Assessing community participation in local economic ... - CiteSeerX

Political Geography 19 (2000) 573–599 www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo

Assessing community participation in local economic development — lessons for the new urban policy Mike Raco

*

Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, 25 Bute Gardens, Glasgow G12 8RS, UK

Abstract Urban policy in Britain has long been characterised by circumscribed and fluctuating institutional structures of community involvement. From the Community Development Programmes of the early 1970s to the assertive neo-liberalism of the 1980s and back to the partnership based politics of the 1990s, community involvement in the construction and delivery of urban policy has been a critical theme. The new administration, with its emphasis on the ‘stakeholder’ society seems set to continue the trends of the 1990s by promoting the concept of partnership as something of a panacea for the difficulties and exclusionary politics that have dogged urban policy programmes. Consequently, a vital area of study into the next century concerns the form that local democratic structures will take and the relative levels and distribution of risk and reward that regeneration schemes create for different sections of local communities. Drawing on material from Cardiff, this paper examines the construction of local political relations in the new urban governance and addresses the issue of community involvement in the politics of local economic regeneration. In particular, it focuses on a small business association which emerged in the wake of the major regeneration programmes being undertaken by the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC), a powerful quango established by central government in the late 1980s. The study demonstrates how the association, which consisted of local businesses, tried to influence the local regeneration programmes and how its ‘progrowth’ stance was actively used by the CBDC to legitimate its own policies in the face of wider criticisms from local residential groups. The paper looks at the difficulties of constructing local community participation and concludes that voluntarist, top-down partnership structures in existing policy may only serve to legitimate and implement policy decisions taken by powerful non locally-accountable regeneration agencies.  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

* Tel.: +44-141-330-4082; fax: +44-141-330-4983. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Raco). 0962-6298/00/$ - see front matter  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 6 2 - 6 2 9 8 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 0 4 - 4

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M. Raco / Political Geography 19 (2000) 573–599

Keywords: Urban policy; Local economic development; Community politics; Governance

Introduction The role of communities in urban policy has been an area of contention since the early 1970s. In that time community involvement has been championed by some as the primary means of developing effective democratic involvement in the construction of local strategies and programmes, while others have portrayed communities as bastions of local vested interests over whom authority and policy should be wielded from above (Eisenschitz & Gough, 1993). Indeed, some commentators, such as Wilks-Heeg (1996) have referred to the idea of policy coming full circle, from the Community Development Programmes of the early 1970s, to the non-participatory politics of the 1980s and back to the inclusion of communities through partnerships in the 1990s. The new administration with its rhetoric of inclusive politics and the championing of consensus building looks set to continue the recent trends in urban policy established by the previous government. The Regeneration minister Richard Caborn (1997) has stated that, The government places great importance on the real involvement of local communities in the whole range of regeneration activities. It is important to the success of regeneration programmes to involve as many people as possible. This can lead to better decision-making, enhanced programme delivery and improved sustainability. Partnerships are seen as the institutional mechanisms through which community involvement will be mediated and represent the bases for the construction of new urban policy initiatives. However, a range of authors have criticised the structures of contemporary partnerships in urban policy. Peck and Tickell (1994), for example, focus on the construction of partnerships from above, i.e. the emergence of local partnerships in the 1990s has had less to do with bottom-up, community empowerment and more to do with central government funding programmes which have emphasised local competition and the construction of local partnerships to bid for funds. The new emphasis on community development has been linked to the wider neo-liberal objective of creating active citizens to promote self-reliance, local initiative and reduced ‘dependence’ on the welfare state (Kearns, 1992; Cochrane, 1993; Lovering, 1995). Consequently, the promotion of partnerships has gone hand in hand with the growth of non-elected quangos and restructured mechanisms of local accountability. Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) represent one of the best examples of institutions which were established in the 1980s to present a dynamic ‘single-minded’ approach to regeneration, yet through the 1990s have also been required to engage in the building of local partnerships and assist in the development of local collaborative economic strat-


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egy building (see Imrie & Thomas, 1993; Healey, Khakee, Motte & Needham, 1997). Any future involvement of partnerships in the delivery and/or formation of urban policy crucially depends on the way in which such institutional relations are constructed. As such, studies of existing community involvement provide a commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of current relations. This paper contributes to the debate on community involvement in the construction and delivery of urban policy through a study of the regeneration of Cardiff Bay, South Wales. The area has experienced severe economic hardship in the past thirty years as the former docks have declined, leaving an area of dereliction and decay. In 1987 the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC) was established to extend local authority plans for the redevelopment of the area and regenerate 2700 acres of land through property-led regeneration initiatives. This study examines their relations with local community groups, with a particular focus on a small voluntary business association, named the Cardiff Bay Business Forum (CBBF), which emerged in the wake of the renewal programme. The paper argues that CBDC, in its search for local legitimation for its programmes, which have caused major controversy amongst local residential communities and environmental groups, has used the CBBF as a supportive local voice and exploited the traditional local hostilities between the residential, ethnic communities and the local businesses community. The study demonstrates some of the current weaknesses in the development of local community politics and emphasises that unless the powers and representative structures of institutions, such as CBDC, are tackled then the issue of partnership will continue to be dogged by selective community representation, legitimacy and exclusion. The paper is divided into three sections which seek to establish the context of community participation in urban policy, provide a case study of such involvement, and develop some ideas for the future of participatory political relations. The first section examines the role of communities in urban policy and outlines the strengths and weaknesses of developing community-based initiatives. It also provides a critical commentary on the degree to which the local partnerships, constructed in the 1990s, fulfill their stated objectives of involving community interests. The second section examines the role of community groups in urban policy in Cardiff Bay, South Wales. It focuses on the relations between particular local interests and the conflicts that have emerged over the costs and benefits of renewal. It emphasises the difficulties of constructing community involvement in the current context and identifies the issue of political legitimacy (for regeneration agencies) as the primary motivation for coopting community groups. In a third, concluding section, the theme of community involvement is expanded with some discussion on the importance of constructing ‘strong’ democratic frameworks and reducing the powers of non-locally accountable quango bodies. The paper argues that community building should be viewed as a process and that voluntarist local partnerships may fail to engage a wide range of community interests and may, indeed, exploit the less critical more, so-called ‘responsible’, sections of local communities.

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Examining the role of communities in urban policy The cyclical nature of community involvement Community participation in urban policy has fluctuated in a number of ways. The late 1970s and 1980s represented a shift in policy approach from the Community Development Programmes of the early 1970s, with economic criteria becoming the central rationale of regeneration policy. Colenutt and Cutten (1994: 237) note that “during the course of the 1980s, policy became refocused not on people and communities but on property and physical regeneration”. Through the 1990s, the limitations of the trickle-down approach to regeneration initiated a series of changes in urban policy ostensibly geared to increasing the degree of community participation and empowerment within policy-making processes (Lawless, 1996). The winding down of Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) and Enterprise Zones (with their associated Exit Strategies), the establishment of 10 Integrated Regional Offices to manage regeneration funds and the focus on local partnerships to coordinate and establish local policy programmes (as under City Challenge) represented a shift in government policy which reasserted local authorities as central organisations of policy programmes and encouraged community participation through partnership (Wilks-Heeg, 1996). In London Docklands, for example, the LDDC established a community services department to enable local people to obtain advantage from regeneration programmes and to foster, what they termed, ‘balanced’ communities in regard to employment and housing opportunities (see Oc & Tiesdell, 1991; Keith & Pile, 1993). Policy programmes, such as City Challenge, encouraged the establishment of local partnerships designed to include public, private and voluntary sectors in the development of locally specific policy programmes and objectives. For Colenutt and Cutten (1994) the idea of working in partnership is welcomed because it addresses the complex and interrelated nature of urban problems and the need to incorporate and build on the views of local communities. Partnerships have been cited as a panacea for the failures that have beset urban policy since its inception in the late 1960s (Gummer, 1995). Indeed, as will be discussed below, the present government looks set to continue the trend. However, the degree to which such partnerships effectively encourage community participation has been called into question (Lawless, 1996). Partnerships in urban policy cannot be divorced from the wider funding structures in which they have been developed. Thus, local partnerships have often been established to compete for central government funds. In such circumstances, policy processes are encouraged to follow lines established by central government. As Wilks-Heeg (1996: 1275–6) notes, these new partnerships work to, “the exclusion of democratic forces...[an] urban policy designed to be responsive not to local needs but to goals which fit central government objectives”. The growing centralisation of policy and the introduction of competition for funds has been used to constrain the autonomy of locally based strategies of regeneration (Raco, 1998). For Peck and Tickell (1994) the new local partnerships of the 1990s do not represent a new devolved localism, geared to


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the development of strategic policy programmes through the integration of bottomup, community proposals. Instead, they can be characterised as “corporatist-style coalitions, constructed with a view to getting one over the competition and, above all, getting [public] money” (p. 253). The form and effectiveness of community participation in such partnerships has become an area of ambiguity, for as Colenutt and Cutten (1994: 239) note,

the problem is that whilst community representatives are formally recognised within partnership arrangements as being equal partners...they often lack the power and resources and technical knowledge to operate on an equal footing with other partners.

Communities, in this interpretation, may be used to obtain legitimacy, through incorporation, for public sector programmes, whilst having a minimal influence on decision-making processes. They may also be used as scapegoats — accepting responsibility for local policy failings (Lovering, 1995). Centrally-structured partnerships may ‘pass the buck’ for the failures of central government’s urban policy (Turok & Hopkins, 1997). The reemergence of local community initiatives, through partnerships, can also be understood as one way of promoting a neo-liberal agenda for local capacity building (Eisenschitz & Gough, 1993). In this interpretation, communities have been given the role of legitimating and justifying the unraveling of the welfare state (Nevin & Shiner, 1994). As Lovering (1995) suggests, urban policy has witnessed the admission of selected community-oriented organisations to new partnership arrangements constructed from the top-down and shaped by the patronage of new regulators, with little in the way of real empowerment or resources being given to this new clientele. The development of partnerships has only served to compromise local organisations and interests with different political objectives from the visions of economic regeneration promoted by powerful local interests, striving to attract public funds and inward investment. Moreover, the requirement to fulfill central government criteria and develop successful bids may circumscribe the challenges and influence of local interests, which are required to conform to new consensus-based politics. Under City Challenge, local communities and authorities underwent a range of monitoring procedures, not required by quangos, such as UDCs and TECs, who could be ‘trusted’ to adopt policies in line with central government thinking (Robinson & Shaw, 1994). Indeed, the introduction of the SRB and similar shifts in funding in Scotland, have taken place in the context of reductions in the overall level of resources devoted to urban policy. The development of top-down partnerships can only be understood in light of reduced state provision (Imrie, 1997; Turok & Hopkins, 1997). It is in this context that the next section examines the construction of community involvement in urban policy and the ways in which current government thinking is seeking to extend the principle of partnership.

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Building community involvement — divisions, conflicts and participation In the rhetoric of partnership the term community is often used in simplistic ways. Community politics in any given area is fraught with divisions, tensions and conflicts. Some communities may benefit from policy or regeneration programmes which have focused primarily on economic growth. Others may suffer a variety of negative externalities. Growth is not good for all, with costs falling disproportionately on low income sections of local communities and marginal businesses which are forced to move premises (see Harding, 1995; Raco, 1997). Differential community interests can result from the varying possibilities, opportunities and difficulties created by regeneration programmes. It is only through empirical study that researchers can identify the types of communities established in different contexts. For, as Dalby and Mackensie (1997: 101) argue: local communities do not necessarily exist in already pre given form....Environments may be socially constructed in specific controversies, but so too are the communities that are formed around the specific issue, communities often construct specific local identities as part of the campaign against an external development understood as a threat. There are clear limitations in giving local communities clearly defined properties. For Harvey (ibid: 425), community has always meant different things to different people and even when something looks like it can be found, it often turns out to be as much a part of the problem as a panacea....Well founded communities can exclude, define themselves against others, and erect all sorts of keep out signs. Yet the issue of local community involvement has become increasingly important in urban policy. The Commission for Social Justice Report (CSJ, 1994), for example, has highlighted the ways in which community influence can be incorporated into local economic development strategies through the construction of new institutional relations. Central to the CSJ’s argument is the development of ‘social capital’ within communities to construct a people-led series of local economic development initiatives which are the ‘essential foundation of lasting empowerment’. Programmes of action, it is argued, should move away from ‘fire-fighting’, reactive strategies of coping with distress and move towards proactive, inclusive, locally-based initiatives to tackle the roots causes of socio-economic problems experienced by communities in deprived areas. These new partnerships would differ from those established under programmes like City Challenge, as they would emphasise “the need to build linkages between the economic, human and social capital investments required to achieve sustainable regeneration” (p. 325). A shift in attitudes is called for where policy makers reject the notion that ‘government knows better than their citizens’. New institutional capacities should be developed, with particular reference made to the


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establishment of local Community Development Trusts, alongside a National Community Regeneration Agency to coordinate and audit the activities of Trusts. However, this approach raises questions of its own. What role for example do local authorities play in these new community-based institutional structures? To what extent are macro-economic issues, such as the restructuring of the welfare state being addressed by this focus on local scale initiatives? Moreover, what is the role of existing non-elected institutions of governance, which will remain in existence for the foreseeable future? (see Weir, 1996) In their report on community influences on urban policy, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA, 1989) argued for the creation of ‘sensitive’ local authorities at the centre of new institutional relations. It, for example, places an emphasis on, an effective community development approach which relies upon the coordination of community work initiatives and workers within the council’s own services — education, social services, housing, leisure etc...It is also helpful to develop a focal point around which such policies and procedures may evolve. (AMA, 1989: 22) Such literatures emphasise the shared objectives and needs of local authorities and communities, yet the two are by no means synonymous (Nevin & Shiner, 1994). In a historical context, local authorities and communities have often clashed over issues of local economic development. The modernisation programmes of the 1960s and 1970s, for example, initiated a variety of local political conflicts (see Simmie, 1976; Saunders, 1980; Dearlove, 1973; Imrie & Raco, 1997). The new government has established guidelines for partnership organisers for integrating community groups into decision-making processes (DETR, 1997a). It argues that “if community involvement is to be taken seriously, it must mean to take account of all members of the community” (p. 2). Institutions are called upon to be clear about what a partnership is trying to achieve and map out the existing networks of community interests and organisations. They then need to enlist community support and discuss with key people and organisations how best to involve local people. However, the guidelines warn participants to, be aware that you may not be seen as impartial....Think about working alongside community leaders or someone who is already in touch with the communities you are seeking to involve...[in light of this] determine the appropriate level of involvement, in terms of what is acceptable to the partnership as a whole, and what is expected by the particular community interests that the partnership is seeking to involve. (p.2) Moreover, the guidelines go on to specify that institutions be ‘aware’ that they may be asked questions about their objectives and should, therefore, “identify the structures and processes of community involvement that are appropriate in the light of your objectives and initial feedback”. This form of policy-making perpetuates some of the difficulties that have plagued

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partnerships in urban policy. There remains a focus on what is termed ‘appropriate’ community involvement. ‘Relevant’ community interests and issues are to be addressed in plan-making processes, yet the decisions over who such groups are and whether they are appropriate are left to the discretion of state institutions organising and managing the partnerships. This echoes the findings of Saunders (1980) who notes that obtaining access is a key determinant of local political power and influence. For a community group which has reservations about a type of local economic development strategy being pursued by regeneration agencies, this may present a dilemma. If its criticisms are seen as ‘irresponsible’ in the context of local decision-making processes, then it may be treated as ‘unworthy’ for consideration in the new partnership bodies. However, if it softens its criticisms and adopts a more conciliatory approach, a group may find itself increasingly detached from sections of the community that it is supposed to represent. This pressure on local groups to cooperate has been criticised by some as a form of depoliticisation of local decision-making processes, where the striving for consensus on policy agendas laid down by central government has effectively restricted political debate and the airing of critical views (see Colenutt & Cutten, 1994). This is particularly the case in urban renewal programmes where some community interests have more to gain (or lose) than others (Raco, 1997; Zimmer, 1964; Berry et al., 1968). For regeneration agencies there may be a tendency to incorporate groups who are positive about aspects of the regeneration to develop greater (political) legitimacy for programmes and ‘outflank’ other local opposition groups. The partnership guidelines outlined above reinforce this discretionary, selective, approach to community involvement in decision-making processes. They also encourage institutions to seek out contacts within local communities, particularly through community leaders, yet as this study will demonstrate such leaders may pursue their own agendas of those of a substantive minority. Reliance upon selected forms of community participation may act as a “means to adjusting to new demands without directly challenging existing political and social structures” (Cochrane, 1986: 53). The paper elaborates on this discussion by examining the politics of regeneration in Cardiff Bay, South Wales. In particular, it focuses on the construction of local consensus politics surrounding strategies of local economic development and the role that community groups have had on local decision-making processes. Regeneration in Cardiff Bay has been led by a powerful quango, the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC), operating with the backing of other central, regional and local state institutions. CBDC has focused on a property-led strategy of renewal and has been challenged by residential communities in the area for its failure to move from a bricks and mortar approach to a more sensitive, redistributional local strategy. The paper documents the rise of the Cardiff Bay Business Forum (CBBF), a small business association, which emerged to counter the opposition by residents and pursue a ‘pro-growth’ stance on the regeneration. The research shows how CBDC has selectively co-opted the support of CBBF’s leadership in its attempts to overcome local (political) opposition and has used local partnerships and consensus politics to legitimate, rather than shape its regeneration strategy. It suggests that in certain instances ‘community strategies’ may provide little more than fig leaves for the legitimation


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and implementation of policies intended to favour the recapitalisation of local areas through major, private sector, property-led investments. The paper also addresses the degree to which community groups can foster their own autonomous interests and whether attempts to construct community in local decision-making processes necessarily include some at the expense of others. The research was conducted between March 1995 and July 1996 and consisted of four sources of information to examine the organisation of the CBBF, its structure and purpose, and its relations with other local institutions and community groups. Firstly, a survey of 43 local firms in and around the Bay area was conducted to assess the levels of CBBF membership, obtain the characteristics of local firms, and gauge local attitudes to the regeneration and the CBBF. Secondly, a documentary search was conducted of CBBF minutes, notes and publications, alongside those of local institutions and the local (and national) press, to provide a source of information on the organisation of the CBBF, the scale and nature of the regeneration plans and the wider perceptions of the CBBF, particularly in regard to the local residential communities of Cardiff Bay. Thirdly, 42 interviews were conducted with local businesses. These included 8 members of the CBBF’s executive committee, 22 current members and 12 ex-members or non-members. Fourthly, interviews were conducted with the representatives of a variety of local institutions involved in the redevelopment of the Bay. These included the CBDC, the local authorities, the Chamber of Commerce, the Welsh Development Agency and the Welsh Office. The politics of local economic development in Cardiff Bay — regeneration and the role of community participation The modernisation of Cardiff and the regeneration of Cardiff Bay — the coming of the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation The emergence of an explicit policy for economic regeneration for South Cardiff followed the establishment of South Glamorgan County Council (SGCC) in 1974 and its response to the decline of the formerly prosperous docklands area. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Cardiff had been known as ‘coal metropolis of the world’ in reference to its position as an export centre for Welsh Valley coal (Daunton, 1977). The steady decline of the docks in the post war period left a large area of derelict land, separated from the modernised, prosperous city centre, by the Great Western Railway line. The last major steelworks in the city, East Moors, closed in 1978 with the loss of 4000 jobs and SGCC saw limited potential in developing manufacturing industries in a wider context of manufacturing decline in the city1. 1 Cardiff’s economy comes second bottom in ranking (after the Highlands and Islands of Scotland) in the UK in its proportion of manufacturing employment, at just 12.5.% (CCC, 1995). High levels of service sector activity (77%) originate in the designation of Cardiff as capital of Wales and the coming of service based public and private sector institutions. Similarly, manufacturing had never developed on a major scale in the city as the coal trades had encouraged the construction of infrastructure geared to the export of coal.

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SGCC set about transforming this area through the preparation of sites for new forms of landuse and the provision of infrastructure to tackle the area’s relatively poor access — an explicitly supply-side approach to regeneration. Subsequently, it initiated the construction of a Peripheral Distributor Road (PDR) as a part of a wider strategic plan for the whole of South Glamorgan (see Fig. 1). This 10–15-year scheme has been undertaken at vast expense with the recently completed Butetown Link alone costing £120 million for just 2.7 km of road (South Glamorgan Reporter, 1995). This regeneration strategy represented a transformation of local relations with an attempt to link South Cardiff “into wider, global, financial and service sectors as a mechanism for developing the local economy” (Imrie & Thomas, 1994: 142). The coming of the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC), in 1987, represented an opportunity to expand on the existing redevelopment proposals for the area. It was given the task of regenerating 2700 acres of derelict land in the former docklands of the city. Its strategy represented an ambitious programme of change with the creation of three to four million square feet of offices, five to six million square feet of industrial space (including hi-tech and modern business sites), 6000 houses, and a range of tourist and leisure facilities (Thomas & Imrie, 1993). It has

Fig. 1.

Central and South Cardiff


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represented a continuation of local and regional state plans for the modernisation of the city and an emphasis on the city as capital of Wales. As the strategy (CBDC, 1989: 3) makes clear, The excellent location and communications in Cardiff, its environment, public and private services as Capital, give the city its national and regional role. These advantages and the ‘Gateway to Wales’ theme can be used to stimulate inward investment in such fields as commerce, industry, the media and tourism, housing and services. Hence CBDC’s stated goal to, establish Cardiff internationally as a superlative maritime city, which will stand in comparison with any similar city in the world enhancing the economic wellbeing of Cardiff and of Wales as a whole. To create this ‘superlative maritime city’ CBDC has focused on encouraging flagship investments, such as company head quarters, hotels and other high quality servicebased forms of economic activity. To fuel such development CBDC, along with other local institutions, has initiated major infrastructure projects, in particular the building of a new highway linking the Bay to the City Centre, known as Bute Avenue, and the construction of a Barrage across the Taff and Ely estuaries to create a freshwater lake around which prestigious property developments could be established and a leisure industry created (see Fig. 2). The CBDC has vigorously strived to foster local ‘consensus’ for its regeneration proposals. It has worked with local and regional state agencies (such as the local authorities, the Welsh Office and the Welsh Development Agency) to develop, what has been termed a ‘Team Cardiff’ approach to the revitalisation of the local economy based on a property-led revitalisation of its productive base. Supported by the local media (see Thomas, 1994), CBDC has sought to propagate a new image for the area based on the creation of new aesthetic landscapes of production and consumption. This striving a for consensus-based local political coalition has been presented by CBDC as a necessary ingredient in attracting investment in the Bay with the argument that “all the community will gain...with new job opportunities and a revitalised physical environment” (Imrie, Thomas & Marshall, 1995: 37). The appearance of consensus has been constructed at the local level through partnership relations which have promoted an institutional and property-led agenda for regeneration. Every piece of community criticism, particularly from local residential communities and small businesses who have stood to be affected by the negative externalities of the regeneration, “has tended to be presented as counter to the wider, widely accepted, ethic of regeneration and...was generally presented as being disloyal to the wider development ethos being propagated by the UDC” (Imrie et al., 1995: 37). However, not all community groups in the Bay have developed critical approaches to the regeneration. Some have adopted pro-growth stances in an attempt to tap into the wider benefits offered by the regeneration programmes. The paper focuses on

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Fig. 2.

Cardiff Bay - Inner Harbour and Bute Town Link

one such group which emerged in the wake of the regeneration, the Cardiff Bay Business Forum (CBBF). CBBF was established in 1991 by a group of local businesses in the Mount Stuart Square area of the Bay, the historical hub of local commercial activity. It emerged due to the collective feeling of ignorance concerning the plans and programmes of the CBDC, the perceived failure of local firms to capitalise on the economic potential of the regeneration and to act as a counter to growing criticisms from local residential community activists who claimed to be excluded from the benefits of regeneration and whose criticisms were becoming increasingly vocal (Thomas, Stirling, Brownhill & Razzaque, 1996). CBBF is a


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locally-based, voluntary body acting to inform and influence state institutions in the implementation of their programmes. At its height it consisted of 315 firms although and has been dominated by a number of professional, service sector companies located in the core commercial area of the Inner Bay, Mount Stuart Square. These firms have much to gain from regeneration programmes. Property developers may accrue profits from escalating land values, while local architects, surveyors and solicitors tender for a variety of contracts available for individual projects and land purchasing schemes. For such businesses the development of the Forum had a double benefit. On the one hand, creating a basis for representation to institutions such as CBDC, to bid for contracts, while, on the other, acting as a supportive network of contacts through which to conduct business. Both are enshrined in the CBBF’s original remit of action which emphasised four initial aims: 앫 To give greater support to and more positive press coverage for the Barrage. 앫 To obtain detailed plans from CBDC, thereby reducing local business uncertainty as to the future direction of the regeneration. 앫 For local firms to benefit from local purchasing agreements with inward investors. 앫 To achieve solutions to problems faced by local businesses — for example, car parking and security issues. As the Chair noted in interview, “we want CBDC to succeed, we simply disagree with their emphasis”. Thus CBBF cannot be characterised as an overtly critical, negative local organisation, set up to oppose the programmes of CBDC — the type of group authors such as Saunders (1980) have described as the most common form of local political voluntary association. Instead, it is a proactive, positive group which stresses the need for representation and the potential benefits for a number of its members. Despite its criticisms of CBDC’s failure to provide opportunities for local businesses, the CBBF has attempted to build a relationship with CBDC which is primarily cooperative, rather than antagonistic in an attempt to tap into the wider material benefits offered by the regeneration2. Such relations are typical of small business contacts with institutions of governance as potential benefits can be accrued from such cooperation (Raco, 1997; Pierre, 1992). As the following sections will show, the existence and influence of such a group raises questions over the nature of local community–UDC 2

At this point it is important to define what is meant by a territorial community. According to Cox and Mair (1989) territorial communities can be seen as attempts by those in a given place to take some control over the political, economic and social processes that effect them. In the case of small businesses, defined territories may take on major significance as “given the uncertainties of capitalism, it is a contingent matter whether or not value will continue to flow through particular socio-spatial structures and this allow their reproduction...therefore agents dependent on socio-spatial structures at similar scales and located in the same place (e.g. a specific locality) have attempted to deal with their uncertainty...through some sort of collective action, via a territorial coalition”(Cox & Mair, 1989: 127). In the case of the CBBF, most members are owner-managers of local small businesses. Whilst the vast majority are not residents in the regeneration area, they nonetheless have a ‘stake’ in the form that the local regeneration programme will take and the positive and negative effects it may have on their businesses’ prospects.

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relations, through partnerships. For CBDC, CBBF represented an opportunity to provide local legitimacy for their strategy thereby isolating wider criticism and indirectly reinforcing long standing prejudices in the city towards the ethnic communities of Butetown (Little, 1972). Where divisions exist in local community representation, one strategy for agencies intent on fostering local economic development is to initiate a ‘divide and rule’ campaign whereby selective local interests are co-opted into a wider growth coalition at the expense of local opponents (Harvey & Swyngedouw, 1993). This may be particularly the case where opposition involves “the kinds of people who the rest of the community feel little sympathy for” (p. 23), a description pertinent to the residential ethnic communities in Butetown. The remainder of the paper focuses on the relationships between CBBF, CBDC and other local community interests to examine the nature of local political relations which surrounded the Bay regeneration and the lessons that such a study provides in the light of future directions of partnership policy. In the next section the relationships between CBBF and CBDC are examined with an emphasis placed on the way the two institutions have interacted and tried to use such relationships for their own ends. A second section then focuses on the relations between CBBF and local residential communities and argues that CBBF has only exacerbated the existing tensions in the area through their portrayal of their role as a responsible, pro-growth organisation. Following the ‘partnership’ trail — the strategy of influence of the CBBF The strategy of influence adopted by the CBBF represented an attempt to include the disparate motivations of the membership, while influencing local institutions, in particular the CBDC. CBBF from the outset sought to become an institutional ‘player’ in its own right, rather than acting as a single issue pressure group. As the chair commented in interview, You don’t get through to someone by banging on their door, instead you go and engage in constructive dialogue and partnership with them. Our aim from the start was to become an interest group, rather than a pressure group. Interest groups work from within political structures to gain influence, pressure groups work from outside and only try to stall or hamper progress. Others on the CBBF’s leadership committee described CBBF’s role as that of an ‘enabler’, seeking to create a symbiotic set of relations with CBDC and other local institutions so that local businesses can have a greater input into local policy-making processes. Central to this strategy has been the realisation amongst CBBF executives of the growing influence of local public–private sector partnerships in shaping local policies3. 3

In interview, CBBF’s chair commented that, partnerships are in vogue at the moment...they are what local politics is all about, so we are looking to make alliances amongst a wide range of organisations. Our interactions are mainly with CBDC and SGCC as both are in need of friends.


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CBBF has representatives on the Cardiff Bay Advisory Committee, the Inner Harbour Partnership, the Cardiff Bay Liaison Committee and a number of formal and informal bilateral relations with other local institutions — for example, the Chief Executive of the Chamber is also on the Environmental sub-committee of the Forum, while until recently the Local Enterprise Company’s Director served as a CBBF executive officer. It has vigorously strived to become an ‘active’ voice for its members and attempted to become embroiled in local decision-making processes to ensure that its agenda is put forward in discussions, particularly with CBDC. Central to its strategy has been its attempts to foster a ‘consultative’ relationship with CBDC. The chair commented in interview that, CBBF has gone from nothing in CBDC’s eyes to having a great stature. Michael Boyce [Chief Executive of CBDC] has publicly stated how important we are and at his first public appointment he referred to us as one of the four major players in the regeneration of the Bay — indeed we have credibility and we are not questioned by other groups...we are a young body yet we have authority and will exact it but only working closely with our partners. Once again, issues of legitimacy and representative authority are cited as the basis for the CBBF’s position within local institutional relations. CBBF has tried to portray itself as a major player, echoing Cochrane’s (1986: 56) suggestion that such groups are in a relatively weak position and consequently “any offers of institutional cooperation from above therefore tend to be accepted relatively easily”. Yet, the CBBF’s claims to be representative of local businesses have been challenged both internally by members and externally by other institutions. Its professed strategy of influence has run into criticism and difficulties due to its perceived failure to address issues of membership concerns and maintain its ‘independence’ in wider institutional networks. For example, many members see the leadership’s attempts to engage with partnership forms of governance as a shift in focus away from smallscale issues, such as rent levels, the stabilisation of site tenure and security4. For 4 For example, local debate on the merits of constructing an Opera House in the Bay was a central aspect of CBBF’s strategy in 1994–1995. In 1994, it launched a major survey of its membership to identify their preferred architectural design. Yet, focusing on such issues has alienated a number of members. As a chartered accountant commented,

I feel that the CBBF have now become a part of the problem for businesses around here! It has ignored us and started focusing on things which its leader finds interesting — like the Opera House for example. But why focus on that when it should be seeking to build local support for local issues. Or as an architect noted, CBBF need to channel some energy in the right direction for a change...the Opera house, for example, was put to the membership of the CBBF after a team of experts had looked at the design. We were not asked whether we wanted it or not, but for the design we preferred. But what did local car repairers know about Opera House design?....It would be so much better if CBBF focused on small scale issues that affect us. Similarly, a metal manufacturer, facing the threat of compulsory purchase to make way for the construction

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such members there have been direct conflicts of interest with the leadership who have publicly supported the major infrastructure schemes which have created problems and threats to the future existence of marginal firms. The emergence of CBBF has highlighted and even institutionalised existing socio-economic cleavages within the business community of South Cardiff. A range of authors have noted how incorporation into partnership or formal political processes has often affected the relations between the leadership and membership of voluntary organisations (see Taylor, 1996; Offe, 1996). For the leadership of CBBF, working so closely with a quango body has created political problems. Its claims to ‘independence’ have been jeopardised as it is increasingly seen as a partner of local political institutions which it is ostensibly challenging. Subsequently, it has also found itself being used to legitimate CBDC policies and activities and thus directly assist the Corporation in placating local residential community opposition. It has exemplified the difficulties of maintaining a legitimate political stance and reputation as it has tried to juggle its position as a pro-growth organisation with claims of political independence. Some local institutions and community activists have been highly critical of CBBF, particularly in its support for the Barrage project. A local MP remarked in interview that CBBF was a ‘tame’ group willing to provide timely local media statements about the positive effects of the regeneration and used by CBDC as a ‘political battering ram’ against opponents, such as himself 5. Other residential community representatives were critical of the fact that CBDC had directly and indirectly supported CBBF financially since its inception. CBDC has consistently funded CBBF through its support of a local newsletter known as Forum News. Every month it takes out a large advertisement at undisclosed cost. Indeed, in its first year it directly subsidised its production. Thus local critics of CBBF accuse the group of being in CBDC’s ‘pocket’, with the consequence that ‘they are hardly going to criticise their paymasters’. This has tarnished CBBF’s attempts to foster an image of political ‘independence’, particularly when allied to its ‘pro-growth’ stance. From CBDC’s point of view, local support from CBBF provides an opportunity to present themselves as local benefactors. The public relations manager at CBDC admitted in interview that,

of Bute Avenue, commented on the unwillingness of the CBBF’s leaders to focus on issues of business survival, rather than the more grandiose aspects of the regeneration. As its manager stated, This site is our greatest asset, its not so easy to just pack up and go. CBDC and I met about me buying a plot. Obviously I wasn’t important enough for them, after all he is a firm supporter of Bute Avenue and that is the reason I’m in such a mess. 5 The MP cited the example of the fierce local debate that had surrounded the environmental, social and economic impacts that the construction of the Cardiff Bay Barrage would bring to the local area. He recalled that CBDC had used CBBF’s vocal and public approval for the scheme to challenge his criticisms. He faced a situation where CBDC were able to say “local businesses support the Barrage, why don’t you?”.


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I would not be doing my job if I did not use CBBF’s approval for local schemes to counter some of the individual anger people feel around here...They were incredibly helpful to us over the Barrage — to be cynical — if CBDC said that the Barrage was the best thing since sliced bread — well we would say that wouldn’t we would be the response. But when we get third party endorsement from CBBF, that can only be useful to us. Other CBDC officers claimed that as far as they were concerned, CBBF existed to express positive views to a wider audience and then “expect to get a good pat on the head” in return for their services. CBBF is, therefore, being used by CBDC in its attempts to legitimate controversial aspects of the regeneration. In many ways CBDC is being highly selective in its use of ‘community’ views and whilst there are genuine concerns amongst some local businesses that the regeneration is not proceeding quickly enough, there is also widespread public dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the regeneration in addressing community issues, such as social infrastructure, employment and housing. CBBF’s executive has deliberately propagated this position with regard to CBDC as a part of its strategy of influence in the Bay. As the Chair commented in a Forum News editorial, “the Forum has done its job in supporting CBDC [over the regeneration]. It is time for CBDC to reciprocate” (Scherer, 1993: 2). Indeed, CBDC’s Chair commented in interview that, such groups are good for us, they give us a prod, so long as they are responsible and by and large CBBF have been compared to local community groups, which are led by activists, so are not always. Activists’ comments need to be looked at with a degree of caution. Such sentiments demonstrate many of the criticisms quangos have faced (see Colenutt, 1992) and illuminate Saunders’ (1980) findings on the dilemmas that groups countenance in developing critical stances towards the programmes of regeneration agencies. Describing groups as ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’, depending on the degree of criticism they make of the Corporation, exemplifies the ways in which UDCs have dealt with local objections to their strategies. Thus, vociferous community representatives who have been critical of CBDC’s plans — particularly over the Barrage, the construction of Bute Avenue, and the lack of spending on community projects — are seen as heretical, ‘irresponsible’ individuals committed to nostalgic sentiments of a past existence. Ostensibly, CBBF has adopted a well-defined strategy of influence. It has engaged with and influenced local institutional partnerships, seeing such an approach as the best way to re-shape local economic development policy. CBBF principally had to deal with the UDC — or as one member put it “do battle with our sparring partner”. Developing such relations provided an opportunity for the CBBF to use the situation to its advantage and to gain influence. Through networks and contacts with individuals at CBDC, CBBF has pushed for schemes helpful to many of its core members in Mount Stuart Square. In 1995, CBDC spent £100,000 on close circuit cameras

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(CCTV) in Mount Stuart Square and surrounding car parks (South Wales Echo, 1995). Their establishment can partly be attributed to CBBF’s logic of influence i.e. their calls for the scheme gave CBDC an opportunity to act while not damaging their attempts to foster an image of the Bay as an area relatively free of crime, as they could claim to be acting with CBBF’s support. CBBF had vigorously promoted such a scheme through Forum News and its representation on local partnership bodies. Other informal relations have also played a part in developing contacts between local bodies. CBBF executives, such as the Treasurer, who also heads the local branch of Barclays Bank, used and exploited a variety of personal and business contacts in promoting the Forum6. It is through the development of bilateral informal contacts between individuals in CBBF and CBDC that many of the relations between the institutions were constructed (particularly in Mount Stuart Square where a restaurant, owned by one of the CBBF’s executives, provided a popular meeting place for CBBF and CBDC members). The CBBF’s vice-chair noted, that the “best way to negotiate is to do it quietly”, claiming that his ‘Christian name’ terms of informality with CBDC officials enabled him, and CBBF, to obtain disproportionately high levels of access to the executive policy-making processes within CBDC. Thereby ‘real’ (although ill-defined) influence could be obtained. Yet, the influence that CBBF has had on CBDC requires greater qualification. Despite the informal relations noted above, the former lacked power in relation to the latter. Thus, the issue of CCTV, for example, is frequently cited by CBBF as its proposal, a notion rejected by CBDC’s chief executive who bluntly remarked in interview that, There is no special relationship with CBBF. There are 101 organisations to whom we relate. CCTV was something they pleaded for and now its here, but it was not just CBBF, the police were clamoring for it but most importantly potential inward investors wanted to see cameras in place otherwise they would not invest. So, CBBF was only partly responsible. Other CBDC spokespersons are critical of CBBF for overstating its influence and pointed out that CBBF were but one voice, in local partnerships, amongst many. Moreover, officers were skeptical of CBBF’s ‘democratic credentials’, suggesting that the Forum was dominated by service-based, spatially concentrated middle class executives bred a ‘lack of objectivity’ over the wider costs and benefits of the regen-

6

The Treasurer made clear, in interview, informal relations and contacts also had a major role to play, Crucially, we are friends with CBDC members. Both officially and unofficially I have excellent contacts with CBDC. I would say that this was more important than the more formal negotiations. I’ll say to them, “look one of our members is pissed off [sic] over a drink, usually in Buffs”. I have different roles as Manager of Barclays Bank, Treasurer of CBBF and I am firm friends with a number of people round here. In that position I won’t be ignored.


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eration and focused overwhelmingly on the issue of how to boost customers numbers for certain businesses only. Thus, while CBBF has constructed networks and attempted to cultivate influence, many of the things it has pushed for depend upon structures and processes over which they have limited control. Representation on partnership bodies or bilateral relations with institutions of governance does not necessitate direct influence (see Colenutt & Cutten, 1994; Raco, 1998). Despite CBBF’s best efforts, they were still regarded as ‘not being objective’. This was primarily due to CBBF’s criticisms of CBDC’s tendering processes, which it considered unfair and poorly targeted. For example, with the issue of car parking, CBBF claimed that it was through their influence that new, secure car parks were constructed in Butetown. Yet, the lack of parking spaces in the area had initially been caused by CBDC’s annexing of the land, on which cars were originally parked, for landscaping projects. The new car parks have used land which CBDC had failed to sell with the onset of recession, and indeed this tied in with CBDC’s aspirations for boosting visitor numbers in its original plans for the area (CBDC, 1989). Thus, while CBBF was one influence in the expansion of parking spaces in the Bay, CBDC, rather than giving major concessions, did little that they had not already planned. Yet, as the editor of Forum News commented “in return for the car parks we backed the CBDC’s plans for the Barrage”. Thus, for a minimal concession, CBDC obtained public support for its most controversial scheme. Once again, therefore, the relative impotence of locally-based territorial community groups is demonstrated. For whilst authors such as Cox (1992) and Leitner (1991) have pointed to the growing importance of territorial urban-based politics, in the context of British urban policy, with its concentration of power in non-elected quangos, the influence of such groups in highly circumscribed. The evidence above allows us, in part, to concur with Cochrane’s (1986: 55) suggestion that “even where pressure groups succeed in winning concessions, they are on relatively trivial issues at significant cost in time”. Participation may succeed only in securing limited objectives while at the same time symbolically legitimating policy-making processes without securing any fundamental concessions. As Saunders (1980: 288) pointedly remarks such groups may in fact “strengthen the pattern of distribution by competing for the crumbs while resolutely ignoring the cake”. This is particularly the case in regard to the relationship between the CBBF and other, more critical, local groups and it is to these relations that the paper now turns. Local communities and the emergence of the Cardiff Bay Business Forum In Cardiff Bay the emergence of the CBBF has institutionalised and highlighted long-standing tensions and rivalries between local businesses and residential communities. Such tensions have historically concerned the divisions between the ethnic communities of Butetown, originally brought to Cardiff as dock labour in the nineteenth century, and the long-standing professional businesses in Mount Stuart Square. The juxtaposition of some of the poorest neighbourhoods in Wales with the professionalised, predominantly middle-class business activities in Mount Stuart Square

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have long created local conflicts of interest (Thomas et al., 1996; Evans, Dodsworth & Barnett, 1984). This has been exemplified by a series of public squabbles concerning CBBF initiatives to encourage visitors to the area, which have been met with fierce protests from local community groups. In Cardiff Bay, the development of voluntary groups cannot be divorced from the historical and contemporary forms of local social relations that have developed. Such groups have been primarily concerned with defending local community interests, within changing economic and political circumstances, rather than acting as foci for encouraging greater participation with the local business community (Thomas et al., 1996). This has been particularly apparent in the formation of a local community newspaper, named Making Waves, which makes explicit reference to the historical background of the Butetown communities and their exclusion from the changes taking place around them. Moreover, the establishment of the CBBF has been perceived as a further threat to the interests of local residential communities rather than a force for encouraging greater local political dialogue. The editor of Making Waves claimed in interview that, the CBBF have added to the problems for us. They have their own ideas on the regeneration. But they have their own people to look after and we are the last people on their list. We do not get on as groups as we simply do not represent the same people. An example of the growing divisions emerged in August 1993, when the CBBF announced proposals for the establishment of a market in Mount Stuart Square, selling a variety of local and non-locally produced products. However, the proposals were greeted with fierce criticism amongst local community activists who saw the establishment of a market as an intrusion on their space — leading to increasing numbers of cars, pollution and noise with the benefits and profits being taken by local businessmen. Similarly, CBBF’s support for the Barrage, the construction of Bute Avenue and the CBDC’s property-led renewal of the Bay have drawn it into conflict with local residents. One community activist felt that “things had got a lot worse since CBBF came on the scene”. Another suggested that “They [CBBF] don’t care about the local community, they are just in it for themselves”. Some criticised the legitimation of CBBF, stressing that its members were local ‘users’, rather than ‘inhabitants’ — visiting the area by day and leaving at night. This growing antagonism highlights Dalby and Mackensie’s (1997) contention that communities do not exist in any pre-given form. To understand how community attitudes develop and the relations between different local interests, an examination is required of the specific contexts and social relations in which they develop. It is not clear what mechanisms new partnership structures would advocate for resolving such local differences which often have their roots in specific historical local relations. In Cardiff Bay, the establishment of the CBBF can be seen as an attempt by local businesses to defend their interests in regard to local community criticisms. In 1991, when CBBF was established, there was some discussion over whether it should attempt to incorporate local community groups in its organisational structures.


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According to the Chair, suggestions were made, by some local businesses, to establish a variety of local training workshops and fora through which the local unemployed could be trained up to match local businesses’ requirements. Indeed, a local community enterprise, named New Employ, exists in Mount Stuart Square, and its managing director is one of CBBF’s vice-presidents. Yet, despite this early optimism from a minority of CBBF members, local hostilities have prevented any such moves. Businesses have been particularly critical of local crime rates and blame community leaders for their failure to tackle it. Perceptions of crime are strong amongst local businesses despite the fact that rates are no higher in Butetown that in other deprived areas of the city (Forum News, 1995). Once again this is a legacy of the area’s past reputation and a perceived increase in levels of property crimes has intensified local business feelings toward local communities. One extreme CBBF member, commented that, “people around here do not deserve the regeneration. The very thought of such people in the CBBF in one way or another appalls me”. CBBF’s response to local crime has been to push for the establishment of CCTV in Mount Stuart Square (funded by CBDC) and other security measures. Yet, such measures have only inflamed local community opinion (South Wales Echo, 1995). One community activist accused CBBF of ‘trying to keep a lid on the local community’ by establishing physical and psychological barriers. Further evidence of community feelings comes from a letter from a local (Arab) community representative group to the Forum News (1996) which argued that, Recent publicity of a spate of break-ins and burglaries in Butetown...has presented a high-handed and patronising attitude toward the local community and highlighted a failure to address the real social issues involved. In seeking to place residents under constant surveillance by installing security cameras in the area, the business community, the police and the local authorities are disregarding the fact that Butetown is a residential area...[not] the City Centre. Indeed, 95% of those working in Mount Stuart Square come in from outside (The Independent, 1995). Yet, local male unemployment is over 50% (South Wales Echo, 1994a,b). With the establishment of the community newspaper, Making Waves, and a community radio station known as Bay FM, local residents have found outlets through which to criticise issues surrounding the regeneration. Both are partly funded by CBDC, but are editorially free. Thomas et al. (1996) have argued that they represent mouthpieces for local views, creating a focus for communication which had previously been lacking. In particular, there has been a focus on reviving past community solidarity over the re-naming of the area from the traditional “Tiger Bay” to “Cardiff Bay”7. Yet, this view of community strength developed from past local 7 The debate over the naming of the South of Cardiff symbolises many of the social and cultural differences which exist in the area and the importance of local historical legacies in influencing the current debates on local regeneration. The area has traditionally been known as “Tiger Bay” and inhabited by the second oldest ethnic community in Britain and characterised by economic hardship, social and physical

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social relations, is the antithesis of CBDC’s intentions to create new local social and economic relations and foster images of a “vibrant”, superlative modern city. Criticisms of such groups and the attitudes of CBDC towards the historical focus of local bodies, were leveled by the CBDC’s Chief Executive who commented that, the local community’s image is always based in nostalgia, but in my opinion the community here used to be about rickets, prostitution, crime and the like — I believe that in looking back, things were grim and harsh and now things have begun to change and we are moving towards a brighter, cleaner future. It remains difficult to see where communities have had an influence on the regeneration. A new school has been constructed for the Butetown community, but even this came about after a delay of several years while CBDC frantically looked for a suitable site. As Thomas and Imrie (1993) argue, this episode demonstrated the naive nature of CBDC activity, for its early promises of a school were not practical, and while it looked for a site, the existing school fell into a state of disrepair, and local councillors, sympathetic to the regeneration, found themselves, along with the CBDC, under heavy local criticism. Likewise, a new Youth Centre has been built close to Mount Stuart Square but there are limited funds to staff it. The new facility remains empty, and the CBDC’s attempt to placate local antagonisms towards the closure of a thoroughfare to Mount Stuart Square, where a number of businesses have complained of high crime rates, failed. Community criticisms of the regeneration programme have fallen on deaf ears as millions of pounds have been spent on the PDR, Bute Avenue will be going ahead, and other forms of service-based activities, encouraging external visitors have been developed while local unemployment shows no signs of falling to anything like the city-wide average (CCC, 1995). Thus, there are no firm commitments to community spending by CBDC as it was primarily established as an economic rather than a social agency. This reinforces Thomas’ (1989) contention that CBDC, like other UDCs, was set up to have more control over physical development than matters of social justice. Trickle down is seen as the mechanism through which communities will benefit, but as a range of authors have demonstrated, such mechanisms often serve to reinforce, rather than reduce, social and economic inequalities (Harvey, 1989). Yet community politics in Butetown has been weakened by infighting and wranisolation and segregation and strong local identities. However, with the emergence of the CBDC and the renewal of the area the name was officially changed to “Cardiff Bay”. This change was part of an attempt to reconstruct the identity of the area, which despite its sense of local community solidarity, was synonymous with sporadic violence, crime, poverty and low quality of life. Psychological, social and spatial boundaries have long existed in the area and the CBDC’s naming of the area as Cardiff Bay represented a deliberate attempt to present an image of integrated redevelopment project which tied in with a longer term modernisation the city. There has been much local resistance to this attempt to reconstruct the image of place. In interview, for example, the editor of Making Waves, which has been particularly influential in its attempts to re-build historical sources of identity and that ‘This place is not called Cardiff Bay, it is Tiger Bay. We’re one of the oldest ethnic communities in the UK and we are extremely close knit as a result of our isolation from the rest of the city and the long term discrimination we have suffered.’


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gling, primarily as a result of the fragmented nature of local social relations. Local issues of race permeate political discussion with community issues divided into simplistic dualisms of “black” and “white”, suffusing the reality of a complex picture of social differentiation and community need. This is consistent with Harvey’s warning that communities may act as exclusive entities which construct as many barriers as they pull down (Harvey, 1996). The community politics of Cardiff can be seen as a legacy of racial tensions in the area and the traditionally differential nature of working class interests (see Evans et al., 1984). The forms of local economic regeneration pursued by CBDC and the support they have received from sections of the local business community have only exacerbated and reinforced such tensions. Whilst it would be unfair to label CBDC as an agency which has actively pursued what Harvey and Sywngedouw (1993) have termed a “divide and rule” strategy in regard to community criticisms of the regeneration, the divisions within and between local community interests in Cardiff Bay has helped provide the appearance of local political consensus and a pro-growth strategy. Meanwhile, CBBF has continued into a seventh year. Ostensibly the processes through which it emerged are still moving in the same direction, i.e. the construction of the Bute Avenue boulevard is yet to proceed and local firms are seeking business opportunities from the regeneration. Consequently, there is still a potential role for a “pro-growth”, business lobbying group to push for project completion and to influence CBDC policies. However, the heterogeneity of CBBF’s membership, its inability to match members’ expectations in the delivery of local benefits and the emergence of growing apathy have weakened its role and support. Its membership has dropped from a peak of 315 in 1992/1993 to 210 in 1995/1996 and a low of 154 in 1996/1997. In a survey conducted by the author 27 of the 43 respondents felt that CBBF was failing to deliver on its promises. In the context of declining membership and the apparent cementing of CBDC’s plans for regeneration, the CBBF’s future appears relatively circumscribed. Like other similar community organisations, CBBF may become a short-lived body, reacting to and trying to influence a particular set of circumstances but finding a combination of existing local decision-making processes and the difficulties in organising a voluntary group of, increasingly apathetic, small businesses limiting their future prospects of survival and influence. In many ways it has suffered from the same difficulties faced by local residential community groups which have found themselves increasingly marginalised from local decision-making processes.

Conclusions The nature of community participation in urban policy looks set to remain a dominant issue in the latest round of policy change. Partnerships seem certain to play a central role in establishing policy frameworks, coordinating public and private sector activities and incorporating varying sections of local (community) opinion. As a DETR (1997b: paragraph 5.21) discussion paper makes clear,

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The advantages of partnerships is that if properly constituted and run they are more suited to implementing the bottom-up approach to regeneration than a single central or local government organisation. They can help to promote ownership of regeneration activity within local communities. Partnerships also provide a powerful way of legitimating policy programmes. The emphasis on community involvement and participation has led some commentators, such as Cochrane (1986: 51), to claim that, governments seem to use community as if it were an aerosol can, to be sprayed on any social programme, giving it a more progressive and sympathetic cachet. Certainly UDCs, under fierce criticism in the 1980s for their perceived failure to address community issues have, in many ways, adopted the rhetoric and language of partnership and community involvement (see Colenutt & Cutten, 1994). However, this study has demonstrated that there are a number of weaknesses with the current mechanisms of community engagement in local decision making processes. It has shown how state institutions, such as CBDC, have used and exploited divisions between local interests to provide political legitimacy for controversial programmes. Thus, the appropriation of communities into the rhetoric of “participative” partnership politics is not a neutral process. Power relations are central both in establishing the types of issues which community organisations are able to influence and in the definition of local political agendas. CBDC has shown a high degree of political astuteness in its ability to define what it accepts as legitimate community involvement, whilst reinforcing its own position as the central agency for regenerating Cardiff Bay. The notion of “responsible” community participation and the degree to which opportunities for influence through partnerships is a viable option for local communities, whose views may conflict with those of regeneration agencies, therefore become central issues. CBDC’s lack of local accountability has meant that community involvement has been closely tied to this issue of legitimation. The paper has also examined the organisation and mobilisation of small businesses in the context of an urban renewal scheme. Such organisations are notoriously unstable coalitions of disparate interests united by contingent circumstances and prone to disbanding almost as quickly as they emerge (Offe, 1985; Simmie & French, 1991). The small businesses in Cardiff Bay have found themselves embroiled in a process of major physical regeneration undertaken by agencies working to predetermined policy agendas. These institutional relations are central in understanding the position of CBBF and other local community groups in influencing local economic development strategies. What the CBDC, and other institutions working alongside them, believe to be right for the area may not necessarily be views shared by local communities. This study has demonstrated the difficulties groups such as CBBF have faced in challenging institutions in the wider context of vigorous local place marketing and property-led image building strategies. CBBF’s logic of influence has had to focus as much on maintaining the legitimacy of its own (political) position as in constructing a challenge to CBDC. Consequently, the influence it have had on local


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decision making processes has been slight and it has not had any major direct effects on the plans of CBDC. The creation of local partnerships per se do not, therefore, necessarily address the inequalities of power that may exist on the local level. Politically constructed and powerful institutions, such as quangos, are able to shape and limit local political agendas. The development of local partnerships often involves the devolution of decision-making power for relatively minor aspects of policy implementation. Moreover, they can also generate legitimacy for action as local groups are seen to be having an “input”, however small that may be. In Cardiff Bay, CBDC executives admitted that their central regeneration programmes were enshrined in the founding legislation and were not up for negotiation. Local groups had little impact in this initial process where the primary decisions concerning the regeneration were taken. Hence, as Lukes (1974: 24) argues we need to ‘allow for consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions’. The current concept of partnership in the new urban policy risks deflecting attention from the processes involved in the formation of policy initiatives to issues concerning local delivery mechanisms and implementation procedures. Whilst the latter may be essential to the effectiveness and legitimacy of policy, they do not, in themselves, constitute ownership of regeneration activities by local communities if the parameters of policy have been constructed elsewhere.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council (Award no: R00429434267) for generously funding this research. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees, Peter Taylor, Rob Imrie, Robina Goodlad, Allan Cochrane, Roger Lee and Ade Kearns for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. I am alone, however, responsible for the content and substance of the paper.

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