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“Aristotle and the rain, once again” G. ROSSI (
[email protected])
[English translation of: “Aristóteles y la lluvia, una vez más”, Diánoia LVI - 65 (November 2010), p. 91-123.]
I In Physics (Phys.) II 8 Aristotle makes some assertions which have recently been read as to rehabilitate the idea that he proposes some kind of interactive or ‘second order’ natural teleology. 1 This reading has been put forward by some interpreters from the Anglo-Saxon interpretative tradition, and it holds that, according to Aristotle, it rains for the sake of the growing of the crop, within the first argument for natural teleology offered in Phys. II 8. This claim about the ‘end’ of the rain, if it can be ascribed to Aristotle, would be a basis for the reading that he endorses not only an ‘immanent’ teleology, but also a ‘second order’, ‘external’, ‘interactive’, ‘global’, or ‘universal’ teleology, such that the ends of different substances would have a hierarchical order. In this manner, the end of a substance or process could be the benefit of another substance ‘superior’, in the natural hierarchy. 2 The problem concerning the existence of some sort of second order teleology in Aristotle, has been the occasion of a long controversy. 3 It is even disputed what kind of ‘extrinsic’ finality, if any, could be attributable to Aristotle. Around this issue, there is a wide range of positions, going from the mere verification of an inter-substantial order (without ascribing a strictly final causal role to it), to a vertical cosmological teleology, or a theocentric teleology, such as medieval Aristotelianism,4 including certain anthropocentric views of cosmology, such as Xenophon’s5 and, later, Chrissipus’.6
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David Furley 1985, and David Sedley 1991, are the authors who sustain explicitly and with stronger arguments this kind of interpretation, which has had ever since some acceptance among scholars. 2 Other texts on which this reading of Aristotelian teleology usually seeks support are Politics I 8, 1256b10-22 and Metaphysics L 10, 1075a11-25. I will discuss the latter in section IV. For a very good discussion of Politics I 8, see L. Judson 2005, pp. 356-358 and especially M. Scharle 2008, pp. 161-165. 3 See Johnson 2005, pp. 15-39, for an informative history of the reception of Aristotelian teleology, which depicts the historical sources of the parties in this vexata quaestio. 4 The fact should not pass unnoticed, however, that Aquinas understands that in Phys. II 8 –the text of our present analysis– Aristotle claims that it does not rain for a purpose or for the sake of something (In octo libros Physicorum, 2, 12, 3). 5 Memorabilia, IV 3. 6 Cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum I 39 (LS 54B, SVF II 1077), Ib. II 14, 37 (SVF II 1153), Ib. II 3739 (LS 54H), y esp. Ib. II 133 (LS 54N), De finibus bonorum et malorum III 67 (LS 57F, esp. 25-29), Porphyry, De Abstinentia III 20 (LS 54P, SVF II 1152), Gelio, Noctes Atticae VII 1 (LS 54Q, SVF II 1169-70), Lactantio, De ira dei 13, 9-10 (LS 54R, SVF II 1152).
2 This problem has been also widely discussed by scholars in the second half of the last century. Wieland, for instance, denied that Aristotle could have postulated a cosmological teleological principle (W. Wieland 1970, pp. 255-59), against what were, at the moment, traditional readings such as Zeller’s (1921, pp. 330 ff.) and Mansion’s (1946). From the specific studies about Aristotelian biology, A. Gotthelf (1987) argues for a strongly immanentist reading of Aristotelian teleology, while M. Nussbaum (1978, pp. 59-106, esp. pp. 60, 93-97), W. Kullmann (1985, p. 174), and D. Balme (1987a) argue for the existence of an exclusive immanent teleology in Aristotle (that is, immanent to natural substances), and they rule out completely any external or second order finality. It is probably based on these researches and conclusions that E. Berti, at the end of the 80’s of the last century (and without denying that Aristotle admits the existence of an inter-substantial order in the sublunary realm), diagnosed that theocentric and anthropocentric readings of Aristotelian teleology are not serious enough to be even considered in exegetical discussion, and that the problem to be solved is rather about the relation between physical and metaphysical teleology (i.e. the relation between the first unmoved mover as a final cause, and the immanent natural finality).7 However, the fact is that the idea of an ‘external’ teleology in Aristotle had already been once more stated (J. Cooper 1982, pp. 217-221), and, moreover, at this same period some prestigious scholars from other interpretative traditions reinstall in the center of exegetic discussion a cosmological interpretation of Aristotelian teleology (like D. Furley in his paper of 1985), and even openly anthropocentric, as D. Sedley has argued in a controversial paper at the dawn of the 90’s. The problem of the existence of a second order natural teleology in Aristotle is itself aporetic. It is hard to deny that Aristotle recognizes an inter-substantial order in nature;8 but the cause of this inter-substantial order in the sublunary realm remains, in my opinion, far from clear. The puzzle behind this problem could be stated thus: if inter-substantial order is the resulting effect of each substance’s attaining its immanent end, then there is no final cause of the inter-substantial order as such, but of each of its parts; and this amounts to say that the inter-substantial order happens by chance (in the Aristotelian sense of the term). On the other hand, if we claim that this order is caused by a final cause, then we would have to admit that this cause would operate over and above the intrinsic ends of each substance, for these latter ends would be subordinated to the former, which also seems an implausible consequence. My purpose in this text, however, is more modest than trying to provide a solution for this puzzle. Instead, I expect merely to clarify some issues concerning the textual basis for this renewed debate. Specifically, I will offer a series of arguments for the reading that Phys. II 8, at least, is not one of the texts on which an ‘external’ interpretation of Aristotelian teleology could be based. Particularly not one of the kind proposed by D. Furley or D. Sedley. In this manner, I will defend the traditional reading 7 E. Berti 1989-90. In a recent monograph about Aristotelian teleology, M. Johnson also rejects emphatically the possibility of an external teleology in any form; but he recognizes, nonetheless, the existence of an inter-substantial order (Johnson 2005, p. 283). 8 Cf. for instance Metaph. L 10, 1075a16-18.
3 that Aristotle does not claim, in this chapter, that it rains for the sake of the growing of the crop, against an opinion which is currently somewhat extended among interpreters. 9 The importance of this text for the interpretation that Aristotle holds a natural second order teleology is fundamental, for it is the only physical text where there is some chance of finding an indication of this sort of teleology. These readings understand that Aristotle claims here that it rains for the sake of the growing of the crop, and from this, and therefore defend a universal natural teleology, or an anthropocentric natural teleology. Thus, not only D. Furley, but also D. Sedley give a preeminence to this text in their papers.
II The thesis that nature (fuvsi~) is a cause as ‘that for the sake of which’ is advanced in the first two lines of Phys. II 8 (198b10-11) and reasserted in the final two lines of the chapter, as that which has been proved (199b32-33).10 Throughout the chapter we find three main lines of argumentation for this thesis. 11 I will deal here with the first one. The main thesis of this chapter is introduced as opposed to the thesis –attributed to Empedocles– that the way in which animals are generated, and their constitution and parts, happen by chance. This last thesis is mentioned initially within a possible objection or puzzle (ajporiva), and it is in this context that Aristotle makes the controversial claim about the supposed finality of the rain. I cite the text in extenso. “The puzzle (ajporiva) arises: (I) why should we suppose that nature acts for something and because it is better? Why should no be like (a) Zeus rains,12 i.e. not 9
The exceptions, to my knowledge, are R. Wardy 1993, M. Johnson 2005, L. Judson 2005, and M. Scharle 2008. 10 It is worth pointing out that Aristotle –just as Theophrastus in his Metaph.– does not claim that everything that happens within sublunary nature, and even in the skies, is for the sake of some end: the eclipse, for instance, is not (Metaph. H 4, 1044b12), and it is at least subject to debate that the rain is. In fact, Aristotle admits that some natural things and natural processes are merely due to necessity. According to some authors this is the case of meteorological processos (cf. Johnson 2005, pp. 149-158; against: Cooper 1982, pp. 217-218, with n.12; Waterlow Broadie 1982, pp. 79-80; Furley 1985; Sedley 1991, Matthen 2001); but not even every part of the living beings can be straightforwardly explained by a final cause, vgr. the perittwvmata, which result from the activity of certain organs, have material necessity as their cause, and they are not for the sake of anything (PA, IV 2, 677a13-14, cf. Ib. III 7, 670a29-31, III 14, 674a17-18, 675b36; GA I 15, 724b26-27, etc.; Cooper 1987; cf. Johnson 2005, p. 186, 197). Some scholars claim, more generally, that finality is altogether absent in the processes of inanimate beings (cf. Charlton 1992, 120; Nussbaum 1978, pp. 59-99), thus limiting the realm of teleology to the processes involving living beings. This would also mean that Aristotelian teleology is applicable within the same coordinates in which teleological explanations are admitted nowadays, i.e. especially in biology (see Mayr 1992, p. 125). However, this last view is discussed by scholars; indeed, most of them are inclined to think that the movements of simple bodies are for the sake of an end in spite of being inanimate (for a different opinion, see Gotthelf 1987, p. 214n19). A summary of scholarly discussion around this last problem can be found in Johnson (2005, pp. 140 ss.). 11 The first is a puzzle: 198b16-199a8 (cf. 199b13-26); the second involves three arguments exploiting the structural parallelism between tevcnh and fuvsi" (199a8-20; 199a33-199b7; 199b26-32). The third is the strongest according to Aristotle (199a20), and points out that animals and plants act without art or deliberation, but nonetheless do things for the sake of an end, vgr. their conservation (199a20-32; cf. 199b9-13). 12 ‘To rain’ (u{w) is used by Homer as a personal verb, such that Zeus is the subject who makes the action of raining (Iliad XII.25; Odyssey XIV.457). After Homer, u{w is also used as an impersonal verb (cf. LSJ s.v.). D. Sedley 1991, pp. 185-86, takes the use of this expression by Aristotle as a sign that he is
4 in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity (for it is necessary for the stuff which has been drawn up to cool, and having cooled, turn to water and come down; but it is merely concurrent (sumbaivnei) that, this having happened, the corns grows). Similarly, if someone’s corn rots on the threshing-floor, it does not rain for the sake of this, vgr. for the corn to be ruined, but that came about concurrently. (b) What, then, is to stop parts in nature too from being like this? For instance, that front teeth grow sharp and suitable for biting of necessity, and the back teeth broad and serviceable for chewing the food, not coming to be for this, but by coincidence? And similarly with the other parts in which the ‘for the sake of something’ seems to be present. (c) So, when all things turned out just as if they had come to be for something, then the things survive by chance (ajpo; tou` aujtomavtou), being suitable constituted;13 when not , they died, and die, as Empedocles says of the man-headed calves. Well, this, or something like this, is the argument which might give us pause. (II) It is impossible, however, that this should be how things are: (i) the things mentioned14 and all thing which are due to nature, come to be as they do always or for the most part, and nothing which is the outcome of luck or spontaneity does that. (ii) In fact, we do not think that it is the outcome of luck or coincidence that there is a lot of rain in winter, but only if there is a lot of rain in August; nor that there are heatwaves in August, but only if there is a heatwave in winter. (iii) If, then, these things are either a coincidental outcome or for the sake of something, and if they cannot be either a coincidental or a spontaneous outcome, then they must be for the sake of something. But all such things are due to nature, as the authors of the view under discussion themselves admit. Therefore, the ‘for the sake of something’ is present in things which are and come to be due to nature.”15 (198b16-199a8) In the following sections I will analyze both parts of the passage just quoted. The analysis of puzzle (I) in lines 198b16-32 will occupy sections III-IV of this paper, and the analysis of the counter-argument (II) in lines 198b32-199a5 will occupy section V, where I shall try to explain which is the function of the example of the rain in winter and the heat in summer within the argumentation against the materialist thesis.
III
thinking here in an anthropocentric teleology. R. Wardy 1993, p. 20, considers that this is an exaggeration on Sedley’s part, and I agree that it is, at the least, an over-interpretation. 13 That is: favorable for survival and probably for reproduction. 14 The antecedent of the tau`ta is not clear, but in my opinion everything points to the living being (and their parts), that is, that which Aristotle has mentioned in the last part of the previous argument, and that is precisely the subject of discussion; the same think D. Furley 1985 and L. Judson 2005. 15 The English translation is based on that of Charlton (1991) with important modifications.
5 To begin with, I want to make some general remarks concerning the argumentative context, starting by the meaning of the puzzle (I). In the first place, we must bear in mind all along that Aristotle is deploying here a puzzle or aporia. This puzzle concerns the thesis that nature is a final cause, and it does not seem to have been formulated, as it stands, by the Materialists themselves, but by Aristotle himself in a somewhat stylized version. 16 The argument in this puzzle aims to establish an analogy between the structures of two phenomena: starting from a case (a), it is inferred that the same causal configuration present in this case, is also present in a second case (b) which is apparently similar to the first. From this it is concluded (c) in general that the generation of the parts of animals is not for the sake of something (sc. the form or essence of the living being), but by chance. The kind of conceptions Aristotle is referring to would claim that the coincidence of some given parts (which are also constituted in this particular manner) in a living being, is not caused by the essence of the living being, nor for the benefit they bestow on the living being, but that the presence of a man’s hands, and a man’s head, and a man’s heart in the same living being is merely accidental or fortuitous.17 This entails, in the end, the denial or the ignorance of the form as a final cause of the parts of animals and of generation. Indeed, the parts of a living being, according to Aristotle, constitute a genuine unity which is the living being, and they are not a mere aggregate resulting from a fortuitous coincidence. The cause of this nonaccidental unity is precisely the form, which is the principle of the living being as a whole, and hence the cause of each of its parts. To this extent, the thesis here attributed to Empedocles, that chance would be responsible for natural generations, derives from his ignorance of the form as the primary meaning of ‘nature’ (cf. GC II 6, 333b5ss.; cf. PA I 1, 642a24-26), and this ultimately results in an elimination of nature, at least in its primary meaning, i.e. the form.18 From this, it is clear that for Aristotle to claim that the causal structure in (a) is exactly the same as in (b) is a mistake; instead, there is no general agreement among authors about Aristotle considering that (a) is true:19 on the contrary, this is precisely one of the issues of controversy. I believe it is necessary to clarify several aspects, as a starting point for the analysis. The conclusion of the argument partly explains why it is a puzzle (ajporiva): in 16
For a different opinion, see D. Furley, 1985. The fundamental reason why I think that the puzzle is formulated by Aristotle is that the opposition between Materialism and teleology, as it appears in the puzzle, cannot but be conceived from the point of view of a teleological conception such as the Aristotelian one (for this, see also Hirsch 1990, who shows that not even the atomists could have had in view such an elaborated teleological conception to disagree with). I might also add that (as pointed out by Sedley 1991, with whom I agree in this particular issue), the explanation of the process of the rain by mechanical causes mentioned in the puzzle is Aristotelian, for it coincides with the one offered, for instance, in Meteor. I 9, 346b23-31 (text quoted below) and De Somno 457b31-458a1. This explanation, in fact, presupposes the Aristotelian theory of elemental bodies, their proper places and their mutual transformation, as well as the causal role of the sun in these transformations. All these considerations lead to think that the construction of this puzzle is most probably attributable to Aristotle. 17 Cf. Phys. II 4, 196a23-24. 18
199b14-15: o{lw" d j ajnairei` oJ ou{tw" levgwn ta; fuvsei te kai; fuvsin. Cf. Sauvé Meyer 1992. Among those who claim that (a) is false, and hence that Aristotle holds true that it rains for the sake of something, are J. Cooper 1982; S. Waterlow-Broadie 1982, p. 80 n.29; D. Furley 1985, D. Sedley 1991, M. Matthen 2001; J.A. Ross 2007, pp. 88-89. 19
6 fact, this conclusion is opposed to the thesis that Aristotle seeks to establish in this chapter. But this is only part of the reason why this argument entails s puzzle. Let me explain. In other places of the corpus Aristotle also presents the materialist thesis and arguments as a possible rival explanation of natural processes, but he does not refer to it in terms of a puzzle, although it is always opposed to his own teleological conception, and hence considered false. This means that it is not only the falsity of the conclusion what makes this argument of Phys. II 8 a puzzle, but also and most importantly the kind of premises from which this conclusion is drawn. More precisely, the reason why this argument is a puzzle is the fact that its premises would be acceptable for Aristotle, while the conclusion that seems to follow is not.20 It is difficult to understand, in fact, why Aristotle would find a puzzle at all in an argument whose premises were as blatantly false, absurd, inacceptable, or implausible, as its conclusion. On the contrary, I think that, in admitting this argument is a puzzle, Aristotle is implying that the starting points (or premises) of the argument are plausible, and maybe even true. In contrast, an argument whose conclusion is opposed to what is considered true, but whose premises are absurd or openly false, does not constitute a puzzle (ajporiva) at all, as Aristotle himself declares regarding Melissus’ arguments (cf. Phys. I 2, 185a11). Even if these reasons are not conclusive, they make it plausible to think that the first term of comparison (a) is Aristotelian doctrine or at least compatible with it; while the term (b) is not genuinely analogous to the former, and therefore the extension of the same causal scheme from (a) to (b) is, according to our philosopher, illegitimate and leads to a false conclusion. Hence the difficulty or puzzle: one would be inclined to accept a premise from which something follows (or seems to follow) which one is not willing to accept, but considers false. In addition, there are also some good reasons to believe that the first term of the comparison (a) is compatible with Aristotelian doctrine. As Sedley recognizes (1991, p. 182), the explanation of the rain offered here by Aristotle coincides with the one we find in other texts, for instance, in Meteor. I 9, 346b20-31. In this text, when studying meteorological phenomena, Aristotle gives an explanation of the rain which is very similar to the one mentioned in the puzzle (I) of Phys. II 8, in that it only appeals to material necessity. 21 It is a circular process of elemental transformation produced by the sun’s circumvolutions and the heat which is thus produced, as well as by the cooling of air in the superior region of the skies. To this extent, it is very likely that Aristotle would claim that, in fact, it rains from necessity, that is: the necessity inherent to the 20
In other texts, Aristotle speaks of puzzles (ajporivai) as a presentation of equally persuasive arguments in favor of contrasting thesis (Top. I 11, 104b12-14; VI 6, 145b16-20), which seems to be the strict sense of ajporiva from the argumentative point of view. But, taken in a wider sense an ajporiva is simply a difficulty that is presented to us. However, neither the mere presentation of a thesis we consider false nor the presentation of a thesis supported by premises we consider false or unacceptable are by themselves difficulties (in this case, nothing would force us to accept the conclusion, not having previously accepted the premises). 21 Cf. also Meteor. I 11, 347b11-20; De Somno 457b31-458a1. The case of the rain is even used as a typical example for absolute material necessity, i.e. of circular causation, in which deductions a tergo are possible (GC II 11, 338a14-b8; An. Post. II 12, 95b38-96a7), in contrast with natural generations which are ‘unidirectional’ and where this kind of necessity does not determine the process, and there are no a tergo demonstrations. For an account of the rain as a circular process which follows the (circular) movement of the sun, see also Meteor. I 9, 346b20-21 with 346b35-347a3.
7 processes of elemental transformation. It is true that these processes of transformation might be explained teleologically (i.e by elemental teleology), as has been pointed out by some authors.22 The point under discussion is, however, whether Aristotle would endorse that it also rains for the sake of the growing of the corn, a thesis completely absent in Meteor. Therefore, if I am right, the puzzle (I) has the following structure: it considers that there is the same relation between (a) the rain as a process which occurs from material necessity and the good (or detriment) resulting from it for the corn or the farmer, and (b) the parts of the animal being generated in a certain manner and the good resulting from this for the living being. This relation –which according to this Materialist argument is the same in both cases (a) and (b)– is accidental or by chance. According to a Materialist explanatory model, then, to claim that there is some finality in nature would entail a confusion: the fact that a process ends up in something f and the fact that f is of benefit for some entity is just a coincidence, and does not entail a final causal relation. As Aristotle describes it, this model would maintain that natural processes are not real and intrinsically caused by an end, but that all of them are due to material necessity, resulting more or less favorable by chance, i.e. considered from a point of view which is external to the process, and hence accidental to the said process.
IV The considerations offered in the previous section are not conclusive. Among other things, it could be objected that the term (a) of the comparison is false but plausible, and to this extent it can raise a puzzle, although Aristotle would still think true (though implausible) that it rains for the sake of the growing of the corn in the threshing field. To the arguments already offered by other authors, I will add another five, against the idea that Aristotle is presenting here a cosmological or anthropocentric natural teleology.23 1. My first argument attends to the context in which we find the puzzle (I). The discussion about nature that is carried out throughout the whole of book II inclines against the idea that Aristotle could be arguing here for an interactive or second order teleology. That is because in the global context of this book our philosopher aims to defend and develop the idea that nature is an internal principle of movement of those entities in which it is immanent (192b13-33), i.e. it is always about the nature of an individual entity, to the extent that the question about nature (fuvsi~) can be understood as the question about the oujsiva of natural entities.24 An innovation of such significance in the concept of fuvsi" compared with what has been said throughout book II (that is, the change from considering ‘nature’ as an internal principle or immanent cause, to considering it an external cause), is not very 22
M. Matthen 2001, M. Scharle 2008. Cf. R. Wardy 1993, and now Judson 2005, Johnson 2005, pp. 149-157; M. Scharle 2008. Johansen 2006 has criticized, in turn, Johnson’s arguments against Sedley. 24 Cf. H. Wagner 1995, p. 449, H. Weiss 1942, p. 51, 73. 23
8 plausible; mostly when it is not announced in an explicit and clear way. Instead, it can be supposed that Aristotle continues here with the general lines of Phys. II from the fact that he concentrates the discussion in Phys. II 8 and 9 around the problem of the causes in the process of generation of living beings, and, to this extent, the fuvsi~ understood as ‘that for the sake of which’ is presented as a cause in these processes. Besides, there is one last point that should not be ignored: throughout Phys. II Aristotle consistently treats fuvsi~ as a cause. 2. My second argument points to the kind of finality that one can ascribe to the rain. Let us concede that it rains for the sake of an end. It is still not clear at all that the end in question is the growing of the corn. At the most, we can say that Aristotle insinuates that it rains for the sake of something in 199a1-5, without stating clearly for the sake of what. This point is relevant, because from the fact that is rains for the sake of something it does not follow that there is an interactive teleology of the kind proposed by Sedley and Furley, such that a meteorological process like the rain could be for the benefit of another substance. In fact, the end of the rain could be perfectly intrinsic to the circular process of the rain itself,25 which is an event associated with a cyclical elemental transformation. In that case, this would be an instance of the so-called ‘elemental teleology’; but is highly dubious that this kind of teleology implies that these elemental transformations happen for the benefit of other natural substances.26 In a similar manner can be interpreted another text that is generally used to support the reading that Aristotle holds a second order teleology: Metaph. L 10, 1075a11-25: “[1] We must consider also in which way the nature of the whole possesses the good and the best –whether as something separated and by itself, or as its arrangement. [2] Or is it in both ways, like an army? For an army’s goodness is its ordering, and is also the general. And more the general, since he is not due to the arrangement, but the arrangement is due to him. [3] All things arein some jointarrangement, but not in the same way –even creatures which swim, creatures which fly, and plants. [4] And the arrangement is not such that one thing has no relation no another. They do have a relation: for all things are jointly arranged in relation to one thing. [5] But it is as in a household, where the free have the least license to act as they chance to, but all or most of what they do is arranged, while the slaves and beasts can do a little towards what is communal, but act mostly as they chance to. [6] For that is the kind of principle that nature is of them. [7] I mena, for example that at least each of them must necessarily come to be
25
Cf. GC II 10, 337a1-15. Cf. M. Matthen 2001; Johnson 2005, p. 141. Part of the literature on this subject considers that the teleological explanation of the movement of simple bodies cannot be identified with the teleological explanation of living beings, and I agree with those who think this is also Aristotle’s opinion (see, for instance, Meteor. IV 12, 390b2-14). Otherwise said: the simple bodies and the processes they are subjected to can be for the sake of something, but this is not to say that they are for the sake of the living being; Cooper 1987, pp. 261-262; cf. Johnson 2005, pp. 143-144, Scharle 2008 and supra n. 10. 26
9 dissolved; and there are likewise other things in which all share towards the whole.”27 I cannot discuss this passage with the extension and detail it deserves,28 but I will concentrate on the question of whether Aristotle is presenting in this text, as Sedley understands, the teleological cosmic principle, which is the nature of the whole, and which would be the one present in the context of Phys. II 8 accounting for the rain being for the sake of the corn.29 Certainly, it is at least arguable to suppose that the results of a theological discussion are also valid, just as they are, in the context of Phys. II 8, and can be thus the hermeneutical key to interpret this last text. But let us set aside these initial qualms, and let us consider if, from the text of Metaph. L 10, it follows that there is a nature of the universe, such that allows to read Phys. II 8 the way Sedley does. For this to be the case, it should be possible to show that the order and substantial interaction mentioned in L 10 is such that, in the natural hierarchy, the inferior substances are (or can be) for the sake of the superior ones, so that the end of the former are the latter, and the former are for the sake of the latter. Now, in this passage of Metaph., there seems to be nothing to support an intersubstantial order of this kind. Let us see this briefly. As Sedley claims, in this text Aristotle assigns to the nature of the whole a causal role with relation to the substances which compose this cosmic order. This seems to follow from [1] and [6]. This causal role, would be manifest in the fact that [4] all substances are jointly ordered in relation with it (pro;~ me;n ga;r e}n a{panta suntevtaktai, 1075a18-19).30 Now, according to Sedley, this influence of the first mover, all the way through the hierarchic chain, is exerted to the extent that each entity aims to participate in the divine as best they can, and each one of them in the manner and measure that they can.31 In fact, the heavenly bodies moving in circles imitate the perfect activity of the first mover, living beings imitate it by way of reproduction, 32 and the elements (or simple bodies) imitate the circular movement of the sun.33 Taking this 27
I quote Sedley’s translation (2000) and his division of the text. For a more extensive discussion of this text, see M. Scharle 2008. 29 D. Sedley claims, indeed, that the nature present in the event of the rain helping the farmer is not the nature of the rain, for the water is a simple body and cannot have a moving internal principle other than moving to its natural place. In this manner, the nature alluded by Sedley should be the nature of the whole ecosystem (D. Sedley 1991, p. 192, 195; cf. D. Sedley 2000, pp. 328-329, 331). Of course, what is under discussion is the presence of this second nature in the text. Recently, M. Matthen has defended that the teleology which operates in this kind of phenomena of elemental transformation would be holistic; but of a different kind than that proposed by Sedley. Matthen understands that it is an internal teleology, belonging to the nature of the whole as a composite substance. This composite substance (whose matter would be the five elements, and whose form would be the first unmoved mover) would have a less cohesive kind of unity than that of the living beings. If that is the case, then we should conclude that the whole as a substance is not as much a substance as a living being, something that the author partly recognizes, but without drawing the consequences that follow from this fact. Neither is it clear what role do living beings play in this kind of composite substance which would be the whole, according to the author. 30 Sedley 2000, pp. 332-333. To this extent, the first mover can be understood as a final cause; for a good discussion of this point, see J. A. Ross 2007, pp. 190-219. 31 Sedley 2000, p. 333. 32 Cf. DA II 4, 415a26-b7; GA II 1, 731b24-35. 33 Cf. GC II 10, 337a1-7 28
10 last case, the rain can be explained thus: it is a process of transformation whereby water imitates the eternal movement of the sun, and thus imitates indirectly the first mover. This indirect imitation –where a substance emulates another one higher in the natural hierarchy– accounts for the global teleological order mentioned in the passage. Given that [2] the goodness of the whole, associated to its nature, is to be identified mainly with the first mover, but at the same time pervades the cosmic hierarchy, then the question is if these other things in the cosmos are for the sake of the first mover not only in the sense that the first mover is their aim (i.e. to imitate its activity), but also in the sense of being of some benefit for the first mover. Only in the last case, there would be some support for the reading that, in the hierarchic chain of nature, the inferior links are for the benefit of the upper ones (and thus, the rain would be for the sake of the corn, and in the last term, of the farmer). Against this reading, though, and as M. Scharle points out, we must remember that in three of the five passages in which Aristotle introduces the distinction between the two senses of ‘for the sake of something’, he does it precisely to underscore that the individual substances are for the sake of the first mover as an aim, but not for its benefit.34 Thus, the individual substances aim to the first mover, but not for its benefit, but to improve themselves imitating –in the particular manner which is possible for each of them (i.e. oujc oJmoivw~, 1075a16)– the most perfect activity. Thus, Metaph. L 10 offers no evidence that the hierarchic order there proposed is such that inferior substances are for the good of superior substances. How, then, would Aristotle account for this kind of substantial interactions, if not resorting to the nature of the whole? In the biological treatises, we find that he explains the interactions where one substance obtains some good or benefit from another one based always on the nature of the substance which obtains some good, and neither on a cosmic nature, nor on the nature of the ‘inferior’ substance.35 That is, for instance: if the plant is good for an herbivorous animal, that is because it is part of the nature of the animal to need these plants; in the same manner, we should think, if the rain is for the sake of the growing of the corn, this finds its explanation in the nature of the corn and not in the nature of the rain or the water.36 In short, even if there is a nature of the whole to which all other substances aim, it does not follow that the end of the rain is the growing of the corn, but, at the most, that this is a case of elemental teleology, that is: that the process of the rain would be for the sake of imitating –as much as it is possible for simple bodies– the circular movement of the sun, and thus, indirectly, the activity of the first unmoved mover.
34
M. Scharle 2008, p. 158; the three passages are: Metaph. L 7, 1072b1-3, EE VIII 3, 1249b13-16, and DA II 4, 415b1-3. 35 This is of fundamental importance, and has been already pointed out by L. Judson 2005 and M. Scharle 2008. 36 Just to mention some examples: the camel has a thick tongue and several stomachs because the food that it eats is thorny, prickly, and hard to digest, and not the other way round (PA III 14, 674a29-b5); sea birds have a moist stomach because their food is wet and easy to chew (Ib. III 14, 674b30-34); the form of the beak, the length of the neck, the form of the legs of the different birds is also explained by the way in which they obtain their food (Ib. IV 12, 692b20-693a23).
11 3. My third argument is an indirect one. If we concede that the reading that it rains for the sake of the growing of the corn is true, then a series of major problems follows. In the first place, given that the rain is something good for a lot of living beings, i.e. if we must search for an extrinsic end of the rain, why should it be for the sake of plants, and not for the sake of terrestrial animals, and even good for most fishes? And why would it be for the benefit of all these living beings, and not for the disadvantage of birds and certain fishes?37 There seems to be a multiplicity of ends, even contradictory ones, for one and the same process: the rain. If this is so, it is hard to sustain that all these results that come about from the rain are also, and at the same time, final causes of the rain. In fact, if we wanted to claim that all the results produced by the rain are its final causes, we would have a multiplicity of causes of the same kind (sc. final) for one and the same thing, and this entails that all of them except one must be accidental, i.e. concomitant to one final cause which would be per se. In fact, the case of the rain thus described has a remarkable parallelism with one of the examples of accident presented in Metaph. E 2: “no science practical, productive, or theoretical troubles itself about it [sc. accident]. For on the one hand he who produces a house does not produce all the attributes that incidentally come into being along (sumbaivnei) with the house; for these are innumerable; the house that has been made may quite well be pleasant for some people, hurtful for some, and useful to others, […] and the science of building does not aim at producing any of these attributes.” (1026b4-10)38 Naturally, the house is good for some and dangerous for others; the point is rather that this advantage and/or disadvantage were not the cause that the house was built the way it was (i.e. were not its final causes), and the proof of that is that the science of building is not about producing these concomitant consequences of the house, but only the essence of ‘house’, which is the final cause per se, that the builder has in his mind because he possesses the science of building.39 It is important to stress that from the point of view of the process of the growing of the corn, it cannot be said that it is an accident that it grows because it rains, given than the rain (or the water) is part of the nutritional process hypothetically necessary for a plant to grow. Aristotle’s point must be here that the growing of the corn is accidental with relation to the process of the rain itself, which is described precisely in material terms (198b19-20). Sedley’s counter-argument (1991, p. 183), that Aristotle admits in the natural realm what he calls ‘double explanations’, i.e., materialist and teleological explanations for one and the same phenomenon or process or thing (so that one of them does not exclude the other and both are per se) is partly correct; but it has to be said that 37
HA VIII 18, 601a26ss.; VIII 19, 601b32-602a3. On the contrary, Aristotle does not explain climatic phenomena through the nature of living beings. Inversely, he explains certain behaviors of the living beings by climatic factors. It is the case of migration in winter, for instance (cf. HA VIII 12, 596b20-28). 38 Ross’ translation, with minor modifications. 39
D. Sedley admits that the rain does not serve only one end, but the growing of the corn is just one of the ends to which the rain serves (Sedley 1991, p. 185); but apparently he sees no difficulty in this.
12 ‘double explanations’ are for processes such as breathing (PA I 1, 642a32-b4), or bodily parts such as the hair of men (Ib. II 14, 658b2-10) and the horns of stags (Ib. III 2, 663b12-664a8), that is: processes and things which are (causally) ‘interior’ to an entity or organism. In other words, within these ‘double explanations’ offered by Aristotle, teleological explanations resort to an intrinsic finality: the form of the entity which undergoes these ‘necessary’ processes. But he does not resort to an external final cause, as would be the case with the rain (according to Sedley).40 This is why I do not think that these cases –and with them, the validity of the ‘double explanations’ scheme– can be equivalent to the example of the rain, unless one commits a petitio principii. Finally, regarding this third argument, it is clear that a further argument in the same vein can be formulated against the thesis of the anthropocentric teleology, because there are a lot of consequences –both good and bad– of the rain for different human activities. I just mention this, but I will not develop the argument, for I think it would be merely redundant. 4. My fourth argument is specifically against the reading that there is an anthropocentric natural teleology in Phys. II 8. I want to defend that, even if an anthropocentric reading of Aristotelian natural teleology is admitted, this kind of teleology would be causally irrelevant in the context of Phys. II. Otherwise said: the sense in which the end of agriculture is that for the sake of which it rains, is not (and cannot be) the same sense in which the fuvsi" is a cause as ‘that for the sake of which’ the parts of the animals are generated. The difference between both kinds of end resumes the initial topic of Phys. II 1, i.e. the distinction between fuvsi" as an immanent cause and principle and tevcnh, which is an external principle of movement (cf. 192b12-23). Both fuvsi~ and tevcnh are also causes as ‘that for the sake of which’. This initial contrast sets the basis for the discussion of natural causes that follows throughout the whole book II: Aristotle is demarcating here the ontological realm which is the subject-matter of this science. An end is an external cause when it uses a process which takes place independently from this end, such that the external end does not have a causal role with respect to this process. For example: the condensation of water takes place independently from the growing of the corn, for it would happen even if there were no threshing fields. But the generation of the eye from a certain matter does not take place independently from the essence of this living being, meaning that the essence of the living being is the cause that the eye is generated, and that it is generated in this manner, and from this kind of matter, so that it may be capable of fulfilling its function. In this contrast, we can see the difference between the causal weight of the two senses of ‘end’: when nature is an end as an internal cause, it is the cause as the necessary condition: if there is no form as a final cause of, say, a wolf, there are no eyes, or teeth, or legs of a wolf.41 The end is, thus, cause of the existence of the things it causes, for instance, the 40
In the same vein, cf. D. Sedley 2000, p. 334. In fact, there are not heads, arms end eyes separated all around in nature, as Empedocles thought to be at some point (Cf. DK 31B57; cf. DK 31A72 y D. Furley 1987, pp. 94-98), but always as parts of a particular living being (cf. Metaph. Z 10, 1035b23-31; PA I 5, 645a30-36). 41
13 parts of animals. On the contrary, agriculture or the growing of the corn in the threshing field, are not a necessary condition for the rain to happen. From this we can infer that the corn in the threshing field, understood as that for the sake of which it rains, cannot be considered an end in a causally relevant sense, with respect to the natural process of the rain. In Phys. II 2 Aristotle alludes precisely to these two ways of understanding the end or ‘that for the sake of which’: “in fact, we are also an end in some manner (pw~), for ‘that for the sake of which’ has two meanings” (194a35-36); i.e. (i) as that for which the process is good or of benefit, and (ii) as that for which the process is good or of benefit, but is also the intrinsic end of that process.42 According to (i), certainly, the farmer, and man in general, is that for the sake of which it rains, as Sedley says. What seems hard to admit, though, is that this second meaning of ‘for the sake of which’ has the causal relevance that Sedley ascribes to it. W. Kullmann, in his discussion of the different meanings of ‘that for the sake of which’ in Aristotle, understands the meaning (i) in such a way that the thing served by the process is a secondary end of this process.43 This kind of relation between the process and its secondary end would be precisely the one taking place between the materials in nature and the ends of the art or technic; and this is precisely the kind of constellation we are considering in the case of the rain falling over the threshing field. And I believe this is not arbitrary: Aristotle himsef introduces this distinction between the two senses of ou| e{neka in Phys. II 2 following the thread of the thesis that some technics use matter (which is to be found in nature, and is independent of the tevcnh) for their own purposes (cf. 194a33-35). In the technical activity we use the matter we find in nature as if it were there in order to be used by us, i.e. for our own good.44 For “we are also (kaiv) an end in some manner (pw~)”, adds Aristotle right away, stating that ‘that for the sake of which’ has two meanings. This formulation leads to think that the manner in which we are an end is not the same in which nature is an end: not only due to the presence of the adverbial kaiv, but also because of the modal adverb pw~ which seems to nuance the statement that we are also an end, in a context where the central subject is nature as an end. In fact, the necessary clarification to make this statement possible follows immediately: ‘that for the sake of which’ has two meanings. We are an end in a different manner than nature.45 And it is not preposterous to think that the difference lies precisely in the intrinsic and extrinsic nature of the end with relation to the process whose result is of profit for that end. In other words: the finality of agriculture is not the cause of the process of the rain in spite of the fact that the rain is (most of the times) good for the ends of agriculture. The finality of agriculture is, so to speak, ‘superimposed’ to the necessary process of the rain, by an activity which uses it and its regularity, as a means. This kind of scheme is valid, it 42
Cf. DA II 4, 415b20-21. Kullmann 1985, p. 172. 44 crwvmeqa wJ" hJmw`n e{neka pavntwn uJpavrcontwn, 194a34-35. Sedley 1991, p. 189, claims that wJ" before an absolute genitive should not be translated “as if”, but with a causal meaning. Nevertheless, LSJ (sv., C.I.3) gives the sense “as” or “as if” for wJ" followed by an absolute genitive. Goodwin 1892, §1574, gives a causal meaning to wJ" but before an absolute accusative. 45 Cf. Berti 1989-1990, pp. 45-46. 43
14 seems, for all the technics which operate with natural processes or facts that are necessary from a material point of view. Technical deliberation, such as described in Metaph. VII 7 (1032b5ss.) with the example of medicine, is based on the knowledge of this kind of material necessary processes, going back from the effects wanted to the causes that produce them until it finds something which depends on the physician, i.e. the point of the causal chain, considered backwards, where man can intervene and start the causal chain downwards. And this process is started by the physician for the sake of an end, vgr. health. The heating of the body is necessary (some conditions being given) and is not itself for the sake of health. The physician uses this material necessity for the sake of an end, for the bodily equilibrium (sc. health) needs to be restored, in some cases, by heat. In the case of agriculture, mutatis mutandis, the same takes place: the rain is a necessary process, which happens always or most of the times in a given season; the farmer uses this material necessity as a means for the corn to grow, for the corn needs water to grow. In general terms, it is possible even to claim that the development of certain technics consists in discovering some connections among certain regularities in nature (which take place independently from human intervention) and certain consequences of these processes which are good for the ends of man. D. Sedley admits that an objection in the line of the one I am advancing could be made (i.e. one that points to the differences between technic and nature). In fact, I understand that this is the more robust objection against Sedley’s reading. The author, anticipating it, claims that Aristotle would not have held that agriculture develops in the way I have just described. Instead, he takes the analogy between biologic teleology and cosmic-anthropocentric teleology one step further, reasserting the idea that the end has an identical causal role in both cases: “Just as the teleological functioning of the parts of the body constitutes a permanent symbiotic interrelation, with no evolutionary origin, so too man’s naturally harmonious relation with his local environment is an inherent feature of an eternal natural order” (Sedley 1991, p. 186-187) I think that there are good reasons to think that Sedley’s last statement –which implies that not only species as final causes, but also the technics as final causes, are ingenerated, or at least have no evolutionary origin– is false. In fact, technic has an “evolutionary” origin according to Aristotle. This is something of great importance, for it weakens once more the equation between both kinds of final cause. The key passage is SE 34, 183b17-184b8, where Aristotle alludes to the long and gradual process of inter-subjective collaboration through time for a technic to develop, to be perfected and completed, from a starting point which is usually imperfect and tentative. Although this text is mainly about technics of argumentation (vgr. la dialectic and rhetoric), Aristotle claims unambiguously that the same holds, more or less, “also for every other technic”.46 V
46
kai; peri; ta;" a[lla" aJpavsa" tevcna" (183b27-28).
15 5. My last argument dwells on some technical aspects of the argumentative structure of the whole passage, and is aimed against the main textual ground of the readings I am opposed to. This is argument (II) in lines 198b36-199a5, where Aristotle claims that the rain at a certain moment of the year is not considered to be by chance, and then says that if these things are not by chance, then they are for the sake of something. From this, it seems to follow that it rains for the sake of something, and hence that Aristotle thought statement (a), in the initial puzzle (I), was false, i.e. that in Aristotle’s opinion it does rain for the sake of the growing of the corn in the threshing field. There are reasons to doubt that the example of the rain introduced in argument (II) should be connected straightforwardly to the first term of the analogy (I). The fundamental reason is, in mi opinion, that the argument (II) is not a resolution of the puzzle, but an independent argument aiming to prove that the conclusion of the puzzle (I) is false.47 Let us remember the difference between both argumentative devices. A resolution (luvsi~) consists in showing, either that the conclusion to the argument does not follow from the premises, or that one or many of the premises are false. 48 Aristotle does not seem to do any of the two in argument (II). A counter-argument, on the other side, does not aim to show the flaws of the initial argument, so that it neither takes into account the starting points of that argument, nor analyzes the connection between them and the conclusion. Instead, it proceeds from a new perspective, trying to conclude the contrary of the previous argument. 49 Argument (II), in fact, starts with an explicit reference to the falsity of the conclusion of puzzle (I): “But it is impossible that things are this way” (ajduvnaton de; tou`ton e[cein to;n trovpon). Besides, if it would be objected that with the example of the rain Aristotle is showing that it is false that (a) it rains out of necessity, we could answer that, in the first place, the argument (I) is not resolved only by stating that the first term of the analogy is false (and Aristotle could not make such a mistake), and, in the second place, that Aristotle does not prove in (II) that it is false that “it rains for necessity and not for the sake of the corn”. Instead, the rain comes in this argument (II) as an example aiming to illustrate a different premise. Let us see this briefly. The thesis Aristotle wants to refute by means of argument (II) is that “when all things turned out just as if they had come to be for something, then the things survive by chance (ajpo; tou` aujtomavtou), being suitable constituted.” That is: the fact that the parts of animals are suited for this or that function (and in general for the survival of the living being), is not the cause of the generation of these parts, but is only the cause of the survival of the animal possessing them, 50 being the parts generated only 47
W. Charlton 1992, p. 123, also seems to treat this passage as an independent argument. Top. VIII 10, 160b23-37; SE 18, 176b29-177a6. 49 This argumentative procedure, in fact, is close to what Aristotle calls ajntisullogivzesqai (counter-argue) (Rhet. II 25, 1402a32-34). In Rhet. III 17, 1418b13, Aristotle also mentions luvein and ajntisullogivzesqai as two different ways of confronting a given argument. For the distinction between these argumentative procedures, see also SE 24, 179b18-24. 50 It is worth remembering that according to Aristotle, the parts are for the sake of the animal also in the sense that the parts are good for the animal, i.e., the living being is ‘that for the sake of which’ in both senses distinguished in Phys. II 2 (cf. Kullmann 1985). 48
16 by material causes. In argument (II) Aristotle seeks to make this thesis implausible, resorting to another feature of chance, namely: the exceptional nature of what is caused by it, as opposed to the regularity of things that happen by nature. This is an e[ndoxon, i.e. a commonly held opinion: what happens by chance is exceptional.51 In order to illustrate this e[ndoxon about chance (and not the thesis about nature), Aristotle resorts in (ii) to the usual way of referring to certain weather events when they happen at certain seasons. Aristotle’s point here seems to be merely that we would not say that two things that usually happen together, when they happen, are ‘fortuitous’ or ‘by chance’: rain-winter, heat-summer. Instead, we say that something is ‘fortuitous’ when two things, that do not usually happen together, actually do happen together: rainsummer, heat-winter. The example is, in my opinion, merely instrumental, i.e. it aims to show the opposition between what is ‘by chance’ and what is regular. Later, in (iii), Aristotle introduces the exhaustive disjunction between things happening for the sake of something or by chance. The fact that this disjunction is exhaustive, also leads to think that Aristotle is not resolving puzzle (I), but argues from a new perspective which does not take into account the premises of (I). In fact: there was a third element in (I) which would break this exhaustive dichotomy, namely: necessity, which caused the rain. For these reasons, I do not think that Aristotle is defending in argument (II), not even indirectly, that it rains for the sake of the corn. The case of the rain in winter (as that of the heat in summer, which are presented together) must be taken simply as an example which illustrates the thesis that we would not say that something unexceptional happens by chance. VI Based on the arguments I offered, I believe that the discussion against Materialism that Aristotle carries out at the beginning of Phys. II 8 should not be counted as a text supporting a holistic or ‘second order’ reading of Aristotelian natural teleology. And moreover, that is highly implausible that Aristotle is defending here, or even implying, the thesis that natural teleology is anthropocentric in a causally relevant sense. The idea that the thesis of anthropocentric natural teleology is attributable to Aristotle could be tenable and interesting, though, if taken in an instrumental or external sense, i.e., in the other meaning of ‘for the sake of something’: man has the capacity of subordinating creatively natural things and processes (which happen with regularity) for the sake of his own ends. This amounts to the invention and development of the technics which use natural matter. Now, it is true that these technics could not be developed if matter would not be there as to be used. The fact that Aristotle recognizes that we, human beings, are also an end, seems to do justice to the pre-philosophical experience that nature appears as an organized whole (an organization which is also possible to know), such that it is there as to be used for our own ends. However, this does not by itself imply that the conditions of possibility of this phenomenon are to be found in the 51
It is evident that there is an oscillation in the notion of chance presented in the puzzle (I) and in argument (II). In the puzzle (I), accidentality refers to the absence of a purpose or final cause; while in argument (II) the chance is characterized as exceptional. This oscillation can be interpreted as a weakness in argument (II) only if this argument is considered as a resolution of the puzzle; instead, if it is a counterargument (as I believe), the change of meaning is not fatal for the argument.
17 teleological-anthropocentric organization of nature itself. The other possibility is that these conditions are given rather by the way in which man relates to nature and its regularity. It would be interesting to explore if this idea can be tracked into Aristotle’s texts, but we cannot complete such a task here. However, from the previous pages we may conclude that it is not plausible to ascribe to Aristotle the thesis stating that natural processes, teleologically-oriented, are also intrinsically directed to fulfill the ends that men decide to give themselves, and that are subsidiarily conveyed in the ends of the particular technics. The reading I defend entails, ultimately, the distinction and discontinuity (on the causal-teleological level) between the practical order and the natural order, as something distinctive of Aristotelian philosophy.
