An investigation into the socioeconomic aspects of

doi:10.1111/disa.12001

An investigation into the socioeconomic aspects of two major earthquakes in Iran Kambod Amini Hosseini Associate Professor and Director of Risk Management Research Centre, International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, Iran, Solmaz Hosseinioon Associate Researcher, International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, Iran, and Zhila Pooyan Assistant Professor, International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, Iran

An evaluation of the socioeconomic consequences of earthquakes is an essential part of the development of risk reduction and disaster management plans. However, these variables are not normally addressed sufficiently after strong earthquakes; researchers and relevant stakeholders focus primarily on the physical damage and casualties. The importance of the socioeconomic consequences of seismic events became clearer in Iran after the Bam earthquake on 26 December 2003, as demonstrated by the formulation and approval of various laws and ordinances. This paper reviews the country’s regulatory framework in the light of the socioeconomic aspects of two major and destructive earthquakes: in Manjil–Rudbar in 1990, and in Bam in 2003. The results take the form of recommendations and practical strategies for incorporating the socioeconomic dimensions of earthquakes in disaster risk management planning. The results presented here can be applied in other countries with similar conditions to those of Iran in order to improve public preparedness and risk reduction. Keywords: Bam (Iran), earthquake, Manjil (Iran), socioeconomic aspects

Introduction Earthquakes are one of the deadliest natural disasters in the world today. The number of seismic disasters averaged 29 per year between 2000 and 2009, with a mean death toll of 45,000 and more than eight million people directly affected per annum (IFRC, 2010). Moreover, earthquakes can result in major economic losses and damage. According to figures published by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, annual worldwide losses in earthquakes average USD 18 billion (IFRC, 2010). There are various reasons why damage has continued to rise, especially in developing countries: • increasing population density in towns and cities, leading to the development of more hazardous areas for residential settlement; • short-term economic considerations that are prevalent in the development strategies of many national and local governments, resulting in uncontrolled establishment of potentially high-risk areas; and • inadequate enforcement of planning laws, design requirements, and the quality of construction. © 2013 The Author(s). Journal compilation © Overseas Development Institute, 2013 Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

Kambod Amini Hosseini, Solmaz Hosseinioon, and Zhila Pooyan

The physical loss of buildings and infrastructure is not only damaging in the short term, but also it generates intangible losses such as a slowdown in economic growth and investment, as well as a decline in consumer confidence, potential earnings, and the production and quality of the workforce. These losses only become apparent over time as their nature and secondary effects are hard to predict in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake (Ove Arup, 2004). Depending on the location of the earthquake and its relation to concentrations of population and industry, the magnitude and value of losses will differ from place to place. These losses have been met by government and the private sector. For example, the distribution of losses in the earthquake in Kocaeli, Turkey, on 17 August 1999 shows that businesses met more than one-half of the costs of the disaster as compared to only 20 per cent paid by government (Couburn and Spence, 2002). Similar proportions can be observed in earthquakes in Iran and in other developing countries, highlighting the importance of planning to reduce the socioeconomic impacts of earthquakes and the need to compensate organisations in each sector of the economy.

Earthquake risk in Iran Owing to its location in an active part of the Alpine-Himalayan orogenic belt, Iran is one of the most seismically active parts of the world. Numerous active faults exist in different areas of the country—the main ones are depicted in Figure 1. Furthermore, seismicity studies of, and investigations into, historical earthquakes in recent decades and centuries in Iran reveal that the country has been continually affected by earthquakes of different sizes and will undoubtedly experience large earthquakes in the future. The records show that Iran may experience an average of one seismic event with a magnitude of 6.0 or higher each year and that there will be an event with a magnitude of at least 7.0 every 10 years (Amini Hosseini et al., 2009). However, irregular and unsustainable growth has occurred in most of Iran’s cities over the course of modern history, especially in recent decades, which has gradually and inexorably increased the vulnerability of the built environment to earthquakes. Construction near or along active faults, negligence with regard to the seismic resistance of buildings, infrastructure and lifelines, and improper development of urban structures and fabric all raise the propensity of future earthquakes to produce major damage and casualties in the country’s cities, as evinced by the heavy loss of life and widespread destruction in the Manjil and Bam earthquakes of 1990 and 2003, respectively. These issues highlight the need to prepare integrated disaster risk management plans for the whole country. Disaster management plans should be based on an accurate evaluation of earthquake risk in different parts of the country. Among the issues that should contribute to this evaluation are physical vulnerability, emergency response capabilities, public awareness and preparedness, and the socioeconomic conditions of communities. The last of these factors is relevant to all phases of risk and disaster management. However, this paper focuses on the vulnerability of communities, emergency response capacities, and reconstruction strategies, as these are all aspects that were highly relevant to the situation after strong earthquakes in Iran.

An investigation into the socioeconomic aspects of two major earthquakes in Iran

Figure 1. Map of active faults and the location of some strong earthquakes in Iran

Source: Hessami, Jamali, and Tabasi, 2003.

Socioeconomic considerations regarding disaster management laws and policies in Iran The disaster management system of Iran has undergone considerable improvements in recent years. In this respect, several laws and regulations have been approved at different levels, and some of them are relevant to the socioeconomic aspects of disaster risk reduction. For example, the national Constitution was approved in 1979 and revised 10 years later (Government of Iran, 1979, 1989). Articles 29 and 31 refer to the right to welfare and the right to decent housing, respectively. These provisions refer implicitly to the government’s responsibility to provide assistance to the population when disasters damage housing and render people destitute. Despite their importance to national life, though, the Constitution does not refer directly to disasters. The Iranian National Expediency Council approved a set of general policies on social activities in 2000. This document provided a means of developing and institutionalising


earthquake preparedness. The aim was to decrease the government’s share of responsibility by encouraging people to assume more responsibility in their own right, using the mass media, educational and cultural institutions, and religious centres to disseminate information. A Comprehensive Plan for Rescue and Relief was approved by the government in 2003 (Government of Iran, 2003). It paid some attention to the need to increase public participation and cooperation through education and awareness-raising measures, as well as to the need to organise volunteers into groups and networks. The general policies that are listed in the Iranian Fourth National Development Plan (Government of Iran, 2004), approved in 2004, also make indirect reference to the socioeconomic implications of a disaster. Article 18 seeks to improve cooperation between the people and the government and participation by the population in development. Article 34 refers to the achievement of sustainable economic growth, which is also related indirectly to the socioeconomic aspects of earthquakes, as these can slow it down and make it unsustainable. The executive programme of the Fourth Development Plan includes an Article (3) that offers financial assistance for retrofitting buildings in urban and rural areas, using income from taxation on petroleum products. Moreover, Article 30 provides financial support for the renovation of the urban fabric and Article 31 provides both incentives for retrofitting and sanctions for property owners who refuse to do so. Article 52 promotes public education and seismic awareness plans, whereas Article 83 allocates funds to disaster mitigation planning at all levels of government. Finally, Article 98 promotes public participation in sustainable development. A Special Development Document was written in 2005 for the purpose of reducing earthquake risk. It was based on the Fourth Development Plan, and included some policies for heightening society’s awareness of the means of living safely in earthquake hazard areas. The aim was to boost public participation and institutionalise the community’s role in earthquake risk reduction initiatives. This process included plans to develop applied research on public education, increases in funding for public education and the development of a safety culture, and strategies for enhancing public awareness of both earthquake hazards and the means of living safely in seismically active zones (Amini Hosseini et al., 2009). The Expediency Council approved a set of general policies on the prevention and mitigation of natural and anthropogenic risks in 2005. One of the most important parts of this was recognition of the need to promote public awareness and a culture of safety in communities that bear the greatest seismic risk (Amini Hosseini et al., 2009). In the latter context, one of the most important developments was the law of 2007 approving the establishment of a National Disaster Management Organisation (NDMO). Among its responsibilities, two tasks are related to socioeconomic issues. The first is the need to foster the work of community-based organisations (CBOs) and integrate it into different phases of disaster management. The second is the development of insurance and other financial compensation tools (Amini Hosseini et al., 2009). Table 1 summarises these laws and policies.


Table 1. Recent laws and policies in Iran that make direct or indirect reference to the socioeconomic implications of disaster Year

Law

Explanation

1989

Establishment of the Office of Unexpected Disasters in the Executive Deputy President section.

No direct reference to socioeconomic issues.

1990

–

Manjil earthquake.

1990

Transferring responsibility for rescue and relief coordination, temporary shelter, and reconstruction of earthquake-affected regions to the Ministry of Interior.

This change has been made to improve the capacity for emergency response after the Manjil earthquake. Again, though, the roles of local people were not considered.

1991

Establishment of the Provincial Taskforce in the Department of Unexpected Events.

The national budget for emergency response and reconstruction was distributed among provinces.

1993

Approval of the executive plan of the National Committee for Mitigation of Natural Disasters Effects.

The Sub-committee of Loss and Damage Compensation established.

2000

General policies on social activities were passed by the Iranian National Expediency Council.

Special attention to promoting public participation and reducing the government’s share of responsibility.

2002

–

Avaj earthquake.

2003

Cabinet approval of the master plan for rescue and relief.

Establishment of education sub-committees, promoting cooperation and awareness-raising.

2003

–

Bam earthquake.

2004

Approval of Iranian Fourth National Development Plan.

Promoting public participation and allocating a budget for risk reduction measures.

2005

Special Development Document.

Increasing public participation and institutionalising the community’s role in risk reduction.

2005

Approval by the Expediency Council of general policies to prevent and reduce risks of natural disasters.

Promoting public awareness and a culture of safety in communities.

2006

–

Silakhor earthquake.

2007

Law approving the establishment of the National Disaster Management Organisation (NDMO).

Developing insurance and other financial compensation tools and fostering the work of communitybased organisations.

It is clear that existing laws and regulations pay relatively little attention to the socioeconomic aspects of earthquakes. This is mainly due to the system of management and the hierarchy of power in Iran, which is top-down and tends not to take socioeconomic characteristics into account. The existing provisions are designed mostly to foster public awareness and participation in risk reduction and disaster management through the use of educational materials and by telling them what to do, not by involving them directly by letting non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and communities take direct action. However, some efforts have been made recently to study the socioeconomic aspects of risk management plans, including an assessment of the cost–benefit relationships with regard to retrofitting vulnerable structures and


renovating old urban fabric. Nevertheless, local earthquake risk managers have not been accorded priority in relation to socioeconomic factors. The consequences and implications of this are reviewed in the following sections, which evaluate the impacts of the largest earthquakes in Iran in recent times.

Socioeconomic impacts of recent earthquakes in Iran The following subsections detail challenges observed in the Manjil and Bam earthquakes according to the reports filed by a number of different organisations, including the International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology (IIEES), the Iranian Red Crescent Society, the Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of the Interior, and the National Welfare Organisation. The Manjil earthquake of 1990 The Manjil–Rudbar earthquake (magnitude 7.3) occurred in the Gilan and Zanjan Provinces of northern Iran on 21 June 1990. Approximately 40,000 people were killed, 60,000 were injured, and 500,000 were left homeless due to the collapse of more than 100,000 homes. Three cities (Loushan, Manjil, and Rudbar) and around 700 villages suffered severe devastation and another 300 villages on the northern side of the Alborz Mountains experienced heavy damage (Amini Hosseini et al., 2009). The most important socioeconomic issues stemming from this event are summarised below.

Social aspects The Manjil earthquake affected a very wide area, including cities and numerous villages. Prior to this event no attempt had been made to promote community participation in risk reduction and disaster management. The existing relief system was based on governmental, rather than community-based, activities. Hence the relief organisations had no plans or mechanisms with which to include local people in postevent initiatives. Owing largely to the low level of preparedness among the local authorities, the response to the disaster was far from satisfactory. Local residents, especially those in rural areas, tried to respond to the emergency, but without training, equipment or know-how. Predictably, the results were unsatisfactory. Moreover, the presence of large numbers of local spectators complicated relief efforts in urban areas. The Manjil earthquake clearly illustrated the need to promote public awareness and trained participation in disaster response. The wide-scale destruction caused by the Manjil earthquake led to severe and prolonged psychological problems among survivors. In the early stages these were exacerbated by the presence of unburied bodies and injured people who had not been rescued, as well as by harsh living conditions. An ill-considered shelter policy compounded the psychological problems, such as attempts to accommodate old people in special camps. This led to the splitting up of families and social fragmentation before the consequences were realised and these people were reunited with their own communities.


After the Manjil earthquake reconstruction planners paid little attention to what forms of housing are socially and culturally acceptable to residents, many of whom objected to what was provided. Although the intention was to ensure that rebuilt and new housing was earthquake-resistant, the necessary materials and expertise were not easily found in the disaster area. This resulted in an inefficient and questionable reconstruction that was contested by the beneficiaries, many of whom adapted the supplied housing, adding extensions that were at variance with the seismic resistance of the main structures. Groups that participated in the rescue and relief efforts came from different parts of Iran and their members lacked familiarity with local socio-cultural conditions. Although there were different ethnic and social groups in the affected area, they were all treated in the same way. That relief teams ignored differences in culture, language, and social structures led to friction with local communities. Hence, there were problems of communication between residents and relief teams, which reduced the ability of the latter to help people resume their daily lives. Consequently, people lost interest in cooperating with the relief endeavours. Moreover, public administrators who were sent to the disaster area from other parts of the country were in contact with limited numbers of survivors and thus did not form a clear picture of the conditions of the affected population as a whole. This led to difficulties in implementing recovery plans and having them accepted by the beneficiaries. Finally, in the disaster area women perform a very important role in household management and daily work, but the recovery task forces neglected this aspect, regarding only men as significant human resources. This added to the delays and inefficiencies of recovery and reconstruction (Shadi Talab, 1994).

Economic aspects Economic losses caused by the Manjil earthquake amounted to roughly 3.4 per cent of Iranian gross domestic product (GPD) (at 1990 levels) and 40 per cent of the GDP of Gilan and Zanjan Provinces (Ashtiany and Mousavi, 2001). In fact, in local areas, economic activities were severely reduced or stopped completely for several months after the event. Of 196,774 residential and non-residential buildings that suffered severe damage, 6.6 per cent were located in urban areas and 93.4 per cent in rural zones. Moreover, of 15,214,719 square metres of damaged property, 69.6 per cent was situated in Gilan Province, 28.4 per cent in Zanjan, and the remaining 2.0 per cent in East Azerbaijan. Hence, the impact was disproportionately shared among the affected provinces. Damage and casualties were increased by a lack of local knowledge of retrofitting techniques, a shortage of skilled workers in the construction trades, and low household incomes, especially in rural areas. The Manjil earthquake led to the loss of some 37,000 jobs and increased unemployment rates by 36 per cent. During reconstruction efforts, the recovery of economic activities and livelihoods was not considered a priority and emphasis was placed squarely on the reconstruction of residential buildings. The result was an increase in financial problems, poverty, and crime in the affected areas. The economic coping strategies


of local people varied quite considerably: about 38 per cent used their own savings to get by; 33 per cent asked for money from family members; 4.5 per cent were supported by the Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran and other charities; 4.5 per cent received unemployment benefit from the government; and 20 per cent engaged in miscellaneous economic activities. In addition, the loss of 90 per cent of cattle in the area caused stock farmers severe hardship (Sahdi Talab, 1994). Indebtedness affected approximately 200,000 people who sought reconstruction loans from banks. Although government-sponsored loans were based on low interest rates and long periods of repayment, many recipients did not understand the terms, treating them more as grants. In any case, the insufficiency of such financing led many people to seek multiple loans from different sources, increasing their indebtedness. Some people ended up selling their furniture and household possessions to remain solvent. In sum, a lack of clarity in relation to the financial conditions associated with the reconstruction process led many survivors to delay rebuilding while they waited for guidance from the government, prolonging the reconstruction period. The Bam earthquake of 2003 An earthquake of magnitude 6.5 occurred in Bam in the southern Iranian Province of Kerman at 05:56 local time on 26 December 2003. The city and neighbouring villages suffered catastrophic damage, affecting a population of some 142,000 people, of whom 26,271 died, and around 30,000 were injured, and 100,000 were left homeless. In one town, Baravat, not a single building was left standing, while 85 per cent of buildings and infrastructure were destroyed in Bam (Hisada, Shibayama, and Ghayamghamian, 2005). Once again, socioeconomic conditions had a significant bearing on response and recovery processes.

Social aspects Social conditions in Bam were quite different from those in Manjil, but yet again the planning for response and recovery took little account of the socio-cultural aspects of the population of survivors. At the outset, relief efforts were initiated to a large degree by local communities, as outside assistance was quite slow to arrive. However, local people lacked expertise, training, and equipment for such activities. There were various reasons why public participation rapidly tailed off after the initial phase of the disaster. Most notably, no plans existed to involve the community in recovery activities. In any case, the high death toll debilitated the local response, as did the considerable mental stress of the survivors (see Table 2). Moreover, some relief teams behaved improperly and some relief goods were unfairly distributed, which added to the lack of cooperation between emergency responders and their beneficiaries (Samadi, 2004; Khazai and Hausler, 2005). Table 2 shows that survivors of the Bam earthquake experienced severe mental and psychological problems, which adversely affected their behaviour. However, the National Welfare Organisation and the Red Crescent Society carried out some activities


Table 2. The most common signs and symptoms of mental disorder among the Bam earthquake survivors (1,000 cases)* Signs and symptoms

Number

Having disturbing thoughts

240

Feeling of loneliness

180

Anxiety about the future

160

Sleeplessness

143

Aggression and nervousness

105

Despair and hopelessness

103

Family problems

101

Sense of isolation

101

Forgetfulness

98

Educational problems

91

Fear

74

Nightmares

66

Addiction

58

Loss of appetite

59

Feeling of sinfulness

55

Communication problems

34

Suicide

5

Other cases: nail biting, hyperactivity, suspicion and personality problems**

–

* Some people experienced more than one symptom. ** Number not recorded. Source: Samadi, 2004.

to improve the social situation and the mental health of the survivors, including counselling services—with assistance from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)— and setting up mental health care centres in the worst-affected areas, showing films, donating books and toys, and organising games for children. It was the first time that such activities had occurred in Iran and the effect on survivors was decidedly beneficial. Other social impacts of the earthquake can be summarised as follows (Moghimi, 2010): • the large proportion of casualties and harsh post-disaster conditions damaged or curtailed social networks and family relations; • cultural differences led to friction between the survivors and the contractors and labourers dispatched to the affected areas to assist with reconstruction; • a lack of fairness in the distribution of temporary housing resulted in disputes and rancour among the survivors, which tended to emphasise socio-cultural differences;


• levels of criminal activity increased, largely due to high rates of unemployment; • school attendance rates dropped owing to the psychological problems of pupils and teachers; and • heroin usage rates soared after the earthquake—Bam is located on a supply route for drugs produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan. By 2006, more than 50 per cent of men and 15 per cent of women were estimated to have become addicted. Addiction among construction workers slowed down reconstruction activities (Tait, 2006).

Economic aspects With levels of destruction (see Figure 2) in the epicentral area averaging between 85 and 90 per cent, it is not surprising that 15,935 residential and 10,176 non-residential buildings were totally destroyed, while 740 and 1,641, respectively, were severely damaged. Bam is—or was—a centre of tourism and the near-total destruction of the citadel (the Arg), along with the devastation of industrial premises and commercial sites, caused unemployment to proliferate. The situation was not helped by the use of external sources of labour for reconstruction work. Many residents who received reconstruction money from banks ended up having to default on their loans. In most cases, though, the loans were not sufficient, owing to increases in the price of construction materials. Hence, many houses are likely to remain partially completed for years to come. Figure 2. Distribution of earthquake damage in Bam and neighbouring Baravat


Source: Amini Hosseini et al., 2009.

In the rural area approximately 12 per cent of farmers were killed, which caused difficulties in the management of citrus orchards and palm groves. The earthquake seriously damaged Qanats (traditional underground irrigation channels) and water wells, leading to shortages of water for agricultural use. Consequently, agricultural production in the local area sunk to about one-half of its normal level. The Government


of Iran and various NGOs allocated USD 2.5 million to support the agricultural sector. This enabled 30 per cent of the refrigerated storage capacity for dates to be reconstructed promptly. Cooperatives started to buy the dates to prevent further economic damage to producers. International assistance designed to reactivate the agricultural sector was mostly focused on the reconstruction of water supply systems, namely Qanats and underground storage tanks ( JICA, 2004). Finally, many stock farmers were obliged to sell their cattle to meet their short-term needs, impacting seriously on the economy of rural areas. The restoration of the citadel, the Arg-e-Bam, was considered a priority as it was on the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s list of world heritage sites. The seriousness of the damage and the complexity of the site have meant that reconstruction could not be completed in only a few years. This and other damage to the city diminished the role of Bam as a tourist centre and resulted in job losses in this sector. Retail businesses were severely affected by the Bam earthquake, which totally destroyed the traditional bazaar and many newer commercial premises. However, retail activity quickly resumed on a limited basis from tents and prefabricated units situated near to the original shops. Industry was less affected, as the main sites were located 20 kilometres from the epicentre. However, deaths and injuries among workers meant that production lines were closed for several months. Finally, many artisans’ workshops in Bam and neighbouring Baravat were destroyed.

Common socioeconomic challenges after the Manjil and Bam earthquakes The Bam earthquake occurred 12 years after the Manjil disaster, and during the intervening period considerable progress was made in improving the disaster management system of Iran. Yet, some of the problems encountered in Manjil were repeated in Bam, especially with respect to socioeconomic factors. These issues, discussed in the following subsections, have not been taken into account adequately in the laws, procedures, and ongoing programmes for managing disasters, which may mean that the problems are destined to recur in the next major earthquake in Iran. Social aspects The social issues that were common to both the Manjil and Bam earthquakes are as follows: first, changes occurred in relations between families, kinship groups, and communities as a result of the physical impact of the disasters. Second, public participation in relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities was insufficient. Third, the post-disaster influx of workers from outside the affected areas led to friction and culture clashes. Fourth, survivors lost confidence in government officials and public administrators, who were deemed to have neglected their duties and commitments. In both disasters, living conditions after the event were harsh and this reality produced


increases in rates of crime and drug addiction. Although the situation had improved by the time of the Bam earthquake, there was still a notable lack of attention to the mental health problems of survivors. Lastly, another persistent problem was the poor quality of information dissemination and unequal distribution of relief goods, which led some survivors in both disasters to feel discriminated against. Economic aspects Various economic problems persisted from the Manjil to the Bam earthquakes: first, in both cases, damage assessments were inadequate for reconstruction planning and funding. Budget allocations for reconstruction proved insufficient because of a lack of attention to potential inflation. In the provision of loans for reconstruction, insufficient attention was accorded to local economic conditions. Bureaucratic delays and administrative difficulties slowed down the provision of financial support and loans to survivors. Finally, the destruction of livelihoods and workplaces produced increases in unemployment, shortages of jobs, and reductions in investment, problems exacerbated by a reliance on imported labour to perform the reconstruction.

Recommendations for the inclusion of socioeconomic considerations in earthquake risk reduction and disaster management In the light of global experiences (see, for example, Karanci and Aksit, 2000; Mattingly, 2000; Shin, 2004) and bearing in mind the lessons of recent earthquakes in Iran, the authors have proposed numerous recommendations to the country’s authorities to ensure that socioeconomic factors are considered in future disaster management and recovery plans. Many of these observations apply to other middle-income states with similar conditions to those of Iran. Promoting public participation Most of the social problems observed in the Manjil and the Bam earthquakes were due to low levels of public awareness of disaster management and insufficient public participation in risk reduction programmes. Given the differences in cultural and socioeconomic conditions between different parts of the country, there is no unique prescription for remedying these problems. In mega-cities such as Tehran, socio economic conditions vary substantially even at the district level (Nateghi, 2001). For example, a study carried out in Tehran in 2009 demonstrated that public participation in risk reduction activities can be promoted via community-based activities in southern districts, which are mainly inhabited by low-income groups that have strong social networks. Individual activities showed more promise in the more wealthy northern areas of the city ( JICA and TDMMO, 2009). This highlights the need to evaluate local socioeconomic conditions prior to planning and implementing programmes designed to foster public participation in risk reduction activities.


Another important way to improve participation is to concentrate on schools, but taking account of the particular characteristics of different parts of the education system (Shiwaku, 2010). The main purpose of disaster education in schools is to increase awareness of disasters and cultivate the basic ability of students to participate in preparedness and response activities. To achieve this, it is necessary to use the whole educational system effectively, in such a way as to bring the notions developed in the schools into homes and the community. This requires the preparation of a disaster education programme and the appointment of educational staff with specific competencies in this field. To cultivate life-long abilities in disaster mitigation, preparedness needs to be integrated fully into the school curriculum, and special activities need to be arranged both in the school and on an extra-curricular basis. The qualities and skills that need to be developed in school students are as follows: • a positive attitude to disaster preparedness and a maturity of judgement; • a volunteer mindset that encourages students to work in the local community; and • acquisition of basic knowledge of disasters, the local environment, and techniques of preparedness, first aid, mitigation, and emergency response. In addition, school facilities need to be managed in ways that reduce risks. Dangers need to be recognised and ameliorated. First aid and safety measures need to be Table 3. Effects of improved public awareness on disaster preparedness Under normal conditions: • increasing knowledge of earthquakes; • increasing knowledge of disaster mitigation; • liaising and communicating with disaster-related organisations and local self-help groups; • understanding the vulnerability of the local area; • ensuring that water resources are available for the extinguishing of fires in the area; • disaster preparedness and prevention of fire at home; • creating and managing information transmission systems in the local area; • setting up evacuation routes and medical facilities; and • amassing and managing equipment and tools for disaster management. During emergencies: • prevention and extinguishing of fires; • rescuing the injured; • ensuring the safety of local residents; • collecting and disseminating information on damage; • conducting evacuation and accommodating students in shelters; • supplying food and water; • supporting neighbouring areas; • cooperating with emergency response and reconstruction initiatives; and • reducing psychological problems in the aftermath of the event. Source: JICA and TDMMO, 2004.


installed. Hence, there need to be frequent safety checks of facilities and equipment. Moreover, emergency information and communication systems need to be developed both for schools and for the external environment. Emergency equipment needs to be stored, maintained, and managed. Plans need to be drawn up for the reopening of schools, if necessary in temporary premises, after a disaster and for the psychological care of their students. Schools should have staff for in-house disaster management and for disaster education. These personnel should be active under normal and emergency conditions. Moreover, schools also should have a disaster management committee to engage in planning activities, periodic reviews of plans, and the preparation of educational materials, and to cooperate closely with students’ families, local communities, and disaster management organisations. These activities will also require training of the participants and the protagonists. Table 3 shows some of the ways in which improved awareness can stimulate preparedness activities, especially when organised through educational activities. Organising community-level disaster management groups and systems It is something of a misassumption that trained professionals provide initial assistance in a disaster. In many cases local citizens are the first responders, and cooperation between neighbours undoubtedly has saved many lives (Helsloot and Ruitenberg, 2004). In addition, collaboration between ordinary citizens and disaster relief organisations can shorten response times and increase the efficiency of actions taken. The importance of CBOs in risk reduction and emergency response planning has been studied in various countries, including Australia (EMA, 1992), Indonesia (Prasodjo, 2007), Japan (Wachtendorf and Tierney, 2001), and Nepal (Dixit, 2004). These experiences demonstrate the importance of increasing the awareness and the capacity of local people and of establishing citizen-based organisations. Existing community-based groups and NGOs that have close relationships with local communities should be used, educated, and activated for disaster risk reduction activities. If no such group exists in a particular area, a new community disaster response group may be set up, so that neighbours can get together and cooperate actively and systematically. To make this process work, the groups require injections of technical knowledge and funding. Once such groups are established, they can play multiple roles in disaster reduction and in ensuring the general safety and liveability of the community. Disaster drills can help to enlighten local people and encourage them to participate in appropriate ways. The resultant groups will be able to perform important tasks such as fighting fires, rescuing people, bringing relief to the suffering, collecting information, and managing evacuation sites. There are several very significant challenges to the establishment of CBOs for disaster response in Iran. The country lacks laws and regulations designed to support this kind of activity. The high degree of centralisation of its disaster management system means that the authorities tend to neglect the role of CBOs. Finally, financial and technical capacities are currently too limited to offer much support. Hence, for


a start, better use needs to be made of existing NGOs and CBOs and legislation is required. Local government needs to be encouraged to provide appropriate support to stimulate the growth of this sector. Developing a natural hazards insurance system Reconstruction activities can impose unexpected and heavy economic burdens on governments and national institutions in developing countries. Despite the inexorable rise in levels of damage in such countries, many of them have inefficient and largely ineffective insurance industries. Consequently, the share of costs borne by local insurance and reinsurance companies is very small, usually less than one per cent, whereas it may exceed 40 per cent in developed countries. The Iranian insurance market is controlled by the Iran Central Insurance Company, which is affiliated to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and is a form of supervisory body that controls the insurance market and functions as a domestic reinsurer. Some private insurance companies have emerged as a result of the privatisation policies of the central government since 2002. Although this can be considered as a first step in the right direction, further reform is needed. There are several key considerations in this respect: first, it is the primary responsibility of the Government of Iran to promote insurance coverage for natural disasters such as earthquakes. At present it does not even insure its own assets, including those that are part of the national cultural heritage. This sends the wrong signal to society. It would be advisable for the country to consider moving towards a form of compulsory insurance of assets against a natural disaster. Moreover, the central function of the Iran Central Insurance Company (ICIC, 2005) should be reviewed with a view to turning it into a regulatory body that is only concerned with financial supervision and control of the private insurance companies. The present policy of regulating insurance limits competition within the insurance sector and thus restricts growth and the size of the national insurance market. Even more importantly, there needs to be a detailed examination of the question of whether natural disaster insurance should be voluntary or compulsory. In addition, there should be a close evaluation of whether to introduce a ‘ceiling system’, as is the case in Japan, in which property assets can be insured up to a certain maximum value only, regardless of their actual market value, or an ‘open system’ that would allow one to insure up to market values minus depreciation, or up to the replacement cost of assets ( JICA and TDMMO, 2004). In the absence of a thorough assessment of the options, it would not be prudent to make detailed recommendations. However, experience in other disaster-prone countries helps to make the point. Notably, any insurance scheme would have minimum capital requirements to ensure that claims can be settled after major disasters. Such a scheme would also need to be regulated with regard to margins of solvency. Moreover, exchange controls, if any, should be established in line with World Trade Organization (WTO) standards. The adequacy of the existing ratios should be considered critically in the light of reserve requirements. This issue needs to be appraised in close connection with tax and tax deductibility issues, as operating margins determine an


organisation’s capacity to make specific reserve provisions for catastrophic perils before such an event occurs. The core concern is that, if a major disaster happens, the hazard to be mitigated may turn into a liquidity crunch that provokes a run on the insurance system. This is one reason why a strong and effective regulatory system is needed. Finally, France, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, the United States, and various Caribbean and Latin American countries have in place disaster insurance schemes in one form or another that include catastrophe bonds, contingent surplus notes, catastrophe equity pools, and catastrophe swaps. It is not appropriate here to discuss the different systems in detail, but one should note that there is a wealth of experience that Iran could draw on to develop its own system for transferring catastrophic risk to capital markets and catastrophe insurance pools. Establishment of a catastrophe insurance pool Owing to the limitations of the insurance industry and socioeconomic conditions more generally, there has recently been an upsurge of interest in developing countries in the establishment of catastrophe insurance pools. Unexpectedly high losses in the Northridge earthquake of 1994 led to the establishment of the California Earthquake Authority (CEA), which operates as a natural disaster pool. Along with reinsurance coverage, this pool has the capacity to pay out up to USD 7.5 billion after a disaster (Palm, 1995). Another successful example is the New Zealand Earthquake Commission, which can disburse up to USD 5 billion (Parr, 1994). Furthermore, after the devastating Marmara earthquake of 1999 that claimed 17,127 lives and caused billions of dollars of damage to the economy, the Government of Turkey launched the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP) in collaboration with a major international financing institution. The TCIP is modelled on the CEA and New Zealand Earthquake Commission, which provide similar earthquake coverage for homeowners and which rely mainly on international reinsurance and capital markets for their risk capital capacity. In fulfilment of a government decree, the TCIP was set up as a separate state-owned legal entity with its own board and management and a remit to provide compulsory earthquake insurance to all residential dwellings registered in Turkey. The pool provides coverage of up to USD 25,000 for each dwelling for a premium that varies across the country depending on seismicity, local soil conditions and the type and quality of construction (Yazici, 2005). Other examples are The Fund for Natural Disaster in Mexico (FONDEN) , the Natural Catastrophe Insurance System of France (CatNat) , and the Norwegian Natural Perils Pool (Norsk Naturskadepool). Currently, 11 national pools of natural disasters exist in 10 different countries. Similar pools may be established in other countries, based on how their socioeconomic conditions enable the award of compensation for the impacts of natural disasters. Socioeconomic impact assessment for future earthquake scenarios A socioeconomic impact assessment can be used to examine how an earthquake will change the lives of the current and the future residents of a community. However, it is not easy to quantify the changes in social and economic conditions that will arise from future earthquakes. The main indicators include changes in the demographic


characteristics of the community, potential effects of an earthquake on services and the housing market, changes in employment and income levels, and alterations to the quality of life (Burdge et al., 1995; Chadwick, 1995). At the same time, it is vital in the area of decision-making to take account of the perceptions of community members of how an earthquake is likely to affect their lives. The assessment should also consider what government programmes can be used to reduce disaster risks. It can serve to indicate the best means of achieving this through a combination of impact avoidance, mitigation, and compensation by providing substitute facilities, resources, and opportunities.

Conclusion This paper has considered the role of socioeconomic conditions at the community level in fostering risk reduction and disaster management activities in Iran. It is clear that earthquakes can impact significantly on the social and economic conditions of life and can lead to problems such as a failure to clear rubble in a timely manner, to care adequately for injured and homeless people, and to provide basic necessities to the survivors. Although these problems are complex and thus difficult to remedy, more foresight and better preparedness could achieve much. Mitigation measures need to be applied to both the built environment and to the social fabric—that is, individuals and their organisations and social groups. With the relentless rise in consequences and losses, existing systems for providing assistance in many developing countries are fast reaching the point at which they will no longer work. New mechanisms need to be devised. In doing so, one should bear in mind that, while certain individuals and groups may be very active and forthcoming in providing input to the planning process, others, such as low-income and minority groups, may be less able or willing to participate, yet their vulnerability level may be as high, or even higher, than that of the mainstream groups. In such cases, programmes to increase public awareness and provide more effective assistance need to be tailored to local conditions.

Acknowledgements This paper reports on some of the findings of two projects carried out by the senior author and his colleagues at the International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology (IIEES) and at the Tehran Disaster Mitigation and Management Organization (TDMMO). The technical and financial support of both institutions is gratefully acknowledged.

Correspondence Kambod Amini Hosseini, Risk Management Research Centre, International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology (IIEES), 21 West Arghavan Avenue, North Dibajee Street, Shahid Lavasani Street (Farmaniyeh), Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran. Telephone: +98 21 2283 1116; e-mail: [email protected].


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