistance, most of it flowing from a variety of new and charitable organizations in the United States to agencies in Russia, 42
Ibid., Entry January 26, 1917. Ibid., Entries February 7 and 8, 1917 44 “Czarine Receives Americans,” New York Times, February 10, 1917, 4. 45 “American Ambulance, Russia,” New York Times, February 25, 1917, 35. Hamilton Fish also announced that the Committee’s contributions to date totaled $101,000 46 Polk, 29. 246 43
especially to the Russian Red Cross.”47 Commensurate with the increase in interest, the American Red Cross looked to expand its presence in Russia. However, implementation of this vision required considerable planning and dialogue. The solution was an “exchange” of what seemed like an endless stream of bilateral “missions.” These efforts are discussed later in this chapter. On April 6, the same day the U.S. declared war against Germany, Newton departed New York to return to Russia via the Pacific route.48 By mid-May 1917, he was back in Russia, and the Petrograd Newton left months earlier was gone. The revolution changed everything. At his former home, the Hotel Astoria, the Grand Ballroom was in ruins from the violence. He had a long talk with Ambassador Francis, and one can only speculate about the scope of their discussion, but it most likely related to the progress of his efforts in the U.S. He frequently visited automobile agent Sidney Friede, who became his roommate on June 9.49 On June 13, a high-level Commission headed by former U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root arrived in Petrograd. Newton met with the Commission on numerous occasions, as well as having some meals with the press pool accompanying it.50 By the time it departed Russia in August 1917, the "goodwill" and fact-finding mission was regarded as a failure.51 Events in Russia continued to stress the fractured foundation of the new government. In an almost clairvoyant manner, Newton recorded in his June 20 diary 47
Saul, War and Revolution, 118. Newton Diary, Entry for April 6, 1917. Newton family. 49 Ibid., He refers to Friede by his initial SAF…Sidney A. Friede. 50 Ibid., Entries June 13 through June 19, 1917. 51 The Root Commission determined that Russia's participation in the war could be maintained through an aggressive propaganda campaign. It failed to understand and identify the real issues tearing apart Russian society. 247 48
entry: “Conditions very uncertain-a crisis seems to be brewing. But Russia is so strange one never knows.”52 Earlier diary entries captured the disorder and chaos in the streets alongside mundane daily activities and plans. On June 26, he noted a detail absent from histories of the events leading up to the July Crisis: “Petrograd-much scurvy and intestinal disorders here. Dysentery at many hospitals. Black bread very bad.”53 On June 27, it became clear that American Ambulance was not immune from the revolutionary contagion. Newton wrote, “Antonoff my senior med. Sergeant arrived from Front with resolutions of soldiers to join League [sic] of Death and inviting me to go.”54 Legions of Death were special voluntary shock troops who vowed to continue fighting no matter what the outcome. 55 A declaration on American Ambulance letterhead in both English and Russian preserved by Philip Newton’s family is the only surviving document providing insight into the thoughts of the Russian personnel who made up the organization. The declaration read: PROTOCOL MEETING OF SOLDIERS OF THE AMERICAN AMBULANCE IN RUSSIA At the Front, June 8, 1917 Chairman, Corporal FEODOR DEMTCHANKO Secretary, Private Alexander Lain The meeting was declared open at 6 P.M. with forty-four soldiers present. It was decided that the entire membership of the American Ambulance, with all of the motors and the hospital, wished to enter the new ‘LEGION OF DEATH’, and organization formed to fight the Germans at any cost, and to which the majority of the soldiers of the 8th Army belong, but before making a final decision, it was decided to have certain points cleared: 1. Is Dr. NEWTON coming back to the Ambulance or not? 2. Have the new reserve parts arrived from America? 52
Newton Diary, Entry June 20, 1917. Ibid., Entry June 26, 1917. 54 Ibid., Entry June 27, 1917. 55 Not to be confused with the Women’s Battalions of Death formed by Kerensky in an attempt to “shame the men” into fighting harder. 248 53
3. If Dr. Newton is returning to Ambulance, please telegraph at once. 4. If reserve parts have not arrived from America, can they be purchased in Petrograd? 5. If Dr. Newton is not returning to the Ambulance, will he inform the Committee which property belongs to him personally, and which belongs to the Ambulance. RESOLUTION: To send to Petrograd to straighten out all of these questions Senior Hospital Sergeant ANTANOFF for ten days, and ask personally Dr. Newton to return to the Ambulance as quickly as possible to make the work of the Ambulance more efficient. After this resolution was read and passed by the Committee the meeting was declared closed. By the Chairman: DEMTCHANKO By the Secretary: LAIN56 The original proclamation was hand-signed by the soldiers. Given the high profile nature and level of interest in the Ambulance unit back in the States, it is not surprising that the national press covered and somewhat sensationalized the revolutionary decision. Washington Times reported: “American Ambulance corps at the front, today voted to enter the Legion of Death-an organization forming all over Russia now, and with the avowed purpose of fighting the Germans to a standstill. Dr. Phillip Newton, an American surgeon, and member of the ambulance corps, left today for the front to join the same organization.”57 The article falsely portrays Newton as joining his men in the fight to the death efforts to hold back the German advance. While untrue, such stories certainly stirred the imagination of the American public and served the fundraising ends of the Ambulance organization. Turmoil in the ranks was exacerbated by worries on the home front. Gasoline shortages threatened military operations and stability in the capital. Newton wrote “soon there won’t be anything,” and predicted a “terrible winter in Petrograd unless conditions 56 57
June 8 Protocol, Document, Newton Family. “Join Legion of Death,” Washington Times (Washington, DC), July 1, 1917, 9. 249
improve.”58 By the time the Russian military launched the ill-fated "Kerensky Offensive" on July 1 the American Ambulance had earned the whole-hearted endorsement of the Provisional Government.59 Newton recorded: “News of Russian advances and capture of 9000 prisoners-Great excitement and chances of strengthening the Provisional Government.”60 Accordingly, American Ambulance in Russia modified fundraising materials to reflect the new endorsement, while still maintaining all of the Romanov symbols and highlighting the support from the now-deposed royal family.61 In a July 5 meeting, Lydig, representing the Federal Council of Allied War Charities, resisted attempts by the Red Cross to exercise oversight over all war relief work. Under the direction of its War Council, the Red Cross hoped to raise one hundred million dollars and serve as the clearinghouse for all American humanitarian aid to Allied governments. Lydig believed American Red Cross efforts would undermine the autonomy and effectiveness of the individual charities, and opposed fundamentally such an overarching role for the Society.62 He told reporters: “It would be a serious mistake at this time if the Red Cross were to take over all these activities. It has upon its hands immediate work to perform with the armies in the field and in other directions which at
58
Ibid., Entries June 29 and June 30, 1917. “American Ambulance, Russia,” New York Times, July 1, 1917, 23. By mid-July 1916, the organized already raised $128,000. 60 Ibid., Entry for July 1, 1917. 61 A digital version of the revised pamphlet is available at https://digital.library.villanova.edu/Author/Home?author=American+Ambulance+in+Rus sia. 59
62
“Urges War Relief Outside Red Cross,” The Sun (New York, NY). July 5, 1917, 2.
250
the present at least will call for all its energies and all the money placed at its disposal.”63 Eventually, by the end of summer 1917, the American Red Cross subsumed all ambulance work in Russia. Ambulances, Ambulances, and Yet More Ambulances At the same time Newton was leaving the U.S., Colonel Andrei Kalpashnikov arrived in the States to raise money to buy ambulances for his unit back in Russia. Representing “Siberian Regiments American Ambulance Society,” Kalpashnikov’s heroic exploits were well-known in the U.S. As Commander of the 21st Flying Column, equipped by Countess Tolstoy of Moscow, he served as Malcolm Grow’s commanding officer. Married to an American, in November 1916, he was appointed Commissioner General of the Siberian Regiments American Ambulance Society. He went to the U.S. to give lectures and raise money for the purchase of a large number of ambulances and trucks to support the Siberian Corps. His unit, the First Siberian Corps, became known as “Ironsides” because it countered the bulk of the German offensive near Warsaw and Lodz. His promotional talks highlighted that at the end of the battle, casualties reduced manpower from forty to only four thousand. He told reporters that in two years he was able to obtain only fourteen ambulances, versus the hundred to hundred and fifty he required. In fact, along the entire Eastern front, he reported there were 31,000 Russian Red Cross nurses supported by only 400 ambulances. He said they “had been promised some cars by various British organizations, but they need all they have and friends have encouraged me to hope in the never failing generosity of Americans I may find some
63
“Red Cross Row Grows Hotter,” Middletown Times-Press (Middletown, NY), July 6, 1917, 1.
251
assistance toward providing the Russian Red Cross with this sorely needed equipment.”64 Kalpashnikov eventually played a critical role, working with Newton and Grow, to promote the need for more ambulances in Russia. Egbert was one of the earliest and most vocal advocates for a sizeable ambulance aid effort for Russia. As early as 1915, he pressed for an ambulance corps to serve strictly humanitarian and diplomatic purposes. In May 1917, he wrote to Dr. Frank F. Simpson, Chief of the Medical Section of the National Council of Defense; to express his concern that Russians believed Americans viewed them as "cannon fodder." He explained that Russia produced no automobiles, and possessed less than one percent of the motor ambulances needed to support their war effort properly. Egbert proposed that the U.S. organize and send, as quickly as possible, a well-organized and equipped ambulance corps commensurate with the size of the similar volunteer force then in France. Under his proposal, it would be commanded by an American Medical Corps Officer and financed entirely by private contributions in the U.S. All costs would be borne by Americans, and it would be presented to the Russians as a gift. Egbert believed it would serve as “the most practical way of quickly showing our sympathy for them.”65 Additionally, Malcolm Grow intended to visit Simpson that week, and presumably discussed some of Egbert’s proposals. Planning to go to Russia on June 7, Egbert offered, if properly authorized, to discuss his proposals with Russian colleagues during
64
“Young Hero Tell of Russia’s ‘Flying Column’ of Red Cross,” Nashua Reporter (Nashua, IA), January 25, 1917. 65 Egbert to F.F. Simpson, Letter, August 7, 1917. Edward H. Egbert Papers, Box/Folder1:8, Hoover Institution Archives. 252
his visit.66 Egbert later wrote “Russia has proven herself our friend repeatedly even since we became a nation. Our future as a commercial power lies more in Russia than elsewhere. I do not advocate less for France but I advocate doing at least as much for Russia.”67 The roots of the American Red Cross Commission headed by Dr. Frank Billings that left for Russia in the summer of 1916 are the subject of some historical debate. Egbert claimed that the Commission resulted from his correspondence with Malcolm Grow. In an August 7, 1917, letter, Egbert writes: After the break in our diplomatic relations with Germany I took the matter up with the Council of National Defense, and later cooperating with my colleague, Dr. Malcolm C. Grow, who I induced to go to Russia with me in 1915, took it up with the War Council of the Red Cross. 68 The outcome of this was that a Mission headed by Professor Frank Billings of the University of Chicago has gone to Russia to investigate and advise the Red Cross as to what action should be taken.69 The timing and content of Egbert’s correspondence, as well as the probable date of the meeting between Grow and Simpson, lends credence to Egbert’s beliefs that he was instrumental in launching the Billings Commission.
66
Ibid. Egbert to Senator John Sharp Williams, Letter, August 7, 1917. Edward H. Egbert Papers, Box/Folder1:8, Hoover Institution Archives. 68 Established in 1916, and charged with coordinating the flow or resources and industry to support the war effort, the Council of National Defense was composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, and Commerce, as well as Agriculture and Labor. Supporting the Council was a non-partisan advisory board that included prominent American industrialist including, among others Samuel Gompers and Daniel Willard. 69 Egbert to Senator John Sharp Williams, Letter, August 7, 1917. Edward H. Egbert Papers, Box/Folder1:8, Hoover Institution Archives. 253 67
On May 10, President Wilson appointed a War Council to coordinate efforts of the National American Red Cross. Chaired by Henry P. Davison, the group’s task was to identify the most effective allocation of Red Cross resources to accomplish the most good. Sending a Commission to Russia was discussed during a War Council meeting in Washington on May 24-25. Called by President Wilson, the session was "to plan means for raising immediately an immense Red Cross war fund."70 Parallels between the Council’s statement, the Commission’s mandate, and Egbert’s concerns and proposals are unmistakable. Davison’s pronouncement is nearly identical to Egbert’s arguments in structure and content. War Council Chairman Henry P. Davison’s statement is almost a copy of the letter Egbert sent earlier that month: “We should do something and do it immediately to hearten afflicted Russia. On the Russian line of 1,000 miles there are only 6,000 ambulances, while on the French front of 400 miles there are 64,000 ambulances fully equipped….Probably nothing that can be done immediately will do more to win this war than strengthen Russia.”71 Malcolm Grow explained the implications of the ambulance shortfall:
Suppose 99 men are hurt, twenty of whom are killed and 30 wounded but able to walk. If five stretchers and twenty stretcher bearers must be depended upon, and the first-aid station is two miles back from the trenches, this means actually that it will take 24 hours to remove the badly wounded. There is an absolute chance that many of them will be rewounded. Some will be killed in transportation. 70
The statements from the meeting were carried in National Geographic Magazine, accompanied by the note: "by courtesy of the American Red Cross, publishes herewith the principal addresses at one of the most awakening meetings that have ever assembled in America." "Our Armies of Mercy," National Geographic Magazine 31, no. 5 (May 1917): 423. 71 “Our Armies of Mercy,” National Geographic Magazine Vol. 31 No. 5 (May 1917): 427. 254
If there were some method by which the stretchers or the crude springless peasant carts employed on the roads behind the front could be exchanged by American Red Cross for 1-man bicycle-tired carts, it would increase four-fold the service value of the Russians sanitars service, to say nothing of remedying conditions that eat into the morale of the Russian troops.72 Additional evidence of Egbert’s role is in the fact that his protégé, Malcolm Grow, was selected to serve on the Commission, and placed in charge of the ambulance question.
In the meantime, Newton worked diligently to build-up his unit and return to the front. On May 15, Newton sent instructions to his assistant, Russian soldier Anton Oras, who was with the Eighth Army at Czernowitz (modern-day Chernivtsi, Ukraine) directing him to bring his car to Petrograd immediately.73 On May 23, Sydney Friede informed Newton that he shipped two ambulances and the touring car, and expected to send the remaining vehicles within two weeks.74 On May 30 Newton cabled Sydney Friede asking him to delay shipping the remaining ambulances until he received further instructions.75
At the end of May, the Department of State requested information, on behalf of Red Cross War Council member and the first Chief Commissioner in Europe Grayson M.P. Murphy, about another volunteer ambulance service operating in Russia, the
72
Marian Bonsall Davis, “Russia Needs Red Cross Help,” Pittsburgh Daily Headlight (Pittsburgh, KS), June 26, 1917, 1. 73 Newton to Oras, 8th Army Front, Telegram, May 15, 1917, Newton Family. 74 Friede to Newton, American Consulate Petrograd, Telegram, May 23, 1917, Newton Family. 75 Newton to Friede, Telegram, May 30, 1917, Newton Family. 255
privately run British Wynne-Bevan Ambulance.76 The telegram, sent over Secretary Lansing’s signature, stated: We are very anxious to undertake helpful Red Cross work in Russia….Miss Wynne of Wynne Bevan ambulance unit which has been operating in Russia for some time. We are considering cooperation with Miss Wynne’s established organization but before committing ourselves we would like to hear from you how the Wynne Bevan unit is regarded in Russia and whether an association with it would facilitate approval of the Russian government.77 Francis replied that reports were not favorable, but informed the Department that: There is an “American Ambulance” in Russia, organized by Dr. Phillip Newton….The rest of the personnel of the unit is Russia(sp). This unit which is now at the front, has 24 ambulances with necessary auxiliary cars and eleven additional ambulances just arrived from Archangel. The cars and equipment were purchased by private subscription secured through a committee at New York but is maintained by the Russian War Department under its distinctive title.78 It was standard practice for the American Red Cross to send an advance team to any location prior initiating new support programs to determine feasibility, gather facts, and lay the foundation for the way ahead. On June 28, the newly appointed Russian Ambassador, Boris Bakhmetieff indicated his support for “the offer of the American Red Cross to send at once to Russia a mission…to make a report as to the way the American
76
The Bevan Wynne Ambulance was founded by English citizen Mrs. Hilda Wynne. It first saw service on the Western Front, and then with General Nikolai Baratov in Persia. After American entry into the war, it also established an “American Section.” It received support from several influential New York families. “How Plucky Mrs. Wynne Dodged Death on the Battlefield,” Times Dispatch (Richmond), July 8, 1917, 43. 77 Lansing to American Embassy Petrograd, Telegram 1610, May 19, 1917, 814.2, General Correspondence, Embassy Russia, RG 84, RFSP, NACP. 78 Francis to Lansing, Telegram 1339, May 29, 1917, 814.2, General Correspondence, Embassy Russia, RG 84, NACP. 256
Red Cross can be of most assistance to Russia be accepted.”79 In a hopeful sign, the American Red Cross already raised large sums of money to apply to Russian relief.
On July 1, the same day as the start of the Russian offensive, Davison officially announced that an American Red Cross Commission would go to Russia to pave the way for future efforts and “do something immediately to hearten” that nation, and “make the Russian people know that the American people are behind them not only in words but in real measures to alleviate their sufferings and share with them the burden of caring for their sick, wounded, and starving people.”80 Selected to head the group was financier and mining engineer William Boyce Thompson assisted by former President of the American Medical Association Dr. Frank Billings. Tasked with determining the most effective courses of action to administer large-scale aid to Russia’s wounded and mitigate its refugee crisis, the group brought along large quantities of surgical and medical supplies to distribute to Russian hospitals and her Red Cross. Journalist and American Red Cross volunteer Marian Bonsall Davis, who spent months on the Western front described what confronted American Red Cross efforts to aid Russia in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution: “Only those who have worked in Russia during the past two years can
79
Lansing to Embassy Petrograd, Telegram 1510, June 28, 1917, 814.2, General Correspondence, Embassy Russia, RG 84, NACP. Bakhmetieff had no familial relationship to his predecessor. 80 Red Cross Experts Will Go to Russia,” New York Times (New York, NY), July 2, 1917, 8. 257
estimate the task before the American Red Cross if the Russian Army is to do its part and draw its share of fire away from the French front.”81
Ambassador Francis was not enthusiastic about the mission. The Department of State directed him to inquire whether the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the group, but he was unable to get a response because the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Tereshchenko was at the front. Francis believed the Russian Government supported the mission but doubted “the wisdom of losing time and expense of sending such a commission.”82 He informed the Department that the Embassy was already working with the Russian Red Cross to form a committee of four Russians and three Americans to distribute any relief supplies, and that “unadvisable to send money but supplies only.”83 Additionally, “Dr. Newton of American Ambulance Corps Russia and Friede both tendered services and very familiar with Russian conditions.”84 On July 6, Newton had lunch with the Root Commission then dinner with Kalpashnikov, as well as War Correspondents Walter S. Whiffen of Associated Press and William G. Shepherd of United Press.85 On July 9, his friend Sydney Friede left Petrograd for the U.S. to join the military. That same day, the Root Commission also departed the city.86 New York Welcomes America’s Russian Ally 81
Marian Bonsall Davis, “Russia Needs Red Cross Help,” Pittsburgh Daily Headlight (Pittsburgh, KS), June 26, 1917, 1. 82 Francis to Lansing, Telegram 1443, June 27, 1917, 811.142/2193,1910-1929 CDF, RG 59, NACP. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Newton Diary, Entry July 6, 1917. 86 Ibid., Entries July 8-11, 1917. 258
After the abdication of the Tsar, Russian Ambassador George Bakhmetev resigned and was replaced two months later by Boris Bakhmetieff, a young former minister of industry and commerce. The new Ambassador came to the United States, accompanied by a commission tasked with coordinating actions to maintain an effective military and diplomatic alliance. New York City, with the support of American Ambulance in Russia, hosted an elaborate welcome ceremony. By proclamation of the Mayor, the free Russian flag was ordered to be hung from all public buildings. Mayor John Mitchel hoped the flags would demonstrate the City’s hospitality and “celebrate…the success of…the overthrow of Russian autocracy and the establishment of a people’s government. New York’s reception to Russia’s distinguished mission will emphasize the bond of union between free Russia and free America and their common struggle for the defense of liberty and democracy.”87 Welcome celebrations were held at City Hall, Madison Square Garden, with a finale sponsored by American Ambulance in Russia at Carnegie Hall. During the welcome ceremony, Mayor Mitchel presented Bakhmetieff with a medal with the inscription “To make the world safe for democracy.” The Ambassador responded by adding loudly “we are one.”88
The highlight of the Carnegie Hall events were motion pictures purporting to be the first to capture the events of the Russian Revolution. The films were described as “several moving pictures taken in Petrograd during the stirring days of the Revolution. 87
“Russian Mission to Be Welcomed by City To-day,” New York Times, July 6, 1917, 6. “Enthusiastic Welcome for Russian Mission at City Hall Reception,” New York Tribune, July 7, 1917, 14. 259 88
These pictures show the soldiers marching without officers, and also show how orderly the mobs were not withstanding the absence of police. The films demonstrate the nonanarchistic tone of the change in Government.”89 The movies served as the opening salvo of another round of fund-raising, this time to raise $200,000 for a large base hospital to support American Ambulance on the Galician front. Promoters highlighted the fact that the organization was:
The first and is still the only American organization, working in Russia, which has preserved its identity during the change of governments, supported entirely by private subscription. Its present purpose is to add several ambulance units to those already on the Russian front and to raise funds for a large base hospital to cooperate with the Russian Red Cross. Any proceeds derived from this meeting go directly to the American Ambulance in Russia.90 Former President Theodore Roosevelt, whose son was a member of the Executive Committee of Ambulance organization, and American Federation of Labor President Samuel Gompers were the keynote speakers. American Ambulance manifested itself in a new temporary incarnation for the event: “The American Friends of New Russia.” The program for the events at Carnegie Hall read “Reception and Mass Meeting to the Hon. Boris A. Bakhmetieff and the Russian High Commission by The American Friends of New Russia American Ambulance in Russia And Mayor’s Citizen’s Committee.”91 The program was directed
89
“Colonel to Greet Russians,” New York Times, July 2, 1917, 7. Ibid. 91 Program for Reception and Mass Meeting, July 6, 1917, Edward H. Egbert Papers, Hammond Arms payment voucher to Edward Egbert October 1916, Box 1:8, Hoover Institution Archives. The program lists members of the Executive Committee as Hamilton Fish, Jr., M. Sergey Friede, William H. Hamilton, Hayden Harris, Charles F. Hughes, Otto H. Kahn, Adolph Lewisohn, Philip M. Lydig, Herbert Parson, William Church, Charles A. Stone, and Secretary R.G. Harris. 260 90
by American Ambulance assistant secretary Ms. Elsa Maxwell, and included music from the Russian Symphony Orchestra and included a selection of other Russian music and the Star Spangled Banner. Speeches by Roosevelt, Gompers, and Bakhmetieff followed the music. The entire event concluded with the films depicting the Revolution.92 The session was not without controversy, but the conflict was not over Russia or the revolution, but a now-famous fight between former President Theodore Roosevelt and Samuel Gompers that occurred in full view of the new Russian Ambassador and his delegation. Roosevelt spoke first, after the Mayor. The former President celebrated Russia's newly established democracy: "Now we feel that the mighty Slav republic has blazed the trail of freedom and has won in legitimate fashion the right to stand in the forefront of the onward movement of mankind.”93 He called on the 5000 person crowd to “Aid the Red Cross in its work for all and give your special support to organizations like the American Ambulance in Russia, for the need of Russia in the matter is more bitter than the need of any other of the great Powers.”94 Roosevelt was followed by Gompers, who for the most part echoed his predecessor’s speech. However, as he finished, he read a telegram from the head of the Federation of Labor from Illinois regarding the recent East St Louis race riots attempting to diminish the role organized labor played in the violence and subsequent killings of African-American workers. In response, Roosevelt reportedly came very close to a physical altercation with Gompers, and interrupted the speech and spoke to the crowd arguing: Justice? Is not merely words. It is to be translated into the living acts, and how 92 93 94
Ibid. “Gompers Assailed by Col. Roosevelt,” The Sun (New York, NY), July 7, 1917, 2. Ibid. 261
can we praise the people of Russia if we by explanation, silence, or evasion apologize for murdering the helpless. In the past I have listened to the same form of excuse from the Russian autocracy for the pogroms inflicted on the Jews. Shall we by silence acquiesce in this amazing apology for the murder of men, women and children in our own country? 95 After Gompers resumed and finished his speech, Ambassador Bakhmetieff took the rostrum to make his first public pronouncement in the U.S.: The destinies of the world are at stake. Never have responsibilities of nations, governments, individuals been so great….The future will depend on whether Russia will emerge from this world’s struggle as a firm democracy, solid and majestic in its democratic consciousness, formidable and powerful in the exertion of its democratic will, supported by the gallantry of its arms….I do not conceal, I do not plead, the revolution needs no apology.96 When it came time for the Ambassador to speak, he continued by introducing a note of reassurance that he was “glad to state that in large measure the period of misunderstanding is over. The splendid advance in Galicia has been the best answer to all rumors of a separate peace. The achievements of Kerensky and Brusiloff as the head of a democratic army can fight bravely and with the best of achievements.”97 News labeled the event a “huge success….It brought together far more persons than could get into Carnegie Hall. The streets outside were thronged.”98 However, confidence in the stability of the Provisional Government was soon challenged. On July 16, Newton, who was still in Petrograd waiting for his for his car to be prepared so he could go to the front, wrote in his diary: “Worked all day getting touring car set up at R.R.[railroad] and Octa [Okhta]. Irresponsible hooligans and soldiers forced ministry out
95
“Gompers Assailed by Col. Roosevelt,” The Sun (New York, NY) July 7, 1917, 2. “Misgivings Toward Russia Fade, Roosevelt Tells New Slav Envoy,” Washington Post, July 7, 1917, 4. 97 “Roosevelt Pleads for Great Russian Effort; Ridicules the Pacifists,” New York Tribune, July 7, 1917, 12. 98 “Gompers Assailed by Col. Roosevelt,” The Sun (New York, NY) July 7, 1917, 2. 262 96
and did a lot of shooting on Nevski [sic][Prospect]. Great excitement until 2 A.M.”99 What Newton described was the soldiers and workers revolt of July 16-20 also known as "the July Days." On, July 17, while anarchy still reigned in Petrograd, Newton recorded, "After a gang of roughnecks tried to commandeer my new car last night, managed to get it locked up in Astoria's yard. Today, with my three soldiers in new car was fired on twice, so left car in Embassy yard.”100 By July 18, the crisis started to dissipate: “300 killed and wounded yesterday. Provisional gov’t in control. Today all bridges except one closed. Irresponsible elements not in evidence. Few who headed out handled roughly. Lenin said to have escaped to Finland…Many loyal soldiers with artillery, machine guns and armored cars guarding bridges and government buildings.”101 The situation improved further the following day: “Anarchists captured by gov’t soldiers. All bridges guarded, but open. Several regiments arrived from front to help. Got car out-special permit to pass restricted areas.” Newton summed up his observations of the July days: Revolt of July 17, 18th, 19th incited by Lenin and other German agents. Firing by irresponsible hooligans who got arms during big revolution. Soldiers who joined in demonstrations against gov’t were stupid enough to be fooled – once they learned the truth abt Lenin et al they immediately shifted back where they belonged. Mon. nite firing began on Nevski at 11:30. No object in firing. No leaders-no opposition. Abt 50 killed and wounded Tuesday 15,000 sailors came from Kronstadt, many of them drunk. At 1:30 firing became general on Nevski and continued intermittently until midnite. Also much firing on Retoina(?), Here at 8:30 pm 85 Cossacks armed only with sabers were fired upon by Lenin’s crowd with rifles and machine guns. 6 men killed and surrounded. 28 horses killed. Reported that over 3000 people killed and wounded.102 By July 20, according to Newton, there were gas shortages, more regiments 99
Newton Diary, Entry July 16, 1917. Ibid., Entry July 17, 1917. 101 Ibid., Entry July 18, 1917. 102 Newton Diary, Summary recorded in inside cover of Newton Diary. 263 100
flowed in from the front, and he was targeted by gunfire as he tried to travel to his headquarters at Oktha. By the next day, it was clear that the Kerensky offensive failed, and the Capital was gripped in panic.103 Ternopol fell to German and Austrian forces on July 23, the same day Kerensky declared a dictatorship. Newton was concerned that his ambulances might have been captured. He worked feverously to rescue his two cars at Finland Station.104 He still hoped to get to the front, however, by late July and early August the direction of Russia's war effort was filled with uncertainty. News from all fronts was terrible, Russian forces were in full retreat, desertions were on the rise, and there was there was talk of a separate peace. The disposition of his ambulances was still uncertain. His command, Russia's Eighth Army, also retreated, and the ambulances were last reported in railway hub of Kolomyia (in modern Ukraine). That town fell to Austrian forces on July 24, and Russian forces fell back to Czernowitz.105 By the first week of August, Newton received orders to return to the front and arranged transport for him, several vehicles, and his two soldiers. However, Ambassador Francis requested that he remain in Petrograd to meet with the Billings Red Cross Commission that was expected to arrive within a matter of days.106 Earlier, it was recommended by the Root Commission’s General Hugh L. Scott, Hamilton Fish, Jr., and Lydig, that Newton apply for a Commission in the U.S Army Medical Service and then remain in Russia as a U.S. military representative. It was also possible that Newton 103 104 105 106
Ibid., Entries July 20-21, 1917. Ibid., Entry July 23, 1917. Ibid., Entries, July 24-August 2, 1917. Ibid., Entries August 3-August 6, 1917. 264
would join the Billings Commission. However, as much as officials of American Ambulance thought independence from the Russian Red Cross or Army would benefit the organization’s funding raising efforts, the decision was made that Newton would remain under the auspices of the Russian Army.107 The Billings American Red Cross Commission arrived in Petrograd on August 7, the same day Kerensky formed a new coalition government. The Commission included several Russian Red Cross representatives, including Colonel Andrei Kalpashnikov, who proved instrumental in its work at the front. The Commission also marked Malcolm Grow's return to Russia. The first day in the capital, Newton had a lengthy discussion with Grow during which it became clear the Commission did not think highly of the Russian Red Cross. The next day, Newton met again with the Commission, and they requested that he investigate conditions on the Russian-Romanian front. Newton departed that same evening on a train bound for Kiev108 en route to the front, and then on to Jassy, Romania. To the Front and Romania On August 11, Newton arrived at the Russian High Command (Stavka) in Mogilev, where he found his detachment among the many hospitals and other ambulances that survived the retreat from Kolomyia. He learned that three cars were smashed, but none captured. All retreated “in good order-carried over 6,000 wounded in
107
Military Attache to Ambassador, Memos, July 14, 1917 and July 27, 1917, 814.2, General Correspondence, Embassy Russia, RG 84, NACP and Francis to Lansing, Telegram 1339, May 29, 1917, 814.2, General Correspondence, Embassy Russia, RG 84, NACP. 108 Newton Diary, Entries August 7-8, 1917. 265
July.”109 His soldiers were overjoyed to see him, and he ordered all cars to be transferred to the rear for overhaul and repairs.110 On August 14, Newton left Mogilev for Jassy where he had dinner with the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ninth Army who informed him that conditions for his forces were improving, but reports from the Romanian forces were not encouraging. The next day, he left Jassy for Lipcani, where he rejoined two of his soldiers and one of his ambulances. His next stop was a brief visit to Stavka, and then to Vinnytsia in west-central Ukraine, where all of his ambulances gathered in preparation for shipment to Petrograd for repairs and reorganization. He was very concerned about Russia and Romania’s stability; he believed both were on the verge of collapse.111 Newton saw no improvement in Petrograd when he returned on August 20. At the Astoria Hotel, he had additional meetings with American Red Cross Commission members and arranged to stay with the lead inspector for ambulances, Malcolm Grow. During this visit, he received confirmation that he was assigned to the Commission and that American Ambulance in Russia was now under American Red Cross oversight. However, before joining Billings and Grow, he had to return to New York to help address an emerging financial controversy at American Ambulance and to clarify whether his work was now under the auspices of the Commission. Newton wrote to Ambassador Francis to explain his travel to Washington: Owing to the fact the AMERICAN AMBULANCE has been affiliated with THE AMERICAN RED CROSS recently, I am leaving for Washington…to straighten out certain details, especially the matter of my own position. 109 110 111
Ibid., Entries August 11-13, 1917. Ibid., Entry August 13, 1917. Ibid., Entries August 14-17, 1917. 266
Col. Billings informs me that he was required by Mr. Davidson to put me on the AMERICAN RED CROSS COMMISSION TO RUSSIA, but that as a member of the Commission I could not do any field work with hospitals or ambulances. Colonel Judson informs me that if I were commissioned in the United States Army, it would be difficult for me to carry on my work with the Ambulance, unless some special arrangement could be made in Washington. From the Above, it will be apparent that I could only straighten this matter in Washington.112 Russia was clearly in trouble; Newton noted in his diary: "General Kornilof [sic] getting stronger, but no one can get them out of this mess."113 As tensions mounted between Kerensky and Kornilov, Newton continued preparations for his temporary return to New York. He believed that the Red Cross and Stevens Railroad Commissions’ work was “almost hopeless because there is no government.”114 On July 27, Newton was informed that American Ambulance would be ordered back to Petrograd and that the priority was the work of American Red Cross Commission. On August 30, Newton left Petrograd bound for the U.S.115 He carried a letter of introduction from Ambassador Francis to Newton D. Baker, the Secretary of War. The document recounts Newton’s service in Russia, and then Francis wrote: I am informed that Mr. H.P. Davison Chairman of the American Red Cross Executive Committee expected Dr. Newton to be attached to the Commission assigned to Russia which commission is now in Petrograd and making very extensive preparation to accomplish its work. Its Chairman, Dr. Billings, tells me however, that Dr. Newton wishes to do field work and consequently cannot be used by the Red Cross Mission….I don't know what Dr. Newton desires from the War Dept if he has any definite plan, but I write to state that so far as my observation…Dr. Newton…is efficient and untiring and would faithfully perform 112
Newton to Francis, Letter, August 24, 1916, Reel 5, David R. Francis Papers, Russia in Transition, Library of Congress. 113 Newton Diary, Entries August 20-22, 1917. 114 Newton Diary, Entry August 23, 1917. Headed by engineer John F. Stevens, the Railroad Commission was sent to Russia in the summer of 1917 to assist Russia to develop more effective railway infrastructure. 115 Ibid., Entries August 27-30, 1917. 267
any services to which he may be assigned. Very truly yours, David R. Francis.116 When he arrived in the U.S. in early September, Newton told reporters that sixteen ambulances purchased through fundraising in the United States were ready for shipment and that four more would be purchased in a matter of weeks. He believed the future outlook of Russia “lies largely in America’s hands” and argued, "We must help Russia and that is our duty now to bolster up the people and help them come back and stay back….the need of material aid is very great."117 He hoped that with “material supplies the Russian army will spend the coming winter in the trenches and keep the Germans so busy that they will have no men to spare to re-enforce their troops on the western front.”118 The American Red Cross Commission The mission of the American Red Cross Commission was to “attend to the medical and surgical needs of the Army. In this work the Commission has the cordial support of the Russian public war relief organization.”119 It was tasked with compiling a detailed report on how the American Red Cross could provide the most effective assistance to Russia. Recommendations would form the basis for any future American aid. The Commission organized itself into “various committees to investigate relief needs of Russia. A thorough survey was made by these committees of the hospital and
116
Francis to Newton Baker, Letter, August 16/29, 1917, Newton Family. The letter is also available, dated August 24, 1916, on Reel 5, David R. Francis Papers, Russia in Transition, Library of Congress. 117 “Russ Army Coming Back, Says Surgeon,” The Sun (New York, NY), September 21, 1917, 4. 118 “Russia,” Crawfordsville Review (Crawfordsville, IN), October 2, 1917, 3. 119 “Dr. Billings, Just Returned, Tells What Russia Needs,” Red Cross Bulletin 1, no. 27 (November 5, 1917): 2. 268
ambulance situation, food situation, sanitation in the army and child welfare work.”120 According to the American Red Cross Bureau of information, at the time the Commission went to Russia, there were only four Russia-centric medical relief efforts in the U.S.: American Ambulance in Russia, Siberian Regiment American Ambulance, Russian-American Relief Association, and Russian War Relief Committee.121 Carrying medical aid worth over two hundred thousand dollars, when the Commission arrived in Petrograd, it immediately started working with the three leading Russian military relief organizations: the Russian Army Medical Corps, Red Cross, and the Zemstvos. Commissioners realized quickly that "Russia has great difficulty in securing equipment for her hospitals because her armies are so enormous. Shipments are planned to include well-rounded stock of chemicals and apparatus."122 Billings recognized despite the heroic efforts of these organizations, critically needed medical supplies including tetanus antitoxin, powdered opium, and other essential medical needs, were nearly impossible to acquire. He, along with the American Red Cross, studied how to fill these gaps and identify remedies. Another medical shipment was sent with over $160,000.00 in aid that included 180,000 anti-malarial tablets, 1,000 pounds of chloroform, 50,000 doses of anti-typhoid vaccine, and tetanus anti-toxin, and other urgently needed medical equipment and consumables. Billings coordinated
120
American Red Cross. The Work of the American Red Cross: Financial Statement of Red Cross War Fund, March 1st, 1918, with Details of the Various Activities through Which this Fund is Distributed. Washington, DC: American Red Cross, n.d., ca. 1918, 72. 121 “Red Cross Bureau of Information, Russia, Early Russian Red Cross Work,” October 1917, File 948.101 “Commission to Russia W.W.I,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 122 Ibid. 269
transport of the medical aid with the American Railroad Commission.123 As part of their data gathering mandate, Red Cross Commission representatives conducted extensive inquiries and detailed inspections of medical conditions at the front. Their findings only served to reaffirm the already horrendous state of the Russian armed forces on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1917. Overall they surveyed the “factories, the supply houses, the ambulance service and field hospitals at the front, of base hospitals, the evacuation sanitary trains and evacuation hospitals at the rear.”124 One inspection, facilitated by Kalpashnikov, was conducted by Major D.J. McCarthy, Major George Whipple, and Major Malcolm Grow, along with Captain Malcolm Pirnie. The team investigated medical capabilities of Russia’s Tenth Army’s in the vicinity of Minsk, collecting data on disease, infrastructure, and overall sanitary conditions. Whipple later described their inspections: “Most of our time was occupied in inspecting hospitals, firstaid stations, Red Cross stores, and so on. Major Grow, of our party, had been with the…Siberian Regiment two years before and took delight in visiting his old comrades in arms. He remarked on the lessened discipline and lower morale…under the Kerensky regime.”125 Their overall assessment was conditions at the front were poor. According to the American Red Cross official report, “a committee of the Red Cross Commission 123
“Red Cross Commission Begins Its Work in Petrograd,” Red Cross Bulletin 1, no. 12 (August 27, 1917): 3. 124 Dr. Frank Billings, “For the Relief of Russia,” Red Cross Magazine 13, no. 1 (January 1918): 71. 125 Technology’s War Record; An Interpretation of the Contribution Made by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Its Staff, Former Students and Its UnderGraduates to the Cause of the United States and Allied Powers in the Great War (Cambridge, MA: Murray Printing Company, 1920), 290. 270
surveyed the Russian front in regard to ambulances and found the situation very bad. They found but few motor ambulances, most of those in use being horse-drawn.”126 Malcolm Grow informed journalist Edward Hungerford: A very great problem upon the Russian front has been the question of obtaining sufficient ambulances. There is but one automobile factory in the Czar’s dominions and that is capable of turning out not more than 200 cars a year. As a large result of the situation the 1,200 miles of Eastern front have had but 6,000 motor ambulances, as compared with 75,000 upon the 400 miles of French and Belgian front….It is not base hospitals that Russia needs and needs so greatly at this time. It is transportation for her wounded-ambulances, not by the dozens, but by the hundreds and by the thousands.127 Closer examination of one inspection provides deeper insight into the focus of inquiry related to transportation of the wounded.128 The Red Cross flying column consisted of consisted of five motorized and twenty-two horse-drawn ambulances supported by two doctors, two feldshers, and two nurses who served behind the lines, as well as a hundred and fifty enlisted men. It transported wounded from just behind the front to the field hospital in the early part of a battle, and later from the hospital to the evacuation point on the railway line. 129 A Zemstvo flying column hospital was inspected, followed by a much larger Army Sanitary Service field hospital. The Zemstvo hospital consisted of a tent with a 126
Work of the American Red Cross: Financial Statement, 76. Hungerford, Edward, “Russia and the Red Cross,” News and Observer (Raleigh, NC), August 1, 1917. 128 D. J. McCarthy, M.D., “Report on the Hospital Organization and Sanitary Service of the Russian Army, Transactions of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia 3rd Series Vol 40 (1918), 58. The original report and supporting documents are available in the National Archives in File 948.101 “Commission to Russia W.W.I,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. Commissioners visited a division hospital of the Russian sanitary service, a Russian Red Cross hospital, and a Zemstvo Union hospital, as well as headquarters of a Russian Red Cross disinfection unit. 129 Ibid., 61. The Commissioners also visited the 1st Siberian Corps the same unit that hosted the American surgeons from Kiev two years earlier, and in which both Grow and Kalpashnikov once served. 271 127
hundred and fifty beds supported by one doctor, six nurses, and two feldshers. Third Caucasian Corp’s flying column consisted of five British made motorized ambulances, as well as forty of the horse-drawn type. The Army Sanitary Corps Division-level hospital could handle three to four thousand wounded per day and was staffed by four doctors, ten feldshers, and three hundred and forty-three enlisted personnel. It had its own ambulance service composed of thirty-two horse-drawn ambulances that carried wounded from the front to the Sanitary hospital, and after the battle, it provided transport to the evacuation point.130 Near Minsk, they visited a facility for the maintenance and repair of ambulances. The shop was designed to maintain motor transports and ambulances for that sector. It could handle up to fifty light repairs, twenty partial overhauls, and from three to four general overhauls each month, capacity insufficient for even the number of vehicles then in use at the front. There was no capability to address larger repairs. A General charged with overseeing the repair shop stressed the importance of considering the poor state of Russia’s roads during vehicle selection. Ambulances had to be rugged, and those converted from general purpose vehicles were not durable enough and difficult to maintain. He believed Ford trucks were best suited in both survivability and availability of spare parts. The vast and varied types of vehicles used as ambulances complicated repair work. In many cases, spare parts were not available and had to be machined from scratch by the mechanics.131 Billings wrote: It is the opinion of well informed Russians and of the members of the Mission who visited the front that the conveyance of the wounded would be very much 130 131
Ibid., 62. Ibid., 56. 272
improved by the use of light motor ambulance of the Ford type. The Mission has therefore advised the War Council that if Russia continues in the war, an adequate number of Ford ambulances should be sent to Russia in time to be of service in late spring of 1918. It is also believed that an American personnel of ambulance drivers and mechanicians [sic] commanded by medical officers should also be sent to work on the Russian front, but a personnel should be sent only if certain conditions in Russia shall be modified to insure the health and life of the Americans. These modification involve that Russia shall again be an effective fighting force; the living and food conditions shall be improved in a reasonable degree to meet American standards; that the American personnel shall consist of enlisted men of the U.S. Army and of medical officer of the Medical Officers Reserve Corps, assigned to this service by the Surgeon General.132 On their return trip to Petrograd, the Commission briefed General Kornilov at Mogilev on their findings. Capturing that session, the report reads: The question of transportation of the wounded received most consideration. He expressed the opinion that there would in all probability be comparatively little fighting on the Middle and North front during the winter, but that active military operation would in all probability persist through the Winter on the Roumanian [sic] front, and that there would be probably need for ambulance service; that the matter of transportation of the wounded by motor ambulance for the rest of the front could wait until the following spring when active military operations might reasonably be expected.133 A separate meeting with Kornilov’s Chief of Staff considered potential options for assisting Russia’s wounded. Kalpashnikov and Grow led the discussion, among other issues, it focused on: transportation of the wounded, care of Russian soldiers from first aid stations to base hospitals, and adaptability of a field ambulance service to Russian conditions. The Commissioners considered selection and provision of ambulances the “most urgent need of all the problems in the war zone in which the American Red Cross might be of assistance….it became perfectly evident on inspection that much pain and suffering might be saved, and the mortality decreased by a well developed motor 132
Billings, “For the Relief of Russia,” 73. McCarthy, “Report on the Hospital Organization and Sanitary Service of the Russian Army, Transactions of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia 3rd Series Vol. 40 (1918): 64-65. 273 133
ambulance service to replace the present system.”134 At the time, ninety-percent of Russian ambulances were of the primitive horse-drawn variant. Slow moving springless carts were far from ideal for carrying injured personnel on the rough Russian roads. The Americans recognized the limitations inherent in sending ambulances to Russia without U.S. support personnel. According to the report: Admitting the feasibility of the field ambulance service under American auspices, the advisability of it will depend on several other factors and considerations. In the recent disorganized state of the Russian Army, it would be inadvisable to turn over a large number of light or medium weight cars under Russian personnel. Lack of discipline and control would only lead to such abuse of the cars on rough roads as to make them useless in a short time.135 According to their recommendations, the best approach was for American personnel to drive and maintain the vehicles. The instability in the Russian armed forces caused considerable concern and hesitation at the prospect of providing ambulances with no American oversight. Putting American personnel into such an uncertain military and political environment was not optimal. Additional considerations included lack of proper housing, food, and the quality of maintenance for vehicles. The logistics trail, financial cost, and risk to mission execution were substantial: “In other words, the American Red Cross must decide in the event of the institution of a field ambulance service for the Russian Army whether it will simply supply the cars and personnel, leaving the working expenses to the Russian Army, or whether it is willing to assume running expenses or completely maintaining such a service.”136 Malcolm Grow was assigned to evaluate the feasibility and costs associated with various courses of action.137 134 135 136 137
Ibid., 65. Ibid., 66. Ibid., 67. Ibid. 274
Grow’s response is entitled “Report on the Ambulance Transportation of Wounded on the Front in Russia; Methods of Transportation Now in Use.” He found that each regiment of four to five thousand men had an average of eight ambulances to service the needs of their wounded. It was not unusual for casualty rates to range between half and two-thirds of a regiment.138 As part of his review, he analyzed flying columns to determine where motorized support was most required. He surveyed three Army Corps. The Thirty-Eighth Army Corps had no motorized transport; First Siberian Corps had twelve, four of which were with Kalpashnikov and Grow’s 21st Russian Red Cross Flying Column. Third Army Corps had only one unit with motor transport (the Sanitary Department of the Army No. 20 (Auto Transport)). Out of the total of nearly fifty flying columns and transport units surveyed, only three had motorized ambulances.139 Grow also evaluated how to maximize motorized transport capacity and efficiency. For analytical purposes, Grow assumed severely wounded had to lay prone, while less severe cases could be transported sitting up, and horse-drawn ambulances could move eight to ten seriously or sixteen to twenty lightly injured eight kilometers per twenty-four hour period. He assumed for a two-kilometer journey that the number increased to twenty heavily wounded and forty lightly injured. A thirty-kilometer requirement reduced the capability to a single trip each day carrying two heavily wounded and four lightly injured. According to Grow's assumptions, a flying column with twenty-five horse ambulances required thirty-five railway cars to transport all 138
Malcolm Grow,"Report on the Ambulance Transportation of Wounded on the Front in Russia; Methods of Transportation Now in Use,," File 948.101 "Commission to Russia W.W.I," RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 139 Ibid. 275
personnel and equipment. Each regiment moved an average of two times a year and had at least six auxiliary flying columns requiring the commitment of almost twenty-six thousand desperately needed freight cars a year.140 During their inspections, the Americans reviewed ambulances manufactured by Renault, Mercedes, Jeffery, Germanine, and Peugeot to assess suitability for Russian conditions. Grow believed these vehicles were poorly suited to Russian conditions. Not only were they too heavy, but it was difficult to obtain spare parts. All replacements had to be machined, and when they were damaged, they had taken out of service and sent to Minsk for repair.141 Grow's "Proposed Plan of American Ambulances, With Drivers, Mechanics and Repair Stations" outlined his vision of U.S. support. Odds of actually implementing the recommendations were slim given the deteriorating conditions in the Russian military. Despite this fact, he recommended that each Russian division receive an American ambulance unit composed of twenty-five vehicles: fifteen ambulances, three light trucks to carry equipment, and three touring cars to serve as personnel transport, a repair car, a gasoline transport, a mobile kitchen, and a vehicle for transporting wounded who could sit upright. The unit was to be led by a Russian officer, with the Americans under the command of a U.S. doctor. Personnel assigned to the unit would include an American military cadre made up of twenty-five drivers, five reserve drivers, twenty-five orderlies, three mechanics, three cooks, three sergeant majors, a quartermaster, and a doctor. All of the American personnel, except the doctor, would be enlisted. The doctor would be an 140 141
Ibid. Ibid. 276
officer from the U.S. Army Medical Corps. Russia would provide three interpreters, three clerks, as well as a Commander and assistant.142 The unit would support an entire Russian army division, and transport wounded from the regimental dressing station to the divisional hospital, and also potentially to the evacuation station. Each Army would be assigned ten American units with a total of two hundred and twenty-five ambulances. When involved in significant military operations, Grow recommended dispersing the ambulances along the front, and keeping a hundred vehicles in reserve.143 U.S. personnel would fall under a headquarters in Petrograd composed of an American medical officer, and a Russian who would coordinate with their national Red Cross, Sanitary Department, and Zemstvos. The overall plan was presented to Russia’s Commander of the Western Front; Chief of the Sanitary Department of the Middle Front; Commander of the Tenth Army; Chief of the Sanitary Department of the Tenth Army; Commander of the Thirty-Eighty Army Corps; and Commander of Tenth Army Red Cross Sanitary Department. All of these key officials, in addition to General Kornilov, supported the plan.144 Billings described the rationale behind the proposal to a group of business representatives from his native Chicago: America can furnish those ambulances, and the question will be can we hearten those Russian soldiers, and we will do it if I can bring it across, provided they stay in the war-to have American personnel over there, partly to convey their sick, partly to help them in sanitary matters, a convertible sort of ambulance service 142
Grow, “Proposed Plan of American Ambulances, With Drivers, Mechanics and Repair Stations,” File 948.101 “Commission to Russia W.W.I,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 277
with American personnel but under the American army, with discipline of the American army, with doctors from the medical corps of the army-not from civil life, who will teach those people, and by their demeanor, show them in America what freedom means.145 The Commission adopted Grow’s recommendations because “The Russian army will need many motor ambulances in the spring of 1918 if it becomes an aggressive fighting force. The units of Ambulances ordered on July 7 and an additional number also should reach Moscow no later than March 1918.”146 A recommendation to the American Red Cross War Council on July 7 envisioned a hundred and twenty-five vehicles along with the necessary American support personnel. However, the Commission concluded that “The question of the practicability and utility of American ambulance personnel in Russia must still be held in abeyance. The subject is one which may be decided only after certain conditions in Russia shall have been modified.”147 The most important condition was law, order, and discipline had to be reestablished in the Russian military.148 Grow’s final report concluded Ford manufactured ambulances were best suited for the mission: “The Ford type is believed to be the best motor ambulance by those most qualified to know, for field and base hospital service in Russia. Where the roads are better and the distances to be covered longer, a heavier type of American car will be useful. With two types of cars, it will be easier to obtain from American duplicate parts for repairs.”149 When Billings and most of his colleagues departed Petrograd for the United 145
“In Russia’s Greatest Message to Chicago Dr. Billings Pleads for Continued Faith and Support,” Chicago Commerce, November 15, 1917, 10-11. 146 “Draft Report,” File 948.101 “Commission to Russia W.W.I,” RG 200, ANRC, NACP. 147 Ibid 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 278
States, they left behind a permanent Red Cross mission under Raymond Robins. The group was responsible for ensuring coordination among the various local relief agencies and ensuring proper distribution of American aid. Robins was also charged with implementing one “of the chief recommendations of the commission…that American ambulance corps be sent to Russia for service at the front.”150 Newton reinforced Grow's view; he told the press that: "An American unit behind each of the great number of Russian ambulance units would have a stiffening moral effect on the entire Russian army of 14,000,000 men."151 On September 10, 1917, the American Red Cross announced that “As part of its program for rendering effective assistance to Russia, the American Red Cross is to ship at once 125 motor ambulances and automobiles to the Red Cross Commission in Russia.”152 Announcing the aid, the Red Cross explained that:”Ambulances are needed with the Russian armies almost more than any other forms of relief….The automobiles being shipped by the Red Cross will equip one Russian army corps with five complete ambulance sections.”153 Mirroring Grow's plan, each unit included fifteen motor ambulances, one vehicle for transporting slightly wounded, one mobile kitchen, and a dressing car. Other support vehicles included two touring cars, three light cargo trucks, a repair car, and vehicle to carry gasoline. As recommended in the final report, for the time being, all of the requirements
150
“A Related Bit of Cheer,” Fort Wayne Weekly Sentinel (Fort Wayne, IN), September 10, 1917, 11. 151 “Says American Help at Once for Russia is Vital,” Morning Register (Eugene, OR), October 6, 1917, 1. 152 “To Equip Five Ambulance Sections for Russian Service,” Red Cross Bulletin 1, no. 16 (September 13, 1917): 2. 153 Ibid. 279
would be filled by Russian personnel.154 Some of the donated ambulances came from unexpected sources. Jewish Americans, long a source of tension between the two nations, saw hope in the Provisional Government and post-revolutionary Russia. A group calling itself “Jewish Friends of Free Russia” raised $20,000 needed to donate twelve ambulances and one truck to the American Red Cross. One of the largest contributors was Newton’s friend and American Ambulance in Russia member, Sydney Friede.155 The organization relayed news of the donation directly to the Red Cross War Council, the vehicles “this fund purchased will be immediately dispatched abroad by Red Cross to supplement the shipment of 125 motor vehicles recently made for service in Russia.”156 The idea originated at a dinner celebrating Russian emancipation where the keynote speaker was former President William H. Taft. 157 Ford Motor Company, the preferred manufacturer of ambulances for Russia, offered a $500,000 credit towards the purchase of their vehicles, parts, and equipment to the American Red Cross. The donation was not exclusively for Russia, but intended to purchase ambulances for any Entente country because "Despite the large number of ambulances in service of on the western Front, many more are needed….In addition, ambulances may be sent as part of Red Cross aid to be extended to Russia and Serbia.”158 154
Ibid. “Washington News of Jewish Importance,” American Jewish Chronicle 3 (September 28, 1917): 560. 156 “Jewish Friends of Free Russia Give Ambulances,” Red Cross Bulletin 1, no. 20 (September 25, 1917): 2. 157 “Washington News of Jewish Importance,” 560. 158 “Ford Company Gives $500,000 Worth of Ambulances and Equipment,” Red Cross Bulletin 1, no. 15 (September 7, 1917): 2. 280 155
American Ambulance in Russia Continues The justification for ambulance support to Russia expanded after American entry into the First World War. Initially, calls for humanitarian aid were based on the desire to show friendship and increase the profile of American assistance. After American entry into the war and the Russian revolution, the requirement for medical support became significantly more tangible and pressing. Solicitations expanded to include pleas based on the need to keep Russia in the war. The end to U.S. neutrality also led to additional pressure on the still static donor base. Organizations competing for donations dramatically increased when America needed to support her own troops' morale and welfare. One American Ambulance in Russia fundraiser, Dean Palmer, stressed the danger of Russia leaving the war during a stop in Richmond, Virginia during the fall of 1917: More ambulances are desperately needed-medical supplies, hospital units, everything, in fact, to mend and succor the wounded Russian. Russia is vital to the allied cause, her battle-fronts are longer than those of the other warring nations put together. To maintain them is essential for they occupy millions of German troops who otherwise would be hurled upon the English, French and American troops in the west.159 American Ambulance used every opportunity to attract donations. Taking advantage of the patriotic fervor accompanying the send-off of U.S. troops, the Organization raised money by building the grandstands and selling the seats for the August 30 farewell parade for New York National Guard’s 27th Infantry Division.160 Not missing an opportunity to raise still more funds, it arranged for a young woman to drive 159 160
“Ambulance in Russia is in Need of Real Help,” Times Dispatch (Richmond, VA), 3. “For Hospital on Russian Front,” Medical Record, September 8, 1917, 422. 281
an ambulance in the parade. She collected a “shower of money”: A gray automobile that looked as if it had been through several wars and was lettered ‘American Ambulance in Russia,’ moved past the library. A young woman…disembarked. She held up a metal dish and coins began to clink against the asphalt. A half dollar, a quarter, and more dimes cascaded from the bleachers. From the windows of the Rogers Peet Co. and the Farmers Loan and Trust Company Building across the avenue the manna also fell.161 Using young women to collect money was a standard method for American Ambulance. Twenty-year-old Natalie Camp drove one of the Ambulances along Fifth Avenue during the 1916 parade and raised money along the way. In September 1917, many news outlets reported that she was going to drive an ambulance in Russia, but first, she would travel across the U.S. drawing recruits and raising funds.162 On their way to ship the vehicles, drivers exploited American Ambulance's notoriety by stopping at Fifth Avenue and Forty Second Street, putting out a stretcher and collecting sometimes collecting as much as $2000.00. Dramatic displays were not the only publicity grabbing tools in the Ambulance organization's toolbox. Entertainment events were also a significant part of the fundraising strategy. Morton Palmer, who produced the film depicting Ambulance activities in Russia, agreed to split receipts from ticket sales 50-50 with the organization. He raised an average of $400.00 a day.163 The movie was advertised as: “Russian Revolution” A week ago it was ‘Pershing in Europe’-today it is ONLY AUTHENTIC –OFFICIAL-COMPLETE-EXCLUSIVE Moving Pictures of the world war’s most astounding event-the Russian Revolution. The pictures are official-taken under the auspices of the AMERICAN AMBULANCE IN 161
“Crowds on 5th Avenue Break All Records,” The Sun (New York, NY), August 31, 1917, 3. Rogers Peet Co was a men’s clothing company and had twelve stores in New York City. 162 Philadelphia Inquirer, September 18, 1917, 7. 163 “Woman is Among Bazaar Swindlers, Swann is Warned,” New York Tribune (New York, NY), December 11, 1917, 6. 282
RUSSIA, active on the Russian Front during the past year-of which Hamilton Fish, Jr., is Chairman, Captain Philip Lydig, Secretary and Wm. H. Hamilton is Treasurer. There are shown the last stand of the Russian Imperial autocracy; the Revolutionary leaders; the “Red Square in Moscow,” with its surging multitudes of SOLDIERS and CITIZENS; the first parade of Jews EVER KNOWN IN RUSSIA; and hundreds of other scenes equally impressive.164 A local Houston, Texas newspaper described the historical significance of this film as “the first and only views of the recent revolution to reach this country.”165 Examples of other entertainment events included a performance of “dramas, Comedies and Ballets Intime,” attended by Ambassador Bakhmetieff and other dignitaries in August 1917.166 There was a one week June benefit featuring the silent film “One Law for Both” about a Russian émigré who escapes to the U.S., to avoid persecution because of his membership in a secret society dedicated to the liberation of Warsaw and the fall of the Romanovs. 167 Starting another campaign in fall 1917, American Ambulance, hoped to raise money for new units as soon as possible because “In January the new Russia port of Kola Bay will be open and free from ice and it is then that General Newton hopes to return to Russia with a shipload of ambulances and medical supplies furnished by the bounty of the American people.”168 By December 1917, the Organization purchased another fifteen ambulances and cars worth approximately a hundred thousand dollars. However, according to Hamilton Fish, Sr., they were “held in New York or vicinity, which the government authorities requested owing to the disordered conditions in Russia should be
164
Motion Picture World, Vol 33 (July-September 1917): 574. “Will Show Scenes of Russian Revolution,” Houston Post, July 19, 1917, 7. 166 “Ballet in Aid of Russia,” Washington Post, August 8, 1917, 7. 167 “For American Ambulance in Russia,” New York Times, June 4, 1917, 9. 168 “Ambulance in Russia is in Need of Real Help,” Times Dispatch (Richmond, VA), 3. The port on Kola Bay is better known as Murmansk. 283 165
held here.”169 The Investigation and End of American Ambulance in Russia When Newton returned to the U.S. in the fall of 1917, he could not predict that less than stellar accounting at American Ambulance would lead to an investigation of national importance. Despite these deficiencies, the organization provided sufficient financial documentation to participate in the most significant national war relief effort to date. Called “Hero Land” and held under the auspices of the “League of Allies” the event hosted sixty-seven Allied war charities. Billed as the “Greatest spectacle the world has ever seen for the greatest need the world has ever known,” it filled four floors of New York’s Grand Central Palace, the city’s main exhibition hall. 170 It featured a full-sized replica of western front trenches, a downed zeppelin, British tank, as well as countless war souvenirs, allied displays, and celebrities. On its opening night, it was visited by 63,000 people.171 The event was organized and held under the shadow of an ongoing New York District Attorney’s investigation into war charities. The case already resulted in the premature closing of the high profile Army-Navy Bazaar because significant portions of its proceeds went to promoters rather than charitable causes. Hero Land hoped to avoid any question of impropriety. In fact, District Attorney of New York County, Edward Swann, told reporters that Hero Land was “responsibly and honestly conducted.”172 After 169
“Hamilton Fish, Sr Defends Son’s Work,” Poughkeepsie Eagle-News (Poughkeepsie, NY), January 15, 1918, 9. 170 “Hero Land Opening, A Blaze of Beauty,” New York Times, November 25, 1917, 20. 171 Ibid. 172 “What District Att’y Swann Says of Hero Land,” The Sun (New York, NY), November 27, 1917, 9. 284
the national war charities oversight body, known as the “Charity Organization Society,” raised questions about several Hero Land participants’ financial practices, organizer John Moffat required all participating war charities to submit audited financial records.173 Money collected went to a central fund, and funds raised at individuals booths would not be disbursed until all accounts were audited and approved.174 American Ambulance occupied almost a whole floor. Its display was called "Russian Street," and featured a bar, several booths, two orchestras, fortune telling stands, and a host of cultural presentations. Somehow, American Ambulance was able to pass the initial financial review, however questions about the organization's business practices soon became too significant to ignore. Some more questionable and aggressive fundraising techniques eventually led to official scrutiny. On November 16, 1917, Swann directed Assistant District Attorney Edwin P. Kilroe to “make a comprehensive investigation of the methods and measures employed in raising and disbursing funds for war charities or war relief work in New York City.”175 The investigation concluded that: “The American Ambulance in Russia is a notable instance of misappropriation of funds, lack of ordinary business system, and inadequate supervision in war-relief activities.”176 Issues came to a head when the American Ambulance applied to raise money in the State of Illinois, an action that 173
“War Relief Societies Aiding ‘Hero Land’ To Show Standing,” New York Tribune, November 23, 1917, 14. 174 Ibid. 175 United States Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, 1919, Regulating Collection of Money: Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, SixtyFifth Congress, 3rd Session on S. 4972. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 4. 176 Ibid., 10. 285
required submission of an audited statement of accounts. The audit was prepared on August 31, and it eventually determined that “records available were insufficient to ascertain…from the total contributions received.”177 Complicating the accounting, was a practice where fundraisers received a percentage ranging to ten to fifty percent of total proceeds collected. One scheme involved a film about tuberculosis called "The Invisible Enemy." Showings of the film, accompanied by an ambulance, were supposed to travel across the country to raise funds. All expenses were to be paid by American Ambulance. Ten percent of proceeds were to be paid to the promoter, twenty percent to the owner of the film, and ten percent to each of the fundraisers. Investigators also found American Ambulance fundraising appeals were misleading. A letter signed by Hamilton Fish, Jr. to Andrew Carnegie contained the claim: "The work of the American Ambulance in Russia is accomplished with practically no overhead charges. Therefore all money that is contributed will go for buying automobiles and surgical supplies. The Russian Government provides for the maintenance of the machines and supplies the gasoline."178 In response, Carnegie donated $1000.00. Despite claims to the contrary, a portion of almost all donations was skimmed off the top for commissions or spent on overhead. Another concern question was how many ambulances did American Ambulance have in Russia? One solicitation claimed fifty ambulances, and that every penny goes to Russia. The investigation report questioned claims that “for two years the Ambulance has been saving lives in Russia,” along with “30 ambulances had been sent to Russia and 177
The audit could not identify the total amount of donations received and how they were applied. Ibid., 11. 178 Ibid., 12. 286
that 40 more of our cars are on the way.’”179 Similarly, a solicitation to the Elks claimed that the Organization had forty-eight vehicles in Russia and that all funds would go for aiding the wounded. In fact, twenty percent of Elk funds went to one of the fundraisers. In the end, investigators determined that at any one time, the organization never had more than nineteen ambulances in the field.180 Newton reported that an additional sixteen Studebaker ambulances were still stored in New York waiting for authorization to be sent to Russia. Hamilton Fish, Jr. loaned one other ambulance to support his unit, the famous African American “Harlem Hell Fighters” of the Fifteenth New York Infantry and another, a Ford ambulance was loaned to the Army Field Service in New York and “worn out.”181 On December 7, 1917, Hamilton Fish, Sr. contacted the New York District Attorney’s Office to request a “thorough investigation of the affairs of the commission”182 He was concerned that ambulance affairs went amiss after his son left the organization in May 1917 to join the Army. According to Fish, Sr, “from the time my son’s practical control of matters necessarily ceased, and he had to rely on others, and unfortunately as your investigation shows, some of these abused his confidence and in a most unjustifiable manner frittered and squandered its funds.”183 He added: As soon as he learned of the transactions with which he found fault he endeavored to correct them, and finally in November placed Chairman Kitteridge, a very reputable attorney…and gave him charge in his absence, and requested him to see that the expenses with which he had found fault be limited and suggesting a reorganization of the Executive Committee and unless these conditions were 179 180 181 182 183
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 13. “Hamilton Fish, SR. Defends Son’s Work,” New York Times, January 13, 1918, 3. Ibid. 287
adopted he authorized Mr. Kittredge to submit his resignation as President. At the same time I desire to protect the good name and reputation of one who has served honorably for three terms in our State Legislature, who is a member of the Governor Whitman’s staff, who has built up a successful business, and who left all to serve his country overseas.184 On the same day the elder Fish contacted the District Attorney to investigate his concerns, Hero Land banned American Ambulance from the bazaar. According to their official statement: It having come to the attention of the management of Hero Land that American Ambulance in Russia has since Hero Land opened been withdrawn from the list of committees approved by the Charity Organization Society, it has been deemed wise to determine without prejudice to that committee that Hero Land shall close the booth of American Ambulance in Russia shall either have been restored to the list of organizations whose accounts and audited statements are approved by the Charity Organization Society or until there can be no question in the public mind that the committee’s funds are properly safeguarded and properly explained.185 Allegedly, the final straw was accusations from a woman who said she donated $1600.00 to buy a vehicle for American Ambulance in Italy, only to have the check cashed by the Russian counterpart. Despite, receiving a refund, she demanded an investigation. Without exception, all official statements and articles about the scandal exonerate Fish and Lydig, both prominent New Yorkers, of any wrongdoing. Swann wrote, in regard to his correspondence with the elder Fish that “the very name of Hamilton Fish should in this community be in itself a sufficient guarantee of good faith, and I told him that I had not publicly or otherwise criticized the connection of Hamilton Fish, Jr., with the ambulance organization and that if I were called upon to extend any criticism that criticism, if I had any to offer, merely would be that may have been careless.”186 184 185 186
Ibid. “HERO LAND Closes ‘Russia Street,’” New York Times, December 7, 1917, 11. “Denies Criticising Fish,” New York Tribune, January 14, 1918, 7. 288
Kilroe discovered that a number of the drivers who stopped their ambulances to raise money received large commissions. Some of these men became known as the “Ten Per Cent Boys.” Two of these men testified that each time they stopped an ambulance and put out the stretcher, they collected between $60.00 and $2200.00. They each received ten percent of the total proceeds. Sometimes their commissions totaled $1000.00 a month. An additional thirty percent went to William Stoermer, a professional promoter, who assumed the title “Managing Director of Field Service.” Only fifty percent went to American Ambulance.187: In general…Mr. Kilroe’s investigation into the administration of the ambulance fund enlightened him on several important details of ambulance driving. He discovered that the frequency with which ambulance drivers halted at fifth avenues and Forty-second Street before taking their vehicles to Russia was due to no desire to accustom their nerves to charging humanity, but to the simple fact that an ambulance stretcher deposited at that point had been known to contain $2000 when it was lifted again.188 The End of American Ambulance Despite the on-going controversy, Newton continued to pursue new vehicles for Russia. He awaited Billings’ return from Russia to determine what, if any, role he would have in future American Red Cross work in that country.189 He worked with Indian Motorcycles to purchase a sidecar and ordered new vehicles from Studebaker.190 Newton’s diary reflects his angst with the level of mismanagement of Ambulance finances. On October 24, he wrote, “Much work trying to get mess straightened out at office-new trouble comes up every day,” and the next day: “Bill Hamilton and the office 187
Regulating Collection of Money, 12. “War Funds Paid For Silk Hosiery And Sable Coat,” New York Tribune (New York, NY), December 12, 1917, 4. 189 Newton Diary, Entry September 29, 1917. 190 Ibid., Entries for October 5, 1917, and November 2, 1917. 289 188
around have gotten A.A. into lots of trouble,” and the end of the month: “Much work getting ambulance affairs straightened out.” 191 On November 1, while “getting things in shape” at the office, he saw Hamilton Fish. Shortly after that, Fish shipped out with his “Harlem Hell Fighters” for the frontlines in France. On October 20, Newton went to Philadelphia to meet with Malcolm Grow. Earlier that month, the American Red Cross transferred all the Ambulance’s medical supplies to their Commission in Romania. On October 25, when he met with Billings, he was still raising money for American Ambulance, including negotiating a potential $60,000.00 donation. At the end of the month, he took possession of more ambulances.192 However, after all of the controversy and negative publicity, “it was Captain Fish’s desire that the organization pass peacefully out of existence as soon as possible.” Kilroe arranged for American Ambulance in Russia’s dissolution and the remaining $7000.00 in its accounts to be sent to the American Red Cross.193 Curtain Closes on American Red Cross Ambulance Movement in Russia In the end, the American Red Cross expended $84,195.98 on an ambulance unit for Russia. The Red Cross shipped “125 cars, together with full equipment and spare tires and parts. It was the original idea of the Red Cross to send several more of these ambulance units, but, as many other matters in Russia, subsequent events made such shipments impractical.” On November 12, 1917, the U.S. government decided to halt all
191 192 193
Ibid., Entry October 24, 1917 and October 25, 1917. Ibid., Entries October 10, 1917, October 25, 1917, and November 2, 1917. “Fish to Close Up Ambulance Fund,” New-York Tribune, January 3, 1918, 9. 290
future shipments of military provisions to Russia.194 Like so many American dreams for Russia, altruism, strategy, and planning collapsed under the weight of the reality that despite hopes to the contrary, the Bolshevik government was not an ally or a friend. Raymond Robins, the last remaining member of the original Commission, tried to use the American Red Cross as means to maintain communications with the Bolshevik government, but ultimately this approach, along with the goal of keeping Russia in the war failed. The situation in Russia deteriorated rapidly after the Bolshevik revolution. Despite naïve hopes that humanitarian assistance could sustain Russia’s desire and ability to continue the fight, the unstoppable wave of revolution and German advance engulfed the struggling nation, and the outcome was likely inevitable.
194
Work of the American Red Cross: Financial Statement, 76 and Sean McMeekin, Russian Revolution; A New History (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 229.. 291
Conclusion
The first volume of the Journal of Russian American Studies was released in early 2017, firmly staking ground for this reemerging field of study. As world events mirror an era before the fall of the Berlin Wall, scholars are once again drawn to a time of RussianAmerican cooperation versus Cold War rivalry. Norman Saul and Benton Whisenhunt explain this revival: “In the twenty-first century…the field has been reborn with exciting new scholarship on Russian-American relations that covers more than the political and diplomatic worlds of the later twentieth century.”1 Renewed interest has spurred a continuing array of studies examining interactions between the two peoples since the founding of the United States. Of particular interest, however, is the period of the Russian Revolution and Great War. The year 2017 also marks the hundredth anniversary of American entry into the First World War. The commemoration has stimulated new scholarship examining U.S. involvement in the war. Among the most recent works, Kenneth Rose’s The Great War and Americans in Europe, 1914-1917, stands out in its efforts to capture experiences of U.S. citizens caught in the midst of the European conflict.2 Recognizing the historical value of eyewitness accounts and contributions of American volunteers, he captures the stories of American visitors, nurses, ambulance drivers, long-time residents, and officials 1
New Perspectives on Russian American Relations, ed. William Benton Whisenhunt and Norman E. Saul (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2016). 2 Kenneth D. Rose, The Great War and Americans in Europe, 1914-1917 (New York: Routledge, 2017) 296
during the early years of the war. He tries to address the entire European theater, but paucity of sources from the Eastern limits his coverage. Therefore, accounts from West vastly outnumber the East in scope, diversity of experience, and quantity. This study has captured many of these missing eyewitness accounts and opened the door to future study of these previously unknown American participants in the Russian war effort. There is a marked contrast between the number of Americans on the Western and Eastern fronts. Tens of thousands of American volunteers flocked to the Western front before April 1917 versus less than fifty in the East. Rose writes that “Americans volunteered to serve for a number of reasons, many of the associated with idealism.”3 Given this catalyst, pre-revolutionary Russia was hardly a draw for Americans hoping to fight against autocracy. American business leaders may have desired enhanced relations to increase their profits, but for humanitarians, the choice must have been clear. Rose quotes German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann’s observation that “American neutrality toward Germany is one of the head; toward the Allies it is one of the heart. What America does for the Allies she does voluntarily and gladly.”4 This statement is directed at the British and French. Americans had a long-standing affinity for both nations developed through common ideals and culture. Germany, conversely, was viewed from the perspective of the widely publicized depredations that accompanied its violation of Belgian neutrality. Russia suffered from not only the gulf between autocracy and democratic ideals, but also the physical challenges associated with travel and
3 4
Rose, 132. Ibid, 9. 297
language. It was much simpler to get to the West, and once there, work with the Allied forces. While humanitarian and military volunteers may not have been drawn to Russia, by April 1916 when David R. Francis arrived in Petrograd to assume his new position as American Ambassador, he was optimistic about prospects for achieving his primary objective, negotiating a new bilateral commercial treaty. In fact, the entire reason, given his complete lack of diplomatic experience, why Francis accepted the top post was “in the hope and expectation of negotiating a commercial treaty.”5 He explained his views during his first few days as American Ambassador: As regards the mutual relations between our two countries, there is undoubtedly every reason for the most friendly feelings, and there is absolutely no ground for misunderstandings or frictions. I hold the firm opinion that trade between our two countries must be carried out on direct, without any intermediaries. I do not doubt that it will be carried on in this way and that it will grow each year and even each month. This is my sincere wish, and toward the realization of all my efforts will be directed.6 All American decisions and actions during this period must be viewed through the prism of their impact on the ability of the U.S., and likewise its business representatives’ to achieve their commercial ends. Support for American humanitarian endeavors, first in promoting the continuation of the mission in Kiev, and later in Persia, was spurred by the desire to maintain a positive environment for commercial growth. Later, as it became
5
David R. Francis, Russia From the American Embassy April 1916-November, 1918 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1921), 10. 6 Interview with David Francis, April 1916, Reel 1, David R. Francis Papers, Russia in Transition, Library of Congress. 298
clear that American entry into the war was inevitable, commercial considerations took a backseat to sustaining Russia’s viability and loyalty as a military fighting force and ally. Transformation from a local Petrograd American colony business matter to an issue with broader implications occurred rapidly. Concern about a loss of American “prestige” was genuine after reverberations from the cancellation of the American Red Cross mission in Kiev and the simultaneous arrival of a U.S. team to help Central Powers prisoners during a period of nearly continuous Russian reversals on the Eastern Front. The timing of these tensions was particularly inopportune. It was a period when American representatives rushed to obtain potentially lucrative Russian war material and infrastructure business. Any action that undermined this goal ran counter to overall U.S. economic objectives. The year 1915 was critical in American commercial engagement in Russia. As David L. Hough explained in March 1915, “American business needs to prepare for the period of reconstruction in Russia succeeding the European war. The volume of business will be far larger than is generally apprehended in this country, but the business man here will have to go at least half way if expects to get the share which is otherwise his practically for the asking.”7 He expected rapid demand for construction, as well as requirements for new railway lines and all the equipment that entailed.8 Other areas, including finance, heavy equipment, and machine tools were also pursued enthusiastically. “American Opportunity for Russian Business; An Interview with Capt David L. Hough,” Iron Age…., 616. 8 Ibid., 617. 299 7
Newton and Egbert's motivations shared a common purpose with their fellowcitizens in Petrograd, they hoped to maintain America's positive image in Russia, and to some extent, a favorable trade relationship was part of their calculus. However, their movement reflected a changing American domestic attitude towards the war. By the end of 1915, German attacks on American neutral shipping took its toll on U.S. public opinion. Domestic sentiments favored the Entente, as evidenced by the number of war charities supporting those causes. The only exception, perhaps, was American Red Cross which managed to maintain its fundamental principle of “neutral humanity” throughout the period before American entry into the First World War. Altruism was the initial impetus of the 1914 American Red Cross “Mercy Ship” mission to provide medical assistance to all warring nations on an equitable basis. Immediately after that aid ceased in October 1915, however, humanitarian aid to Russia became a privately funded affair, and therefore encapsulated the motivations and priorities of its sponsor –The Russian Committee of the American Red Cross, an inherently biased body. The first meeting was at the urging of the official representative of American commerce in Russia, Commercial Attaché Henry Baker. Composed of individuals who were in Russia to represent the interests of their home firms, the group’s commercial-based roots were fundamental from the very outset. Its very approach to acquiring resources highlights the link of between enhancing America’s commercial position in Russia and privately funded American assistance. Support for American medical activities in Russia came from businesses that hoped to benefit from their bilateral trading relationships. 300
However, as relations between the U.S. and the Central powers became more strained, aid rapidly morphed into an issue with strategic implications. As the prototype of later and more varied aid missions, its baseline rationale and core strategic goals formed the foundation of all subsequent efforts. As U.S. strategic military goals took precedence over commercial considerations, objectives of aid missions adjusted accordingly to reflect America’s increasingly urgent efforts to bolster Russia’s reliability and capability as an ally. Newton and Egbert’s efforts were a reflection of those changing views, and American Ambulance benefited from the shift. The organization's objectives bridged the gap between the commercial interests of the Petrograd colony, the changing sentiments of the American public, and strategic goals of the U.S. government. After the March revolution and U.S. entry into the war, Russia’s military shortfalls became a national priority. Governmental sources mobilized the American Red Cross, no longer constrained by strict neutrality, to provide ambulances and other medical aid to Russia. The 1917 American Red Cross Commission to Russia led by Frank Billings reflected the logical transformation as U.S. military interests surpassed commercial considerations. The Commission was a direct offshoot of and likely resulted from the work of Edward Egbert and Malcolm Grow to solicit officially sanctioned U.S. humanitarian aid to Russia. As the Billings Commission reflected the expanded scope, so too the ambulance movement was born of the personal efforts of Newton, Egbert, and Grow. A major pillar 301
of Billing’s mission was to assess Russia’s military medical needs, especially regarding requirements for motorized transport for her wounded. Jennifer Polk writes, “These self-proclaimed foreign humanitarians set up shop with the express aim of achieving military and political goals in another country. More broadly, they undertook to support what they believed were US interests in general.”9 However, by fall 1917, the situation in Russia was changing rapidly. The Bolshevik takeover began a period of uncertainty over the future of Russia as a fighting force, and more importantly the direction of the bilateral relationship. Norman Saul explained the dilemma as the “fact the major problem facing the Red Cross was that with very limited fighting by the Russian army, there was less need for its services but more for basic supplies it could furnish.”10 The bilateral relationship entered a period of considerable uncertainty and deterioration. Questions of aid and assistance were surpassed by a more significant issue, the nature of the bilateral relationship itself.
Jennifer Ann Polk, “Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary Russia and Civil War, 1917-24” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 2012), 473. 10 Saul, 169. 302 9
Bibliography Primary Sources – Archival Collections Bryn Mawr College Library, Special Collections, Bryn Mawr, PA Clara Cary Case Edwards Small Special Collections Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA American Red Cross Mission to Russia, 1917–18 Major C.T. Williams (and Diary, 1917) National Archives, College Park, MD RG 59, Department of State Central Files RG 84, Foreign Posts Consular Posts Petrograd Tabriz Tiflis Diplomatic Posts American Embassy, Russia RG 200, National Archives Gift Collection Records of the American National Red Cross Harvard University Library, Boston, MA American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Floyd O. Smith Office of War Records, Phillip Meister Lydig Radcliffe Institute Mary Frederika Farley Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA American National Red Cross N.N. Baratov Edward H. Egbert James L. Houghteling Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC David R. Francis Papers, Russia in Transition. 303
Rubenstein Library, Duke University, Durham, NC Henry Dunster Baker United Methodist Church Archives, Madison, NJ Christian Advocate Collection George A. Simons University of Virginia Library, Special Collections Department, Charlottesville, VA Dr. William Sydney Thayer US Army Academy of Health Sciences, Stimson Library, Carlisle, PA. Brown S. McClintic US Army Medical Archives Fort Sam Houston Texas Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, Madison, WI Aurel Baker Pardee Families and Private (Unpublished) Frieda Hartman (Author’s collection) Philip Newton (Courtesy of Ann Viall) Floyd O. Smith (Courtesy of George Aghjayan) Paul Zinkhan (Courtesy Sandra Peeper) Primary Sources – Published Government Documents, Documentary Collections, and Contemporary Publications, etc “Across Siberia to Petrograd.” American Red Cross Magazine 12, no. 11 (Nov 1917): 568–71. “American Ambulance in Russia.” Pamphlet. (no date). “American Ambulance in Russia [Provisional Government period.” Pamphlet. https://collections.nlm.nih.gov/ext/kirtasbse/101522805/PDF/101522805.pdf. American National Red Cross. Annual Report for the Year Ended June 30, 1918. Washington, DC: 1919. American Red Cross and Henry P. Davison. The Work in Europe of the American Red Cross; A Report to the American People by the Red Cross War Council. Washington, D.C.: American Red Cross, 1917. “American Opportunity for Russian Business, An Interview with Capt. David L. Hough.” Iron Age 95, no. 11 (March 18, 1915): 616. 304
“American Nurses Decorated for Valor.” Red Cross Bulletin 3, no. 2 (January 6, 1919): 8. American Red Cross. Bulletin no. 4. Issued by the Central Committee (October, 1906): 95. “American Red Cross in Persia.” Chicago Commerce 12, no, 16 (August 18, 1916): 26 American Red Cross. The Work of the American Red Cross: Financial Statement of Red Cross War Fund, March 1st, 1918, with Details of the Various Activities through Which this Fund is Distributed. Washington, DC: American Red Cross, n.d., ca. 1918. “The Appeals for Europe’s Wounded.” American Red Cross Magazine 9, no.4 (October 1914): 215-216. Baker, Henry D. “The Proposed Connection to the Russian and Indian Railway Systems.” Geographical Review 4, no. 2 (August 1917): 92-102. Billings, Dr. Frank A. “For the Relief of Russia.” Red Cross Magazine 13, no. 1 (January 1918): 71-74. Billings, Dr. Frank A. “The Work of the American Red Cross Mission to Russia.” Journal of the American Medical Association 69, no. 20 (17 Nov 1917): 1687–94. Boardman, Mabel T, “The Story of the Ship.” American Red Cross Magazine 9, no. 4 (October 1914): 209-213. Clark, Ida Clyde. American Women and the World War. New York, London: D. Appleton and Co, 1918. Davison, Henry P. American Red Cross in the Great War. New York: Macmillan Co, 1919. Dock, Lavina, et al. History of American Red Cross Nursing. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. “Dr. Billings, Just Returned, Tells What Russia Needs.” Red Cross Bulletin 1, no. 27 (November 5, 1917): 2. Edwards, A.C. “German Intrigues in Persia.” Yale Review 7, no. 3 (April 1918): 613-631. Evans, Ernestine. “Russia’s Women Lovable in War Times: Miss Evans Visits Petrograd.” New York Tribune. January 31, 1915, B13. “Ford Company Gives $500,000 Worth of Ambulances and Equipment.” Red Cross Bulletin 1, no. 15 (September 7, 1917): 2. “For Hospital on Russian Front.” Medical Record 92, no.10 (September 8, 1917): 422. Foster Dulles, Rhea. The American Red Cross; A History. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. Funk, Dr. J.A. “Hamadan Under British Occupation.” Womens Work 24, no. 11 (December 1919): 244-247. Fyfe, Henry Hamilton. My Seven Selves. London: George Allen &Unwin, 1935. Harper, Florence MacLeod. Runaway Russia. New York: Century Company, 1918. Harvard, Valery. Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria During the Russo-Japanese War: Volume II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906-07. Hay, Helen Scott. “Meeting Czar of All The Russias.” American Red Cross Magazine 10, no. 5 (May 1915): 185-189. Hazlett, T. Lyle. “Experiences with the Russian Army of the Caucasus in Northern 305
Persia.” Military Surgeon 41, no.4 (October 1917): 445-449. Hendrick, Ellwood. “Eight of them in Persia.” American Red Cross Magazine 11, no.8 (August 1916): 279-284. Hough, David L. “American Engineer and Business Man,” Iron Age 95, no. 12 (March 25, 1915): 665-668. Hough, David L. “Russia from the Point of View of an American Engineer and Business Man,” reprinted from Iron Age, March 1915, in the Diplomatic Papers of David Rowland Francis, Russia in Transition Reel 3, Library of Congress. “Information For Volunteers For American Red Cross, European Service.” Military Surgeon 35, no .3 (September 1914): 305. “In the Prisoners’ Behalf.”American Red Cross Magazine 10, no. 11 (November 1915): 359-360. “Jewish Friends of Free Russia Give Ambulances.” Red Cross Bulletin 1, no. 20 (September 25, 1917): 2. Judson, William V. Neil V. Salzman ed. Russia in War and Revolution: General William V. Judson’s Accounts from Petrograd, 1917–1918. Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1998. Kalpaschnikoff, Andrew. A Prisoner of Trotsky’s. New York: Doubleday, Page, & Co., 1920. Kiel, Sophie. “Experiences in Russia.” Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Convention of the American Nurses’ Association, The American Journal of Nursing 18, no. 11 (1918): 1036-1044. Koskull, Marie Luise Baronin Von . Damals in Russland. Leipzing: Berleght bei Koehler& Umelang, 1931. Liddle, Robert Scotland. On the Russian Front. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, 1916. “Local Medical Societies.” Journal of the Medical Society of New Jersey 14, no.12, (December 1917,) 470 Lynch, Charles, Joseph H. Ford, and Frank W. Weed. The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War, Volume 8 Field Operations. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925. “Marvels of Surgery Performed by Russians.” Texas Medical Journal 31, no. 7 (January 1916): 291-292. McCarthy, D.J. M.D.. “Report on the Hospital Organization and Sanitary Service of the Russian Army.” Transactions of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia 3rd Series Vol. 40 (1918). McClintic, Major Brown S. Russian Retreat Across Persia. Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Advanced Course, 1935. McClintic, Eleanor Soukup. “With the Russians in Persia.” American Journal of Nursing 18, no.1 (October 1917): 34-40. McClintic, Eleanor Soukop. “With the Russians in Persia (Continued)” American Journal of Nursing 18, no. 2 (November 1917): 34-40, 102-106. Mills, Captain James A. “The Flight from Roumania.” American Red Cross Magazine 13, no. 9, (September 1918): 3-10. 306
Minnigerode, Lucy. “Experiences of Unit C, Kief Russia.” Red Cross Department: American Journal of Nursing 16, no. 3 (December 1915): 220-226 Minnigerode, Lucy. “The Heart of a Hospital in Russia.” American Red Cross Magazine 10, no. 9 (September 1915): 311-314. Morse, Edwin. The Vanguard of American Volunteers in the Fighting Lines and in Humanitarian Service: August 1914-April 1917. New York : C. Scribner's Sons, 1918. One Hundred and Thirtieth Annual Report of the Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America; May 20, 1915. “Our Armies of Mercy.” National Geographic Magazine 31, no. 5 (May 1917): 423. “Over the Top with the Russian War Dogs; Experiences of a Philadelphia Surgeon, Dr. Grow,” Book News Monthly 36 (May 1918): 325-326. “Partial List of Funds Provided in America For Relief of War Sufferers.” Year Book, 1916, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, D.C: Press of Byron Adams (1916), 72. “President Wilson on the Relief Situation,” Red Cross Magazine 10, no.1 (January 1915): 9. Price, M. Philips. War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia. New York: Macmillan Co, 1918. “Red Cross Commission Begins Its Work in Petrograd.” Red Cross Bulletin 1, no. 12 (August 27, 1917): 3. “The Red Cross, In Charge of Jane Delano, European Service.” American Journal of Nursing 16, no. 4 (January 1916): 331-337. “Rough on Her Brother.” American Red Cross Magazine 9, no. 7 (March 1915): 132. Russia: A Journal of Russian-American Trade 1, no. 1 (May 1916). “Russia Honors Americans.” American Red Cross Magazine 10, no. 1. (January 1915): 39. “Russian Bazaar in N.Y.” Russian Review 2, no. 6 (December 1916): 334-335. “Russian Red Cross.” Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 156 (May 17, 1917): 716. Russian Union of Zemstvos; A Brief Report on the Union’s Activities During the War. London: P.S. King and Son Ltd., 1917. The Russo-Japanese War, Medical and Sanitary Reports from Officers Attached to Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field, General Staff. London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1908. Shedd, Mary Lewis. The Measure of a Man; The Life of William Ambrose Shedd, Missionary to Persia. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922. Snively, H.H. “Base Hospital Work in Russia.” Military Surgeon 38, no. 6 (June 1916): 623- 638. Snively, Major H.H. “A National Guardsman on the Galician Front.” National Guard Magazine 13, no. 7 (July 1916): 132-133, 140-141. Technology’s War Record; An Interpretation of the Contribution Made by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Its Staff, Former Students and Its UnderGraduates to the Cause of the United States and Allied Powers in the Great War. Cambridge, MA: Murray Printing Company, 1920. 307
Thompson, Donald C. Blood Stained Russia. New York: Leslie-Judge, 1918. _________________. The Crime of the Twentieth Century. New York: Leslie-Judge, 1918. _________________. Donald Thompson in Russia. New York: The Century Company, 1918. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Tenth Annual Report of the American National Red Cross for the Year 1914. 63rd Congress, 3rd Session, 1915. Document No. 1665. _________________________________. Eleventh Annual Report of the American National Red Cross for the Year 1915. 64th Congress, 1st Session, 1915. Document No. 1307. _________________________________. Twelfth Annual Report of the American National Red Cross for the Year 1915. 64th Congress, 3nd Session, 1916. Document No. 2131. _________________________________. Report of the Secretary and Treasurer of the American Red Cross for the Period January 1 to June 30, 1917. 65th Congress, 2nd Session, 1918. Document No. 1249. United States. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: Supplement 1, The World War. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1933. United States. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: Russia. 3 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 19311932. ____________________________. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia. . Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1937. United States Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, 1919, Regulating Collection of Money: Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, SixtyFifth Congress, 3rd Session on S. 4972. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919. Wadsworth, Eliot. “The Work of the Red Cross in the Event of War.” The American Journal of Nursing 17, no. 12 (September 1917): 1153-1157. Washburn, Stanley. The Russian Campaign, April to August 1915, being the Second Volume of “Field Note from the Russian Front.” London: Andrew Melrose, Ltd, 1915. _____.Victory in Defeat. The Agony of Warsaw and the Russian Retreat. Garden City, NJ and New York: Doubleday, Page &Company, 1917. ______. The Russian Advance; being the Third volume of Field Notes from the Russian Front embracing the period from June 5 to September 1st, 1916. Garden City, NJ and New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1917. “Washington News of Jewish Importance.” American Jewish Chronicle 3 (September 28, 1917): 560. Winn, Dean F. “Statistical Report of Five Hundred Cases Treated in the American Red Cross Hospital at Kiev, Russia,” Military Surgeon 38, no. 1(January 1916), 56-63. Marian Bonsall Davis. “Russia Needs Red Cross Help.” Pittsburgh Daily Headlight (Pittsburgh, KS), June 26, 1917, 1. 308
Primary Sources – Newspapers\ Altoona Tribune (Altoona, PA), Argus-Leader (Sioux Falls, SD), Atlanta Constitution. Baltimore Sun (Baltimore, MD Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Buffalo Commercial (Buffalo, NY) Chicago Tribune (Chicago, IL) Chronicle Telegram’ Crawfordsville Review (Crawfordsville, IN), Delaware Country Daily Times, Decatur Herald (Decatur, Illinois) Des Moines Register Detroit Free Press El Paso Herald Exporter’s Review Fort Wayne Weekly Sentinel (Fort Wayne, IN Greenville News (Greenville, SC), Hickory Daily Record (North Carolina) Houston Post (Houston, TX Huntington Herald (Huntington, IN) Indianapolis News Indianapolis Star (Indianapolis, IN) Lansing State Journal (Lansing, MI ort Wayne Journal-Gazette Morning Register (Eugene, OR), Nashua Reporter (Nashua, IA) News and Observer (Raleigh, NC), News Tribune (Wilmington, DE) Poverty Bay Herald (Poverty Bay, New Zealand), The Sun (New York, NY), New York Sun, New York Times New York Tribune, Oakland Tribune (Oakland, CA) Ottumwa Tri-Weekly Courier (Ottumwa, IA). Palladium-Item (Richmond, IN) Pantagraph (Bloomington, Illinois) Philadelphia Inquirer (Philadelphia, PA), Pittsburgh Daily Headlight (Pittsburgh, KS) Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 31, 1915, 6 Chronicle Telegram (Elryia OH). Times Dispatch (Richmond, VA) Pittsburgh Daily Post (Pittsburgh, PA), Pittsburgh Press 309
Poughkeepsie Eagle-News (Poughkeepsie, NY), Salina Daily Union (Salina, KS) Santa Ana Register (Santa Ana, CA Star-Gazette (Elmira, NY), Washington Post Washington Times Webster City Freeman (Webster City, Iowa) Primary Sources – Published Diaries, Letters, Memoirs, etc. Bicknell, Ernest Percy. In War's Wake, 1914-1915: the Rockefeller Foundation And the American Red Cross Join In Civilian Relief. Washington, D. C.: American national Red Cross, 1936. ___________. Pioneering With the Red Cross: Recollections of an Old Red Crosser. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935. ___________. With the Red Cross in Europe, 1917-1922. Washington, D. C.: American national Red Cross, 1938. Brusilov, Aleksei Alekseyevich. A Soldier’s Notebook. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971. Boardman, Mabel T. Under the Red Cross Flag: At Home and Abroad. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1915 and 2nd ed 1917. Earnest, Clyde Talley. An Adventure Story; By Clyde Talley Earnest, Sr,, SecretaryTreasurer of the American Red Cross Medical Mission to Roumania, July 1917 to January 1918. http:// 1917diary.net/1917_diary.doc. Fish, Hamilton, III. Hamilton Fish: Memoir of an American Patriot. Toledo, OH: Regnery Publishing, 1991. Francis, David R. Russia from the American Embassy: April 1916-November 1918. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1921. Gleason, Arthur. Our Part in the Great War. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1917. Grow, Malcolm C. Surgeon Grow, an American in the Russian Fighting. New York: F.A. Stokes, 1918. Houghteling, James L. A Diary of the Russian Revolution. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1918 Knox, Major-General Alfred W.F. With the Russian Army 1914-1917 (2 vols.). New York: Mayre, George Thomas. Nearing the End in Imperial Russia. London: Selwyn and Blount, 1929. Kravkov, V.P. Velikaia Voina Bez Retushi. Zapinski Korpusnovo Vracha. Moscow: Vreche, 2014. McCormick, Robert Rutherford. With the Russian Army, Being the Experiences of a National Guardsman. London: Macmillan, 1915. Macnaughtan S,, ed, Betty Keays-Young Salmon. My War Experiences in Two Continents. London: John Murray, 1919. Marie, Grand Duchess of Russia. Education of a Princess; A Memoir by Marie, Grand Duchess of Russia. New York: Viking Press, 1931 310
Moberly, Brig-Gen F.J. Operations in Persia, 1914-1919. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1987. Morse, John. An Englishman in the Russian Ranks. London: Duckworth&Co., 1915. Poole, Dewitt C. ed. Lorraine M. Lees and William S. Rodner. An American Diplomat in Bolshevik Russia. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014. Simpson, J.Y. The Self Discovery of Russia. London: Constable and Company, 1916. Snively, Marjorie, comp. The Battle of the Non-combatants: The Letters Dr. Harry Hamilton Snively to His Family from Russia, Poland, France, Belgium, Persia, etc., Assembled by His Daughter New York: Business Bourse, 1933. Smith, F.O. MD. A Hawkeye Abroad, (Privately published, no date) Thurston, Violetta. Field Hospital and Flying Column, Being the Journal of an English Nursing Sister in Belgium & Russia, Being the Journal of an English Nursing Sister in Belgium & Russia. New York and London: Putnam, 1915. Ussher, Clarence Douglas and Grace H. Knapp. An American Physician in Turkey: A Narrative Adventure in Peace and War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917. Washburn, Stanley. On the Russian Front in World War I: Memoirs of an American War Correspondent. New York: Macmillan, 1946, Wrightman, Orin Sage. The Diary of an American Physician in the Russian Revolution, 1917. Brooklyn, NY: Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1928 Secondary Sources – Unpublished Dissertations and Theses Dissertations Davis, Matthew Mark. “Evangelizing the Orient: American missionaries in Iran, 1890– 1940.” Ph.D diss. The Ohio State University, 2001. Ginzburg, Lyubov. “Confronting the Cold War Legacy: The Forgotten History of the American Colonoy in St. Petersburg, A Case Study of Reconcilliation,” Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 2010. Mansoori, Ahmad. “American Missionaries in Iran, 1834-1934,” Ph.D. diss, Ball State University, 1986. Miller, Matthew L. “American Philanthropy among Russians: The Work of the YMCA, 1900-1940.” Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 2006. Polk, Jennifer. “Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary and Civil War Russia, 1917-1924” Ph.D diss. University of Toronto, 2012. Secondary Sources – Books and Articles Aghjayan, George. “Portrait of Bravery: The Life and Times of Dr. Floyd Smith,” The Armenian Weekly, http://armenianweekly.com/2014/04/28/smith. Allen, W.E.D, and Paul Muratoff. Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921. Nashville: Battery Press, 1953. Allison, Wiiliam. American Diplomats in Russia: Case Studies in Orphan Diplomacy, 1916-1919. Westport, Ct: Praeger, 1997. Barnes, Harper. Standing on a Volcano: The Life and Times of David Rowland Francis. St Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 2001. Becker, Adam H. Revival and Awakening. London: University of Chicago Press, 2015. Buttar, Prit. Collision of Empires. New York: Osprey, 2014. 311
_________.Russia’s Last Gasp; The Eastern Front 1916-1917. New York: Osprey, 2016. Colins, Ross F. “Myth as Propaganda in World War I: American Volunteers, Victor Chapman, and French Journalism.” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 92, no. 3 (2015, 642–661). Davis, Donald E, and Eugene Trani. “The American YMCA and the Russian Revolution.” Slavic Review 33, no. 3 (September 1974: 467-91). Dowling, Timothy C. The Brusilov Offensive. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008. Floor, Willem. “Hospitals in Safavid and Qajar Iran” in Hospitals in Iran and India, 1500-1950s, Ed. Fabrizio Speziale, 2012 Fike, Claude E. “The Influence of the Creel Committee and the American Red Cross on Russian-American Relations, 1917-1919.” Journal of Modern History 31, no, 2 (June 1959): 93-109. Fogelsong, David. The American Mission and the “Evil Empire”: The Crusade for a Free Russia Since 1881. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Foster Rhea Dulles. The American Red Cross: A History. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. Gatrell, Peter. Russia’s First World War. A Social and Economic History. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2005. Grant, Susan. “Russian Nurses, 1917-22,” in Russia’s Home Front in War and Revolution, 1914-22, ed. Adele Lindenmeyr, Christopher Reed, and Peter Waldron. Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2016. Grayson, Benson Lee. American-Russia Relations in World War I. New York: Ungar, 1979. Heenan, Louise E. Russian Democracy’s Fatal Blunder: The Summer Offensive of 1917. New York: Praeger, 1987. Hutchinson, John F. Champions of Charity. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, __________. Late Imperial Russia 1890-1917. London: Longman, 1999. Irwin, Julia F. Making the World Safe; The American Red Cross and A Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Kazarski, Richard. An Evening’s Entertainment: The Age of the Silent Picture, 19151928. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1990. Kennan, George F. Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920. Vol. 1, The Decision to Leave the War; Vol 2. The Decision to Intervene. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958. Klekowski, Ed and Libby Klekowski. Eyewitnesses to the Great War: American Writers, Reporters, Volunteers and Soldiers in France, 1914-1918. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, Inc, 2012. Langbart, David. “No Little Historic Value: The Records of Department of State Posts in Revolutionary Russia,” Prologue 40, no. 1 (Spring 2008), https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2008/spring/langbart.html Langbart, David A. “Five Months in Petrograd in 1918: Robert W. Imbrie and the US Search for Information in Russia.” Studies in Intelligence 52, no. 1, Web Supplement (Mar 2008). Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of312
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-52-no-1/. Lenczowski, George. Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948; A Study in Big Power Rivalry, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949. Lincoln, W. Bruce. Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution, 1914-1918. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Russia’s Home Front in War and Revolution, 1914-22, ed Adele Lindenmeyr, Christopher Reed, and Peter Waldron. Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2016. Majd, Mohammad Gholi Majd. Persia in World War I and its Conquest by Great Britain. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003. McMeekin, Sean. The Berlin-Bagdad Express; The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010. __________.The Ottoman Endgame; War Revolution and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2015. ___________. Russian Origins of the First World War. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2011. ___________. The Russian Revolution; A Short History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2017. Millar, Ronald. Kut; The Death of an Army. London: MartinSocker&Warburg Ltd, 1969. Miller, Matthew Lee. The American YMCA and Russian Culture, The Preservation and Expansion of Orthodox Christianity, Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013. Moser-Jones, Marian. The American Red Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2013. ____________. Sister Soldiers: American Red Cross Nurses in Europe’s Great War, 1914-1915, https://history.umd.edu/sites/history.umd.edu/files/Sistersoldiers_draft_mmj_feb2.pdf. Neiburg, Michael and David Jordan. Eastern Front (1914 to 1920). London: Amber Books, 2012. ______________.The Path to War; How the First War Created Modern America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Richter, Jude C. “Philanthropy and Welfare in Russia, 1914-1918.” Russia’s Home Front in War and Revolution, 1914-22, ed Adele Lindenmeyr, Christopher Reed, and Peter Waldron. Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2016. Rogan, Eugene L. The Fall of the Ottomans: the Great War in the Middle East. New York, NY: Basic Books, and member of the Perseus Books Group, 2015. Rose, Kenneth D. The Great War and Americans in Europe, 1914-1917. New York: Routledge, 2017 Rutherford, Ward. The Russian Army in World War I. London: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975. Saul, Norman E. War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914-1921. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Schindler, John R. Fall of the Double Eagle; The Battle for Galicia and the Demise of Austria-Hungary. Lincoln, NE:University of Nebraska Press, 2015. Spring, D. W. "The Trans-Persian Railway Project and Anglo-Russian Relations, 1909313
14." The Slavonic and East European Review 54, no. 1 (1976): 60-82. Stoff, Laurie. Sisters of Mercy in Russia’s Great War. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015. ______. “Sisters of Mercy in Russia’s Great War,” “Russia’s Great War and Revolution,” http://russiasgreatwar.org/media/homefront/sisters_of_mercy.shtml. Showalter, Dennis. Tannenberg, Clash of Empires, 1914. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1991. Stone, David R. The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2015. Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. Sweetman, John. Tannenburg 1914. London: Cassell, 2004. Stone, Norman. The Eastern Front, 1914-1917. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1998 Torrey, Glenn. The Romanian Battlefront in World War I. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2014. Gordon A. Tunstall. Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of 1915 Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010. __________. Written in Blood: The Battles for Fortress Przemsyl in WWI. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016. Walpole, Hugh. Hugh Walpole: A biography. By Rupert Hart-Davis. London: Macmillan&Co., 1952. Whisenhunt, William Benton and Norman E. Saul, eds. New Perspectives on RussianAmerican Relations. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis Group, 2016. Zirinsky, Michael. “American Presbyterian Missionaries at Urmia During the Great War.”http://www.iranchamber.com/religions/articles/american_presbyterian_missionarie s_zirinsky.pdf.
314
