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WMR32210.1177/0734242X13517161Waste Management & ResearchBaird et al.

Original Article

An overview of waste crime, its characteristics, and the vulnerability of the EU waste sector

Waste Management & Research 2014, Vol. 32(2) 97­–105 © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0734242X13517161 wmr.sagepub.com

J Baird1,2, R Curry1,2 and P Cruz1,2

Abstract While waste is increasingly viewed as a resource to be globally traded, increased regulatory control on waste across Europe has created the conditions where waste crime now operates alongside a legitimate waste sector. Waste crime,is an environmental crime and a form of white-collar crime, which exploits the physical characteristics of waste, the complexity of the collection and downstream infrastructure, and the market opportunities for profit. This paper highlights some of the factors which make the waste sector vulnerable to waste crime. These factors include new legislation and its weak regulatory enforcement, the economics of waste treatment, where legal and safe treatment of waste can be more expensive than illegal operations, the complexity of the waste sector and the different actors who can have some involvement, directly or indirectly, in the movement of illegal wastes, and finally that waste can be hidden or disguised and creates an opportunity for illegal businesses to operate alongside legitimate waste operators. The study also considers waste crime from the perspective of particular waste streams that are often associated with illegal shipment or through illegal treatment and disposal. For each, the nature of the crime which occurs is shown to differ, but for each, vulnerabilities to waste crime are evident. The paper also describes some approaches which can be adopted by regulators and those involved in developing new legislation for identifying where opportunities for waste crime occurs and how to prevent it. Keywords End-of-life vehicles, illegal, regulation, tyres, vulnerability, waste crime, waste electronic and electrical equipment

Introduction Background The European Union (EU) aims to become a resource-efficient, green, and competitive low-carbon economy and ‘the most resource-efficient economy in the world’, as outlined in its proposal ‘Living well, within the limits of our plant’, a proposal for an Environmental Action Plan to 2020. Its strategy for growth, Europe 2020, identifies resource efficiency as essential to securing employment and growth in an increasingly crowded world (EEA, 2012a; EU COM, 2011). In 2007, the EU-27 used 8.2 billion tonnes of materials, an increase of 7.8% from 2000 (Eurostat, 2010a), 30% of which were imported, making the EU-27 the highest net importer of resources on a per-capita basis (EEA, 2012a). In 2009, as a result of the economic downturn, resource use within EU-27 had fallen to 7.3 billion tonnes, or 15 tonnes per person per year. So with the development of a Europe where resource consumption continues to grow, but which recognizes that effective waste management can return some of these resources back into the economic cycle, waste has become a global commodity, often traded across boundaries within Europe and beyond (EEA, 2009). However, some of the drivers are not always based on the demand for recycled materials, but rather are the result of increased regulatory control through EU legislation and national targets for recovery. The size of the waste industry, its complexity, and the nature of waste (it can be disguised and mixed), means that there

are significant opportunities for criminals to engage alongside legitimate waste businesses. However, as the paper will highlight, waste crime is often a ‘victimless’ or unknown crime (Daele et al., 2007), conducted by individuals working within or close to the sector. This lack of visibility means it is impossible to determine or quantify the extent of waste crime. However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest the problem is significant, and for some wastes, the crime manifests itself in particular ways, as either illegal shipment for export to developing countries with poor environmental controls, or through the illegal storage and disposal of waste.

Environmental crime According to Interpol, environmental crime is a serious and growing international problem and includes both pollution-based 1School

of Engineering and the Built Environment, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK. 2Institute for a Sustainable World, Queens University, Belfast, UK Corresponding author: Jim Baird, Glasgow Caledonian University, Cowcaddens Road, Glasgow, G4 0BA, UK. Email: [email protected]

98 crime and wildlife crime. Pollution-based crime, includes waste crime which occurs through the illegal trading and disposal of hazardous waste or through the wider contravention of national and international waste laws (www.interpol.int). An environmental crime Summit led by Interpol in Lyon 2012 highlighted some of the challenges which need to be addressed in relation to environmental crime (Andrade, 2012): •• Environmental crime has serious and adverse effects on the planet, biodiversity, and human life and needs to receive higher attention on the political agenda nationally, regionally, and globally. •• Environmental crime is interconnected with other types of crime, including corruption, tax evasion, and drugs trafficking. •• Environmental crime requires increased attention from all components of the law enforcement chain, from police officers on the ground to the judicial system. •• Problems of investigation and operational support is exacerbated by multinational law enforcement operations with a need to integrate environmental crime into main stream crime. In recognition of these challenges Interpol established a Pollution Crime Working Group which, as part of their remit, focused on the problem of illegal shipment of hazardous electrical waste.

Environmental crime in the waste sector Waste crime is a significant subset of environmental crime. Almer and Goeschl (2010), in a study of environmental crime in southwest Germany, reported that 65% of all environmental crime related to illegal activities associated with waste. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) in their annual enforcement reports, show that waste related crime, statutory notices, and final warning letters represent around half of all enforcement measures (SEPA, 2012). Waste crime is often regarded as a victimless or unknown crime, which in most cases leads to waste crime going unreported or, by the time the criminal activity is uncovered, the offenders may have moved elsewhere. As such there will be fewer complaints from the public, making the task for environmental regulatory agencies more challenging. The true extent of waste crime, therefore, will continue to remain largely unknown (Daele et al., 2007). However, some indication of the extent of waste crime has been reported through the work of the EU Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL), who conduct studies across Europe to encourage better implementation of environmental law. Their Transfrontier Shipment cluster is mainly concerned with the effective implementation of the EU Waste Shipment Regulations (WSR; EC Regulation 1013/2006) and Basel Convention (www.basel.int), which seeks to place restrictions on transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. The Enforcement Action II project (IMPEL, 2011) describes a series of shipment inspections which occurred over a 2-year period (2008–2010) with the participation of 29

Waste Management & Research 32(2) European countries. Of the 21,670 shipments physically inspected, 18% of these were waste-related, and of these, 21% were shown to be in violation of the EU WSR. The inspection ‘samples’ were determined from both targeted and random searches, making it difficult to generalize about the extent of illegal shipments. Of the 833 waste shipments found to be in violation, 52% related to administrative violations (mainly relating to missing or incomplete documentation or contamination issues). However, the remaining 48% could be regarded as more serious illegal exports where either notification to the regulatory agencies should have been made or where export was explicitly prohibited (hazardous waste). In terms of specific materials, the violations could be summarized as paper and cardboard (18%), metals (16%) and plastic (16%). All had missing documentation (errors in paperwork) or contamination issues (possibly unacceptable levels of contrary materials). Waste electronic and electrical equipment (WEEE) (14%) was subject to an export bans or missing documentation, while end-of-life vehicles (ELVs)/vehicle parts/tyres (5%) were illegal exports without notification. This work might suggest that up to one-fifth of all containers exported from the EU contain waste and that, of these, around one-fifth will be in violation of national waste regulations, either as administrative violations or more serious export bans.

Characteristics of waste crime Causes of waste crime Several studies have highlighted some of the principal causes of waste crime (Dorn et al., 2007; Bisschop, 2012; Massari and Monzini, 2004; Van Erp and Huisman, 2010). Legislation/weak enforcement. A study of organized waste crime in Italy (Massari and Monzini, 2004) suggested that legislation and weak enforcement can stimulate evasion. The resources needed to ensure a waste sector fully complies with national/international regulations can be prohibitively expensive. Tyres is one example where the EU Directive on the Landfill of Waste (1999/31EC) introduced a ban on tyres from landfill. Over the past 3 years, Environmental Data Services (ENDS; www.ends.co.uk) has reported a significant increase in successful prosecutions for the illegal disposal of tyres suggesting a lack of markets for tyre waste. So while legislation can stimulate new crimes such as the fly tipping of tyres, it can also criminalize previously acceptable disposal activities, for example through the tightening of environmental standards at landfills or at car recovery facilities. Increased costs of legal operations.  New legislation will lead to higher environmental standards for treatment, leading to increased costs and therefore making illegal operations more financially attractive. In a competitive market for waste services, producers will seek the lowest price, creating the opportunity for illegal operators to undercut legitimate operators (Van Erp and Huisman, 2010). Illegal operators will then compete in the market for the waste, undercutting legitimate treatment operations. Indeed the economics of waste crime are very attractive to illegal operators, where the illegal activity can offer savings of 200–300% on the

Baird et al. legal and safe treatment and disposal of the same waste (Dorn et al., 2007). Unlike the normal supply and demand for products and services, the waste producer is supplying both the waste commodity and the payment. At the point of transaction, the waste can have a negative value which is determined by the cost to provide further treatment, recovery, or safe disposal set against the value of any materials or components which can be recovered. This negative value of waste is a unique characteristic of the waste sector. Waste producers may believe their waste is being handled legally, but often do not have enough interest to affirm this. There is no obvious mechanism, other than a duty of care, for the producer to know that his waste contractor has managed his waste safely. Furthermore, consolidation and mergers within the sector have also placed increased pressure on smaller operators, who, through economies of scale, may be less able to compete in the market and may be tempted to become involved in illegal activities. Price inelasticity of waste.  It is suggested (Daele et al., 2007) that the price inelasticity of waste is an important factor, where the demand for waste treatment remains relatively unaffected with an increase in price for services. This inelasticity occurs because the amount of waste treatment required in the market is set by EU legislation or national targets and where demand cannot reduce with an increase in price. The study suggested that this is a particular vulnerability where a lack of competition and cartels might lead to price fixing. However, there is no evidence to support a lack of competition in the waste market. Waste as a global commodity/asymmetry of regulation. Greater level levels turns waste into a material commodity and since waste can be created, stored, treated, and disposed anywhere, a potential global market for waste opens up (Tompson and Chainey, 2011). Much of this trade is needed and necessary in a world where the production of goods, and therefore the demand for raw materials, will most likely come from Asia. Waste is also traded within Europe (with less restriction on shipment) to countries with the necessary treatment and recovery infrastructure (EEA, 2012b). This global trade combined with asymmetries in regulation and enforcement between countries creates the opportunity for waste to flow to developing countries, which lack may lack the regulatory mechanisms to protect themselves from the illegal import of waste (Dorn et al., 2007). Furthermore, the associated revenue from waste brokers in the country of origin and from the sale of recovered materials can be viewed as making a valuable contribution to a developing country’s GDP (Bisschop, 2012). . This is a particular concern for WEEE, which is regarded as hazardous in the EU context and therefore cannot be exported to non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. In the context of a major Belgian study, Bisschop (2012), explains that the asymmetries associated with regulatory control across countries leads to jurisdiction hopping and tighter EU control, giving rise to illegal trading of waste. Complexity of businesses and actors.  The business structure of the waste sector is particularly complex with many actors involved: waste producers, waste management companies, transport and shipping companies, waste treatment operators, and shipping agents and waste brokers. Some waste streams are further complicated by the use of compliance schemes, which

99 assume the obligations of providing evidence of the recovery of a particular waste on behalf of the waste producer. While the regulatory controls are applied to organizations involved in physical production, storage transport, and treatment and disposal of waste, waste brokers do not come into contact with the waste and their role in illegal activities becomes particularly difficult to ascertain. Reported prosecutions point to few waste brokers being sanctioned for illegal waste activities (Daele et al., 2007). Since waste crime can be characterized as white-collar crime (Benson et al., 2009), it is difficult to distinguish between the legal and illegal actors and the nature of the interface between them. Legal actors are individuals or waste businesses operating within and complying with national and international regulations. Illegal actors are not. This creates difficulties for waste producers and legitimate waste management companies looking to use the services for others, but also for regulatory authorities in identifying illegal operators. Passas (2002) suggests this legal– illegal interface can have both antithetical or symbiotic relationships. Antithetical relationships can be antagonistic, with illegal waste operators acting in competition with legal operators, but also injurious, parasitical, or predatory relationships towards legal waste operators may exist. Similarly, symbiotic relationships, such as outsourcing where the illegal waste activity may be undertaken by an illegal actor as part of a contracted relationship, or in collaboration, cooption or reciprocity, and synergy. For waste crime, some antithetical and sysmbiotic relationships will be more developed than others. Furthermore, the legal actor may not be aware of a relationship with an illegal actor. Europol highlighted illegal waste trafficking in their report on the threats to the EU from organized crime (Europol, 2011). It suggested that, while mafia style structures are able to participate in large-scale illegal waste management, there is evidence that smaller organizational structures are involved in the illegal export of waste and that these structures cooperate with legitimate businesses in the financial services, import/export, and metal recycling sectors. The Scottish Borders Council (SBC, 2011) highlights the importance of brokers and traders to the shipment of WEEE to Africa. These African-based waste tourist and brokers serve the European–African trade routes, either with small family-based and larger well-organized trading firms. They are difficult to track and often use false passports to periodically visit the EU to secure WEEE. Brokers are also linked to the legal/ illegal interface as legal intermediaries for illegal shipments. Also involved are metal dealers known to feed into illegal transports. Shipping lines and terminal lines could be accused of a lack of due diligence, whereas shipping agents and expeditors may play a more deliberate role. Nature and physical appearance of waste.  By its very nature, waste can be mixed or disguised (Interpol, 2009). Mirror entries for hazardous waste in the EU List of Wastes provide an opportunity to falsely declare hazardous waste as nonhazardous for export. Plastic, metals, paper, and cardboard sent for export may contain excessive levels of contamination, suggesting the material is being sent for disposal rather than recovery. Some wastes,

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Waste Management & Research 32(2)

Table 1.  Reported waste crime incidents. Year

  2011 2012 2013 (9 months)

Type of waste crime Shipment

Illegal storage and disposal

– – 5

8 10 14

Criminal linked to legitimate waste business

4 3 8

Materials WEEE

Tyres

ELVs

Construction

Mixed

– – 2

1 2 2

3 1 1

– 2 3

4 5 11

Source: Environmental Data Services report (www.ends.co.uk). ELVs, end-of-life vehicles; WEEE, waste electronic and electrical equipment.

such as WEEE, tyres, and ELVs, could be shipped as secondhand goods for reuse or be packed behind other well-packaged waste intended for reuse (IMPEL, 2011). In these circumstances, the exporter will not consider it necessary to declare the materials as waste. Interpol (2009) suggested that the most common methods of export include the mislabelling and forgery of documents accompanying containers or the mixing of electrical waste with legitimate shipments.

Waste crime as a white-collar crime The last two causes of waste crime (complexity of businesses/ nature of waste) illustrate how waste crime can be regarded as a white-collar crime. Sutherland (1983) defined white-collar crime as ‘a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation’. A more pertinent definition as applied to waste crime is ‘an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of money, or to obtain business or personal advantage’ (Edelhertz, 1970). However, Sutherland’s definition does recognize the criminal’s opportunity to commit a crime by virtue of his occupation. White-collar crimes differ in many respects from the more familiar crimes against the person or property. Benson and Madensen (2007) suggest four characteristics of white-collar crime. In the context of waste these are: •• The criminal has special access to the victim or target: the complexity of the waste sector business and the large number of actors (both legal and illegal) means that criminals are able to access the waste stream and engage with the movement of waste. Many successful prosecutions in the UK show offenders often operating legitimate waste businesses (Table 1). •• The criminal uses deception or concealment to hide the offence: a waste producer may be unaware that their waste is being processed illegally, Similarly, waste can be easily disguised as second-hand goods, as in the case for WEEE to developing countries. •• The criminal could be said to be in an ambiguous state of mind: it is not immediately obvious that a criminal act is being committed. The use of formal documentation and the operation of a business which appears legitimate makes it difficult to identify the act as illegal.

•• The criminal can be physically distant or separate from the offence: the waste sector uniquely has waste tourists and brokers who will often never come into contact with the waste (Interpol, 2009).

The vulnerability of certain waste streams to crime Some waste materials are particularly vulnerable to waste crime. Indeed, crime associated with WEEE has prompted international concerns from organizations such as Interpol. A useful way to group these materials is to consider if the crime relates mainly to the shipment of the waste or to its illegal storage or disposal. A review of successful waste-related prosecutions over the last 3 years, reported by ENDS (www.ends.co.uk) and shown in Table 1, highlighted illegal storage and disposal as the principal form of waste crime. In 2013, there has been an increase in successful UK prosecutions relating to the shipment of wastes.

Shipment of wastes International controls exist to control and restrict the movement of hazardous wastes (www.basel.int). At a European level, the EU WSR provides further controls on the movement of wastes. Waste electronic and electrical equipment. The Directive 2002/96/EC on WEEE is intended to prevent electrical waste and to encourage its reuse, recycling, and other forms of recovery so as to reduce its disposal. By 2010, almost all EU countries were easily able to meet the collection/recycling and recovery targets set for each of the categories of WEEE described (Eurostat, 2010b). A recast of the WEEE Directive (2012/19/EU) sets collection targets on the basis of 85% of WEEE generated or a proportion of electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) placed on the market. This effectively increases recovery targets and each Member State will need to provide the additional evidence that more of this waste stream is being treated. However, one aspect of the recast WEEE Directive is tighter requirements on providing documentary evidence of functionality of collected WEEE which is regarded as reuseable and therefore may end up being exported. This is likely to make it more difficult for WEEE to be exported to non-OECD countries in Africa and Asia as second-hand goods

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Baird et al. only to be subject to treatment and disposal under poor environmental conditions. One EEA report suggests that significant amounts of WEEE are not being collected and treated according to EU standards (EEA, 2012b). Instead, it is being exported to non-OECD countries as second-hand goods. The report suggested that 28% of businesses (collectors and exporters) were exporting WEEE illegally. The same report refers also to German and Danish studies of identified WEEE shipments to non-OECD countries that suggest that the scale of illegal shipment is significant. The German Federal Environment Agency examined exported trade data from Hamburg in 2008 (Umweltbundesamt, 2010) and estimated that between 93,000 and 216,000 tonnes of used EEE were exported from Germany to non-EU countries, with much of the used goods being in very bad condition. The EEA extrapolated this data and suggested that between 0.5 and 1.3 million tonnes of used EEE/ WEEE is being shipped out of the EU each year, representing between 16–38% of WEEE collected. WEEE is regarded as hazardous waste and therefore prohibited from export to non-OECD countries for treatment/recovery. From a destination perspective, a Secretariat of the Basel Convention study stated that West Africa serves as a major trading route of used EEE into Africa, with Ghana and Nigeria being the principal import hubs. EICC (2008) suggested that 25–40% of a range of metals used in the electronics sector come from recycled sources, indicating that good recovery of metals is taking place (legal or illegal). A study conducted for the Interpol Pollution Crime Working Group (Interpol, 2009) identified the huge potential for informal networks of criminals to profit from the illegal export of electrical waste to developing countries. The work described research conducted in the EU and the USA. The EU work included interviews with key stakeholders and suggested that almost all companies are involved in illegal exports of WEEE whether they are aware of it or not. Shipment of other wastes. ‘Movement of wastes across the EU’s internal and external borders’ report (EEA, 2012b) describes the significant growth in cross-border waste trade, with exports of copper, iron, steel, aluminium, and nickel having doubled between 1999 and 2011, and plastics increased by a factor of five. EU waste legislation has partly driven this, but there is also the demand for secondary material particularly from the growing economies of Asia. From the same EEA study, it was reported that hazardous waste movements, notified through the WSR increased from 3.2 million tonnes in 2001 to 7.4 million tonnes in 2009 (around 10% of all hazardous waste produced). Of these movements, 75% are for recovery, with much of this waste treated within the EU (97%) and by the Member States with a mature treatment infrastructure. Very little hazardous waste is exported to countries beyond the EU. The EU WSR prohibits the export of hazardous wastes to non-OECD countries. A Basel Convention report on the global movement of hazardous wastes (SBC, 2010) found that, while transboundary movements are increasing (2002–2006), with high-income/developed states allowing the importing of hazardous waste, shipments to nonOECD countries are decreasing.

There is no definitive summary data relating to Green List waste movements under the WSR. Trade data (Eurostat) for materials such as waste paper, card, plastics, and steel and other metals have shown substantial increases (by factors of 2–5) between 1999–2012, with a slight fall immediately after the 2008 global recession. A major inspection survey (IMPEL, 2011) found around half of inspected waste shipments to be in violation of the WSR, with errors relating to documentation associated with Green List wastes or where there was concern over levels of contamination associated with these wastes.

Illegal treatment and disposal Illegal disposal of tyres. Prior to the Landfill Directive’s (1999/31/EC) ban on landfilling tyres in 2003, the main end uses for used/waste tyres in the UK were: 11% exported; 62% reused, recycled, or sent for energy recovery; 23% sent to landfill; and 4% stockpiled or disposed of illegally (Hird Griffiths et al., 2002). The Environment Agency (2012c) notes that approximately 80% of all waste tyres in the UK are dealt through organizations that subscribe to the Responsible Recycler Scheme, which audits its members to ensure used tyres are handled by waste businesses complying with statutory requirements. In 2010, the main end uses for waste tyres in the UK were: recycling (32%); energy recovery (20%); landfill engineering (16%); retreading (12%); and other uses (20%) such as silage clamps and dock fenders (amongst others) (Environment Agency, 2012c). Excluded from these end uses are exports and tyres handled illegally. In the same report, it is suggested that around 10% of all used/waste tyres are handled illegally through illegal baling, unregistered storage and abandonment, illegal landfill operations, burning, the illegal export of used tyres, and resale of used tyres unfit for use in the UK. The market for used/ waste tyres results from the need to remove used tyres from tyre retailers or ELV dismantlers and involves a range of upstream operations that include collection, sorting, and reprocessing (OHL, 2007). One study reported that the replacement of vehicle tyres accounts for 73% of all used/waste tyre arisings, while ELV dismantling accounts for a further 21% (Environment Agency, 2012c). The sector is characterized by a large number of small local tyre retailers (typically with one depot) competing with a few large national (multidepot) organizations (Hird Griffiths et al., 2002). The EA study suggested that, while tyre crime can occur anywhere along the activity chain, it often begins with illegal collections and that common motivators include financial gain, convenience, opportunism, market dynamics/demand, and low risk/punishment offences. The study also noted that where limited treatment options are available and collection costs are higher – a point also made by OHL (2007) – there is a greater risk of illegal collections taking place, as they offer businesses an opportunity to cut costs. Most importantly, illegal tyre collections undermine legitimate operations by forcing them to reduce their prices in order to remain competitive. Where legitimate operations are unable to

102 compete, they may go out of business, further reducing the legitimate options available to local waste tyre producers. End-of-life vehicles. The main objectives of the Directive 2002/53/EC on ELVs are the prevention of waste from vehicles and the reuse, recycling, and recovery of ELVs and their components as to reduce the final disposal of waste. With a recovery target for 2006 of 85% by weight being broadly met by EU Member States and with developments in shredding capacity, including the recovery of fine metals, and including energy recovery to count towards the 2015 recovery target of 95%, means that the recovery targets will probably be met. However, EU waste data (Eurostat) reports that 5.6 million cars were recovered as ELVs in 2010, and yet in the same year the European Automobile Manufacturers Association reported 15.6 million cars newly registered onto the EU market (ACEA, 2010). The target recovery is based on the number of vehicles that become ELVs, which in the UK, for example, means those passed to an authorized treatment facility which can issue a certification of destruction and not the number of new cars placed on the market. A significant number of vehicles – several hundred thousand in the UK – are scrapped outside of the compliance scheme. Across the UK and Europe, alternative recovery or disposal routes have emerged. Export of second-hand cars is a growing feature of the European car market and that the second-hand trade does mask some illegal activities, such as the export of wrecked or stolen cars. A significant number of cars are being scrapped by unlicensed operators who remove the economically desirable parts. Some cars are abandoned rather than properly scrapped (European Commission, 2007). Previous studies (Bisschop, 2012; Interpol, 2009; Van Erp and Huisman, 2010) suggest that illegal shipments of WEEE often accompany ELVs for export. Depolluted vehicles can be exported legally with proper notification to many countries. However, vehicles are shipped for second-hand use overseas and since shipping is based on volume, exporters will try to maximize the use of space by incorporating other materials, which might be illegal shipments of WEEE. However, each ELV has a positive value, and since the reprocessing of ELVs mainly involves expensive shredding technologies that both developed and developing countries would need to make, the export of vehicles is less of an issue. While illegal shipment of ELVs does take place, from the Environment Agency’s annual crime report (Environment Agency, 2012a), the main illegal activities are around the illegal storage and disposal operations of scrap yards or dismantlers, outside of the formal authorized treatment facility structure. Illegal scrap yards dismantle and recover vehicle parts and then realize the value of the remaining scrap. Over the past two decades, such operations have become part of a waste-permitting system and operators with historical activities are now subject to regulatory controls. Fly tipping.  Fly tipping should also be mentioned – since it is illegal disposal – and is often associated with dumping of tyres. A major review of fly tipping by Webb et al. (2006) explored the UK Flycapture database, surveyed all authorities in England,

Waste Management & Research 32(2) surveyed householders, analysed data on convicted fly tippers, and conducted one on one interviews with offenders. The study identified two types of offenders: (i) opportunistic offenders, who take advantage to save or make some money and are generally less motivated to break the law and hence can be easily deterred; and (ii) persistent or prolific offenders, who are highly motivated and less easily deterred.

Identifying and preventing waste crime Tools designed to help regulatory agencies establish costeffective, risk-based, and intelligence-led inspection regimes are well documented (www.impel.eu) and are not described here. However, one approach, often overlooked, is to make use of existing waste data reporting as part of a permitted waste facility. All waste is generally weighed and expressed in terms of EU List of Wastes. Analysis of this data, in particular the output of one facility linking to another, might highlight potential ‘leakage’ of waste from legal operations.

IMPEL strategies IMPEL has suggested complementary approaches (IMPEL, 2012) to inspection, which are detailed here. Communication.  There is a need for better communication and guidance and the reporting of performance of regulated businesses. For example, the WSR is complex and the controls applied not only depend on the nature of the waste (hazardous/ nonhazardous), but also the regulatory requirements of the destination country. Each country has different criteria for what wastes can be imported, and this complexity arguably could go some way to explain the administrative errors which occur. As part of the Life European Pathway to Zero Waste Project, the Environment Agency has produced ‘Waste exports – a good practice guide for local authorities’ (Environment Agency, 2011), which, although targeted at some of the waste dealt with by local authorities, represents an intervention that raises awareness of businesses of the requirements of the WSR. In addition, the Environment Agency has developed its waste exports control tool to help exporters of waste understand the regulatory requirement for shipping certain types of waste for recovery to a specified country (Environment Agency, 2013). Certification or voluntary approaches.  There is a need for the use of third-party certification programmes and independent auditing. Supply chain. Customers of regulated waste operators should promote inspections to provide assurance that the waste is being handled safely and legally.

Other strategies Other methods beyond inspection exist to help identify and target waste crime.

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Baird et al. Table 2.  Illustration of waste crime script for tyre collection by an offender. Scene classification

Cast

Activity

Preparation

Offender

Preactivity     Activity

Offender

Offender knows several independent tyre retailers operating outside of national tyre disposals scheme and needing to dispose of tyres at minimum cost Offender offers retailer a price for the ‘safe’ disposal of old tyres Offender may provide ‘evidence’ of legitimate waste operation   Tyres are collected by offender; a waste transfer note might be provided as ‘evidence’ of legitimate activity

Independent tyre retailer Offender

Source: Tompson and Chainey (2011).

Method for Assessment of Vulnerabilities of Sectors (MAVUS).  In a EU-funded Belgian study (MAVUS), an approach was developed to measure the specific vulnerabilities of the waste sector to organized crime (Daele et al., 2007). The approach considered the sector on three levels: (i) the economics of the sector, the market structure, price setting, and the international context; (ii) environmental scanning using techniques such as PEST (political, economic, social, and technological) analysis to understand the cluster of actors within the waste sector, in terms of regulatory framework, their social environments, and the criminals in and around the industry; and (iii) an analysis of the business structures and processes. Daele et al. (2007) suggests this sector/environment/business structure approach has the benefit of focusing on the economic reality of the sector, pays attention to the causes of crime, does not rely on crime data, and considers the problem of vulnerability in the context of market trends. White and Heckenberg (2011) developed this approach of vulnerability assessment into a 18 point checklist designed to help regulators consider where vulnerabilities might be in the management of hazardous waste in particular. Use of crime scripts.  Tompson and Chainey (2011) proposed the use of crime scripts and their analysis as a method for an objective assessment and understanding of illegal waste activity. Their approach breaks up the process into six acts (creation, storage, collection, transport, treatment, and disposal), with each act sub categorized to scenes where the illegal activity might take place. Each scene has a preparation, preactivity, activity, and post activity stage, with the principal offender being the lead actor in the scene. An example is given in Table 2 for the illegal collection of tyres; in this instance, there will be another act/scene where the illegal disposal will take place. Situational crime prevention approach. Another approach to identifying and reducing waste crime is to recognize that the criminal activity occurs in a particular context or situation. Theory of situational crime prevention is based on premise that crime can be reduced, if not altogether prevented, by altering various dimensions of the opportunity structures that are available to potential offenders. It sets out five principles of crime prevention (Benson and Madensen, 2007): •• increase the degree of effort necessary to carry out the offence •• increase the risk of detection prior to, during, or after the completion of the criminal act

•• reduce the rewards that can be obtained by engaging in the offence •• reduce situational conditions that may provoke an unplanned criminal action •• remove the offender’s ability to make excuses. Benson and Madensen (2007) offer a 25-point matrix to explain how measures or interventions can be applied in the context of wider crime against the person or property. Their studies, however, focus on applying situational crime prevention applied to white-collar crime, and since waste crime is principally a white-collar crime phenomenon, situational crime prevention seeks to disrupt the illegal waste activity by making it more difficult for the offenders to act, increase the risks of being caught, diminishing the rewards to the crime, and removing any excuse that people use when committing the crime. The situational crime prevention approach was applied to two illegal disposal sites in London (Environment Agency, 2012b). While it was reported that the impact of the approach was not substantial, it did help inform the Environment Agency’s own practices. Van Erp and Huisman (2010) have suggested that situational crime prevention could be used to target the use of the second-hand goods status in the export of WEEE. Remote sensing. At its simplest, remote sensing can be described as the acquisition and analysis of data about the earth’s surface acquired using airborne (aircraft and satellite) sensors. While remote-sensing imagery can be used on its own, its full potential comes into evidence when it is combined, using GIS software, with other layers of information (e.g. altitude, water bodies, roads, and urban development). Ottavianelli et al. (2005) and Silvestri and Omri (2008) describe early attempts to detect landfills and monitor leachate releases and landfill gas emissions using remote-sensing imagery. Quinlan and Foschi (2009) and Yonezawa (2009) in separate studies were able to detect illegal stockpile of tyres and other wastes using high-resolution satellite imagery.

Conclusion As the EU has adopted tighter controls on the collection, storage, transport, treatment, and disposal of waste, the complexity of the sector, the range of actors involved, and the ability of disguise or hide waste has led to the growth in white-collar waste crime. By

104 its very nature, waste crime largely remains unreported, but where regulatory inspections have been made, the extent of waste crime has been significant. Waste has become a global commodity and studies have shown that the asymmetries in pricing and regulatory controls, in particular in relation to the EU and developing countries create the conditions for waste crime to occur. As a white-collar crime, it is difficult to identify who in the sector is operating legally and who illegally. The nature of waste often means the producer of waste not only pays the waste contractor but provides the waste material. The waste producer, therefore, does not have first-hand experience of the quality of service provided by the waste contractor and, with economic pressures to procure the cheapest waste service, creates the conditions for illegal operators to flourish. Recognizing the vulnerabilities for waste crime is a first step in prevention. Approaches have been suggested to identify where waste crime has the opportunity to occur. Inevitably, this requires well-framed legislation and the provision of adequate resources on the part of the regulator to detect and prevent waste crime.

Declaration of conflicting interests The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Funding This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

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