Martin Kramer. Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity. THREE. LINES OF POETRY
PLOT THE TRAJECTORY of Arab national consciousness. "Awake, O Arabs,.
Martin
Kramer
Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity
LINES OF POETRY PLOT THE TRAJECTORYof Arab
THREE
O Arabs,
consciousness.
"Awake, ode of Ibrahim al-Yaziji,
famous
and
penned
arise!"
national
the begins in Lebanon.1
in 1868
George Antonius deployed the line as the epigraph of his influential book, Arab
The
Arab
desire
for
as
Awakening,1
the
first utterance
from Ottoman independence the of resistance poem begins
am an Arab!"
of
a nascent
I "Write down, the Palestinian poet by rule.
Mahmoud Darwish, written in 1963 to assert an Arab identity denied by Israel and theWest.3 The poem immediately entered the Arab of
to be recited from memory canon, In the century that separated of people awakened and arose, gradually
nationalist
schoolchildren.
millions the world
and
one
another
that
they
by a generation these two lines, insisting before as
should
be written
down
line ends
a poem
of anguish
Arabs. "Are we most
read
widely
had
one
Arabs
big
lie?" This
in the midst of the latest Gulf crisis by Nizar Qabbani,
written gone
wrong
defiance;
Arab contemporary to sustain exclamation
they were
poet
and
critic.4
Too
of awakening points a mark of doubt. question by
replaced
the
much and Once
half of Europe and a Superpower had admitted to living a lie for most
of this century,
the Arabs
not
could
suppress
their own
doubt
any longer. Their god had also failed, spectacularly so. It had been called
Arabism,
or Arab
or pan-Arabism,
nationalism,
time Qabbani posed his question,
and by the
it had been in full retreat for a
generation. Martin
Kramer
African
171
Studies
is Associate at Tel Aviv
Director University.
of the Moshe
Day an Center
for Middle
Eastern
and
172
Martin Kramer
At
their belief in the Arab present, many Arabs have suspended now a and doubt is whether there Arab collective nation, openly mission. of
swept up by Islamic activism prefer to think recently as Muslims, first and foremost and do so without their lexicon has turned "the Arabs" into a times,
Those
themselves At
apology.
and wastefulness, implying incompetence, to as Arabs plainly prefer be known Egyptians, Moroccans? citizens of over twenty independent
label, Other
derogatory subservience.
Syrians, Jordanians, its own flag and own states, each with asMiddle taken to referring to themselves
interests.
Some
even
have
in anticipation of cooperation
Easterners, order peace and a new regional on Europe. A few intellectuals modeled keep the Arab flame alive. are or Paris, where most in Yet often London abroad, they they command audiences of Third Worldists and "pro-Arabs." dwindling over whether For a decade and they have quarreled pan-Arabism of an Arab-Israeli
Arab
are simply in remission or beyond all resuscitation. It has existed "Arabness" still persists. for as long as
nationalism sense
A
of
the Arabs have walked to negotiation In this half.
the stage of history, and it has been subject
by every
generation this sense
a millennium for nearly must of "Arabness"
generation, the growth of loyalty to separate Arab the global of liberal democracy, triumph
anathema
and
the prospect as nationalism
capitalism, to Arab
to
states, a burgeoning the ascendancy of
terms with Islam, market
a
and come
of peace with Israel. All were over most it evolved of this
can doubtless "Arabness" accommodate the new challenges, century. a modern as it has always done. Arab nationalism, creation of this well under their century, may altogether impact. disappear to But whatever its history the prospects of Arab nationalism, this point rapid history broader
and
rise, birth, a new deserves
enjoy
of
the most
decline telling,
instances
remarkable
any modern for it has not
of
nationalism. been
invoked
of
the
That in the
over
of identity that marks the growing instability a time when Arab nationalism this century. There was a place of some prominence in the comparative study of
debate
the end of did
one
represents
it became the domain of specialists, which as Hans and who Arnold well. Kohn, just Toynbee to integrate into some wider Arab nationalism first attempted the its virtual partisans between became framework, comparative
nationalism, was perhaps
world
wars
but
later
despite
their
own
reservations
about
nationalism
in
Arab Nationalism: In a
Mistaken
173
Identity
of mea
for British culpa?Toynbee's policy, most the for Zionist?they extravagant accepted slogans of as statements of sociological fact or incontrovertible Arab nationalism moral its surface. beneath claims, and saw none of the contradictions general. Kohn's
When
spirit
states
the Arab
these
contradictions
kept
later theorists
after World War II, gained independence to in the fore all their and surged complexity, at arm's length. "No brief summary of the long
and intricate history of the Arab world could hope to disentangle wrote Rupert its states and peoples," have shaped a in scarcely concealed "For full-scale exasperation. analysis to evaluate the whole be necessary record of Arab experience,
the forces which Emerson itwould
such matters including the effects of Ottoman
as the tribal, sectarian, rule, the machinations
and other of
divisions, the European and culture."5
and the role of Islam and of the Arab language powers, In short, itwas a job for someone else who knew it better. But even those comparativists who knew Arab nationalism quite well chose not to make it the pivot of their comparisons, for fear of perhaps losing The
the general case Arab
standards
reader does
of Europe. two hundred million,
in a labyrinth.6 a dauntingly remain
The
speakers in a zone stretching to the Arabian Sea?a region
of Morocco
of Europe from the Atlantic
complex
of Arabic from
one number
today the Atlantic
that extends
parallel
by
the over
shores to all
seaboard of Iberia to the Urals. No
a potential as large, nationalism has claimed European constituency as far-flung, or as fragmented. It has never been easy to document across this zone, of political the historical evolution consciousness a thinness in its persists study. as a straightforward Nor did Arab nationalism reaction originate toWestern of the kind in familiar elsewhere Asia and imperial rule,
and
Africa. Western
Some
Arab
rule, while
over a century of direct experienced peoples none at all. As a result, Arab others experienced
nationalism followed distinct courses of development the Arabian Crescent, peninsula, coast. Each of these zones African
the Nile encountered
in the Fertile
and the North valley, on different theWest
on Arab nationalism times. Variations terms, at different multiplied, even inspiring separate classifications, sometimes such as Nasserism arcane subclassifications, and Ba'thism, and even more such as neo Ba'thism.
Many
of these became
rivals, even to the point
of bloodshed.
This has made it difficult to generalize about Arab nationalism, and
174
Martin Kramer to deploy
treacherous
such generalizations
in the larger debate
over
nationalism. in the following Emerson
The purpose It is to attempt
is not to attempt as a prelude wished,
pages
what
the treacherous. to comparison:
to trace the political trajectory of Arab nationalism plotted by the poets, to walk an idea briskly through its historical phases, and to to those
its relationship
characterize
other
ideas
have appealed to "the speakers of the dad"
and
identities
that
that sound which
is
to Arabic.
It is the story of a nationalism that arose fitfully, then faltered It and failed. is an account of spread dramatically, how millions to of people themselves be Arabs and imagined then, as though in a case of mistaken to have been claimed identity, someone else all along. unique
THE EMERGENCE OF ARABISM Arabism
first arose
century not as a direct reaction a of the state of the Ottoman rule, critique over most of the Arabic-speaking whose reach had extended since the early sixteenth For nearly four hundred century.
to Western Empire, peoples
in the nineteenth
but
as
years, these Arabic speakers had been fully reconciled to their role seat of the Empire was in Istanbul, and its vast in Ottoman administered But the Ottomans Turkish. of their Arabic Islam, as did the overwhelming majority state as a Their evolved in Islam, subjects. partnership
in the Empire. domains were professed speaking embracing language Muslims
God
The
all of
the Ottoman
they spoke. who spoke
Arabic
revealed the Qur'an
seventh conquests,
century. which
sultan's Muslim retained
in Arabic
They also celebrated carried Islam from
a pride
subjects, in their
whatever
language:
to an Arab prophet
in the
the history of the early Arab to the Pyrenees. And the Oxus
they took pride in their genealogies, which linked them to Arabia at the dawn of Islam. But that very fidelity to Islam bound them to on other and prided themselves spoke languages new to who and the defense and genealogies, brought vitality of Islam. Since the fifteenth century, the Ottomans showed expansion
Muslims
who
other
to an Islamic zeal that had carried this vitality, harnessed precisely All the Muslim Islam to the very gates of Vienna. subjects of the saw themselves as participants Ottoman house in and beneficiaries
Arab Nationalism: Islamic
this shared Arab
Mistaken
and they drew
enterprise,
175
Identity
no distinction
between
and Turk.
But with the relative decline inOttoman power, especially in the nineteenth
the
century, The
weaken.
great
foundations
Ottoman
to symbiosis began at rolled both up being
of
carpet
this
was
ends: by Europe's Great Powers, locked in imperial rivalry, and by Christian
the discontented whose Ottomans
lost
of Ottoman
rule
in Europe, form. The
took a nationalist independence on a succession of Westernizing reforms but in the the North Caucasus, Balkans, footing
for struggles embarked
eventually
subjects
their
Africa, and Egypt. As the Empire dwindled, so did the confidence of its remaining remaining the Fertile the Arab
discontent
even
of the Empire, provinces Arabic-speaking come Crescent?a discontent that would "awakening."7 controversies
Many
some
and
subjects,
still
surround
the nature
in the appeared in Arabia and as
to be known
and
extent
of
this
to have drawn two it is generally discontent, upon agreed sources. were there the minority communities of Arabic First, much influenced who currents, Christians, speaking by European to transform Arabic worked into a medium of missionary work and but
modern
learning.
From
their efforts did much
about
the middle
of the nineteenth
century,
to kindle interest in secular Arabic belles
to the modern of Arabic conventions of lettres, through adaptation the press, and the theater. The Arabic the novel, literary revival, centered in Beirut, did not translate immediately into Arab nationalism. But it did argue for the existence to which of a secular Arab culture, Christians
and Muslims
in equal measure. the Christian legacy, minority of the Muslim and to win for majority
had supposedly this shared Arab
upon By elaborating sought to erode the prejudice
contributed
Christians their full equality as fellow Arabs. Arabism
also
arose
a second
from
absorbed the Arabic-speaking Muslim over competition and bureaucratic such demand
century Ottoman
in the conduct opened, Empire
Rivalries
had
always
elite, especially in the keen
to Ottoman
government positions of those grievances passed over for turned into the governors occasionally
appointments sinecures. The
spoils by Ottoman that Istanbul accord
autonomy
source.
of
more provinces As the twentieth
cities spread to all the major was Arabic but it centered spoken,
this Arabism where
the Arabic-speaking their own affairs.
of
the
upon
176
Martin Kramer its adherents
where
Damascus,
began
to organize.
While
the Arabism
of Muslims resembled that of Christians in its pride of language, it differed fundamentally in its deep attachment to Islam. It appealed to Muslims their name
that
the greatness in of the Arabs resided in the of Islam. The Arabs, understanding acting had created a great empire and civilization, and only
by arguing
privileged of Islam,
the Arabs
restore
could
nothing
secular
closely
associated
about with
to
its pristine this assertion of Arab Islam
Islamic
There was grandeur. became genius, which and
apologetics
reformism.
This "Arab awakening," Christian andMuslim, a trenchant
social
criticism
or a truly modern
failed to produce of politics.
language
Ultimately, itwould defeat itself by its apologetic defense of tradition and religion.8 But it did go far enough to shake the confidence of some
Arabic
pamphleteers
in the legitimacy of Ottoman speakers even tried to conjure up Ottoman fears
subsidies) by publishing Most of these appeared Europe's
capitals
began
tracts
in the name
in Europe, to debate
and
rule. A
few
(and foreign of an "Arab movement."
some
"the Arab
in of opinion The debate question." journals
was premature. In 1907 the English traveler Gertrude Bell gave the commonplace
assessment
of these
stirrings:
Of what value are the pan-Arabic associations and inflammatory leaflets that they issue from foreign printing presses? The answer is easy: they are worth nothing at all. There is no nation of Arabs; the is separated by a wider gulf from the Bedouin than Syrian merchant the Syrian country is inhabited by Arabic he is from the Osmanli, races all eager to be at each other's throats, and only speaking from prevented fulfilling their natural desires by the ragged half fed soldier who draws at rare intervals the Sultan's pay.9
Yet by the eve ofWorld War
I, Arabism did begin to take a more
form against the two challenges of Turkification palpable status quo. the cultural threatened Turkification
and Zionism. The
Turkish
to
speaking subjects of the Ottoman
Empire had been exposed
nationalism, European-style Balkans. Turkish-speaking
into the its penetration through to construct for then began
themselves philologists an ancient
largely Muslims
a trend strengthened by Western identity as Turks, to the of establish and romantics who greatness sought As the Ottoman "Turanian" civilization.10 Empire
a new
to give the polyglot authorities stumbled, Ottoman Empire attempted more nation-state the of a European of the character by enforcing
Mistaken
Arab Nationalism: use of Turkish
at the expense
of other
never
This
languages, including Arabic. in caused some apprehension War I, and may have helped
fully implemented, policy, on the eve of World the Arab provinces to rally the supporters of cultural Arabism Zionist
in Palestine
settlement
111
Identity
to a political the political
threatened
purpose. status quo.
Ottoman authorities tolerated the influx of Jewish immigration in the belief that itwould ultimately benefit the Empire, as it had in successive
waves
sultan's
subjects land on which
not
But
since
the Spanish Inquisition. since this latest wave concurred,
all of
the
saw of immigrants as a refuge but as
they were settling not merely in the making. As the pace of Zionist and immigration their immediate settlement grew apprehensive increased, neighbors From the turn of the of dispossession. about the looming possibility the
a state
became amatter of growing century, Ottoman policy toward Zionism in the Arabic and criticism debate press.11 unease Arabism thus arose from a growing about the pace and direction
of
change.
Yet,
while
the Ottoman
Empire
lasted,
this
Arabism did not develop into full-fledged nationalism. Its adherents not Arab for administrative decentralization, pleaded independence, and they had no vision of a post-Ottoman order. They imagined in the form of an accountable solution and professed government for the liberal democracies
admiration
vague
of the West,
a a
especially
of France and England, although they had an imperfect grasp of the behind the slogan of "liberty." Above all, they were practical. meaning in not dreams of Arab in did power. Their grievances, They indulge the words "were of a critic of later Arab local and nationalism, services or to the they related to the quality of government and those who proper scope of local administration; sought redress in their communities, for such grievances were mostly men well known specific;
a sober constitutional to conduct able perhaps to entertain limitless ambitions."12 grandiose,
War
I, they were probably Muslims
Arabic-speaking about the legitimacy
to defend
still in the minority,
outnumbered
and
raised
Christians
of Ottoman
rule,
who and
even
stood
no
by
doubt
prepared
it.
THE ARAB NATION
World War
but not opposition eve On the of World
AND THE EUROPEAN EMPIRES
I forced a choice upon the adherents of Arabism. After
some hesitation,
the Ottoman
Empire
entered
the European
war
on
Martin Kramer
178 the
side of Germany,
Britain
prompting
to fan
and France
every
ember of dissent in the Empire. The Allies held out the prospect of they
"the Arab something they called a a in local potentate found partner
for
independence eventually
and
nation," of Mecca,
the
Sharif Husayn. The Sharif had an ambitious vision of a vast "Arab kingdom" for his family, and in 1915 he secured commitments from
its future regarding he finally raised the standard
In and frontiers. independence of revolt against Ottoman rule.
Britain
1916,
The Arab Revolt which began in Arabia had little to do with the Arabism that had emerged in the Fertile Crescent. Itmore faithfully of the Sharif, and the enthusiasm the dynastic ambition and desert tribes. However, guns gold among Arabia's
expressed for British
the Sharif's sons, the Emirs Faysal and Abdallah, contacts
with
the
existing
in Damascus,
societies
Arab
also established and
the
revolt recruited dissident Arab officers who had deserted Ottoman ranks.
officers
These
had
Ottoman
attended
academies,
military
where they had imbibed the idea of the army as the "school of the nation" them.
from The
the German
revolt
who
officers
thus made
had
a volatile
for
trained
and
advised
whose
mix,
diverse
participants dreamed the different dreams of Arab kingship, desert and military While dictatorship. in the drive for differences
liberal constitutionalism, anarchy, the revolt lasted, they suspended independence. In 1918, as the Ottomans
their
retreated
before
British
arms
in Palestine,
the Arab Revolt culminated in triumph when Faysal led his followers into Damascus
and
there
union
eventual
of
these
an "Arab Government."
formed
to Versailles, where Asia" be of recognized peoples and that "no steps be taken he went
areas
he
asked
that
as "independent inconsistent with under
one
In 1919, "the Arabic-speaking sovereign peoples," the prospect of an
sovereign
government."
Finally, in 1920, a "General Syrian Congress" declared the independence of a "United Kingdom of Syria" including the entire and
Levant,
proclaimed
Emir
Faysal
king.
From
an
Damascus,
"IraqiCongress" also proclaimed Iraq independent, under the kingship of the Emir Abdallah.13 An Arab
nation
its members
outset, other claims. Most to France
and
had made
the game of nations, claims which far-reaching
entered
and
from
the
ran up against commitments
Britain had made wartime notably, The first, the so-called the Zionist movement.
Sykes
Arab Nationalism:
Mistaken
179
Identity
Levant as agreement, secretly recognized most of the northern a zone of French the Balfour the second, Declaration, privilege; a in Britain also home Palestine. national Jewish publicly supported
Picot
in the territories interests strategic and economic sons. The and his the Sharif Husayn contradictory at Remo San the sorted out in April conference, 1920,
demanded
had
and France
on
settled
of occupied as separate
the division
to administer they planned On the basis of these mandates. which
agreements,
Faysal and his followers from Damascus
claims
Britain
where
Ottoman League French
by were
territory, of Nations' forces
drove
in a brief battle in July,
French rule on Syria that would last for a quarter of imposed a century. At the same time, Britain began to fulfill its commitment to more extensive under the Balfour Declaration by opening Palestine and
Zionist
and
immigration
settlement.
Arab
violence
Jews
against
first broke out inApril, presaging the strife between Arab and Jew June,
a fixture
become
that would
a widespread
of the British mandate
insurrection
against
In
for Palestine.
the British
broke
out
in
Iraq, which British forces suppressed by force. Increasingly Arab nationalists charged that Ottoman rule had been replaced by British even more alien than itsMuslim government imperialism, to compensate Britain did move the leaders of the Arab
and French predecessor.
Revolt in 1921: it appointed Faysal as the king of Iraq in expanded an emirate
and carved
borders,
it then which mandate, turned over to Abdallah. against deep grievance territories they wanted,
Jordan out of the Palestine from Zionist and exempted immigration now nursed a But the Arab nationalists the denial
they believed had been promised to them. Arab
and Syria, which once
nationalism, inspired by theWest's itself as a negation of its imperialism. The Arab nationalist lament against Fertile
Crescent
commensurate Transjordan, geography
over the partition of the in Palestine of independence
and France
Britain and
of Trans
liberalism,
the arbitrary partition of the states was of the new
validity. a political community. Lebanon?these Palestine, with
history,
to redefine
None
had much
or classical
began
and
their
Syria, names borders
Lebanon, derived largely
Iraq, from reflected
the imperial jostling for strategic position or oil.14Only the idea of Lebanon had some historical depth, since theMaronite Christians of Mount and had
Lebanon achieved
a strong sense of separate even in the late Ottoman autonomy
maintained some
identity period.
180 But
Martin Kramer were
the Maronites
too few,
and the borders
in 1920 by the French (atMaronite of Muslims.
would
nation,
culture dating back to the Phoenicians?safely
before the rise of any
But the Maronites contemporary religions. in Lebanon that the idea of "eternal the Muslims
of Lebanon's persuade
anything expressed Half themselves.
more
than the sectarian
solidarity their forced population regarded as still another as cruel as trick of imperialism,
idea of an Arab
its supposed there
established
fragmented accustomed
societies
most
nation
thought had been played
to most just as arbitrary the makers and backers of the
seemed
It satisfied
members.
Arab Revolt, who and
Lebanon"
in 1920.15
them
of
to
of theMaronites
the other tricks the Arab nationalists against But the
failed
of Lebanon's
in Lebanon
inclusion
drawn
to manufacture later attempt the idea a commerce and by distinguished seafaring
Maronites
of a Lebanese
of Lebanon
insistence) included largenumbers
regrouped in Iraq after their flight from Syria, another of
to regarding to classify continued
the
Arab Fertile
themselves themselves
nationalist
state.
But
few persons Crescent, as Arabs. As in Ottoman
in the were
times, sect, and genealogy. by religion, or Sunnis or Shiites, Maronites
or Christians, or that clan, family, tribe, village, or urban of this Druzes, not to be ruled by foreigners from over the wish did quarter. They sea. But neither did they desire to be ruled by strangers from across They
were
Muslims
members
even if those the desert, some of them had made
the war, strangers During spoke Arabic. to secure separate their own diplomacy, to difficult the war, their allegiance After proved independence.16 soon as The Arab nationalist discovered. the Arab nationalists win, to be chaotic, in Damascus and his proved on In in of the rested the British. bayonets Iraq reign subsequent a "The Great British called the Imposed," Faysal correspondence, a stranger to his subjects, who had been awarded polity fragmented in Faysal's nationalists The Arab in arbitrary borders. entourage state
under
Faysal
dreamed of a great Arab state, but itwas all they could do to keep together
the would-be
Arabs
that
they
ruled.
Faced with masses of people who had not chosen to be Arabs, the a doctrine them any other that denied developed discarded the wars, the Arab nationalists choice. Between progressively as a voluntary formed by the French idea of the nation contract, to secure their liberty. Increasingly their nation resembled individuals
Arab
nationalists
Arab Nationalism: Volk, a natural of language by the mystery restore its greatness, could the German
surrender
nation and even
Mistaken
above
181
Identity
all human
bound volition, the unity of this nation
lore. Only if the price
of unity
meant
the
of freedom.
This struggle had to be conducted not only against imperialism, but
also
were else.
the would-be Arabs themselves. against and some openly professed eager to be Arabs, In such instances, Arab nationalism assigned
Not
all of
them
to be something itself the task of
educating them to an Arab identity, preferably by persuasion but if necessary nationalism's
by
to
According compulsion. first true ideologue and
Sati'
a confidant
al-Husri, of Faysal,
Arab
Every person who speaks Arabic is an Arab. Everyone who is affiliated with these people is an Arab. If he does not know this or if he does not cherish his Arabism, then we must study the reasons for his we must teach him It be the result of may position. ignorance?then we must the truth. Itmay be because he is unaware or deceived?then awaken him and reassure him. Itmay be a result of selfishness?then we must work
to limit his selfishness.17
This ominous passage presaged the drift of Arab nationalism away say
from that
aspirations slogan of nation
the
of a voluntary we to which should
liberal model
the
system is a Fascist
"solidarity, as an obedient
system,"
wrote
obedience,
and
community. our direct
in 1930, sacrifice."18 The
al-Husri
and
hopes raising idea of
to the army
army Itwent
can
"We
the the
itself,
immediately appealed hand in hand with a growing militarism, belief that only the armed rise above forces could the on "selfishness" of the sect and clan, enforcing the nation. discipline
especially and the
its officers.
this trend. The country became in 1930, Iraq pioneered independent in 1932. Less than a year later, and joined the League of Nations a massacre the army conducted of the Assyrian (Nestorian Christian) to the Arab cause. accused of In 1936, a coup minority, infidelity
d'?tat established a thinly-veiled military dictatorship, in the name of national unity. Finally, in 1941, a junta of colonels led Iraq into a war
of
the course
"liberation" of which
with
Britain, the nationalists
it promptly inspired a pogrom
which
lost, and against
in the
Jews of Baghdad. Mistreated retrospect,
minorities, Iraq's
early
strongmen,
military experience
of
independence
lost
battles?in
anticipated
an
182
Martin Kramer
entire era of Arab
Yet
nationalism.
this nationalism,
and its extravagant in popularity from
extrapolation, pan-Arabism, gained immensely the 1930s. Accelerated from desert encampment migration
to settled
town, from village to city, began to unloose primordial ties, diminishing to nationalist resistance the expansion of education, ideology. With masses Arab nationalist indoctrinated of young pedagogues people, from primary
school
through
the growth
of the Arabic
nationalism
into
every
university.
The
press brought
classroom,
clubhouse,
spread
of
literacy
the message and
and
of Arab
coffee
shop.
In
the public arena, Arab nationalism gradually achieved a firm hold on political and all other discourse, to spread beyond It also began
loyalties became unspeakable.19 to include the Fertile Crescent,
first Egypt, then North Africa. Arabic-speaking Africa had come under
foreign
rule earlier
than Arabic-speaking
Asia.
France
began
colonization of Algeria in 1830 and occupied Tunisia in 1881, while Britain occupied Egypt in 1882. In every instance there had as local to foreign rule. But it had been formulated in most instances Islam. Until the patriotism, strongly tinged with saw as themselves and the earliest few Arabs, 1930s, Egyptians been
resistance
Arab nationalists did not include Egypt in their vision.20 InNorth a Africa, resistance
its inhabitants.
united language
of the population and spoke Berber, took an Islamic form, since only Islam But no definition of the Arab nation based on
large proportion to foreign rule could
long
exclude
Arabic-speaking
Africa,
and
the very
geography of imperialism created a potential bond of solidarity and the Syrian, the Algerian number of Egyptians time, a growing as Arabs. see themselves Paradoxically,
between
the Egyptian and the Iraqi. In and North Africans began to the empires of Britain and
France linked together Arabic-speaking lands which had enjoyed few if any organic ties inOttoman times, inspiring for the first time the idea of an Arab world stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf. At
the time,
the division
of this world
did not yet seem permanent,
and themessage of Arab nationalism, calling for the full independence did not seem completely contrived. and unity of all Arabs everywhere, to divest War Britain and France After World II, weary began of their troublesome of the more themselves portions empires. and Trans Jordan became Egypt and independent. Syria, Lebanon,
Iraq, their independence effectively revoked by Britain during the
Arab Nationalism: war,
to renegotiate the terms for the great majority
began
independence
matter states,
Identity
183
of British
withdrawal.
Full
seemed
of Arabs
nationalists
that an Arab
hoped
a
only
by individual
be acquired piecemeal
of time. It would but Arab
Mistaken
commonwealth
might emerge from this fluid situation. Elaborate plans for Arab unification But
proliferated. these plans quickly
its own
elite,
ran aground.
By now each state possessed and anthem. Their proposals "Greater Crescent unity,"
and
flag, bureaucracy, for "Fertile
aggrandizement.21
were schemes federation," Arab much After negotiation
ruling
counterproposals, and "Arab Syria,"
self
for
British
and
the independent Arab states established the Arab mediation, in 1945, a compromise that recognized the distinct League sovereignty of each of them. In the end, independence did not alter
the map
drawn
Arab
by
imperialism. to assist one
The
states
member but
none
of
the
would
another, League promised the Arab League of sovereignty, which their prerogatives sacrifice In Article 8 of the charter particular, meticulously upheld. nonintervention: "Each member of the charter principle upheld
in the of government established the systems respect as concerns states and regard the exclusive them other member to abstain states. from any action Each shall pledge of those to change of established calculated systems government."22 state
shall
while the article of nonintervention, to its greatest weakness. Not quo, pointed the unencumbered their rulers commanded Yet
citizens
and
much.
They Arab larger
subjects. invariably purpose,
By
reasons
of
state.
independence
and
The
remained
nationalism
rhetoric, as advancing a their actions their own they were pursuing
justified even when
in the
Fertile
Crescent, to invoke
the confidence
paradox a loose
solidarity.
the status states and
of their allegiance as admitted they
own
their
purposes. Especially parochial reason lacked created without
sanctifying all of these
could
m?lange But a growing
so
pass of
number
long
states openly as Arab
about slogans of intellectuals
and officers, abhorring ambiguity, turned their Arab nationalism saw the Arab nationalism They professed as posturing to argue the need for and began came when Their moment the fragile Arab order over Israel.
into a rigorous by rulers and revolution. stumbled
doctrine.
states
184
Martin Kramer
ARAB REVOLUTION The
rhetorical
Nations
a chasm
into
turned
gap authorized
the partition
in 1948, after into two
of Palestine
the United states,
one
Jewish and one Arab. When the neighboring Arab states moved against Israel in 1948, they claimed to be fighting in concert, to their
uphold
to the Arabs
commitment
brotherly
own
each sought a separate modus interests, a hard-fought ended with war, which even more had than been allotted territory
was
and with
Nations, hundred
thousand
Arab
as
states
the Arab
In
of Palestine.
its own war to defend its
fact they did just the opposite: each waged
vivendi Israel to her
reluctant
with
Israel.
It
in possession of the United by hosts
to
seven
refugees.
The events of 1948, like those of 1920, shifted the ground from beneath Arab nationalism. While the Arab states negotiated fitfully to stir. The began Constantin intellectuals, exemplified by the Syrian historian Zurayk, criticism leveled a withering the conduct of the and war, against
with
intellectuals
and officers
it difficult for Arab states to present 1948 as anything less
made than
disaffected
Israel,
a rout.
stabbed old-guard in 1949;
Then
the
officers
moved, charging they had been senior and commanders. by politicians Syria's turned out by a military nationalist coup leadership was two more in 1952, that year, with another coups followed
in the back
and yet another in 1954. Abdallah, who and
Jordan, kingdom as his "West Arab Palestine
Israel. The monarchy dealings with of "free officers," invoking Egypt's of official corruption allegations monarchy
in a bloodless
in 1949 renamed his
remnant the adjacent annexed of was in 1951 assassinated for his Bank,"
in 1950
coup
barely held on. In 1952, a group failure in the Palestine war and in
its conduct, overturned the a revolutionary republic.
and established
By 1954, one of these officers, Gamal Abdul Nasser, had emerged as undisputed
leader.
In 1958,
a sanguinary
coup
by more
"free
officers" destroyed the Iraqimonarchy, and the regicides established a "popular republic." which Arab nationalism, became
became after
"revolutionary" that the Arabs, demonstrated remained disunited, politically
1948.
after "anti-imperialist" in Palestine The war
despite militarily
their
formal
weak,
and
1920, had
independence, economically
underdeveloped. The failure could still be blamed on imperialism,
Mistaken
Arab Nationalism: Arab
and much
nationalist
global conspiracy, which
went
thought
Identity
into drawing
images
185 of a
allegedly implanted Israel to assure the
But some intellectuals of the Arabs. domination continuing in Arab of intrinsic weaknesses the existence began to suggest
West's also
culture
that these had made the task of the arguing new of Arab nationalism, fiery champions a social revolution now promised overcome that would
and
society, easier. The
Zionists
young colonels, these weaknesses
prosperity.
and propel
the Arab
world
to unity,
power,
and
In the spirit of the times, they usually defined this
as socialism?or, more Arab lest it socialism, precisely, be alleged that the changes were not authentically Arab in inspiration. no longer meant Arab nationalism only literary revival and anti revolution
It meant
extensive land reform, and nationalization, all in the name of "the revolution." And if, in their
imperialism.
five-year plans, new lexicon, Arab nationalists as "revolutionaries," cast themselves then their opponents could only be "reactionaries."23 took two parallel The new dispensation became forms, which known
as Nasserism
nationalism
and Ba'thism.
to the personality
Nasserism cult
married
of Gamal
Abdul
revolutionary who
Nasser,
enjoyed immense prestige in the Arab world after he pulled a political victory from the combined British, French, and Israeli attack
on Suez
like reform
in 1956. Nasserism
combined
with
a program of socialist the charismatic Nasser
the idea that Egypt under the very heart of the Arab world, and had the resources to lead all Arabs to unity. A streak of pragmatism ran and will to which evolved from while Nasser through Nasserism, day day an ideology too makeshift to constitute held power. It was and constituted
relied more
on Nasser's
doctrine. glow than on any systematic to at first Arab gave character, priority Egypt's to or out times he made be Afro-Asian? Muslim, African, Egypt But it was precisely whichever served his particular that purpose. And
while
warm
Nasser
ambiguity which made Nasser all things to all Arabs, and permitted Egypt to imagine herself to be the bridge to Arab nationalism, linking
the Arabs
of Asia
and Africa
to unity.24
in the march
Ba'thism tended to bemore ideologically stringent, if only because its founders
were
Sorbonne-schooled
from minority sects, who had debates and Nietzsche, Fichte, to chose call themselves They
filled
teachers hailing Syrians, mostly their spare time with academic
and Houston the Ba'th,
Stewart
meaning
Chamberlain.
resurrection,
and
186
Martin Kramer
they were
as amatter
"revolutionaries"
of principle.
Their
constitution,
adopted in 1947, announced that their goals could not be achieved by means
"except
of
revolution
and
struggle.
To
rely
on
slow
evolution and to be satisfied with a partial and superficial reform is to threaten
to their failure and loss." The and to conduce was a single Arab creation the of state, since all goals were differences "accidental and unimportant. among Arabs They will all disappear with the awakening of Arab consciousness." And these aims
first of these
as "a necessity nationalism itself."25 As
socialism
they
regarded depth of Arab
the Ba'th demonstrated "their
party:
emanates
which
from
an early member
the
attested,
all the characteristics of an ideological of events was
interpretation
almost
identical,
but
they
did not trust one another; they loved the people, but hated the individual; they held thewhole sacred, but they despised the parts."26 The Ba'th spread its influence by penetrating the junior officer corps and eventually acquired power through military coups in both Syria and
Iraq. The
usual
pattern
was
for the military
wing
of the
local
party to purge the civilian wing and install a military dictatorship, under
the Ba'th
Nasser
and
socialism."27 freedom, slogan of "unity, to the summit the Ba'th carried Arab nationalism
of
early gambles paid off because he was the to play foreign nationalist leader who was first Arab positioned a one in he called another powers against game "positive neutralism." its achievements.
When came
Nasser's
the Americans
refused
to his rescue. When
backing France
of the Algerian (in league with
The Arab world, radio transistor,
to finance
the Aswan
his nationalization uprising
provoked the United
the Soviets Dam, of the Suez Canal and
an attack by Britain and came to his rescue.
States
Israel), through glued to these maneuvers before Nasser's stood breathless
the now ubiquitous act. The high-wire
Ba'th in Syria longed to join it and pushed for negotiations with Nasser over unity. In 1958, the talks culminated in the birth of the United Arab Republic?a union of Egypt and Syria, offered to the Arab world as the first step toward a general Arab union. The names of Egypt and Syria disappeared from themap, replaced by a region." Arab nationalism region" and a "northern Nasser's its high-water first visit to Damascus, mark during Other Arab enthusiastic crowds. he was greeted by wildly "southern
trembled for their
as "Nasserists" long-awaited
filled Bismarck.
the streets Lebanon
reached where leaders
to clamor of their capitals invited American troops
Mistaken
Arab Nationalism:
187
Identity
to stem the tide; Jordan accepted British forces. No Arab state of Arab unity on its own. the march capable of withstanding that succumbed. the United Arab Republic in the end, itwas a struggle for into turned and the Ba'th of Nasser The marriage In this uneven the camp of Arab nationalism. within domination seemed But
run a badly ran Syria like a colony?and the Egyptians at that. The union did not release some pent-up potential
contest, colony
which only the combining of Egypt and Syria could tap. Quite the opposite: the union threatened to kill all productive initiative, especially in Syria, through the imposition of "Arab socialism." In a Syrian
1961,
coup
ousted
Nasser's
from Damascus
viceroy
and
declared the union finished. The breakup demonstrated the salience of differences far too deep to be blown away by blithe slogans. There
and more
1963,
and the Ba'th in between Nasser negotiations never and treaties. But there would unity schemes
be more
would
be a repeat of the United Arab Republic.28 In retrospect,
the collapse
of the Egyptian-Syrian
union
in 1961
the beginning of the long slide of Arab nationalism. The following year, Nasser contributed to its undoing by his massive
marked
intervention
on behalf
side
of the "revolutionary"
in Yemen's
civil
war. Everything Egypt did inYemen, including aerial bombing and napalming, had the opposite of the intended effect. A British journalist who
the Egyptians
watched
ignorance
and
at work
in Yemen
was
amazed
by their
arrogance.
one of the more piquant experiences of my post-revolutionary in Sanaa to be hailed by most of them with a chummy affability stay in that implied as clearly as any words that they and Iwere somehow as in the of civilisation embattled this thing together representatives midst of savagery. "What can you do with these people?" they would often laugh, in tones of vastly superior deprecation, "They are not come from British colonial see...." like us, you Having directly more all the the I recognised Aden symptoms easily. Creeping Itwas
is a catching disease, and those Egyptians were imperialism step away from clapping their hands together and shouting, service.29 when they wanted In Yemen,
similarity,
as
in Syria,
vast
leaving Arab
incomprehension.
differences
to war Arab
overwhelmed
any
only
a
"Boy!"
remote
in a spirit of mutual
Martin Kramer
188
Nationalist
theory had promised that unity would bring liberation
but in the hands of actual practitioners it had foreigners, a whip became of domination, wielded by some Arabs over others. scars as did the to grow, its of Arabs The number bearing began one Syrian, were wrote The Arabs, disillusionment. "like the from
inhabitants of an island who have been promised that the ship of soon
will
deliverance
arrive.
have
They
buried
their
tools
and
the ship arrives, it is a
packed their meager belongings; but when
to believe in some The will still remained strong an to of show. Arab doubt nationalism's quarters, edge began Its champions responded supply of persuasive words began to dwindle. use more of the persuasive of Abu prisons by making frequent slave
boat."30 but
Za'bal
near Cairo, Mezze
and Tura
in Damascus,
and
the cellars
of
the Nihayyah Palace in Baghdad. The crisis finally broke in 1967. The Arabs may well have blundered into war with Israel that June, but once they were in the thick of it, they expected more than in 1948. Most assumed that they had been not weakened, strengthened, social revolution, the Ba'th, of Arab under the banner
two decades by nearly and the militarization and
nationalism
of Nasser
and
of politics,
all
the
against struggle delivered defeat, Instead, they got less: a truly ignominious in six days. Its territorial consequences included the Israeli occupation the West of East Jerusalem, Bank, and Gaza?all densely populated Israel.
by Arabs?and that had
kept
of the Sinai and the Golan, two geographic buffers Israel
at a distance
from Cairo
and Damascus.
The
of pan-Arabism."31 less than "the Waterloo nothing represented to step down, the crowds filled the streets to Nasser offered as their leader. Through demand that he continue years of pounding to silence every Nasser Ba'th had and the indoctrination, managed defeat
When
and many voice, only Arab nationalism. of language
other into
the
collective
understood But
and
the limited spoke its way deep worked in voices would be raised
as defeat
two other psyche, One spoke nationalism.
to Arab opposition states. The to individual
other
the language of allegiance of Islam.32 loyalty to a universalist spoke
THE TRIUMPH OF THE STATE Arab individual creation, to interests. their separate give priority Since
their
states Yet
had
never
hesitated
they had been persuaded
to
Arab Nationalism:
Mistaken
Identity
189
by their perceived lack of legitimacy to pledge formal fidelity to the Arab nation, and thus risked being dragged into crises generated by accused of breaking Arab ranks for states, or being out. As 1967 such crises could deteriorate however, staying proved, into war, in lives, territory, and exact a steep price and quickly states of these lumbered under immense prestige. Many already to assume economic burdens. did not have the means the They other
Arab
burdens of their neighbors, especially theweighty Even mighty
Egypt
could
no
longer
assume
load of Palestine.
the sole custodianship
of the Arab cause (an Egypt which sent tens of thousands of troops to defend the Arab cause as far away as Yemen, yet had difficulty its own people at home). If these states were ever to set their feeding own priorities, to justify openly have their separate they would and demand the primary of their citizens and existence, loyalties subjects.
Paradoxically, Egypt led the way again, this time under Anwar as-Sadat.
Sadat
launched
an attack
against
Israel
in October
1973,
but this time Egypt fought a strictly Egyptian war for the return of the Israeli-occupied Sinai. Although Egypt waged thewar in tandem with Syria, it quickly broke with Syria in the war's aftermath. By the decade's the Sinai.
end, Sadat's
Sadat
had given of recognition
Israel a peace treaty in return for on the United Israel, his reliance
liberalization turned all the assumptions of States, and his economic on their head?and Arab nationalism no apologies Sadat offered so. Instead, he made an explicit case for Egypt's for doing right to chart its own course and address its own problems first. Sadat paid
for his policies with his life, and Egypt was briefly ostracized for its states cautiously Arab followed suit. now their choices justified they by invoking Saudi, or Iraqi national Syrian, Jordanian, interests, not Arab national as states, despite their origins themselves destiny. And by legitimizing in imperial map closer to legitimizing rooms, they came that much in rooms. its Zionist Israel, despite origins drawing
peace More
with
Israel.
often
than not,
But
other
For the first time, it became possible to criticize the myths of and to see the differences Arabism, among Arabs not as "accidental" even but as living realities, of respect. Lebanon's most deserving
prominent historian, Kamal Salibi, criticized Arab nationalism for "deluding the general run of the Arabs into believing that the political unity they had once experienced under Islamwas in fact an
Martin Kramer
190
Arab national unity which they have subsequently lost, or of which they have been deliberately robbed." This made it "difficult for to to properly accommodate Salibi called on intellectuals present."
the
them
realities
political
of
the
to:
view of this history as a Arab nationalist united national march that went wrong at some point, and correctly an account of assess it as the parochial history that it normally was: so many different Arab regional experiences of one kind or another, fitting more or less into a general pattern. No Arab country today its actual existence as a willful or need feel any guilt about accepting the erroneous
discount
departure from an Arab national historical norm. It is only the Arabs succeed in ridding themselves of the highly idealized vision of their past that they will be able to live Arab nationalist in Arab world as a coherent political community the modern together and relate to one another constructively various members whose unwillful
when
without
After
reserve.33
this once
1967,
surreptitious
view
could
be pronounced
openly,
and it laid the intellectual foundation for the growing self-confidence of
states.
individual
But that self-confidence
rested
as much
as on persuasion.
on power
Despite their difficulties on the battlefield, these states had mastered that The regimes realized surveillance. the technologies of domestic to forestall any dissent and they resolved defeat left them vulnerable, to state The the make these ubiquitous. technologies by using
largely worked.
approach
a bout
inaugurated
of
Unlike
instability,
the defeat of 1948, which
the even more
defeat
humiliating
of 1967 marked the beginning of an era of unprecedented stability, even immobility. The flood of oil income that followed the 1973 war
state had not to buy off dissent. The regimes permitted In of the words it had become become omnipotent. legitimate,
also
only one Syrian
intellectual:
"The cancerous
growth
of the state has been
accompanied by the increasingly diminished power of everybody and everything enjoy
calling
the whole
some Arab else, especially what As a consequence, 'The People.'"
thinkers
and
leaders
"Arab
society
is on
cancelled out as a reality of political significance in the
of all Arab regimes."34 By the time communism collapsed, reckonings one-man of protracted the last preserve lands had become the Arab rule, and so they remain today. The king of Jordan has reigned now for forty
years,
the king
of Morocco
for thirty-two
years.
Libya's
Arab Nationalism: leader made
his
coup
twenty-four
Palestine Liberation Organization
Mistaken
years
191
Identity
ago. The
chairman
of
the
(PLO)has held his title for twenty
four years. Syria's president has held power for twenty-two years. over ruler has held the for sway Iraq's country years, twenty-two as president. the last fourteen The emir of Kuwait has reigned for
fifteen years, the king of Saudi Arabia for eleven years. Egypt's president has held office for twelve years. Not one of these states could be categorized as a democracy, although after 1967 they laid unprecedented claims to the loyalty of their citizens and subjects, and
intruded
every aspect of virtually the Lebanon, Only perennial exception, over its legitimacy and its power enhancing upon
society. proved society
of
incapable after 1967.
In
this birthplace of Arab nationalism, social peace had come to depend on
an equilibrium "one Arab nation."
between
the myths of "eternal The Maronites agreed to march
Lebanon"
and
in step with
the
Arabs, so long as they could carry the flag of Lebanon; theMuslims agreed to parade behind the flag of Lebanon, provided the parade to an Arab
marched
cadence.
By this understanding,
Lebanon
would
supply intellectual rationales for Arab nationalism; others would provide the soldiers for its battles. For a time the equilibrium held, and
Lebanon
free-market duty
established
a quasi-democratic In times of regional
economy. and managed
by words,
to dodge
war
order public crisis, Lebanon with
Israel.
a
and did
But
its
after
1967, Lebanon began to lose its balance. The Muslims, wracked by guilt,
demanded
that Lebanon
finally take up the Arab burden of its southern to attacks border Israel. against
and open Palestine, The Maronites, awed by Israel's example, thought they could turn the state of Lebanon into something a small comparable: powerhouse,
armed to the teeth, defiant of the Arab world around it. In 1975, the situation
under and
in civil war, and Lebanon exploded virtually disappeared a checkered of militia crisscrossed map fiefdoms, by green red lines. The only lines that did not count were Lebanon's
borders, and both Syria and Israel entered the fray.When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, itworked feverishly with its Lebanese allies
to remake
power
over
the country in its image, but to no avail. Since to has tried do the resolve and success. 1989, Syria same, with more Aside from Lebanon, states exercised more all other confident their societies,
and more
Before 1967, Arab nationalism
independence
from one another.
appeared to drain states of their
192
Martin Kramer
legitimacy.
After
legitimacy
that
its slippage both strengthened
to produce a surge of incumbent regimes.
seemed
1967,
states
and
This strength had severe limitations: Arab states still could not enemies such as Israel. But they could one and enforce their will over another, by an with almost ruthless efficiency.35
stand up to powerful off interventions
ward
their own
societies
external
THE CHALLENGE OF ISLAM
The voice of Islam also bid to fill the silence left by Arab nationalism. Arab
nationalists and had
rival, element out
of
had always tried to disarm
in Arab their way
nationalism. to argue
loyalty as a potential Islam as a primary
Islamic regarded it by incorporating Even
the Christians
that Arab
them went
among
nationalism
complemented
rather than contradicted the Islamic loyalties still felt by so many Arabs. "The power of Islam," affirmed Michel Aflaq, the founding ideologue of the Ba'th and a Christian by birth, "has revived to in our days under a new form, that of Arab nationalism."36 appear Arabs saw this as a confidence But many Muslim game, and regarded as mutually For exclusive. Islam and any form of nationalism
Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian ideologue of Islam who was executed by If in 1966, Arab nationalism signified "spiritual decadence." no so "was he doubt capable had the Prophet Muhammad wished, in order to of pan-Arab nationalism of setting forth a movement
Nasser
unify
the
strife-riven Arab
mankind,
tribes
of Arabia." to submit
and non-Arab,
Instead, to God.
he The
called
all of
Arabs
thus
enjoyed no privileged standing in Islam, of the kind claimed by Arab
is the Muslim real chosen people or of territorial affiliation of ethnic, racial, regardless on the concluded that Reflecting early Islam, Qutb "God's
nationalism:
community, its members."
"sole collective
identity Islam offers and other
Persians, Byzantines, banner." God's During that Arab nationalism announced
Arabs, under
his had
is that of the faith, where nations
and colors
are equal
interrogation, Qutb police its role in universal "exhausted
history."37
The Islamic critique of Arab nationalism theory
to its practice.
Arab
nationalism
had
extended beyond erred
in breaking
its the
primary bond of Islam during the Arab Revolt?a bond that linked Arab and Turk. The Arab nationalists betrayed their fellowMuslims
Arab Nationalism:
Mistaken
to side with
in order
the British, who naturally their trust those who placed
for just reward Arab nationalists on God
Identity
193
them?a betrayed in unbelievers. The
their error by abandoning reliance then compounded to in order become liberals, fascists, and law,
and his divine
socialists, inmimicry of foreign ideological fashion. And while they professed respect for the faith of Islam, they filled their prisons with the truly
faithful,
whom
they
accused
of
subversion
for preaching
theword of God. Who did not doubt that the rout by the Jews, and of Jerusalem
the falling
into Zionist
hands,
a punishment
constituted
for straying from God's path? Did not Israel itself prove the power of religion and state combined? This brand of Islamic loyalty enjoyed an immense appeal among a majority
formed
confessional
community
Saudi Arabia acknowledged "golden during
The first was composed of Shiites, in Iraq and Kuwait, the largest single in Lebanon, in and important minorities
of two underclasses.
the members who
and the Arab Gulf states. Arab nationalism them as fellow Arabs, but it glorified precisely that as disastrous, same caliphs
the Shiites mourned age" of Arab history which its heroes were martyred which by the very
lionized in Arab nationalist historiography. In the present, the institutions of Shiite Islam, and even many Shiite families, straddled the divide between the Arab states and Iran, so that many Shiites as an artificial nationalism division, regarded Arab incompatible with the Arab-Persian of Shiism. After contemporary symbiosis so Iran's revolution in 1979, many in Arab Shiites lands identified success to its with that declared their the strongly they allegiance revolution's Lebanon's
and repudiated leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, states in which and loyalty to the individual Hezbollah took this the furthest, professing
obedience
to the
nationalism
"the Arabs" The
other
leader
of the Islamic
revolution,
and whose
lot worsened
as populations
grew
they lived. absolute
and denouncing to Israel.
for self-worship and their capitulation of the tens of millions underclass consisted
who had abandoned the countryside and flooded
both Arab
of indigents
into the cities,
and oil
incomes
fell.
In the slums and bidonvilles of Cairo and Algiers, not only did the doctrines
of Arab
sound obsolete, but the promises of states to in also hollow those the grip of rang prosperity by In and the poverty numbers, grinding unemployment. growing to movements their Islamic which gave dispossessed loyalty employed made
nationalism
194
Martin Kramer
a more
familiar vocabulary and called for the reinstitution of Islamic as law the panacea for all political, ills. These social, and economic were to Islamic movements work within states, prepared existing but only as a matter of convenience. They professed loyalty only to
Islamic law, and committed themselves to fight for its implementation wherever of Arab their
even in distant Afghanistan, where many as volunteers Soviet fought against
possible, Muslims
"atheistic"
For
clients.
thousands forces
and
these
their political believers, Afghan not at did end the border crossing of any state, or even community to any place where It extended where Arabic ceased to be spoken. or to Islam reigned had be defended. supreme
In the void left by Arab nationalism
after 1967, two ideas of
thus competed for primacy. On the one side stood those community a who that the inhabitants of any one state constituted argued a sense. in distinct this idea, political Regimes people championed
for it legitimized their claim to act solely in the interests of the state?identified
increasingly
with
one
ruling
group
or one
ruler.
On the other side stood thosewho believed that allMuslims constituted a universal
political community, standing above any narrower political This idea suited opposition since it denied movements, authority. to An all immense gap separated existing regimes. virtually legitimacy these two visions, but their adherents Arab agreed on one point: nationalism
had
or too narrow
failed
been irredeemably, having to satisfy the quest for identity.
ARAB NATIONALISM
too broad
either
ADRIFT
And what of the remaining Arab nationalists? After 1967, their numbers
and
influence
intellectuals
Many in Arabic
except steadily dwindled, did live a pan-Arab actually
for an audience
that
among
intellectuals.
reality. They "from the Ocean
stretched
wrote to the
Gulf," and published in pan-Ar ab journals that circulated just as widely. They jetted from capital to capital for conferences on the state of the Arabs. They had one foot (and sometimes both) in the West, where the freest Arabic press and publishing houses did their In this rarefied
business. could
still be sustained.
atmosphere, For the most
the myths part,
of Arab
these
nationalism
intellectuals
did not
regard the defeat of 1967 as a failure of their idea, but rather as a failure
of
its implementation
by others,
who
were
criticized
for not
Arab Nationalism:
Mistaken
being sufficiently radical or sufficiently ruthless. Much nationalist
after
"self-criticism"
advocacy who could
But
of violent
change. an idea whose
revive
even
1967
of the Arab
further
pushed intellectuals lacked an Arab come
time had
195
Identity
toward Bismarck
and nearly
gone.
Nasser had faltered, and in 1970 he died. The Ba'th in Syria, after more
twists
master
came
turns,
to rest
in 1970
were
Palestinians
a desperate
a al-Asad, lack of better
under Hafiz
above
put Syria realpolitik Arab nationalists fixed their hopes on Saddam Hussein.
alternatives, and finally The
and
who
of
all. For
first on the Palestinians,
choice,
since
they
themselves
had largely despaired of other Arabs. At the height of Nasser's powers, they had allowed themselves to believe in him, and to see him PLO
as their
redeemer.
in 1964,
Nasser
also
the auspices
under
the creation of the prompted of the Arab League. But even
before the Arab armies collapsed in 1967, Palestinians had begun to into an instrument
of their own. The dominant no Fatah demanded component pretensions. pan-Arab even the moral zones of exterritorial support of the Arab states, and was Israel's It to frontiers. operation, especially along prepared assure to the of these But it bastions. fight independence promoted no message of Arab and it gave first priority to the revolution, a state, which of a Palestinian establishment "entity," presumably transform
the PLO
Fatah
had
state system.38 the existing Arab a different Palestinian took course, announcing groups to that they would work the "petty bourgeois of topple regimes" states as a stage in their struggle to liberate Palestine. the Arab This was the pan-Arab of the so-called Arab Nationalists promise would
fit into
But other
Movement
and
its most
flamboyant
offspring,
the Popular
Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), both founded by students at the American hijackings
University made them
like their New "revolution"
of Beirut. the heroes
Their of many
Left contemporaries
now.
The
and rhetoric high-strung Arab intellectuals who,
in the West,
demanded
the Palestinian
in the guerrillas hills opposite became the of this Israel, symbols struggle. and Guevara, Living on the edge and citing Mao they were themselves in poetry celebrated and song by the pan-Arab But intellectuals. fedayeen,
rock-strewn
although the fedayeen sought to imitate the methods of guerrilla warfare which succeeded elsewhere, they completely failed to liberate any part of Palestine
or the Arab world,
and they provoked
Jordan's
196
Martin Kramer in 1970. As Jean Genet the Palestinian recorded, in "to summed the have been up phrase, a a of for thousandth second."39 As the second passed,
ruthless
suppression "revolution" could
be
dangerous Arab nationalist
for the Palestinian enthusiasm and fringe waned, even the fringe finally endorsed the mundane demand for a Palestinian more Arab one to make state alongside Israel?one state, prepared
more
"Our future is with the spokesman of Israel," compromise. a in French 1970?two told academic the PFLP, Ghassan Kanafani, nor China, years before his assassination by Israel. "Neither Europe,
nor are
nor the Arab the Soviet Union, in us or would do interested
or individually, for us."40 The
states,
collectively decisive anything
Palestinian uprising that began in 1987 in theWest Bank and Gaza just that: a Palestinian of arms in Arab quantities
was
would
Palestinians more The more
valuable choice desperate
modern upon
Iraqi the
architecture, and motifs,
fight
sympathy of Saddam
uprising,
relying not but on stones
arsenals, their own fight, of the West.
as the pan-Arab Saddam
step. If anything, ruler to cultivate
hero had
a specific
funds upon
the massive
and knives.
in an effort
legacy of ancient Mesopotamian and poetry, the state encouraged it lavished
on
to win
represented done more
Iraqi loyalty, civilization.
The the far
an even than
any
drawing In art,
the use of Mesopotamian archaeological digs and restorations.
Since no loyalties had survived from antiquity (whichwell predated the Arab
be accommodated Iraqis could by the Sunnis and Shiites. After and Kurds,
all
conquest),
myth?Arabs
Mesopotamian
Saddam blundered intowar with Iran in 1980, Iraq billed herself as of the eastern
the defender
Arab
flank
against
the Persian
hordes?
all the better to justify the demand for war loans from Gulf Arab states.
But
dismissed
Saddam
was
the pan-Arab
no vision
ardent as an
pan-Arabist, idea whose
and
in 1982
time had
passed:
is no linking unity to the removal of boundaries to It could have been Arab present mentality. longer acceptable to or into ten We consideration have take twenty years ago. acceptable the Arab mind and psyche have undergone. We the change which must see the world as it is... .The Arab reality is that the Arabs are The
question
of
now twenty-two states, and we have to behave accordingly. Therefore, not must be unity imposed, but must be achieved through common fraternal opinion. Unity must give strength to its individual partners, not cancel their national identity.41
he
Arab Nationalism: Those included
twenty-two Kuwait.
In 1990,
on which
states,
Saddam's
Iraq
invaded
Mistaken unity
Kuwait,
197
Identity not
"must
be
imposed,"
it a province
declaring
of Iraq. Possession of Kuwait would have filled the Iraqi treasury in perpetuity (a treasury that held a cash reserve of $30 billion back in 1980 but groaned under a debt of more than $100 billion a decade later). Significantly, Iraq did not formally justify its invasion as an act of Arab
nationalist to the state
unification. and
of
belonged Iraq claimed that Kuwait an asserted that the annexation
Iraq, an Arab moral claim. But Arab nationalists Iraqi legal right, not were a reincarnation as of Nasser, seized upon Saddam though he at that, for being far more reckless and ruthless. and an improvement
properly
lacked Nasser's
he
While
and nuclear
charm,
potential?power,
he had
oil, missiles, that would he hinted,
nerve
agents, at the
be put
service of all the Arabs. He would be their sword, much like the four giant swords he had cast for his victory arches inBaghdad, dedicated at a ceremony
in 1989
during which
he paraded
upon
a white
horse.42
Hichem Dja?t, the preeminent Tunisian historian, exemplified the In 1978, in a sober mood, he wrote of the intellectuals. euphoria some to pin all hopes on achieving not be healthy that "it would an state to sort of absolute and that attempt unity," by any Arab use
its power
for that purpose
would
be "not
only
dangerous
but
doomed to failure." No Arab state had sufficient power to effect such unity, and no Arab or Russia would Europe, the heart
could allow
The analysis it to the winds
of the Old World."43 threw
this
"entertain so cohesive
the notion that America, a unity to be founded in makes after
perfect Saddam
sense
to
annexed
day, yet Dja?t to Saddam Hussein, "a new perspective he declared, Thanks Kuwait. And Iraq is its pole and motor." is opening up, that of unification. a start: it still represented If that meant war, or even defeat,
to tell you, as Europeans, that your nations were born In annexing Kuwait, Saddam Hussein has entered the was sure to He of a source of make of trying history. dynamics In addition, he was undertaking for himself, material means. wealth I don't have out of wars.
the beginning of the unification of the Arab world. is more important than legality.44 "Our pursue
Sometimes
legitimacy
our goals we goal let us seek by the edge of the sword / For are thus surely secured." This verse from Yaziji's ode of
198 1868 surface
Martin Kramer anticipated of Arab
the preference for coercion that ran beneath the no longer Once its slogans nationalism. swayed nationalism of persuasion, gave up even the pretense
Arab millions, raw to worship
But power. that power; despite incredible like the Palestinian fedayeen a for thousandth "dangerous
Saddam
not
had
amassed
military expenditures, a generation before,
of enough Saddam's Iraq,
could only be In the end, Dja?t was state to by any Arab
of a second."
in 1978 that an attempt he wrote right when to failure." In battle, be "doomed force unity would the Iraqi "motor" broke down, of unification and the scenes of immediately soldiers and armored burned-out columns recalled surrendering Iraqi as the defeat
so much
nothing
of
1967.
And,
in the end,
Saddam
was right when he said in 1982 that the "Arab mind and psyche" not
would
accept
borders. Most
the imposition
or the removal
of unity
of existing
of the Arab states joined the international coalition
a state system which had become their own, against him, to uphold even if it originated it was And long ago in an imperial partition. not only Arab governments invasion: which the the rejected publics to polls, never took Saddam in the Arab coalition states, according as a pan-Arab savior.45 The Arab nationalists called 1991 seriously a defeat
of the Arabs In 1967,
analogous. was lost
to foreign only Iraq was
as a whole, three Arab occupation,
analogous states were and
to 1967.
itwas
But
not
Arab
defeated, territory In all Arabs felt humiliated.
state was the sovereignty of an Arab defeated, in Casablanca, of Arabs and millions restored, Cairo, Damascus, themselves the victors. and Riyadh considered 1991,
In the war's Israel moved
that victory
the ultimate
would
represent Eastern order, Middle state among legitimate
following The new
the United
aftermath, to translate
a negotiation order would
the Arab States, a new into regional of Arab
undoing than Arab, would states, to be recognized of peace and a definition
rather
also
include Turkey,
states, order
nationalism. include
Israel
and that That as a states
by all Arab of Israel's borders.
and perhaps
other
states
that wished to define themselves asMiddle Eastern. The rationale for the idea of theMiddle East, made most fully by some Cairo vision nationalist had become that the Arab argued a in It was age, and it postideological ideological war of a costly Arab cold for a continuation Israel, against the Arabs could no longer count on any outside support
intellectuals, anachronistic. pressed although
Arab Nationalism:
Mistaken
199
Identity
following the end of the Superpower Cold War. The moment had come
to shift priorities
to the domestic
of economic
agenda
growth,
lest theArab world sink under theweight of its swollen populations. seemed to demonstrate, of Europe the economic to future belonged formations of many nations. regional composed to promote These cooperated economic and collective growth security, economies of the massive burden of military relieving expenditure.
As
the unification
arms
Water,
the environment,
control,
tourism?these
trade,
and
hundreds of other issues could not be negotiated to a resolution by the Arabs
alone.
states were
Arab
also Middle
Eastern
and
states,
while they belonged to an Arab state system, they also belonged to a Middle
Eastern
order would Arabs
and
order. The of that regional shape and content over time; a first step would be the progress of at the negotiating table.46
evolve Israelis
The idea of the Middle East as a framework of identity faces many obstacles. It has nothing like the depth of the idea of Europe. The Middle East is a term that was first put into wide currency by an American
naval
indeterminate
area guarding a part a colorless It remains
Singapore."47 idea of an Arab
nation
and the term Middle usage.
in 1902
who
strategist,
"from
and
the Ocean
inaccurate to the Gulf"
from
"an to
Suez but
the
term, is no older,
East passed long ago into common Arabic into an organizing
Its translation
the sea route
of
it as
described
of regional
principle
relations
would constitute the final triumph of the realmap over the imaginary
now on adding the last touches on the real map ? map. All depends the mutually that will define Israel. agreed borders TALKING DEMOCRACY Is it true, as Fouad Do nationalism"?
AND
ISLAM
Ajami wrote, its defenders,
at the end of the road
that this signifies the "end of Arab in exile, inhabit "fortresses mostly
that are yet
to receive
the dispatches
that all
is lost and the battle is over"?48 Arab nationalism has suffered yet another inspiring
blow, a few
and
has
societies
and journals published under
the mercurial
retreated
in Europe. With
Mu'ammar
to
almost in Beirut,
and clubs
al-Qaddafi,
its point of origin, some newspapers
and
the exception of Libya no Arab
state makes
any credible pretense of championing Arab nationalism. Yet Arab nationalists
have
not
lost hope
that
from
their
last fortresses,
they
200
Martin Kramer return
to recapture the center. Did that not triumphant an case to one in of Iran, where the old ayatollah, banished happen a revolution of Shiite Islam, launched of the last bastions and swept
might
to power? The to Arab hope
return
of political that
Islam
holds out purgatory do the same. Their
from
nationalists
they might on Saddam of failed, but there are other avenues gamble desperate can adapt to the Arab nationalism return, provided spirit changing of the times. Arab The
has never
nationalism
core of its message
of one Arab
been
has never
changed, to be drawn
destined
nation,
messianism.
As
the division
established
and
recognized, became
But
nationalism
Arab
immense
the
given
moment
to such adaptation. and remains the existence
and socialism, radicalism, ever more world became
this borrowing achieved less, so that ever more in its Utopian presumptions. economic and social problems that face nationalists
a revolutionary
become
might
fascism, the Arab
of
are Arab
there
societies,
averse
in some form of together an enemies. of external array against borrowed themes supplementary
unity, and poised antagonistically But in the past, Arab nationalism from liberalism, and vocabulary
Arab
totally
who one.
believe They
that
intend
any to be
there. Since
they have bid to stay in the contest by as the natural and ally of democracy never required a commitment to nationalism
of 1991, nationalism
the "defeat"
Arab presenting Islam. In theory, Arab it showed either, and in practice and
dictators prime,
Arab
parties
and
a strong nationalists
executing they now
unity. That a matter of conviction prevailing
order
has
aversion had
a strong preference for revolutionary to Islamic movements. In their
no
Islamic
qualms
activists,
about all
banning in the name
political of Arab
and Islam is less upon democracy convenience. understand that the They not two weaknesses. Its democratic. First, it is have
fixed
than
are under pressure now in power for a generation, aging rulers, for and that yearns that gets younger from a populace every year, a measure in it is not legitimate of political Second, participation. have of frustrated who numbers the eyes of the growing people yearn for a They genuinely can which of authenticity, only be achieved by they believe in the of an Islamic state under Islamic law. Somewhere the creation to one of it is possible succumb that a regime might Arab world filled
measure
the ranks
of
Islamic movements.
Arab Nationalism: these weaknesses.
nationalists
Arab
and perhaps emerge or Islam or both.
triumphant
Mistaken
Identity
201
to join the resulting fracas either by championing democracy hope
a reading of the leading it journals of pan-Arab opinion, to sing. that the slogan of Islam has been more difficult appears most is plenty There of common Islamic discourse, ground with From
notably
in the shared conviction that the Arab world
from
imperialist But normalized.
domination
and
Islam
that Israel's
has
its champions,
already mass movements, and disciplined and well-organized no an in interest almost alliance with the discredited Arab
nationalism.
still suffers must
not
be
in the
form
of
presence
these
express of stragglers
The
round-table debates among Arab lengthy about their possible with Islamic relationship are not reciprocated movements leaders by the Islamists, whose once have no need for guidance from others, those who especially nationalist
intellectuals
them.49 Still, some Arab nationalist from intellectuals, persecuted in Europe their perches and America, have offered their intellectual services to the defense of Islamic movements before Western opinion? something themselves. although apologists denounced
Islamic movements
to undertake been ill-prepared foundations of a relationship, are pleased or not all Arab nationalists to become prepared a for varieties of Islam which, few years ago, they only This
has
have
created
the
with all their polemical force. In contrast, the slogan of democracy There are no mass democracy movements, now to Arab claims be committed regime conversion themselves. conference and means
often
seems
And
so
attitudinal existing identification away or Islam. The show
nationalists
a similar
if the people were only allowed to express endorse the Arab nationalist program: greater of the United and withdrawal from States,
is that
themselves, they would Arab unity, repudiation the Arab-Israeli peace
date
than that of the Arab
the
brim with articles, journals pan-Arab and study-group reports on the methods proceedings, of promoting in the Arab world. The democracy this sudden enthusiasm for underlying political pluralism
assumption and free elections
state
less credible
to appropriate. and while every virtually to democracy, their late
is easier
process.50 This belief flies in the face of the show a continuing shift of self surveys, which from the Arab nation, and toward either the results
of those
polarization
free elections held to relatively between the party of the state and
202
Martin Kramer of Islam. No
the party in these
elections.
Arab
And
nationalist
while
there
parties have been a factor is a constituency for some
elements of the Arab nationalist program, Islamic American Islam.
it clearly belongs
to
similar repudiations of platforms incorporate are in and but couched the of Israel, language hegemony In these circumstances, of Arab nationalists the commitment parties,
whose
as superficial as that of the Islamists to democracy remains and the more mass seen one as It is for mobilization and regimes. slogan or as a the and then shield order, overturning existing undermining of a triumphant Islam. But even as the Arab the revenge against of democracy, their eyes remain fixed on the man who next next the the Saddam?the Nasser, horizon, awaiting save the Arabs from themselves and unite them. Even now, will is on everyone's when the slogan of democracy lips, half of the Arab nationalists
speak
in a recent survey believe that Arab unity intellectuals not can only be achieved by democracy.51 by force, now has lost almost But Arab nationalism, having everything, and Islam has been of democracy little to lose, and its endorsement should now cast in just that spirit. That Arab nationalism made nationalist
itself as the defender of freedom and the faith is ironic. The irony is who have a strong sense of history themselves, it Arab nationalism memories. discarded because They long an exorbitant even as it exacted of power, failed to keep its promise to and faith. It was not the only Utopian ideology price in freedom more the useful comparison, when do so at the time. And perhaps
not
lost on the Arabs
and
is longer, the perspective two Soviet communism:
may great
be between myths
of
Arab
nationalism
solidarity,
and
impossible
in
their scale, deeply flawed in their implementation, which alternately stirred and whipped millions of people in a desperate pursuit of power through themiddle of the twentieth century, before collapsing in exhaustion?and lounges
of
stranding
their
last
admirers
in the
faculty
the West.
ENDNOTES Tbrahim
al-Yaziji,
"Tanabbahu
wa
istafiqu"
2George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: Movement (London: H. Hamilton, 1938).
("Awake
and Arise").
The Story of the Arab National
Arab Nationalism: 3Mahmoud Darwish, 4Nizar
"Bitaqa hawiyya" an asta'dhina
"La buda
Qabbani,
Mistaken
203
Identity
("Identity Card"). al-watan"
("IMust
Ask
the Homeland's
Permission"). 5Rupert
From
Emerson,
to Nation:
Empire
The
to Self-Assertion
Rise
of Asian
and
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 126.
African Peoples
6See, for example, Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960); and Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (London: Basil Blackwell, 1983). 7First assessed
by Antonius,
The Arab
Awakening.
For subsequent
accounts,
see Zeine
N.
Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut: Khayat's, 1958); Sylvia Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1962); Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); C. Ernest Dawn, From Age 1798-1939 Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1973); Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); A. A. Duri, The Formation
Historical
of the Arab Nation,
trans. Lawrence
I. Conrad
(London:
Croom
Helm, 1987); Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry, 2d ed., trans. Marion Farouk Sluglett and Peter Sluglett (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1990); and Rashid Khalidi et al, eds., The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991 ). 8For the most
systematic
critique
of
the
see Hisham
"awakening,"
Sharabi,
Arab
Intellectuals and theWest (Baltimore,Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970). For its difficulties in creating a modern vocabulary of politics, see Ami Ayalon, Language and Change in theArab Middle East: The Evolution ofModern Arabic Political Discourse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 9Gertrude Bell, The Desert and the Sown (London:W. Heinemann, 10Turkishnationalism, outlook
of early Arab
Turkish Nationalism,
inspired by Balkan nationalisms, nationalism.
On
1876-1908
its genesis,
1907), 140.
in turn inspiredmuch of the
see David
Kushner,
The
Rise
of
(London: Cass, 1977).
nSee Neville J.Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism Calif.: University of California Press, 1976).
before World War I (Berkeley,
12ElieKedourie, "Pan-Arabism and British Policy," in Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 213. 13OnArab politics in the immediate postwar period, see Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence: Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal's Kingdom in Syria, 2d ed. (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1977). 14For the genesis
of
the names
that
filled
the postwar
map,
see Bernard
Lewis,
"The
Map of theMiddle East: A Guide for the Perplexed," The American Scholar 58 19-38. (1) (Winter 1988-1989): 15Thedeep debate in Lebanon over the very definition of its history is considered by Ahmad Beydoun, Identit? confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais contemporains (Beirut:L'Universit? Libanaise, 1984); and Kamal Salibi,
204
Martin Kramer
A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered Calif.: University of California Press, 1988).
times, most famously by
16While the story of the Arab Revolt has been told many T.
E.
Lawrence
and
there
Antonius,
George
are
(Berkeley,
accounts
fewer
of
the
rival
campaigns for separate independence in different part of the Fertile Crescent. For awidening of the perspective, see Eliezer Tauber, The Arab Movements inWorld War I (London: Frank Cass, 1993). L. Cleveland, The Making 17Quoted by William of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati( al-Husri (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 127. 18Ibid.,
163-65. see C. Ernest
19On this evolution,
of a Pan-Arab
Formation
"The
Dawn,
the Inter-War Years," International Journal of Middle (February 1988): 67-91.
in
Ideology
Eastern Studies 20 (1)
20On the Egyptian debate over identity, see Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, (New York: Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood Oxford University Press, 1986). 21These plans have been considered in great detail by Yehoshua Porath, In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1986). nJ. C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa inWorld Politics: A Documentary Record, 2d ed. (NewHaven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), 736. 23For a contemporary
of the transition
discussion
24For
an
assessment,
see Nissim
Rejwan,
Critics (New York: JohnWiley,
26Sami
al-Jundi,
of
see Leonard
politics,
Nasserist
Ideology:
Its Exponents
and
1974).
25Translation inHaim, Arab Nationalism: a member
to ideological
in theMiddle East (New York: JohnWiley,
Binder, The Ideological Revolution 1964).
the
Ba'th
An Anthology, from
its
233-41.
earliest
years
who
wrote
a
devastating account of the party, as quoted by Elie Kedourie, "Arabic Political in Elie Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies Memoirs," (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 201. 27For the early history of the Ba'th, seeKamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization (Syracuse,N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966); John F. Devlin, The Ba(th Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976); and Kanan Makiya [Samir al Khalil], Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1989), 149-257. 28For this period, seeMalcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir 3d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); and His Rivals, 1958-1970, and P. J.Vatikiotis, Conflict in theMiddle East (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971). 29DavidHolden,
Farewell to Arabia
(New York: Walker,
1966), 101.
Arab Nationalism:
Mistaken
205
Identity
30AbdulAziz Said, "Clashing Horizons: Arabs and Revolution," inMichael Curtis, ed., People and Politics in theMiddle East (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1971), 279. 31Fouad
"The
Ajami,
End
and Arab Nationalism: 1987), 98. 32The most
in Tawfic
of Pan-Arabism,"
The Continuing Debate account
thought-provoking
of
E. Farah,
ed.,
Pan-Arabism
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview crisis
the post-1967
of Arab
Press,
nationalism
remains Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Other works
of
representative
the reassessments
made
by Arab
nationalist
intellectuals
include Abdallah Laroui, The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism*, trans. Diarmid Cammell (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976); Samir Amin, The Arab Nation (London: Zed Press, 1978); and Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change inArab Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). For a variety of assessments by non Arabs, seeMichael Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Jacques Berque, Arab Rebirth: Pain & Ecstasy, trans. Quintin Hoare (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983); David Pryce Jones, The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs (New York: Harper &; Row, 1989); and Olivier Carr?, Le nationalisme arabe (Paris: Fayard, 1993). 33Salibi,A House 34Kamal
of Many Mansions, "Cultural
Abu-Deeb,
218, 231. in a Fragmented
Creation
Sharabi, ed., The Next Arab Decade: Westview Press, 1988), 165. 35The strengthening
of
the Arab
state
served
Alternative as the
theme
in Hisham
Society,"
Futures
(Boulder, Colo.:
of a multiyear
project
on
"Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World," which generated four volumes of detailed studies. The most significant of these studies are collected in Giacomo Luciani, ed., The Arab State (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990). 36MichelAflaq, Fi sabil al-ba(th (Beirut:Dar al-Tali'a, 1963), 55. 37Quoted by Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), 30-32. 38On
the
39Jean Genet, 40Quoted
of
evolution
1959-1974:
this
approach,
see Moshe
Arab Politics and the PLO Prisoner
by Carr?,
of Love, Le
nationalisme
trans.
The
Palestinian
Entity
(London: Frank Cass, 1988).
Barbara arabe,
Shemesh,
and Modern
Bray
(London:
Picador,
1989),
239.
175.
41 Quoted by Amatzia Baram, Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba(thist Iraq, 1968-89 (London: Macmillan, 1991), 121. The book includes a detailed discussion of the issue of identity in Iraqi politics, and the genesis of the Mesopotamian
myth.
42See Kanan Makiya Art, Vulgarity and [Samir al-Khalil], The Monument: Responsibility in Iraq (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991). 43Hichem Dja?t, Europe and Islam (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985), 140-41.
206
Martin Kramer
44Quoted by Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (New York: Norton, 1993), 242. The second half of this work is devoted to the rush of Arab nationalist intellectuals to endorse Saddam Hussein before and during the Gulf crisis. 45David Pollock, "The Arab Street"? Public Opinion in the Arab World, policy paper no. 32 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute forNear East Policy, 1992), 29-41. 46An example of this trend is the article by the Egyptian intellectual Lutfi al-Khuli, "Arab?
Na'am
wa-lakin
sharq
awsatiyin
aydan!,"
al-Hayat
(London),
20 May
1992. 47RodericDavison, "Where is theMiddle East," inRichard Nolte, Middle East (New York: Atherton, 1963), 16-17. 48FouadAjami, "The End of Arab Nationalism," 12 August 1991.
ed., The Modern
The New Republic
(Washington),
see the of a roundtable of Arab of such a debate, proceedings example a nationalist-Islamist on the of nationalist intellectuals rapprochement possibility
49For an
in al-Mustaqbal al-arabi (Beirut) (161) (July 1992): 96-119. 50Fora typical statement of this view, seeAs'ad AbuKhalil, "ANew Arab Ideology?: The Rejuvenation of Arab Nationalism," Middle East Journal 46 (1) (Winter 1992): 22-36. at Yarmuk conducted survey was by researchers one thousand from several Arab almost respondents
51The
al-arabi
(164) (October 1992): 27-33.
and included University, countries. See al-Mustaqbal