Argumentation, the Visual, and the Possibility of ... - Springer Link

Argumentation, the Visual, and the Possibility of Refutation: An Exploration RANDALL A. LAKE University of Southern California

and BARBARA A. PICKERING University of Nevada – Las Vegas

ABSTRACT: Taking the possibility of visual argumentation seriously, this essay explores how refutation might proceed. We posit three ways in which images can refute and be refuted in a mixed-media environment: (1) dissection, in which an image is broken down discursively; (2) substitution, in which one image is replaced within a larger visual frame by a different image; and (3) transformation, in which an image is recontextualized in a new visual frame. These strategies are illustrated in an analysis of three American documentary films on abortion. KEY WORDS: Abortion, image, negative, refutation, visual argumentation

Historically preoccupied with understanding the forms of discursive reason, argumentation theory in recent years has expanded beyond discursive forms to include so-called ‘presentational’ (Langer, 1942/1957, pp. 79–102) forms such as art, film, and television. Efforts to assimilate the visual image to argument have been controversial.2 Certainly there may be important differences between linguistic and imagistic argument forms. For example, perhaps, as Fleming (1996, pp. 14–15) has suggested recently, discursive arguments are processed sequentially while images are grasped simultaneously. However, even such a basic distinction may be exaggerated. Does not the enthymematic character of discursive argument approach the gestalt grasping of an image’s import? What evidence of human cognition warrants the confident declaration that the active bridging of perceived ‘gaps’ in a discursive argument differs in kind, not simply by (lesser) degree, from the active apprehension of a complex, ambiguous image (cf. Birdsell and Groarke, 1996, pp. 1–5)? Is it really true that images, unlike language, lack a vocabulary and rules of grammar and syntax? Do not many visual symbols come to possess conventional meanings in a culture? Are not schools of art distinguished by conventionalized, stylized forms? Perhaps the most we can say is that images are comparatively open-textured, with meaning more dependent on the internal relations among their components (shapes, colors, etc.) and less governed by agreed-upon meanings of each component in Argumentation 12: 79–93, 1998.  1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

80

RANDALL A. LAKE AND BARBARA A. PICKERING

isolation (definitions of terms) and codified rules governing the relations among these components (grammar and syntax). Again, however, this may be a difference in degree, not in kind (cf. Birdsell and Groarke, 1996, pp. 5–7). In any event, to argue (as Fleming does) that images cannot argue because they do not satisfy the traditional criteria of (verbal) ‘argument’ simply begs the question whether these criteria are adequate. We do not pretend that the issue is settled; nonetheless, we want only to acknowledge this controversy and suggest why we believe the notion of ‘visual argument’ to be defensible. This defense is not our subject, but our point of departure. Instead, we explore one implication of taking ‘visual argument’ seriously; specifically, if images can be said to ‘argue,’ what might it mean to say that they can refute (and be refuted)? To date, study of visual forms has been limited largely to [to use O’Keefe’s (1977, 1982) familiar distinction] argument1. That is, while scholars have examined ‘the argument’ made by discrete visual forms, such as the Nazi film, The Wandering Jew (Williams, 1987), paintings by Mary Cassatt (Chase, 1990), and pictorial representations of human evolution (Shelley, 1996), little has been done to contextualize these visual arguments in a larger process of argumentation (or argument2) in order to examine how different visual forms might ‘argue with’ one another. Indeed, Blair’s recent essay, which defends the intelligibility of visual argument, nonetheless restricts his defense to argument1 ‘because visual arguments are more plausibly akin to reasons for claims . . . than to open disagreements between interacting parties’ (1996, p. 24). Put another way, scholars have neglected what we will call the problem of refutation in visual argumentation. Refutation, or pointing out the weaknesses in opposing arguments with which you disagree (Hollihan and Baaske, 1994, pp. 126–127), lies at the very heart of the argumentation process; clash is the sine qua non of disputation. However, the logical apparatus by which we comprehend refutation is discursive. In the venerable tradition of reasoning begun by Aristotle, refutation is possible because certain propositions logically deny the truth of certain other propositions. Thus, statements of the form, ‘All A is B,’ are denied by ‘contrary’ and ‘contradictory’ statements of the form, ‘Some A is not B’ and ‘No A is B.’ In short, refutation of opposing claims is possible because propositions may negate each other. The problem of refutation in visual argumentation, then, occurs because even if pictures argue, they do not argue propositions (Condit, 1990, p. 85). If images are not propositional, it is hard to imagine how they can employ the logic of negation upon which refutation traditionally relies. A number of theorists have pointed implicitly to this problem. Susanne Langer (1942/1957), for example, contends that presentational forms, including visual symbols, convey their meaning in a gestalt, not a linear, form; images ‘do not present their constituents successively, but simultaneously, so the relations determining a visual structure are grasped in one

VISUAL ARGUMENT

81

act of vision’ (p. 93). Unlike language, images cannot be decoded via a semantic. Instead, they present to the eye a complex of traits (shape, color, light, and so on) that can be decoded only via their internal relations. Absent a semantic, the meaning of one trait cannot be fixed and thereby opposed to another. Blue cannot be said to be the ‘opposite’ of red. Absent opposition, one image cannot negate another. ‘Where there is no exclusion of opposites, there is also, strictly speaking, no negative. In nonverbal arts this is obvious; omissions may be significant, but never as negatives’ (Langer, 1953, p. 242). And absent negation, there is no refutation. Langer (1942/1957) concludes: ‘since presentational symbols have no negatives, there is no operation whereby their truth-value is reversed, no contradiction’ (p. 262). Kenneth Burke concurs. Inspired by Bergson’s discussion of the ‘idea of nothing,’ Burke (1966) argues that ‘there are no negatives in nature, where everything simply is what it is and as it is. To look for negatives in nature would be as absurd as though you were to go out hunting for the square root of minus-one’ (p. 9). Instead, as a product of human symbol systems, the negative belongs to the realm of ideas, not images. ‘For the negative is an idea; there can be no image of it. But in imagery there is no negative’ (p. 430). It is important to understand that, for Burke, the realm of symbols is the realm of reason and moral action, while the realm of nature is the realm of sensation and sheer motion (pp. 428–431). For humans, who are the ‘inventors of the negative’ (p. 9), there is no going back; even the sheer positives of nature are thoroughly infused with the negatives of discourse, so that even our apprehension of images is contaminated by the ideas we hold about those images. [Barthes (1977) makes a similar point about the ‘imitative’ arts which, he claims, comprise two messages: a ‘denoted’ one consisting of the image that is the ‘analogon’ of reality, and a ‘connoted’ one that is ‘the manner in which the society to a certain extent communicates what it thinks of it’ (p. 17).] Even so, refutation, the ability to negate, is ideational; images do not cancel each other, but only vary in intensity (Burke, 1966, pp. 430–431). From this premise that images, which are not propositional, cannot negate, some theorists have concluded that images cannot argue. Fleming (1996, p. 17), for example, cites both Langer and Burke approvingly to this effect. Even those scholars who have proffered nonpropositional views of argument (Brockriede, 1975; Conley, 1985; Fisher, 1987; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958/1969; Rasmussen, 1994; Willard, 1976) have not yet come to grips with visual refutation. This essay, to the contrary, will begin to explore the possibilities of refutation in visual, nonpropositional, argumentation. We suggest that visual arguments can be said usefully to refute one another even though they do not, strictly speaking, negate one another. Such refutation can be accomplished in at least three ways: (1) through dissection, in which an image is ‘broken down’ discursively, its component parts named and its relations

82


analyzed, thereby opening the image to refutation via traditional (discursive) argumentative means; (2) through substitution, in which one image is replaced within a larger visual frame by a different image with an opposing polarity; and (3) through transformation, in which an image is recontextualized in a new visual frame, such that its polarity is modified or reversed through association with different images. We will illustrate these refutation strategies in visual argumentation through a case study of three short films on the subject of abortion: (1) The Silent Scream (hereafter SS), released in 1985, and undoubtedly the most (in)famous American anti-abortion film, which purports to depict, through ultrasound imaging, the ‘murder’ of a fetus; (2) A Planned Parenthood Response to ‘Silent Scream’ (hereafter PPR), also released in 1985, in which medical ‘experts’ debunk SS’s ‘propagandistic’ images; and (3) The Answer (hereafter TA), released in 1987, in which the attending physician at the abortion depicted in SS rebuts the charges leveled in PPR and defends the truth of SS’s depiction. Without question, abortion has been one of the most divisive domestic political issues on the American scene for many years. It has been the subject of discussion and debate in all walks of life. A continuing series of Supreme Court decisions and election campaigns has kept the subject in the public eye, and sometimes-violent demonstrations at abortion clinics (including the death of a Florida physician) have intensified the conflict. Historically, images have played an important part in this controversy on both sides. Anti-abortionists have made extensive use of photographs, including smiling fetuses that suck their thumbs and the bloody, mangled remains of abortion, to argue for legal protection of fetuses as ‘babies’ (Brock, 1991; Condit, 1990, pp. 79, 82). For their part, pro-choice advocates have used images such as a bloody coat hanger and the Statue of Liberty to argue that abortion should remain legal (Condit, 1990, pp. 92–94). Although still images became commonplace, both sides continued to seek more persuasive ways to convey their message to the public. Antiabortionists believed that showing the moving fetus might be more successful in converting undecided voters, and the advent of ultrasound and sonogram technology provided the opportunity. Originally developed in the late 1950s as an alternative to x-rays, ultrasound became available in the United States a decade later and, with the aid of computer developments in the early 1970s, was able to provide reasonably detailed images of the fetus in utero (Pickering, 1992, p. 13). In 1985, in ‘a dramatic shift in the contest to find the most persuasive imagery’ (Withycombe, 1989, p. 42), this technology was unveiled in the 28-minute film, The Silent Scream. Since then, both sides have made increasing use of cinematic images to make their case; at least six other well-known films – two by anti-abortionists and four by pro-choice advocates – were produced between 1985 and 1992 (Pickering, 1992, pp. 10–11).

VISUAL ARGUMENT

83

For our purposes, SS, PPR, and TA are especially good case studies because they contain film images consciously designed to argue a claim and refute counter-claims. PPR was created to rebut SS’s contention that the fetus is a ‘child’, and TA was created to rebut attacks like those launched in PPR and to defend the veracity of SS’s original claim. Of course, these films are mixed media, containing both discursive and presentational elements. We believe this to be a strength. Since we are not concerned to defend the claim that images per se can argue (although, to reiterate, we believe that this claim can be defended), analysis of film – particularly documentary, non-fiction film – affords a more realistic study of the refutational possibilities typical in the ambient mixed media environment, in which discourse and image interplay. This emphatically does not mean that only discourse carries an argument and that images at best reinforce or serve as evidence for discursive claims. On the contrary, as we hope to make clear in what follows, there are many possibilities: sometimes images carry the argument instead; sometimes visual and discursive arguments are at odds; and while an image’s ‘claim’ obviously can be translated into language and refuted discursively, so can a visual argument be constructed to refute a discursive claim. We turn now to an analysis of each of these films, and the techniques by which refutation proceeds.

THE SILENT SCREAM

This film first aired nationally on ‘Jerry Falwell Live,’ the cable television program hosted by the founder of the conservative Moral Majority. Subsequently, copies were sent to all nine Supreme Court justices and every member of Congress. Narrated by anti-abortion convert Bernard Nathanson, M.D., the film depicts an ultrasound record of an abortion in progress. It begins with a brief history of the technological advances that make it possible to see inside the womb, and shows an ultrasound procedure being performed. The centerpiece of the film consists of the ultrasound images of the abortion procedure, accompanied by Nathanson’s narrative and manipulation of plastic models of fetuses and medical instruments. At its end, Nathanson decries the increasing numbers of abortions performed each year and indicts the medical establishment for ‘keeping women in the dark,’ daring it to show this film to those contemplating the procedure. Anti-abortionists predicted that SS would change the way Americans thought about abortion. The president of American Portrait Films, which produced it, described the film as ‘the atom bomb of the pro-life movement’ (Cuniberti and Mehren, 1985). Falwell predicted: ‘As soon as we can show the pictures in prime time, the same way we have shown the starving children in Ethiopia, the big American heart will respond and say “stop it!” ’ (Clendinen, 1985, p. A15). Senator Gordon Humphrey (Republican

84


from New Hampshire) suggested that SS would convince Americans that abortion was immoral in the same way that Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin changed Americans’ view of slavery (MacDonald, 1985). Before we can focus directly on the process of refutation, it is necessary to examine the original claim to be refuted. SS attempts to prove visually that the fetus is an unborn ‘child’ and that abortion therefore must be murder. While we will treat this as the claim that subsequent films either refute or defend, it is worth noting how this claim itself functions refutatively in the larger abortion controversy. SS was meant to disprove the presumption that the fetus is not a human being deserving of legal protection, a presumption enshrined in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade. Thus, Nathanson takes great pains to argue at the outset that the ‘new science’ of fetology, as depicted by the ultrasound images, reveals our historical misconceptions about the fetus and proves conclusively that it is a ‘child.’ This ‘child’ then becomes abortion’s ‘victim’ where before there had been none, and the purpose of the film becomes to portray abortion ‘from the victim’s vantage point.’ So, although we will not discuss them primarily in these terms, one should remember that the images with which SS ‘proves’ its claim simultaneously function refutatively. For our purposes, two sets of images are germane. First are those that give ‘presence’ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958/1969, pp. 115–120) to the fetus. Foremost among these are the black-and-white, allegedly realtime, ultrasound images of an allegedly twelve-week-old fetus before and during an abortion. Although Nathanason praises their ‘amazing resolution,’ these images in fact are so grainy and indistinct that most commentators attribute their persuasive power to Nathanson’s accompanying narrative (Condit, 1990, pp. 86–87; Petchesky, 1987; Pickering, 1992, pp. 54–55; Williams, 1985). Throughout, Nathanson refers to the ‘child’ and attributes to it feeling and intelligence, contending, for instance, that it ‘senses aggression in its sanctuary’ and is aware of ‘the most mortal danger imaginable.’ During the abortion, the fetus’ movements become ‘violent,’ in a ‘pathetic attempt to escape the inexorable instruments’ that ‘begin to tear the child apart.’ As the fetus is ‘crushed’ and ‘dismembered,’ its mouth is ‘wide open in a silent scream.’ In the aftermath of the procedure, the ‘pieces of tissue’ are evidence that ‘there was once a living defenseless, tiny human being there.’ In addition, Nathanson’s highly charged verbal narrative is accompanied by yet other images. Prior to showing the ultrasound, he prepares audiences for what they are about to see by displaying a series of comparatively more recognizable plastic models of the fetus at various stages of development. He also displays and demonstrates the instruments with which the abortion will be performed. Then, as the ultrasound film rolls, Nathanson uses a pointer to identify the fetus’ body parts, circling its limbs and pointing to its head, mouth, nose, brain, eye sockets, ribs, spine, and so on; he clari-

VISUAL ARGUMENT

85

fies the fetus’ position in the uterus by positioning one of the plastic models next to the screen; his pointer mimics the action of the medical instruments; and he places the polyp forceps in front of the screen, demonstrating the motion by which this instrument is said to ‘crush the head’, a scene not shown by the ultrasound. Following his commentary on the procedure itself, Nathanson turns to a discussion of the abortion ‘industry’; in this segment, photos of dismembered fetuses are juxtaposed with exterior shots of a number of women’s clinics; the former obviously are meant to depict what goes on behind the façades of the latter, to make the invisible visible. Finally, near its conclusion, the film again emphasizes its claim about fetal humanity through still color photographs of fetuses seemingly resting serenely in the womb. In short, contrary to the film’s implication, the ultrasound images do not speak for themselves. Far from it. Instead, Nathanson’s other verbal and visual techniques are intended to make audiences see a human baby in the sequence of fuzzy, otherwise undiscernible images. So framed, however, these images provide a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ of the fetus’ humanity that is particularly appealing to a ‘visually oriented culture’ (Petchesky, 1987, p. 264). Also significant are SS’s images of women. Indeed, while the fetal images ostensibly speak for themselves but in fact are subordinate to Nathanson’s discursive claim, here the situation is different. There is virtually no discursive argument about women, save for a brief assertion that they are victims of the medical establishment. On the other hand, there is a powerful visual argument that women are defined by (and properly restricted to) their reproductive capacities. While it endows the fetus with presence, the film suppresses the presence of women (Kauffman and Parson, 1990), literally and visually silencing them. No woman speaks in the entire film. Visually, women are depicted as passive, pregnant objects victimized by ‘abortionists.’ In an early segment, a woman lies on an examining table as a physician performs an ultrasound; the moving image of her fetus on the screen causes her to smile. The next woman to appear in the film also is lying on a table; we see her from the waist down only, her feet in the stirrups, as a suction abortion is performed. Finally, in a series of close-ups, several young white women stare sadly, deep in thought; one clutches a baby rattle and another cries. These images reduce a woman to the physical environment of her fetus, making her ‘a passive spectator in her own pregnancy’ (Petchesky, 1987, p. 277). The sequence of these images also is highly significant. Not only do they depict, in order, the ‘before,’ ‘during,’ and ‘after’ of abortion, but the women’s faces enact in their responses to pregnancy and its termination the same reactions to each of these conditions that anti-abortion advocates would have all viewers of SS emulate (cf. Branham, 1991). In sum, SS endows the fetus with presence while suppressing the

86


presence of women, visually constructing a natural hierarchical order between them for the purpose of advocating a corresponding legal order in which the rights of the fetus are paramount. We turn now to PPR’s refutation of this argument.

A PLANNED PARENTHOOD RESPONSE

On the defensive due to the media attention given SS (Zintl, 1985), the prochoice community sought to defuse the atom bomb. The result, also produced in 1985, was A Planned Parenthood Response to ‘Silent Scream’, produced by the Seattle and King County, Washington, chapter of this organization. Its title clearly signals the film’s refutative purpose. It begins with Lee Minto, executive director of this chapter, explaining the organization’s role and discussing the reasons why women might choose to terminate their pregnancies. Then ‘academically qualified’ experts critique the claims (both verbal and visual) made in SS, which they label a ‘propaganda film’, identifying ‘obvious’ and ‘deliberate distortions of film and of fact.’ The five ‘most alarming inaccuracies’ are: (1) the fetus being aborted is more than twelve weeks old, and consequently looks more human than it should; (2) the plastic model exaggerates the fetus’ size; (3) relatively unsophisticated ultrasound technology is used deliberately ‘so that detail had to be guessed at’; (4) film speed in scenes depicting fetal movement is manipulated in order to create a sense of calm and serenity in the womb prior to the abortion and a contrasting sense of unrest and violence during the abortion; and (5) a twelve-week fetus is not biologically capable of feeling pain or uttering a ‘silent scream.’ These charges refute the images of both fetus and woman portrayed in SS; their purpose is to reverse SS’s attributions of presence. When refuting the image of the fetus and thereby suppressing its presence, PPR’s primary strategy is dissection. The images of the fetus are ‘broken down’ and subjected to discursive reinterpretation. The plastic model, it is said, must be ‘a foot long,’ but it is used misleadingly to represent a ‘two-inch fetus.’ To make the point about film speed, a portion of SS is shown on a monitor as a commentator shifts viewer attention from the fuzzy image of the fetus to the medium itself, contending that the slow motion deception can be seen in visible frame-by-frame changes. The contrived dramatization in which the head of the ‘child’ is crushed is defused by testimony that 90 percent of abortions do not require this step. To counter the image of the ‘silent scream,’ a commentator displays comparative pictures of brain development, claiming that the fetus’ brain at this stage is neurologically incapable of registering alarm, and that its lungs at this stage are solid and hence incapable of ‘screaming.’ When endowing women with presence and refuting SS’s image of them,

VISUAL ARGUMENT

87

PPR’s primary strategy is substitution. It replaces images of women as passive and pregnant with images of women as active professionals. Three of the six commentators in PPR are female: one, as noted, is Executive Director of the local Planned Parenthood chapter; one is an M.D. specializing in obstetrics and gynecology with the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound; and one is a Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Washington. Hence, unlike SS, women in PPR do speak; indeed, they speak extensively and authoritatively on a wide range of issues. (Thus, we should note, it is significant that a substantial part of PPR’s dissection of the fetal image conveyed in SS, discussed above, occurs through women’s voices.) These images of authoritative women speaking refute SS’s ‘before-andafter’ images of women through the technique of substitution. The M.D. explicitly characterizes SS’s portrayal of women who have had abortions as confused and despondent as ‘offensive.’ Further, much of the film overtly tries to shift viewer attention from the act of abortion (represented by the ultrasound) to the reasons for abortion, depicted by commentators who detail situations in which they believe abortion to be justified. This move seeks to make visible women’s motivations, which are invisible in SS’s portrayal. And while there is no image of a motive per se, the image of confident career women defending the choice to abort substitutes for and thereby refutes the image of women who only find joy in pregnancy and despair in its termination. Indeed, just as the ‘before-and-after’ images enact the attitude toward abortion that anti-abortionists want viewers of SS to adopt, the sociologist in PPR serves as a model of the resisting viewer who recognizes the manner in which she is being ‘manipulated.’ She acknowledges having reservations about viewing SS because ‘I had an ultrasound not so long ago,’ and then testifies to her reaction: ‘I realized that what I was doing was being manipulated, manipulated to treat this, this fetus, which is in the very primitive stage of development as if it were my baby.’ In this way, the image of a new mother who reaches a contrary conclusion about the ultrasound replaces SS’s images of women. Finally, on a more global level, there is an important way in which PPR attempts to refute SS by transforming its key images. A recurrent strategy in PPR consists of showing a commentator who critiques SS while viewing it on a monitor. The effect is to transform the meaning of SS’s images by altering the visual frame within which those images are interpreted. Removed from the visual frame constructed by SS itself, a frame that encourages audiences to interpret them as objective and scientific fact, these images are placed in a visual frame consisting of expert critique, a frame that encourages audiences to interpret them as the manipulative propaganda of an unethical charlatan. In this way, the positive polarity of SS’s ultrasound images is reversed, and audiences are encouraged to interpret these images negatively instead.

88


THE ANSWER

Two years after SS was released, Nathanson’s production company prepared a reply to charges leveled against it by numerous critics, including those presented in PPR. This 15-minute film begins with a statement by Nathanson, who explains that TA will dispel the criticisms leveled at SS, followed by an interview with Dr. Jay Kelinson, who claims to have performed the abortion shown in SS. Kelinson remains seated behind a desk during the ten-minute interview which, surprisingly, is conducted not by Nathanson but by an off-camera, female voice. At first glance, The Answer appears to rely almost exclusively on traditional discursive strategies of refutation, albeit in a question-and-answer format. TA is concerned with the substantive criticisms of SS, including some (but not all) of those made in PPR, and does not explicitly address the images portrayed in PPR. However, we will suggest, there is an important respect in which TA relies on substitution. The off-camera interviewer (a female who we never see) asks questions of Kelinson, who replies (and only replies rather than initiating talk himself ) while seated behind a desk. The tone of the questions is formal, not chatty; their style is scripted, not extemporaneous; and Kelinson’s demeanor is serious, even pensive. This arrangement suggests an interrogation rather than a conversation or discussion. Indeed, it is reminiscent of a courtroom. This impression is strengthened by Nathanson’s brief introduction to the interview, in which Kelinson is described as ‘the only qualified witness’ to the abortion depicted in SS, who ‘has now volunteered to come forward and present his testimony’ (our emphases). Moreover, when Kelinson later admits that he is not ‘pro-life,’ and still performs some abortions ‘for medical reasons,’ it becomes clear that this witness’ testimony is reluctant, which, because it is given grudgingly and contrary to the witness’ own interests, often is believed to be the most reliable kind of testimony (Hollihan and Baaske, 1994, p. 104). Hence, if the experts in PPR in effect put SS ‘on trial,’ TA constructs Kelinson as the best witness, offering the best testimony, for the defense (cf. Withycombe, 1989, esp. pp. 117–118). Indeed, Nathanson returns at the film’s end to ask rhetorically, ‘any questions?’ – the functional equivalent of ‘the defense rests.’ In context, the issue being addressed here is credibility: Nathanson’s (in SS) versus the pro-choice experts (in PPR) versus Kelinson’s – and thus, by corroboration, Nathanson’s (in TA). Imagistically, then, Kelinson’s superiority is accomplished by two related substitutions. First, the image of a nonpartisan, even reluctant witness replaces PPR’s images of expert – but partisan – critics. It even replaces SS’s now-suspicious images of Nathanson. Kelinson testifies that Nathanson did not participate in the abortion filmed and did not pay Kelinson to testify to its

VISUAL ARGUMENT

89

authenticity. Thus, even if PPR has succeeded in undermining Nathanson’s credibility, TA seems visually to say, surely here is the unimpeachable source, the ultimate arbiter of the truth. Second, the image of a trial, an adversarial process in which both sides are presented but justice prevails, replaces PPR’s images of one-sided criticisms. This is true even though TA in fact presents only one side; the adversarial connotations that attend a trial are (literally) imag(e)inary. Many of the ‘charges’ against SS that Kelinson denies are ‘straw people.’ For example, he protests that the speed of the ultrasound film was never ‘increased beyond normal to simulate hyperactivity’; however, the charge in PPR was that the film was slowed down to simulate calm, and then returned to normal speed. Indeed, his reply to a related question concedes the criticism. He is asked: ‘Did anyone deliberately alter the speed of the tape except to show particularly important sequences in slow motion [our emphasis] or freeze frames?’ Kelinson’s reply, ‘absolutely not,’ is a nondenial denial. In fact, throughout TA, it appears that Kelinson is defending only the veracity of the ultrasound tape per se and not its use in SS. Near the end of TA, the interviewer asks a compound question about SS, as follows: ‘Planned Parenthood claims the film The Silent Scream is riddled with scientific, medical and legal inaccuracies, misleading statements and exaggerations. You were the one who actually did the abortion in The Silent Scream and you made the tape. Do you agree with Planned Parenthood’s allegations?’ Kelinson’s answer at best confuses the film and the tape, and at worst defends only the latter. He replies: ‘Absolutely not. There was no manipulation of that tape. There was no misrepresentation. What one sees with that ultrasound tape is, was actually what happened at that time. I have nothing to gain by doing that tape. I am not a pro-life person. I can unequivocally state that there was no alteration, that that tape is in fact true.’ In this way, TA blurs a crucial distinction, making it appear that Kelinson is vouching not just for his own tape but for Nathanson’s film as well. What matters here is the gestalt image of justice that is portrayed, not the substantive details of accusation and defense; TA depicts ‘the truth’ more than it presents the truth. It substitutes an image of objective, adversarially-tested fact for PPR’s image of expert – but partisan – opinion, thereby rebutting the latter’s charge that SS was just ‘propaganda.’ This substitution also works a final transformation analogous, but contrary in polarity, to that effected in PPR. Both PPR and TA show portions of the ultrasound film first seen in SS. As we noted above, PPR transforms these images by recontextualizing them in a visual frame of expert critique, thus refuting their status as objective, scientific fact. Similarly, TA transforms these images yet again by recontextualizing them a second time, this time in a visual frame of adversarially-tested truth. PPR’s transformation reverses the positive polarity of SS’s ultrasound images, making them negative; TA’s transformation reverses this negative

90


polarity, making the images positive again. The effect is to refute the visual argument of PPR and rehabilitate the original claim depicted in SS. Finally, it is crucial to note, the relative paucity of visual cues in TA (focused almost exclusively on a single character, seated at a desk, with limited camera angles, and so on) does not subordinate the film’s visual argument to its discursive one. Far from it. The sparse images of TA make precisely the same visual claim to the unvarnished Truth as do the profuse images of SS; the difference in presentational strategy is necessitated by changes in the larger argumentative context. That is, because PPR challenged the accuracy of the images in SS, its defense of these images makes TA’s argument refutative, while SS’s original argument was constructive. Under these circumstances, a visually richer TA would have defeated its very purpose – to testify to the authenticity of SS’s imagery – by drawing attention to the many ways in which imagery can be manipulated and can carry an argument.

CONCLUSION

Mot commentators believe that the failure effectively to refute anti-abortionists’ visual argument concerning the humanity of the fetus jeopardizes the pro-choice cause. Rosalind Petchesky (1987), for example, complains that ‘finding “positive” images and symbols of abortion hard to imagine, feminists and other pro-choice advocates have all too readily ceded the visual terrain’ (p. 264). In her insightful analysis of the persuasive power of still fetal photographs, Nicol Brock (1991) suggests that visual images are less ‘dialogic’ than discursive arguments, because ‘unlike verbal rhetoric, a photograph is not adaptable to a dialectic progression of statements and counterstatements’ (p. 9). Nonetheless, she contends that many who ‘lean toward’ the anti-abortion position do so ‘because they cannot debate with the fetal image,’ and concludes that, if pro-choice advocates are to win the abortion argument, they must ‘find an image that not only is compelling but that directly refutes the assertion that the fetus is a person’ (p. 24; emphasis in original). Hence, she seems to believe that the visual refutation of fetal images is both essential and impossible. This essay has sought a way out of such dilemmas. We have attempted to illustrate how images, even though they are not propositional and hence lack the capacity, strictly speaking, to negate, nonetheless may be said to ‘refute’ other images. To summarize: SS implicitly claims that unmediated ultrasound images prove the humanity of the fetus, a claim belied by the presence of numerous other interpretive cues, some of which are themselves visual but most of which are verbal. PPR dissects these ultrasound images by subjecting them to discursive reinterpretation; it substitutes images of active, professional women for SS’s images of passive, pregnant women; and it transforms key segments of SS by redepicting them in a

VISUAL ARGUMENT

91

larger visual frame of critique. TA relies heavily on discursive refutation of PPR and defense of SS, but also substitutes a judicial image of nonpartisan ‘truth’ for PPR’s image of expert – but partisan – critique and thereby retransforms SS’s ultrasound images as neutral and factual. Thus have we attempted to show how refutation of visual images can proceed in a realistic, mixed-media environment. While we have sidestepped the question whether ‘pure’ images can be said even to argue, much less refute, we want to observe in closing that this is not simply an abstract theoretical question. Interestingly, SS (and anti-abortion rhetoric generally) implicitly adopts the view (of Fleming, among others) that pictures cannot argue, and adapts this view to ideological ends; that is, it contends that images of the fetus are beyond argument and constitute irrefutable proof of the fetus’ humanity. In contrast, PPR implicitly adopts the view (of Birdsell and Groarke, among others) that pictures can argue, and adapts this view to contrary ideological purposes; that is, it contends that images of the fetus are only argumentative, are susceptible to refutation, and constitute misleading evidence of the fetus’ humanity. The topic of abortion highlights the importance of visual literacy in a media age; in our opinion, to conclude that argumentation theory has nothing to offer here would be unfortunate, indeed.3 We do not mean to imply that dissection, substitution, and transformation are the only strategies of visual refutation; undoubtedly, there are others. We also are acutely aware of the difficulty of conveying these visual strategies effectively to readers in an essay without pictures. Finally, we do not pretend to have analyzed these three films exhaustively; their visual refutation is only one of several features of potential interest to argumentation scholars. For these reasons, we encourage others to view these films – and other presentational and mixed forms – for themselves, both to test the utility of the ideas presented here and to stimulate further theorizing about visual argumentation and refutation. NOTES 1

Dr. Lake is Associate Professor in the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, 90089-0281. Dr. Pickering is Assistant Professor in the Hank Greenspun School of Communication, University of Nevada-Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, USA, 89154-5007. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1994. Some material is drawn from Dr. Pickering’s doctoral dissertation, ‘The Rhetoric of Visual Images: An Analysis of Pro-choice/Pro-life Films’ (U. of Southern California, 1992), directed by Dr. Lake. The authors are listed alphabetically and contributed equally to this essay. 2 For the most recent example, compare Birdsell and Groarke (1996) with Fleming (1996). Consulting these articles’ references will lead the reader to the larger literature on this issue. 3 Although we acknowledge a correspondence, in this sense, between our views of visual argument and our pro-choice positions on abortion, we hasten to add that we do not attribute any such correspondences to anyone else, nor do we suggest that these particular correspondences are necessary.

92


REFERENCES Barthes, R.: 1977, Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath, Hill & Wang, New York. Birdsell, D. S. and L. Groarke: 1996, ‘Toward a Theory of Visual Argument’, Argumentation and Advocacy 33, 1–10. Blair, J. A.: 1996, ‘The Possibility and Actuality of Visual Argument’, Argumentation and Advocacy 33, 23–39. Branham, R. J.: 1991, ‘The Role of the Convert in Eclipse of Reason and The Silent Scream’, Quarterly Journal of Speech 77, 407–426. Brock, N. C.: 1991, ‘The Form, the Soul, and the Carnage: A Rhetorical Analysis of Fetal Photographs’, paper presented to the Speech Communication Association convention, Atlanta, Georgia. Brockriede, W.: 1975, ‘Where is Argument?’, Journal of the American Forensic Association 11, 179–182. Burke, K.: 1966, Language as Symbolic Action, University of California Press, Berkeley. Chase, K.: 1990, ‘Argument and Beauty: A Review and Exploration of Connections’, in R. Trapp and J. Schuetz (eds.), Perspectives on Argumentation: Essays in Honor of Wayne Brockriede, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, IL, pp. 258–271. Clendinen, D.: 1985, January 23, ‘President Praises Foes of Abortion’, New York Times, pp. A1, 15. Condit, C. M.: 1990, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric: Communicating, Compromise, and Social Change, University of Illinois Press, Chicago. Conley, T. M.: 1985, ‘The Beauty of Lists: Copia and Argument’, Journal of the American Forensic Association 22, 96–103. Cuniberti, B. and E. Mehren: 1985, August 8, ‘Abortion Film Stirs Friend, Foe’, Los Angeles Times, p. I1. Fisher, W. R.: 1987, Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia. Fleming, D.: 1996, ‘Can Pictures Be Arguments?’, Argumentation and Advocacy 33, 11–22. Hollihan, T. A. and K. T. Baaske: 1994, Arguments and Arguing: The Products and Process of Human Decision Making, St. Martin’s Press, New York. Kauffman, C. and D. W. Parson: 1990, ‘Metaphor and Presence in Argument’, in D. C. Williams and M. D. Hazen (eds.), Argumentation Theory and the Rhetoric of Assent, University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, pp. 91–102. Langer, S. K.: 1942/1957, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art, 3rd ed., Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Langer, S. K.: 1953, Feeling and Form, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York. MacDonald, M.: 1985, February 25, ‘A Bitter “Silent Scream” ’, Maclean’s, p. 58. O’Keefe, D. J.: 1977, ‘Two Concepts of Argument’, Journal of the American Forensic Association 13, 121–128. O’Keefe, D. J.: 1982, ‘The Concepts of Argument and Arguing’, in J. R. Cox and C. A. Willard (eds.), Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, pp. 3–23. Perelman, C. and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca: 1958/1969, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argument, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. Petchesky, R.: 1987, ‘Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the Politics of Reproduction’, Feminist Studies 2, 263–292. Pickering, B. A.: 1992, The Rhetoric of Visual Images: An Analysis of Pro-choice/Pro-life Films, Diss. University of Southern California, Los Angeles. Rasmussen, K.: 1994, ‘Transcendence in Leonard Bernstein’s Kaddish Symphony’, Quarterly Journal of Speech 80, 150–173. Shelley, C.: 1996, ‘Rhetorical and Demonstrative Modes of Visual Argument: Looking at Images of Human Evolution’, Argumentation and Advocacy 33, 53–68.

VISUAL ARGUMENT

93

Willard, C. A.: 1976, ‘On the Utility of Descriptive Diagrams for the Analysis and Criticism of Arguments’, Communication Monographs 43, 308–319. Williams, D. C.: 1985, ‘Ideological Analogons: Portraits of “Truth” ’, in J. R. Cox, M. O. Sillars and G. B. Walker (eds.), Argument and Social Practice: Proceedings of the 4th SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, Speech Communication Association, Annandale, VA, pp. 253–276. Williams, D. C.: 1987, ‘Representations of Ideology: Analogons, Images, and Ideographs’, in F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair and C. A. Willard (eds.), Argumentation: Analysis and Practices (Proceedings of the Conference on Argumentation 1986) Foris, Dordrecht/Providence, Studies of Argumentation in Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis 3B, pp. 298–307. Withycombe, R.: 1989, Burke’s Representative Anecdote and Toulmin’s Argument Fields: Analysis of Arguments in Anti-abortion/Pro-choice Films, Diss. University of Oregon, Eugene. Zintl, R. T.: 1985, February 4, ‘New Heat Over an Old Issue’, Time, p. 17.

FILMS ANALYZED The Silent Scream: 1985. Videocassette. Prod. Bernard N. Nathanson and D. S. Smith. Dir. J. Dabner. American Portrait Films, Anaheim, CA. A Planned Parenthood Response to ‘Silent Scream’: 1985. Videocassette. Exec. Dir. Lee Minto. Planned Parenthood of Seattle and King County, Washington. The Answer: 1987. Videocassette. Prod. Bernard N. Nathanson and Adelle R. Nathanson. Dir. Charles Warren. Bernadell.