The call for regional arrangements continued until 1980s as per. UNGA resolution ... Conference on Human Rights, ASEAN g
APPENDICES Part 1: Understanding ASEAN
Page 1 of 237
APPENDIX 1: TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION TO ASEAN ......................................................................................................... 3 ASEAN INTEGRATION & HUMAN RIGHTS ................................................................................... 9 ASEAN COMMUNITY ............................................................................................................... 15 ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY BLUEPRINT ........................................................................... 16 ASEAN POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY BLUEPRINT ........................................................... 54 ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY BLUEPRINT ................................................................ 73 BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE SECOND REGIONAL CONSULTATION ON ASEAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM.............................................................. 99 HOW FAR IS ASEAN FROM ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ASEAN COMMUNITY? .......................... 108 ASEAN, CIVIL SOCIETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: KNOWING THE BASICS .................................... 113 ASEAN TOURISM ................................................................................................................... 133 UNDERSTANDING ASEAN, ITS SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS............................. 135 ASIAN REGIONALISM: HOW DOES IT COMPARE TO EUROPE‟S? ................................................. 142 [UN REPORT] BANGKOK NGO DECLARATION ON HUMAN R IGHTS ......................................... 146 EXPERT DIALOGUE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ON REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS IN AFRICA, AMERICAS AND EUROPE: INFORMATION PAPER ......................................................... 168 REPORT OF EXPERT DIALOGUE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ON REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS IN AFRICA, AMERICAS AND EUROPE ................................................................. 176 CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT WITH ASEAN: AN OVERVIEW .................................................. 217 CHARTER OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS ............................................ 218 THE ASEAN PEOPLES‟ CENTER - JAKARTA............................................................................. 219 CIVIL SOCIETY AND ASEAN INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ......... 222 ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND ASEAN SECRETARIAT ............................................ 226 NEWS COLLAGE ...................................................................................................................... 229
Page 2 of 237
Outline What is ASEAN? • Background, History • Charter •
Introduction to ASEAN Ed P. Legaspi — e l e ga s pi @s e a ca . n e t Southeast Asian Committee for Advocacy (SEACA) 6 September 2009
Regional Inter-governmental Organization
8 August 1967
10 members 4.5million sq kms 570million people (growth1.5%)
Bangkok Declaration • •
•
Context: 1960s
cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, technical, educational and other fields, promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule U N of law and adherence to the principles of the U UN N Charter. Representing the collective will of the nations of Southeast Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity
•
Conflict:
• •
Poor Communism
•
Marcos, Suharto, Thanom, Lee, Abdul Rahman
— — — —
Indo nesia-M al ays ia (Ko nfrontasi 19 62 -66 ), Philippines-Malaysia (over Sabah) Singapore secessio n from Malaysia Mindanao, So uthern Thailand
— Cold War, arms race, proxy w ars — Indo china War: Vietnam , Laos Cambodia — Burm a: 19 62
Page 3 of 237
Stages of Development
ASEAN Today: Diversity
First 10 years (1967-1976): establishment, solidarity, dialogue partners • The next 20 years: (1977-1997): expansion (5, 6, 9, 10) • The next 10 years: (1998-2007): vision, formalisation • The next 7 years: (2008-2015): Community building •
Diversity Political systems: Democracies, Dictatorships, Monarchy • Economic develo pment • •
— HDI (2004): Rank 25 to 133 — GDP (2006): $208 to $29,499 •
Economic systems
What’s New?
The ASEAN Charter
Vision and Charter • Blueprints of Cooperation • Human Rights Commission
Gives legal personality to ASEAN • Clarify common objectives and principles • Defines structure • Mechanis ms • O perations
•
•
ASEAN Objectives • •
• • •
Enhance peace, s ecurity stability Political, s ecurity, econom ic, socio-cultural cooperation Pres erve as nuclear weapo ns free zo ne Peace w ith the world , harmo nious enviro nment Single m arket and productio n bas e
• •
• • • •
ASEAN Principles
Alleviate poverty, narrow developm ent gap Strengthen demo cracy, protect and pro mote human rights Res pond to co mm on threats Promo te s us tainable develop ment Develop human res ources …
•
• • • • •
Res pect for independence, soveriegnty, territo rial integrity Shared co mm itm ent: peace, s ecurity s tability Renounce us e of force Peacef ul settlement o f disputes No n-interference in internal aff airs Freedom from external interference, subversion, coercion
Page 4 of 237
• Respect for fu nd a m e n t al
• •
• •
•
freedoms, protect and promote human rights, promote social justice Respect UN Ch a r ter, international law, IHL Abstain from participation in activities which threaten m e m b e rs Respect cultures, religions, la ng u a g es Centr ality of ASEAN in economic, political, social, cultural relations Adherence to rules towards integration, and market dri ve n ec on o m y
ASEAN Bodies • • • • • • • • •
Summit: Heads of State Coordinating Council: Foreign ministers Community Councils Sectoral ministerial bodies ASEAN Secretariat Council of Permanent Representatives ASEAN National Secretariats ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights ASEAN Foundation
ASEAN Charter: the new and good Legal personality: more accountable, stronger (?) • Human Rights, democracy as principles • Human Rights body (Article 14) • Recognition of civil society participatio n •
Critique of the Charter SECURITY
•Rules based, shared norms and values • Cohesive, peaceful, stable, resilient with shared responsibility •Dynamic and Outward looking
ECO NO M I C •Single Market and production base •Competitive economic region •Equitable Economic development •Integration into global economy
SO C I O CULTURAL •Human Development •Social Welfare and Protection •Social justice and rights •Environmental Sustainability •ASEAN Identity
Non-participatory drafting process Codifies past agreements • All about governments and not interaction with the people • Unclear spaces of how civil society can parti cipate • Lack of disciplinary and dispute resolution mechanis ms • •
ASEAN Charter
Critique of the Charter • •
Market-oriented language Does not acknowledge the centrality of redistribution and economic solidarity to the goals of poverty eradication, social justice and lasting peace
Charter’s SSttrraatteeggiicc VVaalluuee to cciivviill so c i e t y A space to stake claims and accountabiliity An anchor to discuss ASEAN • Possibility to transform ASEAN to work for the mutual benefit of the governments and the peoples •
•
Page 5 of 237
General overview of Blueprints • • • • •
Three “integral” pillars of the ASEAN Vision 2015: AEC, ASC, ASCC (work in tandem) Clear targets and timelines for implementation Pre-agreed flexibilities to accommodate the interests of all ASEAN Member Binding General Content — Policy/Goals; technical, Action plan
General Critique of the Community Blueprints
ASEAC Economic Community Blueprint (AEC)
ocess No participation, even secretive pro • All about governments (does not address corruption and repression) • Whose community is ASEAN? •
a single market and production base, • a highly competitive economic region, • a region of equitable econo mic development, and • a region fully integrated into the global economy. •
Priority Integration Sectors
Critique of the AEC
Common interest and where they compete the most. • agro-based products; air travel; automotives; e-ASEAN; electroni cs; fisheries; healthcare; rubber-based products; textiles and apparels; tourism; wood-based products; and logistics (additional sector as may be identified by the Ministers after the agreement) •
Liberalization • Only protects end-users (consumers) • What about sustainability? Environment and livelihood • Disregards existing bilateral econo mic agreements • No detail on how the region acts as a whole •
Page 6 of 237
ASEAN Security Community Blueprint (ASC)
ASC Characteristics
Fra mework is based on politi cal and securrit y cooperation where countries live at pe a ce with one another, and the ASEA N, with the world at la rge . • Princip les are n on -in t erferen c e, consensus, •
•
•
nation al and r eg iona l re silienc e, and respect for so vereignty. Elements of t he Blueprint: political de ve lop men t, sh ap ing and sh aring o f no rms on c ounter t errorism and nu cle ar free zo nes, inter-st at e conflict pre vent ion a nd postconflict pe ace -bu ild ing ; co mb at ing terrorism
1. a rules-based community of shared values and norms 2. a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security 3. a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world
Critique of the ASC
Critique of the ASC (2)
State-cent ric in p erspectiv e (national s ecurrity ) — Existing int ernal conflicts should be addressed:
o v e r r e so u r c e s , o v e r s e l f determi nation/ identity — G overnments (policies) are sources of confli ct
Does not provid e f or polit ica l part icipation a nd rep res entation of civil s ociety • No ref eren ce to in ternational human right s standards>adheren ce to internat ional standa rds and prin cip les • No d ispute mechan ism on in ternal conflicts, int rastate con flicts, s epa ratism. •
• •
•
•
No recognition of internally displaced people (IDPs) Cultural diversity is not addressed >recognition of diversities in ethnicity and religion, and of marginalization Strengthen and monitor existing regional instruments on migrants, women, children, and CSO and public participation in processes Promote regional civilian peacekeeping forces
ASEAN Socio-cultural Community Blueprint (ASCC) promotion of human development and security • narrowing the development gap • ensuring environmental sustai nability • building an ASEAN identity •
Coverage of ASCC • • • • • •
Poverty Health Disaster Management Education Food security Social impact of integration
Page 7 of 237
• • • •
Environmental sustainability Migrant labour Women and children’s rights Science and Tec hnolo gy
Critique of the ASCC • •
• •
Socia l justic e vs. soc ia l pro te ction; systemic vs. symptomatic Syste mic so lution s to a dd re ss soc ia l injustice: pro ble ms of access, co nflicting intere sts with co m me rcial/ind ustr ia l interests Particip atio n sho uld not be limited to this sphere. Div er sity and ide ntity of peo ples w ithin me mb er countries
Is there hope for real change?
I m pa c t • •
Legal, (rules based) therefore accountable Greater Recognition — —
• •
- within ASEAN (leverage against governm ents) - Regional partners (international leverage)
Mechanisms to address regional issues: Huma n rights, migrant workers, women and children Recognition of Civil Society - the right to participate
THANK YOU!
Page 8 of 237
Changes are not impressive, but we can work with that. We will work with that.
ASEAN: Overview
ASEAN Integration & Human Rights
Established in 1967 42 years later, ASEAN evolved from its role as a regional forum in Southeast Asia to become a significant player in the international arena and as a main platform to voice regional concerns. The political dynamic of ASEAN changed with the inclusion of Brunei Darussalam (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Burma (1997) and Cambodia (1999) as members. When the ASEAN Charter was enforced on 15 December 2008 The region continues to be the place where human rights defenders still risk their lives and liberty when speaking out, challenging the impunity of human rights violators and seeking to build societies that respect and uphold values of human dignity. Different political landscape, from military dictatorship, absolute monarch to democratic country Inter-state conflicts have been set to a minimum — partly due to the existence of ASEAN. Conflicts and discrimination, however, have been prevalent within the confined of the national boundary
• •
•
•
Yuyun Wahyuningrum Policy Advisor — ASEAN December 2009
[email protected] [email protected]
• •
ASEAN Human Rights related Instruments
Human Rights in ASEAN Countries ƒ In Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, mining and oil palm plantations had displaced indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands and causing environmental havoc. ƒ Urban poor in Cambodia had been victimized from the force-eviction policy of the national and trans-national corporation Impunity persists in breaching the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. • The process of democratization and trust building to democratic institutions continue to be the obstacles • Gross violations of human rights - crimes against humanity; genocide, torture, extra-judicial killings, terrorist acts • Death penalty, IDPs, statelessness, human rights of migrant workers, human rights of trafficked persons • Access to justice, and rule of law has been politicized to protect the interest of powerful groups of individuals and institutions.
• •
•
•
•
Is there any HR provision in the Charter? Preamble;
•
article 1 on the purpose of the charter;
• •
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against women in ASEAN (2004) Declaration Against Trafficking in person on Trafficking particularly on women and children (2004) ASEAN declaration on the promotion and protection of Migrant Workers (2007) ASEAN Charter (2008)
What does HR provision on the ASEAN Charter means:
YES. Human rights term has been mentioned 4 times in the Charter: •
Declaration on the commitment for Children (2001)
The protection and promotion of human rights in ASEAN should, at least, in compliance with the regionally agreed international human rights standards, namely : • UDHR
article 2 the principle of the charter; Article 14 “In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body”
• •
•
Page 9 of 237
2 core human rights instruments: CRC & CEDAW International humanitarian laws (Geneva convention ILO labor core standards
Was there any human rights discourse before the Charter? •
1st mention of „human rights‟ - the 1978 Joint Declaration of the ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting: “… international cooperation to promote and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex and religion should be enhanced.”
•
July 1993 (after the Vienna World Conference) in the joint communiqué by the 26th ASEAN-AMM: “ASEAN recognizes that human rights are interrelated and indivisible, it affirms its commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the Vienna Declaration. It agreed that ASEAN should consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.”
Reality Check •
•
•
•
The global-local-regional interaction
The Political History of AICHR •
There are at least four angles to perceive the history of AICHR I
I
I
I
That the history of human rights in ASEAN is the history of dialogue between international-national (global-local) interaction. The impact of having series of pledges, declarations, resolutions, and conventions at the international level have been permeated into the national level and then factoring in the change happened at the regional level; That the history of human rights in ASEAN is the history of tireless civil society‟s advocacy and diplomacy to universalize the international standards at national and regional level; That the history of human rights in ASEAN is the history of democracy movements in ASEAN countries. The opening political spaces for civil society to engage are possible because the country is undergoing the transition to democracy;
•
•
•
That the history of human rights in ASEAN is the journey of believing that engagement can make change.
The global-local-regional interaction •
• •
• •
Non-intervention and consensus remain de rigueur as ASEAN‟s decision-making process. Much to the chagrin of civil society organisations, these two approaches remain rigidly reflected in the TOR of the AICHR At the same time principles such as the ASEAN Way and the Asian Values, continue to be supported strongly by the authoritarian regimes, hinder the promotion and protection of human rights in the region The strengthening of democracy in the region‟s de facto leader played significant part in pushing for human rights issues into the agenda of the grouping Now, ASEAN has ASEAN Inter-government Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), lunched on 23 Oct 2009 in the 15th ASEAN Summit in Hua Hin, Thailand
In 1960s, the then United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) established a study group to consider the possibility of establishing regional human rights commissions in all parts of the globe, implicitly in the Asia-Pacific. In 1968 by the Commission‟s request to the UN SecretaryGeneral to organise regional seminars to discuss avenues for their establishment in regions where there were no regional human rights commissions. In 1982, the idea to establish a human rights mechanism for the Asia Pacific region articulated during the UN sponsored seminar on national, local and regional arrangements for the protection and promotion of human rights in the Asia Pacific region in Colombo, Sri Lanka.
The global-local-regional interaction
In 1977, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) also began to pass resolutions on “regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights”. In 1978, the UNGA released resolution for the establishment of regional arrangements based on regional machinery. The call for regional arrangements continued until 1980s as per UNGA resolution 34/154 (1981). From 1990-2005 OHCHR organized the 13 regional workshop to discuss about regional human rights mechanisms In 1983, there was a notable submission on the “Declaration to the Basic Duties of ASEAN Peoples and Governments” by the Regional Council for Human Rights in Asia (RCHRA), an organisation based in the Philippines
•
June 1993 - ASEAN governments endorsed the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA) in the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria, which highlighted the need to set up regional human rights mechanisms for regions which are yet to have one. I
•
It should be noted that in preceding the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights, ASEAN governments alongside other Asian states introduced the discourse on “Asian Values” as a counter argument to the position on human rights being „universal‟, and promoted it as an alternative regional human rights discourse.
1993 - ASEAN parliamentarians added their support to the momentum by their adoption of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organisation (AIPO) Declaration on Human Rights in 1993 stating that “it is likewise the task and responsibility of member States to establish an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights”.
Page 10 of 237
The global-local-regional interaction
The global-local-regional interaction
There were no more developments after those seminal statements. Due to frustration with the lack of progress, a number of academics, political activists, and members of civil society groups started to discuss steps towards reawakening the discussions on a regional human rights mechanism, which resulted in the setting up of a Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism in 1996 From 1994-1997 - there were many other informal groups discussing human rights mechanisms which had expanded the discussion on possible regional human rights mechanisms in public spaces: I Annual meeting of the ASEAN-Institute of Strategic International Studies Colloquium on Human Rights (AICOHR) I Annual Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Informal Seminar on Human Rights.
• •
•
The significant impact of the 1997 financial crisis challenged the notion of „Asian values‟ as it provided evidence that Southeast Asia was not a unique region and it is interconnected with other regions as well as sharing the vulnerability to the crises.
•
This understanding lead to further integration of ASEAN, which was reflected in the 1997 ASEAN 2020 and 1998 Hanoi Plan of Action. These documents helped reinforce the call for more human rights promotion and protection in ASEAN. At the 2000 ASEM in Seoul, human rights and democracy were accepted as discussion topics by Asian partners.
•
The debate on human rights mechanisms took a central role in ASEAN with the adoption of the 2003 Bali Concorde II, the 2004 Vientiane Action Program (VAP) and the acceptance of the idea of establishing a human rights body in the ASEAN Charter, as the association‟s purpose for existence evolved to include the need to be a more integrated regional community
•
The global-local-regional interaction
The global-local-regional interaction •
•
•
•
At the 10th ASEAN Summit in November 2004 in Vientiane, ASEAN leaders officially reaffirmed the intention of drafting the ASEAN Charter as stipulated in the 2004 VAP, “We recognize the need to strengthen ASEAN and shall work towards the development of an ASEAN Charter”. At the 11th ASEAN Summit in December 2005, ASEAN leaders issued the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, where they committed themselves to draft the Charter “to serve as a legal and institutional framework of ASEAN to support the realization of its goals and objectives”. This declaration stated inter alia that the Charter would reaffirm “the promotion of democracy, human rights and obligations, transparency and good governance and strengthening democratic institutions”. They also stated their commitment to set up an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to provide practical recommendations on the creation of the Charter. In the same year, the first ASEAN Civil Society meeting was held alongside the official meeting and NGO representatives were able to present their recommendations to the officials.
In 2006, the EPG finally suggested ASEAN to include a reference on the establishment of a regional human rights mechanism in the ASEAN Charter. The EPG report was endorsed by the ASEAN leaders at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines in January 2007 in its Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter. It also directed a High Level Task Force (HLTF) to draft the Charter ready for signing in November 2007 during the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore. The HLTF met for the first time in February 2007 and began drafting the Charter based on directives from the 11th and 12th ASEAN Summits, the EPG Report and other key ASEAN documents. The Charter was approved at the 13th ASEAN Summit on November 2007 in Singapore and it provides for the establishment of an ASEAN human rights body. The Charter was completed through signatures by the ten member states of ASEAN, by 15 December 2008.
• •
•
•
•
•
The global-local-regional interaction •
AICHR as we have now
In March 2007 Retreat, ASEAN Foreign Ministers discussed and approved the inclusion of a regional human rights mechanism. However, a consensus on the nature of the human rights mechanism could not be reached at the Retreat.
I
Inter-governmental, consultative, lack of protection mandate, lack of independence I
I
•
They deferred the decision and eventually endorsed the drafting of Terms of Reference (TOR) in July 2009 during the 42nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Phuket, Thailand.
I I
•
•
The 42nd AMM finally adopted the TOR on the establishment of AICHR on 20 July 2009. The meeting also agreed that the High Level Panel (HLP), a team of 12 officials (representing 10 states) who initially drafted the TOR, would also draft a declaration as a political commitment of the ASEAN leaders to augment the promotion and protection of human rights in the region.
I I
I
10 members from 10 member states for 3 years, the chair of AICHR is the chair of ASEAN Reps are accountable to appointing government (Art. 5.2), can be replaced anytime (Art.5.6), shall act impartially according to the ASEAN Charter and TOR (Art.5.7) Decision making: consultation & consensus ASEC to provide secretariat & finance support to AICHR. Member states can second their staff too to AICHR
AICHR is an overarching body (Art 6.8) AICHR can obtain information on the promotion and protection of human rights from member states (Art 4.10) AICHR shall prepare studies on thematic issues on HR (Art 4.12)
Page 11 of 237
Can AICHR protect human rights?
Important Articles in TOR •
• • • • • • •
Art. 4.6 — promote the full implementation of ASEAN Instruments related HR, i.e: ASEAN Declaration on the elimination against women Art. 4.8 & Art. 4.9 — to ensure people‟s voices to be heard Art. 4.10 — obtain information Art. 4.12 — thematic reports Art. 6.2 — annual meeting of AICHR Art. 6.8 — Overarching HR institution Art. 7.1 — SG can bring the issue to the attention of the AICHR Art. 9.6 — Review 5 years
•
I
•
The regional development of human rights will depend largely on the Commission‟s ultimate composition. The TOR of the AICHR provides the States with the necessary procedures on how they can send their representatives to the AICHR. It can be through appointment or the national process of selection. I
•
However, Article 5.2 states very clearly that the Representative shall be accountable to the appointing government, and not to the people of ASEAN.
Article 6.9 requires AICHR to “expeditiously determine the modalities for ultimate alignment” with the two bodies. But what is unclear now is the line of reporting, given that the nature of the establishments are very different from one another. I
AICHR was established based on Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter, while the ACW C and ACMW were created under the 2004 VAP. The ASEAN charter is legiti mate as it is a legal document, while the 2004 VAP has been replaced with the blue print on social-cultural cooperation, which is not legally binding.
•
•
•
• •
•
The funding and secretariat support of the AICHR will depend on the availability of resources and expertise for both the AICHR and the ASEAN Secretariat. There are foreseeable operational challenges for the AICHR and other regional human rights mechanisms in the pipeline, such as the ACWC and ACMW. ASEAN states are encouraged to second their officials to the ASEAN Secretariat in order to resolve the budgetary problem. In terms of control over their budget, AICHR is required to seek approval from ASEAN Foreign Ministers, and recommendations from the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN. This is also the case with the AICHR‟s program and activities‟ plan. It is assumed that the budgeting and program plan will become a venue for contestation in terms of controlling the scope of the work of AICHR.
Representatives of AICHR
Brunei Darussalam — Pehin Datu Imam Dato Paduka Seni Ustaz Haji Awang Abdul Hamid Bakal, Chief Justice of the Syariah High Court Cambodia — Om Yentieng , member of HLP, government official , Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of Cambodia, Special advisor to the Prime Minister of Cambodia Hun Sen, Head of the Anticorruption Unit at the Council of Ministers Indonesia — Rafendi Djamin, activist, Executive Director of HRWG
The representatives can only receive the reports of human rights abuses without being able to react to the submitted reports as there is no such function in the AICHR as of now.
Can AICHR protect human rights?
Representatives of AICHR •
This principle, already seen as an ASEAN trademark, is often used by member States as an excuse/defence to avoid fulfilling their human rights obligations under international law which forms one of the underlying principles of any international treaty.
The absence of complain mechanism of the AICHR is and will continue to be the stumbling bloc of protecting the human rights of the people in ASEAN. I
Can AICHR protect human rights? •
The biggest spoiler of the TOR is Article 2.1.b on the noninterference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states.
•
•
•
•
Laos PDR — Boungkeut Sangsomsak, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao PDR, Ambassador to Thailand, Non-resident Ambassador to Malaysia (1990-1995) Malaysia — Shafee Abdulla, member of SUAHAKAM, Lawyer Myanmar/Burma — Kyaw Tint Swe, Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations Philippines — Rosanio G. Manalo, Member of the High Level Task Force for the ASEAN Human Rights Charter, Undersecretary for International Economic Relations for the Department of Foreign Affairs, Chairwoman of the UN Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Chairwoman of the UN Commission on the Status of Women
Page 12 of 237
Representatives of AICHR •
•
•
AICHR, ACWC, ACMW
Singapore — Mn Richand Magnus, Senior District Judge for the Subordinate Courts of Singapore ( 40 years in the Legal Service), Deputy President, Industrial Arbitration Court Thailand — Dn Snipnapha Petchanameesnee , academic, activist, political scientist Vietnam — Do Ngoc Son, Vietnam Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Thailand, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Asia, Governor of the 13th Asia-Europe Foundation board
ACWC Will be launched in April 2010 To promote the implementation of international instruments, ASEAN instruments and other instruments related to the rights of women and children. • To develop policies, programs and innovative strategies to promote and protect the rights of women and children to complement the building of the ASEAN Community. • To promote public awaneness and education of the rights of women and children in ASEAN. • To advocate on behalf of women and childnen, especially the most vulnerable and marginalized, and encourage ASEAN Member States to improve their situation. • To build capacities of relevant stakeholders at all levels towards the realization of the rights of women and children • •
•
Whatever the argument — the body is established — Questions: I
I
I I
I
How — with the limitation entails to AICHR — the body can work at its maximum level? How we can contribute to strengthening of AICHR? — How we can speed up the body to grow teeth, in another words, How we can hold AICHR and member states accountable to HR?
•
How we can continue to secure and institutionalize the civil society and people’s participation in AICHR process? How to make AICHR to be a Transparent, Independent, Efficient, Predictable body?
The Role of Civil Society •
•
•
• •
Step up protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers against exploitation and mistreatment; Strengthen protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers by enhancing labour migration governance in ASEAN Countries; Regional cooperation to fight human trafficking in ASEAN; and Development of an ASEAN Instrument on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant W orkers
The Civil Society’s Contribution
What next? •
ACM W • was established in September 2008. • ACMW Work Plan focuses on four thrusts:
Within the last decade, civil society involvement has not only been in the area of setting the agenda, norms and standards but also defining the issues, priority and process, building the constituency of ASEAN — can be done for AICHR (and ACWC) as well To ensure, sustain, and improve the participation and engagement of civil society with ASEAN, it is imperative to move the expectation from creating democratic room for engagement to institutionalizing the space and process for people‟s participation in decision-making processes of ASEAN and AICHR
The Role of Civil Society
Civil society‟s role is very important as:
•
I
a vehicle for citizens‟ participation,
I
countervailing power in ASEAN,
I
increasing the accountability of the states,
I
creator of social capacities,
I
promoter of social cohesion and social equality,
I
supporter of an ASEAN reform agenda.
•
•
•
continue to influence the agenda-setting of related organizations based on civil society‟s concerns and initiatives support the creation of national and regional pool of researchers, trainers, civil society experts, on ASEAN and human rights strengthen and improve existing infrastructure (i.e. ASEAN peoples‟ Center), procedures and mechanisms for civil society engagement with ASEAN and AICHR, enhance regional communication and cooperation among civil society to minimize the fractions within civil society working on ASEAN,
Page 13 of 237
The Role of Civil Society
What CSO can do: • • •
Initiate CS FORUM to the Annual Meeting of AICHR for better coordination among civil society
•
organize the annual meeting to provide 2 annual reports on: •
• •
•
•
1) human nights situation in ASEAN, and 2) the performance of the AICHR— start 2010 — 2011
Use the reports as basis to amend on neview the AICHR‟s work performance after 5 years
•
•
„Pilling strategy‟ of HR reports •
Maximize the role of ASG, CPR, Nat. Secretariat Engage in the process of developing the Rules of Procedures, ASEAN HR declaration & AICHR‟s reports How to best use the available venue to advance the „promotional activities‟ for the purpose of HR protection Establish and/or strengthen venues for engagement (narrow the gap) between advocacy groups working on civil and political rights and ESC rights Making these venues popularized so as to enable others involved in the promotion of change in the region More?
Page 14 of 237
ASEAN Community
POLITICAL SECURITY
•Rules based, shared norms and values • Cohesive, peaceful, stable, resilient with shared responsibility •Dynamic and Outward looking
ECONOMIC •Single Market and production base •Competitive economic region •Equitable Economic development •Integration into global economy
SOCIOCULTURAL •Human Development •Social Welfare and Protection •Social justice and rights •Environmental Sustainability •ASEAN Identity
ASEAN Charter
ASEAN Economic Community Council
ASEAN Security Community Council ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers
ASEAN Coordinating Council
Page 15 of 237
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint I.
INTRODUCTION
The ASEAN Leaders at their Summit in Kuala Lumpur 1. in December 1997 decided to transform ASEAN into a stable, prosperous, and highly competitive region with equitable economic development, and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities (ASEAN Vision 2020). 2. At the Bali Summit in October 2003, ASEAN Leaders declared that the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) shall be the goal of regional economic integration (Bali Concord II) by 2020. In addition to the AEC, the ASEAN Security Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community are the other two integral pillars of the envisaged ASEAN Community. All the three pillars are expected to work in tandem in establishing the ASEAN Community in 2020. 3. Subsequently, the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) held in August 2006 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, agreed to develop “a single and coherent blueprint for advancing the AEC by identifying the characteristics and elements of the AEC by 2015 consistent with the Bali Concord II with clear targets and timelines for implementation of various measures as well as pre-agreed flexibilities to accommodate the interests of all ASEAN Member Countries.” 4. At the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007, the Leaders affirmed their strong commitment to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 as envisioned in the ASEAN Vision 2020 and the ASEAN Concord II, and signed the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015. In particular, the Leaders agreed to hasten the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 and to transform ASEAN into a region with free movement of
Page 16 of 237
goods, services, investment, skilled labour, and freer flow of capital. II.
CHARACTERISTICS AND ELEMENTS OF AEC
5. The AEC is the realisation of the end goal of economic integration as espoused in the Vision 2020, which is based on a convergence of interests of ASEAN Member Countries to deepenand broaden economic integration through existing and new initiatives with clear timelines. In establishing the AEC, ASEAN shall act in accordance to the open, outward-looking, inclusive, and principles ofan market-driven economy consistent with multilateral rules as well as adherence to rules-based systems for effective compliance and implementation of economic commitments. 6. The AEC will establish ASEAN as a single market and production base making ASEAN more dynamic and competitive with new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives; accelerating regional integration in the priority sectors; facilitating movement of business persons, skilled labour and talents; and strengthening the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN. As a first step towards realising the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN has been implementing the recommendations of the High Level Task Force (HLTF) on ASEAN Economic Integration contained in the Bali Concord II. 7. At the same time, the AEC will address the development divide and accelerate integration of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam (CLMV) through the Initiative for ASEAN Integration and other regional initiatives. Other areas of cooperation are also to be incorporated such as human resources development and capacity building; recognition of professional qualifications; closer consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies; trade financing measures; enhanced infrastructure and communications
Page 17 of 237
connectivity; development of electronic transactions through e-ASEAN; integrating industries across the region to promote regional sourcing; and enhancing private sector involvement for the building of the AEC. 8. Based on the above and taking into consideration the importance of external trade to ASEAN and the need for the ASEAN Community as a whole to remain outward looking, the AEC envisages the following key characteristics: (a) a single market and production base, (b) a highly competitive economic region, (c) a region of equitable economic development, and (d) a region fully integrated into the global economy. These characteristics are inter-related and mutually reinforcing. Incorporating the required elements of each characteristic in one Blueprint shall ensure the consistency and coherence of these elements as well as their implementation and proper coordination among relevant stakeholders. A. Single Market and Production Base 9. An ASEAN single market and production base shall comprise five core elements: (i) free flow of goods; (ii) free flow of services; (iii) free flow of investment; (iv) freer flow of capital; and (v) free flow of skilled labour. In addition, the single market and production base also include two important components, namely, the priority integration sectors, and food, agriculture and forestry. Al. Free flow of goods 10. Free flow of goods is one of the principal means by which the aims of a single market and production base can be achieved. A single market for goods (and services) will also facilitate the development of production networks in the region and enhance ASEAN‟s capacity to serve as a global production centre or as a part of the global supply chain.
Page 18 of 237
11. Through ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN has achieved significant progress in the removal of tariffs. However, free flow of goods would require not only zero tariffs but the removal of non-tariff barriers as well. In addition, another major component that would facilitate free flow of goods is trade facilitation measures such as integrating customs procedures, establishing the ASEAN Single Window, continuously enhancing the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) Rules of Origin including its Operational Certification Procedures, and harmonising standards and conformance procedures. 12. The Common Effective Preferential Tariffs for ASEAN Free Trade Area (CEPT-AFTA) Agreement will be reviewed and enhanced to become a comprehensive agreement in realising free flow of goods and applicable to ASEAN needs for accelerated economic integration towards 2015. 13. Elimination of Tariffs. Tariffs on all intra-ASEAN goods will be eliminated in accordance with the schedules and commitments set out in the CEPT-AFTA Agreement and other relevant Agreements/Protocols. Actions: i. Eliminate import duties on all products, except for those phased in from the Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Lists by 2010 for ASEAN-6 and by 2015, with flexibilities for some sensitive products by 2018, for CLMV in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol to Amend the CEPT Agreement for the Elimination of Import Duties; ii. Eliminate import duties on products in the Priority Integration Sectors by 2007 for ASEAN-6 and 2012 for CLMV in accordance with the provisions of the ASEAN Framework (Amendment) Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors; iii. Complete the phasing in of the remaining products in the Sensitive List (SL) into the CEPT Scheme and reduce tariffs on these products to 0-5% by 1
Page 19 of 237
January 2010 for ASEAN-6, 1 January 2013 for Viet Nam, 1 January 2015 for Lao PDR and Myanmar, and by 1 January 2017 for Cambodia, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Special Arrangements for Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Products; and iv. Phase in products, which are in the General Exceptions List, in conformity with the CEPT Agreement. 14. Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers. ASEAN has achieved significant progress in tariff liberalisation. The main focus of ASEAN towards 2015 will be placed on the full elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Actions: i. Enhance transparency by abiding to the Protocol on Notification Procedure and setting up an effective Surveillance Mechanism; ii. Abide by the commitment of a standstill and rollback on NTBs; iii. Remove all NTBs by 2010 for ASEAN-5, by 2012 for the Philippines, and by 2015 with flexibilities to 2018 for CLMV, in accordance with the agreed Work Programme on Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) elimination; iv. Enhance transparency of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs); and v. Work towards where possible having regional rules and regulations consistent with International best practices. 15. Rules of Origin (ROO): Putting in place ROO which are responsive to the dynamic changes in global production processes so as to: facilitate trade and investment among ASEAN Member Countries; promote a regional production network; encourage development of SMEs and the narrowing of development gaps; and promote the increased usage of the AFTA CEPT Scheme.
Page 20 of 237
Actions: i. Continuously reform and enhance the CEPT ROO to respond to changes in regional production processes, including making necessary adjustments such as the introduction of advance rulings and improvements to the ROO; ii. Simplify the Operational Certification Procedures for the CEPT ROO and ensure its continuous enhancement, including the introduction of facilitative processes such as the electronic processing of certificates of origin, and harmonisation or alignment of national procedures to the extent possible; and iii. Review all the ROO implemented by ASEAN Member Countries, individually and collectively, and explore possible cumulation mechanisms, where possible. 16. Trade facilitation. Simple, harmonised and standardised trade and customs, processes, procedures and related information flows are expected to reduce transaction costs in ASEAN which will enhance export competitiveness and facilitate the integration of ASEAN into a single market for goods, services and investments and a single production base. Actions: i. Assess trade facilitation conditions in ASEAN; ii. Develop and implement a comprehensive trade facilitation work programme which aims at simplifying, harmonising and standardising trade and customs, processes, procedures and related information flows; iii. Promote transparency and visibility of all actions and interventions by all stakeholders within international trade transactions; iv. Establish a regional trade facilitation cooperation mechanism; v. Establish ASEAN Trade Facilitation Repository;
Page 21 of 237
vi. Develop national level measures to support and ensure effective implementation of regional level initiatives; and vii.Develop a comprehensive capacity building programmes to ensure smooth implementation of the work programme. 17. Customs Integration. In light of the acceleration of AEC, the realisation of ASEAN Customs Vision 2020 is brought forward to 2015. In particular, the 2005-2010 Strategic Plan of Customs Development aims to: (a) integrate customs structures; (b) modernise tariff classification, customs valuation and origin determination and establish ASEAN e-Customs; (c) smoothen customs clearance; (d) strengthen human resources development; (e) promote partnership with relevant international organisations; (f) narrow the development gaps in customs; and (g) adopt risk management techniques and audit-based control (PCA) for trade facilitation. Actions: i. Modernise customs techniques, guided by simple and harmonised customs procedures and formalities in line with international standards and best practices through the implementation of regional models of processing of cargoes and shipments (ASEAN Cargo Clearance and ASEAN Customs Declaration Document in 2007); ii. Establish ASEAN Customs Transit system to facilitate movement of goods and means of transport; iii. Establish ASEAN Customs systems dealing with special customs regimes such as Temporary Admission, Outward Processing and Inward Processing with the view to facilitate integration of production and supply chains; iv. Adopt international standards and practices to secure a uniform system of tariff classification, a synchronised system of value assessment for
Page 22 of 237
customs purposes and a harmonised system of origin determination, and information exchange where possible; v. Implement ASEAN e-Customs; and vi. Promote mutual assistance for better customs efficiency and effectiveness. 18. ASEAN Single Window. The implementation of measures of simplifying, harmonising and standardising trade and customs, processes, procedures and the application of ICT in all areas related to trade facilitation would be paramount in the ultimate creation of an ASEAN Single Window. The ASEAN Single Window is an environment where ten National Single Windows of individual Member Countries operate and integrate. National Single Window enables a single submission of data and information, a single and synchronous processing of data and information and a single decision-making for customs clearance of cargo, which expedites the customs clearance, reduce transaction time and costs, and thus enhance trade efficiency and competitiveness. Actions: i. ASEAN-6 (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) shall operationalise their National Single Windows by 2008 at the latest; ii. ASEAN-4 (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam) shall operationalise their National Single Windows no later than 2012; and iii. Standardisation of data elements based on WCO data model, the WCO data set and United Nation Trade Data Elements Directory (UNTDED) and acceleration of introduction of information, communication and technology (ICT) for digitalised processing and exchange.
Page 23 of 237
19. Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade. Systems of standards, quality assurance, accreditation, and measurement are crucial to promote greater efficiency and enhance cost effectiveness of production of intra-regional imports/exports. Standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures will be harmonised through the implementation of the ASEAN Policy Guideline on Standards and Conformance, with greater transparency, improved quality of conformity assessment and active participation of the private sector. Actions: i. Harmonise standards, technicalregulations and conformity assessment procedures through their alignment with international practices, where applicable; 1 ii. Develop and implement sectoral Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) on Conformity Assessment for specific sectors identified in the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Mutual Recognition Arrangements (also see footnote 1); iii. Enhance technical infrastructure and competency in laboratory testing, calibration, inspection, certification and accreditation based on regionally/internationally accepted procedures and guides; iv. Promote transparency in the development and application of standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures in line with the requirements of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the ASEAN Policy Guideline on Standards and Conformance;
1
Identification of standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures to be harmonised or for sectoral MRAs to be developed, must take into consideration the impact on ASEAN trade, the complexity of the regulatory system, the technical infrastructure as well as the feedback from stakeholders.
Page 24 of 237
v. Strengthen post market surveillance systems to ensure the successful implementation of the harmonised technical regulations; and vi. Develop capacity building programmes to ensure smooth implementation of the work programme. A2. Free flow of services 20. Free flow of trade in services is one of the important elements in realising ASEAN Economic Community, where there will be substantially no restriction to ASEAN services suppliers in providing services and in establishing companies across national borders within the region, subject to domestic regulations. Liberalisation of services has been carried out through rounds of negotiation mainly under the Coordinating Committee on Services. Negotiation of some specific services sectors such as financial services and air transport are carried out by their respective Ministerial bodies. In liberalising services, there should be no back-loading of commitments, and pre-agreed flexibility shall be accorded to all ASEAN Member Countries. 21. In facilitating the free flow of services by 2015, ASEAN is also working towards recognition of professional qualifications with a view to facilitate their movement within the region. Actions: i. Remove substantially all restrictions on trade in services for 4 priority services sectors, air transport, e-ASEAN, healthcare and tourism, by 2010 and the fifth priority services sector, logistics services, by 2013; ii. Remove substantially all restrictions on trade in services for all other services sectors by 2015; iii. Undertake liberalisation through consecutive rounds of every two years until 2015, i.e. 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2015;
Page 25 of 237
iv. Target to schedule minimum numbers of new subsectors for each round: 10 sub-sectors in 2008, 15 in 2010, 20 in 2012, 20 in 2014 and 7 in 2015, based on GATS W/120 universe of classification; v. Schedule packages of commitments for every round according to the following parameters: • No restrictions for Modes 1 and 2, with exceptions due to bona fide regulatory reasons (such as public safety) which are subject to agreement by all Member Countries on a caseby-case basis; • Allow for foreign (ASEAN) equity participation of not less than 51% by 2008, and 70% by 2010 for the 4 priority services sectors; not less than 49% by 2008, 51% by 2010, and 70% by 2013 for logistics services; and not less than 49% by 2008, 51% by 2010, and 70% by 2015 for other services sectors; and • Progressively remove other Mode 3 market access limitations by 2015; vi. Set the parameters of liberalisation for national treatment limitations, Mode 4 and limitations in the horizontal commitments for each round by 2009; vii.Schedule commitments according to agreed parameters for national treatment limitations, Mode 4 and limitations in the horizontal commitments set in 2009; viii. Complete the compilation of an inventory of barriers to services by August 2008; ix. Allow for overall flexibilities2, which cover the subsectors totally excluded from liberalisation and the sub-sectors in which not all the agreed parameters of liberalisation of the modes of supply are met, in scheduling liberalisation commitments. The scheduling of liberalisation commitments in each round shall be accorded with the following flexibilities: 2
The 15% figure for overall flexibility will be reviewed upon the completion of the inventory of limitations in 2008.
Page 26 of 237
• Possibility of catching up in the next round if a Member Country is not able to meet the parameters of commitments set for the previous round; • Allowing for substituting sub-sectors that have been agreed to be liberalised in a round but for which a Member Country is not able to make commitments with sub-sectors outside the agreed sub-sectors; and • Liberalisation through the ASEAN Minus X formula. x. Complete mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) currently under negotiation, i.e. architectural services, accountancy services, surveying qualifications, medical practitioners by 2008, and dental practitioners by 2009; xi. Implement the MRAs expeditiously according to the provisions of each respective MRA; xii.Identify and develop MRAs for other professional services by 2012, to be completed by 2015; and xiii. Strengthen human resource development and capacity building in the area of services. For the financial services sector3, 22. Liberalisation measures of the financial services sector should allow members to ensure orderly financial sector development and maintenance of financial and socioeconomic stability. Member Countries would be guided by the following principles in pacing their liberalisation measures: a) Liberalisation through ASEAN Minus X formula where countries that are ready to liberalise can proceed first and be joined by others later; and
3
All measures for the financial services sector will be subject to prudential measures and balance of payment safeguards as provided for under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services.
Page 27 of 237
b) The process of liberalisation should take place with due respect for national policy objectives and the level of economic and financial sector development of the individual members. Actions: i. Progressively liberalise restrictions in sub-sectors or modes as identified by each member country by 2015; and ii. Progressively liberalise restrictions in the remaining sub-sectors or modes, which are not identified under “pre-agreed flexibilities”, by 2020. A3. Free flow of investment 23. A free and open investment regime is key to enhancing ASEAN‟s competitiveness in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as intra-ASEAN investment. Sustained inflows of new investments and reinvestments will promote and ensure dynamic development of ASEAN economies. 24. ASEAN investment cooperation is being implemented through the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), 1998, while investment protection is accorded under a separate agreement i.e. the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, 1987 or commonly referred to as ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA). 25. Under the AIA, all industries (in the manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, forestry and mining and quarrying sectors and services incidental to these five sectors) shall be open and national treatment granted to investors both at the pre-establishment and the post-establishment stages, with some exceptions as listed in member countries‟ Temporary Exclusion Lists (TEL) and Sensitive Lists (SL) . The TEL is to be phased-out based on agreed timelines. Although the SL
Page 28 of 237
does not have a timeline for phasing-out, they will be reviewed periodically. 26. To enhance regional integration as well as to maintain a competitive investment area, both the Framework Agreement on the AIA and the ASEAN IGA will be reviewed. The objective is to realise a more comprehensive investment agreement which should be forward looking, with improved features, provisions and obligations by considering international best practices that would increase the investor confidence in ASEAN. The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which will build on the existing AIA Agreement and ASEAN IGA, will cover the following pillars: Investment Protection 27. Provide enhanced protection to all investors and their investments to be covered under the comprehensive agreement. Actions: i. To strengthen among others the following provisions: • investor-state dispute settlement mechanism; • transfer and repatriation of capital, profits, dividends, etc. 4; • transparent coverage on the expropriation and compensation; • full protection and security; and • treatment of compensation for losses resulting from strife.
4
Since these items are related to capital movements, they should follow the guiding principles of capital movements as stated in section A.4. „Freer Flow of Capital‟, particularly on Allowing Greater Capital Mobility.
Page 29 of 237
Facilitation and Cooperation 28. A more transparent, consistent and predictable investment rules, regulations, policies and procedures. Actions: i. Harmonise, where possible, investment policies to achieve industrial complementation and economic integration; ii. Streamline and simplify procedures for investment applications and approvals; iii. Promote dissemination of investment information: rules, regulations, policies and procedures, including through one-stop investment centre or investment promotion board; iv. Strengthen databases on all forms of investments covering goods and services to facilitate policy formulation; v. Strengthen coordination among government ministries and agencies concerned; vi. Consultation with ASEAN private sectors to facilitate investment; and vii.Identify and work towards areas of complementation ASEAN-wide as well as bilateral economic integration. Promotion and Awareness 29. Promote ASEAN as an integrated investment area and production network. Actions: i. Create the necessary environment to promote all forms of investment and new growth areas into ASEAN; ii. Promote intra-ASEAN investments, particularly investments from ASEAN-6 to CLMV; iii. Promote the growth and development of SMEs and MNEs;
Page 30 of 237
iv. Promote industrial complementation and production networks among MNCs in ASEAN; v. Promote joint investment missions that focus on regional clusters and production networks; vi. Extend the benefits of ASEAN industrial cooperation initiatives in addition to the AICO Scheme to encourage regional clusters and production networks; and vii.Work towards establishing an effective network of bilateral agreements on avoidance of double taxation among ASEAN countries. Liberalisation 30. Progressive liberalisation of ASEAN Member Countries‟ investment regime to achieve free and open investment by 2015. Actions: i. Extend non-discriminatory treatment, including national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment, to investors in ASEAN with limited exceptions; minimise and where possible, eliminate such exceptions; ii. Reduce and where possible, eliminate restrictions to entry for investments in the Priority Integration Sectors covering goods; and iii. Reduce and where possible, eliminate restrictive investment measures and other impediments, including performance requirements. A4. Freer flow of capital 31. Strengthening ASEAN Capital Market Development and Integration.
Page 31 of 237
Actions: i. Achieve greater harmonisation in capital market standards in ASEAN in the areas of offering rules for debt securities, disclosure requirements and distribution rules; ii. Facilitate mutual recognition arrangement or agreement for the cross recognition of qualification and education and experience of market professionals; iii. Achieve greater flexibility in language and governing law requirements for securities issuance; iv. Enhance withholding tax structure, where possible, to promote the broadening of investor base in ASEAN debt issuance; and v. Facilitate market driven efforts to establish exchange and debt market linkages, including cross-border capital raising activities. 32.
Allowing Greater Capital Mobility.
The liberalisation of capital movements is to be guided by the following principles: a) Ensuring an orderly capital account liberalisation consistent with member countries‟ national agenda and readiness of the economy; b) Allowing adequate safeguard against potential macroeconomic instability and systemic risk that may arise from the liberalisation process, including the right to adopt necessary measures to ensure macroeconomic stability; and c) Ensuring the benefits of liberalisation to be shared by all ASEAN countries. Actions: i. Remove or relax restrictions, where appropriate and possible, to facilitate the flows of payments and transfers for current account transactions;
Page 32 of 237
ii. Remove or relax restrictions on capital flows, where appropriate and possible, to support foreign direct investment and initiatives to promote capital market development A5. Free flow of skilled labour 33. In allowing for managed mobility or facilitated entry for the movement of natural persons engaged in trade in goods, services, and investments, according to the prevailing regulations of the receiving country, ASEAN is working to: Action: i. Facilitate the issuance of visas and employment passes for ASEAN professionals and skilled labour who are engaged in cross-border trade and investment related activities. 34. In facilitating the free flow of services (by 2015), ASEAN is also working towards harmonisation and standardisation, with a view to facilitate their movement within the region. Actions: i. Enhance cooperation among ASEAN University Network (AUN) members to increase mobility for both students and staff within the region; ii. Develop core competencies and qualifications for job/occupational and trainers skills required in the priority services sectors (by 2009); and in other services sectors (from 2010 to 2015); and iii. Strengthen the research capabilities of each ASEAN Member Country in terms of promoting skills, job placements, and developing labour market information networks among ASEAN Member Countries.
Page 33 of 237
A6. Priority Integration Sectors 35. While it is desirable to integrate across the whole range of economic sectors, ASEAN has recognised the magnitude of the challenge this would pose and initially focused its resources on comprehensively integrating a limited number of priority sectors, which will serve as a catalyst for the overall ASEAN economic integration. 36. Twelve priority integration sectors were identified for accelerated economic integration. Several Member Countries took on the coordinator role for each sector. Each priority integration sector has a roadmap, which combines specific initiatives of the sector and the broad initiatives that cut across all sectors such as trade facilitation measures. 37. Raising the efficiency of these key sectors will enable ASEAN to compete for capital, and retain value-added economic activity and employment in the region. The sectoral approach allows the region to focus its limited resources on rapid and deep integration in these critical areas while provides ASEAN members the opportunity to observe and manage the impact of integration and to jointly develop a stronger sense of commitment to economic integration prior to a broader roll-out. Actions: i. Conduct a bi-annual review to monitor the status, progress and effectiveness of PIS roadmaps to ensure their timely implementation; and ii. Identify sector-specific projects or initiatives through regular dialogues or consultation with stakeholders, particularly the private sector. A7. Food, Agriculture and Forestry 38. Enhance intra- and extra-ASEAN trade and long-term competitiveness of ASEAN‟s food, agriculture and forestry products/commodities.
Page 34 of 237
Actions: i. Monitor implementation of CEPT-AFTA schemes for agricultural and forest products; ii. Develop and apply fisheries quality management systems that ensure food safety and support competitive position of ASEAN fisheries products on world markets through the implementation, validation, verification of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP)-based systems and improved laboratories practices, and adapting quality and safety management systems so that they may be applied to small enterprises in ASEAN by 2009; iii. Establish Good Agriculture / Aquaculture Practices (GAP), Good Animal Husbandry Practices (GAHP), Good Hygiene Practices (GHP), Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) based systems; for agricultural and food products with significant trade / trade potential by 2012; iv. Harmonise the quarantine and inspection/sampling procedure by 2010 and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures for agricultural, food and forestry products with significant trade / trade potential; in accordance with international standards/guidelines, where applicable, by 2015; v. Harmonise the Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) of commonly used pesticides for widely traded crop products in accordance with international standards/guidelines, where applicable, by 2010; vi. Harmonise the regulatory framework for agricultural products derived from modern biotechnology in accordance with international standards/guidelines, where applicable, by 2015; vii.Harmonise the safety and quality standards for horticultural produce and agricultural products of economic importance in the ASEAN region, in
Page 35 of 237
accordance with international standards/guidelines, where applicable, by 2015; viii. Harmonise the animal (both terrestrial and aquatic animals) health control for safety of food of animal origin through a common bio-security management standards scheme, in accordance with international standards/guidelines, where applicable, by 2015; ix. Harmonise guidelines for the use of chemicals in aquaculture and measures to eliminate the use of harmful chemicals, in accordance with international standards/guidelines, where applicable, by 2009; and x. Develop a regional reference framework on phasedapproach to forest certification by 2015. 39. Promote cooperation, joint approaches and technology transfer among ASEAN Member Countries and international, regional organisations and private sector. Actions: i. Develop joint strategies / positions on issues of related interest to ASEAN with international organisations such as WTO, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), CODEX, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and dialogue partners; ii. Promote collaborative research and technology transfer in agriculture, food and forestry products; iii. Establish strategic alliances and joint approaches with the private sectors in promoting food safety, investment and joint venture opportunities, promotion of agricultural products and market access;
Page 36 of 237
iv. Strengthen efforts to combat illegal logging and its associated trade, forest fire and its resultant effects; and v. Strengthen efforts to combat illegal fishing. 40. Promote ASEAN agricultural cooperatives as a means to empower and enhance market access of agricultural products, to build a network mechanism linking agricultural cooperatives, and to fulfil the purpose of agricultural cooperatives for the benefit of farmers in the region. Actions: i. Strengthen strategic alliance between agricultural cooperatives in ASEAN through bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation; ii. Establish business linkages among the potential agricultural cooperatives within ASEAN; and iii. Promote direct investment and strategic partnership with ASEAN agricultural cooperatives producers, consumers, and traders. B. Competitive Economic Region BI. Competition Policy 41. The main objective of the competition policy is to foster a culture of fair competition. Institutions and laws related to competition policy have recently been established in some (but not all) ASEAN Member Countries (AMCs).5 There is currently no official ASEAN body for cooperative work on CPL to serve as a network for competition agencies or relevant bodies to exchange policy experiences and institutional norms on CPL.
5
Currently, only four AMCs (Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam) have their own competition law and competition regulatory bodies. Malaysia has not passed any nation-wide competition law but has, instead, relied on sector-level regulations to ensure and enforce competition in markets.
Page 37 of 237
Actions: i. Endeavour to introduce competition policy in all ASEAN Member Countries by 2015; ii. Establish a network of authorities or agencies responsible for competition policy to serve as a forum for discussing and coordinating competition policies; iii. Encourage capacity building programmes/activities for ASEAN Member Countries in developing national competition policy; and iv. Develop a regional guideline on competition policy by 2010, based on country experiences and international best practices with the view to creating a fair competition environment. B2. Consumer Protection 42. The building of an integrated economic region with a people-centred approach in this region has made ASEAN mindful that consumers cannot be precluded in all measures taken to achieve this integration. Consumer protection measures are already being developed in tandem with the proposed economic measures to address the already emerging consumer protection. Actions: i. Strengthen consumer protection in ASEAN through the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Consumer Protection (ACCCP); ii. Establish a network of consumer protection agencies to facilitate information sharing and exchange; and iii. Organise regional training courses for consumer protection officials and consumer leaders in preparation for an integrated ASEAN market. B3. Intellectual property rights (IPR)
Page 38 of 237
43. In principle, intellectual property (IP) policy can serve as a powerful stimulus to (a) cultural, intellectual and artistic creativity and their commercialisation; (b) efficient adoption and adaptation of more advanced technologies; and (c) continuous learning to meet the ever-rising threshold of performance expectations. 44. IP policy can also help to incubate a vibrant culture of creativity and invention, and to ensure more equitable access and benefits to all stakeholders in both traditional and newer IPRs. Furthermore, IP policy can influence both the volume and quality of external trade and investment and the transfers of advanced, proprietary technologies. IP creativity is a major determinant of local value added and external competitiveness. 45. Regional cooperation in IPR has been guided by the ASEAN IPR Action Plan 2004-2010 and the Work Plan for ASEAN Cooperation on Copyrights which aim to develop a culture of learning and innovation supported by a friendlier IP profile to businesses, investors, inventors and creators in ASEAN. In addition, these Plans are also designed to foster better public awareness, coordination and networking, predictability, capacity building, and contribution of IP industries to competitiveness and development. Actions: i. Fully implement the ASEAN IPR Action Plan 20042010, and the Work Plan for ASEAN Cooperation on Copyrights; ii. Establish an ASEAN filing system for design to facilitate filings by users and promote coordination among the IP Offices in ASEAN Member Countries, as receiving office, contingent upon the language requirements; iii. Accession to the Madrid Protocol, where possible; iv. Sustain consultations and information exchanges among national enforcement agencies in IPR protection; and
Page 39 of 237
v. Promote regional cooperation on Traditional Knowledge (TK), Genetic Resources (GR) and Cultural Traditional Expressions (CTE). B4. Infrastructure Development 46. Transport Cooperation. An efficient, secure and integrated transport network in ASEAN is vital for realising the full potential of the ASEAN Free Trade Area as well as in enhancing the attractiveness of the region as a single production, tourism and investment destination and narrowing development gaps. ASEAN transport is also critical in linking ASEAN with the neighbouring Northeast and South Asian countries. 47. Regional efforts have been made to enhance transport facilitation and logistics services, promote multimodal transport infrastructure linkages and connectivity, facilitate transport and tourism integration and further liberalise the air and maritime transport sectors. The enabling framework for the full liberalisation of air services in ASEAN shall be expeditiously implemented. 48. Multi-modal transport and transport facilitation. The ASEAN Transport Action Plan (ATAP) 2005-2010 covers maritime, land and air transport, and transport facilitation. The Plan outlines 48 action measures. Actions: i. Implementation of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit by 2009; ii. Implementation of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Multimodal Transport by 2010; and iii. Finalisation of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Inter-State Transport by 2008 for its implementation beginning 2010.
Page 40 of 237
49. Land transport. Priority is given to completion of the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL) and the ASEAN Highway Network (AHN) projects. Actions: i. Complete the development of all the missing links in the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link; ii. Complete the implementation of the AHN projects, in particular, road construction I improvement of below Class III road (two narrow lanes with double bituminous treatment) sections of designated Transit Transport Routes (TTRs) of the AHN; and iii. Enhance road safety in ASEAN. 50. Maritime and air transport. Adopt the general principles and framework for an ASEAN Single Shipping Market and develop and implement the ASEAN Single Aviation Market. Actions: i. Implement relevant International Maritime Organisation (IMO) conventions; ii. Implement the Roadmap towards an Integrated and Competitive Maritime Transport in ASEAN; iii. Implement the ASEAN Open Sky Policy (Roadmap for Integration of the Air Travel Sector); and iv. Implement the ASEAN Single Aviation Market. 51. Information Infrastructure. A secure and connected information infrastructure is important for sustaining the region‟s economic growth and competitiveness. Efforts have been made to facilitate interconnectivity and technical interoperability among ICT systems, leveraging on existing national networks and evolving these into a regional information infrastructure. Equal emphasis has been given to improving trust and confidence in the use of the Internet and security of electronic transactions, payments and settlements.
Page 41 of 237
52. Develop high-speed inter-connections national information infrastructures (NII).
among
all
Actions: i. Facilitate high-speed connection among all national information infrastructure by 2010 and implement ICT measures as identified in the VAP; ii. Intensify capacity building and training programmes for national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and strengthen its capacity, cooperation and the coverage of the region‟s cyber-security network, including expanding the ASEAN CERT Incident Drills to include ASEAN‟s Dialogue Partners in 2007; iii. Encourage the participation of all stakeholders (people, communities, enterprises and public administrations) in utilisation and development of ICT applications and services on the regional information infrastructure; iv. Support sectoral ICT applications (initially in key sectors such as customs, logistics, transport, content industry) to improve their effectiveness and productivity; v. Expand the number of ASEAN countries participating in the ASEAN MRA for telecommunications equipment; and vi. Deepen regional policy and regulatory framework to deal with the opportunities and challenges in the area of Next Generation Networks, including the interoperability of productslservices, information systems and networks in the convergence environment. 53. Energy Cooperation. Secure and reliable supply of energy including bio-fuel is crucial to support and sustain economic and industrial activities. Regional collaboration in the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) and the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) Projects allows the optimisation of the region‟s energy resources for greater security. These
Page 42 of 237
projects also provide opportunities for private sector involvement in terms of investment, including financing, and technology transfer. Interconnected networks of electricity grids and gas pipelines offer significant benefits both in terms of security, flexibility and quality of energy supply. 54. Expedite the development of the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP). The APG involves 14 electricity interconnection projects and the TAGP, seven gas interconnection projects. Actions: i. Accelerate implementation of the APG and TAGP; ii. Promote greater involvement of private sectors in APG and TAGP; and iii. Finalise the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement to enhance oil and gas security in the region; 55. While ASEAN strive towards accelerating the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015, it is important to ensure that such development is sustainable through, among others, mitigating greenhouse gas emission by means of effective policies and measures, thus contributing to global climate change abatement. Recognising the limited global reserve of fossil energy and the unstable world prices of fuel oil, it is essential for ASEAN to emphasise the need to strengthen renewable energy development, such as bio-fuels, as well as to promote open trade, facilitation and cooperation in the renewable energy sector and related industries as well as investment in the requisite infrastructure for renewable energy development. 56. Mining cooperation. Enhance trade and investment and strengthen cooperation and capacity in geological and mineral sector for sustainable mineral development in the ASEAN region. Actions:
Page 43 of 237
i. Facilitate and enhance trade and investment in minerals; ii. Intensify institutional and human capacity building in ASEAN geological and mineral sector; iii. Promote environmentally and socially sustainable mineral development; and iv. Encourage the participation of the private sector in mineral development. 57. Financing of Infrastructure Projects. Financing is always recognised as an important contributor to economic growth. As ASEAN accelerates its economic integration efforts, greater investment will be needed particularly in the development of regional infrastructure. Putting in place innovative financing schemes to attract greater private sector involvement is thus important. Actions: i. Promote greater participation of private sectors and international organisations in financing regional infrastructure development such as the APG, TAGP, SKRL and ASEAN Highway Network; and ii. Remove or relax impediments to cross-border investment inifinancing of regional infrastructure projects. B5. Taxation 58.
Actions: i. Complete the network of bilateral agreements on avoidance of double taxation among all Member Countries by 2010, to the extent possible. B6. E-Commerce
59. To lay the policy and legal infrastructure for electronic commerce and enable on-line trade in goods (e-commerce) within ASEAN through the implementation of the e-ASEAN
Page 44 of 237
Framework Agreement and based on common reference frameworks. Actions: i. Adopt best practices in implementing telecommunications competition policies and fostering the preparation of domestic legislation on e-commerce; ii. Harmonise the legal infrastructure for electronic contracting and dispute resolution; iii. Develop and implement better practice guidelines for electronic contracting, guiding principles for online dispute resolution services, and mutual recognition framework for digital signatures in ASEAN; iv. Facilitate mutual recognition of digital signatures in ASEAN; v. Study and encourage the adoption of the best practices and guidelines of regulations andior standards based on a common framework; and vi. Establish a networking forum between the businesses in ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners as a platform for promoting trade and investment. C. Equitable Economic Development CI. SME development 60. The ASEAN Policy Blueprint for SME Development (APBSD) 2004-2014 outlines the framework for SME development in the ASEAN region. It comprises strategic work programmes, policy measures and indicative outputs. Its objectives are to: (a) Accelerate the pace of SME development, optimising on the diversities of ASEAN Member Countries;
Page 45 of 237
(b) Enhance the competitiveness and dynamism of ASEAN SMEs by facilitating their access to information, market, human resource development and skills, finance as well as technology; (c) Strengthen the resilience of ASEAN SMEs to better withstand adverse macroeconomic and financial difficulties, as well as the challenges of a more liberalised trading environment; and (d) Increase the contribution of SMEs to the overall economic growth and development of ASEAN as a region. Actions: i. Timely implementation of the ASEAN Policy Blueprint for SME Development 2004-2014 (APBSD); ii. Promote networking of SMEs and their participation in the building of regional production and distributions networks; and iii. Promote best practices in SME development, including SME financing. C2. Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) 61. Given the different levels of development among ASEAN Member Countries, there arises the need to ensure the deepening and broadening integration of ASEAN is accompanied by technical and development cooperation to address the development divide and accelerate the economic integration of the less developed ASEAN Member Countries so that the benefits of ASEAN integration are shared and enjoyed by all ASEAN Member Countries. This would allow ASEAN Member Countries to move in a unified manner. 62. The Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), launched in November 2000, gives the direction and sharpens the focus of collective efforts to narrow the development gap not only within ASEAN but between ASEAN and other parts of the
Page 46 of 237
world as well. The IAI currently covers the following priority areas, namely infrastructure, human resource development, information and communications technologies (ICT), capacity building for regional economic integration, energy, investment climate, tourism, poverty reduction and improvement in the quality of life. 63. Meeting the AEC challenge will require CLMV to develop policy to enhance economic growth, strengthen economic competitiveness, increase domestic and foreign direct investments, expand private sector enterprises while meeting its public goals. Actions: i. Enhance the IAI to serve as the platform for identifying and implementing technical assistance and capacity building programmes for both public and private sectors in ASEAN Member Countries, in particular, CLMV and the other sub-regional arrangements such as the IMT-GT and the BIMPEAGA within ASEAN to allow them to be equal partners in the development of regional production and distribution networks; ii. ASEAN-6 to continue its support for IAI programmes; iii. Garner sufficient support from dialogue partners and international organisations such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank for effective implementation of the IAI programmes; iv. Buildistrengthen capacity of government officials to developiimplement economic and social policies that would mitigate the effects of economic integration; and v. Conduct periodic socio-economic studies to monitorievaluate the impact of economic integration.
Page 47 of 237
D. Integration into the Global Economy 64. ASEAN operates in an increasingly global environment, with interdependent markets and globalised industries. In order to enable ASEAN businesses to compete internationally, to make ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply chain and to ensure that the internal market remains attractive for foreign investment, it is crucial for ASEAN to look beyond the borders of AEC. External rules and regulations must increasingly be taken into account when developing policies related to AEC. DI. Coherent Approach towards External Economic Relations 65. ASEAN shall work towards maintaining “ASEAN Centrality” in its external economic relations, including, but not limited to, its negotiations for free trade (FTAs) and comprehensive economic partnership (CEPs) agreements. This shall be done by: Actions: i. Review FTAiCEP commitments vis-à-vis ASEAN‟s internal integration commitments; and ii. Establish a system for enhanced coordination, and possibly arriving at common approaches andior positions in ASEAN‟s external economic relations and in regional and multilateral fora. D2. Enhanced participation in global supply networks 66. ASEAN shall also enhance participation in global supply networks by: Actions: i. Continuing the adoption of international practices and standards in production distribution, where possible; and
Page 48 of 237
best and
ii. Developing a comprehensive package of technical assistance for the less developed ASEAN Member Countries to upgrade their industrial capability and productivity to enhance their participation in regional and global integration initiatives. III.
IMPLEMENTATION
67. A strategic schedule that includes key milestones for a comprehensive and deeper economic integration shall form an integral part of this Blueprint. Consultations have been made with relevant bodiesistakeholders to invite their inputs and coordinating conferences were held to jointly review the Blueprint and its strategic schedule among all stakeholders to ensure consistency of the above measures, programmes and milestones across sectors and promote greater sense of ownership of the Blueprint. 68. Relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies will coordinate the implementation of the above programmes and measures while relevant government agencies will be responsible for overseeing the implementation and preparation of more detailed action plans at the national level. Partnership arrangements with the private sector, industry associations and the wider community at the regional and national levels will also be actively sought where required to ensure participation of all stakeholders in the integration process. 69. For the successful implementation of these programmes and measures, the necessary institutions or mechanisms, resources, capacity and political will be accorded to the Community building process. A. Implementation Mechanism 70. Relevant sectoral Ministerial bodies shall be responsible for the implementation of the Blueprint and monitoring of commitments under their respective purview.
Page 49 of 237
The ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM), as the Ministers-inCharge of Economic Integration in the Council of ASEAN Economic Community, shall be accountable for the overall implementation of the Blueprint. 71. To allow for effective implementation of the Blueprint, the following measures on charting strategic directions and coordination shall be implemented. Actions: i. The HLTF shall provide strategic inputs to the AEM on issues affecting the timely implementation of the Blueprint; ii. Undertake regular consultations with various sectoral bodies to discuss and elicit feedback on implementation issues of the Blueprint; and iii. The Secretary-General of ASEAN shall report the progress of AEC to relevant ministerial meetings and the Summit. 72. In enhancing the implementation arrangements and streamlining the decision-making process of all ASEAN economic initiatives identified in the Blueprint and beyond, the following measures are recommended: i. Promote transparency and improve the operation of notification procedures under all ASEAN economic agreements through the Protocol on Notification Procedures; ii. Ratification of ASEAN legal instruments shall be made within six months of signing; iii. Decision-making process by economic bodies to be made by consensus, and where there is no consensus, ASEAN to consider other options with the objective of expediting the decision-making process; iv. Utilise the Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) to promote a rules-based community;
Page 50 of 237
v. The ASEAN Minus X formula can be invoked to accelerate the implementation of agreed economic initiatives; and vi. Flexibility should be accorded in the implementation of AEC, which shall be pre-agreed and not delay the overall progress and implementation of the AEC. 73. Progress in the implementation of the above programmes and measures for AEC building by Member Countries needs to be monitored, reviewed and disseminated to all stakeholders. The ASEAN Secretariat shall review and monitor compliance of implementing the Blueprint. Action: i. Develop and maintain a set of statistical indicators, including an integrated tariff and trade data database system, address harmonisation of statistics and data quality issues, and the AEC scorecards, to monitor and assess the progress of implementation of each element of the AEC. 74.
For the financial sector, i. Establish an appropriate implementation mechanism in the form of regular progress reports to the Leaders. B. Resources
75. Research and capacity building support is to be mobilised from various facilities. Actions: i. The ASEAN Development Fund, with contributions from Member Countries, will be a vehicle to draw resources from other ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources;
Page 51 of 237
ii. Identify and implement technical studies or training programmes on issues, areas or topics where analytical as well as capacity building support are needed to facilitate the implementation of the AEC Blueprint; iii. Translate milestones and targets of the AEC Blueprint into national milestones and targets and incorporate them in their national development plans; iv. Promote the participation of the ADB, World BankiIFC, dialogue or trading partners and the private sector in the development of regional infrastructure projects; v. Strengthen the research and planning capabilities of the ASEAN Secretariat in areas relevant to the AEC; vi. Strengthen the research capabilities and human capital development of each ASEAN Member Country; and vii.Establish appropriate capacity building programmes to assist newer member countries to enhance the development and regulatory frameworks of their financial markets. C. Communications 76. Success of building the AEC requires involvement by all stakeholders in the integration process. In addition to involving all stakeholders in the formulation of the Blueprint, a good communications programme is required to create greater public awareness of the AEC in all ASEAN countries as well as to keep all stakeholders, including the business communities and people of ASEAN, informed of the progress of this community building. Actions: i. Launch a comprehensive communications plan to explain to the government officials, key stakeholders and the general public the objectives, benefits and challenges of the AEC;
Page 52 of 237
ii. Develop a regional platform for open discussion and sharing information in implementing the ASEAN Economic Community; iii. Member Countries shall set up a mechanism at the national level to regularly report the outcome and issues of the integration process; and iv. Create an AEC communications website that would provide an additional channel to reach communities at large, where stakeholders can provide feedback and respond to ASEAN economic initiatives. D. Review 77. The AEC Blueprint shall be reviewed periodically taking into account dynamic regional and global developments. KKKJJJ
Page 53 of 237
ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint I. INTRODUCTION 1. The ASEAN Political-Security Community has its genesis of over four decades of close co-operation and solidarity. The ASEAN Heads of States/Governments, at their Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997 envisioned a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies. 2. To concretise the ASEAN Vision 2020, the ASEAN Heads of States/Governments adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) in 2003, which establishes an ASEAN Community by 2020. The ASEAN Community consists of three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). 3. Conscious that the strengthening of ASEAN integration through accelerated establishment of an ASEAN Community will reinforce ASEAN‟s centrality and role as the driving force in charting the evolving regional architecture, the ASEAN Leaders at the 12th ASEAN Summit in the Philippines decided to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015. 4. At the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore, the ASEAN Heads of States/Governments signed the ASEAN Charter, which marked ASEAN Member States‟ commitment in intensifying community-building through enhanced regional cooperation and integration. In line with this, they tasked their Ministers and officials to draft the APSC Blueprint, which would be adopted at the 14th ASEAN Summit. 5. The APSC Blueprint is guided by the ASEAN Charter and the principles and purposes contained therein. The APSC Blueprint builds on the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP), as well as relevant decisions by various ASEAN Sectoral Bodies. The ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action is a principled document, laying out the activities needed to realise the objectives of the ASEAN Political Security Community, while the VAP lays out the measures necessary for 2004-2010. Both documents are important references in continuing political and security cooperation. The APSC Blueprint provides a roadmap and timetable to establish the APSC by 2015. The APSC Blueprint would also have the flexibility to continue programmes/activities beyond 2015 in order to retain its significance and have an enduring quality.
Page 54 of 237
II. CHARACTERISTICS AND ELEMENTS OF THE APSC 6. It is envisaged that the APSC will bring ASEAN‟s political and security cooperation to a higher plane. The APSC will ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. 7. The APSC shall promote political development in adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as inscribed in the ASEAN Charter. It shall be a means by which ASEAN Member States can pursue closer interaction and cooperation to forge shared norms and create common mechanisms to achieve ASEAN‟s goals and objectives in the political and security fields. In this regard, it promotes a people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society, regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and cultural background, are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community building. In the implementation of, the Blueprint, ASEAN should also strive towards promoting and supporting gender-mainstreaming, tolerance, respect for diversity, equality and mutual understanding. 8. At the same time, in the interest of preserving and enhancing peace and stability in the region, the APSC seeks to strengthen the mutually beneficial relations between ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners and friends. In doing so, it also maintains the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive, while remaining actively engaged, forwardlooking and non-discriminatory. 9. The APSC subscribes to a comprehensive approach to security, which acknowledges the interwoven relationships of political, economic, social-cultural and environmental dimensions of development. It promotes renunciation of aggression and of the threat or use of force or other actions in any manner inconsistent with international law and reliance of peaceful settlements of dispute. In this regard, it upholds existing ASEAN political instruments such as the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia (TAC) and the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), which play a pivotal role in the area of confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and pacific approaches to conflict resolution. It also seeks to address non-traditional security issues. 10. Based on the above, the ASEAN Political-Security Community envisages the following three key characteristics: a) A Rules-based Community of shared values and norms; b) A Cohesive, Peaceful, Stable and Resilient Region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; and
Page 55 of 237
c) A Dynamic and Outward-looking Region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world. 11. These characteristics are inter-related and mutually reinforcing, and shall be pursued in a balanced and consistent manner. To effectively realise the APSC, the APSC Blueprint is an action-oriented document with a view to achieving results and recognises the capacity and capability of ASEAN Member States to undertake the stipulated actions in the Blueprint. A. A RULES-BASED COMMUNITY OF SHARED VALUES AND NORMS 12. ASEAN‟s cooperation in political development aims to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN, so as to ultimately create a Rules-based Community of shared values and norms. In the shaping and sharing of norms, ASEAN aims to achieve a standard of common adherence to norms of good conduct among member states of the ASEAN Community; consolidating and strengthening ASEAN‟s solidarity, cohesiveness and harmony; and contributing to the building of a peaceful, democratic, tolerant, participatory and transparent community in Southeast Asia. 13. Moreover, cooperation in political development will bring to maturity the political elements and institutions in ASEAN, towards which the sense of interstate solidarity on political systems, culture and history will be better fostered. Such inter-state solidarity can be achieved further through the shaping and sharing of norms. A.1. Cooperation in Political Development 14. Since the adoption of the ASC Plan of Action in 2003, ASEAN has achieved progress in different measures of political development. There was increased participation by organisations, such as academic institutions, think-tanks, and civil society organisations in ASEAN meetings and activities. Such consultations and heightened interactions fostered good relations and resulted in positive outcomes for the region. 15. Efforts are underway in laying the groundwork for an institutional framework to facilitate free flow of information based on each country‟s national laws and regulations; preventing and combating corruption; and cooperation to strengthen the rule of law, judiciary systems and legal infrastructure, and good governance. Moreover, in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, the ASEAN Charter stipulates the establishment of an ASEAN human rights body.
Page 56 of 237
A.1.1. Promote understanding and appreciation of political systems, culture and history of ASEAN Member States Actions i.
Assign appropriate ASEAN sectoral bodies to take necessary measures to promote understanding and appreciation of political systems, culture and history of ASEAN Member States, which will undertake to: a. Encourage the holding of at least two track-two events per year, including academic conferences, workshops and seminars; b. Release periodic publications on the dynamics of ASEAN Member States‟ political systems, culture and history for dissemination to the public; and c. Intensify exchange of experience and training courses in order to enhance popular and broader participation.
ii. Hold seminars/workshops to share experiences on democratic institutions,
gender mainstreaming, and popular participation; and iii. Endeavour to compile best practices of voluntary electoral observations.
A.1.2. Lay the groundwork for an institutional framework to facilitate free flow of information for mutual support and assistance among ASEAN Member States Actions i. Encourage the ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Information (AMRI) to develop an institutional framework to facilitate free flow of information, based on each country‟s national laws, by establishing an information baseline of these laws and to submit a progress report to the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council; ii. Request each ASEAN Member State to develop relevant media exchange programmes to aid free flow of information, starting within three months from the adoption of this Blueprint; iii. Enhance media capacity to promote regional-community building, explore the possibility of establishing an ASEAN media panel to boost cooperation and collaboration among the media-related institutions and organizations with emphasis on the process of the implementation of the APSC Blueprint; iv. Implement internships, fellowships, scholarships and workshops, study visits and journalist exchange programs to enhance media capacity and professionalism in the region with emphasis on the process of the implementation of the APSC Blueprint; and v. Facilitate co-production and exchanges of films, TVs, animations, games and new media content to promote cultural exchanges with emphasis on the process of the implementation of the APSC Blueprint.
Page 57 of 237
A.1.3. Establish programmes for mutual support and assistance among ASEAN Member States in the development of strategies for strengthening the rule of law and judiciary systems and legal infrastructure Actions i. Entrust ASEAN Law Ministers Meeting (ALAWMM), with the cooperation of other sectoral bodies and entities associated with ASEAN including ASEAN Law Association (ALA) to develop cooperation programmes to strengthen the rule of law, judicial systems and legal infrastructure; ii. Undertake comparative studies for lawmakers on the promulgation of laws and regulations; iii. Develop a university curriculum on the legal systems of ASEAN Member States by the ASEAN University Network (AUN) by 2010; and iv. Enhance cooperation between ALAWMM and ALA and other Track II organisations through seminars, workshops and research on international law, including ASEAN agreements. A.1.4. Promote good governance i. ii. iii.
iv.
Conduct analytical and technical studies to establish baselines, benchmarks, and best practices in various aspects of governance in the region; Promote sharing of experiences and best practices through workshops and seminars on leadership concepts and principles with emphasis on good governance, and on developing norms on good governance; Conduct a study by 2009 on partnership between public and private sectors and academia in creating a conducive climate for good governance to provide concrete recommendations to appropriate ASEAN sectoral bodies; and Promote dialogue and partnership among governments, private sectors and other relevant organisations to foster and enable new ideas, concepts and methods with a view to enhance transparency, accountability, participatory and effective governance.
A.1.5. Promotion and Protection of human rights Actions i. Establish an ASEAN human rights body through the completion of its Terms of Reference (ToR) by 2009 and encourage cooperation between it and existing human rights mechanisms, as well as with other relevant international organizations; ii. Complete a stock-take of existing human rights mechanisms and equivalent bodies, including sectoral bodies promoting the rights of women and children by 2009; iii. Cooperate closely with efforts of the sectoral bodies in the development of an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers;
Page 58 of 237
iv. Strengthen interaction between the network of existing human rights mechanisms as well as other civil society organisations, with relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies; v. Enhance/conduct exchange of information in the field of human rights among ASEAN countries in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of peoples in accordance with the ASEAN Charter and the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; vi. Promote education and public awareness on human rights; and vii. Cooperate closely with efforts of the sectoral bodies in the establishment of an ASEAN commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children. A.1.6. Increase the participation of relevant entities associated with ASEAN in moving forward ASEAN political development initiatives Actions i. Develop modalities for interaction between relevant entities associated with ASEAN, such as the ASEAN-ISIS network, and ASEAN sectoral bodies; ii. Promote research studies and scholarly publications on ASEAN political development initiatives; iii. Hold consultations between AIPA and appropriate ASEAN organs; and iv. Revise the Memorandum of Understanding of the ASEAN Foundation to take into account the provisions of the ASEAN Charter. A.1.7. Prevent and combat corruption Actions i. Identify relevant mechanisms to carry out cooperation activities in preventing and combating corruption and strengthen links and cooperation between the relevant agencies; ii. Encourage all ASEAN Member States to sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation for Preventing and Combating Corruption signed on 15 December 2004; iii. Promote ASEAN cooperation to prevent and combat corruption, bearing in mind the above MoU, and other relevant ASEAN instruments such as the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLAT); iv. Encourage ASEAN Member States who are signatories to the United Nations Convention against Corruption to ratify the said Convention; and v. Promote the sharing of best practices, exchange views and analyse issues related to values, ethics and integrity through appropriate avenues and fora and taking into account inputs from various seminars such as the ASEAN Integrity Dialogue.
Page 59 of 237
A.1.8. Promote Principles of Democracy Actions i. Promote understanding of the principles of democracy among ASEAN youth at schools at an appropriate stage of education, bearing in mind the educational system in the respective ASEAN Member States; ii. Convene seminars, training programmes and other capacity building activities for government officials, think-tanks and relevant civil society organizations to exchange views, sharing experiences and promote democracy and democratic institutions; and iii. Conduct annual research on experiences and lessons-learned of democracy aimed at enhancing the adherence to the principles of democracy. A.1.9. Promote peace and stability in the region Actions i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi.
Support the inclusion of culture of peace which includes, inter alia, respect for diversity, promotion of tolerance and understanding of faiths, religions and cultures in the curriculum of ASEAN academic institutions; Develop programmes and activities aimed at the promotion of culture of peace, interfaith and intrafaith dialogue within the region; Promote respect and appreciation for the region‟s diversity and harmony among the peoples of the region; Promote dialogue and greater interaction among various religious and ethnic groups; Promote networking among schools in the region to develop peaceeducation in their respective curricula; and Support poverty alleviation and narrowing development gaps to contribute to promoting sustained peace and stability in the region.
A.2. Shaping and Sharing of Norms 16. ASEAN promotes regional norms of good conduct and solidarity, in accordance with the key principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. In this context, ASEAN also continues to uphold the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the SEANWFZ Treaty and other key agreements, as well as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea.
Page 60 of 237
A.2.1. Adjust ASEAN institutional framework to comply with the ASEAN Charter Actions i. Prepare and implement a transitional work plan on the necessary institutional reforms needed to comply with the ASEAN Charter; ii. Develop, as appropriate, supplemental protocols and/or agreements, including terms of references and rules of procedures, needed to implement the ASEAN Charter; and iii. Develop a legal division to support the implementation of the ASEAN Charter. A.2.2. Strengthening Cooperation under the TAC Actions i. Convene workshops and seminars to assess the progress of the implementation of the TAC and explore ways to improve its mechanisms; ii. Convene a conference of High Contracting Parties to the TAC to review its implementation; and iii. Encourage the accession to the TAC by non-ASEAN countries. A.2.3. Ensure full implementation of the DOC for peace and stability in the South China Sea Actions i. Continue ASEAN‟s current practice of close consultation among Member States to achieve full implementation of the DOC; ii. Explore and undertake cooperative activities identified in the DOC and eventually explore other co-operative measures on the basis of close consultation among the member countries, while respecting sovereignty and integrity of each other; iii. Carry out on a regular basis the overview of the process of implementation of the DOC, thus ensuring timely and proper conducts of the Parties in the South China Sea in accordance with the DOC; and iv. Work towards the adoption of a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).
Page 61 of 237
A.2.4. Ensure the implementation of South East Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, and its Plan of Action Actions i. Comply with the undertakings in the SEANFWZ Treaty, including accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements and related instruments; ii. Encourage Accession to the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty by Nuclear Weapon States; and iii. Cooperate to implement the Plan of Action and draw up specific work programmes/projects to implement the Plan of Action. A.2.5. Promote ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Actions i. Establish the ASEAN Maritime Forum; ii. Apply a comprehensive approach that focuses on safety of navigation and security concern in the region that are of common concerns to the ASEAN Community; iii. Stock take maritime issues and identify maritime cooperation among ASEAN member countries; and iv. Promote cooperation in maritime safety and search and rescue (SAR) through activities such as information sharing, technological cooperation and exchange of visits of authorities concerned. B. A COHESIVE, PEACEFUL AND RESILIENT REGION WITH SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY 17. In building a cohesive, peaceful and resilient Political Security Community, ASEAN subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security, which goes beyond the requirements of traditional security but also takes into account non-traditional aspects vital to regional and national resilience, such as the economic, sociocultural, and environmental dimensions of development. ASEAN is also committed to conflict prevention/confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy, and post-conflict peace building. B.1. Conflict PreventionlConfidence Building Measures 18. Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy are important instruments in conflict prevention. They mitigate tensions and prevent disputes from arising between or among ASEAN Member States, as well as between ASEAN Member States and non-ASEAN member countries. They will also help prevent the escalation of existing disputes. 19. In the area of defence and regional political consultations, ASEAN Defence Officials have been involved in the ASEAN security dialogue since 1996. Under
Page 62 of 237
the framework of the ASEAN Regional Eorum (ARE), ASEAN has made voluntary briefings on political and security developments in the region and regularized meetings of high-level defence officials under the ARE Defence Officials‟ Dialogue (DOD) and the ARE Security Policy Conference (ASPC). ASEAN has also established an annual ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ASEAN Defence Senior Officials‟ Meetings. B.1.1. Strengthen confidence-building measures Actions i. Organise regional exchanges among ASEAN Defense and military officials, at all levels, including among military academies, staff colleges and defence universities in the ASEAN Member States; ii. Promote the exchange of observers of military exercises, commensurate with the capability and condition of each ASEAN Member State; iii. Share information among ASEAN Member States on submissions to the UN Register of Conventional Arms; iv. Promote bilateral exchanges and cooperation between defence officials and exchange visits between military training institutions to promote trust and mutual understanding; and v. Conduct joint research projects on defence issues between governmentaffiliated policy and strategic research institutes in the region. B.1.2. Promote greater transparency and understanding of defence policies and security perceptions Actions i. Work towards developing and publishing an annual ASEAN Security Outlook; ii. Hold voluntary briefings on political and security developments in the region; iii. Develop an ASEAN early warning system based on existing mechanisms to prevent occurrence/escalation of conflicts; and iv. Hold consultations and cooperation on regional defence and security matters between ASEAN and external parties and Dialogue Partners including through the ADMM Plus when it is operationalised. B.1.3. Build up the necessary institutional framework to strengthen the ARF process in support of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Actions i. Eollow-up on the recommendations of the Review of the ARE; ii. Implement the enhanced role of the ARE Chair, and activate the Eriends of the ARE Chair mechanism as and when needed;
Page 63 of 237
iii. Implement the decision of the ARE Ministers to move the ARE towards the preventive diplomacy stage (PD); iv. Expand the capacity of the ARE Heads of Defense Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting (ARE HDUCIM) to exchange best practices in defense policies and academic development; v. Compile best practices on confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolutions for further development by ARE; and viii.Enhance the role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN in the ARE including further strengthening the ARE Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat. B.1.4. Strengthen efforts in maintaining respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of ASEAN Member States as stipulated in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Actions i. Compile best practices and relevant international law to promote understanding and appreciation of best practices concerning friendly relations and cooperation among Member States of the United Nations; ii. Convene consultation as well as a series of tract-two activities to strengthen cooperation in addressing threats and challenges that may affect the territorial integrity of ASEAN Member States including those posed by separatism; and iii. Eurther promote and increase awareness on these issues to help accelerate the pace of ASEAN Community building and elevate ASEAN‟s profile in the world. B.1.5. Promote the development of norms that enhance ASEAN defence and security cooperation Action: i. Initiate preparatory work for the development of practical cooperation programmes among the militaries of ASEAN Member States. B2. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 20. Convinced that the settlement of differences or disputes should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes, which might endanger or hinder cooperation, ASEAN promotes the TAC, which seeks to preserve regional peace and harmony and prescribes that Member States refrain from threat or use of force. 21. The TAC gives provision for pacific settlement of disputes at all times through friendly negotiations and for refraining from the threat or use of force to
Page 64 of 237
settle disputes. The strategies for conflict resolution shall be an integral part of a comprehensive approach. The purpose of these strategies shall be to prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between ASEAN Member States that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability. 22. ASEAN, the United Nations and other organisations have held a number of cooperation activities in the effort to promote peace and stability. More efforts are needed in strengthening the existing modes of pacific settlement of disputes to avoid or settle future disputes; and undertaking conflict management and conflict resolution research studies. Under the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN may also establish appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms. B.2.1. Build upon existing modes of pacific settlement of disputes and consider strengthening them with additional mechanisms as needed Actions i. Study and analyse existing dispute settlement modes and/or additional mechanisms with a view to enhancing regional mechanisms for the pacific settlement of disputes; ii. Develop ASEAN modalities for good offices, conciliation and mediation; and iii. Establish appropriate dispute settlement mechanism, including arbitration as provided for by the ASEAN Charter. B.2.2. Strengthen research activities on peace, conflict management and conflict resolution Actions i. Consider the establishment of an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation; ii. Compile ASEAN‟s experiences and best practices on peace, conflict management and conflict resolution; iii. Identify priority research topics, with a view to providing recommendations on promoting peace, conflict management and conflict resolution; iv. Enhance existing cooperation among ASEAN think tanks to study peace, conflict management and conflict resolution; v. Hold workshops on peace, conflict management and conflict resolution with relevant regional and international organisations, including the UN; vi. Undertake studies to promote gender mainstreaming in peace building, peace process and conflict resolution; and vii. Develop a pool of experts from ASEAN Member States as resource persons to assist in conflict management and conflict resolution activities.
Page 65 of 237
B.2.3. Promote regional cooperation to maintain peace and stability Actions i. Carry out technical cooperation with the UN and relevant regional organisations to exchange expertise and experiences in maintaining peace and stability; ii. Identify national focal points, with a view to promoting regional cooperation in maintaining peace and stability; and iii. Establish a network among existing ASEAN Member States‟ peace keeping centres to conduct joint planning, training, and sharing of experiences, with a view to establishing an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability, in accordance with the ASEAN Defence Ministers‟ Meeting (ADMM) 3-Year Work Programme. B.3. Post-Conflict Peace-building 23. ASEAN‟s efforts in post-conflict peace building shall complement other comprehensive approaches to: (a) ensure the complete discontinuity of conflicts and violence and/or man-made disasters in affected areas; (b) facilitate the return of peace and/or normalisation of life as early as possible; and (c) lay the ground for reconciliation and all other necessary measures to secure peace and stability, thus preventing the affected areas from falling again to conflicts in the future. 24. Measures can be pursued in promoting humanitarian relief activities, including intensifying cooperation with the United Nations and other organisations, as well as capacity building for people in affected areas. B.3.1. Strengthen ASEAN humanitarian assistance Actions i. Provide basic services or assistance to bring relief to victims of conflict in consultation with the receiving State; ii. Promote cooperation for orderly repatriation of refugees/displaced persons and resettlement of internally displaced persons; iii. Promote the safety of the humanitarian relief assistance workers; iv. Develop common operating procedures for the provision of humanitarian assistance in the event of conflict; v. Intensify cooperation with the United Nations and promote the role and contributions of relevant international organisations on humanitarian assistance; vi. Promote civil-military dialogue and coordination in humanitarian assistance; and vii. Expand the role and contribution of women in field-based humanitarian operations.
Page 66 of 237
B.3.2. Implement human resources development and capacity building programmes in post-conflict areas Actions i. Draw up guidelines for training and capacity-building needs assessment; ii. Identify priority training topics; iii. Design training programmes in the identified priority topics and development of training materials; iv. Implement annual programmes in each target area; v. Develop cooperation programmes with relevant external parties and financial institutions to promote Human Resources Development and capacity building in post-conflict reconstruction and peace building; and vi. Work towards the development of a systematic training programme for formal and community educators in the field of peace education and reconciliation, which can be conceptualised and implemented. B.3.3. Increase cooperation in reconciliation and further strengthen peaceoriented values Actions i. ii.
iii.
Undertake studies to increase cooperation in reconciliation and further strengthen peace-oriented values; Promote public participation in the development of cooperation in postconflict reconstruction and rehabilitation including the encouragement of comprehensive input of academia, media, non-governmental organisations, civil society and community groups; and Promote inter-communal understanding through exchange activities.
B.4. Non-Traditional Security Issues 25. A key purpose of ASEAN is to respond effectively and in a timely manner, in accordance with the principles of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and transboundary challenges. B.4.1. Strengthen cooperation in addressing non-traditional security issues, particularly in combating transnational crimes and other transboundary challenges Actions i. Implement effectively eight priority areas in the Work Programme to Implement the Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime; ii. Endeavour to ratify the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters among ASEAN Member States and work towards elevating it to an ASEAN treaty;
Page 67 of 237
iii. Continue the work of the working group, as mandated by the ASEAN Law Ministers‟ Meeting, to enhance cooperation on the issue of extradition; iv. Eurther strengthen criminal justice responses to trafficking in persons, bearing in mind the need to protect victims of trafficking in accordance with the ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children, and where applicable, other relevant international conventions and protocols on trafficking in persons; v. Enhance cooperation to combat people-smuggling; vi. Work towards a drug-free ASEAN by 2015, in accordance with the ASEAN Work Plan for Combating Illicit Drug-Trafficking, by: strengthening measures to prevent the illicit production of drugs, import and export of controlled chemical precursors as well as regional cooperation in controlled delivery; and enhancing cross-border law enforcement cooperation through information sharing, best practices, and capacity building, in combating drug-trafficking; vii. Develop multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements towards combating drug and precursor chemical trafficking starting in 2008; viii.Provide assistance to ASEAN Member States in enhancing scientific laboratory capacity in precursor identification and drugs signature analysis for drug enforcement operation and intelligence; ix. Provide transfer of knowledge concerning the profile of drug crime syndicate groups as well as watch-list of their drug activities; x. Provide transfer of knowledge on best practices on the disposal of precursors and essential chemicals seized from clandestine laboratories; xi. Strengthen the capacity of the criminal justice system including judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials on drug control; xii. Enhance cooperation with relevant external parties in combating transnational crimes, including countering terrorism; xiii.Enhance cooperation and coordination among existing ASEAN sectoral bodies in dealing with transnational crimes; xiv. Strengthen close cooperation among ASEAN Member States, to combat IUU fishing in the region and where applicable, through the implementation of the IPOA - IUU fishing and work towards the establishment of ASEAN Eisheries Consultative Eorum (AECE); xv. Promote full implementation by relevant sectoral bodies, to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, in accordance with the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UN PoA) and the International Instrument to enable States to Identify and Trace, in Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (International Tracing Instrument); xvi.Strengthen cooperation and assistance in combating and suppressing cyber crimes including cooperation among law enforcement agencies, taking into account the need of each country to develop laws to address cyber crimes; xvii. Eorge closer cooperation in fighting against sea piracy, armed robbery against ships, hijacking and smuggling, in accordance with international laws; and
Page 68 of 237
xviii. Strengthen cooperation in the field of border management to jointly address matters of common concern, including forgeries of identification and travel documents, by enhancing the use of relevant technologies to effectively stem the flow of terrorists and criminals. B.4.2. Intensify counter-terrorism efforts by early ratification and full implementation of the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism Actions i. Work towards the entry into force of the ASEAN Convention on CounterTerrorism (ACCT) by 2009 its ratification by all ASEAN Member States, and promote effective implementation of the Convention; ii. Endeavour to accede and ratify the relevant international instruments on counter terrorism; iii. Promote effective implementation of the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter-Terrorism; and iv. Cooperate to support development initiatives aimed at addressing the root causes of terrorism and conditions conducive to terrorism. B.5. Strengthen ASEAN Cooperation on Disaster Management and Emergency Response Actions: i. Enhance joint effective and early response at the political and operational levels in activating the ASEAN disaster management arrangements to assist affected countries in the event of major disasters; ii. Enhance civilian-military coordination in providing effective and timely response to major natural disasters; iii. Einalise the SOP for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations for establishing joint operations in providing relief aid to disaster affected areas of Member States in line with the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER); iv. Work towards effective interface on disaster management between ASEAN and other ASEAN-related bodies such as the ASEAN Regional Eorum (ARE), ASEAN Plus Three and East Asia Summit (EAS) in a manner that will enhance ASEAN‟s disaster management capacities; and v. Develop ARE strategic guidelines for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation.
Page 69 of 237
B.6. Effective and timely response to urgent issues or crisis situations affecting ASEAN Action: i. Convene special meetings at the Leaders‟ or Ministerial levels in the event of crisis or emergency situations affecting ASEAN; and develop arrangements to address such situations in a timely manner. C. A DYNAMIC AND OUTWARD-LOOKING REGION IN AN INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED AND INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 26. ASEAN fosters and maintains friendly and mutually beneficial relations with external parties to ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. ASEAN remains outward-looking and plays a pivotal role in the regional and international fora to advance ASEAN‟s common interests. 27. Through its external relations, ASEAN will exercise and maintain its centrality and proactive role as the primary driving force in an open, transparent and inclusive regional architecture to support the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015. C.1. Strengthening ASEAN Centrality in Regional Cooperation and Community Building Actions: i. Initiate, host, Chair and/or Co-Chair activities and meetings with Dialogue Partners, other external parties, and within the context of ASEAN Plus Three, EAS and ARE; ii. Explore, initiate and implement concrete cooperation activities on actions as stipulated in various agreed documents including the APSC Blueprint under the existing regional frameworks; iii. Advance the ARE towards Preventive Diplomacy in a phased and prudent manner while continuing with Confidence Building Measures; while also engaging other regional and international organisations and Track II organisations in the process; and iv. Enhance coordination in ASEAN‟s external relation and regional and multilateral fora. C.2. Promoting Enhanced Ties with External Parties Actions: i. Promote activities to raise awareness of ASEAN and enhance ASEAN‟s interests, including the establishment of ASEAN Committees in Third Countries where appropriate; Page 70 of 237
ii. Explore cooperation projects with regional organisations such as the GCC, ECO, Rio Group, SAARC and SCO; and iii. Develop cooperation projects to implement the ASEAN-UN Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). C.3. Strengthening Consultations and Cooperation on Multilateral Issues of Common Concern Action: i. Enhance consultations within ASEAN including by ASEAN Permanent Missions in United Nations and other International Organisations with the aim of promoting ASEAN‟s interests. III. IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW OF THE APSC BLUEPRINT A. IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM 28. To ensure the success in implementing the APSC Blueprint, Member States shall integrate the programmes and activities of the Blueprint into their respective national development plans. 29. All relevant ASEAN senior official bodies or their equivalent shall be responsible in ensuring the implementation of the various elements, actions and commitments in the Blueprint by reflecting them in their respective work plans, mobilising resources for them, raising issues for the consideration of their respective ministerial bodies and the ASEAN Leaders, and undertaking national initiatives in order to meet these commitments. 30. The Coordinating Conference for the ASEAN Political-Security Community Plan of Action (ASCCO) shall continue to serve as the platform in coordinating the efforts of various sectoral bodies through exchanges of information, best practices, and lessons learned in the implementation of the APSC Blueprint. ASCCO‟s new initiatives and recommendations on emerging issues shall be reported to the ASEAN Political-Security Council. 31. The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Council shall be responsible for the overall implementation of the Blueprint and shall ensure coordination of efforts under its purview as well as those which cut across the other Community Councils. 32. Progress of implementation of the APSC Blueprint shall be reported annually by the Secretary-General of ASEAN to the annual ASEAN Summit, through the APSC Council. B. RESOURCE MOBILISATION 33. Einancial resources to implement the Blueprint will be mobilised by ASEAN Member States, as well as from various facilities including the ASEAN
Page 71 of 237
Development Eund (ADE), Dialogue Partners, donor countries, international agencies, the private sector, and non-governmental organisations. C. COMMUNICATION STRATEGY 34. To ensure the success of establishing the APSC, a comprehensive communication plan will be developed and launched at the national and regional levels. This will not only create greater public awareness of the various initiatives, outcomes and issues of the APSC, but also enable all stakeholders to be involved in the process. D. REVIEW MECHANISM 35. The APSC Blueprint shall be reviewed and evaluated to ensure that all the activities are responsive to the needs and priorities of ASEAN, taking into account the changing dynamics of the region and the global environment. The review and evaluation shall be conducted biennially by the ASCCO, in co-ordination with the ASEAN Secretariat. In the course of the review and evaluation, ASEAN Member States are given the flexibility to update the Blueprint. As in the progress of implementation of the APSC Blueprint, the results of the review and evaluation shall be reported by the Secretary-General of ASEAN to the ASEAN Summit through the APSC Council. ▪▪▪
Page 72 of 237
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint I. INTRODUCTION 1. The ASEAN Leaders adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) in Bali, Indonesia on 7 October 2003 to establish an ASEAN Community by 2020. The ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security community, economic community, and socio-cultural community that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability, and shared prosperity in the region. 2. At the 12th ASEAN Summit on 13th January 2007 in Cebu, the Philippines the Leaders, affirming their strong commitment to accelerate the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015, signed the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of an ASEAN Community by 2015. 3. The 13th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore on 20th November 2007, agreed to develop an ASCC Blueprint to ensure that concrete actions are undertaken to promote the establishment of an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). II. CHARACTERISTICS AND ELEMENTS 4. The primary goal of the ASCC is to contribute to realising an ASEAN Community that is people-centred and socially responsible with a view to achieving enduring solidarity and unity among the nations and peoples of ASEAN by forging a common identity and building a caring and sharing society which is inclusive and harmonious where the well-being, livelihood, and welfare of the peoples are enhanced. 5. The ASCC will address the region‟s aspiration to lift the quality of life of its peoples through cooperative activities that are people-oriented and environmentally friendly geared towards the promotion of sustainable development. The ASCC shall contribute to building a strong foundation for greater understanding, good neighbourliness, and a shared sense of responsibility. 6. The ASCC is characterised by a culture of regional resilience, adherence to agreed principles, spirit of cooperation, collective responsibility, to promote human and social development, respect for fundamental freedoms, gender equality, the promotion and protection of human rights and the promotion of social justice. 7. The ASCC shall respect the different cultures, languages, and religions of the peoples of ASEAN emphasise their common values in the spirit of unity in diversity and adapt them to present realities, opportunities and challenges. 8. The ASCC will also focus on the social dimension of Narrowing the Development Gap (NDG) towards bridging the development gap among Member States. 9. Based on the above, the ASCC envisages the following characteristics: (a) Human Development; (b) Social Welfare and Protection; (c) Social Justice and Rights; (d) Ensuring Environmental Sustainability (e)ofBuilding the ASEAN Identity; and (f) Page 73 237
Narrowing the Development Gap. A. Human Development 10. ASEAN will enhance the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by providing them with equitable access to human development opportunities by promoting and investing in education and life-long learning, human resource training and capacity building, encourage innovation and entrepreneurship, promote the use of English language, ICT and applied science and technology in socio-economic development activities. A1. Advancing and prioritising education 11. Strategic objective: Ensuring the integration of education priorities into ASEAN‟s development agenda and creating a knowledge based society; achieving universal access to primary education; promoting early child care and development; and enhancing awareness of ASEAN to youths through education and activities to build an ASEAN identity based on friendship and cooperation. Actions: i. Achieve universal access to primary education across ASEAN by 2015 with priorities to eradicate illiteracy and to ensure compulsory primary education for all and gender equality in education, through advocating for equal opportunity in education regardless of social class, geography ethnicity, background or physical disabilities, with 70 percent target benchmark achieved by the end of 2011; ii. Improve the quality and adaptability of education, including technical/vocational/skills training education in the ASEAN region by developing a technical assistance programme including training for teaching staff and staff exchange programme at higher education level for this purpose by 2009, in particular CLMV; iii. Undertake periodic reviews of the various ASEAN scholarship programmes for the purpose of rationalizing and consolidating them in order to increase their impact; iv. Use ICT to promote education and life-long learning particularly in underserved communities through open, distance education and e-learning; v. Promote education networking in various levels of educational institutions and continue university networking and enhance and support student and staff exchanges and professional interactions including creating research clusters among ASEAN institutions of higher learning, in close collaboration with the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) and the ASEAN University Network (AUN); vi. Promote equal access to education for women and girls and enhance the exchange of best practices on gender-sensitive school curriculum; vii. Strengthen collaboration with other regional and international educational organisations to enhance the quality of education in the region; Page 74 of 237
viii. Include the teaching of common values and cultural heritage in school curricula and develop teaching materials and capability for this purpose starting in 2008; ix. Develop and offer courses on ASEAN studies, both in the primary, secondary and higher education levels; x. Continue the ASEAN Youth Leadership Development Programme and similar programmes with the same objectives and encourage networking among ASEAN Youth Programme alumni to promote solidarity and mutual understanding; xi. Support learning of ASEAN languages and promote exchanges of linguists; xii. Establish ASEAN university games, ASEAN youth peace corps, ASEAN computer games and ASEAN Science Olympiad to promote greater interaction and understanding among the youths in the region; xiii. Continue implementing youth awards programme such as the ASEAN Youth Day Award and Ten Accomplished Youth Organisations in ASEAN (TAYO ASEAN) to recognise outstanding individuals and youth organisations significantly contributing to the promotion of ASEAN ideas and values among the youth across the region; xiv. Work towards the establishment of an ASEAN Youth Programme Fund to fund the various youth projects and activities in ASEAN; xv. Establish platforms for networking and sharing of best practises on ASEAN children and youth development strategies and tools; xvi. Exchange of cultural performers and scholars among Member States through education system to give greater access and understanding of the different cultures of ASEAN Member States; xvii. Promote the options of university placements in an institution of higher learning in a second ASEAN Member State through “a semester abroad” or “a year abroad” programme; xviii. Support the citizens of Member States to become proficient in the English language, so that the citizens of the ASEAN region are able to communicate directly with one another and participate in the broader international community; xix. Promote life-long learning; xx. Work towards the establishment of an ASEAN Youth Development Index to evaluate the outcomes and effectiveness of youth programmes in the region and to assist Member States in planning new youth interventions; and xxi. Promote early child care development through sharing of best practices, experiences and capacity building. A2. Investing in human resource development 12. Strategic objective: Enhance and improve the capacity of ASEAN human Page 75 of 237
resource through strategic programmes and develop a qualified, competent and wellprepared ASEAN labour force that would benefit from as well as cope with the challenges of regional integration. Actions: i. Undertake a survey by 2009 and work to strengthen the existing centres of excellence in the field of human resource development in the ASEAN region; ii. Promote the use of English as an international business language at the work place; iii. Undertake assessments to identify gaps in training needs in ASEAN, particularly in the CLMV in order to develop joint technical cooperation programmes for the workforce; iv. Enhance the IT skills of the workforce in ASEAN through joint training programmes and courses; v. Develop gender-responsive skills training programmes for trainers in ASEAN Member States in particular the CLMV by 2010; vi. Design and implement training programmes to address the needs of high value-added industries that enhance ASEAN global competitiveness; vii. Develop a consolidated plan for regional cooperation for skills development for women, youth, and persons with disabilities; and viii. Conduct ASEAN Skill Competition regularly to support ASEAN workforce development, particularly its effort to achieve regional standard competency. A3. Promotion of decent work 13. Strategic objective: Incorporating decent work principles in ASEAN work culture, safety and health at work place and ensuring that the promotion of entrepreneurship becomes an integral part of ASEAN‟s employment policy to achieve a forward-looking employment strategy. Actions: i. Enhance capacity of governments to monitor labour markets and human resource indicators, and design social impact policies; ii. Establish national skills frameworks as an incremental approach towards an ASEAN skills recognition framework; iii. Endeavour to build an ASEAN network of experts in industrial relations to assist in promoting sound industrial relations, industrial harmony, higher productivity and decent work by 2010; and iv. Implement the Plan of Action on National Occupational Safety and Health Frameworks for ASEAN as affirmed by the ASEAN-OSHNET. Page 76 of 237
A4. Promoting Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 14. Strategic objective: Implement human resource development programme which will facilitate the implementation of regional ICT initiatives. Actions: i. Implement capacity building programmes to increase ICT literacy in ASEAN, including women, children, the elderly and people with disabilities; ii. Promote positive use of ICT in particular the Internet; iii. Encourage the introduction of ICT at all levels of education; iv. Initiate the early use of ICT at the primary school; v. Enhance the use of ICT to promote e-learning; and vi. Develop a workforce and manpower with high levels of ICT proficiency and expertise. A5. Facilitating access to applied Science and Technology (S&T) 15. Strategic objective: Develop policies and mechanisms to support active cooperation in research, science and technology development, technology transfers and commercialisation and establishment of strong networks of scientific and technological institutions with the active participation of private sector and other relevant organisations. Actions: i. Establish a network of S&T centres of excellence to promote cooperation, sharing of research facilities, technology transfer and commercialisation, and joint research and technology development by 2011; ii. Strengthen collaborative research and development in applied S&T to enhance community well-being; iii. Facilitate the exchange and mobility of scientists and researchers from both public S&T institutions and private sector according to the respective laws, rules, regulation, and national policies; iv. Establish strategic alliances with private sector to promote R&D collaboration and technology transfer and commercialisation; v. Establish ASEAN scholarship and fellowship opportunities to support the ASEAN Virtual Institute of Science and Technology (AVIST) and other related science activities; vi. Heighten the awareness on applied S&T for sustainable development; Develop a core set of S&T indicators that can serve as input in the development of human resource strategies by economic and industry planners; vii. Enhance and sustain the utilization of the ASEAN Science and Technology Page 77 of 237
Network (ASTNET) and other S&T networks; and viii. Promote the development, use and sharing of digital content among ASEAN Member States. A6. Strengthening entrepreneurship skills for women, youth, elderly and persons with disabilities. 16. Strategic objective: Increasing the participation of women, youth, elderly, persons with disabilities, vulnerable and marginalised groups in the productive workforce by enhancing their entrepreneurial skills, particularly to improve their social well-being and contribute towards national development and regional economic integration. Actions: i. Establish an ASEAN Forum on Youth Entrepreneurship under the joint auspices of labour, youth and education sectoral bodies by 2009; ii. Establish a women entrepreneurship network by 2010 and create favourable conditions for women entrepreneurs in the region, including by providing at the national level, access to micro credit, technology, trainings, markets and social protection services; and iii. Build an ASEAN network of experts on entrepreneurship to, among others, conduct skills training for out-of-school youths, the elderly and persons with disabilities by 2010. A7. Building civil service capability 17. Strategic objective: Establish effective, efficient, transparent, responsive and accountable civil service systems through increased capacity-building, enhancement of public human resource competencies among ASEAN bureaucracies, and increased collaboration among ASEAN Member States. Actions: i. Develop strategies for the implementation of the ASEAN Conference on Civil Service Matters (ACCSM) Work Plan (2008-2012) by 2009; ii. The ACCSM to promote ASEAN collaboration in the promotion of effective and efficient Civil Service, public accountability and good governance, and hold workshops in these fields on annual basis, starting in 2008; iii. Strengthen the capability of ASEAN Resource Centres under the auspices of the ACCSM to develop and conduct training programmes designed to assist all Member States; iv. Develop a pool of experts/trainers who will serve as resource persons in civil service capacity-building and training programmes; v. Develop training designs, manuals, and modules along Gender and Development (GAD), and Ethical and Good Governance for sharing with ASEAN countries; vi. Develop and conduct competency-based training programmes for sharing Page 78 of 237
among ASEAN civil service systems under the auspices of the ACCSM; vii. Strengthen collaboration in realising the development of efficient, effective, capable, accountable and responsive Civil Service in ASEAN through the activities of the ASEAN Resource Centres (ARCs), ASEAN Sectoral Bodies, and other regional activities that support the implementation of the ACCSM priority areas; viii. Institute policies and programmes and undertake sustained campaigns in the civil service to implement the ACCSM Work Plan (2008-2012) in order to promote transparency, honesty, environmental concern, respect for human rights and gender equality, and priority attention and action for the poor and needy, among ASEAN public servants, who should be leading agents and advocates of the goals and ideals of the ASCC; ix. Enhance and establish mechanisms for effective and efficient public services, including service standards, citizens feedback procedures, and output-based performance rating systems; and x. Expand the role of civil society and citizens groups in integrity efforts and governance. B. Social Welfare and Protection 18. ASEAN is committed to enhancing the well-being and the livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN through alleviating poverty, ensuring social welfare and protection, building a safe, secure and drug free environment, enhancing disaster resilience and addressing health development concerns. B1. Poverty Alleviation 19. Strategic objective: Fully address socio-economic disparities and poverty that persist across ASEAN Member States including achieving the MDG goal of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. Actions: i. Develop and implement an ASEAN Roadmap towards realising the UN Millennium Development Goals in consultation among concerned sectoral bodies with a view to identify and extend technical assistance required in the field of poverty reduction; ii. Support ASEAN Member States‟ community-driven initiatives for poverty reduction towards narrowing the development gap within ASEAN; iii. Intensify efforts to implement projects related to poverty alleviation particularly in area of rural infrastructure, water supply, sanitation under the Initiative for ASEAN Integration and other sub- regional cooperation frameworks; iv. Improve ASEAN capacity in simple and applicable assessment and monitoring poverty reduction strategies through a targeting system that ensures low exclusion and leakage rates; v. Families living under poverty to be79aided with appropriate support system to Page of 237
enable them to become self-reliant; vi. Strengthen ASEAN cooperation in microfinance, including strengthening cooperation and networking between microfinance institutions in povertystricken areas with due regard to local values and traditions as well as addressing the phenomenon of the feminisation of poverty; vii. Work towards the establishment of an ASEAN data bank on poverty incidence and poverty reduction programme, which can be shared among Member States; viii. Continue sharing experiences and best practices through regular holding of workshops and seminars on poverty alleviation in ASEAN Member States and its dialogue partners; ix. Establish an ASEAN Network for Family Development; and x. Facilitate the rural volunteers movement and the exchange of young professional in rural development in ASEAN. B2. Social safety net and protection from the negative impacts of integration and globalization 20. Strategic objective: Ensure that all ASEAN peoples are provided with social welfare and protection from the possible negative impacts of globalisation and integration by improving the quality, coverage and sustainability of social protection and increasing the capacity of social risk management. Actions: i. Undertake a survey of existing social protection regimes in ASEAN; ii. Enhance exchange of best practices in social security systems; iii. Include social protection in ASEAN‟s cooperation in progressive labour practices; iv. Explore the establishment of the social insurance system to cover the informal sector; v. Establish a network of social protection agencies to promote the wellbeing and living conditions of the poor, vulnerable, underserved and disadvantaged groups affected by adverse impacts of integration process and globalisation; vi. Study on enhancement of support for natural disaster risk safety mechanism in agriculture, forestry and fisheries; vii. Conduct research studies on the impact of economic integration and globalisation from gender perspective in order to have concrete bases in formulating appropriate gender-responsive interventions; viii. Develop appropriate actions and preventive measures against the use of the internet and pornography which exploit women, children, and other Page 80 of 237
vulnerable groups; ix. Develop appropriate actions and preventive measures against the use of the internet to disrupt social harmony by inciting hatred, discrimination, and intolerance; and x. Strengthen ASEAN cooperation in protecting female migrant workers B3. Enhancing food security and safety 21. Strategic objective: Ensure adequate access to food at all times for all ASEAN peoples and ensure food safety in ASEAN Member States. Actions: i. Harmonise national food safety regulations with internationally-accepted standard, including quarantine and inspection procedures for the movement of plants, animals, and their products; ii. Strengthen the work of ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Food Safety to better coordinate all ASEAN Food bodies/subsidiaries, and the implementation of their work programmes; iii. Promote production of safe and healthy food by producers at all levels; iv. Develop model food legislative framework and guidelines and strengthen food inspection and certification system from farm to table in ASEAN Member States; v. Develop further the competency of existing network of food laboratories in ASEAN to facilitate the exchange of information, findings, experiences, and best practices relating food laboratories works and new technology; vi. Strengthen the capability of ASEAN Member States to conduct risk analysis; vii. Enhance consumer participation and empowerment in food safety; viii. Enhance the roles of ASEAN Food Security Reserve Board (AFSRB) as well as increase regional staple food reserves; ix. Strengthen the cooperation with regional and international institutions including private organisations to secure food for the region; x. Establish a network to enhance intra and extra ASEAN food trade cooperation to ensure stability in regional food distribution; xi. Ensure that food is available at all times for all ASEAN citizens; xii. Encourage the application of environmentally sound technologies in farming and food processing; xiii. Improve the quality of surveillance and the effectiveness of responses to food-borne diseases and food poisoning outbreaks through, among others, information sharing and exchange of expertise; Page 81 of 237
xiv. Enhance advocacy to promote production of safe and healthy food by producers and education and communication to communities for empowerment in food safety; xv. Provide opportunities such as forums, meetings to facilitate coordinated actions among stakeholders geared for promotion of food security and safety; and xvi. Integrate these actions into a comprehensive plan of action with the ultimate goal of improving health outcomes. B4. Access to healthcare and promotion of healthy lifestyles 22. Strategic objectives: Ensure access to adequate and affordable healthcare, medical services and medicine, and promote healthy lifestyles for the peoples of ASEAN. Actions: i. Promote investment in primary health care infrastructure, in a rational manner and likewise ensure adequate financing and social protection for the poor and marginalised populations for better access to services and achievement of health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); ii. Promote and undertake information and educational drive and public health policies‟ advocacy activities to encourage healthy lifestyle and behaviour change intervention including diet, physical activities and mental health, that are accessible, affordable, and sustainable; iii. Employ strategies to strengthen integrated risk management, promotion of healthy lifestyle and behavioural change; iv. Develop and adopt a framework for unhealthy food and beverages including alcohol similar to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC); v. Enhance awareness on the impact of regional/global trade policies and economic integration on health and develop possible strategies to mitigate their negative impacts through regional workshops and seminars, advocacy, sharing of studies and technical documents; vi. Develop strategies for ASEAN to strengthen capacity and competitiveness in health related products and services, including in the pharmaceutical sector; vii. Facilitate research and cross-country exchange of experience in promoting the integration of safe, effective and quality Traditional Medicine, Complementary and Alternative Medicine (TM/CAM) into the national healthcare system, and across other sectors; viii. Promote the application of biotechnology, food technology, and nanotechnology to assist in the sustainable use of biological resources, and design, production and delivery of drugs and other products; ix. Promote e-health in facilitating timely sharing of appropriate, accurate and complete information for the benefit of public health; Page 82 of 237
x. Promote collaboration in Research and Development on health promotion, health lifestyles and risk factors of non-communicable diseases in ASEAN Member States; xi. Promote the sharing of best practices in improved access to health products including medicines for people in ASEAN; xii. Provide adequate incentives and better working conditions to ensure the retention of health workers within the region and develop, in close collaboration with WHO including relevant sectors, a fair code of practice on the international recruitment of health workers to resolve the critical shortage of health workers around the world; xiii. Encourage exchange of experts in the field of public health, medicine, physical and health education, to promote sharing of knowledge and experience; xiv. Encourage public-private partnership, community empowerment and gender sensitive policies in improving community health standard; xv. Promote capacity building programmes such as improving pharmaceutical management capability; facilitating training courses and exchange of experience in researches on stability, bio- availability, bioequivalence, clinical studies, validation of manufacturing process, validation of analytical methods; xvi. Establish and maintain an ASEAN Nutrition Surveillance System; xvii. Promote the sharing of best practises in improving the access to primary health care by people at risk/vulnerable groups, with special attention to diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular diseases, cancers and disabilities through regional workshops, seminars, and exchange visits among the ASEAN Member States; xviii. Empower consumers to become active participants in health care and to make informed choices to maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of use of Traditional Medicine/Complementary and Alternative Medicine (TM/CAM); xix. Advocate policy makers to accelerate actions to increase accessibility to sexual and reproductive health information and friendly health services, and educate society especially parents and adolescent on reproductive and sexual health education; xx. Develop programmes and improve surveillance of certain noncommunicable diseases, including diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular diseases and cancers which are becoming more prevalent in the community due to changing lifestyles; xxi. Strengthen existing health networking in ASEAN Member States in order to push forward an active implementation on health services access and promotion of healthy lifestyles, as well as continually exchange of knowledge, technology and innovation for sustainable cooperation and development; xxii. Promote rational use of drug, especially on prescription of antibiotic; Page 83 of 237
xxiii. Exchange of information and experience on drug price control to access essential drug in all ASEAN Member States; and xxiv. Promote the exchange of experiences among ASEAN Member States on public health policy formulation and management. B5. Improving capability to control communicable diseases 23. Strategic objective: To enhance regional preparedness and capacity through integrated approaches to prevention, surveillance and timely response to communicable and emerging infectious diseases. Actions: i. Consolidate, further strengthen and develop regional cooperative arrangements through multisectoral and integrated approaches in the prevention, control, preparedness for emerging infectious diseases in line with International Health Regulation 2005 and the Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED); ii. Establish/strengthen/maintain regional support system and network to narrow the gap among ASEAN Member States in addressing emerging infectious diseases and other communicable diseases; iii. Ensure that stockpile of antivirals and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is maintained at regional level for all member states and for rapid response and rapid containment of potential pandemic influenza; iv. Reduce the impact of HIV transmission and the impact of HIV epidemic, consistent with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the UNGASS declarations on HIV and AIDS, ASEAN Commitments on HIV and AIDS, and Third ASEAN Work Programme on HIV and AIDS; v. Improve better access to affordable antiretroviral treatment and opportunistic disease treatment as well as diagnostic reagents; vi. Develop programme to improve 2nd generation HIV surveillance (risk factors and behaviour) and promote sharing of information and experience among ASEAN Member States; vii. Promote the sharing of best practises in improving the access to primary health care by people at risk/vulnerable groups, with special attention to HIV and AIDS, malaria, dengue fever, tuberculosis, and emerging infectious diseases through regional workshops, seminars, and exchange visits among the ASEAN Member States; viii. Strengthen regional clinical expertise through professional organisations networks, regional research institution, exchange of expertise and information sharing; ix. Strengthen cooperation through sharing of information and experiences to prevent and control infectious diseases related to global warming, climate change, natural and man-made disasters; Page 84 of 237
x. To tackle the issues of clean water, hygiene, sanitation and waste management that have implications on infectious diseases; xi. Strengthen cooperation among ASEAN Member States in contact tracing and health quarantine; xii. Strengthen and maintain surveillance system for infectious diseases including HIV and AIDS, malaria, dengue fever, and tuberculosis; and xiii. Promote the collaboration in Research and Development on health products especially on new medicines for communicable diseases including neglected diseases commonly found in ASEAN Member States. B6. Ensuring a drug-free ASEAN 24. Strategic objectives: Reduce significantly, the overall prevalence of illicit drug abuse in the general population, in particular students, youth and those in highrisk and vulnerable groups through preventive measures and by increasing access to treatment, rehabilitation and aftercare services to ensure full re-integration into society as well as through enhanced partnership between the public and private sectors and civil society organizations. Actions: i. Develop and widely implement family, school, workplace and community-based drug prevention and drug abuse control programmes; ii. Promoting civic awareness and social response by proactively advocating advocacy against the damage and dangers of drugs; iii. Reducing illicit consumption of drugs by building consensus and sharing of best practices in drug demand reduction programmes; iv. Sharing of drug research data among ASEAN Member States; v. Develop technical assistance that would help concerned countries identify alternative crops as substitute to illicit drug crops and institute sustainable policy reforms; vi. Promote wider access to markets for alternative development (AD) products within the region consistent with national and international obligations and treaties applicable multilateral trade rules; vii. Facilitate the establishment and maintenance of treatment and rehabilitation centre in any ASEAN Member States. viii. Exchange of experience, expertise and best practice and lessons learned on the prevention and treatment of and aftercare drug users/addicts among both public and community-based organisations and NGOs; ix. Strengthen capacities of drug demand reduction workers and drug control officers; and develop pool of experts and trainers in the fields of drug demand reduction and drug control programme. Page 85 of 237
B7. Building disaster-resilient nations and safer communities 25. Strategic objective: Strengthen effective mechanisms and capabilities to prevent and reduce disaster losses in lives, and in social, economic, and environmental assets of ASEAN Member States and to jointly respond to disaster emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international cooperation. Actions: i. Fully implement the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response by 2015; ii. Support the establishment and operationalisation of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) to facilitate cooperation and coordination among ASEAN Member States and with relevant UN agencies and international organisations; iii. Institutionalise capacity building programmes in areas of priority concern of Member States by the year 2015, and promote technical cooperation, joint research and networking to increase the capacity and capability of Member States in responding to disasters and reducing losses from disasters; iv. Establish a fully functioning ASEAN Disaster Information Sharing and Communication Network by the year 2010, to promote sharing of information and best practices and facilitate decision making process; v. Implement or enhance public awareness and education programmes on a regular basis, and promote public participation in programmes related to disaster risk reduction and emergency response in order to promote community resilience to disasters; vi. Promote partnership with relevant stakeholders, including local communities, non- governmental organisations and private enterprises, and strengthen cooperation with United Nations and relevant international organisations; vii. Carry both national and ASEAN flag or logo to promote the visibility of ASEAN among the first responders engaged in humanitarian missions; viii. Promote sustainable livelihood options through socio-economic development activities to minimise disaster risks and enhance community-coping capacities; ix. Strengthen community-based disaster preparedness and participation through promotion of indigenous knowledge and practices, implementation of public awareness and education and sharing of best practices and lessons learnt to build a disaster-resilient community; x. Promote wider utilisation of services of existing regional facilities, such as ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC) and ASEAN Earthquake Information Centre (AEIC), in providing early warning information and technical advisories to enhance regional disaster preparedness; xi. Establish an ASEAN volunteer programme to assist disaster stricken areas which will also enhance ASEAN togetherness; and Page 86 of 237
xii. Promote multi-sectoral coordination and planning on Pandemic Preparedness and Response at the regional level including development of a regional Multi-Sectoral Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan. C. Social Justice and Rights 26. ASEAN is committed to promoting social justice and mainstreaming people‟s rights into its policies and all spheres of life, including the rights and welfare of disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginalised groups such as women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities and migrant workers. C1. Promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities 27. Strategic objective: Safeguard the interests and rights as well as provide equal opportunities, and raise the quality of life and standard of living, for women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities. Actions: i. Work towards the establishment of an ASEAN commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children; ii. Continue to implement the Work Plan to Operationalise the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region; iii. Implement programmes on child survival, development and protection consistent with the Convention on the Rights of the Child; iv. Establish an ASEAN network of social workers by 2013; v. Conduct regional capacity building programmes on social services and rehabilitation for persons with disabilities; vi. Support activities in promoting and developing care and welfare and the quality of life and well being of the elderly, persons with disabilities, women and children living under poverty, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, including by exchanging best practices in all related fields such as accessibility, rehabilitation, protection and care including medical care. This should also include volunteer home-based care and all other forms of alternative family and community care arrangements; vii. Enhance support and commitment to improve social protection for the elderly in ASEAN Member States, through networking, and exchange of information; viii. Develop social security standards in each ASEAN Member States; ix. Facilitate and exchange research and studies in gerontology and medicine for the elderly;
Page 87 of 237
x. Use sex-disaggregated data, among others, to promote awareness on gender equality, women‟s role and contribution in the development of the region at the policy level; xi. Promote and enhance the percentage of women‟s participation in all fields and at all levels, including political, decision-making as well as socioeconomic empowerment of women; xii. Incorporate a gender perspective into national and regional policies and enhance the participation of women in programmes and projects; xiii. Promote and encourage participation of persons with disabilities in decision-making and recognise their accomplishments; xiv. Develop and implement programme to assist children living under disadvantaged and vulnerable conditions; and xv. Establish an ASEAN Consortium of Social Welfare Practitioners, Educators and Schools of Social Work. C2. Protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers 28. Strategic objective: Ensure fair and comprehensive migration policies and adequate protection for all migrant workers in accordance with the laws, regulations and policies of respective ASEAN Member States as well as implement the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. Actions: i. Operationalise the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of Rights of Migrant Workers under the auspices of the SLOM to implement the provisions of the Declaration and work towards the development of an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers; ii. Institutionalise and convene on a regular basis the ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour as a platform for broad-based discussions on migrant labour issues under the auspices of the Committee, which reports to SLOM; iii. Promote fair and appropriate employment protection payment of wages and adequate access to decent working and living conditions for migrant workers and provide migrant workers, who may be victims of discrimination, abuse, exploitation, violence, with adequate access to the legal and judicial system of the receiving states; iv. Intensify efforts to protect the fundamental human rights, promote the welfare and uphold human dignity of migrant workers by, among others, facilitating the exercise of consular functions to consular or diplomatic authorities of states of origin when a migrant workers is arrested or committed to prison or custody or detained in any other manner, under the laws and regulation of the receiving state and in accordance with the Vienna Convention and Consular Relations; Page 88 of 237
v. Facilitate data-sharing on matters related to migrant workers for the purpose of enhancing policies and programmes concerning migrant workers in both sending and receiving states; vi. Strengthen policies and procedures in the sending state to facilitate aspects of migration workers, including recruitment, preparation for deployment overseas and protection of the migrant workers when abroad as well as repatriation and reintegration to the countries of origin; vii. Facilitate access to resources and remedies through information, training and education, access to justice, and social welfare services as appropriate and in accordance with the legislation and of the receiving state, provided that they fulfil the requirements under applicable laws, regulations, and policies of the said state, bilateral agreements and multilateral treaties; viii. Establish and promote legal practice of the sending state to regulate recruitment of migrant workers and adopt mechanisms to eliminate recruitment malpractices through legal and valid contracts, regulation, and accreditation of recruitment agencies and employers, and blacklisting of negligent/unlawful agencies; and ix. Promote capacity building by sharing of information, best practises as well as opportunities and challenges in relation to protection and promotion of migrant workers‟ rights and welfare. C3. Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 29. Strategic objective: Ensure that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is incorporated in the corporate agenda and to contribute towards sustainable socioeconomic development in ASEAN Member States. Actions: i. Develop a model public policy on Corporate Social Responsibility or legal instrument for reference of ASEAN Member States by 20i0. Reference may be made to the relevant international standards and guides such as ISO 26000 titled “Guidance on Social Responsibility.”; ii. Engage the private sector to support the activities of sectoral bodies and the ASEAN Foundation, in the field of corporate social responsibility; iii. Encourage adoption and implementation of international standards on social responsibility; and iv. Increase awareness of Corporate Social Responsibility in ASEAN towards sustainable relations between commercial activities and communities where they are located, in particular supporting community based development. D. Ensuring Environmental Sustainability 30. ASEAN shall work towards achieving sustainable development as well as promoting clean and green environment by protecting the natural resource base for economic and social development including the sustainable management and Page 89 of 237
conservation of soil, water, mineral, energy, biodiversity, forest, coastal and marine resources as well as the improvement in water and air quality for the ASEAN region. ASEAN will actively participate in global efforts towards addressing global environmental challenges, including climate change and the ozone layer protection, as well as developing and adapting environmentally-sound technology for development needs and environmental sustainability. D1. Addressing global environmental issues 31. Strategic Objective: Effectively address global environmental issues without impinging on competitiveness, or social and economic development based on the principle of equity, flexibility, effectiveness and common but differentiated responsibility, respective capabilities as well as reflecting on different social and economic conditions. Actions: i. Intensify regional cooperation to enhance and strengthen national and regional capacities to address issues and commitments to relevant Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) through regional research, promoting awareness, capacity building programmes and informed policy choices; ii. Promote synergies in the implementation of related MEAs through strengthening of regional cooperation to address measures related to the thematic clusters of MEAs on atmospheric issues such as climate change and ozone depleting substances, and MEAs on chemicals and chemical wastes; iii. Promote ASEAN common understanding/common position on relevant MEAs; and iv. Adopt a holistic approach in fostering regional cooperation on environmental issues, with the participation of all relevant stakeholders including business, academics, NGOs and civil society organisations. D2. Managing and preventing transboundary environmental pollution 32. Strategic Objective: Implement measures and enhance international and regional cooperation to combat transboundary environmental pollution, including haze pollution, transboundary movement of hazardous wastes through, among others, capacity building, enhancing public awareness, strengthening law enforcement, promoting environmentally sustainable practices as well as implement the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution2. D2.1. Transboundary Haze Pollution Actions: i. Operationalise the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution through the implementation of concrete preventive, monitoring and mitigation measures and to initiate the process of developing protocols for the implementation and operationalisation of the Agreement; ii. Develop mutually beneficial cooperation amongst ASEAN Member States that acknowledge each country‟s laws, rules, regulations, and national Page 90 of 237
policies, whether it is multilateral or bilateral cooperation, which put more focus on prevention activities; iii. Operationalise the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control to facilitate cooperation and coordination, including joint emergency response among Member States; iv. Secure funds for the ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Fund, with voluntary contributions from the Parties, and in cooperation with ASEAN partners to provide additional resources for the effective implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution; v. Control and monitor land and forest fire occurrence in the region and promote the sustainable management of peatlands in the ASEAN region to reduce risk of fire and associated transboundary haze pollution through the implementation of the ASEAN Peatland Management Initiative (APMI) by the year 20i5; D2.2. Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes Actions: i. Enhance regional coordination and exchange of information, experience and expertise in hazardous waste management; ii. Optimise the existence of Basel Convention Regional Centre for Training and Technology Transfer for Southeast Asia (BCRC-SEA) and the role of its Steering Committee in providing regional services of technology transfer and capacity building of hazardous waste management; iii. Establish effective and fully functioning regional mechanisms to address transboundary hazardous wastes, including illegal traffic of hazardous wastes, in line with the Basel Convention Procedures and Modalities. D3. Promoting sustainable development through environmental education and public participation 33. Strategic Objective: Establish a clean and green ASEAN, rich in cultural traditions where the values and practices of the people are in accordance with the rhythm and harmony of nature, with citizens who are environmentally literate, imbued with the environmental ethic, and willing and capable to ensure the sustainable development of the region through environmental education and public participation efforts. Actions: i. Implement the ASEAN Environmental Education Action Plan (AEEAP) 200820i2; ii. Establish a baseline assessment on the extent to which national curricula in the basic education system include Environmental Education (EE) and Environmentally Sustainable Development (ESD) content; iii. Establish a baseline assessment on of the237 extent to which teacher education Page 91
programmes and in-service and pre-service training address EE/ ESD theory and practice; iv. Ensure that Quality Assurance (QA) systems for formal education (that is, national standards) require the inclusion of EE/ ESD issues in the relevant disciplines; v. Promote research on EE/ ESD issues to ensure continuing development in formal education; vi. Promote sustainable schools (for example, eco-schools/ green schools) concept and practice throughout ASEAN; vii. Develop EE curricula, materials and resources that are locally relevant and complement ESD at the local/ community level; viii. Promote EE as a key integrating tool for the development of „environmentally sustainable cities‟ in each ASEAN Member State; ix. Use appropriately designed and targeted EE for promotion of environmentally sustainable business practices; x. Promote ASEAN Environment Week which serves as platform for national level activities to celebrate and raise awareness of the region‟s environment with all stakeholders in each of the ASEAN Member States; xi. Establish a baseline of EE for sustainable development training needs for stakeholders in both the formal and non-formal sectors; xii. Provide EE and ESD training opportunities for key stakeholders; xiii. Provide ASEAN EE for Sustainable Development Leadership Training Programmes for key target groups (e.g., government officials, members of parliament and other elected officials, media and communication professionals, youth, women, etc.); xiv. Create an ASEAN EE/ ESD scholarship scheme for the region‟s stakeholders; xv. Actively promote and manage the ASEAN Environmental Education Inventory Database (AEEID) as the central platform for information dissemination, exchange and learning for EE and ESD in ASEAN; xvi. Develop an ASEAN-wide „Youth for Sustainable Environment‟ Network; xvii. Establish an ASEAN sustainable/green/eco-school network; xviii. Establish an annual ASEAN EE Conference/ Forum for the region‟s EE stakeholders as a platform for the exchange of information, materials, experience, networking, etc; xix. Build and strengthen existing networks of NGOs, universities and media throughout the region to be effective practitioners, promoters, communicators and agents of change for EE and ESD; and Page 92 of 237
xx. Enhance the participation of community leaders, such as those religious leaders who have close contact with local communities, in promoting public awareness on the importance of sustainable development and environmentally sustainable practices. D4. Promoting Environmentally Sound Technology (EST) 34. Strategic Objective: Use environmentally sound technologies to achieve sustainable development with minimal impact on the environment Actions: i. Operationalise the ASEAN Network on EST (ASEAN-NEST) by 20i5; ii. Work towards the adoption of region wide environmental management/labelling schemes to promote economic growth and environmental protection by 20i5; iii. Facilitate an EST Forum to develop technology need assessments an develop cooperation among ASEAN Member States; iv. Enhance cooperation among ASEAN Member States within the framework of South-South and North-South cooperation to promote technology transfer; v. Explore the establishment of a clearing house centre on EST for ASEAN Member States (i.e. Cleaner Production Centre); and vi. Intensify cooperation on joint research, development, deployment and transfer of EST. D5. Promoting quality living standards in ASEAN cities/urban areas 35. Strategic Objective: Ensure cities/urban areas in ASEAN are environmentally sustainable, while meeting the social and economic needs of the people. Actions: i. Expand on the existing work under the ASEAN Initiative on Environmentally Sustainable Cities; ii. Intensify individual and collective efforts to improve the quality of air and water within ASEAN through regional or national initiatives to reduce industrial and transportation pollutions; iii. Share experiences, expertise and technology in areas such as urban planning including transportation, green building, water management, urban greenery and urban biodiversity conservation, sanitation and waste management, 3Rs (Reduce, Reuse and Recycle) and air, noise, water, and land pollution control, through among others twinning cities programme; iv. Work towards initiatives such as “Low Carbon Society”, “Compact Cities”, “Eco-Cities” and “Environmentally Sustainable Transport”; Page 93 of 237
v. Develop internationally comparable measures for environmental sustainability for major cities in ASEAN by 20i5; vi. Introduce and implement an ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities (ESC) Award by 2008 as an incentive to promote ESC practices. D6. Harmonizing environmental policies and databases 36. Strategic Objective: Promote feasible efforts to harmonise on a stepby-step basis environmental policies, and databases, taking into account the national circumstances of Member States, to support the integration of the environmental, social and economic goals of the region. Actions: i. Work towards the implementation of the thirteen priority environmental parameters and undertake efforts to ensure region wide harmonization in terms of measurement, monitoring and reporting by 20i5; ii. Strive for harmonization of standards and conformity assessment procedures for environmental performance/programmes by 20i5; iii. Continue producing informative periodical state of the environment reports for policy making and addressing impacts on the environment; iv. Promote environmental sustainable/green procurement practices in ASEAN Member States and develop a region wide strategy for the ASEAN region by 20i5; and v. Encourage regional cooperation on Strategic Environmental Assessment of large-scale projects and other activities which may cause significant environmental impacts in the region. D7. Promoting the sustainable use of coastal and marine environment 37. Strategic Objective: Ensure ASEAN‟s coastal and marine environment are sustainably managed; representative ecosystems, pristine areas and species are protected; economic activities are sustainably managed; and public awareness of the coastal and marine environment instilled. Actions: i. Enhance inter-agency and inter-sectoral coordination at the regional and international levels for achieving sustainable development of ASEAN‟s coastal and marine environment; ii. Build capacities to develop national marine water quality standards by 20i5 using the ASEAN Marine Water Quality Criteria as a reference; iii. Establish a representative network of protected areas to conserve critical habitats by 20i5 through further implementation of the ASEAN Criteria for Marine Heritage Areas, and ASEAN Criteria for National Protected Areas; iv. Promote conservation and sustainable management of key ecosystems in Page 94 of 237
coastal and marine habitats, such as joint efforts to maintain and protect marine parks in border areas, and the “Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security”; v. Enhance the capacity and capability of, as well as economic benefits for the fishery and other coastal community to encourage their active participation in promoting environmental sustainability; vi. Promote the sustainable use of coastal and marine environment through public awareness campaign to highlight the global importance of coastal and marine environment in addressing food security, maintaining ecosystem services, as well as protecting marine environment; vii. Promote collaboration among ASEAN Member States in responding to transboundary pollution due to the oil spill incidents; and viii. Promote cooperation in addressing pollution of coastal and marine environment from land-based sources. D8. Promoting Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and Biodiversity 38. Strategic Objective: Ensure ASEAN‟s rich biological diversity is conserved and sustainably managed toward enhancing social, economic and environmental well-being. Actions: i. Achieve by 20i0, a significant reduction in the current rate of loss of biodiversity through implementing relevant national, regional and international programmes of work; ii. Promote collaboration, sharing of lessons learnt on access and equitable sharing of genetic and biological resources by 20i5; iii. Promote further listing and coordinated management of ASEAN Heritage Parks as an effective platform for ecosystem-based protected areas management by 20i5; iv. Enhance cooperation in the management of transboundary protected areas between neighbouring ASEAN Member States; v. Take appropriate measures to minimise impacts of transboundary movement of living modified organisms in accordance with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety by 20i5; vi. Establish a functional regional network to promote capacity building in developing inventory of the biological resources and biosafety measures of the ASEAN Region by 20i5; vii. Enhance the role and capacity of the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (ACB) to function as an effective regional centre of excellence in promoting biodiversity conservation and management; viii. Promote the involvement of local community to maintain biodiversity Page 95 of 237
conservation and forest health by 2015; ix. Promote effective management policies and practices to reduce the impact of invasive alien species at the regional and international levels; x. Promote regional cooperation on sustainable management of biodiversity such as sharing research and development experiences, exchange of experts, and training; xi. Strengthen efforts to control transboundary trade in wild fauna and flora through the ASEAN Action Plan on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora 2005-20i0 and the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN) to implement commitments to Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); xii. Explore cooperation among ASEAN Member States to conduct joint survey and monitoring of migratory wildlife; and xiii. Promote cooperation among ASEAN Member States in combating land degradation for sustainable land management to support sustainable agriculture and environment. D9. Promoting the Sustainability of Freshwater Resources 39. Strategic Objective: Promote sustainability of water resources to ensure equitable accessibility and sufficient water quantity of acceptable quality to meet the needs of the people of ASEAN. Actions: i. Continue implementation of the ASEAN Strategic Plan of Action on Water Resources Management; ii. Endeavour to reduce by half the number of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 20i0; iii. Manage water resources efficiently and effectively in order to provide adequate and affordable water services by 20i5; iv. Promote the implementation of integrated river basin management by 20i5; v. Promote public awareness and partnership to enhance integrated water resources management; and vi. Promote regional cooperation on water conservation measures and programmes as well as scientific and technological innovations in water quality improvement and supply. D10. Responding to Climate Change and addressing its impacts 40. Strategic Objective: Enhance regional and international cooperation to address the issue of climate change and its impacts on socio-economic development, health and the environment, in ASEAN Member States through implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures, based on the principles of Page 96 of 237
equity, flexibility, effectiveness, common but differentiated responsibilities, respective capabilities, as well as reflecting on different social and economic conditions. Actions: i. Encourage ASEAN common understanding on climate change issues and where possible, engage in joint efforts and common positions in addressing these issues. ii. Encourage the efforts to develop an ASEAN Climate Change Initiative (ACCI); iii. Promote and facilitate exchange of information/knowledge on scientific research and development (R&D), deployment and transfer of technology and best practices on adaptation and mitigation measures, and enhance human resource development; iv. Encourage the international community to participate in and contribute to ASEAN‟s efforts in afforestation and reforestation, as well as to reduce deforestation and forest degradation; v. Develop regional strategies to enhance capacity for adaptation, low carbon economy, and promote public awareness to address effects of climate change; vi. Enhance collaboration among ASEAN Member States and relevant partners to address climate related hazards, and scenarios for climate change; vii. Develop regional systematic observation system to monitor impact of climate change on vulnerable ecosystems in ASEAN; viii. Conduct regional policy, scientific and related studies, to facilitate the implementation of climate change convention and related conventions; ix. Promote public awareness and advocacy to raise community participation on protecting human health from the potential impact of climate change; x. Encourage the participation of local government, private sector, nongovernmental organisations, and community to address the impacts of climate change; and xi. Promote strategies to ensure that climate change initiatives lead to economically vibrant and environment friendly ASEAN Community taking into account win-win synergy between climate change and the economic development. D11. Promoting Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) 41. Strategic Objectives: Promote the implementation of sustainable management of forest resources in the ASEAN region and eradicating unsustainable practices including combating illegal logging and its associated trade through amongst others; capacity building, technology transfer, enhancing public awareness and strengthening law enforcement and governance. Page 97 of 237
Actions: i. Implement Strategic Plan of Action of the ASEAN cooperation in Forestry (2005 — 20i0); ii. Encouraging environmentally sustainable planning and management of the ASEAN region‟s forests; iii. Strengthen to address social cultural aspect of illegal logging and its associated trade in particular poverty eradication and illicit practices such as corruption and money laundering; iv. Support for global and regional initiatives to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and to promote a reformed afforestation and reforestation under the Clean Development Mechanism (A/R-CDM) effort and to identify and avail appropriate international incenti For further information, please contact the Press Division, Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tel.02-6435i70, Fax.02-6435i69, E-mail:
[email protected] -PM-
Page 98 of 237
Briefing Paper for the Second Regional Consultation on ASEAN and Human Rights on the ASEAN human rights mechanism(s)1 Jakarta, 4 — 7 August 2008 I. Background of ASEAN and Human Rights: 1. The Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), which was established in 1967, has always been seen as an “elitist club” which only recognises state security and often put democracy and human rights aside. However, this view seems to have changed in the 1990s after the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria in June 1993. 2. At the conference, participants endorsed the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA), where the document highlighted the need to set up a regional human rights protection mechanism for regions which are yet to have one. The outcome of the World Conference seem to have influenced the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Singapore when it declared in a Joint Communiqué that, “the Foreign Ministers welcomed the international consensus achieved during the World Conference on Human Rights […] and reaffirmed ASEAN‟s commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the Vienna Declaration of 25 June 1993.”2 3. The same Communiqué also stressed that, “in support of Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action […] ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an appropriate regional human rights mechanism”. II. Developments in ASEAN on women and children’s rights 4.
ASEAN started its focus on women and children concerns, not explicitly on women‟s rights, since the 1980s. Specifically, it has adopted the following: a. On women: i. Declaration on the Advancement of Women in ASEAN (1988) ii. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region (2004) iii. ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children (2004)
1
Although there are three human rights mechanisms that are supposed to be envisaged under ASEAN documents and agreements which are i) ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), ii) ASEAN Instrument on the Promotion and Protection of Migrant Workers; and iii) ASEAN human rights body (AHRB), however this paper will only talk about ACWC and AHRB. 2 The full text can be found at: http//www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En
Page 99 of 237
b. On children and youth i. Declaration of Principles to Strengthen ASEAN Collaboration on Youth (1983) ii. Kuala Lumpur Agenda on ASEAN Youth Development (1997) iii. Yangon Declaration on Preparing ASEAN Youth for the Challenges of Globalisation (2000) iv. Manila Declaration on Strengthening Participation in Sustainable Youth Employment (2003) 5.
Given that all ASEAN member states have ratified the two international conventions related to women and children - the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) - ASEAN feels more comfortable to discuss about women and children‟s rights issues but are hesitant when it comes to civil and political rights (under the ICCPR). Most ASEAN member states have ratified the ICCPR.
6.
The first mention of women and children‟s rights by ASEAN was in the Hanoi Action Plan (HAP) covering the period 1997-2004. The HAP was intended to fulfil the ASEAN Community by the year 2002 as envisioned in the ASEAN Vision 2020 document. The HAP points out the need to: a.
Strengthen ASEAN collaboration in combating the trafficking in, and crimes of violence against, women and children. b. Work towards the full implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and other international instruments concerning women and children. 7. In 2004, after the conclusion of the HAP, ASEAN leaders came up with the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) for the next five years: 2005- 2010. This ASEAN plan includes the following: a. Complete a stock-take of existing human rights mechanisms and equivalent bodies including sectoral bodies promoting the rights of women and children; b. Formulate and adoption the MOU to establish a network among existing human rights mechanisms; c. Formulate the work of the network; d. Promote education and public awareness on human rights; e. Establish a network of cooperation among existing human rights mechanisms; f. Elaborate on an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers; and g. Establish an ASEAN commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children.
Page 100 of 237
III. Developments of the ASEAN Charter 8.
The goal of creating an ASEAN Charter was first officially acknowledged in the 10th ASEAN Summit in November 2004 in Vientiane as embodied in the VAP: “we recognise the need to strengthen ASEAN and shall work towards the development of an ASEAN Charter”. At the 11th ASEAN Summit in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, ASEAN leaders came out with the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter. This was followed by the setting up of Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to provide practical recommendations on the creation of the charter. The Declaration stated that the charter would reaffirm the “promotion of democracy, human rights and obligations”, a final recognition of the importance of human rights in the charter.
9.
Regarding the inclusion of a human rights mechanism, the EPG report only stated that “the EPG discussed the possibility of setting up of [sic] an ASEAN human rights mechanism, and noted that this worthy idea should be pursued further, especially in clarifying how such a regional mechanism can contribute to ensuring the respect for and protection of human rights of every individual in every Member State.”3 This wording was particularly disappointing when considering that it was way back in 1993, at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), that the foreign ministers “agreed that ASEAN should…consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.”4
10. The 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines in January 2007 endorsed the EPG report with its Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter. It also directed a High Level Task Force (HTLF) to draft the Charter ready for signing at the November 2007 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore. 11. The HLTF met for the first time in February 2007 and began drafting the Charter based on directives from the 11th and 12th ASEAN Summits, the EPG Report and other key ASEAN documents. IV. ASEAN Charter and ASEAN human rights body 12. At the 13th ASEAN Summit on November 2007 in Singapore, the HLTF presented the ASEAN Charter to the ASEAN leaders, which was then signed by all the ten leaders. It is now under a ratification process. As of July 2008, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos PDR, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam have deposited their ratification documents to the ASEAN Secretariat, while the other four members, namely Burma, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, have yet to ratify the charter. 13. The ASEAN Charter mentions human rights three times, as follows:
3
Ibid, pg.23 AMM Communiqué (1993), Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Singapore on 23 24 July 1993, available online at (accessed 31st May 2007): http://www.thinkcentre.org/article.cfm?ArticlelD=1797
4
Page 101 of 237
a.
ASEAN will “[adhere] to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” (Preamble) b. The purpose of ASEAN is “to strengthen democracy enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN.” (Purpose) c. ASEAN and its member state shall act in accordance with the “respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice.” (Principles) 14. Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter makes references to the ASEAN human rights body: a. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. b. This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. V.
Engagement with ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) under the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) 15. After the adoption of the VAP in July 2005, ASEAN senior officials (SOM) met the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (Working Group). The Working Group is a coalition of government officials from national working groups, academe and NGOs in the following five countries namely Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The national working groups are to assist in the human rights programmes of the VAP with regards to the ACWC. The Working Group tasked the Thailand national Working Group and Mahidol University‟s Office of Human Rights and Social Development (OHRSD) to conduct studies and stocktaking of the regional and national laws relating to the rights of women and children in ASEAN. The OHRSD conducted two meetings on 20 November 2006 and 3-4 April 2007 which started the process of writing and releasing the report of the study. 16. In the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action Coordinating Conference (ASCCO) held in Jakarta on 4-5 September 2006, the ASEAN SOM and the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) agreed that they would take the lead role in the implementation of the VAP in the area of women and children‟s human rights and will be working with other bodies such as the Senior Official Meeting on Social Welfare and Development (SOMSWD) and the ASEAN Committee of Women (ACW)5
5
See “ASEAN and Women and Children’s Rights”, paper by Everlyn S. Dunuan, National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, presented at the First Regional Consultation on ASEAN and Human Rights
Page 102 of 237
17. At the first meeting of the OHRSD expert group on 20 November 2006, some of the significant conclusions and recommendations were: a. Any regional mechanism to be established should take into consideration the regional economic and social agenda; b. The commission should not replicate the experiences of other regional mechanisms but should be distinctly ASEAN. c. The institution should not challenge the government. It should not be used, however, by governments as window dressing to raise their image. d. The commission should be mandated with promotional and protective activities. It should be empowered to monitor compliance by member-states according to international and regional standards. e. The selection of the commissioners should be done through a participatory and transparent process including impartiality and independence of the commission and commissioners. f. Further consultations should be broadened to involve more people from various sectors. g. Engaging civil society and creating space for dialogue with all parties concerned is needed.6 18. On 3-4 April 2007, the Regional Consultative Meeting on the Establishment of an ACWC was held in Bangkok to discuss the study report on the establishment of the ACWC. The outcome of the meeting identified the following components of any regional mechanism: a.
Promotion and protection of human rights, particularly women‟s and children‟s rights; b. Consistency with international standards, particularly CEDAW and CRC; c. Commission of experts with independence of action; d. Inputs from civil society pertaining to the establishment and functioning of the commission; 19. Both meetings resulted in the report entitled “Towards an ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children” which was only released in June 2008, four years after the VAP was launched. The report is very comprehensive as it discusses i) ASEAN‟s commitment to the promotion and protection of the rights of women; ii) Legal and political commitment to human rights of the rights of women; iii) Lessons drawn from other regional mechanisms; and iv) conclusion and recommendations. However, there is very little involvement from the broader civil society, human rights organisations, and women and children‟s rights groups as participants were mainly governments and national machineries on women or children.
6
nd
Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (2007). A Submission on the Occasion of the 2 ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action Coordinating Conference (ASCCO). Available at: http://www.aseanhrmech.org/downloads/Working%20Group%20Submission%202nd%20ASCCO.pdf
Page 103 of 237
20. In another development, on 7-8 April 2008, the ASEAN Secretariat held a Joint Roundtable Discussion on the Establishment of an ACWC in Jakarta which stressed the need to set up the commission. It also recommended that the terms of reference of the Commission should be established by the appropriate ASEAN body and the members of the drafting group to be nominated by member states. However, there are different views and options on the following: a. Establishment of the Commission prior to the establishment of the human rights body; the status of the Commission would be reviewed with the establishment of the human rights body with the option for it to be subsumed under the body; b. Await the establishment of the human rights body first and then consider the establishment of the Commission (or an alternative mechanism) after; c. Review the ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW)‟s mandate and ensure that it covers all function of the Commission on Women and establish a new ASEAN Committee on Children to oversee issues related to the child. 21. The outcome of the Joint Roundtable was sent to the ASEAN Committee for Women (ACW) and SOMSWD for endorsement and was subsequently submitted to the 41st AMM in July 2008.7 VI. Actors in engagement and development of the ASEAN human rights body 22. With regards to the ASEAN human rights body/mechanism, there have been several major groups who played key roles in monitoring and advocacy for the creation of the ASEAN human rights mechanism. This part will explain the brief background of each group and the work that each group has done with respect to the process of the establishment of the ASEAN human rights body. 23. The first player is the ASEAN ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights (AICOHR), which is an annual platform organised by the national members of the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). It has held annual meetings since 1993. The AICOHR, however, does not conclude or recommend what can or cannot be used for submission to the ASEAN. But it has provided the initial venue for human rights defenders and government officials to meet and discuss about human rights. 24. AICOHR held its 15th Meeting in Manila, the Philippines on 1-2 May 2008 with the theme, “Towards Implementing the Human Rights Provisions in the ASEAN Charter: Views from Human Rights Advocates”. 25. The second actor is the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (Working Group). As mentioned earlier, this is a coalition of national working groups comprising representative of government institutions, parliamentary human rights committees, national human rights institutions, the academe, and NGOs set up in 1995. It 7
See ASEAN Secretariat’s Discussion paper for the Joint Roundtable Discussion Recommendations on the Establishment of the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children, 7 8 April 2008 at the ASEAN Secretariat.
Page 104 of 237
follows a step by step, constructive and consultative approach when dealing with the government. The Working Group convenes annually for two main events — a) the Workshop on ASEAN Regional Human Rights Mechanism, and b) the Roundtable Discussion on Human Rights in ASEAN. The first is a forum for governments, NHRIs, the ASEAN Secretariat, and NGOs to discuss updates on the implementation of VAP and the ASEAN human rights body. The second forum involved only the government, NHRIs, and the members of the Working Group. 26. The Working Group has access to meetings of the ASEAN SOM in every ASEAN ministerial meeting. In the 2000 SOM, the Working Group submitted a draft agreement on the setting up of the ASEAN Human Rights Commission; however, there has been no feedback from the SOM.8 27. Four national human rights institutions (NHRIs) have been established in the following ASEAN member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. These NHRIs have set up their network and regularly meet in the ASEAN NHRIs Forum. So far, four meetings have been held since its formation in 2007. These NHRIs held their 4th Consultative Meeting and Conference in Manila, Philippines from 29-31 January 2008 while its Technical Working Group (TWG) meeting was held from 28-30 April 2008 in Cebu City, the Philippines. 28. The meeting of the TWG in April 2008 resulted in the terms of reference (TOR) for the ASEAN Human Rights Commission (AHRC). It recommended that the AHRC should be the first body that should be set up. It is believed that the TOR has been submitted to the 41st AMM in Singapore. Some of the key points in the TOR include: a. The AHRC shall advise and assist ASEAN in formulating directives and procedures and recommend measures to be taken in addressing human rights issues as well as the ratification of international treaties; b. It shall promote, protect, and monitor human rights consistent with the UDHR. c. It will cooperate with NHRIs, NGOs, civil society organisations, regional institutions, and international institutions concerned with human rights; d. It shall receive, analyse, investigate and take action on complaints of alleged violations by any person(s) or group of persons and others. VII.
Engagement by Solidarity for Asia People’s Advocacy (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN
29. The Solidarity for Asia People‟s Advocacy (SAPA) is a network of Asian national and regional NGOs and people‟s organisation operating at regional (and international) level. The motivation for this network was to improve communication, cooperation, and coordination between Asian civil society groups in order to enhance the influence on regional inter-governmental structures. The SAPA Working Groups were set up in specific areas to share relevant information and news and to coordinate activities. Three 8
See the Draft Agreement at http://www.aseanhrmech.org/downloads/draft agreement.pdf
Page 105 of 237
Working Groups are currently operating: the Working Group on UN Human Rights, Working Group on ASEAN, and Working Group on Migration and Labour. 30. On 26-28 August 2007, the first Regional Consultation on ASEAN and Human Rights was held by Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) in Kuala Lumpur. In the meeting, civil society actors in ASEAN came together to set up the Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights (TF-AHR). This is a network of civil society organisations under SAPA Working Group on ASEAN, which focuses on the creation of the ASEAN human rights body. Its objectives are: a.
To hold ASEAN member states accountable to their international and domestic human rights obligations, and b. To make the ASEAN human rights mechanisms more accountable and effective. The meeting produced the Kuala Lumpur Action Points as a basis for an action agenda. 31. From May to July 2008, national workshops on AHRB have taken place in six countries namely: Cambodia (20 May 2008), Indonesia (23-24 July 2008), Malaysia (27-28 July 2008), Philippines (9 May and 10 June 2008), Thailand (5-6 July 2008), and Burma‟s border with Thailand, Mae sot (8-9 July 2008). The civil society inputs of these national consultations were submitted to the AMM in Singapore on 18 — 24 July 2008 which highlighted: a) The composition of HLP shall include independent human rights experts from each of the ASEAN member states, who will participate in all meetings of the HLP in order to provide necessary advice, b) The HLP shall engage in a democratic and inclusive process of consultation with relevant groups, to include: .
National and regional civil society consultations which gather views on the powers, responsibilities and structure of the ASEAN human rights body in order to ensure that the body serves the needs and interests of the people of ASEAN;
.
The establishment of appropriate mechanisms for these consultations;
.
Creative forms of communication to reach the largest number of people possible within ASEAN. Such forms of communication should enable concerned citizens who otherwise were not able to participate directly in consultation meetings to register their views on the powers, responsibilities and structure of the ASEAN human rights.
32. Other civil society groups, like indigenous peoples and the Vietnam Lawyers‟ Association have indicated their interest to look into how to get involved in ASEAN. VIII. Issues to be concerned
Page 106 of 237
33. The upcoming drafting of the TOR on the ASEAN human rights body by the High Level Panel (HLP) is an opportunity for civil society to influence the composition, function, and related issues of the body effectively through engagement with the HLP. The Panel was appointed at the 41st AMM meeting in Singapore in July. The opportunity for civil society to contribute to the body also extends through systematic cooperation and collaboration with several key actors including respective governments, the ASEAN Secretariat, the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, and the National Human Rights Institutions. 34. On another front, there has been very little development with the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children, although the plan of setting up the ACWC has been initiated since 2004. There has been speculation that the plan of setting up the ACWC will be eventually scrapped by ASEAN. 35. Therefore it is most important that civil society groups discuss and organise a strategy on how to precede with the two tracks of human rights mechanisms; whether we should support the setting up of separate commissions or a single overarching commission. FORUM-ASIA HRWG 2008
Page 107 of 237
How far is ASEAN from establishment of the ASEAN Community? After almost three months of delay, Thailand finally hosted the 14th ASEAN Summit in Cha-am, Phetchaburi province, and Hua Hin, Prachuap Khiri Khan province, from February 28 to March 1, 2009 with the attendance of all ASEAN leaders for the first time under a new Charter. The 14th ASEAN Summit was held under the theme “ASEAN Charter for ASEAN Peoples.”, emphasizing the importance of enhancing people‟s participation and people-oriented ASEAN in which every sector of the society can benefit from the process of ASEAN integration and community building. The three-day ASEAN summit covered several hotly debated issues, for example, illegal migrants in the Indian Ocean and the welfare and well being of the Palestinian people in Gaza. Undoubtedly, the meeting did not overlook a major concern on the global economic downturn, which did not spare the ASEAN nations but the magnitude of the effects vary from country to country, depending on the country‟s economic and financial stability. An accelerate implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint was also discussed at the summit. The ASEAN Economic Community is recognized as one of ASEAN Community‟s three pillars, the other two namely Political-Security Community and Socio-Cultural Community. In addition, the Declaration on the roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009-2015) was signed by the ASEAN leaders with the objective of ensuring durable peace, stability, and shared prosperity in the region1. o
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC)
APSC Blueprint2 is expect to draw ASEAN towards a rules-based Community of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable, and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security including a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world. The full implementation of the Blueprint will also bring about prosperity in the region and protects the interests and welfare of ASEAN people. The 3rd ASEAN Defense Ministers‟ Meeting (ADMM), as part of the APSC, was convened in Pattaya, Thailand, February 25-27, 2009. The defense ministers focused on the strengthening the APSC, reinforced ASEAN‟s ability to deal with non-traditional security challenges such as natural disasters, particularly the establishment of a special force to provide humanitarian assistance for member countries which are affected by natural disasters. The ADMM meeting also exchanged ideas on cooperation with civil society organizations, and strengthened the framework for future dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN Dialogue Partners and friends. During the ADMM meeting, three papers were signed including “The Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief”, “ADMM-Plus: Principles for Membership,” and “ASEAN Defense Establishments and Civil Society Organizations Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security.” The ADMM, a key pillar in the APSC, is expected to play a critical role in enhancing regional peace and security. Although politics and security are correlated, some argue that the political and security issues should be separated from the pillar. The security issue should be considered as a target of the ASEAN political community. This is because security does not imply politics and military of the nation alone but it should also link to economic and social security as well. In addition, it is proposed that to forge
Page 108 of 237
ahead a single political security community, border confrontations and the spillover of transnational problems such as migration and environment should be taken into consideration among the ASEAN nations. o
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC)
ASCC Blueprint3 is adopted to recognize an ASEAN Community that is people-centered, socially responsible with a view to achieving solidarity, unity, a common identity, and building a sharing and caring society. In this regard, the ASCC addresses human development; social welfare and protection; social justice and rights; ensuring environmental sustainability; building ASEAN identity; and narrowing the development gap. According to ASCC Blueprint (2009 — 2015), human development opportunities can enhance the well-being and livelihood of ASEAN peoples if member countries promote and invest in education and life-long learning, human resource training and capacity building, encourage innovation and entrepreneurship, promote the use of English language, ICT, and applied science and technology in socio-economic development activities. In addition, it should include social welfare and protection for the people, such as building a safe, secure and drug free environment, enhancing disaster resilience, and addressing health development concerns. In the ASCC Blueprint (2009 — 2015), it indicates the needs for promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities as well as migrant workers and promoting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). In times of global warming, environmental sustainability is a major issue for the countries to achieve sustainable development. ASEAN plans to promote clean and green environment by protecting the natural resource base for economic and social development including the sustainable management and conservation of soil, water, mineral, energy, biodiversity, forest, coastal and marine resources as well as improvement in water and air quality for the region. Climate change and ozone layer protection, including developing and adapting environmentally-sound technology for development and environmental sustainability will also be taken into consideration. To achieve the ASCC, narrowing the development gap within ASEAN and the social dimensions of development between ASEAN-64 and the CLMV5 countries is a prerequisite in meeting the ASCC mandates. Furthermore, ASEAN aims to build the ASEAN identity by promoting greater awareness and common values in the spirit of unity at all levels of society. Profiling ASEAN among ASEAN citizen particularly the youths through education and culture has been an ongoing process. For example, in Thailand, the Department of ASEAN Affairs has produced and launched two cartoon books, namely “ASEAN Discovery,” and “Let‟s Get to Know ASEAN”, on Children‟s Day (January 10, 2009), in order to disseminate information about ASEAN to increase ASEAN awareness among the youths and general public. The “ASEAN Discovery” animated book tells the tale of „Blu‟, an alien who has 10 friends from each of the ASEAN countries, namely „Siam‟ representing Thailand, „Peter‟ (Singapore), „Peepid‟ (Malaysia), „Trumsieng‟ (Cambodia), „Budy‟ (Indonesia), „Khamsuay‟ (Lao PDR) „Momo‟ (Burma), „Maria‟ (Brunei), „Forsia‟ (the Philippines), and „Kiew‟ from Vietnam. o
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)
Page 109 of 237
The AEC will establish ASEAN as a single market and production base making ASEAN more dynamic and competitive with new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives; accelerating regional integration in the priority sectors7; facilitating movement of business persons, skilled labor and talents; and strengthening the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN (AEC Blueprint8). AEC Blueprint is a single comprehensive document, which identifies the characteristics and elements of AEC with clear implementation targets and timelines for the various economic integration measures within ASEAN. The Blueprint is organized along AEC‟s four primary objectives, namely: o o o o
a a a a
single market and production base; highly competitive economic region; region of equitable economic development; and region fully integrated into the global economy
ASEAN leaders agree to accelerate the establishment of the AEC by 2015 and to transform ASEAN into a region with free flow of goods, services, investment, skilled labor, and freer flow of capital. In regards to free flow ofgoods, import duties on all products except for those listed under the Sensitive and Highly Sensitive List (unprocessed agriculture products) are to be eliminated by 2010 for ASEAN-6 by 2015, with flexibilities for some sensitive products by 2018, for CLMV In terms of free movement of investment, the proposed elements of the comprehensive investment agreement would cover articles on the following pillars: investment protection, facilitation and cooperation, promotion and awareness, and liberalization. However, removal of all trade barriers in goods, services, and investment still faces many hurdles physically, technically, economically, politically and culturally9. To facilitate the free flow of skilled labor, ASEAN will issue visas and employment passes for ASEAN professionals and skilled labor who are engaged in crossborder trade and investment related activities. Moreover, it is required ASEAN members to develop core competencies and qualifications for job/occupational and trainers skills in the priority services sectors (by 2009); and in other services sectors (from 2010 to 2015); and to strengthen the research capabilities of each ASEAN member country. ASEAN leaders has also agreed to facilitate the movement of experts, professional and skilled workers in 4 areas, namely, engineering, architectural, accounting services, and nursing, including medical practitioners, starting from January 1, 2009. The AEC also aims to strengthen ASEAN capital market integration and allow greater capital mobility by removing or relaxing restrictions on capital flows, where appropriate, to support EDI and to promote capital market development. Significance of the ASEAN Community In the midst of the global economic downturn which was hit by subprime loan crisis, forming an integrated community will help ASEAN nations to strengthen their economic competitiveness and attractiveness to investors to the region. If the ASEAN Community can achieve the goal of becoming a community, such as the European Union by 2015, ASEAN can then take advantage of the complementarities between ASEAN economies to achieve economies of scale,
Page 110 of 237
industrial efficiency, and productivity. A more integrated ASEAN will enable ASEAN members to build solidarity and partnerships to narrow development gaps and ensure achievements of MDGs in the regionl0. However, ASEAN is still far from achieving the target of a regional community. Critical part of the establishment of the ASEAN Community According to Dr. Kriengsak Chareonwongsakll, the comprehensive integration towards an ASEAN community is still doubtful, firstly because of the difference among ASEAN members, in terms of the different states of development of each member country, which could lead to an uneven distribution of benefits if such integration took place. Secondly, the obstacle to establish AEC is the lack of a common ownership among ASEAN members due to different history and culture of each member countryl2. Chareonwongsak (2008) also pointed out that ASEAN countries have never been allied and since the people of ASEAN have not been sufficiently informed on the vision to establish AEC, and they still perceive themselves as the citizens of individual countries, not as the citizens of an ASEAN community. Thirdly, ASEAN lacks the enforcement of good rules as ASEAN adherence to law is casual, which shows negligence to rules and dependence on interpersonal relationships rather than institutionalized laws. Therefore, ASEAN cooperation is a declaration, rather than a treaty in practice. Finally, ASEAN‟s management system is not efficient. The structure of the ASEAN secretariat is weak due to its limited authority, its committee roles, lack of human resources, budget and political support. Chareonwongsak (2008) concludes that ASEAN would be far from successful in establishing AEC due to its lack of realization of the importance of power elites and efficient mechanisms to support cooperation, and the gap that exists between ASEAN members. Thus, the most important issue is to build the framework in establishing AEC, by strengthening relationships at a people-to-people (P to P) level, and creating a sense of ASEAN community in the region. Eurthermore, whether ASEAN Community will be developed will depend on the strength of its regional institutions.l3
Page 111 of 237
ASEAN COMMUNITY ASEAN Political-Security Community • • • • •
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Defence Law Transnational Crime
ASEAN Economic Community • • • • • • • • • • • •
ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Energy Food, Agriculture & Forestry Finance Investment Minerals Mekong Basin Development Cooperation Transport Telecommunication & IT Tourism Sectoral Bodies under the Purview of ASEAN Economic Ministers
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community • • • • • • • • • • • • •
ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint
Community Outreach
Page 112 of 237
Culture & Arts Disaster Management Education Environment Haze Health Information Labour Rural Development & Poverty Eradication Science & Technology Social Welfare & Development Women Youth ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint
ASEAN, Civil Society and Human Rights: Knowing the Basics CONTENTS
Page Introduction
1
SECTION 1: ASEAN IN GENERAL 1.
What is the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)?
1
2.
Why was ASEAN formed?
1
3.
What are the key decision making bodies within ASEAN?
2
4.
What is ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit, the Post Ministerial Conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum?
2
5.
What is the ASEAN Charter?
3
6.
What new decision making bodies will the ASEAN Charter introduce?
7.
How has the ASEAN Charter been drafted?
3
SECTION 2: ASEAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS 8.
What has been ASEAN’s attitude towards human rights?
4
9.
Why did ASEAN become more concerned about human rights issues during the 1990’s?
4
10.
What relevance does the ASEAN Charter have to human rights?
6
11.
What is a Human Rights Mechanism?
6
12.
Why is it necessary to have an ASEAN human rights mechanism?
7
13.
What progress has been made within ASEAN regarding the establishment of a Regional Human Rights Mechanism?
8
14.
What is the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism?
8
Page 113 of 237
15.
How does an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism relate to moves towards establishing an Asia Pacific Human Rights Mechanism?
16.
What role do National Human Rights Commissions play in the promotion and protection of human rights in the region?
9
10
SECTION 3: ASEAN AND CIVIL SOCIETY 17.
How do ASEAN and civil society view one another?
11
18.
What do the terms “track 1” and “track 2” diplomacy mean?
11
19.
What is ASEAN ISIS, APA and AICOHR?
12
20.
What is Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA)?
13
21.
What is the SAPA Working Group on ASEAN?
13
22.
What is the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC)?
14
23.
What is the Civil Society Task Force on ASEAN Migrant Workers (TF AMW)?
15
24.
What is the Civil Society Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights (TF AHR)?
15
Useful contacts
16
Page 114 of 237
Introduction This booklet is designed to provide a handy overview of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in relation to civil society and human rights. It is aimed primarily at those working within civil society organisations who deal with human rights issues, hoping to assist them in their engagement with ASEAN by improving their understanding of key events, institutions, processes and terminology.
SECTION 1: ASEAN IN GENERAL
1.
What is the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)?
The Association of South East Asian Nations, otherwise known as ASEAN, is a grouping of ten nation states: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma (Myanmar), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The governments of these nations come together to discuss regional issues and develop regional policies for South East Asia. The group was founded on 8 August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Its official aims and purposes included the promotion of regional peace and stability; and the acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development. Brunei Darussalam joined the group in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Burma in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. Timor Leste currently has observer status with ASEAN, and will become a fully fledged member once it meets certain criteria (including trade liberalisation requirements), which is likely to be around 2011.
2.
Why was ASEAN formed?
All of the founding countries of ASEAN, apart from Thailand, were newly established sovereign nation states following the period of decolonisation after World War II. This, combined with the onset of the Cold War, meant that all of the governments of the founding countries were feeling vulnerable to challenges to their rule, whether that be from neighbouring countries or from groups within their own country (conveniently referred to by governments at this time as “communist insurgents”). Therefore, a driving motivation behind the foundation of ASEAN was to help guard these governments against such challenges. Subsequently, non interference in the internal affairs of member states was established as a key principle of ASEAN, with their means of reaching decisions by consensus helping to ensure that ASEAN has remained loyal to this founding principle up to the present day.
1
Page 115 of 237
3.
What are the key decision making bodies within ASEAN?
Major decisions are made by the ministers of the respective governments of ASEAN according to the principle of decision by consensus. There is no separate group of ASEAN decision makers, such as exists in the European Union. The highest decision making body is the ASEAN Summit, involving the heads of government of each member state, which meets once a year. The next notch down is the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), also held annually (usually around July), in which all of the foreign ministers of ASEAN come together. On the same level as the AMM is the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting and the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting. Next comes the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting, which involves the top civil servants of the relevant ministries of ASEAN, meeting throughout the year on an ad hoc basis. ASEAN has designated the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee as the focal point in ASEAN for human rights concerns. This Standing Committee is made up of the Directors General of all the ASEAN Departments within the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the member states of ASEAN. The ASEAN Secretariat, based in Jakarta, Indonesia, is the administrative centre of ASEAN. Although this is not where policy decisions are made, it is from here that decisions are implemented. This means that the Secretariat plays an important role in drawing up plans of action, in collaboration with ASEAN Senior Officials, to implement decisions made at ASEAN’s high level meetings. These plans of action then go back up the chain of command, being amended and endorsed at the ministerial meetings ready for final approval at the ASEAN Summit. The Secretary General heads the Secretariat, and is the figure ultimately responsible for coordinating and implementing ASEAN’s activities. She or he is appointed for a five year term and is selected from one of the member countries of ASEAN according to a system of alphabetic rotation. The current Secretary General is Ong Keng Yong of Singapore, and he will be replaced by former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan in January 2008.
4.
What is ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit, the Post Ministerial Conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum?
ASEAN has developed a number of forums and meetings to coincide with its own meetings (outlined in point 3 above) in order to engage countries from outside of South East Asia in economic and security matters. The ASEAN Plus Three forum aims at expanding cooperation, particularly on economic and trade issues, with North East Asia (China, Japan and South Korea). The forum first met informally in December 1997 and was institutionalized in 1999. For the sake of convenience, the APT is held towards the end of the ASEAN Summits (see point 3). The East Asia Summit is a wider grouping which also seeks to develop cooperation on economic and trade matters. Members are the ASEAN Plus Three members, Australia, India and New Zealand. The 2
Page 116 of 237
first East Asia Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur on December 14, 2005. As with the APT, these meetings are held during the ASEAN Summits. The Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) takes place during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of foreign ministers (see point 3) and is where ASEAN meets with its “Dialogue Partners“ to discuss economic and security issues. These dialogue partners are Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, the United States and the United Nations Development Programme. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994, is a security grouping which is held in conjunction with the PMC. The forum aims to build trust, clarify positions and develop cooperation to enhance peace and security in the Asia Pacific region through a process of dialogue between foreign ministers. Its members are the ASEAN member states plus Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sri Lanka, Timor Leste and the United States.
5.
What is the ASEAN Charter?
The ASEAN Charter will give ASEAN a legal personality under international law, which will help it in its relations with outside countries and regional groupings (for example, in securing trade and other economic agreements). The Charter will also determine the functions and areas of competence of key ASEAN bodies and their relationship with one another in the overall ASEAN structure in pursuit of the regional community proposed in the ASEAN Vision 2020 (see point 8). The ASEAN Charter was signed by the leaders of all 10 ASEAN member states on 20th November 2007 during the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore. It now goes to each of the national parliaments for ratification. ASEAN hopes that the instruments of ratification of all ten member states will be deposited with the Secretary General of ASEAN within one year of signature (the Charter will enter into force on the thirtieth day following the deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification). However, the ratification process is by no means a foregone conclusion; the Philippine President Gloria Arroyo indicated during the 13th Summit itself that the Philippine Congress would refuse to ratify the ASEAN Charter unless Burma commits itself to restoring democracy and releasing Aung San Suu Kyi.
6.
What new decision making bodies will the ASEAN Charter introduce?
The highest decision making body will remain the ASEAN Summit (see point 3), with it meeting biannually rather than annually. However, other key decision making bodies will be restructured to reflect the three pillars for an ASEAN Community envisioned in the 2003 Bali Concord II (see point 8). The ASEAN Coordinating Council will consist of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers and shall meet biannually. As suggested by its name, this body will be responsible for coordinating implementation of the 3
Page 117 of 237
agreements and decisions made at the ASEAN Summit. The ASEAN Community Councils will be made up of senior government ministers (or their representatives) from across different sectors (each member state will decide on its national representation for each of the Council’s meetings). These Councils will consist of the ASEAN Political Security Community Council, the ASEAN Economic Community Council, and the ASEAN Socio Cultural Community Council. Each will coordinate and implement decisions from the ASEAN Summit and submit reports and recommendations for consideration. Under the purview of the relevant ASEAN Community Council will be the ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, which will bring together the ministers of specific sectors (for example, all of the labour ministers of all the member countries will make up one sectoral ministerial body). These bodies will help to implement agreements and decisions from the ASEAN Summit, and submit reports and recommendations to their respective Community Councils. Each ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Body will then have under its purview relevant senior officials and subsidiary bodies to assist it in its work. The Charter establishes that each member state will have a Permanent Representative to ASEAN with the rank of Ambassador based in Jakarta. These representatives will collectively support the work of the ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, and coordinate with the ASEAN National Secretariats and the ASEAN Secretariat. Furthermore, the Permanent Representatives will facilitate cooperation with external partners, assisting in the Charter’s goal of securing a more united stance at the multilateral level.
7.
How was the ASEAN Charter drafted?
In 2005 ASEAN set up an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to provide practical recommendations on the creation of an ASEAN Charter. The Leaders of ASEAN endorsed the EPG’s report at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines in January 2007 with “The Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter”, and directed a High Level Task Force (HLTF) to begin drafting the Charter, due to be ready for signature at the 13th ASEAN Summit to be held in Singapore in November 2007. The HLTF met for the first time in February 2007 and began drafting the Charter based on the Leaders’ directives from the 11th and 12th ASEAN Summits, the EPG Report and other key ASEAN documents. Although civil society was given the opportunity to provide some input to the HLTF (see point 20), overall the drafting process remained very “ASEAN like”, with key negotiations with government officials taking place behind closed doors and with no copy of the draft Charter being published for civil society to examine prior to its signing by ASEAN heads of state in November 2007. In response to this, a number of civil society organisations have decided to come together to draft an ASEAN Peoples Charter (see point 21 for further details).
4
Page 118 of 237
SECTION 2: ASEAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS
8.
What has been ASEAN’s attitude towards human rights?
ASEAN did not concern itself with human rights issues up until the late 1980s, when it began to issue a series of declarations and statements (see point 8 for further details). The reason for this lack of activity in promoting and protecting human rights is closely related to ASEAN’s principle of non interference (see point 2). Human rights principles set clear guidelines on the obligations and responsibilities of governments to their people. If the exercise of power by governments violates human rights, then question marks can be raised over the legitimacy of the government. Furthermore, if power is not exercised and certain duties or obligations are not fulfilled then the legitimacy of the government can again be called into question. The member governments of ASEAN have been keen to guard against such interference.
9.
Why did ASEAN become more concerned about human rights issues during the 1990’s?
During the 1990s, there appeared to be some progress in bringing ASEAN to engage on human rights issues. This can be partly explained by the change in the international political environment, with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent convening of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria in June 1993. In response to the new wave of optimism regarding the spread of human rights concepts, there were attempts by governments in South East Asia to use the “Asian values” argument to discredit human rights concepts as Western concepts. Two of the strongest advocates of the “Asian values” argument were Singapore’s then prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and Malaysia’s then prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad. In spite of these arguments, the participants of the World Conference on Human Rights (consisting of representatives of 171 nations from around the world) agreed on the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action1 as a way of moving forward at the global level with the promotion and protection of all human rights for all. The influence of the World Conference was seen the following month (July 1993) at the Twenty Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Singapore when it was declared in a Joint Communique that, “The Foreign Ministers welcomed the international consensus achieved during the World Conference on
1
The full text can be found at: http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En 5
Page 119 of 237
Human Rights…and reaffirmed ASEAN’s commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in the Vienna Declaration of 25 June 1993.”2 Subsequently, an increasing number of ASEAN’s declarations, statements and plans of action began to refer to human rights. Here is a list of the most commonly cited ones: 1997 ASEAN Vision 2020: Marking ASEAN’s 30th anniversary and motivated by the ordeal of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, this declaration has become a landmark document, setting the goal of the creation of a “concert” of South East Asian nations. This document not only mentioned ASEAN’s traditional concerns of peace and security between nations and of economic development, but also mentioned the creation of a “community of caring societies” with “focus on the welfare and dignity of the human person and the good of the community”.3 1998 The Hanoi Plan of Action (1999 2004): This was the first plan of action which sought to implement the 1997 ASEAN Vision 2020. It pledged to enhance the exchange of information in the field of human rights among ASEAN countries, and to implement two core UN human rights treaties in the region (the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women).4 2003 — The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II): This declaration sought to give a coherent structure and organization to the ASEAN Vision 2020, mapping out the creation of three pillars for an ASEAN Community: an ASEAN Security Community (ASC), an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and an ASEAN Socio Cultural Community (ASCC) which again referred to the creation of a “community of caring societies”.5 2004 — The Vientiane Action Programme (2004 2010): Following on from the Hanoi Plan of Action, this plan sought to continue with the goal of implementing the ASEAN Vision 2020, including the creation of the three pillars described in the Bali Concord II. The more concrete mentions of human rights concerned the elaboration of an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers and the establishment of an ASEAN commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children.6 However, the multitude of plans, declarations, and programmes of action has failed to bring about any meaningful progress at the regional level in tackling the human rights violations and abuses that 2
The full text can be found at: http://www.aseansec.org/2009.htm
3
The full text can be found at: http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm
4
The full text can be found at: http://www.aseansec.org/687.htm
5
The full text can be found at: http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm
6
The full text can be found at: http://www.aseansec.org/VAP 10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf 6
Page 120 of 237
continue to occur on the ground in South East Asia on a daily basis. ASEAN’s output has been plentiful in rhetoric, but sadly lacking in specifying the means of implementation, measuring progress, and fixing timeframes. Furthermore, because they are not legally binding, there has been no real sense of concern or urgency within ASEAN to realise any of the grand proclamations contained in the documents.
10.
What relevance does the ASEAN Charter have to human rights?
Human rights NGOs have recognised that the adoption of an ASEAN Charter represents an opportunity to set ASEAN on a more human rights friendly path. They duly sought to pressure the drafters and ASEAN government officials to accept the inclusion of human rights elements in the Charter. Particular focus was paid to pressuring for the inclusion of references to human rights as one of the key principles of ASEAN, as well as the more substantive reference to an ASEAN human rights mechanism. The inclusion of references to human rights in the ASEAN Charter is therefore an encouraging sign of progress within ASEAN. With the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms included as an explicit purpose and principle of ASEAN, this should mean that serious human rights violations are seen as serious breaches of the Charter, allowing for discussion at the ASEAN Summit pursuant to Article 20. On the down side, no explicit provision on termination or suspension of membership is contained in the Charter. It is also questionable how far the ASEAN Summit, which is a political gathering, will be willing to go in reprimanding one of its members. Furthermore, no mention is made of internationally agreed norms and standards (including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), which will make it more difficult to hold governments to account. The Charter also establishes an ASEAN human rights body (article 14), which is undoubtedly a positive development. However, no further details are provided regarding its powers, functions, mandate or timeframe for establishment, with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers mandated to draw up the body’s terms of reference. It is then not yet clear whether the body will be able to perform the functions necessary to improve the human rights situation on the ground in Southeast Asia (see point 10). To the detriment of human rights, the old principles of non interference and decision by consensus retain their pre eminence in the Charter (see point 7). Furthermore, no mention is made of states’ “responsibility to protect” in relation to the principle of non interference, whereby the protection of national sovereignty is contingent on the government’s protection of their own citizens. This is particularly disappointing when considering that all ASEAN heads of state endorsed this concept at the UN World Summit in September 2005. Over the coming months and years it will then be up to civil society organisations to focus on the windows of opportunity that are contained in the Charter. Despite the vagueness of references to human rights and the retention of state centric principles, civil society does at least have something to latch on to and work with as it seeks to develop a systematic, coherent and sustained strategy of engagement with ASEAN. 7
Page 121 of 237
11.
What is a Human Rights Mechanism?
A human rights mechanism is the means through which the promotion and protection of human rights occurs on the ground, and can exist at the national, regional and international level. The term “mechanism” is very broad, and can take many forms. A human rights commission is one type of human rights mechanism. Although the term “commission” does not tell us what the mechanism can do, it does tell us that the mechanism will not be able to issue legally binding decisions (a court would be needed to play this role). Instead, the commission is usually an advisory body, ideally made up of independent experts performing the following functions: a)
Conducting on site visits to inspect the human rights situation on the ground within each member state.
b)
Investigating, free from outside interference, credible allegations of human rights violations, and making recommendations based on their findings.
c)
Consulting with government and non governmental actors and producing thematic studies on human rights issues relevant to the region. Based on these studies, the commission could again issue recommendations for action by governments, be it remedial, legislative or administrative.
d)
Promoting human rights through human rights education programmes and public awareness building activities.
The major potential weakness of a commission of this type is that its decisions are not legally binding, meaning governments can ultimately choose to ignore the recommendations that are made. Therefore, the role of civil society is crucial to the efficacy of a commission. By raising awareness among the general population of recommendations made by the commission, more pressure is placed on governments (particularly in the more democratic countries) to provide good reasons for ignoring recommendations. Existing examples of regional human rights commissions are the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, established in 1959; and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, established in 1986. A human rights court is another type of human rights mechanism. A court would adjudicate on allegations of human rights violations following the consideration of evidence presented to it, with the decisions being legally binding on states that have agreed to its jurisdiction. Allegations of human rights violations could be received from individuals, groups or states (against other states). Rather than being a replacement for the commission, this mechanism can exist side by side in a complementary relationship, as exists in the Americas and Africa. In these regions the commission continues with its important work of monitoring the human rights situation on the ground, collecting evidence regarding allegations of human rights violations, increasing awareness of human rights standards within the 8
Page 122 of 237
member states through workshops, and assisting the work of the court by deciding on the admissibility of complaints received. The commission can also help in monitoring the implementation of decisions made by the court (in the Council of Europe, this role is performed by the Committee of Ministers). The most well established regional human rights court (established in 1950) is the European Court of Human Rights in the Council of Europe.
12.
Why is it necessary to have an ASEAN human rights mechanism?
South East Asia is not covered by any regional human rights mechanism, despite having the most developed intergovernmental organization in the Asia Pacific region. It is vital that ASEAN develops a human rights mechanism in order to: a)
Offer people protection from human rights violations when national mechanisms fail;
b)
Act as a check and balance on national processes;
c)
Empower people from within the region to claim their universal human rights in a way that is sensitive to local cultural and social preferences (due to the geographical proximity of the mechanism, and the fact it is made up of people from the region);
d)
Promote regional peace and security (through the promotion and protection of human rights);
e)
Provide regional input to the development of international human rights standards and the improvement of international human rights mechanisms;
f)
Assist national governments in the implementation of their international human rights obligations; for example, assisting in the implementation of concluding observations of treaty bodies which national governments are party to, and helping to follow up on recommendations of special procedures;
g)
Provide help to national institutions to strengthen their role in the promotion and protection of human rights at the national level; for example, by providing advisory services to national governments in the administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights education and capacity building of governmental and non governmental institutions;
h)
Help national governments to better address human rights concerns that cross national borders; for example, human rights violations and abuses that come from organised crime (including terrorism, human trafficking, sexual exploitation of migrant workers and children), migration and migrant workers, diseases and pandemics, economic development projects (including dam building and river diversion projects), food security, and environmental issues (including cross boundary pollution and toxic waste dumping).
9
Page 123 of 237
13.
What progress has been made within ASEAN regarding the establishment of a Regional Human Rights Mechanism?
With regional human rights mechanisms already established in the Americas (within the Organisation of American States), Africa (within the African Union) and Europe (within the Council of Europe), the changing international political environment (referred to in point 8) brought pressure upon South East Asian governments to bring themselves under some kind of regional human rights arrangement. The same Joint Communique from the 1993 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting referred to in point 8 stated that, “in support of [the] Vienna Declaration and Program of Action [1993]…ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.” However, it was not until 20 November 2007, with the signing of the ASEAN Charter, that the leaders of the member states of ASEAN finally committed to the establishment of a regional human rights mechanism (in the Charter the term “body” as opposed to “mechanism” was used). No further details were provided in the Charter, with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting mandated to draw up the body’s terms of reference. The Charter will now be referred to each of the member states’ national parliaments for ratification (see points 5 and 9 for further details).
14.
What is the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism?
In response to the Joint Communique of the Twenty Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting referred to above, an informal Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism was formed in 1994, which was formally recognised in 1998 by the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN during the Thirty First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. This Working Group is a coalition of national working groups and focal points from the ASEAN member states. National working groups have so far been organized and recognized by ASEAN in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. These national working groups are composed of representatives from government institutions, parliamentary human rights committees, the academe, and NGOs. Those countries without national working groups (Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Burma, Singapore and Vietnam) have, as a holding measure, national focal points, usually based within the foreign ministries of the member countries. These national working groups and focal points then come together in regional meetings to decide on recommendations to present to ASEAN. The stated “primary goal” of the Working Group is “to establish an intergovernmental human rights commission for ASEAN”.7 To achieve this, the group has the challenging job of seeking to bring together the views of civil society and government representatives.
7
See the official website of the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism at: http://www.aseanhrmech.org/ 10
Page 124 of 237
Without underplaying its civil society elements, in many ways this initiative has developed into a track 2 dialogue process (see point 17) in its own right: The Working Group has good access to ASEAN senior ministers, is officially recognised by ASEAN as a dialogue partner, and holds annual meetings with ASEAN senior officials, along with other informal meetings throughout the year. The Working Group has made submissions to senior ASEAN officials, such as the Draft Agreement for the Establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Commission,8 and has been asked by ASEAN to assist in the implementation of the human rights related activities in the Vientiane Action Programme. In the ASEAN Charter, the Working Group is officially recognized in annex II as one of the “entities associated with ASEAN”. The Working Group described the inclusion of a human rights body in the ASEAN Charter as “a breakthrough for human rights in the region”.
15.
How does an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism relate to moves towards establishing an Asia Pacific Human Rights Mechanism?
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), since its establishment following the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, has consistently promoted regional cooperation in the Asia Pacific for the establishment of a regional human rights mechanism. However, due to the diversity of the region and the lack of political will amongst the governments of the Asia Pacific, little progress has been made towards this goal. Each year workshops, known as the “Annual Workshop on the Framework of Regional Cooperation for Human Rights Promotion and Protection in the Asia Pacific Region”, are held to talk about this idea. The most concrete outcome from the fourteen Workshops that have been held since 1994 has been the Tehran Framework. This Framework, agreed on at the 1998 Workshop, sought regional technical cooperation in: i) developing national human rights institutions; ii) national human rights action plans; iii) human rights education; and iv) the realization of economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development. However, in reality little attention has been paid by states to following up on this framework.9 Because of the lack of progress made at the Asia Pacific level in developing a regional human rights mechanism, and with there being little prospect for much progress in the near future, human rights NGOs in South East Asia have come to focus their efforts on the more attainable goal of developing a human rights mechanism at the ASEAN level. Furthermore, the successful establishment of a
8
This can be accessed from the Working Group’s official website at: http://www.aseanhrmech.org/aboutus.html
9
During the 2007 Workshop in Bali, Indonesia, it was agreed that the next workshop “should be a special event to reflect on the progress and achievements made under the Asia Pacific Framework, including the four Tehran pillars” (Bali Action Points adopted by member states on 12 July 2007). 11
Page 125 of 237
mechanism at the ASEAN level is seen as providing more meaningful impetus towards the eventual creation of a mechanism at the Asia Pacific level.
16.
What role do National Human Rights Commissions play in the promotion and protection of human rights in the region?
A National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) is a type of National Human Rights Institution (NHRI). There are currently four NHRCs within the countries of ASEAN. These are in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. There are also ongoing moves to establish one in Cambodia. As at the regional level, a NHRC should be able to conduct investigations on the human rights situation within the country; receive complaints and duly investigate them; provide human rights advice to the government on legislative, policy and administrative matters; and play a role in helping to increase the general public’s knowledge and understanding of human rights. The problem found by all of the NHRCs in South East Asia is that their respective governments often lack the political will to follow up on the commission’s decisions and recommendations, which are not legally binding. Therefore, even when NHRCs function well and come up with strong and progressive recommendations, the governments often fail to implement them or simply choose to ignore them. Back in 1996, ASEAN’s position was that a regional human rights mechanism could not be established until all of the countries of ASEAN had established their own NHRCs. With this prerequisite in place, it would have taken many years before a regional human rights mechanism was even possible. Thankfully, by 1997 ASEAN recognised that this was an unrealistic prerequisite to have in place, and duly dropped it. Nevertheless, increasing cooperation between the NHRCs in South East Asia can help to pave the way for the acceptance of a regional human rights commission. In this regard, the Declaration of Cooperation signed by the four NHRCs in Bali, Indonesia on 28 June 2007 should be seen as a positive development. This declaration included a commitment that “Regional strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights shall be gradually developed within and among the four national human rights commissions including advising their respective governments to take the necessary steps to establish an appropriate ASEAN human rights mechanism and/or any organ in the ASEAN Charter.”10 In another notable recent development, following the violent crackdown on peaceful protests by Burma’s military government in August/September 2007, the four NHRCs within ASEAN along with the NHRC of Timor Leste drafted and signed a statement urging the Burmese government to observe human rights principles and for ASEAN governments to take urgent action. This represents the first time that the NHRCs have collectively issued a statement on human rights violations occurring within another ASEAN country. 10
The full text of this declaration can be found on the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission’s website: http://www.komnasham.go.id/portal/?q=node/15 12
Page 126 of 237
SECTION 3: ASEAN AND CIVIL SOCIETY
17.
How do ASEAN and civil society view one another?
ASEAN’s approach towards civil society involvement can be gauged by looking at ASEAN’s “Guidelines for ASEAN Relations with NGOs”.
11
These state that “Approval of application for affiliation of an NGO
12
with ASEAN shall be based primarily upon the assessment of the positive contribution which such an NGO could make to the enhancement, strengthening and realization of the aims and objectives of ASEAN.” This has enabled some degree of engagement with, for instance, the business sector, as ASEAN has pursued its policies of economic development. However, the guidelines immediately place human rights NGOs on the back foot, with their aims and objectives seemingly incongruent with those of ASEAN’s (see point 7). Subsequently, the vast majority of NGOs that are accredited with ASEAN are mostly technical in nature. NGOs themselves have not always been interested in engaging with ASEAN in a systematic or sustained manner, with the general attitude being that NGOs’ limited capacities are better focussed elsewhere (i.e. at the national or international level). Only recently have forums been developed through which civil society groups can engage with ASEAN (see points 18 23). It has, then, been rather too easy for ASEAN to pick and choose which parts of civil society to engage with.
18.
What do the terms “track 1” and “track 2” diplomacy mean?
The description of two tracks of diplomacy seeks to place together different groups and individuals and their proximity in relation to policy decision makers (i.e. governments). Track 1 diplomacy refers to diplomacy amongst government officials. Track 2 diplomacy refers to discussions between individuals with expert knowledge (usually consisting of academics and representatives from business and government in their private capacity) who are recognised as experts by governments and allowed to feed into track 1 diplomacy. Track 2 diplomacy in the region has been dominated by government supported think tanks, in particular ASEAN ISIS.
11
The ASEAN Secretariat’s Guidelines for ASEAN Relations with NGOs are available online at: http://www.aseansec.org/6069.htm 12
Gaining “affiliation” status with ASEAN offers improved access to information and meetings of ASEAN and provides more opportunities to present views and recommendations on policy matters (to the ASEAN Standing Committee via the ASEAN Secretariat; see point 3 for details on these bodies). Affiliated NGOs are also eligible to apply for funding for projects from the ASEAN Foundation. All applications for affiliation status are made to the Secretary General of ASEAN. 13
Page 127 of 237
19.
What is ASEAN ISIS, APA and AICOHR?
ASEAN ISIS stands for ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies. ASEAN ISIS is a regional network of think tanks (producers of ideas for policy) that have established track 2 diplomacy (in 1992 their track 2 status was institutionalized with access granted to the Senior Officials Meeting prior to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting). It was officially launched in June 1988 in Singapore with the signing of the Statutes of ASEAN ISIS, and was subsequently registered with the ASEAN Secretariat as an ASEAN NGO (see point 16 on registering with ASEAN). Its work has tended to focus on the promotion of regional security cooperation. ASEAN ISIS’s main platforms for the expression and development of their ideas come in the form of the Asia Pacific Roundtable (APR), the ASEAN ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights (AICOHR) and the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA). The annual ASEAN People’s Assembly represents an attempt by ASEAN ISIS to bring civil society into the track 2 process (see point 17). The first APA was held in November 2000 in Batam, Indonesia and is now an annual event. Each assembly seeks to discuss a broad range of problems, issues, challenges and threats faced by the people of ASEAN, with recommendations from the assembly communicated to ASEAN by ASEAN ISIS. The latest assembly (the sixth) took place in Manila in October 2007 under the title “ASEAN at 40: Realizing the People’s Expectations”. The ASEAN ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights (AICOHR) was a response by ASEAN ISIS to contribute intellectual discourse to the growing talk of human rights in South East Asia in the 1990s. The colloquium first met in 1993, and has been holding annual meetings (in the Philippines) ever since, with themes including good governance, labour and refugees, the rule of law, the 1997 economic crisis, human security, women, and human rights monitoring. Over the years the colloquiums have become a little more open to civil society participation. Although their effect is difficult to measure, APA and AICOHR have undoubtedly helped to bring those involved in track 1 and 2 processes to think and talk more about issues relevant to civil society in the region and to engage more with civil society groups. However, due the close links with government, and ASEAN ISIS’s control over the processes, civil society has remained keen to develop its own platforms while still participating in these meetings.
20.
What is the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA)?
The Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA) is a network of Asian civil society groups operating at the regional (and international) level. The motivation for its formation was to improve communication, cooperation and coordination between Asian civil society groups in order to enhance their influence on regional inter governmental structures. The network was formally established at a meeting in Bangkok in February 2006. Strategic decisions on cooperation, coordination and advocacy activities are made at the annual SAPA General Forum (the first of which was held in February 2007 in Bangkok), which is 14
Page 128 of 237
attended by all members of SAPA. The SAPA General Forum elects the members of the Regional Steering Committee (RSC), which coordinates the work of SAPA and deals with governance and procedural issues. Currently over 100 civil society organisations, both national and regional, are members of this network. The Charter of Principles of SAPA was prepared by the RSC in accordance with the decisions of the SAPA General Forum. This Charter contains basic values, principles and orientations to which the SAPA members subscribe to and promote in their activities. This includes support for a “people centred regionalism as an alternative to the current process of regional integration and economic globalization driven by the maximization of profits and neo liberal political economic ideology.” Furthermore, the Charter specifies that “SAPA shares and upholds the values and principles of democracy and rule of law, human and people’s rights, social and economic justice, ecologically sustainable development, cultural diversity, gender equality, peace and people’s security and transformation of conflicts through nonviolent means.” In order to bring focus and substance to SAPA’s efforts, working groups have been set up in specific areas to share relevant information and news and to coordinate activities, including following up on action plans agreed upon at the SAPA General Forum (a Working Group can be initiated by any member, which must be agreed to by the RSC). Three working groups are currently operating: the Working Group on the UN Human Rights Council, the Working Group on Migration and Labour, and the Working Group on ASEAN.
21.
What is the SAPA Working Group on ASEAN?
The SAPA Working Group on ASEAN13 was formed during SAPA’s first meeting in February 2006. The initial motivation for its formation came from a desire to engage with ASEAN on the Charter drafting process (see points 5, 6 and 9). The Working Group has sought to influence this process by making submissions to the Eminent Persons Group on the three pillars of an ASEAN community (the Security Pillar, the Economic Pillar and the Socio Cultural Pillar), which included a call to establish human rights as a foundation of the community.14
13
The conveners of the meetings of this working group are FORUM ASIA and SEACA.
14
The submission on the security pillar can be found at: http://www.asiasapa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemid=50 The submission on the economic pillar can be found at: http://www.mfasia.org/mfaResources/SAPA Submission2 ASEANCharter EconPillar Final.pdf The submission on the socio cultural pillar can be found at: http://www.asiasapa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35&Itemid=50 15
Page 129 of 237
In order to bring further focus to its work, two thematic task forces have been set up under the working group on the themes of migrant workers and human rights (see points 22 and 23).
22.
What is the ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC)?
The ASEAN Civil Society Conference, or ACSC as it’s more commonly referred to, is a new platform for civil society groups in South East Asia to come together to gather their views to present to the ASEAN Summit (see point 3). The first ACSC was an initiative of the Malaysian government together with the Center for ASEAN Studies of the Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), organised in December 2005 just prior to the 11th ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The aim of the organisers was to provide a venue for civil society in the region to come together and to engage with ASEAN, with the first ACSC including a 15 minute interface between civil society leaders and ASEAN heads of state. Unfortunately, the second ACSC did not receive similar support from the Philippine Government, who hosted the 2006 ASEAN Summit. Nevertheless, civil society recognised the immense benefit of having a gathering which was entirely in the hands of civil society (the SAPA Working Group on ASEAN took the lead in organising the second ACSC) in contrast to APA, which is organised by ASEAN ISIS (see point 18). The second ACSC was held in December 2006 in Cebu, the Philippines with more than 300 participants from countries within the ASEAN region attending. While building on the first ACSC, this second conference also provided an opportunity to bring together input from civil society national consultations (facilitated by SEACA, the Southeast Asian Committee for Advocacy), which in 2006 were held in the Burma Thailand border, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam on the concept of regionalism, civil society engagement with ASEAN and the ASEAN Charter. The 2007 meeting was renamed the ASEAN Plus Civil Society Conference (ACSC III) in order to stress the goal of an open form of regionalism which is people centred. ACSC III, entitled “Moving Forward: Building an ASEAN People’s Agenda”, took place from 2 4 November 2007 in Singapore, prior to the ASEAN Summit (also in Singapore) which was held from 18 22 November. Over 200 participants from civil society organizations and trade unions from across Southeast Asia and beyond took part. At the conclusion of the Conference, participants called upon the leaders of ASEAN to postpone the signing of the ASEAN Charter due to the Burmese junta’s recent violent crackdown on peaceful protests. The participants also criticised the lack of people participation in the ASEAN Charter drafting process and agreed to draft an ASEAN People’s Charter “that will embody the shared values and collective aspirations of the peoples of the region”. Drafting will be completed in time for ACSC IV in 2008 (due to be held in Thailand).
16
Page 130 of 237
23.
What is the Civil Society Task Force on ASEAN Migrant Workers (TF AMW)?
This is a group of representatives from trade unions, migrant workers and human rights NGOs, and migrant workers’ associations. The Task Force was formed in April 2006 in Singapore to help realize the commitment made by ASEAN to develop an ASEAN instrument for the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers, as mentioned in the Vientiane Action Programme and the 2007 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. Through a series of consultations with representatives from civil society, trade unions, governments and intergovernmental organizations, the taskforce is developing a proposal for an ASEAN Framework on Migrant Workers, which is consistent with international core labour standards (including the ILO migrant conventions 97 and 143 and the 1990 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families).
24.
What is the Civil Society Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights (TF AHR)?
In August 2007, some 30 NGOs from around the region came together in Kuala Lumpur for the First Regional Consultation on ASEAN and Human Rights, with participants setting their sights on more sustained and effective engagement with ASEAN. At this meeting, a Civil Society Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights (TF AHR) was set up as part of the SAPA Working Group on ASEAN (see point 20) to focus on human rights institution building within ASEAN. The TF AHR also helps in implementing a series of action points agreed upon at the Kuala Lumpur meeting, which mention the need for civil society to maintain pressure for a credible and effective regional human rights mechanism; to bring ASEAN to implement human rights commitments it has made at both the regional and international level; and to pressure ASEAN to address human rights issues which are currently kept off of its agenda (such as refugees/non citizens/stateless persons, ethnic minorities, internal conflicts, the human rights side of trade and finance, and greater involvement in helping to bring about democratisation and the promotion and protection of human rights in Burma).
17
Page 131 of 237
USEFUL CONTACTS: Organisation
Email address
Website
The ASEAN Secretariat
[email protected]
http://www.aseansec.org/
The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism
[email protected]
http://www.aseanhrmech.org/
ASEAN ISIS Secretariat
[email protected]
http://www.siiaonline.org/asean isis_network
Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA)
http://www.asiasapa.org/
For NGOs interested in becoming part of the SAPA network, apply through their website at: http://www.asiasapa.org/index.php? option=com_contact&task=view&con tact_id=1&Itemid=79
The Task Force on ASEAN Migrant Workers (TF AMW)
http://www.workersconn ection.org/articles.php?m ore=70
[email protected]
18
Page 132 of 237
ASEAN Tourism
South East Asia is the generally accepted name for a series of island and peninsulas which lie east of India and west of China. South East Asia is blessed with abundant sunshine and plentiful rain. With the exception of North Vietnam and a few mountain locations, virtually all of South Asia falls within the 27-360 C annual temperature range. There are, however, seasonal variations in rainfall and temperature due to changing wind and pressure systems. Warm, humid climatic conditions have given rise to lush tropical rain forests teeming with a wide variety of plant and animal life. Beside the climate, South East Asia nations shares similarities on the archeological background. Archeological evidence for the origins of some prevalent South East Asian decorative motifs may be seen in beautifully ornamented ritual bronze artefacts, such as kettle drums, weapons and bells, which have been uncovered from many sites throughout the regions. The highly stylized designs found on bronze objects from the late Chou period of China (eight-third century BC) also had some influence on South East Asian decorative motifs in terms of asymmetrical layout of design and the merging and modification of motifs to fit in with an overall schema. This influence is most evident on some textiles from Borneo and Sumatra. This corner of the world is also remarkable for its incredible diversity of ethnic groups, each of which has its own language, customs, mores, and religious belief. South East Asia today has a sprinkling of hunting-gethering Negrito people, such as the Atea of the Philipines, The Semang of Malaysia, and the Orang Kubu of Sumatra. Austroloid people are also thought to have passed through South-East Asia during the early migration period. Traces of these people may be seen in the current racial stock of Timor and Flores. Meanwhile the majority of the present day indigenous population are basically Mongoloid, consisting of various people who migrated from South China and the Tibetan border areas at various times. The earliest and most far reaching influence which was to permeate South East Asia was that of India. Many local rulers adopted such Indianized ideas as a belief in a god-like king at the head of a hierarchical administration system, an ancestral genealogical pedigree system, the lunar-solar calender, astrology, and various of Hindu ritual worship. Buddhism was brought from India by traders. The basic proportions and much of the iconography for South East Asia religious art come from India cannons of design. Classical Indian art motifs, such as crowned snakes, the Makara water monster, the Kala monster face mask, the garuda bird (the mount of the Hindu God Vishnu), peacocks, the lotus, the „vase of plenty„ and the wishing appear on South East Asia textiles. Local languages have been greatly enriched by the loan from Sanskrit, the ancient and sacred language of India. Indian epics, such as the Mahabarata and the Ramayana and the Buddhist Jataka Tales, form the basis of classical theatre in South East Asia. The Ramayana is performed as a puppet play in http://www.asean-tourism.com/aboutasean/ (1 of 2)4/13/2010 7:06:09 AM
Page 133 of 237
• ASEAN • Brunei Darussalam • Cambodia • Indonesia • Laos • Malaysia • Myanmar • Philippines • Singapore • Thailand • Viet Nam
Asean Tourism
southern Thailand, northern Malaysia and Java, and as a dance drama in Burma, Laos, central Thailand and central Java. Puppet figures from these epics (called wayang) appear on the textiles of Bali and Lombok in Indonesia. During the early years of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), China took a more active interest in South East Asia. The influence of China culture can be seen in ceramics. Chinese ceramics have been imitated in brassware by the Maranao people of southern Philipines, while some ceramics motifs have been widely copied on South East Asian textiles. Images of Dragon from stoneware jars may occasionally be seen on warp ikat clothes from Sumba. In Bali and Thailand, the banji, or swastika, motif is a pattern regularly encountered on silk weft ikat. It may also be seen in a supplementary weft on Lao, Shan, and Kachin textiles. Meanwhile the influence of Muslim to South East Asia may be seen in the soft, loosely woven double ikat-pattern patola cloth, sometimes called cinde. Patola textiles became symbols of wealth and prestige. The royal weft ikat cloth of Thailand and Cambodia is similar with the weft ikat cloths from Inle Lake in Burma and some sarongs, such as the malong andong of southern Philipines. The European influences by the spread of Western hygiene, improved sanitation, and health care have led to a decreased death rate and lead to the increase in population. While education and the spread of Western ideas and technology have been responsible for much material progress, they have contributed to a cleavage between new and traditional ways of life. The influence of the textile motifs can be seen in the use of garden flowers in cloth from Arakan and Amarapura in Burma, Laos, Javanesse Batik and Timor. South East Asian shares some similarities from the ancestors, artefacts up to the influence brought by India, China, Muslim and Europe. However, the South East Asia nations have the same backgrounds. The similarities lead to the unity among the nations. [top]
http://www.asean-tourism.com/aboutasean/ (2 of 2)4/13/2010 7:06:09 AM
Page 134 of 237
Establishment •
•
Understanding ASEAN, its systems, structures and mechanisms
• • • •
ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by 5 original member countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984 Vietnam joined on 28 July 1995 Lao PDR and Burma on 23 July 1997 Cambodia on 30 April 1999 ASEAN secretariat is located in Jakarta, Indonesia
YUYUN WAHYUNINGRUM YUYUN@FORUM-ASI A.ORG
Fundamental principles of ASEAN
Aims and Purposes of ASEAN 0
To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region
•
Feb. 1967 - Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) established fundamental principles of ASEAN: Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations 0 The rights of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, and coercion 0 Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another 0 Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner 0 Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 0 Effective cooperation among themselves. 0
0
To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the UN Charter
ASEAN’s structures (Pre-Charter) •
ASEAN’s Structure (Pre-Charter)
ASEAN Summit (Highest decision-making body in ASEAN) 0
Annual meeting of ASEAN Head of State and Government
•
Joint Ministerial Meeting (Composed of Foreign and Economic Ministers) — Second after ASEAN Summit
•
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (in different issues ranging from agriculture and forestry, trade, energy, environment, finance, information, investment, labour, law, youth, etc).
•
Secretary-General of ASEAN Secretariat — mandated to “initiate, advise, coordinate, and implement ASEAN activities”.
Page 135 of 237
ASEAN’s Structure (based on ASEAN Charter) •
ASEAN Summit — Supreme policy-making body of ASEAN
•
ASEAN Coordinating Council (Foreign Minsters) — coordinate the meetings of ASEAN Summit! Coordinate the implementation of agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit
•
ASEAN Community Council (comprises of ASEAN Political Security Community Council, ASEAN Economic Community Council, and ASEAN SocioCultural Community Council)
•
ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies
ASEAN’s Structure (based on ASEAN Charter) ASEAN Secretary-General Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) to ASEAN — “facilitate ASEAN cooperation with external partners” [including CSO] • ASEAN National Secretariat • ASEAN Network Secretariat • •
Actors in ASEAN
Track 1
• Track 1 0
0 0 0
ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC) ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Good Governance (AIPCGG)
• Track 2 0 0
Academic! Think Tank (ASEAN ISIS Network) National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) (?)
• Track 1.5-2.5 0
Individual ASEAN Government! Ministry of Foreign Affair; Department of ASEAN • Senior Official Meeting (SOM), Senior Official Meeting on Social Welfare and Development (SOMSWD), ASEAN Committee on Women • ASEAN secretariat • High Level Panel (HLP) •
State, ASEAN National Secretariats
• Track 1.5
Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism
• Track 3 0 0
Civil Society Organisations (Accredited or unaccredited) SAPA Working Group on ASEAN, SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights
Track 1.5: Parliamentarian ASEAN Inter Parliamentarian Assembly (AIPA) ASEAN Inter Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC) • ASEAN Inter Parliamentary Caucus on Good Governance (AIPCGG) • •
Track 1.5-2.5: WG for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism • Co-Chair: Mr. Marzuki Darusman • Co-Chair: Mr. Vitit Muntabhorn • Secretary General: Mr. Carlos Medina • Cambodia WG: Ms. Kek Kalabru • Indonesia WG: Mr. Marzuki Darusman • Malaysia WG: Dato Param Cumaraswamy • Philippines WG: Senator Wigberto Tanada • Thailand WG: Professor Sriprapha
Phetchamesree
• Singapore Interim Committee:
Mathi
Page 136 of 237
Ms. Braema
Track 2: ASEAN ISIS
Track 2: National Human Rights Institutions
ASEAN Institute on Strategic and International Studies • Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS) • Cambodian Institute for Co-operation and Peace (CICP) • Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) • Laos Institute for Foreign Affairs (IFA) • Malaysian Institute for Strategic and International Studies • Philippines’ Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) • Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) • Thailand’s Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS) • Vietnam’s Institute for International Relations (IIR)
ASEAN Four National Human Rights Institutions • Commission of Human Rights Philippines (CHRP) • Komnas Ham (Indonesia) • Suhakam (Malaysia) • National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) • Cambodia? (coming soon…?)
Track 3: CSOs (i)
Track 3: CSOs (2)
SAPA (Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy) Working Group on ASEAN • SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights • 6o plus NGOs accredited by ASEAN (not relevant to HRs advocacy) •
•
Trade Unions
Mode of Engagement (i)
Mode of Engagement (2)
i. Through general forums: ASEAN People’s Assembly 0 ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) 0
2. Human Rights specific forums: ASEAN ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights (Working Group) 0 Roundtable Discussion on Human Rights in ASEAN (Working Group) 0 Regional Consultation on ASEAN and Human Rights (SAPA TFAHR) 0 ASEAN National Human Rights Institutions Forum (4NIs) 0 0
3. Affiliation: ASEAN accredited NGOs 4. Engaging ASEAN secretariat 5. Engaging respective countries’ Department of ASEAN; or relevant Ministries, High Level Panel, and applicable venues (?) i.e. SOMSWD, ACW 6. Engaging Committee Permanent Representative
Page 137 of 237
i967-2008: 4i years of ASEAN From state-centric to people-oriented (?)
ASEAN Vision 2020 (Dec i997)
i997 - ASEAN Leaders agreed on more outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring society • 2003 — ASEAN Leaders resolved that ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely: ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN SocioCultural Community •
Hanoi Action Plan (i999-2004), December i998 0
0
“Enhance exchange of information in the field of human rights among ASEAN countries in order to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all peoples in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action”.
I
“A
community of Caring Societies”
I“All
people enjoy equitable access to opportunities for total human development regardless of race, religion, language, or social and cultural background”
IEnvisage
“caring ASEAN where hunger, malnutrition, deprivation, and poverty are no longer basic problems”
Implementation of Hanoi Action Plan (i999-2004) • i3 June 2004 - Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women in the ASEAN Region
• 29 November 2004 - ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in
Persons Particularly Women and Children
Work towards the full implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and other international instruments concerning women and children”.
Implementation of the VAP (2004-2010) • i3 Jan 2007 — ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of
the Rights of Migrant Workers
• 29 November 2004 - Vientiane Action Programme (2004-2010) 0
0 0 0 0 0
Complete a stock-take of existing human rights mechanisms and equivalent bodies including sectoral bodies promoting the rights of women and children; Formulate and adoption the MOU to establish a network among existing human rights mechanisms and formulate the work of the network; Promote education and public awareness on human rights; Establish a network of cooperation among existing human rights mechanisms; Elaborate on an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers; and Establish an ASEAN commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children.
Page 138 of 237
ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Human Rights body, CSO involvement
ASEAN Human Rights body
ASEAN Charter, 20 Nov 2007 0
0
0
0
Preamble: Adhere “to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Purpose: “To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedom, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN”. Principle: “Respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice”. Article i4 — “In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body”
•
To materialize this, the ASEAN governments established a High Level Panel (HLP) consisted of representatives from the i0 ASEAN member countries to draft the terms of reference (TOR) of the body in July 2008
• HLP meets every from July 2008 to July 2009
Feb 2009 (i4th ASEAN Summit) the first draft will be submitted to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting • July 2009 (43rd AMM) — The final draft will be submitted and come into force • Dec 2009 — The body will establish along with the commissioners •
ASEAN HLP Members •
•
•
• •
ASEAN HLP Members
BRUNEI - H.E. Dato Paduka Haji Shofry Abdul Ghafor, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and TradeBrunei Darussalam CAMBODIA - H.E. Om Yentieng, Advisor to the Royal Government of Cambodia, President of the Human Rights Committee of Cambodia INDONESIA - Mrs Wiwiek Setyawati Firman, Director for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs LAOS - H.E. Bounkeut Sangsomsak, Vice Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs MALAYSIA - H.E. Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak, Ambassador with Special Functions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
•
• • •
• •
MYANMAR - H.E. U Myat Ko, Secretary of Myanmar Human Rights Group, Director-General, General Administration PHILIPPINES - H.E. Amb Rosario G Manalo, Department of Foreign Affairs SINGAPORE - H.E. Bilahari Kausikan, 2nd Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs THAILAND - H.E. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand to the UN Office and Other IOs in Geneva HLP Alternate: Prof Vitit Muntarbhorn, Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn UniversityThailand VIETNAM - H.E. Pham Quang Vinh, SOM Leader of ASEAN-Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Timeline
CSO Processes
Dec 2009 — Establishment of ASEAN human rights body • Jan 20i0 — The body will be operated • Dec 20i0 — Establishment of ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Women and Children • 20i5 — Formation of ASEAN Communities — ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community •
• May — June 2008 — National consultations in 8
countries on ASEAN and ASEAN human rights body
• July 2008 — Regional Orientation Meeting for
Indigenous Peoples on ASEAN and AHRB
• August 2008 — Regional Consultation on ASEAN and
human rights: compiling all inputs from national consultations to be CSO submission to HLP for the TOR on ASEAN human rights body • September 2008 — Regional consultation on the ASEAN commission on the rights of women and children and AHRB
Page 139 of 237
CSO-HLP Process
Positions
• The Thailand Focal Point of the SAPA TFAHR met the HLP Thailand,
H.E. Sihasak Phuangketkeow in a CSO consultation on i3 August 2008;
•
• • • • • •
Philippine assistant, H.E. Mariylin Alarilla in a CSO consultation on i0 October 2008; The Malaysian Focal Point of the SAPA TFAHR met the HLP Malaysia, H.E. Ahmad Fuzy in a CSO consultation on i6 October 2008; The Indonesian Focal Point of SAPA TFAHR met the HLP Indonesia, H.E. Wiwiek Firman in CSO Consultation on i7 December 2008; The Cambodian Focal Point of SAPA TFAHR meet with H.E. Om Yentieng in December 2008 The Indonesian Focal Point of SAPA TFAHR met the HLP Indonesia, H.E. Wiwiek Firman in CSO Consultation on 5 January 2009 The Malaysian Focal Point of SAPA TFAHR met the HLP Malaysia, H.E. Ahmad Fuzy in CSO Consultation on 6 Feb 2009 The Indonesian Focal Point of SAPA TFAHR met the HLP Indonesia, H.E. Wiwiek Firman in CSO Consultation on i2 February 2009
On AHRB 0 0 0
•
On CSO involvement
• Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia support for CSO participation
Positions •
CSO Process on the ist Draft TOR AHRB
On AHRB versus ACWC 0 0 0 0 0
0
Vietnam — welcome the constructive suggestions (in the beginning) Malaysia — concern on migrant workers issues, suggest that TOR is not too open Brunei — concern for ASEAN commission on women and children Lao and Vietnam are the most difficult block, strong input from MFA and country, very well prepared before the meeting, support mandate on promotion, put few protection in TOR, pushing for ASEAN definition on human rights
0
• The Philippine Focal Point of the SAPA TFAHR met the HLP
•
Indonesia — from one body to two bodies Malaysia, Thailand, & Philippines — two bodies Singapore, Brunei — one body CLM? Working Group, 4 NIs — divided: some support one body, the rest supports two bodies SAPA-TFAHR & Women’s Caucus — support one body, ACWC shall be integrated into the AHRB, Committee on women shall be distinguished with Committee on children
National Workshops Thailand: 3i Jan 2009 in Bangkok, organized by Thailand Focal Point, People’s Empowerment 0 Burma-border: 2 Feb 2009 in Mae Sot, organized by Burma Focal Point, HRIEB and Altsean 0 Malaysia: 4-5 Feb 2009 in Kuala Lumpur, organized by Malaysia’s Focal Point, SUARAM 0 Vietnam: 9 Feb 2009 in Hanoi, organized by Vietnamese Lawyers Association 0 Indonesia: i2 Feb 2009 in Jakarta, organized by Indonesia’s Focal Point, HRWG and Kalyanamitra 0
CSO Process on the ist Draft TOR AHRB Philippines: i3 Feb 2009 in Manila, organized by the Philippines Focal Point, TFDP and PAHRA 0 Cambodia: i6 Feb 2009 in Phnom Penh, organized by Cambodia Focal Points, ADHOC 0
0
2nd Burma-border: April 2009 in Chiang Mai, will be organized by HREIB
0 0
Singapore in March Brunei Darussalam?
0
Timor Leste?
CSO Process on the ist Draft TOR AHRB •
Regional Workshop 0 0
0 0 0
Thematic - Gender: i8-i9 Feb 2009 in Bangkok, organized by Gender Focal Point (APWLD, IWRAW) Thematic — Rights of Disability People: i2-i5 Feb and i6-24 Feb 2009 in Vietnam, organized by Disability People International (DPI-AP) Thematic — Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: 2i Feb 2009 in Bangkok, organized by the IP Focal Point Thematic - Refugee Issues: i3-i4 April 2009, organized by SEARRN Thematic - Child Rights: i-2 May 2009 in Jakarta, organized by Child Rights Focal Point (SEASUCS)
Page 140 of 237
CSO!HLP Process on the ist Draft TOR AHRB Compilation Workshop of national and thematic inputs and comments is planned to be conducted in March i7-i8, 2009 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia • CSO Interface Meeting with HLP in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on March i9, 2009 • Experts Dialogue with CSOs & NIs on the Regional Human Rights Mechanisms, 4-5 May 2009 in Jakarta, organized by the ASEAN People’s Center •
Schedule of HLP Meeting in 2009 i2-i4 Feb in Luang Prabang, Lao PDR U i9-2i March in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia U i — 4 April in Siem Reap, Cambodia U 5 — 8 May in Vietnam U 3 — 6 June in Burma U i3 — i4 July in Bangkok, Thailand — FINALIZATION OF THE SECOND DRAFT OF TOR AHRB U In the i5th ASEAN SUMMIT (Thailand), The Body will be established together with commissioners U
We have only 5 months left to the final draft of the TOR AHRB!
Thank You
Page 141 of 237
Another i0 months left to the establishment of the AHRB!
Asian regionalism: How does it compare to Europe‟s? April 21st, 2009
Among the six Asian leaders (or seven if you include Australia) who attended the London meeting of the Group of Twenty (G20) on April 2 was the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—the first time ASEAN had been accorded this recognition in such a high-profile international forum. It was a telling indication of the increased importance of regional cooperation in Asia. Asia is not yet adopting a common approach to tackling the ongoing global crisis—although neither, to be fair, is the more established European Union (EU). But by helping to form a consensus among their members, Asia‟s regional groupings could help bridge the gap between national policies and global action, enabling them to tackle the global crisis more effectively. This essay compares Asian regionalism with Europe‟s. It contrasts their differing approaches to regional cooperation and integration and draws lessons for how they could address the global crisis and other common challenges. Models of regionalism A common thread runs through the turbulent histories of Asia and Europe: the immense dynamism and impressive discoveries of their great civilizations have often been directed towards destruction and death. Fortunately, their collective energies are now channeled more constructively—not least into closer regional cooperation that entrenches peace and enhances prosperity. Regionalism has progressed much further in Europe than in Asia. The devastation wreaked by two world wars convinced Europeans of the importance of working together to bind their economies and societies together. They realized that by pooling their sovereignty with their neighbors in certain areas they could achieve more than by acting alone. By drafting common rules, promoting close coordination among national authorities, and developing strong regional institutions that advance economic integration, the EU has generated huge economic gains and sharply narrowed the income gap among member countries. EU governments also cooperate closely in foreign and security policy, as well as in justice and home affairs. The milestones in Europe‟s economic integration are the creation of a customs union, followed by a single market, and then a common currency. Very broadly speaking, after adopting a common trade policy, European countries agreed to the free movement of goods, labor and services, then progressively liberalized their capital accounts, and more closely coordinated their monetary and exchange-rate policies before introducing the euro in 1999. Thus the integration of production and trade preceded—and was a precondition for—financial and monetary integration. The EU now has an extensive institutional structure and a large regional bureaucracy centered in Brussels, its administrative capital. The European Commission, Council of Ministers, Court of Justice, Parliament and other EU institutions employ more than 60,000 eurocrats, while EU governments‟ very large permanent delegations in Brussels act as strategically important extensions of national ministries and agencies.
Page 142 of 237
Regionalism in Asia has developed rather differently. Regional integration has been driven more by markets than by governments. Cooperation among national authorities is more recent and less intimate. It remains focused on economic issues (with some social components) and light on formal institutions. For now, it involves no political ambitions, although ASEAN has an advanced security dialogue with several Asian and non-Asian partners. Asia‟s pragmatic and flexible approach to regionalism is partly dictated by history. Asian countries are little inclined to compromise their independence by pooling sovereignty with their neighbors, not least because several Asian nation states have only recently emerged from colonialism and need first to build their national identities. Disparities in economic development, social structures, and political systems are also much greater in Asia than Europe. Asia‟s economic integration has been largely driven by the development of increasingly sophisticated production networks that span the region and enable companies to benefit from each country‟s comparative advantages, through an articulated regional division of labor. As industries have been transferred from advanced economies to developing ones, the production of manufactured goods has been fragmented across the region. This, in turn, has generated a huge expansion of intraregional trade in parts and components. But since Asia‟s exports of final goods mostly go to the United States and Europe, closer regional connections have gone hand in hand with greater global ties. The catalyst for the recent enhancement of regional cooperation in Asia was the 1997/8 financial crisis. This created a greater awareness of the region‟s shared interests and vulnerabilities. In particular, it created a greater need for financial cooperation—prompting the establishment of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers‟ Process and several related structures such as the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative—at an earlier stage of integration than in Europe. The emergence of Asian regionalism also reflects the region‟s disappointment with the way the International Monetary Fund handled the 1997/98 crisis. Asia does not yet have a single market in goods and services, although bilateral and subregional trade agreements have multiplied in recent years. This is in part driven by the stalling of the World Trade Organization‟s Doha Round, but also by the proliferation of preferential trade agreements around the world. Even so, Asia‟s regionalism remains outwardoriented—focused on supporting market relationships rather than supplanting them and on sustaining its openness to global markets. Asia lacks strong regional institutions and a bureaucratic body to serve the region. Unlike in Europe, regional treaties tend to be short and focused on codifying informal interactions among members rather than introducing a complex set of binding rules, and related sanctions. Asia‟s few regional institutions are small and lean, with a limited mandate from national authorities to manage external shocks, internalize regional spillovers, and provide effective regional public goods. Whereas European regionalism is dominated by the EU, Asian regionalism is based on many overlapping subregional organizations that cooperate to varying degrees in different areas and provide a solid backbone to connect markets and people. The criteria for admission to the EU are quite clear—democracy, a market economy, and the transposition into national law of EU laws and regulations (the acquis communautaire). Compliance with these rules can be monitored fairly objectively. Candidate countries must also be approved by a consensus of existing EU member states. In the case of Asian regional
Page 143 of 237
bodies, however, it is difficult to identify an unambiguous set of rules governing membership issues, as they are generally based on ad hoc decisions by political leaders. Important regional players such as the People‟s Republic of China (PRC), India, and Japan have yet to start a concrete dialogue on formulating a vision, shared goals and roadmap for regional cooperation in Asia. But the creation of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005—which brings together the 10 members of ASEAN, plus the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (which together make up ASEAN+3), as well as Australia, India, and New Zealand—could eventually provide a forum for such an impetus. While the EAS has no plans for now to create an „Asian Commission‟ and emerge as the Asian counterpart to the EU, EAS, ASEAN+3 or ASEAN could help Asia to act together and speak with a single voice. Facing the future Europe and Asia both face the huge challenge of articulating a response to the ongoing economic crisis. Although its ultimate impact on regional cooperation and integration is still unclear, it could give a new impetus to Asian regionalism, as the 1997/8 crisis did. In fact, history shows that major steps to enhance regionalism are usually taken as a reaction to shocks—while the Second World War prompted the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting was established in response to the crisis of 1997/98. And while a global crisis requires a global response, closer regional cooperation can be useful to enhance the effectiveness of global action. For instance, European countries need to harmonize their approaches to financial regulation and supervision, while Asian ones should start a dialogue in areas such as exchange rates and fiscal policy that they have neglected up to now. In so doing, both Asian and European regionalism could provide a stepping stone to solving the global crisis. The two regions can also learn from each other. Europe would do well to emulate the flexibility of Asia‟s production structures and labor markets, its emphasis on investment in productivity-enhancing research and development (R&D), and its concept of open regionalism, which minimizes discrimination against non-members. Asia could adopt some of the EU‟s governance principles. These include: (i) deciding some issues by qualified majority voting and others by consensus; (ii) giving additional weight to small countries and minorities in decision-making, so as to make regionalism more inclusive; (iii) the „subsidiarity‟ principle, whereby decisions are taken at the lowest sensible level of government; (iv) the open method of coordination, which allows member countries to agree on initiatives for intergovernmental cooperation without legal constraints; and (v) mutual surveillance through peer review and peer pressure, to ensure that members respect commitments before resorting to sanctions. Asia could also take inspiration from Europe‟s pro-activeness in creating common institutions. Although trying to establish strong regional institutions that involve the pooling of members‟ national sovereignty would be premature, much could be done to enhance Asia‟s institutional capabilities for economic cooperation. As the ongoing crisis is reshaping the global financial architecture, enhancing Asia‟s economic dialogue and cooperation is an important step to shape and raise its profile in global institutions. The EU is often presented as the integration model for other regional groupings, in Asia and elsewhere. But while regions can learn from others‟ experiences, their needs and
Page 144 of 237
circumstances vary. Asia must find its own path to greater cooperation and integration. This requires visionaries, people with great ideas who—as Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann, and Altiero Spinelli did in Europe—can influence opinion makers, inspire national leaders, and eventually enable the region to speak with a more prominent common voice in global forums. Dr Giovanni Capannelli is a Senior Economist with the Asian Development Bank‟s Office of Regional Economic Integration and lecturer on the political economy of Asia-Europe relations at the Ateneo de Manila University. The ideas expressed in this article are exclusively the author‟s and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent.
Page 145 of 237
[UN Report] Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights
Page 146 of 237
Page 147 of 237
Page 148 of 237
Page 149 of 237
Page 150 of 237
Page 151 of 237
Page 152 of 237
Page 153 of 237
Page 154 of 237
Page 155 of 237
Page 156 of 237
Page 157 of 237
Page 158 of 237
Page 159 of 237
Page 160 of 237
Page 161 of 237
Page 162 of 237
Page 163 of 237
Page 164 of 237
Page 165 of 237
Page 166 of 237
Page 167 of 237
Expert Dialogue with Civil Society on Regional Human Rights Mechanisms in Africa, Americas, and Europe Aryaduta Hotel, Jakarta, Indonesia, 4-5 May 2009 Organized by FORUM-ASIA, SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights & OHCHR Information Paper Introduction 1. Rise of various inter-governmental regional systems to promote and protect human rights had begun since the end of the Second World War. These regional systems are now found in Europe, the Americas, and Africa. They are established by regional treaties stipulating key norms (the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights) and the establishment of mechanisms which range from regional human rights commissions to regional human rights courts and/or political bodies which exercise binding decisionmaking powers. 2. The common feature enjoyed by these regional mechanisms is that they help to review the human rights situation and fill the gaps — in the absence of national remedies or where the national mechanisms are inadequate. As a result, they offer access to justice through pressure for accountability where the national system does not provide the necessary redress. 3. This information paper is prepared by FORUM-ASIA and Solidarity for Asian People‟s Advocacy (SAPA) Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights (TFAHR) as one of the supporting materials for the participants attending the Expert Dialogue with Civil Society on Regional Human Rights Mechanisms in Africa, Americas, and Europe in Aryaduta Hotel, Jakarta, Indonesia, 4-5 May 2009. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) History 4. The inter-American human rights system was established with the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in Bogota, Colombia in April of 1948. The American Declaration was the first international human rights instrument of a general nature. Under this, there are two bodies to promote and protect human rights, which are the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). The IACHR was created in 1959 and held its first session in 1960. 5. By 1961, the IACHR had begun to carry out on-site visits to observe the general human rights situation in a country or to investigate specific situations. Since that time, the 1 IACHR has carried out 69 visits to 23 member States. In relation to its visits for the
Page 168 of 237
observation of the general human rights situation of a country, the IACHR has published 44 special country reports to date. 6. In 1965, the IACHR was expressly authorized to examine complaints or petitions regarding specific cases of human rights violations. Up until 1997, the IACHR has received thousands of petitions, which have resulted in 12,000 cases which have been processed or are currently being processed. (The procedure for the processing of individual cases is described below). The final published reports of the IACHR regarding these individual cases may be found in the Annual Reports of the Commission or independently by country. Instruments 7. Six months before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it adopted the Charter of the OAS and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (The American Declaration). The rights set out in the American Declaration are similar in scope to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They encompass political and civil rights (life, liberty, religious freedom, fair trial) and economic and social and cultural rights (leisure time, work and social security). 8.
The main difference with the American Declaration is that it delineates corresponding duties owed by the citizens of the Americas. The general duties imposed upon citizens range widely -- from duties to pay taxes, to the support and protection of minor children, to the duty of civil or military service. Other duties correspond to particular rights. For example, the right to vote requires the duty to exercise that vote; the right to an education, connotes the duty for legal guardians to obtain an elementary education for children.
9. In 1969, the American Convention on Human Rights was adopted. The Convention entered into force in 1978. As of August of 1997, it has been ratified by 25 countries: Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Convention defines the human rights which the ratifying States have agreed to respect and ensure. 10. The Convention also creates the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and defines the functions and procedures of both the Commission and the Court. The IACHR also possesses additional faculties which pre-date and are not derived directly from the Convention, such as the processing of cases involving countries which are still not parties to the Convention. The American Declaration remains important for those states that have not ratified the Convention. Functions of IACHR 11. The functions of the IACHR to include as follow: a. Receives, analyzes and investigates individual petitions which allege human rights violations, pursuant to Articles 44 to 51 of the Convention. 2
Page 169 of 237
b. c.
d.
e.
f. g.
h. i.
Observes the general human rights situation in the member States and publishes special reports regarding the situation in a specific State, when it considers it appropriate. Carries out on-site visits to countries to engage in more in-depth analysis of the general situation and/or to investigate a specific situation. These visits usually result in the preparation of a report regarding the human rights situation observed, which is published and sent to the General Assembly. Stimulates public consciousness regarding human rights in the Americas. To that end, carries out and publishes studies on specific subjects, such as: measures to be taken to ensure greater independence of the judiciary; the activities of irregular armed groups; the human rights situation of minors and women, and; the human rights of indigenous peoples. Organizes and carries out conferences, seminars and meetings with representatives of Governments, academic institutions, non-governmental groups, etc... in order to disseminate information and to increase knowledge regarding issues relating to the inter-American human rights system. Recommends to the member States of the Organization of American States (OAS) the adoption of measures which would contribute to human rights protection. Requests States to adopt specific “precautionary measures“ to avoid serious and irreparable harm to human rights in urgent cases. The Commission may also request that the Court order “provisional measures“ in urgent cases which involve danger to persons, even where a case has not yet been submitted to the Court. Submits cases to the Inter-American Court and appears before the Court in the litigation of cases. Requests advisory opinions from the Inter-American Court regarding questions of interpretation of the American Convention.
Special Functions of IACHR 12. Furthermore, the IACHR has special function to established Special Rapporteur and address the individual appeals. The IACHR has established three specialized mandates to monitor OAS states‟ compliance with inter-American human rights treaties in the following areas: a. OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression b. Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers and their Families c. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women 13. The Commission processes petitions lodged with it pursuant to its Rules of Procedure. Petitions may be filed by states, NGOs or individuals. Unlike most court filings, petitions are confidential documents and are not made public. Petitions must meet three requirements; domestic remedies must have already been tried and failed (exhaustion), petitions must be filed within six months of the last action taken in a domestic system (timeliness), petitions cannot be before another court (duplication of procedure). Inter-American Court on Human Rights 14. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights was established in 1979 to interpret and make decisions on cases arising from the American Convention and other relevant treaties. 3
Page 170 of 237
Cases may be referred by the Commission or a member state, although an individual has no direct access to the court. 15. The court only has jurisdiction over those states that have accepted contentious jurisdiction either on a blanket basis (for any case brought against it) or on a case by case basis. The court has heard cases involving the death penalty, the killing of street children and massacres during armed conflict in Colombia and Guatemala. Decisions of the court are binding. Although appeals are not allowed, parties may ask for interpretation within 90 days of receipt of a decision. 16. The court also issues advisory opinions on the request of the Commission or a state party. In terms of composition, there are seven judges, intended to be of the highest moral authority, who are elected from member states for a six-year, one time renewable term. European Court of Human Rights History 17. The European Court of Human Rights, set up in 1959, is an international court with jurisdiction to rule, through binding judgments, on individual and inter-State applications alleging violations of the European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1998, the Court has operated on a full-time basis. It is made up of 47 judges, one for every State Party to the Convention. The judges, who are totally independent, are elected for six-year terms by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 18. Despite this correspondence, however, there are no nationality requirements for judges (e.g. a Swiss national is elected in respect of Liechtenstein). Judges are assumed to be impartial arbiters, rather than representatives of any country. On account of the considerable increase in the number of applications and the Court‟s excessive workload, the member States of the Council of Europe decided to reform the supervisory machinery introduced by the Convention, as a result, they adopted Protocol No. 14 to the Convention in 2004.1 19. The court is divided into five “Sections“, each of which consists of a geographic and gender-balanced selection of justices. The entire court elects a President and five Section Presidents, two of whom also serve as Vice-Presidents of the court. All terms last for three years. Each section selects a Chamber, which consists of the Section President and a rotating selection of six other justices. The court also maintains a 17-member Grand Chamber, which consists of the President, Vice-Presidents, and Section Presidents, in addition to a rotating selection of justices from one of two balanced groups. The selection of judges alternates between the groups every nine months. Procedure Protocol No. 14, which is intended to guarantee the Court’s long-term effectiveness by optimizing the filtering and processing of applications, envisages, among other measures, the creation of new judicial formations for the simplest cases and a new admissibility criterion (the existence of “significant disadvantage”) and introduces a nine-year non-renewable term of office for judges. It will enter into force once all the State Party to the Convention have ratified it. 1
4
Page 171 of 237
20. In order for an application to be admissible, the applicant must have exhausted the effective remedies available in the country in which the alleged violation was committed. He or she must also lodge the application within six months of the date on which the courts or authorities of that State issued their final decision. Cases which are manifestly ill-founded are declared inadmissible. 21. Where an application is not inadmissible, the Court encourages the parties to reach a friendly settlement. If this proves impossible, the Court rules on the case in a Chamber of seven judges or, in exceptionally important cases, in a Grand Chamber made up of 17 judges. All of the Court‟s final judgments are binding on the States found to have violated the Convention, which are obliged to execute them. 22. Complaints of violations by member states are filed in Strasbourg, and are assigned to a Section. Each complaint is first heard by a committee of three judges, which may unanimously vote to strike any complaint without further examination. Once past committee, the complaint is heard and decided by a full Chamber. Decisions of great importance may be appealed to the Grand Chamber. Any decision of the court is binding on the member states and must be complied with, except if it consists of an advisory opinion. 23. Court processes are also time consuming and costly. The latter concern has been met to some extent with the provision of legal aid to complainants who are unable to afford to pay all or some of the legal costs. The workload of the court has increased greatly with the addition of new member states to the Council of Europe in recent years. There are increasing complaints over the time lag between the laying of a complaint and hearing, due to growing backlogs in the courts. The concern over the timeframes is exacerbated by the delay of several countries in implementing the decisions of the court. These issues highlight the need for adequate resources, the political will to ensure enforcement of decisions and the importance of developing strong national human rights mechanisms to ease the burden on regional mechanisms. 24. Courts are not always the best institutional mechanism for dealing with systemic or cultural forms of discrimination. The types of evidence introduced and rules of procedure may not allow for all the social, economic, and cultural information required for making broad-ranging public policy decisions of considerable importance to one or more States. Courts are also not well equipped to implement preventative measures or to address systemic issues. 25. It is the role of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to supervise the execution of court judgments, though it has no formal means of using force against member countries in order to comply. However, the ultimate sanction of non-compliance is expulsion from the Council of Europe and thus becoming a „pariah„ state within Europe. Furthermore, the European Union takes a keen interest in the Convention and Court (and its jurisprudence) so would not look kindly upon any EU member state that did not fulfill its Convention obligations. European Commissioner on Human Rights 5
Page 172 of 237
26. The European Commissioner on Human Rights was mandated to address educational, promotional and advisory to the 46 members of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe initially adopted both a court and a commission. When the court‟s jurisdiction became binding on all State Parties in 1998, the commission was abolished. The European Court is considered by most human rights advocates to employ the most stringent enforcement mechanism. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) History 27. The African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (ACHPR) is a quasi-judicial body tasked with promoting and protecting human rights and collective (peoples‟) rights throughout the African continent as well as interpreting the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights and considering individual complaints of violations of the Charter. 28. The Commission came into existence with the coming into force, on 21 October 1986, of the African Charter (adopted by the OAU on 27 June 1981). Although its authority rests on its own treaty, the African Charter, the Commission reports to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (formerly the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Its first members were elected by the OAU‟s 23rd Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 1987 and the Commission was formally installed for the first time on 2 November of that year. For the first two years of its existence, the Commission was based at the OAU Secretariat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, but in November 1989 it relocated to Banjul, Gambia. (NB: The ACHPR should be distinguished from the African Union Commission, as the OAU Secretariat has been renamed since the creation of the African Union.) 29. The Commission meets twice a year: usually in March or April and in October or November. One of these meetings is usually in Banjul, where the Commission‟s secretariat is located; the other may be in any African state. 30. The ACHPR is made up of eleven members, elected by secret ballot at the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (subsequently, by the AU‟s Assembly). These members, who serve six-year renewable terms, are “chosen from amongst African personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples‟ rights“ (Charter, Article 31) and, in selecting these personalities, particular consideration is given “to persons having legal experience“. 31. The members are to enjoy full independence in discharging their duties and serve on a personal basis (i.e., not representing their home states); however, no member state may have more than one of its nationals on the Commission at any given time. The members choose, from among their own number, a chairperson and a Vice Chairperson, who each serve two-year renewable terms. Function of ACHPR 6
Page 173 of 237
32. The Commission has three broad areas of responsibility to include — a) Promoting human and peoples‟ rights, b) Protecting human and peoples‟ rights, and c) Interpreting the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights. 33. In pursuit of these goals, the Commission is mandated to “collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in the field of human and peoples, rights, organise seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local institutions concerned with human and peoples‟ rights and, should the case arise, give its views or make recommendations to governments“ (Charter, Art. 45). 34. With the creation of the African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (under a protocol to the Charter which was adopted in 1998 and entered into force in January 2004), the Commission will have the additional task of preparing cases for submission to the Court‟s jurisdiction. In a July 2004 decision, the African Union Assembly resolved that the future Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights would be integrated with the African Court of Justice. 35. The African Commissioners have established thematic rapporteurs who have delivered a variety of important reports on a wide array of issues including The Rights of Women in Africa, Extrajudicial and Arbitrary Executions and Killings in Africa, Human Rights Defenders in Africa and the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. Thematic reports are perceived as less threatening to individual State investigations since they only address single issues involving several, if not all, member states. 36. The individual commissioners are given responsibility for several countries in the region. Individual members visit their respective countries throughout the year to meet with governmental officials, to remind them of their obligations and to meet with NGOs and to undertake other promotional presentations on human rights. 37. The ACHPR also accepts individual and inter-state complaints which it investigates and attempts to mediate a settlement. In the event that the matter is not settled, the African Commission makes recommendations as to how to resolve the matter. The State is required to respond with a plan of action designed to implement the decision within ninety days. If the specific state refuses to comply, the recommendations are reviewed by the Executive Council (comprising the Ministers of Foreign Affairs) who may choose to put political pressure on the recalcitrant State to act. 38. ACHPR has also special function to cover the mandate of Special Mechanisms and Working Group. Mandate holders of these special mechanisms are highly regarded experts in their field who monitor, investigate and report on allegations of violations in member states of the African Union. Currently, the existing special mechanisms in ACHPR are: a. b. c. d.
Extra-judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Freedom of Expression Prisons and Conditions of Detention Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 7
Page 174 of 237
e. Rights of Women 39. The Working Group consists of five groups which monitor and investigate under the following mandates: a. b. c. d. e.
Working Group on Specific Issues related to the work of the African Commission Working Group on Indigenous Populations I Communities in Africa Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Working Group on the Robben Island Guidelines Working Group on the Death Penalty
40. When it was just commenced in 1981, The ACHPR had relatively weak Charter and weaker institutional support. The ACHPR‟s mandate and powers were limited. Moreover, the time allocated to meetings was sporadic and brief. The staff and financial resources allocated to the ACHPR were very limited. However, with the passage of time the African commissioners, by means of liberal interpretations of their role and powers, have been able to cultivate the groundwork for a more serious respect for human rights in Africa, slowly building a culture of human rights in the region. 41. Currently, the ACHPR has been remarkably open to civil society groups playing a major role in the system, both on reporting on the state of human rights in a particular country and on specific thematic reports. Such inclusion of NGOs has had a mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship: it has assisted the ACHPR to remain informed on current issues in the region; it has also raised the profile and legitimated the important work being carried out by NGOs in the region. 42. A major concern has been the lack of compliance by states with the recommendations of the ACHPR which has been rectified to some extent by the fact that the recommendation of the ACHPR is now considered by the Executive Council rather than the African Union Assembly. This has resulted in a more robust accountability system that has been bolstered by the establishment of a court with the power to make binding decisions on the state parties.
8
Page 175 of 237
OHCHR REGIONAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH-EAST ASIA REPORT OF EXPERT DIALOGUE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY AND NHRIS ON REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS IN AFRICA, THE AMERICAS AND EUROPE JAKARTA, 4-5 MAY 2009 I. INTRODUCTION From 4-5 May 2009, OHCHR South-East Asia Regional Office in Bangkok (ROB), the civil society Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights (TFAHR), and the CIDA funded Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation in Human Development (SEARCH) jointly organised a workshop on regional human rights mechanisms in Africa, the Americas and Europe. The participants for the workshop were the thematic and national focal points of the TF-AHR and National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) representatives from the region, with experts on the human rights systems in Africa, the Americas and Europe acting as resource persons throughout the two days. The aim of the workshop was to share experiences of how civil society and NHRIs in the regions of Africa, the Americas and Europe contributed to the establishment and development of credible regional human rights mechanisms. Through the course of sharing these experiences, civil society organisations (CSOs) and NHRIs from SouthEast Asia were able to consider new ideas on how to contribute to the creation of credible and effective ASEAN human rights mechanisms. II. STRUCTURE OF THE MEETING Persons of recognised expertise from the regions of Africa, Europe and the Americas1 gave 45 minute presentations on their respective human rights systems (see III.1 to III.3 below). Each lecture was followed by a 30 minute interactive discussion between the experts and the participants. There was then a presentation on the relationship between national, regional and international human rights mechanisms and inter-regional cooperation (III.4), which was followed by a panel discussion comparing the roles of civil society/NHRIs in Africa, the Americas and Europe in developing credible regional human rights mechanisms (III.5). Day 2 featured a series of workshops in which participants split into three groups to discuss the following topics: “Facing off the return of the ‘Asian values’ thesis” (III.6); “Considering the ‘evolutionary approach’ to the development of human rights norms and standards in ASEAN” (III.7); and “Working with different regional human rights mechanisms to create an effective system” (III.8). The final session of the day featured a Panel discussion entitled, “Thoughts on civil society and NHRIs strategy for the months and years ahead to help develop credible and effective regional human rights mechanisms” (III.9), which brought the two-day meeting to an end.
1
Mr. Constantin Cojocariu for Europe (Interights, UK); Prof. Frans Viljoen for Africa (University of Pretoria, South Africa); Prof. Christina Cerna for the Americas (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, US)
1
Page 176 of 237
III. SUMMARY OF THE MEETING Day One: Following opening remarks by Mr. Arief Patra M. Zein of SAPA’s Executive Committee and by Mr. Daniel Collinge on behalf of the Regional Representative of OHCHR South-East Asia Regional Office, Mr. Homayoun Alizadeh, the three experts gave presentations on their respective regional human rights systems. III.1
The European Human Rights System
Main points from Mr. Constantin Cojocariu’s presentation: • •
• • •
•
• •
• • • •
Of all the regional human rights systems, the European system is the most complex and the most well-established. Regarding the human rights institutions in Europe, the most well established human rights body is the Council of Europe which has adopted approximately 150 treaties, many of which concern human rights. Some of these treaties have been the basis for the establishment of human rights bodies, the most prominent of which are the European Court of Human Rights, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In addition to the Council of Europe, another important body which has addressed human rights is the European Union (EU). The Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), established in 1975, also concerns itself with human rights. Regarding the contributions that National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs) (domestic and international) have made in the development of these institutions, 50 years ago not many such groups and institutions existed. The Council of Europe was established in 1949 in London by ten countries, with its seat in Strasbourg, France. Its aspirations were as follows: i) A desire to end all wars. It was believed that committing to human rights law at the international level would contribute to avoiding wars in the future; ii) To set itself out as an ideological counterpart to Communism, based around the pillars of human rights, democracy and the rule of law; iii) To bound Germany, France and the UK in a common international framework to help avoid armed conflict in the future. Over time, respect for human rights has become part of the common European identity. For most of its history, the Council of Europe has only included Western European democracies. It was only after 1989 and the fall of communism in Europe that it widened considerably to include countries in Eastern Europe. Today it has 47 state parties incorporating approximately 800 million people. After 1989, countries sought to enter the Council of Europe in order to demonstrate their credentials as democratic countries. The conditions for entering are a formal commitment to human rights and the rule of law, the acceptance of the European Convention on Human Rights and acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. The most important statutory bodies in the Council of Europe are the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers. The Committee of Ministers is made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each of the countries of the Council of Europe, which meets on a regular basis. It is the executive arm of the Council of Europe, adopting decisions and issuing resolutions on a variety of human rights issues. The Committee of Ministers also supervises the implementation of the judgements by the European Court of Human Rights and has a role in the implementation of the European Social Charter and the Framework Convention for National Minorities.
2
Page 177 of 237
•
•
•
• •
•
• • • • •
• • • •
The Parliamentary Assembly is formed of parliamentarians from each of the countries of the Council of Europe. It provides a useful forum for discussion of human rights in Europe in general and provides the research and debate necessary before the adoption of treaties by the Council of Europe. It has a series of working groups on issues such as the reform of the European Court of Human Rights (which NGOs have enjoyed good access to). The European Court of Human Rights is the most advanced regional human rights mechanism in the world. The Court was created following the entry into force of the European Convention on Human Rights which is one of the many treaties of the Council of Europe. It was signed in 1950, with the drafting of the Convention taking place in parallel with the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It entered into force in 1953. Presently, the European Convention on Human Rights has been ratified by 47 countries, and is now a precondition to entering into the Council of Europe. It is a civil and political rights charter, although it includes some rights relating to social and economic rights and is inspired by the UDHR. It establishes the European Court of Human Rights, which is the body implementing the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court is competent to receive individual complaints (from any of the 800 million people within the Council of Europe) and hear inter-state complaints. The Court also gives advisory opinions to the Committee of Ministers concerning interpretation of the articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. After the European Convention on Human Rights entered into force, a part time court worked in cooperation with the European Commission on Human Rights. The Commission would examine the case at first instance and issue its judgement and then submit to the Court for its legally binding judgement, with the Committee of Ministers playing a key role in the implementation of these judgements. In 1998, with the entry into force of Protocol 11 to the European Convention, the part time Commission and part time Court were merged and replaced by a permanent European Court of Human Rights. The Court developed as circumstances changed in Europe with the fall of communism and the adoption of the Convention by former communist states. There has been constant pressure for reform, and the Court has changed to a very large extent. The implementation of judgements continues to be entrusted to the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. It is a very effective mechanism and is based on political consensus and peer pressure. Once the Court renders a judgement, it goes for consideration to the Committee of Ministers which meets periodically and examines whether the state party against which the judgement has been rendered has complied with obligations coming from the judgements. Judgements give rise to individual and general measures. Individual measures may include compensation and states generally comply with this. The general measures are more wide ranging measures (e.g. legislative or policy change) which aim at eliminating the underlying systemic causes of the violation, and this is where it is more difficult to get states to comply. Implementation of judgements is linked to one of the biggest problems facing the Court, which is its huge pending case load. If states do not implement the judgements, more complaints will come to the Court. The Committee of Ministers calls on states periodically to implement judgements, and they will not close the files on these judgements until the states can demonstrate convincingly that the judgement has been thoroughly implemented. There have been no sanctions for non-compliance. However, there is the possibility of expelling a state from the Council of Europe, but this has never happened. Historically, states have complied with the Court’s judgements. However, more recently states such as Russia and Ukraine have not been so compliant.
3
Page 178 of 237
• •
•
• • •
• • • •
•
•
The Court is composed of judges equal in number to that of contracting states. The independence and professionalism of the judges is obviously essential for maintaining the quality of the judgements and the credibility of the mechanism. State parties submit a list of 3 judges to the Parliamentary Assembly which attempts to achieve gender balance. Both the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers chooses one judge from the list of three. There has been much controversy surrounding the recent lists submitted by states in Eastern Europe which did not include very good candidates; they did not comply with the conditions of independence and professionalism but have still sometimes been elected to the Court. As a result, there has been much discussion on reforming this process. The Court acts as a Court of Appeal for human rights for the whole of Europe, meaning it has a subsidiary role to that of domestic courts. One has to exhaust domestic remedies before going to the European Court of Human Rights. Domestic courts have the primary role in implementing the rights set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights. Complaints have to comply with the admissibility criteria before the substance is examined. Approximately 95% of applications which reach the Court are declared inadmissible. So, only about 5% reach the merit stage. The European Social Charter is another important treaty adopted within the Council of Europe. It complements the European Convention on Human Rights, as it is concerned with social and economic rights. It entered into force in 1965 and was revised in 1996. The operation of the European Social Charter is quite complicated, with states having different levels of commitment to the Charter; some are bound by the 1965 version and some by the 1996 version. States can also adopt various combinations of the articles in the Charter. The social and economic rights in the Charter include rights concerning employment, social cohesion, health, and protection of children and the family. The implementation of the Charter is based on a reporting mechanism whereby states submit reports for consideration to the Social Charter Committee and the Committee of Ministers on how they comply with their obligations under the Charter. Rights in the Social Charter are non-binding and are subject to progressive implementation. Supervision of implementation of the provisions in the Charter is also not as strict. Recently, the final protocol to the European Social Charter introduced a collective complaints mechanism. Collective complaints may be introduced by international nongovernmental organisations concerning systematic violations of the rights in the Charter (e.g. housing conditions for the Roma minority in Greece). The Social Charter Committee will give a decision on the merits of the complaint. States are formally obliged to comply with the decision of the Committee, although the record of compliance is not very good. The Committee of Ministers is entitled to oversee implementation of decisions on these collective complaints, and it makes recommendations to the states regarding compliance. There are also thematic mechanisms within the Council of Europe. There is the Committee for the Protection against Torture (CPT), which is essentially a preventative mechanism which aims at preventing torture of detainees (covering not only prisons but any persons deprived of their liberty, such as persons in psychiatric hospitals). The CPT will make ad hoc and periodic visits to places of detention in the Council of Europe’s member states. Reports are produced following these visits, which are confidential but which may be made public with the agreement of the state. Other human rights mechanism/instruments within the Council of Europe include the Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities, which sets forth standards for the protection of minorities. The Commissioner for Human Rights is a recently created office which aims at assisting states in implementing human rights standards developed within the Council of Europe. And the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance does country monitoring and publishes reports on the situation of racism and intolerance in different European countries.
4
Page 179 of 237
• •
• • • •
• • •
The European Union is a different institution, overlapping to some extent geographically with the Council of Europe. Although it began as an economic union, human rights have become an issue of discussion within the EU. The European Court of Justice is the judicial court enforcing EU legislation, though it invokes general human rights principles and common constitutional provisions. EU legislation only really touches on human rights incidentally, with the legislation primarily concerned with economic integration and federalism. The Fundamental Rights Agency is an EU monitoring body, established in 2007, that provides fundamental rights assistance and expertise to the 27 EU member states in implementing community law. A Fundamental Rights Charter of the EU will become legally binding once the Lisbon Treaty enters into force. However, the Lisbon Treaty has not yet been ratified by all EU member states. The EU generally works closely with the Council of Europe in matters concerning human rights, and there is talk of the EU joining the European Convention on Human Rights. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a Cold War institution in the sense that at the time of its formation, during the Cold War, there were wide disagreements between the East and the West. The OSCE provided a forum for discussions on the issues of common interest, which included to some extent human rights, though commitments to human rights were not very pronounced before the 1990s. It was a compromise solution, which may be relevant in certain senses to Asia. It has a big geographical ambit, with 57 members, and its standards are non-binding with no convention having been adopted by the OSCE. The OSCE developed detailed and non-binding standards in relation to democracy, the rule of law, national minorities, freedom of expression etc. Although the standards are non-binding, they are useful nevertheless and sometimes reach a greater level of detail than within the Council of Europe.
Questions from the participants: Q: What was the role of civil society organisations in the establishment of the European Human Rights Commission and Court? •
The Court was established about 50 years ago, just after World War II, with the level of development of civil society far behind what it is now. This is in contrast to present day conditions, where NGOs are involved to a large extent in discussions surrounding the reform of the European Court of Human Rights and the development of human rights standards.
Q: Although it is clear that the European mechanisms are some of the best, it is also to a certain extent undermined by its own fame. For example, now the European Court has almost 100,000 backlog cases. I believe that one of the causes of delay is the expansion of the EU, because you have a lot of member countries and, from what I understand, the issue is now to transfer some of the workload to national mechanisms. So I want to learn more about the existing national mechanisms in European countries. •
Yes, the European Court of Human Rights is a victim of its own success and it is clear that if the caseload before the Court continues to increase it may result in the Court closing down altogether. Therefore, there has been lots of debate and discussion around reforming the Court so that it may successfully face this challenge. It is clear that the solution should include more effective remedies at the domestic level, so that complaints do not reach the Court in the first place. This is a matter under discussion and nobody has come up with any solution to the problem. States in Europe have varied records of implementation; in Western Europe there are states that do not have any judgements against them, whereas some states in Eastern Europe have hundreds of judgements and thousands of complaints
5
Page 180 of 237
pending before the Court against them. So there is a problem of commitment and implementation of judgements given by the Court. It is important for states to actively take some of the burden of implementing their obligations under the Convention. Protocol 14, which was seen as the solution to the problems of the European Court of Human Rights, has been adopted by all countries apart from Russia, which refuses to adopt it. Therefore, the reform proposal included in that protocol has been stalled. By this time, the Protocol is already outdated in terms of providing effective solutions to the problems faced by the Court. Q: The European Court of Human Rights is an adjudication body and therefore its findings or conclusions are meant to be legally-binding and enforceable. Could you please tell us a bit more about how this is done regarding the enforcement of the conclusions or the findings of the European Court, and could you please cite certain cases or illustrations where there has been a problem with the enforcement or implementation of any of its findings. •
The Committee of Ministers has the power to supervise implementation of judgements from the European Court of Human Rights. The Committee of Ministers is made up of the foreign ministers from every country in the Council of Europe. It is essentially a political mechanism. States, as a general rule, voluntarily comply with the judgements rendered by the European Court of Human Rights. In an example where implementation has not been efficient, the European Court of Human Rights has rendered numerous judgements condemning Italy for the breach of article 6 concerning the right to a fair trial, specifically in relation to length of proceedings. There is a systemic problem in the Italian judicial system in that the civil proceedings last for a very long time. Although the Court has found against Italy on numerous occasions, Italy has not yet solved the problem. They need to adopt a very profound and effective reform of their civil procedure code to deal with this problem. During the Committee of Ministers meetings, they draw the attention of the Italian Government to resolve the problem and issue recommendations to help. The Italian Government has adopted some reform of the civil procedure code but it has not been effective so far. There is no means whereby the Committee of Ministers can oblige member states to comply with the judgements; it is just a matter of formal agreement around a common set of principles. In so far as a state does not want to comply, there is very little that the Committee of Ministers can do. But generally, states have complied. So the system is based on voluntary compliance to a large extent.
Q: Regarding the NHRIs, is there any particular role they take when there is a problem regarding enforcement of specific decisions or conclusions of the Court? •
In cases, for example, involving violence by the police, one of the possible measures of compliance may be a recommendation for training to be carried out by NHRIs for these forces. They have a role in the effort to bring domestic standards into line with international standards, including the European Convention on Human Rights, and the implementation of these standards. States have the primary role to comply with obligations, and NHRIs can assist with the fulfilment of this role.
Q: How does the European Social Charter protect the rights of migrant workers? •
With regard to migrant workers coming from members states of the EU, there is the principle of free movement of workers within the EU. With regard to non-EU workers, states have a wide margin to decide on policies concerning migrant workers but, in principle, discrimination against migrant workers is prohibited. It does not matter if you are, for instance, a worker from the Philippines coming to work in the UK; you can sue the British state before the European Court of Human Rights and they can hand down a judgement.
6
Page 181 of 237
Q: Regarding the European Social Charter, does it deal with non-state actors (e.g. private companies) and, if so, how? •
Under the European Court of Human Rights, states have developed a notion of positive obligations which apply to relations between individuals. This means that states have to react and put an end to a breach of a right by a private person or private company. However, under the European Social Charter there has been no case under the collective complaint mechanism concerning the duties of non-state actors.
Q: You said that 95% of complaints are not admitted by the European Court. What are the admissibility criteria they have to comply with? •
Regarding the admissibility criteria of the Court, the complaint has to be submitted within six months after exhaustion of domestic remedies; it has to be submitted by the victim of the violation; and it has to be directed against a state party to the Convention. Because of its heavy caseload, the Court interprets these criteria quite strictly which is why 95% of the complaints are rejected.
Q: Is it required that the complainants are also citizens of the European Union or can, for instance, Filipinos in the Philippines file a case before the court? Furthermore, is it possible that violations by European countries in the Philippines can be admitted as cases before the European Court? •
In relation to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, the complainants have to come within the jurisdiction of a state party to the Convention, which means that you do not have to be a national of that state to file a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights. So, if one of your rights has been breached while you have been under the physical jurisdiction of one of the state parties, you can file a complaint to the Court. At the same time, the Convention also has effect outside of Europe; for example, when armed forces of one of the state parties to the European Convention occupy an area outside of the Council of Europe, and breaches of human rights occur, those people are entitled to file a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights.
Q: Regarding the absence of sanctions following non-compliance by the European Court for Human Rights, how then can the Council of Europe ensure that human rights victims gain justice? •
The only sanction available to the Committee of Ministers is the removal a state from the Council of Europe, but it has not been applied yet. There is a lot of talk about possibly doing this with Russia now, with Russia also threatening to pull out of the European Convention system. But generally, in Europe the system works effectively through peer pressure, pressure from civil society and a genuine commitment to human rights.
Q: I am very interested that at the start of the Council of Europe there was also a challenge in terms of the question of sovereignty. In relation to ASEAN there has always been this issue of sovereignty and non-interference. With the development of the Council of Europe and human rights standards in the region, how did they go about this issue? •
In 1953, when the European Convention on Human Rights was adopted, in the run up to the adoption of the Convention there was wide disagreement in relation to the existence of an individual complaints mechanism. For a very long time, the mechanism of individual complaints was optional. States such as the UK and France expressed very serious concerns in relation to what they saw as surrendering parts of their sovereignty to a body of international judges in Strasbourg coming from very different jurisdictions and with different systems of law. Even after the UK adopted the individual complaints mechanism, throughout the 1970s they threatened periodically to withdraw from the 7
Page 182 of 237
complaints system. France only accepted the individual complaints mechanism in 1991. Only relatively recently did the individual complaints become a more significant feature of the Convention system, with states now automatically having to accept the right to individual petitions upon ratification of the Convention. But it was a process, with states only gradually coming to accept this mechanism. Q: Regarding admissibility requirements, would you say that the 95% rejections in terms of admissibility are all correct or should the European Court be more lenient? My concern is that, with a large number of dismissals, this would really have an impact in terms of defeating the purpose of providing a last remedy for human rights violations. I have similar concerns with the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. •
The European Court of Human Rights faces specific problems and is really one of a kind. I would not compare it to UN bodies or other courts. Interights cannot adopt a line suggesting that the admissibility criteria should not be implemented so strictly given the caseload that the European Court is facing and the danger that the Court might collapse under the weight of this caseload. Yes, admissibility is seen to some extent as a tool for releasing some of that pressure. But there is a limit here; the individual complaint should not be compromised by too serious an approach to the admissibility criteria and there is a fine line to be tread.
Q: You mention that voluntary compliance by the state parties is very high; but if you look at governments around the world, we find that this is very unusual. What then motivates the European countries to comply with the judgements? •
III.2
The system is based on voluntary compliance as a general rule. Countries in Eastern Europe, former communist countries, have joined the European Union. Compliance with human rights principles and compliance with the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights has been one of the criteria for joining the European Union. They therefore have an interest in showing that their record on human rights protection is a positive one. It is also a process of peer pressure to adhere to a set of commonly agreed principles. However, it is not just Eastern European countries that have problems with implementation; well established countries such as Italy also do. Peer pressure form NGOs, civil society, the Committee of Ministers and from other governments is important in the various mechanisms that exist at the European level, and is often effective. The Inter-American Human Rights System
Main points from Prof Christina Cerna’s presentation: • • •
•
International concern with human rights begins with the UN’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The inter-American system is the oldest regional organization of its kind in the world. It has been in existence since 1890 and was known earlier as the Pan American Union. The Organization of American States (OAS) was created at an inter-American Conference in Bogota, Colombia, in May 1948, following the creation of the UN. For 58 years, comparable to the 40 years of the existence of ASEAN, the inter-American system had no constituent document. At this 1948 meeting, the 21 states of the inter-American system adopted not only a Charter but also the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The UDHR was adopted 7 months later, on December 10, 1948. Article 18 of the OAS Charter enshrines the principle of non-intervention. In 1823, US President Monroe enunciated what is known as the “Monroe doctrine”, declaring the Western Hemisphere (except Canada) its area of influence, and it warned European powers not to encroach upon it. Simon Bolivar’s response was to convene the Congress of Panama, held in June-July 1826 to which the US was not invited. Bolivar wanted a 8
Page 183 of 237
•
•
•
• •
• •
•
•
•
• •
Spanish-American league with Great Britain, as its protector, against the other European powers and the United States. It was the United States, however, that helped to make Bolivar’s idea of regional integration and cooperation a reality in 1889-1890, as the First International Conference of American States was held in Washington DC. Bolivar is still revered in much of Latin America. The original 21 OAS member states did not include Canada (which did not join the OAS until 1990) nor the island states of the Caribbean since they did not become independent until the 1960s. Today, approximately one third of the OAS membership is Englishspeaking. It has been suggested that since, at its founding, the inter-American system was comprised of one very powerful and 20 comparatively weak nations that it should be compared to the Soviet Union’s relations with the countries of Eastern Europe rather than to a union of more or less equal states, such as the Council of Europe or the African Union. The OAS today includes every independent nation of the Americas and represents approximately 900 million people in 35 countries. The European system, in comparison, does not include all independent states (Belarus is excluded). It is a contradiction of the inter-American system that the military dictatorships that dominated the region from the 1960s through the 1980s were not considered to have violated the principles of the OAS Charter and were not excluded from participation as was Cuba in 1962. The official languages of the Organization are four, but most of the work is conducted in Spanish and English. Unlike the European human rights system, which was created by the entry into force of a treaty (the European Convention on Human Rights), the Inter-American Commission was created by a political resolution in 1959, in part as the inter-American system’s response to the Cuban revolution which threatened to ignite revolutions across the hemisphere. The Inter-American Commission met for the first time in October 1960. Its work consisted of exchanging information with governments and making proposals for measures of cooperation. The Commission immediately began to receive complaints alleging violations of human rights but it was not authorized by the OAS political bodies to take individual decisions on these complaints. The scope of the Commission’s activity was restricted, of course, by the principle of non-intervention. Closely related to the issue of the respect for human rights was that of promoting democracy. The 1959 Meeting of Foreign Ministers (our equivalent of the Security Council) that mandated the creation of the Commission also affirmed that “the existence of anti-democratic regimes constitutes a violation of the principles on which the OAS is founded, and a danger to united and peaceful relationships in the hemisphere.” The 1959 “Declaration of Santiago, Chile” set forth for the first time some of the attributes of democracy such as rule of law, free elections and not perpetuating oneself in power. In 1991, the OAS General Assembly, symbolically, was again held in Santiago, Chile, and celebrated the fact that for the first time all the governments in the hemisphere, except for Cuba, were the result of free elections. They adopted Resolution 1080 by which the OAS Foreign Ministers resolved to meet should the democratic process be interrupted in any OAS member state. On September 11, 2001, Resolution 1080 was converted into the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which in Article 1 affirms that the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy. In 1966, the UN adopted the two Covenants to give binding legal force to the rights set forth in the UDHR. In 1969, the OAS member states adopted the American Convention on Human Rights, a treaty that set forth civil and political rights that was supplemented, in 1988, by the Protocol of San Salvador, which set forth economic, social and cultural rights. Experts from the European system attended the 1969 Conference and the inter-American system is modelled on the European system.
9
Page 184 of 237
• • • • • •
• •
• •
•
•
•
The UN Covenants took until 1976 to enter into force and similarly the American Convention took until 1978 to enter into force. The Protocol of San Salvador entered into force in 1999. During the first two decades of the Inter-American Commission’s existence (19591979), when the hemisphere was still dominated by dictatorships (and before the American Convention was adopted), the Commission’s work focused on carrying out on-site visits. The entry into force of the American Convention in 1978 initiated the second stage (19792001) in the evolution of the inter-American system’s protection of human rights, which is characterized by the processing of individual complaints. A number of states have not yet ratified the American Convention, and are subject to the Commission’s application of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man which the Commission interprets as legally binding on those states. The Convention’s member states now include all Latin American states, and 21 of those states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the inter-American Court. The American Convention created the Inter-American Court, which exercises contentious jurisdiction over cases that have been brought first to the Commission for decision and then may be presented to the Court by either a state party to the Convention, or by the Commission itself, for binding legal adjudication. The Court is empowered to declare that a member state has violated an individual’s human rights in a binding legal judgment that provides for reparations for the violation. The Court also has the competence to issue advisory opinions. In addition, the Court is empowered to issue provisional measures, a kind of injunction, to protect the individual from irreparable harm until it has time to issue a judgment on the case. The Commission applies the American Convention to the 24 member states that have become parties thereto, and it applies the Declaration to the 11 states that have not yet ratified the American Convention. The Commission is composed of 7 members (Commissioners), who are proposed by their governments but elected by the OAS General Assembly and serve in their individual capacity for a term of office of four years. They may be re-elected only once. The President and the two Vice-Presidents of the Commission are elected by the Commission during the first session of the year and serve for that year. The Commissioners are not salaried but they receive an honorarium and their travel and expenses for their work for the Commission are paid. The functions of the Commission also include presenting an Annual Report to the OAS General Assembly every year on its work. The most important functions of the Commission are the processing of individual cases and litigating these cases before the Inter-American Court. In 2001, we entered the third stage (2001- present) of the Commission’s evolution, when it was decided that the Commission would submit to the Court all cases in which the state has not complied with the Commission’s recommendations. The Commission holds two regular periods of sessions per year and special sessions as needed (unlike the European Court of Human Rights, it is not a permanent body). Regular sessions are held at the Commission’s Headquarters in Washington DC or at a different location with the consent, or at the invitation of, a member state. During its regular sessions the Commission holds hearings both on individual cases and on issues (thematic hearings) of interest to victims of violations and to NGOs. The Commission holds approximately 100 hearings a year, and another approximately 70 closed working meetings during the session. Many of the hearings can now be viewed live or on tape on the internet. As mentioned, the first stage (1959-1979) of the Commission’s history was characterized by on-site visits. The Commission would carry out an on-site visit to examine the situation of human rights in a certain country for one or two weeks which would be followed by the production of a report on that visit. The visit would only take place at the invitation of the member state and with a great deal of publicity.
10
Page 185 of 237
•
• • •
•
•
•
•
• •
•
The Commissioners, during the on-site visit, meet with many representative sectors of society (e.g. the government, judges, the press, union leaders, prisoners, human rights groups, etc.) in order to collect as much information as possible on the situation of human rights in the country. These large, comprehensive visits have been mostly replaced by smaller on-site visits involving one or two Commission members to study a specific problem, e.g. access to justice in Bolivia. Last year however, the Commission carried out one general on-site visit, to Jamaica. Following the on-site visit, the Commission publishes a report on the visit, or it may report on the visit in its Annual Report to the General Assembly or to a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Commission has conducted approximately 100 on-site visits in its history, the greatest number having been to Haiti. With the entry-into-force of the American Convention and the creation of the Court, individual petitions replaced on-site visits as the most important activity of the human rights system. Since 1965, when the political bodies granted the Commission the power to examine and decide individual complaints, the Commission has processed over 12,000 petitions. It is important to recall in this context that the work of the inter-American system is subsidiary to the national system and the most important requisite for the admissibility of petitions is the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Commission receives between 900 and 1,500 petitions per year. Of that number, only about 150 petitions are opened and communicated to the state per year. The Commission rejects at least 90% of all petitions received for failure to comply with the requisites for admissibility. There are of course exceptions to these admissibility requirements. If the domestic law does not afford due process for the protection of the right(s) that have been allegedly violated, then domestic remedies need not be exhausted; if the party has been denied access to remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or if there has been an unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the domestic remedies. The Inter-American Court has its seat in San Jose, Costa Rica and has seven judges. The judges are not elected by all the member states of the OAS but only by the states parties to the American Convention. They are elected for a term of six years and may be re-elected only once. The Court has issued 195 judgments to date, a modest number when compared to the approximately 1,500 judgments issued annually by the European Court of Human Rights, but a substantial number when compared to the African Human Rights Court which has yet to issue its first judgment. The human rights protected by the inter-American system are primarily civil and political rights. Whereas in the past, the issues that dominated in the inter-American system involved situations with massive numbers of forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and torture, today we are dealing with issues that have more to do with due process of law. I call this the Europeanization of the inter-American system whereas Europe, with its expanded membership now including Russia and countries of Eastern Europe, is confronting the kinds of issues that the inter-American system traditionally dealt with; I call that the Latin Americanization of the European system. In the late 1990s the Commission began to create rapporteurships to give special attention to certain issues and groups of concern such as freedom of expression, prison conditions, children, women, migrant workers, afro-descendants, internally displaced, economic, social and cultural rights and citizen security. These rapporteurships are each headed by a member of the Commission, except for freedom of expression (which is headed by a staff member), and are financed by donations from observer governments or from private foundations. These rapporteurships permit the Commission to promote reforms in areas of concern in the hemisphere and to organize seminars and conferences throughout the region. These promotional funds (US$5.1 million) today (2009) comprise
11
Page 186 of 237
more than the Commission’s regular budget (US$ 3.6 million), and facilitate a balance between the promotion and protection functions of the Commission. Questions from the participants: Q: You mentioned the issues of the dictatorships in the region. How do human rights mechanisms address the political reality in the region, because we have quite similar issues in ASEAN? •
The way dictatorships were dealt with in the inter-American system differs over time. During the time that dictatorships existed in the region, they were treated as any other government. Today, because of the important landmark resolution in 1991 stating that all governments in the region are now the result of free elections followed by the adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the inter-American system now talks about the dictatorships that existed in countries A, B or C, and even those countries talk about their previous governments as being dictatorships, which is literally a sea change from the way that they were dealt with and the respect they were granted while in power. Today, it is basically through cases involving amnesty laws that the inter-American system deals with the issues that came up during these dictatorships. The most important decisions of the Inter-American Commission deal with the declaring of the incompatibility of amnesty laws in 1992 in Argentina and Uruguay. These were Commission decisions and the states did absolutely nothing to implement them. They were not enforced and there was the question as to whether the Commission’s decisions were actually legally binding. The Court noted in a judgement that the decisions of the Commission are purely recommendatory in nature (with only the Inter-American Court granted the competence under the American Convention to issue legally binding decisions). However, the Commission is not totally in accord with this viewpoint and argues that while a Commission decision may be soft law, it is still law. It was not until 2001, with a judgement in the Barrios Altos case (concerning a neighbourhood in Peru), that the Inter-American Court at the request of the Commission declared amnesty laws incompatible with a state’s obligations under the American Convention. Peru had a transitional government (Fujimori had fled to Japan) at the time the case was being argued before the Court and the new representatives of the Paniagua Government were supportive of the decision and sought ways to have it implemented. A few years later, the Commission took the case of the Chilean amnesty law to the Court. However, the situation was very different because the Chilean Government was not ready to give up its amnesty law. The Chilean Government today states that it does not apply the amnesty law, but it is still on the books and could be invoked at any time. It is also through the “guarantee” of democracy in the Inter-American Democratic Charter that the past is addressed and a preventive measure against future dictatorships is established.
• •
•
•
Q: I am interested to know the involvement of civil society in the beginning of the inter-American human rights system up until now, including in the process of implementing recommendations. •
• •
Although I do not know the role of civil society from the beginning, their increasing role in the work of the inter-American system has been phenomenal. I believe, as in any regional or international mechanism, it is civil society that drives the mechanism forward, pushing for the creation of new mechanisms and treaties and constantly seeking ways to improve effectiveness. The NGOs in the inter-American region are very well organised and are very effective and active. I would say that perhaps in Peru more than any other country there are more NGOs that work in human rights, which probably explains why we have more petitions from Peru than any other country in the region. NGOs are actively involved in vetting candidates for the Commission and judges for the Court; they promote candidates and criticise some candidates who are nominated by governments for not being recognised experts in human rights. 12
Page 187 of 237
•
•
NGOs also take an active role in the amendment of rules of procedure for bodies such as the Commission. Presently, the inter-American system has a process by which any amendments are presented to the states and to civil society for their comment. Members of civil society are present at relevant meetings and are given the floor to present their positions. So, civil society today is a very active player and clearly the main user of the system. Following amendments to the Inter-American Court’s rules of procedure, NGOs are now permitted to have autonomous standing before the Court. It is still the Commission or the state party that must present the case to the Court but, once the case is presented, the NGO that is defending the victim has an independent role to play in presenting its own pleadings, evidence, witnesses and request for reparations. So there are now 3 actors in our system in any court case; there is the state party, the Commission and the NGO, together with the victim, and that has significantly raised the profile of civil society in these suits. Also, NGOs that are not connected to the victim but have an interest in the case may bring Amicus briefs to present their points of view before the Court.
Q: You mention that under the Convention there exists the principle of non-interference, but on the other hand the Court is authorised to issue legally binding decisions. How is the principle of non-interference reconciled with this authority to issue legally binding decisions? On the part of ASEAN, it has been impressed on us time and again that non-interference would be nonnegotiable in the TOR of this body. •
•
•
I think it is best to quote a Mexican diplomat who stated that it is in the exercise of our sovereignty that we have become a state party to this convention and that we accept the decisions of the inter-American Court. There is no contradiction between accepting, by the political will of a state, the decisions of an international body and the principle of non-intervention. Since the reforms of 2001, we now send every case in which a state does not comply with our recommendations to the Inter-American Court. This was designed to strengthen the legal nature of the Commission’s decisions. What we have seen in practice is that, curiously, the states do not comply with the Commission’s decisions and the case still goes to the Court. But then on the first day of the hearing before the Court, initially in 25% of the cases the Court would either totally or partially accept state responsibility for the violations alleged before the Commission even litigated anything. That number has now gone up to 40%. So there is either an expression that the state is not interested in litigating, or that the state prefers to dispose of the case at the beginning of the litigation rather than carry out the litigation before the Court. The Commission, under the Convention, has a three month window from the adoption of the merits decision within which the state must comply with the recommendations in that decision. States are now requesting an extension of time to comply. For example, the Commission’s merits decisions are rather formulaic in that they contain two main elements: i) The state must investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for the violation, and ii) The state must make reparations, both material and moral, for the victims of those violations. As part of the moral reparations they must make guarantees of non-repetition. So states are saying in order to deal with these underlying defects, for example to change a law, they cannot do this in 3 months. Subsequently, the Commission is granting extensions of up to a year and requesting the state to present interim reports every two or four months on the acts that they take to comply with these recommendations. Therefore, compliance is being shifted to the Commission level before the case is brought before the Court for litigation.
Q: Both Europe and the Americas have been able to adopt Conventions on human rights, and it is their respective Commissions or Courts that are tasked to interpret any issues arising from the implementation of the rights declared under these conventions. We do not have an ASEAN
13
Page 188 of 237
Convention on human rights; is it safe to assume that the adoption of such a convention would be an essential or desirable pre-requisite? •
With regard to the interpretation of the American Convention, our Court has the competence both to decide contentious cases and to issue advisory opinions on what the Convention means. I think it is essential that the ASEAN system has a human rights instrument to define what it means by human rights. I am surprised not to have seen any drafts floating around, especially because in the 1980s and 1990s, including in the Vienna Conference, the whole “Asian values” debate was taking place. What are these different Asian values and where are the instruments which set these forth?
Q: In the European system, they chose to combine the Commission and the Court. But in the inter-American system, you still maintain the Commission and the Court separately. What is your view of the pros and cons of merging into one or maintaining two? •
I think one of the main reasons why the European Commission and Court were merged in 1998 is because they have so many members. They had 46 members of the Commission and another 46 judges on the Court and that is a lot of people to have on board. Personally, I think that number is unworkable both in terms of expense and in terms of reaching a consensus.
Q: Can you explain a little more the process of selecting and electing the 7 members of the Commission? •
•
•
How and what kind of individuals get selected and elected is an extremely important question. In our Statute, we have a provision that deals with incompatibility where the members of the Commission must determine whether the functions or acts of any member are incompatible with his or her service on the Commission. It is one of the most important provisions in the Statute and has been repeatedly invoked, because as much as the system will protest that it is not a political system, it cannot escape politics. Only states can nominate candidates, and it is all the states from the General Assembly that elect the members of the Commission. Regarding the Court, it is only the states parties to the American Convention that can nominate and elect judges to the Court. In the past, the Commission had very different members; retired statesmen, former presidents, former foreign ministers, and active ambassadors all featured. These functions were progressively questioned as being incompatible with the member’s service on the Commission. Today, the non-written working rule is that if an individual takes instructions from his/her government, that is considered to be an incompatible function. So if he/she is a governmental functionary, this is considered to be a position that is incompatible and he/she must resign from that position for the period of service on the Commission. In recent years, members of the Commission and Court have been individuals with a recognised competence in the field of human rights, and have come more from academia (e.g. professors of international law or human rights law). Currently, there is a female (Venezuelan) President of the Commission, and a female (Chilean) President of the Inter-American Court. I am not 100% sure that this is better; there is a certain prestige in having a former president or a former foreign minister on the Commission. It is something that you have to try and see. Clearly civil society has a very important role to play in vetting the qualifications of the nominees. But it is, in the last analysis, up to the members of the Commission to determine whether they consider an incompatibility regarding a member exists and, if it does, then they send the issue to the General Assembly. The Commission has had a number of discussions about the incompatibility of members but it has never gone to the General Assembly.
Q: Does the inter-American region have its own set of region-specific values? And how do you utilise these values? 14
Page 189 of 237
•
•
You would have to derive them from principles such as non-intervention, which is as important and fundamental a principle in the inter-American system as it clearly is in the ASEAN system. I think it is also very much interpreted as a non-intervention message to the US not to intervene in the affairs of Latin American states, because there is long history of US intervention in Latin American affairs. There is also Article 4, which is our “right to life” provision of the American Convention, which protects “the right to life, in general, from the moment of conception.” At face value, this looks as though abortion is prohibited. In fact, the Commission issued a decision in the early 1980s in a case presented against the US, which held that the words “in general” meant that states that permitted abortion did not have to change their laws. Instead, it was up to the states to determine this issue at the domestic level. One assumes that there are certain values in the sense that the region is one of the most Christian regions of the world; Catholicism is very important in many member states. In some constitutions there used to be a provision that a president had to be Catholic. Those provisions have been changed in recent years. In the sense of Asian values, the argument in the 1993 Vienna Conference was that Asian values were somehow different from the international standard; the inter-American system has never made that argument.
Q: The new UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) has already entered into force with many inter-American countries having already ratified it. I would like to know whether the Commission has future plans to implement the CRPD. •
The inter-American system has its own Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, which entered into force in 2001. This convention is the newest human rights convention in the inter-American system and, in 2006, a working group was established which prepared a “Program of Action for the Decade of the Americas for the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities” (20062016).
Q: Regarding your argument that the American system started off as more of a political body; we also see ASEAN as a political body. It is concerned with cooperation among states, consensual in nature and focused on the protection of the sovereignty of every state and the recognition of Asian values. The ASEAN human rights body (AHRB) is the body that will be tasked with drafting the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights. So that is a difference; it does not start with a common understanding on human rights standards because it is the AHRB which is going to be developing it, and the AHRB will be a creation of ASEAN based on the ASEAN Charter, which civil society is fearful of. In relation to your comment about being a political body, how did the inter-American Commission develop and how can we learn some lessons there in relation to confronting ASEAN and its development of the human rights mechanism? •
The Inter-American Commission was created in 1959, I argue, in response to the Cuban revolution which took place on 1 January 1959. There was a threat at the time that the leaders of the Cuban revolution wanted to spread revolutions throughout the Americas and, in response, the inter-American system created the Inter-American Commission to deal with human rights issues and the Inter-American Development Bank to deal with economic and social questions. My point was that it was in reaction to a political event that the Commission was created and, unlike the European system which was created as a result of the adoption of a legally binding convention (the European Convention on Human Rights), our system was not created by a convention. So it could have been abolished at any point; states could have decided that they did not really need a human rights commission any more and do away with it. Also, the inter-American system was not created with an instrument. It was created to do as little as possible; only to make very general recommendations to states.
15
Page 190 of 237
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
However, from the very beginning the Commission received complaints of human rights violations because once you create a human rights body you are going to get complaints. That is the nature of the animal; if it is out there people will send it complaints and say “my human rights are being violated”. So the question was what could the Commission do with these complaints, and the political bodies basically said “not much”. The political bodies concluded that the Commission could not examine or decide on individual complaints or do fact finding but instead could only make general recommendations and study the human rights situation in the region. That did not change until 1965, again as a result of a political event which was a civil war in the Dominican Republic. The Commission played a humanitarian role at this time, assisting in the exchange of political prisoners. Because of its successful activity in the Dominican Republic, the political body rewarded the Commission with the competence to decide individual complaints. That was the beginning of the opening of individual complaints. But, as I said, this was not effective because many of the countries in the region were dictatorships and the individual complaints system really does not work under a dictatorship because it is subsidiary. You have to be able to exhaust your domestic remedies, and in order to exhaust your domestic remedies you have to have a functioning judiciary, and you have to have a state that responds to your requests for information. For years the Commission had states that did not respond to its requests for information about cases, so the Commission invented a presumption that the facts were true as alleged if there was no information provided by the state to contradict those facts. And so the Commission would decide, one after another, cases on this presumption which really does not produce good law. So it took a long time for this individual complaints procedure to become relevant. In the absence of such a procedure in these first two decades, the work of the Commission centred on the carrying out of on-site visits. The Commission was able to do that, not because it had the specific competence to carry out fact-finding or monitoring throughout the region but because its statute said that the Commission could hold its sessions in any state in the region, and by its own initiative it started translating that competence into a competence to carry out fact-finding missions. These missions gradually became more and more elaborate and came to involve the setting up of an office in-country for the mission. The most famous mission was the one to Argentina in 1979 while Argentina was still under military dictatorship. The Commission went in with a lot of fanfare; it held a press conference when it arrived in the country and said it was there to carry out a human rights mission to find out what the complaints of the people in the country were. The most important thing was the setting up of an office in a centrally located hotel and inviting people to come and present their complaints. The Commission had lines 20 blocks long of people waiting to present their complaints and it went away with 5,000 individual pieces of paper of names and complaints. These people waiting in line, with their desire to present these complaints to the Commission, had a huge impact in the country The information contained in the 5,000 petitions was used to build a report. The Commission prepared a report on the human rights situation in Argentina in 1980 which was about 300 pages, most of which was derived from those complaints which described the pattern of how persons were detained, and then taken off to secret detention centres and then extra-judicially executed. Argentina threatened to withdraw from the Organisation if it were condemned by the OAS General Assembly when that report was presented. Argentina argued that the report should omit the name of Argentina when it was presented to the General Assembly and that only the number for the report would be used, and they won on that point. Argentina also insisted that the names of any government official or government agent be taken out of the report, because to leave the names in deprived the individual of his/her due process; so all the names were taken out as well. But it remains today one of the most important reports produced by the inter-American system. So there are strategies other
16
Page 191 of 237
than individual complaints if you find that the complaints system is not yet right for the ASEAN mechanism. Q: With Cuba being excluded from the OAS, what are the power dynamics between countries such as the US, Canada and the Latin American countries? How do these dynamics influence the functioning of both the Court and the Commission? •
•
•
• •
•
•
Cuba was not excluded from the organisation because there is no provision in the OAS Charter to expel any member state. The legal fiction that was invented in 1962 was that because Fidel Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist Communist that this was considered incompatible with the purposes and principles of representative democracy and free elections contained in the OAS Charter. So the government of Fidel Castro was suspended from participating in the activities of the OAS, but Cuba to this day is still considered a member state of the OAS. The issue of Cuba was a very controversial issue for the organisation until about 1994. The Commission had prepared more reports on Cuba than any other state even though it was not permitted to visit Cuba and because Cuba was not allowed to defend itself in the political organs of the organisation. By 1994 the organisation was so divided on the issue of Cuba that it was incapable of taking any decision. So the Commissioners stopped doing special reports on Cuba, though it continues to include it in its Annual Report. It does so because under its general mandate, one of the functions is to raise the awareness of human rights in the Americas. Cuba continues to be a live issue, as seen during last month’s summit in Trinidad and Tobago, the first Summit to be held in the Caribbean. Just prior to the Summit, the President of Venezuela held a pre-Summit with certain like-minded states to unify their position at the OAS Summit. At that pre-Summit meeting, Evo Morales, the President of Bolivia, declared that he was a Marxist-Leninist Communist and challenged the OAS to expel him from the organisation. To this point nothing has happened on that declaration, but the issue of the reintegration of Cuba is both an expressed wish of the current Secretary-General of the OAS and a number of the member states of the region, who very much want to see Cuba reintegrated into the OAS. Cuba, for its part, has stated that the OAS is the Ministry of Colonies and that it has no interest or desire to be reintegrated, but a lot of this is political posturing. I think Cuba will certainly be an issue at the next General Assembly which will be held in June. With regard to the role of the US and Canada, there are some scholars who think that the OAS should be looked at in the same way that the Soviet Union and its satellites were looked at, rather than an organisation of equals, because we have one Superpower and a number of states that are clearly much less influential. Until this current administration (it is still not clear which direction it will head) the US has very much been an outlier. It participates in the system in the sense of providing money; for instance, it created the funds for the creation of the rapporteur on freedom of expression. It consistently states how much it supports the inter-American system and the Inter-American Commission. When it comes to cases it responds, it sends officials to defend against cases at hearings and at working groups during the session, but when a decision or a precautionary measure is issued, as was the case with the Guantanamo detainees (the Commission issued precautionary measures as early as March 2002; the detainees were brought there in January 2002), the US does not comply with these measures. The US argued that international human rights law does not apply in this situation; only international humanitarian law applies, and the US has never consented to letting the Commission apply international humanitarian law. So the US created a legal black hole for these detainees and ignored the precautionary measures issued by the Commission. Canada is a much lower level player. Its Senate has indicated to us that it is interested in ratifying the American Convention but very little movement has been made and we expect that this conservative government would be unlikely to do so at the current time.
17
Page 192 of 237
•
III.3
Unfortunately, the English speaking countries are very much marginalised in this system and, despite the organisation’s best efforts, the human rights system has become in many ways a “Hispanic” system. It is the Latin American countries that have ratified the Convention, accepted the treaty and are participating in litigation and cases before the Court. The African Human Rights System
Main points from Prof Frans Viljoen’s presentation: •
•
• •
•
•
•
• •
The African System, I think, comes third in the line because it is the youngest of the three systems. If it were a human being, it would have just come of age, just slightly over 21 years old. That I think is something that one should keep in mind in terms of expectations of accomplishments of this system. Linked to that, one has to concede, despite the optimistic picture which I will try to paint, it is surely the weakest of the three systems. But, despite these remarks, I think it may also be a system that has certain resonances for this region. There are 53 member states of the African Union (AU) at the moment (Morocco is the one state in Africa that is not a member of the AU, which withdrew due to recognition of the plight of the right to self-determination for the people of Western Sahara), making it bigger in number than the other regional systems. Like the other two systems, the African human rights system is located within a political arrangement. That arrangement was formed in 1963 as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was founded as an embodiment of the idea of pan-Africanism and was a vehicle that brought together the newly independent African states. So, when the OAU was formed in 1963, it was not really directing itself in any significant way towards human rights protection. This was demonstrated by the fact that human rights were not enshrined in the mandate of the OAU when it was founded. Over time, however, the OAU adopted some human rights instruments. In 1969, due to the pressure on states in Africa, it adopted the first instrument of significance: an OAU refugee convention which became a first erosion of this idea that the OAU was not really established to deal with human rights. More recently, the OAU has transformed itself into a new body called the African Union (AU), which took place through the African Union Constitutive Act, adopted in 2000. This is the organisation within which the African human rights system exists. There is now a much clearer understanding that human rights forms part of the political institutional arrangements within Africa. If one looks at the AU 2000 Constitutive Act, one finds that it does still embrace, as the OAU did before it, the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference. But at the same time, states also give up part of their sovereignty to accept the principle of respect of human rights. So it is not a boundless, uncontrolled sovereignty which is at stake here but a sovereignty circumscribed and limited by the other principles of the AU. The most significant is that in article 4h of the AU’s Constitutive Act which says that the African Union has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of a member state, but only in very limited circumstances; namely when crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide have been committed. So, for the most serious manifestations of human rights violations, there is a very explicit right of collective intervention in the name of all the members together in the domestic affairs or domestic arena of African states, again reinforcing the acceptance of sovereignty but its erosion at the same time. The principle of sovereignty must also be further eroded by the principles of the promotion of gender equality, which is enshrined as one of the basic principles of the AU, as well as respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance. Regarding the broader political sphere of the AU, just like the European system, it has a parliament (Pan-African Parliament) where matters pertaining to human rights may be
18
Page 193 of 237
• • •
•
• • • •
•
• •
discussed, although this parliament only has consultative status (it cannot adopt binding legislation). The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) is an innovative structure which brings together civil society and helps to make their voices heard within the AU. The Peace and Security Council within the AU has importance to emergency situations and the resolution of human rights violations pertaining to those. The membership of the AU is not conditional on human rights as an entry requirement. But there may be sanctions imposed against the states if they do not observe the decisions and policies of the AU, which includes decisions and policies on human rights (art 23(2) of the Constitutive Act). Also, in a relatively innovative formulation in the AU Constitutive Act, governments which come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the AU (art 30). The AU has acted on this, for example in the cases of Madagascar and Mauritania. The membership of Madagascar was suspended in 2002, after disputed presidential elections, and that of Mauritania in 2005, following a coup d’état. Both states were subsequently readmitted as members. The substantive/normative part of the human rights system is principally derived from one particular document (as is the case with the other systems), which is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Charter was adopted in 1981 and entered into force in 1986. The African Commission, which is the monitoring body of the African Charter, started functioning in 1987. The African Charter has also been supplemented by further normative texts that have been adopted. For example, there is the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa which was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 2005. A dichotomous situation in the African human rights system was created in 1990 with the adoption of a new substantive treaty dealing with the rights of children (the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child). Not only were a new set of standards created, but that treaty also established a new body, the Committee of Experts on the Rights of the African Child. This is not a sub-committee of the African Commission but is a totally independent body created to oversee the Charter on Children, with basically the same competences as the African Commission. One needs to understand that the adoption of a separate body took place at a time of great optimism in the early 1990s. With the spread of democracy, windows of opportunity were seen everywhere. Subsequently, African states were prepared to adopt this treaty and to install a new body to implement it with the optimistic hope that it would become a focal point for the protection of children. In practice, however, this body has not been given the resources required and has not taken up issues in an effective way. It took nearly a decade for the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child to enter into force (1999) and the body has still not considered any communications and has just started to consider state reports. It is interesting that the Protocol on the Rights of Women, when it was adopted in 2003, extended the substantive scope of the African Charter to allow for very specific rights of women. But in this instance the states opted not to create a new body but to place this Protocol under the auspices of the already existing African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Perhaps having learnt the lessons from the relative failure of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the idea now was to strengthen and enlarge the mandate of the central body rather than creating a further proliferation of institutions. There has been an extension of the human rights system with the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on the African Human Rights Court in 1998 (entered into force in 2004), supplementing the African Commission with a court. The AU is primarily concerned with furthering economic integration and regional unity, and in this context has a court of justice, similar to the European Court of Justice. This means there is one court to deal with economic integration and one to deal with human rights. However, the AU member states decided in 2008 to integrate these two courts into a single institution with the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human
19
Page 194 of 237
•
•
•
•
•
•
• •
Rights, and this process is under way. The Protocol providing for a merged Court has been signed by 15 states; none of the required 15 ratifications have been secured, so the establishment of this Court is still some way off. There is also a parallel process within the AU dealing with human rights issues which comes under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is an economic programme within the AU which drives the integration and growth objectives of the AU. Within NEPAD there is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is similar to the UN’s Universal Periodic Review. The APRM requires a state to submit a report to its peers, who in this instance are the highest political leaders of the participating states (i.e. presidents/prime ministers). States have to opt in to the APRM, and a majority of AU states have done so. Quite a number of countries have already gone through the process. In contrast to the UN system, the APRM is also very closely tied to the economic objectives of development plans. So it is broader than just human rights, dealing also with economic policies and governance. So what brought about the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981? If the OAU was founded without an explicit human rights mandate, the climate changed in the 1970s. At the international level there was the entry into force of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1976, with the establishment of the Human Rights Committee creating a certain atmosphere and reality check in terms of human rights protection. Perhaps most importantly, 1979 saw the coming to an end of brutal dictatorships in Uganda, the Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea. The OAU reflected on its inaction during these dictatorships and was brought over to the idea of adopting some fundamental human rights standards that would help to ensure that these kinds of dictatorships would not recur in Africa. If one looks at the African Charter there is a sense in which you could see that it was, for some states, a form of window dressing to placate criticism. But other states were seriously committed to the idea of creating a structure that would give human rights protection to the individual. The Charter seems sometimes to go both ways. If one looks only at the wording of the Charter, you would not really understand its full potential. One has to look at how, subsequently, the Charter was in fact interpreted and used by the Commission. One of the main lessons of the African system is the importance of the body interpreting the standards, because if it were not for a body that was independent and progressive these standards could have been interpreted in very different ways. The drafters also had to look at the possibility of norm recognition and norm enforcement. Interestingly, at the very beginning the idea was floated that there should just be a commission established without any human rights instrument. Although it is difficult to surmise exactly how the process evolved, it seems that some African academics wanted to articulate an African conception of human rights and did not just want to rely on the existing legal frameworks that were in place (that would have been assumed to be the texts that an African commission would have to implement). We find then a drafting process mainly by states but involving a few NGOs and academics that emanated in the adoption of the African Charter. The African Charter does give some expression to an African conception of human rights. It deals not only with individual rights but also group rights, referred to in the Charter as peoples’ rights. So there is a notion of the collectivity of rights because of the traditional understanding of Africaness. Individual duties are also referred to, such as duties towards your family. They are understood mainly to be of a moral nature rather than of a legal nature but important in underscoring certain understandings of human rights. Another important feature is the justiciability of not only civil and political rights but also economic and social rights. With social and economic rights such as the right to health and education included in the Charter, there is no differentiation in terms of their applicability or enforcement. They are equal, with no separate structure and are all integral to the African Charter.
20
Page 195 of 237
•
•
•
• •
• •
• •
• • •
•
At this time norm enforcement took place through a non-judicial body. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was created, as a quasi-judicial body functioning similarly to a court but with only a recommendatory mandate, not a legallybinding mandate. There was some debate about having a court, but it was at this point in time thought to be too intrusive. The African Commission consists of 11 Commissioners, serving in their personal capacity. They are nominated by the states, and are elected by the AU Assembly but they do not pledge any allegiance to a particular state. They meet twice a year in ordinary sessions for approximately two weeks. They are part time but get a small honorarium for their work during sessions. The sessions of the African Commission are divided into public and private sessions. The private part is where the Commission exercises its protection mandate, such as dealing with individual communications. However, most of the meeting is open (public sessions), concerning the exercise of its promotional mandate which would be, for example, the consideration of state reports. The Commission has its secretariat or headquarters in Banjul, The Gambia. The secretariat has, for many years, been underfunded and not very well supported by its political masters, but this has been changing over time. In terms of gender composition, of the 11 commissioners at the moment a majority are women, and the Chair, Vice-Chair and Secretary of the Secretariat are women. In the beginning, in 1987, all were men. So there has been a very definite evolution in this regard. Regarding the mandate of the Commission, it can consider inter-state and individual complaints. The same kind of admissibility requirements apply: exhaustion of local remedies, insulting language may not be used in a communication, it must be submitted within a reasonable time. The Commission has heard about 400 communications to date (quite a small number). It is much more likely to find that a case is admissible than, for example, the European system, but this may be because it has received relatively few cases. When a state has accepted the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ jurisdiction, once the Commission has expressed its non-binding views the matter then may be referred by the Commission to the Court (similar to the inter-American system). Regarding on-site visits, once a number of communications against a particular state have been received the Commission will undertake an on-site visit to inspect and verify the situation and then come up with a report. In a place like Zimbabwe, one cannot underestimate the value of such a report because of the tendency of the government to deflect any criticism by the notion that criticism is inspired by Western imperialist forces. But if a body set up by Africans themselves comes up with a critical report, it has a certain resonance and value. The African system is the only regional system that has a system of state reporting which, to some extent, mirrors the UN state reporting function. It is a similar system of reporting, with concluding observations, although this system is not yet fully developed. The African Commission can also adopt resolutions in which it essentially gives its views on thematic issues such as the right to a fair trial, and also can adopt resolutions on human rights situations in a particular country (which are recommendatory in nature). The Commission has created special mechanisms such as special rapporteurs and working groups. Working groups, as opposed to special rapporteurships, may also comprise members of civil society. For example, the working group on indigenous peoples in the African system consists not only of members of the Commission but also members of civil society and indigenous communities themselves. These special mechanisms bring out thematic reports, highlighting particular issues and emerging situations. The Commission also undertakes promotional visits, which is perhaps different from other systems. Each commissioner is assigned a number of countries and that commissioner has to go on a regular basis to those countries, speak to the President (on issues such as the late submission of state reports) or engage with other government 21
Page 196 of 237
•
•
•
•
•
• • •
• • •
officials and create a climate of better understanding and cooperation with the African human rights system. Regarding the independence of the Commissioners, the African Charter says that they must be people of the highest reputation, known for their morality, integrity, impartiality and so forth. Despite this provision being in the African Charter from the beginning, the members of the Commission that were elected were often very closely associated with governments. Christina made the point that there is a certain value to having high placed officials, but it also obviously has a downside. If the person is an ex-diplomat or sitting diplomat, someone who is representing a country or is a sitting member of the executive, as was the case in Africa, then the independence or at least the appearance of independence is compromised. Over a period of time, criticism from civil society emanated in the adoption of a statement (note verbale) by the AU setting out to states that they should not nominate people who are members of government (a minister, undersecretary, diplomatic representative etc). This was a political instruction by the AU to the member states on how to nominate candidates for the Commission. Fortunately, this has been largely implemented and today we find a different kind of composition. Regarding the role of National Human Rights Institutions, in the African system they have what is called “affiliate status”. NHRIs can apply for such a status, though unfortunately this does not mean so much in practice. Bodies with affiliate status are able to sit in on the Commission’s sessions and are invited to bring agenda points, but their meaningful involvement needs to be further extended and more meaningfully implemented. NGOs form a more integral part of the African Commission’s work than NHRIs. They can acquire formal “observer status”; more than 400 NGOs have acquired such a status. NGOs have been involved in standard setting; for instance, the protocols on the Court and on Women’s Rights would not have seen the light of day had it not been for the NGO movement pushing forward these agendas. They have been pivotal in the creation of new institutional mechanisms such as special rapporteurs, working groups, and the Court itself. During the sessions in the Commission that deal with the promotional part of its mandate, NGOs will be seated there as well as members of the different government delegations. In a very real sense, sessions of the African Commission present an opportunity for governments and NGOs to engage in dialogue which may not even be possible at the domestic level, such as issues concerning marginalised people. For example, issues concerning indigenous people have been heard at the regional level whereas domestically they have not been granted much of a voice. Increasingly, this is also the case with sexual minorities. Individual communications have been mostly brought by NGOs. If it had not been for NGOs’ awareness raising, training, bringing of cases and advocacy for better follow up, the system would certainly not be where it is now. Also for state reporting, as with the UN, shadow reports and the development of the system has been driven by the NGOs. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has been in existence since 2004. Currently, 11 judges have been elected, but the Court has not heard a case yet. Most of its time has been dedicated to elaborating its rules of procedure, developing its systems and coordinating its new systems with that of the African Commission. The Court will give binding decisions whereas the Commission’s decisions are recommendatory. The Commission is the main channel through which cases may be brought to the Court. If a state agrees, under a protocol a state may also accept that individuals may go directly from the state (after exhausting domestic remedies) to the Court (bypassing the Commission). Only 2 states have accepted this protocol. The judges must be jurists of high moral character, nominated by the state parties, elected by the AU Assembly.
22
Page 197 of 237
•
• •
• •
• • •
Regarding the problematic issue of enforcement, the Commission has not been very concerned about the effective implementation of its own findings or decisions. Initially it observed a relatively rigid divide between its own role (quasi-judicial) and enforcement (which seemed to be political). Increasingly, it has also taken it upon itself to adopt resolutions which indicate to states that they have to observe the decisions of the Commission. The Commission also now has a rule which requires states to inform the Commission within 90 days of a decision having been given against a state of what has been done to give effect to the decision or the finding of the Commission. In essence, enforcement stays political because the reports of the Commission and Court ultimately are considered by the political organs, the Executive Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and finally the AU Assembly (the highest summit of the AU). Enforcement by political bodies revolves around the principle of mobilisation of shame and peer pressure. Increasingly, as African states become more democratic and democracy becomes engrained, these methods of enforcement become more effective. But if the national levels of consent for human rights and democracy are low, then one has to accept that the level of mobilisation of shame and peer pressure will also result in something far from ideal. However, there is the possibility of the AU applying sanctions for non-compliance. Although a majority of the findings of the Commission have not been implemented, a significant number have been implemented resulting in some important changes. Some of the salient characteristics of the African system are as follows: o It has a strong commitment still to the principle of non-interference but married to the collective responsibility for human rights protection. o It is a system that has both promotional and protective aspects to its mandate. o It expresses a uniquely African conception of human rights but without compromising the universality of human rights. o The independence of the Commissioners has been strengthened over the years, and the gender composition has grown. o The Commission has adopted a progressive approach to interpreting the African Charter. The Commission (at least when it came to consist of more independent members) has been the driving force in this process towards making the Charter more progressive and human rights friendly. o The Commission involves, quite actively, NGOs and has also carved out a role for NHRIs. o It holds its sessions not only in one place but roams around the continent. The African human rights system has overlapping mandates with the other systems; African states are also members of the UN and other regional bodies. Regarding ratification of UN human rights instruments, African states have a high rate of ratification which does not always translate into implementation. There are a number of sub-regional units in Africa consisting of maybe 10 or 15 states. The overriding objective of these sub-regional units is economic integration. Ultimately, these sub-regional bodies will move the African Union towards an economically integrated unit (although that is quite a distance away). At least two of these sub-regional organisations (the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)) have established not only economic integration systems but also courts, and those courts have been approached to deal with human rights cases. The intention was never for these courts to be human rights courts, but the wording in the treaties of the courts has enabled them to tackle human rights issues. For instance, the SADC Treaty makes mention in one article to the principle of human rights, democracy and good governance and in another to the principle of equality. Farmers from Zimbabwe who have been dispossessed of their land have approached this Court and received a favourable judgement; the Court found that the conduct of the Zimbabwean Government conflicted with the SADC Treaty which contained this modicum of human rights and served as the basis for this judgement. These were desperate measures by people who did not really have another form of recourse, but it showed how
23
Page 198 of 237
the smaller units, such as these sub-regional bodies, could also be exploited for human rights purposes. There are also other regional initiatives which are relevant to Africa, such as the League of Arab States and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIS). They have a membership that is broader than just Africa but African states are also part of this. If one looks at the Arab Charter and the Commission that has also been created under the Arab League to ensure the protection of human rights, the African states also fall within its ambit. Regarding the OIS, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights has been serving as a source of inspiration. The principle would apply that the higher level of protection will always be that which is to be applied in a particular state so that the membership of different organisations does not diminish or detract from the higher level that may be set by the African Union.
•
•
Questions from the participants: Q: You have mentioned about sanctions imposed against non-complying states in Africa. Could you give us examples of these sanctions? •
Unfortunately, the AU has not imposed sanctions, apart from suspending members. One could say though that the AU is still in its infancy. Sub-regional bodies such as ECOWAS have imposed sanctions in particular circumstances. However, because of the principle of non-interference, states are generally still very reluctant to impose sanctions on noncomplying states.
Q: How and why does the African Charter cover both human rights and peoples’ rights? •
•
•
The idea of what a people is has not been defined. If one looks at the drafting of the African Charter, it was omitted deliberately. It was too contentious because the idea of people could have some resonance with minority status; is it linguistic, ethnic or other minorities that are understood to be under peoples? Is it really just saying that peoples refers to those within the geographical boundaries of a state? And is everyone within the boundaries of the state entitled to these rights? Or is it somehow a more politicised notion that is linked to decolonisation or some socialist understanding of rights? The Commission has had a number of opportunities to look at what peoples as a concept means. For example, there has been a case where people from a particular province invoked the right of peoples to self-determination in order for them to make a claim to secede from the geographic unit of the state. The Commission found that although they were a linguistic and cultural group, they would not be entitled to self-determination in the form of secession because that would be in conflict with the principles of the AU which, amongst other things, are concerned with territorial integrity. But the Commission interestingly leaves the door open on this matter. In one of its findings on an individual communication, Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire, the Commission expressed the view that if the rights of a people are so seriously violated that they would not be entitled to self-determination in any sense, that they have exploited all possibilities and they have experienced only refusals and they have undergone human rights violations of an extent that makes them really lose their right to self-determination completely within that state, it is possible for them to be entitled to self-determination, which could even include secession. In other cases, the idea of a people is linked to the geographic unit. For example, there is a case of Jawara v The Gambia (Jawara was the President of The Gambia who was deposed in a military coup d’état). Jawara brought a case against the new Government saying that not his rights, but the people of The Gambia’s rights to political self-determination had been violated by his being deposed by military force.
24
Page 199 of 237
Q: I would like to come back to the link between human rights and a region’s culture and also to the often made claim by leaders in developing countries that civil and political rights need to give way to economic and social development. •
The African Charter is one of the first instruments that talk in a legally binding document about the right to development, which has an internal dimension but also an international dimension of cooperation. However, African conceptions and understandings of human rights, such as the idea of “individual duties” and “peoples”, are largely of symbolic value compared to the distinctly legal and operational mechanism to realise individual rights. Also, notions of African cultural understandings of human rights helped to legitimise the African Charter in the eyes of many Africans. Notions such as individual duties and peoples, although symbolically important, have not been used by a progressive Commission to undermine individual rights or to detract from their protection.
Q: I would like to ask you about the complementarity between the African Court and the International Criminal Court (ICC). What kinds of measures were taken by the African Court before the ICC issued arrest warrants in the cases of Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo? •
•
•
The African Court has the jurisdiction to make a finding on the violation of the African Charter by the member states. The member states have committed themselves to uphold these rights and values and individuals or other states can complain to the Commission that a state party has not lived up to its obligations. So it is possible that an individual could have brought a case against Sudan as a government not living up to its obligations under the African Charter. Indeed, there have been a number of cases arising from the Darfur crisis; not against the politicians as such but against the State for violating the rights of women who have been raped, with the State not having taken sufficient measures to protect their rights. The African Court, just like the other regional human rights courts, does not have the jurisdiction to pronounce on individual criminal responsibility. So the African Court and the ICC really play two different roles. It could be interesting if the African Commission or the Court had to find on facts which could be linked to a case that the ICC brings. We know that the African Union has been quite reluctant and obstructionist against the ICC’s efforts to get Omar al-Bashir (the Sudanese president) indicted. In the process, the AU is now throwing the ball to the AU’s Legal Affairs Department saying that they should now look to see if the African Court can become a court of criminal jurisdiction. So there is, because of what has happened in this particular instance, an effort to investigate the potential for the African Court to become a court of criminal jurisdiction, especially when considering that the African Human Rights Court is going to be merged with the African Court of Justice, which will be a much more broad-based court with a human rights chamber and a general affairs chamber that will deal with economic integration. So the idea would be to also have a criminal chamber in the newly integrated court. I personally think that this would be the wrong way to go, because a criminal prosecution is much more complex than either a human rights matter or other matters that would fall under the jurisdiction of the to be established African Court of Justice and Human Rights; it is a totally different matter to prosecute a criminal trial than it is to deal with a human rights violation case.
Q: In the case of Darfur, is the debate on whether genocide is occurring restrictive when considering the scale of human rights violations occurring there? •
If article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act allowed collective intervention by the AU only in respect of genocide, then it would be very controversial because then all these debates on whether it is genocide or not will come into play. However, because article 4(h) is linked to crimes against humanity and war crimes it is such a big pool of very serious human rights violations that the circumstances will not really open these kinds of technical 25
Page 200 of 237
debates. It is clear that the situation constitutes at least crimes against humanity which should be sufficient for the AU to intervene. Although let me concede that the AU did not use force to intervene in Darfur; a possible explanation is that at the time the AU had just been set up and it did not really have the forces on the ground to legitimise such a finding. The AU did, in ad hoc ways, deploy forces and intervene but it never used its formal legal powers under 4h) to do so, perhaps to save face because it was not prepared to do so in the beginning. Q: Can you speak more about the exhaustion of local remedies requirement. •
It is true that the regional system is supplementary to the national system in the sense that you have to first exhaust the local remedies. However, in many African local systems the remedies may not be available because of lengthy delays, ineffectual systems, and overburdensome costs. Subsequently, the Commission has been very flexible when it comes to the admission of cases. For example, if you can show that you could not use a local remedy because of your poverty, you are exempted from the “exhaustion of local remedies” provision. It also says in the African Charter that you must exhaust local remedies, if any, unless they are unduly prolonged. So the Commission has gone very far to say that the local remedy has to be effective, which means that the state cannot just defend itself by saying “here is a local remedy that has not been exhausted” if it is not effective and adequate in practice. Maybe it is because the Commission has had relatively few cases that it has been prepared to bend over backwards to allow many more cases to come to it.
Q: After the general election violence in Kenya last year, the African Union created another body to look into it. Why was the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights not given this task? •
At present, there is a lack of integration and taking the Commission seriously to give it these tasks. It does not speak well within the AU if you create a body and then somehow you do not use it to its full potential. So that is certainly a problem.
Q: Can you say a little bit more about how the Protocol on the Rights of Women has been implemented. You said that it was integrated into the African Commission; how is it also integrated into the Court, and has there been any kind of decision or move on the issue of sexual violence in armed conflict? •
• •
The Women’s Protocol entered into force in 2005, so it is still quite young. It takes as a starting point that women have all the rights in the African Charter but you need to spell out in more specificity the rights of women. So how do women’s rights in Africa look specifically compared to the general statement of all rights that are in the African Charter or if you compare it to UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)? If one looks at the Protocol, it really looks at African women in a holistic way and tries to focus on issues particular to the African woman. The Protocol is integrated with the African Commission in the sense that when a state submits its state report, if it has ratified the Protocol, it also needs also to report on the provisions of the Protocol. Individuals may submit communications on both the African Charter and the Protocol (if the state has ratified it). So far, unfortunately, no case has yet been decided under the Protocol (there are some cases pending). One also has to be realistic; in a sense, the women’s movement looked at the African Charter and looked at the lack of cases being brought by women against states and, for that reason principally, they fought for the adoption of a protocol. But the same obstacles that inhibited women and prevented them from bringing complaints under the Charter may still be in place under the Protocol. So, it is also important that access to the Protocol is taken seriously by CSOs on the ground to ensure that it is not an empty promise. 26
Page 201 of 237
•
The Protocol also speaks in more detail about sexual violence and armed conflict, but unfortunately, again, no particular case has yet been decided on this matter.
Q: One fear we have of the ASEAN human rights body is the most probable absence of independence on the part of the would be Commissioners who will be chosen and paid by the member states of ASEAN. In the case of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, how has the independence of the Commissioners been strengthened through the years and what role did civil society play to contribute to the achievement of this independence? •
I agree with you that the independence and impartiality of the Commissioners is absolutely crucial. It is not good enough that there is a legal text which says that there should be independence. In practice, the persons should serve not as an instructed government employee but as an independent expert. It is interesting that even with the Arab Charter and the Arab Commission, the body that is created guarantees the independence of the members; they are not government instructed individuals. But even if there are guarantees on paper, the African Commission has, over the years, consisted of diplomats and people who served in government. It was only through pressure on states (because, in a sense, it is unfair to approach the Commissioners who has been nominated by a state and elected by the AU) from NGOs over a long period of time that changes occurred in practice. Memorandums were written, examples were given of other systems, information was given to the Commission and to the state parties and, after a number of years change in the AU’s policy came about. Critical voices, ultimately, were heard and the system changed.
Q: The principle of non-interference exists alongside the right to intervene in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity. Does that limit the mandate of the Commission and the Court to investigate human rights violations that cannot be defined as genocide or crimes against humanity but still serious human rights violations? •
The principle of non-interference in the AU Constitutive Act, which is the political body’s constitution, exists alongside the principle of collective interference by the AU in the domestic affairs of a state in the instance of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. This means that the AU could send a military force to intervene in a state when genocide is taking place there. This provision was inspired by what happened in Rwanda in 1994. It does not relate specifically to the Court and the Commission’s competence, because the Constitutive Act of the AU allows for this form of collective intervention only in respect to very grave human rights violations, while the African Charter allows for the submission of communications by individuals against the state on all the rights contained in the Charter. So if you ratify the African Charter, you also give up your sovereignty in a much broader sense.
Q: How is the right to democracy defined in the African system? Also, the system mentions that it would not recognise governments that come to power through unconstitutional means. What do you mean by unconstitutional means? If we take the cases of the colour revolutions in Europe, people removed the governments through demonstrations. Would that be considered as an unconstitutional means? •
•
Democracy is not very well defined in the African Charter. The Charter, when it was adopted in 1981, spoke very ambiguously about the right to participate in political affairs and it was only progressively that a new understanding of democracy grew. Indeed, the AU recently adopted a Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance (only two states have so far ratified) which clarifies the meaning of democracy. So, understanding of the concept is still evolving, as is the “unconstitutional means” concept. The examples of the colour revolutions in Eastern Europe would probably not be seen as a means which will be included because the understanding of unconstitutional means is very state-centred. It is still understood to be when the power of a state is diminished in ways which other states would not want to have their own power diminished. 27
Page 202 of 237
Q: You told us about the role of the NGOs that can apply for observer status and can even bring individual communications to the Commission and give shadow reports. What about NHRIs? Are they accredited the same role? And the exhaustion of domestic or local remedies would surely include the National Human Rights Commissions (NHRC). What happens if a NHRC does not adequately respond or react to particular human rights complaints? Would the African Commission be able to hold the NHRC to account for, say, a dereliction of duty, or is it covered also by the principle of non-interference? •
Unfortunately, NHRIs have a much less clearly defined role in the African Commission. I think it is a product of a lack of understanding of their role. For example, if one looks at state reporting, some of the NHRIs that have affiliate status with the Commission would really be responsible for drafting the state reports within their countries. Others, which see themselves as totally removed from the process, are not so much in a position to submit shadow reports. The NHRIs have never really grouped themselves together and come up with a clear understanding of what their role would be. The Commissioners facilitated a number of meetings and this is ongoing, but there is a lack of a clear cohesive approach. What is emphasised is that whatever their mandates are, the Commission depends on the NHRIs to domesticate whatever its findings and norms are. What seems clear is that the NHRIs have that role to take from the Commission level to the national level, and through their particular processes, make effective and translate into domestic reality what is relevant from the African Commission.
Q: What was the driving force for a strong African Human Rights Charter in 1981? Who were the main actors? •
Although the Charter was adopted in 1981, one needs to remember that the more progressive elements in the AU Constitutive Act are from 2002. That was when there was a very different African community of states. In the 1980 document, one could also look at it very cynically and say that if you look at the African Commission’s mandate, it is not even clear that the Commission was supposed to deal with individual communications. At that point in time in the international community you had two models: the ECOSOC 1503 model whereby if there were systematic violations, ECOSOC would conduct a confidential inquiry; and the Human Rights Committee model, which considered individual human rights complaints. If you look at the Charter and the role assigned to the Commission, it hinges between the two models. It was only through the activism of the African Commission’s members that its individual complaints competence was established. So, I am with the colleagues who have emphasised the role of the institution, the members of that institution, and the independence and the competence of the members of that institution, more than the text (though one obviously needs the text as well).
Q: How is the working relationship between the Court and the Commission? What is the motivation to retain the Court and the Commission? • •
• •
The Commission and the Court are both working on the final versions of their rules of procedure to clarify their relationship, so we have not yet had a case go to the Court. Ordinarily the system would say that individuals first go to the Commission for a recommendation. If the state does not implement the decision or the finding of the Commission within a certain period of time, then the case will go to the Court for the legally binding decision, which in international law has a different value to a recommendation and will serve within a different framework to enforce that finding. Maybe in the years ahead we could see the integration of the Commission and the Court into a unified system, as they are talking about in the inter-American system. But in the short term, one will see the two institutions coexisting. Also, it should be remembered that the Commission will still be the institution to go to for all of those states that have not ratified the Protocol on the Court, of which there are many. 28
Page 203 of 237
So the Commission really still has to be there with an individual complaints mandate, otherwise the individuals within the states that had not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction would have nowhere to go. One needs to keep in mind that the Commission still has its promotional mandate; all the state reporting and promotional visits and so forth may become more important now that we may eventually have more cases going directly to the Court from individuals and states that have accepted its competence.
•
III.4
The Relationship between National, Regional and International Human Rights Mechanisms/Inter-Regional Cooperation
Main points from Prof Maureen Maloney’s presentation: •
Common features of Regional Human Rights Mechanisms: o Subsidiary to national human rights protection systems. o Normative Framework (political consensus, convention, declaration etc): Not lower than international standards. o Independent, impartial experts in human rights and persons of integrity: Process of nomination by states and election of members at regional level; Serve in individual capacity; Plurality of membership; Privileges and immunities for members; Procedure of removal in cases of incompatibility. o Do both promotion and protection work: Receive and decide on both individual and interstate complaints; Can declare violations of human rights and provide access to a regional court that can order legally binding decisions and reparations; Make country visits and engage in country level activity; Hold meetings in different member states; Hearings which are widely publicised; Develop other mechanisms (e.g. special rapporteurs) that engage in both promotion and protection work; Preventative mechanisms (e.g. emergency procedures); Transparency of documentation regarding decisions and recommendations which is widely disseminated. o Competent and full time secretariat support with sufficient resources (including budgetary and human resources). o Established procedures for interaction with civil society and NHRIs. o Cooperation with international human rights mechanisms.
•
Benefits of regional systems: o Better able to understand the shared characteristics of the region (economic, geographic, social and cultural); o Criticism from the region can be more effective; o Help to provide regional input into the development of international human rights norms and standards; o Better placed to provide capacity building to assist national governments in fulfilling their human rights obligations and in the establishment of NHRIs.
Main points from Mr. Homayoun Alizadeh (Regional Representative, OHCHR South-East Asia Regional Office): •
The fact that the AHRB is likely to consist of members appointed by the national governments and is likely to abide by the principle of non-interference will make it difficult for the body to engage in any human rights protection work. The question is 29
Page 204 of 237
how can CSOs compensate for this missing protection mandate? The UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a new process which Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have already undergone. This process has encouraged NGOs to create networks to write the national reports and to look into the violation of human rights. Civil society also has to work with governments and the UN to help ensure the recommendations that come from the UPR are implemented. Civil society, alongside the ASEAN human rights body, should help to ensure the implementation of recommendations of treaty bodies, special procedures and the UPR (which includes recommendations on protection issues). These recommendations are currently not being implemented. Civil society should push the AHRB to look into regional human rights issues such as migration and human trafficking, including questions of protection which these issues raise. Civil society has to work with NHRIs because NHRIs have human rights protection mandates. The ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation is becoming increasingly strict in downgrading NHRIs which do not abide by the Paris Principles. This acts as an incentive for NHRIs to engage properly with CSOs in carrying out their protection work.
•
• •
Questions from the participants: Q: Can we file cases of human rights violations before the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in South-East Asia at the same time as with the ASEAN Human Rights Body? •
Mr. Homayoun Alizadeh: OHCHR is the secretariat of the treaty body mechanisms, and can assist in forwarding complaints to the relevant treaty body committees. Our task at the regional level is to ensure that we have a follow up system in place to help address these individual cases (e.g. closed door diplomacy with government officials, following up with regional human rights mechanisms etc). Prof Christina Cerna: If you mean can you apply to a UN mechanism and the regional body with the same case, in the inter-American system it depends on if it is a similar mechanism. We used to consider the UN Human Rights Committee the only similar mechanism to the inter-American Commission, so that if you presented the case to the Commission you could not also present it to the UN (and vice-versa). The interAmerican Commission is now saying that none of the UN mechanisms is sufficiently similar to the inter-American system because there is no access to a court. You cannot get a legally binding decision from the UN, so you can apply to wherever you want in the UN and to the inter-American Commission. But there is a provision in the American Convention that says you cannot present your case to another international proceeding for settlement. All of the regional bodies have this, so it depends on the respective regional body to determine what they consider as a similar proceeding.
•
Q: What is the role of regional mechanisms in the UPR process? •
Regional human rights mechanisms can acquire observer status in the Human Rights Council for the UPR sessions.
Q: One of the advantages of having a regional human rights mechanism is that it can assist with the establishment of NHRIs at the national level. I would like to hear how the regional mechanisms in the different regions have helped to establish NHRIs. •
Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not require the creation of an NHRI to provide for remedies of human rights violations. However, legislation adopted by the EU has provided an impetus for the creation of NHRIs in terms of it being a condition for joining the EU. In addition, a network was created of NHRIs in the EU, the Council of Europe and other regional bodies and these networks have acquired consultative status within these regional institutions. Also, regional 30
Page 205 of 237
•
•
mechanisms in the Council of Europe (such as the Commissioner on Human Rights) provide governments with technical assistance in the establishment of NHRIs. The Human Rights Institute (not an OAS body) in Costa Rica has connections with the inter-American system, and one of the roles of the Institute is to serve as a secretariat for human rights ombudsmen in the region. Frequently, human rights ombudsmen serve as experts in inter-American Court hearings. In Africa, not all member states have NHRIs. I do not think the system should be premised on some form of conditionality that there should be an NHRI established because some of the states that give the best effect to the work of the Commission are states that do not have NHRIs. This also means that you cannot have a standard process whereby everything goes from the Commission to the NHRI; there is a diversity of ways in which the Charter and the Commission’s work will be domesticated most effectively depending on the national circumstances.
Q: At the international level some of the most effective mechanisms are the special procedures, and I also know at the regional level some of the best work has been done by the visits of special procedures. So could you expand on how regional special procedures collaborate and work with special procedures at the international level. •
•
In the inter-American system the Commission has worked with UN rapporteurs on different thematic issues. The inter-American Commission’s rapporteur on freedom of expression has worked with the equivalent rapporteur at the UN level and also with the rapporteur of the African Union, initialling joint communiqués on issues of common concern. We have worked with the rapporteur on the independence of the judiciary at the UN level and we also frequently cite their studies in cases before the Commission. In Africa, significant special rapporteur mechanisms have been established. For example, perhaps the most successful procedure of the Commission has been its special rapporteur on prison conditions. This rapporteur has conducted a number of visits and follow-up visits, made recommendations to states and been given access to the prisons. In respect to these visits, the rapporteur has collaborated with the UN special rapporteur on torture so as to ensure against duplication.
Q: If we have a weak regional human rights mechanism, is this better or worse than nothing at all, because I am still concerned that a weak mechanism will be used by authoritarian states in the region to protect themselves? •
•
•
III.5
The inter-American system was created as probably the weakest system imaginable. However, the initiative of the members of the Commission and the work of civil society formed the engine that made this choo choo train go forward and become the credible system that it is today. So yes, it is better to have a weak system than no system at all. The African system was weak and it has grown, so it was better to have a weak system than nothing. But it certainly places a high burden on the shoulders of civil society because if there is a weak system the danger lurks large of that being a way of legitimising oppression and many other negative forces. So it really calls one to action to ensure that one is a co-constructer and not a passive spectator. One does need to be aware of the risks of a backlash in relation to existing human rights standards such as the potential for the creation of bad case law which is not in agreement with international human rights law. Panel Discussion Comparing the Roles of Civil Society/NHRIs in Africa, the Americas and Europe in Developing Credible Regional Human Rights Mechanisms
African system: •
In the African system, the granting of an official status for NGOs (Observer Status) entitles them to build up formally recognised links within the AU machinery which 31
Page 206 of 237
•
•
•
assists in the flow of information (e.g. this status enables them to speak at sessions of the Commission). However, the formal linkages have not become an obstacle or constraint for other NGOs; for instance, the fact that an NGO may not have observer status has not prevented them from submitting communications. The formation of NGO coalitions has also been very important in the African context. For example, around the African Court’s establishment there was a coalition of NGOs which pushed for its creation and now pushes for the further ratification of the Protocol on the Court and the bringing of cases. When one looks at the compliance of findings of the Commission by states, research has shown that when an NGO was involved in bringing the case and in following up the results of that finding there was a much greater likelihood of that finding being implemented. If it is one person bringing one case the chances of a government taking that seriously is, unfortunately, not very great; but if it becomes embedded in a social movement driven by civil society there is a much greater chance of compliance. NGOs should link themselves with academic institutions for strategic reasons, capacity building and training and convince them also of the importance of this endeavour. The same applies to the media, because it is all about visibility and bringing information to the common knowledge of everyone.
Inter-American system: • • • •
•
•
NGOs can acquire status before political bodies and have the right to take the floor and make contributions both at the General Assembly and at the weekly meetings of the Permanent Council. They have been at the forefront of demands for new international human rights instruments. They have a role in promoting certain candidates for the Commission or the Court or criticising candidates who have been named by states. With respect to donors and money that is given to the system that is earmarked for certain specific work, this is a double-edged sword in many ways. For example, with rapporteurships that are created with this money, it is an “observer” government (not a member state) that is setting the agenda. There has been internal criticism as to how much money should be accepted and for what purposes because it does divert the attention of the Commission from what others consider it to be its primary function, which is deciding on the merits of individual cases. However, this is a very low level criticism and in general these new rapporteurships are quite welcome. The role of NGOs also concerns advocating for: changes in laws, truth commissions, fighting impunity and prosecutions. The specific situation in a country determines the agenda of the NGO which then, in many ways, determines the Commission’s own agenda. The Washington College of Law of American University in Washington, D.C. has for a number of years instituted a moot court programme on the inter-American human rights system which takes place every May. This year there are about 99 teams from some 30 countries participating, including an African team, on a hypothetical question involving inter-American human rights law. This is a good training ground for young lawyers to study the inter-American system. Indeed, the best litigants are now taken on by the Commission and the Court as interns or fellows.
European system: •
The role of civil society in the continuous development of human rights standards has been crucial. Currently there are many avenues that NGOs can use to influence the human rights agenda and act as an essential source of information for the various human rights mechanisms within the European system.
32
Page 207 of 237
Questions from the participants: Q: Are targets set for governments in the respective regions to spend a certain percentage of its budget on particular human rights groups or themes? • •
•
The inter-American Commission does not set any guidelines for targeting budgetary allocation. In Africa, in the Protocol on the Rights of Women, there is one provision which says that states should revise their budgetary allocations to reduce military spending and increase social spending involving, particularly, women and children, though it does not specify figures. One will have to see whether this can ever be invoked in a judicial setting to challenge a budget. Nevertheless, there is a very clear provision in a legal text that sets some kind of progressive realisation target for diminishing military spending and increasing spending on social aspects, including women’s affairs. The European Social Charter has defined a framework for what progressive realisation of economic and social rights means, and it includes a condition that states have an obligation to demonstrate progress in relation to the implementation of, for example, the right to housing and the corresponding resources that have been spent. However, the European Court has not become involved in indicating to member states how to spend their money.
Q: How should the involvement of civil society be institutionalised in areas such as the selection and election of Commissioners, especially given the reluctance of ASEAN to engage with civil society? •
•
•
In the inter-American system it is exclusively the prerogative of the member states to nominate candidates. Civil society plays an active role in lobbying for or against the candidates that they would like to see win; frequently before the candidates are nominated they might suggest names of individuals that they think would make good commissioners or judges. However, they do not have an official role in that selection process. It would be interesting to have some kind of institutional mechanism at the regional level. This does not exist in the African system. The emphasis is more on the national level to ensure that the individual state’s nomination is as good as it can get. Civil society should work to get the state to accept some form of transparent mechanism whereby there is an open debate and some form of entry point for civil society to interface with the process of national nominations. The appointment process of judges to the European Court of Human Rights is not without problems. States have been known to appoint candidates who lack the requisites of independence and necessary qualifications, so there has been pressure on states to be more transparent in the process of identifying the list of 3 applicants which is then submitted to the Parliamentary Assembly from which the judges are ultimately chosen.
Q: Can complaints be filed against member states for violations committed outside of the region? Can human rights cases be brought against private companies owned by nationals operating in other regions of the world? •
•
In the inter-American system, anybody can file a complaint, though you still have to comply with the requisites for admissibility, the most important being the exhaustion of domestic remedies. You do not have to be a national from any of the countries of the member states; you only have to allege that the OAS member state has committed a violation of your human rights as set forth either in the American Declaration or the American Convention. The inter-American Court has found that a non-state actor can be responsible for human rights violations. In a landmark case (Pueblo Bello v Colombia), which involved human rights violations committed by paramilitaries, the Court found that the paramilitaries were 33
Page 208 of 237
created by the state and that the state could have dissolved them; in not doing so it was subsequently responsible for the violations committed by them. With regard to extraterritoriality, the Commission has received cases involving human rights violations in Iraq, for example. The test in cases dealing with extra-territoriality is whether the respondent state has effective control over the alleged victims. If it does, then the system will generally take jurisdiction. Q: In the three continents does the common person actually know about these human rights mechanisms or is it just the domain of academics and NGOs? •
•
•
One of the biggest problems of the European Court of Human Rights is that they have too many applicants/cases. Nevertheless, often the people whose human rights have been violated rely upon NGOs to provide assistance and expertise in pursuing their case with the European mechanisms. The Court is better known than other mechanisms such as those provided under the European Social Charter. In Peru and Argentina the common person does know about the regional human rights mechanisms, and whenever somebody feels that they have been wronged by their Supreme Court they look to the Inter-American Commission. In the US and Canada, the inter-American Human Rights system is pretty much unknown. Even in Europe, with its 50,000 plus cases per year and the inter-American Commission’s 1,500 cases per year, in regions of 800 and 900 million people respectively this is just a tiny drop in the bucket. Africa is certainly the region with the lowest level of awareness. This is why the African Commission is including promotion as a principal part of its mandate, and seeks to work in collaboration with NGOs, the media etc. Currently, the focus should lie with NGOs positioning themselves to work in the region, and with lawyers. At the very least, one should create a generation of lawyers who would recognise a case to bring to the Commission if it is appropriate.
Q: How do you view the two parallel processes in ASEAN regarding the establishment of an ASEAN human rights body and an ASEAN Commission on Women and Children? •
•
•
Prof Cerna: I find it curious in ASEAN that you are thinking of creating a Women and Children Commission at the same time that you are considering the creation of an ASEAN human rights body. In a way you are fractionalising out a segment of the larger picture of human rights protection to a separate body, and I do not understand why you would want to do that. In the African system, there is a general African Commission and also a Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. I would argue that it is an historical anomaly and that if we had the luxury of sitting back and devising the system now, we would integrate it all into one and make one strong institution. With the Protocol on the Rights of Women, there was an opportunity to create a new body again, but it was agreed that the new substantive scope should fall within the existing African Commission and that this institution should be strengthened. The creation of two separate bodies has been counterproductive, maybe because of the specific situation (e.g. the two bodies were placed under two different political entities within the African Union - one under social affairs, the other under political affairs, limited resources were available). So, there were many reasons within the particular African context why this was not an ideal solution. I am not saying that this is true for all systems, but that is certainly how it played out in Africa. In the inter-American system, whenever a donor country or a foundation gives money to the Commission it will frequently be earmarked for specific themes such as freedom of expression and the creation of a rapporteurship. When the issue came up for the first time in 1998, the inter-American Commission was very zealous in making sure that this rapporteurship would be somehow affiliated with the Commission and would not be autonomous. So there has been a strong interest in keeping all of these promotional mechanisms under the umbrella of the inter-American Commission.
34
Page 209 of 237
•
Mr. Alizadeh: If you create another institution, rather than having sub-committees, you have to spend money and energy. The key issue is whether it will be able to do protection work in accordance with international standards. Prof Maloney: Strategically, there are some reasons to have the ASEAN Commission on Women and Children. We know that the ASEAN human rights body is going to be extremely weak, so there is a possibility that the ASEAN Commission on Women and Children could be much stronger because it is not quite as threatening to ASEAN members. It seems that, if they are both created, at some point they will come together. If one of the bodies has more protection powers, then this could help to strengthen the mandate of the weaker body.
•
Day Two: The second and final day of the meeting featured three workshop sessions, whereby participants broke out into groups to discuss specific issues. III.6
Workshop 1: Facing Off the Return of the “Asian Values” Thesis
Main points from the working groups: • • • • • • • • • • • • •
• •
For some Asian politicians, Asian values challenge the “Western” concept of human rights in the sense that human rights are individualistic rather collectivist. The “Asian values” thesis fails to recognise the link between individual and collective rights. There is no clear definition of what Asian values are; the concept is left very vague. The idea of “Asian values” can be used to justify cultural relativist positions on issues such as sexual orientation, where it can be used to claim that Asian countries and Asian communities cannot accept homosexuality or same sex marriage. Asian values, as interpreted by states, are archaic e.g. heads of state must be obeyed by their citizens; the youth must obey their elders; patriarch relations etc. Self-interest lies at the core of the Asian values thesis; people in power want to stay in power, and this thesis helps them to do so. Politicians can ignore the views of the people with individual human rights being dismissed as “Western”. “Asian values” enables politicians to derogate from the human rights principle of universality. We need to learn from Africa’s experience; Africans do not define what peoples’ rights are, hence there is no need to seek a definition of Asian values. We do have Asian values, but the notion has been abused by some Asian leaders. It is important for CSOs to develop the concept in a way which respects the diversity of the people of Asia. We are all equal human beings, with equal rights. Promoting so-called Asian values will only create divisions. Emphasis should be placed on equality among people regardless of national or geographic boundaries. The Asian values thesis is linked with religious values, which gives it an unquestionable nature. Religion, coupled with poverty helps people to buy into Asian values. There are question marks over whether Asian states are really secular. For example, Mahathir declared Malaysia to be an Islamic state; Islam is allowed to evangelize in Malaysia while other religions are not. In Thailand, to be Thai is to be Buddhist; others, such as southern Malay Muslims both feel and are perceived to be outsiders. In many European countries, religion is at the core of national identity. It is important how courts at the national and international level manoeuvre amongst different claims in giving weight to morality and national security vis-à-vis individual rights. CSOs need to position themselves to influence governments in the drafting of the ASEAN human rights declaration. 35
Page 210 of 237
•
III.7
Civil society perceptions and how to counter state’s perceptions: o Human rights are not foreign; they are natural, inherent, intrinsically good and embedded within Asian society. o Asian values are also human rights values, and vice versa. o We can provide arguments that Asian values actually include more human rights inspired by elements – more egalitarian, inclusive, universal – than politicians allow for. For instance, in the pre-colonial society, homosexuality was accepted. o We can say that values are learned and not static. o Asian values should not go lower than human rights standards or be used to suppress the establishment of an ASEAN human rights mechanism. o Civil society can invoke Asian values to hold leaders to account for human rights violations and as a means of asserting the human rights of people. o The Asian values stigma that is derived from Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kwan Yew will make it difficult to promote Asian values in a human rights friendly way. Workshop 2: Considering the “evolutionary approach” to the development of human rights norms and standards in ASEAN
Main points from the working groups: • • • • • • •
• • • • •
The “evolutionary approach” suggests starting small and developing towards something more significant. It suggests the progressive realisation of something over a period of time. The term means different things to different governments; for example, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand use the term in a more constructive way than other governments in the region who use it to stifle the process. Some form of evolution has taken place with the regional human rights systems in Africa, the Americas and Europe. CSOs need to gain ownership of this term “evolutionary approach”. If conservatives are in charge, evolution will go in a negative direction. The term provides space for governments to negotiate on more controversial aspects of the ASEAN human rights body (AHRB); for example, on the protection mandate. It can also be a way of limiting the mandate while achieving consensus. The term is premised on the notion of consensus. What is the political agenda behind the evolutionary approach? It is saying that the process towards the protection and fulfilment of human rights needs to be slowed down. The term is also used by governments to pacify civil society. It can also be used to justify the establishment of a very weak mechanism (promotion with no protection mandate) with weak instruments. It could be good to have elements of the AHRB that are optional to enable the more progressive states to move forward. Alternatively, it could be problematic having different standards for different states. The timeframe or roadmap for this evolutionary approach has not been made clear by ASEAN governments. Civil society has to have a clear idea in terms of the substance of what it wants (e.g. rapporteurs) and of the timeframe. Should civil society take an ideal position or an “evolving” position? The “evolutionary approach” is a term of the state. Civil society should be pushing for the strongest possible mechanism (protection mandate, investigatory powers, individual complaints mechanism, rapporteurs, even the establishment of a court). There are certain basic principles and concepts which should not be subject to “evolution”.
36
Page 211 of 237
• • • • • • • •
• • III.8
The AHRB must start from the Universal Declaration and other core international human rights treaties. The “Paris Principles” also establish basic standards and principles for human rights mechanisms. What should civil society do if the AHRB falls down on even the basic principles? Issue a statement condemning it and then develop strategies to engage with it to make it stronger. The vagueness of the TOR can be used to the advantage of CSOs. Making it too specific may be restrictive in terms of the AHRB’s future development. The best approach for civil society advocacy will vary from country to country. CSOs must work together and through networks, join together to lobby governments and submit checklists to governments. The concept of non-interference needs to be evolved to bring it in line with human rights standards. Independent commissioners are needed on the AHRB to enable the evolutionary approach to be a positive and constructive process. With human rights mechanisms in Africa, Europe and the Americas, the principle of appointing independent commissioners who are experts acting in their individual capacity has been there from the very beginning. Civil society should make clear that this is nonnegotiable. It is difficult to see how the members of the AHRB can be independent when their loyalty and accountability belong to the appointing governments. What is being proposed in the terms of reference looks more like the UN Human Rights Council than a Regional Human Rights Commission. Workshop 3: Working with Different Regional Human Rights Mechanisms to Create an Effective System
Main points from the working groups: • • •
•
• • •
•
The TOR of the AHRB does not mention about the establishment of sub-commissions. An ASEAN Commission on Women and Children can be used as an entry point for other human rights issues. In Africa, the establishment of a separate human rights body for children (the Committee of Experts on the Rights of the African Child) has not been successful. The body has not been given the resources required, is placed under a separate political body and has not taken up issues in an effective way. With the Protocol on the Rights of Women, there was an opportunity to create a new body again, but it was agreed that the new substantive scope should fall within the existing African Commission and that this institution should be strengthened. There is a concern that an ACWC separate from the AHRB may become marginalized. One integrated human rights body is what should be aimed for, with sub-commissions on specific themes/groups established under the AHRB. If separate bodies are created they should be integrated in the future. The creation of separate bodies, independent from one another, could create problems in terms of securing funding. The ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers has already been established, consisting of staff from the member countries’ Department of Labour. The proposals for the establishment of an ASEAN commission on the promotion and protection of the rights of women and children (ACWC) and the elaboration of an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers are derived from a policy document (the Vientiane Action Programme) whereas the ASEAN human rights body is derived from a stronger legal basis (the ASEAN Charter). Additional mechanisms to make up the ASEAN human rights system could include subcommissions on specific themes/groups, special procedures, individual complaints mechanisms, preventative mechanisms (early warning system; something similar to the 37
Page 212 of 237
• • • • III.9
European Committee on the Prevention of Torture), inquiry procedures, reporting procedures, a regional human rights court, a mechanism to examine and review domestic laws to ensure compliance. National human rights mechanisms should also be established which, in turn, link up with regional human rights mechanisms. An individual complaints mechanism and a human rights court are central to human rights protection. Different mechanisms should be utilised by civil society for maximum effect. This includes coordinating/collaborating with UN human rights mechanisms. The TOR of the ACWC could be based on the TOR for the AHRB, but also strengthened, which could in turn act as an incentive to strengthen the AHRB’s TOR. Panel Discussion2: Thoughts on Civil Society and NHRIs Strategy for the Months and Years Ahead to Help Develop Credible and Effective Regional Human Rights Mechanisms
Main points from Ms. Atty. Leila De Lima (Chairperson, Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines) •
•
• •
The ASEAN NHRI Forum has submitted its recommendations to the HLP on how to improve the TOR. These recommendations include the following: o Would like the AHRB to be called a “Commission”. o That it be effective, credible and accessible. o That it be an independent deliberative inter-governmental body with emphasis on the promotion and protection of human rights. Recognise that it is an intergovernmental body, but that it should be more than simply a consultative body (as it is currently referred to in the TOR). o Elaborate on the AHRB’s functions and give it more independence. o The formation of the Commission should take place through a transparent, participatory and inclusive process of consultation with all stakeholders, including NHRIs. o Note the total absence of any language with respect to NHRIs in both the ASEAN Charter and in the TOR. o In the mandate, push for the maximum, which includes protection. Implicitly, the ASEAN NHRI Forum adheres to the “evolutionary process” in that we are proposing a mandate to receive, analyse, investigate and take action on complaints on alleged violations of human rights for any person or group of persons or on its own initiative, but that no reference is made to a court. o The Commission shall only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law. Initiatives/action that may be taken: o Need more dialogue, forums to maximise lobby efforts with governments. NHRIs are in a good position to add extra pressure to governments. Are closer to government than civil society and also closer to civil society than governments, so can act as a bridge between the two. o Sustained advocacy against cultural relativism. o Utilise to better effect the various mechanisms within the UN human rights system. Between now and July it should be non-stop advocacy work directed towards governments to develop a substantive protection mandate for the AHRB. The focus of the ASEAN NHRI Forum is also to be able to assist in the establishment of NHRIs in other ASEAN member states.
2
Sitting on this panel were Mr. Yap Swee Seng, Executive Director of Forum Asia; Ms. Atty. Leila De Lima, Chairperson, Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines; and Mr. Rafendi Djamin, Convenor of the SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights.
38
Page 213 of 237
• •
Certain NHRIs may not respond adequately to human rights concerns and issues in their respective countries. So the AHRB has a role to play in this instance, in accordance with the principle of the exhaustion of domestic remedies. A representative from Komnas Perempuan, National Commission on Violence Against Women in Indonesia, added that i) Their position is to have one unified human rights body; ii) Coordination between ASEAN and NHRIs needs to improve; iii) The TOR should refer to the need for consultation with NHRIs from the region.
Main points from Mr. Rafendi Djamin (Convenor of the SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights): •
•
•
Focusing on the possible joint initiatives between civil society and NHRIs in terms of engagement with the AHRB, it was recommended to: o Collaborate on public awareness campaigns regarding ASEAN human rights mechanisms. o Collaborate on the selection of the commissioners, especially where member states’ internal processes provide more space for this. o Hold regular consultations on advocacy and trans-boundary human rights issues in relation to the AHRB. There is possibly going to be another discussion with the HLP before they decide on the final draft of the TOR in July. The best practices we have learned from other regions can inform advocacy and lobbying to help persuade governments to fill the gaps in the current TOR. The AHRB is likely to have serious gaps in terms of its protection mandate. One way to fill this gap is to encourage states to implement recommendations from UN human rights mechanisms, such as the treaty bodies, special procedures and the UPR.
Questions/comments from the participants: Q: Do NHRIs also have some strategies to respond to the emerging mechanisms such as the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers (ACMW) and the ASEAN Commission on Women and Children (ACWC)? •
Ms. Atty. Leila De Lima: There is some recognition that the ACWC might go ahead of the AHRB but the position of the NHRIs is that, as much as possible, they should be integrated with the AHRB instead of separate commissions.
Comment: The ACMW is not structured to deal with human rights; they are mid-level officers appointed to ensure the implementation of article 22 of the ASEAN Declaration on Migrant Workers (develop an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers) and then to ensure that it is implemented at the national level (the ACMW met in Bangkok in April). The Task Force on Migrant Workers, consisting of civil society and trade union representatives, will finalise a framework instrument by the end of next week. This framework instrument will be passed to the Senior Labour Officers Meeting (SLOM) in Vientiane who will then hand it over to the ACMW to continue the drafting process. The ACMW does not have a role to play in terms of a complaints mechanism, which is why the Task Force is calling for a sub-committee of the AHRB to deal with migrant workers issues. Q: Regarding CSO collaboration with the NHRIs on the selection process for the Commissioners of the AHRB, are you referring to the selection process or suggesting someone that can come from civil society or from the NHRIs to sit on the AHRB? •
Mr. Rafendi Djamin: I am proposing for a discussion to take place, otherwise the Commissioners will simply be appointed by national governments without consultation. It is important to engage with governments on what kind of process they will have to select the commissioners; the TOR leaves it open to governments to decide on their internal 39
Page 214 of 237
process of consultation. CSOs can say to their governments, for example, “In Indonesia it is possible to have an internal process of consultation, why not us?” Governments are worried about their image within ASEAN and this can give civil society leverage. Comment: Regarding Child Rights CSOs, the challenge for us is to engage with the children and young people who are supposed to benefit from this AHRB and whatever mechanism will be working to protect their rights. What is imperative now is for us to translate many of these messages into something that children and young people can truly relate to and which will allow them to provide inputs into the process. •
Mr. Yap Swee Seng: What are the issues to focus on during the period May-July 2009 in terms of improving the text of the TOR? Things to highlight include the independence of the persons sitting in the AHRB, which is crucial if we want to ensure that the mandate of the AHRB will evolve in a positive direction. Also, what is our non-negotiable bottom line? An investigation mechanism as one of the key protection elements should be pushed to be included in the final text. These two points are crucial to ensure the effectiveness of the body and its future development.
Comment: In Uruguay at the moment there is a petition process going on where they are trying to get 250,000 signatures to repeal the amnesty law in Uruguay. I am not optimistic about the idea of talking to the HLP and getting them to include protection at the last minute; it just does not sound like that is in the cards. What you can do is try to hand a kind of fait accompli or some kind of public manifestation through a petition campaign to this new human rights commission that is being created under the ASEAN Charter. If you send them complaints about human rights violations then at some point somebody is going to ask what are you going to do with these complaints and they are going to have to answer something. So if you present them with the facts of human rights violations in this region that forces them to take some kind of action. Looking at the Sabato Commission in Argentina, Ernesto Sabato was one of the most prestigious novel writers in Argentina and he was named by the Government to head a truth commission. Now, you would not expect a novelist to be heading a truth commission, but he was a man with an important reputation and was widely loved in the country. It is then important to think outside of the box for the people with the great reputations in the region who would be credible members of the Commission that you could promote. Comment: Civil society should argue for the whole range of human rights, including sexual orientation and gender identity, right to safe and legal abortion etc. We feel that our role is to maintain our convictions. •
Mr. Yap Swee Seng: Issues for civil society to focus on after the body is set up will include the drafting of the rules of procedure of the body and the drafting of the ASEAN human rights declaration.
Q: What are we going to do on July 13-14 at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) when the TOR will be finalised? Do we have any chance to go inside the meeting, because I do not know what the previous experience of dealing with the AMM is? Is there anything that we can do prior to that date? •
Mr. Rafendi Djamin: From now until July we are still trying to request one more interface with the HLP, as occurred in Manila and Kuala Lumpur. However, we can also approach the MFA and the HLP members at the national level to ask for developments regarding the filling of the protection gap for the AHRB. They received instructions from their own ministers during the meeting in Hua Hin to really strike a balance between protection and promotion. In our consultations with our own governments, we can ask for the results of the deliberations after these instructions.
40
Page 215 of 237
•
• • • •
As far as the AMM is concerned, it has always been a closed meeting. However, we can try to change this. The SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights (TF-AHR) has won space and recognition and secured interactions with the HLP on the discussion of the TOR. The next step is to secure consultations at the AMM. CSOs have to consider the possibility of having a media blitz of advocacy in June and July, prior to the AMM. Following the AMM, CSOs need to develop a position on the finalised TOR, and whether to initiate a wide public campaign denouncing it? CSOs will also have to focus on the proposed modality of consultation with civil society by the AHRB and the drafting of the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights. The TF-AHR will have its regional consultation in August 2009 at which point we can identify what the priority issues are to bring to the attention of the AHRB in performing their mandate.
Comment: The AMM will be closed to civil society, but not to journalists. So maybe we should identify journalists that will be invited to the AMM and have a meeting with them. We need the country focal points to help identify who these journalists are. Comment: In the Kuala Lumpur meeting we decided that we should do some analysis to compare CSO submissions with the TOR. I think this is very important for us to show the gap between these two documents and to use it as a lobby tool. This should be prepared before July. Comment: It is important for the different sectors of civil society to come together and agree on a common core message. When we approach our governments we need to have a common stance. •
III.10
Mr. Yap Swee Seng: The secretariat of Forum-Asia will put together the points and ideas that have been discussed here and will then circulate to everyone. The secretariat will also continue liaising with the HLP and continue with the public advocacy campaign that started two months ago. Closing remarks
Ms. Atty. Leila De Lima, on behalf of the ASEAN NHRI Forum, expressed appreciation for the two day dialogue and the suggestions that resulted, including the need for closer collaboration between CSOs and NHRIs. Mr. Yap Swee Seng thanked the participants and organisers along with the three experts for travelling from so far afield and providing valuable experiences and suggestions. Mr. Rafendi Djamin, on behalf of the TF-AHR, expressed his sincere gratitude and thanks to the experts for helping the participants better understand the workings of regional mechanisms and the role of civil society and NHRIs in other regions of the world. He thanked OHCHR Regional Office, Bangkok and SEARCH for the close collaboration and cooperation since the beginning of the planning for this expert dialogue. And he expressed appreciation for the contributions from all national and thematic focal points of the SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights, including Lao and Viet Nam, and looked forward to elaborating further cooperation and engagement with the wider civil society networks in the countries of ASEAN. He also gave thanks to Ms. Atty. Leila De Lima for representing the ASEAN NHRI Forum, and to Komnas Perempuan for participating. IV. FOLLOW UP TO THE MEETING •
This report will be circulated to all participants of the meeting as a resource to help link their work in South-East Asia with experiences from Africa, the Americas and Europe. ______________
Prepared by Mr. Daniel Collinge, ROB
41
Page 216 of 237
The Logic of Engagement I
Civil Society
The importance of policy diffusion in the region •
I
Engagement with ASEAN:
• •
An Overview
•
I
Jenina Joy Chavez Focus on the Global South
• •
I
I
ASEAN Charter Building Process
Important initiative by the Malaysian Government in 2005 was claimed by civil society organizations as their o wn
I
Continuing the process 4 ACSC‟s (Shah Alam 2005; Cebu 2006; Singapore 2007; Bangkok 2009) • ACSC V, October 2009 Enriching the process • National processes for the ACSC I
I I
• • •
I
• •
I
I
I
I
Preparations for the Official Interface (nb: Malaysia cf: Thailand) The ASEAN Peoples‟ Forum (APF) Gearing towards direct dialogue
•
SAPA Liaisons to the ASEAN (cf: ASEAN Peoples’ Center) TF on ASEAN and Human Rights TF on ASEAN Migrant W orkers
Engagement on various issues: human rights; migrant workers‟ rights; trade, agriculture and economic issues; various socio-cultural issues
ASEAN Peoples’ Charter • • •
Regional consultations To prepare submissions Event organized by the HLTF (Manila, March 2007)
•
Engagement on the ASEAN Community Blueprints
•
National processes In line with ACSC II and III processes Events organized by EPG members (Manila, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur) • Events organized by the HLTF (Jakarta, Manila, Bangkok) •
SAPA Working on ASEAN •
Input Submissions to the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) • Political-Security Pillar (Ubud, 17 April 2006) • Economic Pillar (Singapore, 28 June 2006) • Socio-Cultural Pillar and Institutional Mechanisms (thru Amb. R. Manalo, Manila, 10 November 2006) • Letter of reiteration (26 November 2006)
•
Consistently in six countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the Burma-Thai border Intermittently in Singapore (ACSC III) Absence in Brunei Darussalam, Laos and Myanmar
Other Initiatives and Commitments I
Re-i magining a new unity
I SAPA W G on ASEAN
•
I
The desire to be included People‟s participation People-to-people regionalis m
Alternative Regionalism •
ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) and the ASEAN Peoples’ Forum (APF) I
Socializing ASEAN Transparency Accountability
Reclaiming people’s spaces, reclaiming the region •
Briefing Note for the ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representatives 24 August 2009 I Jakarta
ASEAN as a „planking‟ mechanis m
Democratizing ASEAN spaces, policy and processes
A continuing process ACSC commitment To consolidate rich CS perspectives, aspirations and actions To use as input/assessment when the ASEAN Charter is reviewed in 2013
Page 217 of 237
Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations PREAMBLE
WE, THE PEOPLES of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as represented by the Heads of State or Government of … : NOTING with satisfaction the significant achievements and expansion of ASEAN since its establishment…; RECALLING the decisions to establish an ASEAN Charter in the Vientiane Action Programme, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter and the Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter; MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and interdependence among the peoples and Member States of ASEAN…; INSPIRED by and united under One Vision, One Identity and One Caring and Sharing Community; UNITED by a common desire and collective will to live in a region of lasting peace, security and stability, sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and social progress, and to promote our vital interests, ideals and aspirations; RESPECTING the fundamental importance of amity and cooperation, and the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, consensus and unity in diversity; ADHERING to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; RESOLVED to ensure sustainable development for the benefit of present and future generations and to place the well-being, livelihood and welfare of the peoples at the centre of the ASEAN community building process; CONVINCED of the need to strengthen existing bonds of regional solidarity to realise an ASEAN Community that is politically cohesive, economically integrated and socially responsible in order to effectively respond to current and future challenges and opportunities; COMMITTED to intensifying community building through enhanced regional cooperation and integration, in particular by establishing an ASEAN Community comprising the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN SocioCultural Community, as provided for in the Bali Declaration of ASEAN Concord II; HEREBY DECIDE to establish, through this Charter, the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN…
Page 218 of 237
ASEAN People Center
Launched last Janua ry 2009, based in JJJaaakkkaaarrrta ta Initiated by Forum Asia, based in Ban gkok Thailand and SEACA (South East Asia Committee fo r Advocacy), bas ed in Manila-Philippin es
The ASEAN Peoples‟ Center - Jakarta Rafendi Djamin Coordinator Human Rights Working Group — I nd on e si a Convener SAPA Task-Force on ASEAN and Human Rights Presented at Singapore National Consultation on TOR of AHRB w Post-Museum, Singapore 4 April 20 09
5/13/2010
1
5/13/2010
Principle on Engagement •
•
V i si o n
Engaging the ASEAN Process, is both a right and an obligation for the ASEAN peoples Engagements at the regional level should have strong foundations at the national level
5/13/2010
3
•
•
Enhancing Civil Society advocacy and engagement with ASEAN on people‟s issues Contributing to the task of ASEAN community building eshrined in ASEAN Charter
5/13/2010
Main Purpose of the Center Facilitating process of engagement between civil society form all members countries of ASEAN with the new structure of ASEAN after the working into force of ASEAN Charter
5/13/2010
4
Current Functions •
•
2
•
• •
5
Information Center on ASEAN for civil Society advocacy work Provide briefing sessions to all stakeholders of ASEAN particularly to ASEAN secretariat, member-states and dialog partners, and international media Offers capacity building activities for effective CS enggagement with ASEAN Complement CS advocacy through effective issue monitoring and lobbying
5/13/2010
Page 219 of 237
6
Scope of Engagement
On the Security pillar
to the 3 pillars of ASEAN: a) Politic and Security, b) Economic Cooperation, c) Socio-Cultural cooperation ,
>
>
>
5/13/2010
7
On ASE AN Economic Pillar 1.
2.
Ensuring Broader definition and reference to security Ensuring more conducive political environment for peace, security, stability Ensuring harmonization of existing ASEAN instruments and norms with international norms and standards define ASEAN key stakeholders: governments and its peoples
5/13/2010
8
On ASE AN Economic Pillar-2
a strong social protection element in economic development founded on redistributive justice, poverty eradication and growth with equity and non-discrimination regional harmonization and complementation in industry, agriculture, and services
5/13/2010
9
4. coopera tion in regional human resou rce
development that en sures do mestic emplo yment in critical industries and services 5. enshrine international core labor standa rds an d the principle of equal treatment, as well as adoptin g standa rd employmen t con tracts tha t protect the righ ts and well-being of native an d migrant labor alike 6. responsi bility of member states to pro mo te, protect, and fulfill human rights, such as the guarantee that all TNCs operating in ASEAN should respect human ri ghts 5/13/2010
10
On Socio-Cultural Cooperation
On ASE AN Economic Pillar-3 7.
ensure equi tabl e acc ess to and ownershi p of markets and p roducti ve resourc es and, i nsti tuti onali ze di saster management mechani sms 8. Ensuri ng enforcement of p ri nci pl e of sustai nabl e devel opment, the encourag ement of an i ndustri al producti on sys tem (cl ean, resource- and energyeffi ci ent and sus tai nabl e), promote renew abl e energy sources, and member s tates‟ commi tment to up hol d the concep t of sus tai nabl e cons umpti on 9. adherence to regi onal l evel commi tments (moni tori ng system) 10. ful l and meani ngful parti ci pati on of ci vil soci ety at al l l evel s of deci si on-maki ng so as to ensure more effec ti ve and equi tabl e benefi ts shari ng, and to strengthen economi c i ntegrati on 5/13/2010
ASEAN Security community
• >
11
Elem ents of socio-cultural community: What ppprrriin innccciip innssstttiitittuuutttiio ipplle leesss and iin ioonnnsss are nnneeeeeedddeeeddd to secure the elements of an ASEAN socio-cultural community? W hat does community of caring societies mean? What does it entail? • Managing the social impacts of economic integration • Environm ental sustainability • Regional social cohesion 5/13/2010
Page 220 of 237
12
On Socio-Cultural Cooperation
Current Scope of engagement
What Specific Secto rs /A re as of S oci o -C ult u ral Cooperation should be i nc l u d e d? • • • • •
•
health educ ati on youth wom en sub-regi onal cooperati on — de fact o c om m unities or gl ori fi ed speci al ec onom ic zones? (e. g. BlMP-EA GA )
5/13/2010
•
13
Establishment of ASEAN human Rights Body , ASEAN commission on Women and Children coordinated by SAPA Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights Migrant Workers Rights , coordinated by SAPA Task-Force on ASEAN Migran Workers
5/13/2010
W ay forward •
•
•
14
Thanks..
Ensuring legal status of APC, and formalization affiliation to ASEAN Broadening Scope of engagements to all pillars of ASEAN Strengthening human resources and experts within ASEAN People Center
5/13/2010
15
5/13/2010
Page 221 of 237
16
Civil Society and ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights
Ou t lin e
Civil Society and ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights
1. 2. 3.
4.
Rafendi Djamin Coord dinator of Human Rights Worki ng g Grroup — Indonesia Conven err of Solidarity for Asian People Ad vocac cy (SAPA) TaskForce on ASEAN and Human Rightts
[email protected] g
1. Introduction I I
Introducttio n An overview w of H um an Rights in A SEAN SAPA Task k Force o n ASEAN and Hum an Rights Content of Subm issio n
Human Rights issues in ASEAN
Human Riights Situation in ASEAN The current development of ASEAN Human Rights Mechanisms
Gross violations of Human Rights Æ Crim es against humanity; genocide, To rture, Extrajudicial killings, terro ris t actss I death h penalty, hum an rightss educatio n, ID P, protection of H RD, human rights of M igrant workers, hum an rights of traffficked perso ns I
Engagement in First workshop on prep of AHRB after working into force of ASEAN charter I
Workshop on the Promot ion and Protec tion of Human Rights “Supporting the Establishment of Regional Human frights Mec chanisms in ASEAN” in Bali 15-17 May 2008 Æ hosted by ASEAN Sec and Indonesiian MFA.
Human Rights Framework AICHR — October 2009 I ASEAN Commission on Wom men and Children (ACWC) — working Group on TOR I ACMW — D Drraaffttiinngg PPrroocceessss of ASEAN LLeeggaall Framework for the Protecttion and Promotion of Migrant Workers Rights I
Page 222 of 237
BROADENING MEMBERSHIP, FFO OC OIIN CA ALL PPO NTTSS aanndd PPaarrttnneerrss 2nd ASEAN CSO consultation on ASEAN and Human Rights , August 2008 , Jakarta. I Housing Ri ghts I Indigenous Peoples’ Rights I The Rights of People with Disability I Children’’s Rights I National consultation in Vietnam and Laos I
O u t reac h in g … I
al Orientation meeting for Indigenous Peoples on Regiona ASEAN and AS EAN human rights body (AHRB) (28 J ul y 2008), Chiang Mai, Thailand a ttended by 22 participants from nati onal and regional indigenous people es;
I
Regiona al Caucus on Women a nd d Children on the A S EA N Human Rights Mechanism (4 August 2008), Jakarta, a ttended by 30 participants from wo omen and children’s righ ts orga nizattions in Burma, Indonesia, Lao os, Malaysia, Philippines, Singaporre, Thailand, and Vie tna m ;
I
The Region nal C on s ul ta ti on for wom men and c hil dr e n or ga n iz z a ti on s on the ASEA N Human Rights Me c h a nis m s , (15- 17 September 2008), Ba ngkok k, Thailand
O u t reac h in g ..2
Engagement at national level
Thematic - Gender: 18- 19 9 Feb 2009 in Bangkok, organized by Gender Focal Point (APWLD, IWRAW) I Thematic — Rights of Disab bility People: 12-15 Feb and 16-24 Feb 20 009 in Vietnam , organized by Disability People International (DPI- AP)) nd diiig geen no ou uss Peo I Thematic — IIn oples’ Rights: 22 Feb 2009 in Bangkok, organiized by the IP Focal Point I
I
I
I I
I I I I
The Thailland Focal Point of the SAP A TFA AHR met the HLP Thai land, H.E. Siha asak Phuangketkeow in a CSO consultatiion on 13 Augu st 2008; The Ph hilippine Focal Point of the SAPA TFAHR met the HLP Ph ilippine assistant, H.E. Mariylin Alarilla in a CSO consultation on 10 October 2008; The Malaysian Focal Point of the SAPA TFAHR met the HLP Mala ysia, H.E. Ahmad Fuzy in a CSO consultation on 16 October 2008; The Indone esian Focal Point of SA PA TF FAHR met the HLP In donessia, H.E. Wiwiek Firman in CSO Consultattion on 17 December 2008; The Indone esian Focal Point of SA PA TF FAHR met the HLP Indone sia, H.E. Wiwiek Firman in CSO Consultattion on 12 Feb ru ar y 2009 The Indone esian Focal Point of SA PA TF FAHR met the HLP In donessia, H.E. Wiwiek Firman in CSO Consultattion on 5 January 2009 The Cam mbodian Focal Point of SA PA TF FAHR met the HLP Cambodia, H.E. Om Yentieng in CSO Consu ultation on December 2008; The Malaysian Focal Point of SAPA TFA AHR met the HLP Malaysia, H.E. Ahmad Fuzy in CSO Consultation on 6 Feb 2009
Engagement at regional level during HLP 3rd Meeting (12 — 14 Sep 2008 , Manila) Cons ultattion civil society with HLP from Philippines , Amb. Manalo o n 10 September 2008 I Fol low ed b y Interface of SAPA Task For ce on ASEAN and HR with the 10 HLP for the TOR R of AH RB I Cons ultation with Indonesian HLP, Ms Wiwi k Seti aw an in Bali during 5th HLP Meeting on synch hronizing the process of the creation of ASEAN Commission n on the Protection and Promotion on the Rights of Wom en and Children (ACWC), ASE EAN Commission on Migrant Workers (ACMW) and ASEAN Human Rights Bo dy (AH RB) I
Ca mp aig n .. I Joint
a regional campaign toward “Accountable, Independent and Effective AHR Commission” I Publishing FAQ on AHRB, posters, stickers, T-shirt, post cards, booklet I Public awareness campaign and educatio n on AHRB at National lev ell, outreaching vulnerable groups
Page 223 of 237
I Submitted
in September 2008 during the 1 Interface Meeting with HLP in Manila I Submission is a result from the 2nd Regional Consultation on ASEAN and Human Rights (August 200 08) and compiled from 8 national consultations in May — June 2008 I Well received,, very comprehensive, endorsed by more than 200 organizations 1st
I Part
IV:: On the Sub- commissions and Secretariat shall be open for the creation of sub-commissions, including subcommissions on women, childrren, migrant wo rkers, indigenous peoples, and others
I commission
I Part
V: Financial
governments shall prov vide adequate financial support to the commission
I ASEAN
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
PreamblefPrelimin ary Provisionss, Purposes and Principles, Evolutionary process, Responsibilities, Nature and Status, Mandate and Function,
Role of ASEAN Secretariat, 10. Relationship with Regional and International Human Rights Entities,, 11. Rule of Procedure, 12. Budget,, 13. Name, 14. Road Map, 9.
I Part
e High Level I: On the work of the Panel: I
Work in an inclusive and democrratic manner i n nati ona al a nd regional consulttation with ci vi l society grou p s
I Part
II: Mandate of the ASEAN human rights body I
commission shall be given the mandate to w or k on promo otion , prote ction and thereby t he fulfillmentt of human right s.. Both m andates shall be treated in equal impo ortance at all tim es
I Part
III: On the Composition and Structure of the Commission
I Submitted
on 7 November 2008 over the e-mail to HLP Chair, Ambassador Sihasak , official submitted to HLP Indonesia on 11 November 2008 in Bali, Ind donesia I Refined version using the 15 proposed head of discussion on TOR I Well received
I Submitted
during the 2nd Interrface Meeting with HLP in Kuala Lumpur, 20 March 2009 I Result from 8 national consultations during February — March 2009 & write-shop on 18-19 March 2009 in KL I Responding to the 13 Feb 2009’s version of the TOR I Highlighting principles
Page 224 of 237
1. I
I
I
the work off AHRB must be guided by international norms and standards embo died in the Unive ersal Declaratio n of Human Rightss and other internatio nal instruments AHRB to co ver the promo tion, protectio n and fulfilm ent of human rights should not be limited to only citizens in the AS EAN but to all peo ples in the e regio n AHRB to ensure that all member states in the ASEAN act upon its obligattion to pro mote, protect, and fulfil all human rights in line with in ternation nal human rights norms and standards
Unclear provisions on prot ectio on mandate and function 7. Lack of enforcement mechanism m 8. Independence of AHRB fr om governments my 9. Fiscal Autonom 10. Secretariat support for the work of AHRB 11. Decision-making process 12. Chairmanship of AHRB 13. Removal of members 6.
2. 3.
4. 5.
Cultural relativism risks undermining international human rights norrms and standards Principle of non-interference The right of individuals, civil society organizations and peoples organisations to access and participate in the AHRB AHRB relations with ASEAN bod dies AHRB relations with the ASEAN N National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs)
Role of CS on ensuring the role of ASEAN HRM I
Ensuring that Political Declaration will include a clear guideline on strengthening protection mandat
Thank you
Page 225 of 237
Role of the Secretary-General and ASEAN Secretariat 7.1 The Secretary-General of ASEAN may bring relevant issues to the attention of the AICHR in accordance with Article 11.2 (a) and (b) of the ASEAN Charter. In so doing, the Secretary-General of ASEAN shall concurrently inform the ASEAN Foreign Ministers of these issues. 7.2 The ASEAN Secretariat shall provide the necessary secretarial support to the AICHR to ensure its effective performance. To facilitate the Secretariat‟s support to the AICHR, ASEAN Member States may, with the concurrence of the Secretary-General of ASEAN, second their officials to the ASEAN Secretariat. (f) (aft 8, sec, 2, f on ASEAN coordinating Council) consider the report of the Secretary-General on the functions and operations of the ASEAN Secretariat and other relevant bodies; (g) approve the appointment and termination of the Deputy Secretaries-General upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General; and (art. 10, sec 2) 2. Each ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Body may have under its purview the relevant senior officials and subsidiary bodies to undertake its functions as contained in Annex 1. The Annex may be updated by the Secretary-General of ASEAN upon the recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives without recourse to the provision on Amendments under this Charter. ARTICLE 11 SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ASEAN AND ASEAN SECRETARIAT 1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN shall be appointed by the ASEAN Summit for a non-renewable term of office of five years, selected from among nationals of the ASEAN Member States based on alphabetical rotation, with due consideration to integrity, capability and professional experience, and gender equality. 2. The Secretary-General shall: (a) carry out the duties and responsibilities of this high office in accordance with the provisions of this Charter and relevant ASEAN instruments, protocols and established practices; (b) facilitate and monitor progress in the implementation of ASEAN agreements and decisions, and submit an annual report on the work of ASEAN to the ASEAN Summit; (c) participate in meetings of the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Community Councils, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and other relevant ASEAN meetings; (d) present the views of ASEAN and participate in meetings with external parties in accordance with approved policy guidelines and mandate given to the SecretaryGeneral; and (e) recommend the appointment and termination of the Deputy Secretaries-General to the ASEAN Coordinating Council for approval. 3. The Secretary-General shall also be the Chief Administrative Officer of ASEAN.
Page 226 of 237
4. The Secretary-General shall be assisted by four Deputy Secretaries-General with the rank and status of Deputy Ministers. The Deputy Secretaries-General shall be accountable to the Secretary-General in carrying out their functions. 5. The four Deputy Secretaries-General shall be of different nationalities from the Secretary-General and shall come from four different ASEAN Member States. 6. The four Deputy Secretaries-General shall comprise: (a) two Deputy Secretaries-General who will serve a non-renewable term of three years, selected from among nationals of the ASEAN Member States based on alphabetical rotation, with due consideration to integrity, qualifications, competence, experience and gender equality; and The ASEAN Secretariat shall comprise the Secretary- General and such staff as may be required. 8. The Secretary-General and the staff shall: (a) uphold the highest standards of integrity, efficiency, and competence in the performance of their duties; (b) not seek or receive instructions from any government or external party outside of ASEAN; and (c) refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as ASEAN Secretariat officials responsible only to ASEAN. 9. Each ASEAN Member State undertakes to respect the exclusively ASEAN character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. ASEAN Charter (c) (ASEAN Committee of Permanent representatives; Art. 12 sec 2, c) liaise with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat on all subjects relevant to its work; ARTICLE 15 ASEAN FOUNDATION 1. The ASEAN Foundation shall support the Secretary- General of ASEAN and collaborate with the relevant ASEAN bodies to support ASEAN community building by promoting greater awareness of the ASEAN identity, people-to-people interaction, and close collaboration among the business sector, civil society, academia and other stakeholders in ASEAN. 2. The ASEAN Foundation shall be accountable to the Secretary-General of ASEAN, who shall submit its report to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Coordinating Council. ARTICLE 16 ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH ASEAN 2. Rules of procedure and criteria for engagement shall be prescribed by the Committee of Permanent Representatives upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General of ASEAN.
Page 227 of 237
3. Annex 2 may be updated by the Secretary-General of ASEAN upon the recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives without recourse to the provision on Amendments under this Charter. ARTICLE 18 IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE SECRETARYGENERAL OF ASEAN AND STAFF OF THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT 1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN and staff of the ASEAN Secretariat participating in official ASEAN activities or representing ASEAN in the Member States shall enjoy such immunities and privileges as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions. 2. The immunities and privileges under this Article shall be laid down in a separate ASEAN agreement. ARTICLE 23 GOOD OFFICES, CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION 2. Parties to the dispute may request the Chairman of ASEAN or the Secretary-General of ASEAN, acting in an exofficio capacity, to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation. ARTICLE 27 COMPLIANCE 1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, assisted by the ASEAN Secretariat or any other designated ASEAN body, shall monitor the compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, and submit a report to the ASEAN Summit. ARTICLE 30 OPERATIONAL BUDGET AND FINANCES OF THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT 3. The Secretary-General shall prepare the annual operational budget of the ASEAN Secretariat for approval by the ASEAN Coordinating Council upon the recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives. ARTICLE 47 SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, DEPOSITORY AND ENTRY INTO FORCE 3. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of ASEAN who shall promptly notify all Member States of each deposit.
Page 228 of 237
The Citizen On Mars :: ASEAN Issues
News Collage
“Ground control to Major Tom.“ A Great Leap for Mankind • • • • •
home About Free Blogsome Themes Login Contact us
Zero Tariff Trade Bodes Well for ASEAN Posted January 2, 2010 — by admin Category Global Politics, ASEAN Issues Comments (5) The beginning of 2010 bodes so well to the regional group ASEAN or Association of Southeast Asian Countries as six of its members began zero-tariff trading on January 1, 2010. Under a scheme that began as far back as 1993, ASEAN countries agreed to have tariffs reduced to 5% by 2010 and ultimately down to zero by 2015 under the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs for ASEAN Free Trade Area (CEPT-AFTA) guidelines. At this rate, the grand ambition of having a single market and eventually a unified economy for ASEAN is just about on the right track, bringing forth to reality the grand ambition set forth when ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was initiated in 2002. This tariff-free trading opens up myriads of opportunities for those who make business and should bring Page 229 of 237 http://citizenonmars.blogsome.com/category/asean-issues/ (1 of 16)4/3/2010 5:30:56 AM
in more vigor to intra-ASEAN trade. Sourcing of cheaper raw materials should be far more flexible now.
Page 230 of 237
http://citizenonmars.blogsome.com/category/asean-issues/ (2 of 16)4/3/2010 5:30:56 AM
The Citizen On Mars :: ASEAN Issues
Goods could flow from one member-country to another without the usual restraints, increasing trade activities exponentially. Thus could redound to wide employment creation as a result of increased production and higher profitability. ASEAN boast of a huge market that could easily rival that of China and India with a population of more than half-a-billion and with a workforce deemed to be equally if not more skilled and knowledgeable. With the danger of financial ballooning and industrial peaking looming over China and India, ASEAN could be the next preferred haven for foreign direct investments from abroad, offering a location that is far richer in natural resources and labor. However, full economic integration for ASEAN encounters very difficult obstacles ahead as the economic disparity of its members is too patent for comfort where member countries like Singapore and Malaysia are far too advanced from those striving economies of Laos and Myanmar. To make matters more complicated, political issues is one remaining thorn in the side of ASEAN economic ambitions as Myanmar continues to be adamant in introducing structural reform in government, as well as in the communist states of Vietnam and Laos. A unitary currency is therefore unthinkable at this point, at least not within the decade or two. European Union had almost flawlessly integrated itself in 1993 because of the non-issue of economic disparity and political divergence among its members. But for ASEAN, these are issues that remain unresolved and off-putting. Yet, despite of this, hope should remain for ASEAN as long as it keeps on moving, albeit in slow and calculated steps. Bookmark & Share
Indonesia CulturelMalaysia Culture Posted September 7, 2009 — by admin Category Music, ASEAN Issues Comments (10) There’s an interesting issue brimming between the two Southeast Asian neighbors - Indonesia and
Page 231 of 237
http://citizenonmars.blogsome.com/category/asean-issues/ (3 of 16)4/3/2010 5:30:56 AM
The Citizen On Mars :: ASEAN Issues
Malaysia - one that has caught the news world just today. It‟s in fact a broiling issue that threatens to overflow --- amounting even to a call for war. Just lately, Indonesia has accused Malaysia of plagiarizing its culture when the latter used a Balinese dance --- the Balinese Pendet Dance --- to promote a TV Program aimed at imbibing tourism. Malaysia has since apologized and had canceled the use of the disputed dance. Yet, tempers remain high as Indonesian protesters trooped to the Malaysian embassy in Jakarta and pelted it with unlikely missiles, from rotten eggs to ninja bladed stars --- mind you. And some of them thought war could ensue. Now that‟s really a serious consequence just for a mix-up on a cultural dance, getting overboard somehow. But there‟s a positive thing I see in this brewing controversy for it only shows how these two countries feel so much passionately about their culture. Contrary perhaps to the fact that some of us do not even think about it anymore, not in this ultra-high speed, modern age that we are living right now. Still, I must say that Indonesia and Malaysia should hold their horses and refrain from going to war (pun intended) based on the misuse of a Balinese Pendet Dance. Historically, speaking the two countries share so much in terms of culture and civilizing influence, a fusion that goes back to so many centuries ago, even as far back as the empiric age of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit (7th to 13th Century). And even with the Philippines, cultural affiances are myriad and overwhelming. In this age, the Hindu culture from across the ocean had made very deep inroads into the Malay Archipelago and into the vast Indonesian islands. This had happened in a time long before the Arabs and Chinese came, for trade or religious duty. In this manner, mix-ups or confusion with cultural items or matters would surely ensue, and could not actually be negated completely. To this, there should be understanding and indulgence between the two Southeast Asian countries, two nations that are often at odds with each other, even going to war in the 1960‟s in dispute of Borneo(Konfrontasi). And besides, it‟s time that Southeast Asian countries should band together culturally and not be so mindful of minor cultural differences. Culture is best apprehended and appreciated when it is shared especially to the ones that are near and adjacent. By the way, as an upshot of this controversy, some Indonesians started to point out that the Malaysian Page 232 of 237
http://citizenonmars.blogsome.com/category/asean-issues/ (4 of 16)4/3/2010 5:30:56 AM
The Citizen On Mars :: ASEAN Issues
national anthem, Negaraku (My Country) , was merely a copycat of an Indonesian song Terang Bulang (Bright Moon). This is true in some point since the two songs, Negaraku and Terang Bulan are adaptations of an old French melody that was so popular in the entire Malay peninsula in the 17th century. Now this one could actually inflame and flare-up nationalistic and patriotic feelings and sentiments since we are already speaking of a national anthem here, and not merely a cultural dance. I hope the leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia would be wise enough to calm the fierce debate at the soonest time possible and be able to resolve it in the most reasonable of manner. Bookmark & Share
Myanmar Gets Away with Economic Lip Service From China Posted August 13, 2009 — by admin Category Philippine Politics, Global Politics, ASEAN Issues Comments (8) For one, Myanmar has just become the most persistent customer of the United Nation Security Council today, as its sentencing of freedom icon Aung San Suu Kyi to an 18month of reclusion has earned it another ticket towards official condemnation. It used to be Israel, staunch raiders of territories of its neighbors, Lebanon and Palestine. Fortunately for Myanmar, veto-wielding countries China and Russia posed stumbling block to the United Nation condemnation with China issuing statements that the western world should respect Myanmar‟s sovereignty. And accordingly, other neighbor countries like India and Thailand forms a belt of protection and easement with China and Myanmar rest comfortably on this. But this is pointed out to be most economic in nature as Myanmar remains to be among the few countries in the eastern hemisphere to have been able to preserved vast portion of natural resources, in terms of lumber and minerals, and definitely China depends on this so much that now it gives the global lip-service. This must be what colonialism looks like nowadays. Page 233 of 237
http://citizenonmars.blogsome.com/category/asean-issues/ (5 of 16)4/3/2010 5:30:56 AM
The Citizen On Mars :: ASEAN Issues
Conspicuously, the ASEAN secretariat is mum on this latest political storm brewing from the land of pagodas. Perhaps, it‟s starting to get tired of Myanmar‟s troubled ways. Everybody gets tired somehow. Maybe the United nation will soon get numbed on Myanmar‟s irreverence that it may just leave the issue there stale and unattended, to keep a blind eye. I hope not. Bookmark & Share
Myanmar Does Not Belong In ASEAN Posted May 15, 2009 — by admin Category Global Politics, Current Events, ASEAN Issues Comments (1) There goes Myanmar once again, hugging the headlines not with any conceivable achievement nor gain, but for yet another unfortunate incident, with the re-arrest of Burmese freedom fighter Aung San Suu Kyi, two months before her house arrest was about to end, as promised by the military junta over there. We do not condone intervention. But sometimes, enough‟s enough. Some boundaries have been crossed. This most recent talk about Myanmar involves a swimming incident where an American Vietnam War veteran who swam across the Inya Lake to reach her house where she was placed under house detention, for almost 19 years now. And it was about to end, just two months away, now she‟s being fully detained in a prison cell. I was asking about why would Ms. Suu Kyi allow some old grungy American person to jeopardize her eventual freedom? And why would the military government there thinks she would do such a foolhardy thing? I think ASEAN should step in now and do something palpable and patent about Myanmar. Despite that political intervention into each member‟s internal affairs is highly restricted as a matter of hard policy, yet I think such application of a policy long established had become so stoic and inflexible, allowing for an irrational political stance such as the ASEAN nonchalance over Myanmar, where even when the military there were already killing their own people, such as the orange-clad Buddhist monks during the Page 234 of 237
http://citizenonmars.blogsome.com/category/asean-issues/ (5 of 16)4/3/2010 5:30:57 AM
The Citizen On Mars :: ASEAN Issues
so-called “Orange Revolution” last year. And ASEAN keeps mum, deciding that it doesn‟t want to antagonize and isolate Gen. Than Swe‟s often bizarre administration. My bad, such foolishness and inanity, I don‟t know what it is there for if it could not lift any finger against the notorious junta in Yangon. The European Union had just toughened its sanction against Myanmar and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had just strongly demanded the release of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi. And what does ASEAN do, it says it does not want to isolate Myanmar. Seemingly, the decision could be principled enough since a raucous Myanmar, especially with a patently murderous military junta reigning over there, could affect the overall peace and security situation in the Southeast Asia region, not good for political image outside while ASEAN is angling for EU-style economic integration in a decade or two. But at least, ASEAN got to do something. ASEAN does not need Myanmar if it continues at this path of repression. When you anything about Myanmar, you‟d thought you are transported back to a past and backward generation, where people work in slave camps without fees and eating porridge all the time and where human lives do not seem to have value at all. EU had to make Poland and Turkey begged on their knees just to be included in the one-market system. But in this side of the world, it‟s the other way around, ASEAN had to turn a blind eye so as just to keep Myanmar on its ranks. Now that‟s entirely unheard of. ASEAN should issue some final ultimatum to Myanmar, despotism has no room in ASEAN. Bookmark & Share
Strange Days In Thailand Posted September 1, 2008 — by admin Category Global Politics, ASEAN Issues Comments (10) Strange politics is not merely the monopoly of Filipinos, and that should somehow gives us a feeling of relief. At least we are not alone in that sort of oddity. Thailand is experiencing a deep political crisis even as we speak now. Hundreds of thousands of workers from 43 state enterprises (they do still have a huge state-controlled concern) has headed towards the street demanding the ouster or resignation Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, accusing him of massive corruption and being merely a lackey of disgraced former PM Thaksin Shinawatra. Sundaravej had been Page 235 of 237
http://citizenonmars.blogsome.com/category/asean-issues/ (6 of 16)4/3/2010 5:30:57 AM
The Citizen On Mars :: ASEAN Issues
the elected leader just last December after the military had decided to turn over power back to civilian rule, after seizing it forcefully from Shinawatra. In that election, backers of Shinawatra---Sundaravej being amongst them---had taken a huge share of votes and in consequence and also in essence rebuking the military‟s earlier role in ousting the ex-PM. Like us, Thailand voters are so soon to forget the sins of former despots. Most of the lion‟s share in that December election came from voters in large rural areas, who had been outward with their support and continuing admiration of Shinawatra. But today, the urban citizens, consisting of the middle-class and upper —class, wants to bring home the message, where the rural population could not be trusted in their political choices and suasions, where they remain faithful and loyal to an administration beset with allegations of corruption and abuse. That now, they (the urban citizens) have virtually caused general paralysis in Thailand, protesting in the streets, threatening even to stifle major and most-basic public utilities such as water and electricity. Violence could erupt, when in fact one explosion had already been reported. What‟s more worrisome is the ever-widening gap between the rural class and urban class in Thailand, and now becoming more patent and obvious. This situation might lead to a civil war. I hope not. Bookmark & Share
Myanmar Needs Every Help Possible Posted May 7, 2008 — by admin Category News & Info, ASEAN Issues Comments (20) Just months after being perturbed by widespread conflict, where hundreds of monks took to the streets in protests of the military junta there, where some have been fatally shot at, Myanmar is once again thrown into a crisis, this time all the more grave and lamentable. Cyclone Nargis lashed at the southwestern region of Myanmar, along the famed Irriwaddy delta, and left more than 22,000 people killed. At that rate, this tragedy has become of massive proportion as the number of deaths is expected to rise steadily where 40,000 others remain missing and unaccounted for. The first time I heard about the cyclone hitting Myanmar, I was not as perturbed at that point considering that in this part of the world, harsh weather conditions mostly come and go throughout the year, especially such as in the Philippine situation. But hours after I heard the initial reports from CNN, I began to hear the word “cyclone” and that got me a little bit more disturbed. I never thought a cyclone exist or could possibly happen in this part of the world, for I‟ve never heard windstorms passing through Page 236 of 237
http://citizenonmars.blogsome.com/category/asean-issues/ (7 of 16)4/3/2010 5:30:57 AM
The Citizen On Mars :: ASEAN Issues
the Asian region called that way. Tropical cyclones are often termed as typhoons around here. But Nargis was called a cyclone even from the beginning, bringing such havoc. It is but sad for our neighbor Myanmar. I have been in full disagreement to the military rule there, especially with Nobel laureate Aung Sang Suu Kyi still being persecuted there under a prolonged house arrest but the Myanmar people surely doesn‟t need to be disturb by yet another ugly situation. It‟s just a bad thing for them. I hope the aids and assistance from the international community would continue to pour in and not be delayed any second more. A minute delay might mean lives being saved or lost. Electricity is all cut- down. Water is not to be found. Shelter is ever more needed. It‟s time that the military junta there set aside their all-too-ardent politics and allow every possible assistance to come in. Earlier, an American response team were disallowed entry into the affected area as the military government continues to be adamant against the U.S. government and wouldn‟t allow any possibility of an American military presence there, even for just a small length of time, despite the urgent necessity for assistance. EU had pledged about 3 Million dollars and that would be just be about sufficient for the immediate concerns. But U.S. personnel are more experienced and far more capable to respond to this kind of situation that their presence is of extreme necessity there. I hope politics should take a backseat for now. Lives of thousands in the Irriwaddy delta are at stake here and that should be the main focus now. And I hope members of ASEAN, like the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand should extend the most help possible, and it is time to apply and put into action the ASEAN spirit of neighborliness and cooperation and help Myanmar get out of this very distressing situation. Bookmark & Share
Page 237 of 237
http://citizenonmars.blogsome.com/category/asean-issues/ (8 of 16)4/3/2010 5:30:57 AM
