Authoritarianism and Pathological Hatred: A Social ...

Authoritarianism and Pathological Hatred: A Social Psychological Profile of the Middle Eastern Terrorist MICHEL GOTTSCHALK AND SIMON GOTTSCHALK

Grounded on the analysis of MMPI tests administered to 90 jailed Middle Eastern terrorists, and semi-structured interviews with 57 Middle Eastern terrorists released from jail, this paper suggests that, regardless of their ethnicity, religiosity, political affiliations, or gender, Middle Eastern terrorists share common social-psychological tendencies. Organizing these tendencies under the labels of “authoritarianism” and “pathological hatred,” we suggest that contemporary terrorists are significantly different from their respective ethnic control groups and their predecessors. Briefly stated, rather than using violence against innocent civilians as a means to accomplish rational political ends, we suggest that today’s terrorists use rational political goals as a convenient means to inflict violence against innocent civilians.

Introduction: The Problems with Academic Research on Terrorism While terrorism has become a major concern for the lay public, army personnel, policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and the media, most of the academic literature pertaining to this topic addresses almost exclusively its logistical, legal, organizational, and political aspects.1 Few bother to examine the primary unit of analysis of this phenomenon—the terrorist himself or herself as an actor articulating complex social psychological dispositions. The few existing theories discussing the psychosocial etiology of terrorism suffer from a number of weaknesses as well. In some, the concept of terrorism is used to designate other forms of political violence;2 in others, theories do not derive from the analysis of empirical data collected through rigorous methodological approaches, but consist mainly of commonsensical statements which seem to project their author’s moral positions and which, in many cases, derive from the ad hoc analysis of specific occurrences which cannot be generalized.3 Additionally, rather than advancing logically deMichel Gottschalk has presented, published and co-authored numerous papers on terrorism. Before his studies, he served in an anti-terrorist special unit in the Israeli Defense Forces, and worked as a security special agent while serving in an IDF Special Forces as a reservist. He presently works as a researcher and clinical psychologist in various mental health facilities in Belgium, and as an organizational consultant providing behavioral trainings on organizational communication. Simon Gottschalk is currently editor of Symbolic Interaction. He has presented and published numerous papers, articles, and book chapters that critically investigate, in a variety of sites and phenomena, contemporary social psychological trends.

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The American Sociologist / Summer 2004

rived hypotheses which could somehow be empirically verified, many theories of the psychosocial etiology of terrorism take the form of weakly connected propositions rather than disciplined reflection.4 More problematically, there does not seem to exist a clear-cut definition of terrorism that could both allow for the construction of an empirical model and serve as a basis for multidisciplinary research and theoretical development.5 After having reviewed the literature on non-state terrorism, we have guided the present research by the following definition: Non-state terrorism refers to the premeditated use, attempt to use, or threat to use violence by private individuals or members of non-state organizations against non-combating civilians who, although anonymous, share symbolic characteristics of (a) social group(s) which the perpetrators want to place in a state of chronic fear in order to serve aims they define as ideological and/or political (Gottschalk and Lefebvre, 1995).

While this definition may sound cumbersome, it resolves much confusion that has traditionally plagued the study of terrorism. Thus, although we do not want to minimize the importance and brutality of state-organized terrorism, regardless of its flag, for the purpose of this study, we want to separate state-organized and nonstate forms of terrorism because we believe that different dynamics are at work in these two cases, and therefore require different approaches and questions. Additionally, this definition avoids the pitfall of lumping together those instances that constitute terrorism and those that should be more precisely categorized as political assassination, subversion, revolution, guerrilla, armed struggle, resistance, and other terms that belong to the same conceptual family. We shall thus define as terrorist an individual who fulfills all the criteria specified above. Between Various Reductionisms Scientists of many disciplines have both supported and attacked the claims of a terrorist psychosocial profile that could explain why particular individuals join such a mercilessly violent enterprise. That such a claim has been attacked is quite understandable as it might foster the psychological reductionism of a phenomenon that is unarguably multilayered and caused by numerous micro- and macro-social forces. As a first caveat, therefore, we are not suggesting that psychosocial orientations constitute the only factors explaining terrorism. There always exist real social, political, economic, and territorial conditions that cultivate the emergence of terrorist formations, and those always interact in complex ways with societal position, cultural orientation, and psychological needs. At the same time, as much as we do not want to minimize the objective conditions which foster terrorism, it is still the case that, out of a wide population of individuals experiencing similar conditions, only a very few choose the terrorist option. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to suggest that, regardless of their ethnicity, gender, religious beliefs, or political orientation, those self-selected few must share important psychosocial tendencies. Thus, while acknowledging the danger inherent in reducing complex human phenomena to single domains of explanation, we still maintain that terrorists’ psychosocial orientations are as—if not more—important and powerful motivating factors as the political-ideological missions they invoke to justify the murder of anonymous others and their own death.

Gottschalk and Gottschalk

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Terrorism: Old and New Recent trends in terrorist ideologies and activities lead us to believe that a focus on the terrorist’s psychosocial orientations has become increasingly necessary. In addition to noticeable shifts in the ideological horizon of a variety of groups (religious fundamentalism, violent racism, and ultra nationalism), contemporary terrorist practices also differ from those of two or three decades ago on at least four interrelated dimensions which we find relevant to a social psychological approach. More precisely, 1960s and 1970s terrorist “hits” would often include: (1) the articulation of specific demands—the satisfaction of which would postpone or limit the scope of violence; (2) the communication of grievances to audiences as well as a rationale for their action; (3) an enforced dialogue with and symbolic recognition from official political bodies; and (4) geographic specificity of their hits and/or selective targeting of victims. Terrorist groups operating in the 1960s and 1970s often presented themselves as rational agents or organizations resorting to violence in order to achieve specific political goals. Acknowledging that their strategies were radical, brutal, and fatal, they also attempted to justify those in the eyes of mass media audiences (and themselves?) as a necessary evil to bring a deserving political project (nationhood, liberation, end to oppression, territorial sovereignty, etc.) to fruition. Although audiences of such drama might have objected to the strategies terrorists deployed, both they and the terrorists were at least on the same wavelength and shared a few important parameters of what symbolic interactionists call the “definition of a situation.” For audiences, terrorism was a despicable enterprise, but the goals made sense. For the terrorists, terror was not their preferred strategy but given their perceived objective conditions, desired goals, and limited alternatives, they had little choice. In a sense, therefore, it seems that terrorists used to frame their activities along known and logical parameters that could—or rather had to—be dramatically communicated to the public. In contrast, it seems that contemporary terrorists rarely articulate specific demands that could logically be met, or air grievance they want redressed. Rather than seeking to represent themselves to an audience as political agents struggling for a cause through unconventional means, they seem more interested to represent themselves through televised images of absolute and random violence. If former terrorist groups often sought to force representatives of official political bodies into dialogue and symbolic recognition, it seems that today’s terrorists are interested in neither. Gone is the negotiation process with official political figures, gone are the televised hooded heads reading a list of grievances, gone are the political speeches demanding recognition, the release of jailed comrades, nationhood, freedom, restitution, or a plane with fuel supplies. The objectives of terrorist “hits” seem to have been reduced to the perpetration of terror for terror’s sake. Additionally, the noticeable reduction in communication between terrorists and audiences is paralleled by a shift in terrorist activities which increasingly expand to a global range and which decreasingly discriminate in the selection of victims. Although the reasons explaining these changes in terrorist practices must be numerous and interacting in complex fashions, we believe that an essential part of the explanation resides in a clearer understanding of the psychosocial orientations and motivations characterizing contemporary terrorists. Pushing this argument a

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bit further, we propose that the political goals on behalf of which terrorists claim to struggle constitute but means through which they articulate these psychosocial motivations. Rather than being instrumental to the attainment of political goals, we argue, terrorism is expressive of psychosocial orientations or motivations. Our purpose here is to describe them. The Quantitative Approach: Subjects and Methods Using a quantitative approach, the first two hypotheses we want to verify suggest that: 1. Regardless of their gender, political, religious, or ethnic affiliation, terrorists are more likely to share important psychological orientations with each other than with members of their respective ethnic control groups. 2. Regardless of their gender, political, religious, or ethnic affiliation, terrorists share a discernible psychosocial profile that we organize with the concept of “pathological hatred.”

We verified these two hypotheses by (a) administrating the MMPI-2 tests (see Appendix A) to 90 Palestinian and Israeli Jewish terrorists currently incarcerated in Israeli jails or living in freedom, and (b) administrating and analyzing a scale measuring “pathological hatred” to these subjects (see Appendix B). Results of both tests were compared to two control groups consisting of 30 Palestinians and 31 Israeli Jews who are similar to the subjects on standard demographic variables. The distribution of subjects by organizations is detailed in Table 1. In order to access Palestinian jailed leaders and members of various terrorist groups, the senior author of this paper first secured an authorization from various jailed terrorist leaders. In each prison, Palestinian terrorists of various groups agreed to meet only after having obtained the leader’s collaboration and participation in the research. Following his/her example, other jailed members of the same organization agreed to participate. In order to access leaders and members of terrorist groups now living—sometimes clandestinely—in freedom, the senior author of Table 1 Distribution of Terrorists by Organizational Membership and Legal Status Organization Abu Nidal DFLP FLP Hammas Islamic Ji’had Kach Kahana Hay PFLP PFLP-CG PLO No Organization Total


Prison 2 4 2 3 3 0 5 10 2 15 3

Free 1 4 1 3 3 12 5 6 4 2 0

Total 3 8 3 6 6 12 10 16 6 17 3

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90

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this research relied on Palestinian informants introduced to him by the Belgian consul in Jerusalem. Jailed Israeli leaders whose identity was known to the senior author of this research were approached individually. The Israeli terrorists were met in West Bank Jewish settlements and in Israeli cities and were accessed through the help of informants, intermediaries, and other contacts developed by the senior author. MMPI-2 and Pathological Hatred Test Results Comparisons between terrorists and control group subjects’ MMPI-2 tests (see Appendix C) suggest at least six important findings. First, regardless of their gender, political, religious, or ethnic affiliation, terrorists have significantly higher scores on MMPI-2 subscales measuring psychopathic deviate (Scale 4), paranoid (Scale 6), depressive (Scale 2), and hypomanic (Scale 9) tendencies. Second, regardless of their faith, terrorists belonging to fundamentalist groups are also more likely to obtain high scores on the schizophrenic scale (Scale 8). Third, comparisons between terrorists of different ethnic groups suggest higher levels of psychopathology among Israeli Jews (32.7 percent) than among Palestinians (31.1 percent). Fourth, comparisons of significant subscales among terrorists who belong to various ethnic groups suggest that schizophrenic tendencies (Scale 8) constitute one of the two highest clinical scales among 56 percent of Israeli Jews, and one of the three highest among them. Fifth, psychopathic deviate tendencies (Scale 4) constitute the highest clinical scale among 29 percent of Palestinian terrorists, and one among the three highest clinical scales among 40 percent of them. Sixth, finally, comparisons of terrorists claiming different types of ideological orientation (revolutionary, secular, fundamentalist) reveal important schizophrenic tendencies (Scale 8) among fundamentalists. Scores on the schizophrenic scale are significantly elevated beyond the significant pathological level among 47.7 percent of them and moderately elevated among 58 percent. Comparisons between terrorists and control group subjects’ tests measuring “pathological hatred” suggest at least three important findings. First, the individual’s clinical profile matches his/her terrorist group profile. Second, the individual’s clinical profile is more similar to the general terrorist profile than to the global profile characteristic of his/her own ethnically-similar control group. Third, Palestinian and Israeli fundamentalist terrorists are more similar to each other on “pathological hatred” measures and MMPI-2 clinical profiles than when compared to any other collective configuration. Thus, regardless of their political, religious, ethnic affiliation or gender, terrorists are similar to each other and differ from their respective control groups on 19 “pathological hatred” subscales. On both these scales, therefore, we find that terrorist scores systematically point both to the maladaptive pole of the MMPI-2 scale and to the extreme pole of the “pathological hatred” scale. To us, these results suggest a terrorist psychosocial profile, syndrome or personality which seems to transcend gender, political affiliation, ethnicity, and, among the fundamentalists, faith. The Qualitative Approach: Subjects and Methods Because the quantitative analysis of psychosocial tendencies barely manages to convey their temperament, the senior author of this research enriched the analysis

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by engaging 57 terrorist respondents in semi-structured interviews that were subsequently analyzed by both authors. Because of the very nature of terrorist groups and activities, members have a vital interest in maintaining absolute anonymity and secrecy. Accordingly, the sampling strategy used here was developed according to accessibility, danger, field conditions, and subjects’ willingness to participate. Table 2 details respondents’ organization and the place of interview. Wanting to hear what pathological hatred “sounded like,” respondents were encouraged to discuss in their own voice their general worldviews, reference groups, perceptions of the West, gender relations, social problems, their enemies, their visions for the future and other issues. In order to generate “impulsive answers,” the researcher also used provocative questions, and explained to subjects that the interview could be more interesting and informative if he played both the roles of the “devil’s advocate” and that of the naive observer who is also a potential convert. Subjects’ answers were tape-recorded or transcribed, and translated from Arabic and Hebrew to English and French. Following a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2002), we analyzed these transcripts, coding them for recurring themes that articulate recognizable social-psychological tendencies, memoing these themes, and looking for relationships between them so as to develop a theoretical framework that explains them. This analysis detected nine themes that articulate distinct social psychological tendencies. Although we have categorized these as nine separate themes, it goes without saying that all are interwoven and inform each other. This forced categorization has been accomplished for communication purposes only. Authoritarianism and Pathological Hatred: The Terrorist Logic Ethnocentrism and Racism The seed of Isaac must be annihilated—Ji’had member Let’s kick those goddamned Arabs out of here or let’s give them hell—Kahana Hay member

Approaching the terrorist act as expressing a paroxysmal hatred of the Other, a guiding assumption of this research posited ethnocentrism and its affective corolTable 2 Distribution of Terrorists by Organizational Membership and Place of Interview Organization Abu Nidal DFLP FLP Hammas Islamic Ji’had Kach Kahana Hay PFLP PFLP-CG PLO No Organization Total


Prison 1 2 1 2 1 0 3 2 2 2 3 19

Freedom 1 4 1 3 3 12 5 5 2 2 0 38

Total 2 6 2 5 4 12 8 7 4 4 3 57

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laries as axial in the terrorist psychosocial profile. We follow Adorno’s (1951) work on ethnocentrism which defines it as an ideological system—a relatively stable and organized complex of hostile attitudes towards a particular group—including exclusion, annihilation, subordination, negative opinions, and the use of “moral” values justifying such attitudes toward a collective Other. In contrast to Adorno, however, our notion of “group” is significantly expanded in that it includes not only formal sociological and pseudo-sociological entities that constitute the targets of ethnocentric hostility, but also sociological non-entities. In other terms, anything or anyone who is not “us” is necessarily “anti-us.” Accordingly, we have approached ethnocentrism as: (a) the inability to acknowledge an individual as such (b) the inability to engage another on the basis of his/her individual identity, and (c) the compulsion to prejudge him/her according to stereotypes attributed to the collectivity to which s/he is assumed to belong.6 Our analysis suggests that terrorists of both Muslim and Jewish groups articulate most frequently a virulent ethnocentrism and racism that lead to the dehumanization of the Other. In such a worldview, the Other is often described a subhuman who cannot be eligible for respect, consideration, or human rights. We were in fact astounded by the similarities in the Jewish and Palestinian constructions of their respective “Others.” Thus, while a member of the Jewish-religious nationalist Kahana Hay explains, “the Christian and Muslim faiths are perverted, distorted, man-made vulgarizations of sections of the Torah,” a Hammas member echoes such a sentiment exactly by arguing that both Jews and Christians “have distorted the message of God.” Terrorists also use these views constructing the religious origins of the Other to reinterpret the recent past, the present, and the future. Discussing the Holocaust, Palestinian respondents of all political stripes dismiss it as “a Judeo-American invention,” an “exaggeration” (Islamic Ji’had), or “information invented by Jews and their allies” (Hammas). Such views are also instrumental in framing their current perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Thus, a PLO member claims with all seriousness that “Jews want to dominate the world,” that “all Jews are Freemasons,” that “Zionism is a Freemason ideology,” and that “Jews are the enemies of humanity.” A member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine adds another twist to this picture by stating that “Jews and capitalists are synonymous words,” and a female member of the same group explains that “Jews are the only subhuman race on the planet.” While members of the Hammas frame the entire Jewish question as “artificiality,” an issue that “does not exist,” and which, in any case, was “raised by rich and influential Jews in the West,” such sentiments are also expressed by a Kahana Hay respondent who simply argues that “there are no Palestinians.” Such constructions have, of course, enormous consequences for the kind of engagement members of terrorist groups are likely to develop vis-à-vis their respective Others. Not surprisingly therefore, for a Hammas member, “there is no such thing as an innocent Jewish civilian,” and in the words of a PLO member justifying the killing of children: “their simply being Jews was a sufficient proof of their culpability.” In his vision, “Israeli children are baby scorpions; you kill them before they grow bigger.” Asked about the political logic of killing Jewish civilians in Europe, a PFLP member answers simply “They were Jews.... Killing Jews is O.K. Nobody likes them.” For a second member of that same movement, “A Jew is first and foremost a Jew and a nuisance. Hitler was right on this point.” In the

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words of a third female member of this group, “nobody wants Jews on their soil and everybody is happy to get rid of them.” A similar outlook is also shared by a Jewish Kahana Hay member who paint Arabs as “wild beasts,” “scum,” “lazy,” “primitive hateful cowards” for whom “stealing and murdering is a way of life.” As a freelance Jewish terrorist also insists, he purposefully “wanted to kill innocent people.” The solution proposed by the Kahana Hay member is to “kick them out of here or give them hell.” Members of both ethnic groups unmistakably echo each other by interpreting the Others’ very physical presence as an abomination, a desecration of the land, a polluting of a state of purity that could exist if those they despise could only be disciplined, converted, or forcefully removed. Conventionalism, Authoritarian Submission, and Authoritarian Aggression Terrorists of all stripes display marked puritan and conformist tendencies. Emphasizing that children must be disciplined for their own good, they also promote submission to authority figures, patriotism, homophobia, fear of too much freedom, and—among male members of fundamentalist Islamic groups—traditional views of women which are also highly charged with fears of her seductive and corrupting powers, a point we develop below. Whereas members of the Islamic Ji’had and Kahana Hay see free sexuality as decadent and homosexuality as a “crime,” “abomination,” or “sin,” they also articulate a similar distaste for the ideas of democracy and freedom. Positing that “Westerners have a notion of freedom that is in fact not freedom but slavery,” a Ji’had member adds that, in any case, “man cannot be his own guide and must be guided by God in the same way that a child is guided by his parents.” While a Hammas respondent insists that “man is weak and subject to bad influences,” a Kahana Hay member agrees by stating that “believing in democracy is believing in the wisdom of man above the wisdom of God,” clearly an irresponsible mistake. He believes instead that “there ought to be an elite of well-formed and organized leadership constituting a Sanhedrin of pious judges headed by a Jewish king who could guide the people out of its moral and political chaos in the way of the Torah.” Subjects’ insistence on absolute submission to just leaders and strict religious laws, and their disdain for sociopolitical organizations based on rational decisionmaking and democratic processes are also reinforced by an authoritarian aggression against those who do not share their vision. Such motivations not only encourage a mercilessly hostile construction of the ethnic Other but also of members of their own ethnic group who do not share their beliefs and/or who seek peaceful resolutions to the conflict. Thus, for a PFLP member, “Palestinian militants in the Peace Now movement are traitors whose faith is death. Jewish peaceniks are our preferred targets.” For another PFLP member, “Jewish peace activists pervert Palestinians into believing that living in peace together is not only possible but desirable. Those Jews are much more dangerous to our cause than Kach or Kahana Hay terrorists.” When told that 80 percent of the Palestinian population in the newly autonomous territories seem to support the peace process, a third PFLP member resolves this inconvenient fact by simply stating that “80 percent of my people are wrong and defeatists.” If members of secular and pseudo-revolutionary terrorist groups such as the PFLP justify an absolute intolerance for dissenting viewpoints on political, historical, and strategic grounds, members of fundamentalist terrorist


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groups justify it on religious ones. For a Hammas member, “Arafat and the PLO are worse than our non-Muslim enemies. His death will be violent and exemplary.” Or again, from a leader of the same group, “people who violate Koranic laws know they are misbehaving and are a bad influence. They also know that, in Islam, punishment must be an example.” As he adds, A Muslim regressing to atheism is a fool, a traitor, or a malicious heretic. It is a religious obligation to kill him. A Muslim becoming an atheist freely chooses to die but does not have the courage to kill himself by his own hands. For a pious Muslim, not killing such a person is sacrilegious.

In a similar vein, for the Kahana Hay member, “those not agreeing are ignorant of their own history and rights” and he proposes to “expel from Israel the non-Jews who refuse to live according to the Jewish laws pertaining to Gentiles living in a political and territorial Jewish entity.” Power/Weakness Inspired by a rigidly dichotomous view of a world populated by masters and slaves, oppressors and victims, strong and weak, terrorists believe that the Others are cunning and treacherous subhumans who can only understand the language of force and violence and who, in any case, must endure suffering for the sins of their parents, for their potential future ones, or for just being who they are. Accordingly, there is room for neither negotiation nor dialogue, and solutions to conflicts must be inevitably violent and brutal. For a PFLP woman, Jews only understand violence and strength ... The Israeli peace effort is just a sign of weakness, there is thus no other solution but fight.

This sentiment is again advanced, almost verbatim, by a Kahana Hay member for whom “negotiating means that you recognize your weakness. If violence on our part did not solve the problem, it is because there was never enough of it.” As he continues, Arabs don’t have the same respect for life, peace, and democracy as we do. They understand talk about peace as weakness and fear. Arabs value strength and uncompromising determination.

The themes of power and strength are thus frequent in the terrorist discourse, regardless of its language. While a freelance Jewish terrorist justifies his murderous action as resulting from being enraged by a “feeble government” guilty of “cowardice” and of “paralyzing” and “emasculating” an army which was once the “best and strongest in the world,” a PFLP terrorist insists that “a better world will arise when the weak of today becomes the strong of tomorrow and when he becomes the master of the one he was enslaved to.” Such tendencies are also articulated by an Islamic Ji’had leader who hopes that “when they’ll be weak enough we’ll be strong enough and shoot them down.” The terrorist discourse constructs human relations as a brutal zero-sum game played out between the powerful and the weak. In such a rigid system, there is no room for shades of gray, ambiguities, negotiations, or power distribution. One must claim one camp or the other, and anything in between will either be converted, expelled, or destroyed. As a PFLP member puts it, “the life of an indifferent bystander is worthless.” 46


Having delegitimized the Other’s history, human rights, and legitimacy, terrorist constructions also darken the picture by emphasizing two kinds of violence: the one the Others have inflicted or could inflict upon “us,” and thus, the necessity of inflicting it upon them. The Others’ perceived treacherousness and animal-like quality makes this necessity all the more persuasive. Violence then does not only constitute a means of resolving conflicts but is an axial principle organizing the terrorist’s worldview, a supreme tool enforcing a rigid categorization between the strong and the weak, the winners and the losers, the true and the false. Ultimately, as Gottschalk and Lefebvre (1995) suggest, this compulsive and exclusive utilization of violence as the only strategy constitutes the lethal articulation of psychological motivations; the political justifications are but convenient vehicles. Fundamentalist Nightmares of Dangerous Purity6 Because only a small minority of those who hold fundamentalist views engage in terrorism, an effort was made to isolate those items that distinguish fundamentalist terrorists from non-terrorists. As a result, a theoretical distinction was introduced to distinguish “general fundamentalism” from “exclusionary fundamentalism.” The concept of “general fundamentalism” refers to the compulsive need to integrate and force Others to one’s own value system and to make them at least externally identical to oneself. At some level, therefore, general fundamentalism still articulates a principle of some reciprocity: Once the world has been made morally and behaviorally homogeneous, its laws are the same for everyone. By comparison, “exclusionary fundamentalism” extols the physical elimination of Others without even wanting to convert them. If in general fundamentalism, the different Others remain pariahs as long as they have not converted to one’s own faith, in exclusionary fundamentalism, the Other is unconditionally rejected as s/he can never become “one of us” (see Appendix B). Positing a universe organized by one true God and religion “which gives all answers to all questions,” a Ji’had member dismisses all other truths as erroneous, deceitful or downright lies. The goals of his movement are to make “all Palestinians go back to Islam,” after which “the whole world is to be Islamized.” As he also argues, “Muslim societies must cease to be secular,” and “governments of predominantly Muslim societies will be coerced” along the Islamic path. For a Hammas member also, a danger greater to Palestinians than Zionism or U.S. intervention is “perversion”—referring here to Western influences among Muslims. For a second member of the same group, beyond the radical transformation of Israeli society according to Islamic law, their mission is to “make all Muslims obey God,” after which “Islam must dominate the world”—a tendency which he sees as simply irreversible. As he explains, “there are no nations but already Islamized lands and still pagan countries to be Islamized.” For another Ji’had member, “heterogeneity leads to anarchy, which leads to decadence.... A society organized around Islam is a society without conflicts.” The Kahana Hay member also articulates similar convictions, attesting to this inability to acknowledge and accept heterogeneity and the existence of belief systems different from his own. As he argues, “a non-believing Jew is a mistaken Jew.” As such, the first step in his movement’s mission is to force all non-Jews (at least those who choose to remain in Israel) to live by Noah’s seven commandments; the second is “to impose them on the non-Jewish world.” In his


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view, “the world will be either entirely good or entirely evil,” and in any case, “there are no in-betweens.” In both cases therefore, subjects do not simply display overwhelmingly absolutist views of truth, but have also taken upon themselves the particularly worrisome life project of enforcing them upon Others. That psychological motivations rather than reasonable political aims fuel terrorist activities is further revealed by an analysis of their visions of the present and their plans for the future. Indeed, rather than legitimizing the killing of others by advancing the vision of a utopian society where the people on behalf of whom they claim to fight could attain some sort of modest happiness, the future terrorists propose is rather grim. Punctuating their discourse with terms such as “absolute truth,” “power,” “strength,” “unacceptable difference,” “irreconcilable polarities,” “conspiracies,” “perversions,” “decadence,” “revenge,” “punishment,” and the redeeming “value of suffering,” the terrorist vision constructs a rather dystopian future which begs exploration. Organized around the principles of severe religious justice administered by wise leaders, swift punishment executed by authority figures, sober discipline delivered by strong fathers, and strict obedience enforced on children and wives “for their own good,” such a vision evokes a rather nightmarish and fascistic future. Here, thought and relations are strictly organized, all ambiguity has disappeared, deviance is severely punished, all Otherness has been converted, expelled, or destroyed, and joy, happiness, compassion, forgiveness, friendship, love, and acceptance are conspicuously absent. Non-Perspectivism By non-perspectivism, we refer to a person’s inability to recognize that the motivations that guide another’s actions may be different from one’s own. With regard to this dimension, terrorists of both groups are again interestingly similar to each other. Here again, although a few terms are switched around, their discourse basically remains the same and points at this particular psychosocial orientation. Thus, for example, a Hammas member states that “Judaism is basically wrong because it does not seek to proselytize,” “European youth rebel because they do not have a true faith,” and the French government authorizes the building of mosques in various cities “not as a token of tolerance but as evidence of their doubting of their own faith.” For a PFLP member, “Israeli peace efforts signify that they begin to realize they’re becoming weaker,” and for the Kahana Hay member, “for an Arab, to speak of peace and to agree to territorial concessions has nothing to do with being enlightened but expresses weakness and fear.” Whereas terrorists explain Others’ actions by projecting their own motivations onto them, they also hold on to the belief that once these Others will be led to the terrorist’s “truth,” they will quite naturally embrace it and reject their former mistaken beliefs. For example, the Ji’had leader believes that if people throughout the world “hear us and are open to the Message of Islam, they will willingly convert” because of a “deeply authentic human need which is to belong to a faith they know to be true.” For the Kahana Hay member, those who do not agree are mistaken because “they have not yet been allowed to receive the message of the Great Rabbi.” In this logic, s/he who does not share my wants, beliefs, and distastes is wrong and cannot possibly be allowed to retain this difference. Confronted with my Truth, the Other will surely understand and accept it, and s/he who refuses will just have to disappear.

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Necrophilia Erich Fromm (1976, 1973) distinguishes between two elementary personality orientations polarized on a continuum and competing for the same pool of psychological resources. The biophile orientation is the creative, constructive, communicative, humanistic pole of the personality that is attracted by life and movement. Based on the “being” rather than the “having” mode (1976), this orientation combines optimistic attitudes directed towards the present and the future, beliefs in the inherent wisdom and sociability of human beings, and the refusal to hierarchize humans according to arbitrary emotional positive and negative axes. This orientation can admit sacrificing oneself on behalf of cherished values or faith, but never and under no circumstance can it accept the sacrifice of others on behalf of one’s own value or belief system. The biophile orientation is not simply non-fundamentalist and non-exclusionist, but represents their very antithesis. It is an orientation dominated by the love of life. In contrast, the necrophile orientation is the stagnating, autistic, self-destructive pole of the personality that is attracted by death and the past. According to Fromm, this orientation is manifested by one’s preference for conflictual and pessimistic interpretations of interaction, and for brutal and expedient solutions rather than for patient negotiations. In this orientation, death dominates life, having supplants being, the letter of the Law displaces the principle of Justice, the nation is more important than society, class is more relevant than people, and color overshadows the person. In addition to various themes connoting authoritarian submission and aggression, terrorists also often articulate necrophile tendencies characterized by the desire for violent revenge, and the celebration of suffering and death. Thus, members of both Palestinian and Jewish groups echo each other in their stated desire to inflict “suffering” and “bitterness” on the Other in order to “teach them a lesson.” Whereas a freelance Israeli terrorist declares he wants “to make them suffer like they make us suffer” and to purposefully “hit innocent people,” a Hammas leader endorses such dispositions by claiming that “through his fighters, Allah punishes the enemy by striking at what he cherishes most—his children—so that the source of his love should become the source of his misery.” As a Kahana Hay member also adds, “we’d rather die for a real Jewish kingdom than be annihilated by Muslims or live in sin.” Another PFLP member perhaps most eloquently summarizes this tendency by simply stating that “ultimately it is our violent death that gives sense and value to our life.” And if this sentiment may at first sound courageous, when placed alongside the other tendencies mentioned above, it becomes clear that this death wish through the violent elimination of others articulates, nurtures, and is sustained by other problematic psychological orientations rather than promotes a rational sociopolitical agenda. A Gendered Order Since 1974, Bem and her colleagues have established that subjects who rated highest on her scale of androgyny displayed the most psychological equilibrium and social adaptation. In contrast, subjects whose gender identity was highly conforming to traditional stereotypes fared much lower on such skills. Like Jung, she concluded that androgyny is the most adaptive personality orientation in society— even a traditional one—and the most valid and reliable indicator of psychological Gottschalk and Gottschalk

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health and personality integration. In contrast, fundamentalist terrorists endorse a strictly dichotomous gender hierarchy and articulate a vision of gender relations that is fraught with hostility and danger. For a Hammas member, “nude women constitute a temptation to rape,” and in any case, “her role is to stay home, take care of the children, and be materially taken care of by her husband.” In his view also, the husband should “punish his wife the same way he punishes his children ... out of love, to make them obey.” As he continues, Mixing roles is confusing to the child’s identity. Men and women are different and the knowledge of this difference and of its implications is necessary, and even essential for the sake of the family’s cohesion.... If a man behaves like a woman, and a woman like a man how could they be attracted to each other? Virility attracts women and femininity attracts men.... A de-gendering of roles will lead to anarchy.

Such a view is further reinforced by an Islamic Jihad member who suggest that “the woman’s body is a trap that swerves man’s attention from his duty. Islam clothing recommendations are meant to protect her from man’s weakness.” A PFLP female member perhaps most eloquently describes the predicament she faces as a Muslim communist woman in the community where she lives and which is currently under Hammas control. Her lengthy quote deserves to be reproduced here: According to their fundamentalist view, the place of a woman is at home. I am also a communist, and even more threatening to them, I am a communist woman, meaning, less than a prostitute, less than an atheistic male, more a danger to them than a Zionist soldier ... As a non-believer Palestinian woman I am a threat to Islamic men’s own chauvinistic self-perceptions and perceptions of the social and political order. As a free woman, I represent a dangerous example to other Palestinian women. Demanding sexual equality and equal political participation means delegitimizing their monopoly over power both in society and in the family in which a woman’s status is less than her son’s. As a communist, my perception of women is antithetical to Islamic perception and opposed to Islamic prescriptions ... Claiming that a woman is first and foremost a person, as legitimate as anybody else, and that she can choose to bear a child to the man of her choice means that she can dispossess men of their fatherhood and of their power over her. This is much more sacrilegious than being a prostitute because, first, at least a prostitute is expected to be ashamed of what she is doing; and second, because she still retains her status of fulfilling a sexual function, she is still submitted to men’s appetites. As an atheistic communist women, not only I am not ashamed of my own way of living, but proud of it. My body and my womb are mine and I claim the right to do with them whatever I want ... This is intolerable in the religious frame of mind. That’s why I am in greater danger than any other PFLP comrade or communist man.

Although it is clear that such views of gender relations are informed by enduring cultural traditions, we think that they also ought to be considered within the context of the other dimensions of the terrorist discourse reviewed above, especially those pertaining to Otherness, power-strength, authority, obedience, and hierarchies. In our view, the relation between negative attitudes towards women, pathological hatred and authoritarianism stems from the terrorist’s extremely conformist conceptualization of “Otherness.” As long as an exclusionary attitude finds its justification in culture, it will be adopted opportunistically by certain individuals. Conclusions: Expressive Terrorism The quantitative analysis of social psychological tests completed by terrorists suggests that they share significant tendencies that we organize with the concept of pathological hatred. Wanting to hear what the voice of pathological hatred sounds like beyond statistical regression coefficients, we conducted and analyzed semi50


structured interviews with fifty-seven terrorists. Our analysis of their interviews suggests that, regardless of their gender, political affiliation, religious orientation, or ethnicity, terrorists verbalize significant similar themes, that these themes articulate those psychosocial dispositions, perceptions, and motivations uncovered by Adorno’s research on the Authoritarian Personality as well as a complex of related tendencies we organize with the concept of “pathological hatred.” To reiterate what we suggested above, the problem of terrorism requires multidisciplinary approaches which would investigate the micro, meso, and macro forces which shape this phenomenon. Accordingly, while empirical research at the micro social and psychological levels provides but particular pieces of the puzzle, these pieces are nonetheless as necessary as those contributed by other disciplines and levels of analysis. As we suggested, while legions of individuals unfortunately experience similar oppressive political, social, economic, cultural and territorial conditions, only a selected few will follow the terrorist path to resolve those. In light of the meaningful differences which characterize today’s terrorism, we wanted to explore the possible psychological factors which might explain one’s commitment to such an enterprise which—as we have suggested—seems to become increasingly irrational. If contemporary terrorism is indeed more motivated by expressive needs than by rational-political aims, it seems that different strategies might be called for in both the proactive and reactive engagement with this phenomenon. Although lack of funding has limited this research to a comparison between Jewish and Palestinian terrorists, we hope to expand our research efforts to terrorist and fundamentalist organizations that operate in other regions of the world. Besides verifying whether pathological hatred is replicated in these other groups, such an expanded analysis would also assess the extent to which some, or other social psychological tendencies constituting pathological hatred might be significantly different in terrorist groups that are culturally dissimilar. A preliminary analysis7 suggests that American terrorists constitute an important terrain for future research as they seem to articulate the patterns found in Middle Eastern groups.

Appendix A The MMPI-2 Test This test has a long tradition in psychological research and has repeatedly demonstrated its validity and reliability in thousands of research both in this culture and internationally (Graham, 1990). MMPI-2 tests were translated in Arabic and Hebrew and administered to jailed terrorists. Answers were then coded and analyzed using SPSS computer program to verify for significant patterns among Palestinian terrorists, Jewish terrorists, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist terrorists, and for comparison purposes between terrorists and respective control groups.

Appendix B The PH Scale (“Pathological Hatred”) Developed by the senior author of this paper, this questionnaire aims at exploring social psychological tendencies which the MMPI-2 is insufficiently sensitive to detect. While 49 items measure socialdemographic and organizational variables, the remaining 142 items are inspired by theoretical suggestions about the psychology of terrorism found in the academic literature, and replicate items found in


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Adorno et al.’s work on the Authoritarian Personality (1950), Rokeach’s study on the Fundamentalist Personality (1960), and Turner’s research on the Radical Personality (1971).

(A) Ethnocentrism: Subject’s tendency to agree on items expressing exclusion of the Other based on stereotypes

(B) Authoritarianism and Anti-Humanism: Derived from Adorno et al.’s scale (1950).

1. Puritan Conformism: Rigid adherence to norms and values of the local traditional middleclass. 2. Aggressive Submission and Authoritarian Aggression: Subject’s submissive and uncritical attitudes toward the moral authority of the in-group’s leaders and a tendency to look for, condemn, reject, and punish those who are perceived as violating conventional values and norms. 3. Power and Tenacity: Subject’s preoccupation by ideas of domination-submission, strengthweakness, leading-being led, and identification with power figures. 4. Destructiveness and Cynicism: Generalized hostility towards others. 5. Projectivity: Tendency to believe in an essentially chaotic world and the tendency to project outward unconscious and emotionally-loaded impulses. 6. Sexual Preoccupations: Exaggerated preoccupation with the sexuality of others. 7. Superstition and Stereotypes: Belief in uncontrollable forces determining individual and collective destiny and a tendency to think in rigid categories (reorganized as Internal and External Locus of Control). 8. Anti-Introspection: Tendency to repress expressions of feelings and creative imagination.

(C) Anti-Perspectivism: Refusal or incapacity to see the Other’s actions and psychological orientations as differently motivated than one’s own.

(D) General Fundamentalism: Compulsion to integrate and force others to subject’s system of values and to make him/her/it at least externally identical to one’s own. GF is at least based on a principle of reciprocity: Once the world has been made morally and behaviorally homogeneous, its laws are the same for everybody. GF expresses

1. Manicheism. 2. Intolerance of difference. 3. Non-perspectivist and hostile inability to conceive the Other’s independence from one’s own beliefs and frame of reference without sub/de-humanizing him/her. 4. Fanatical dependency in the belief of the inconceivability for the human to develop a selfmotivated ethical system that does not stem from one’s blind submission to a dogmatic faith, and the ensuing belief that such ethical system must necessarily be evil if based on individual judgment. 5. Sadistic belief in the necessity of suffering and humiliation (especially in children) in order to become morally healthy. 6. Infantilization of women. 7. Belief in learning human values through violence rather than through example and dialogue.

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8. Aggressive fear from a perverting influence of cultural, ethnic, religious, and ideological differences, and the inability to see the potential for cultural enrichment resulting from interaction between individuals articulating different cultural orientations. 9. Inability to see the other’s suffering as undeserving. 10. Illegitimacy of the expression of doubts about dogma. 11. Fearing the mixing of cultures in general.

(E) Exclusionary Fundamentalism: Exclusionary Fundamentalism extols the physical elimination of Others without even wanting to convert him/her. If for General Fundamentalism, the different other remains subhuman as long as s/he has not converted into the subject’s faith, for the Exclusionary Fundamentalism, the Other is completely rejected. S/he can never become “one of us.” Racism is an important aspect of this attitude.

(F) Biophilic vs Necrophilic Attitudes: Items in these two scales were developed from Fromm’s work on the Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973) and To Have or to Be (1976).

1. Biophilic items call upon subject’s agreement to items measuring optimistic attitudes towards life, movement, the present, the future, the belief in the inherent wisdom and sociability of self and humanity in general, andSubject’s refusal to categorize humanity along arbitrary hierarchical lines. Such an orientation can acknowledge one’s supreme sacrifice in the name of one’s values but never the supreme sacrifice of the other. 2. Necrophilic orientations call upon subject’s agreement on items measuring autism, destructiveness, death wish, stagnation, fascination with the past, bitterness and pessimism about human nature, the preference for brutal, violent and expedient solutions to conflicts rather than negotiations and dialogue, the superiority of the letter of the law over the spirit of the law, of nation over society, of class over people, of color over the person.

(G) Gender Role Attitudes: Adapted from Bem’s Androgyny scale (1974)

(H) Intolerance of Ambiguity: Adapted from Budner’s scale (1962).

Appendix C Subjects of Quantitative Research Among those 90 terrorists studied, 65 were Palestinians and 25 were Israeli Jews. Among the Palestinian terrorists, six belonged to Hammas, six to the Islamic Ji’had, 17 to the Palestine Liberation Organization, 16 to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, six to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-GC, three to Abu-Nidal, three to the Palestinian Front for Liberation, and eight to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Of all 65 Palestinian terrorists, 41 were met in prison, 24 were met in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. Among the 25 Israeli Jewish terrorists, ten belonged to Kahana Hay (a fundamentalist group named after his founder, Rabbi Kahana, originally from Brooklyn). Among them, five were met in an Israeli jail, and five were met outside of jail. Twelve Jewish terrorists belonged to the Kach fundamentalist organization (none of them currently incarcerated). Finally, there were three Jewish terrorists that were considered as “freelance” individuals and were met in prison. All of the above shot and killed anonymous and unarmed civilians.


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1.

2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7.

See for example: Kerstetter (1980); Goldman (1987); Horowitz (1977); Howe (1975); Green (1985); Jenkins (1985); Knuston (1980, 1984); Krieger (1977); Kupperman (1977); Laqueur (1990); Lasser (1987); Livingstone (1990); McEwen and Sloan (1979); McFarlane (1986); Mickolus (1977, 1980); Milbank (1976); Miller (1978, 1980); O’Brien (1990); Oots (1990); Pipes (1988); Price (1977); Probst (1991, 1988); Schibley (1990); Schlagheck (1990); Schreiber (1978); Sloan, Karney, and Wise (1978); Sochor (1987); Steinitz (1985); Sulc (1987); U.S. Government Printing Office (1990); Wardlaw (1983); Watson (1976); Wilkins (1992); Wilkinson (1974, 1977, 1990); Wolf (1978); Zawodny (1978). Asherson (1975); Barton (1979); Lador-Lederer (1974); Leiser (1977); Mallison and Mallison (1975); Marshall and Clark (1970); Merari (1978); O’Neill (1974); Paust (1977); Quandt (1990); Green (1978); Sprinzak (1990). Apter (1979); Asherson (1975); Bale (1987); Bell (1981); Bilig (1985); Botstein (1979); Butler (1981); Clark (1983); Corsun (1991); Crenshaw (1990a); Cromer (1988); DeBoer (1979); Dutter (1987); Duvall (1983); Fallah (1981); Fiorillo (1979); Fromkin (1990); Gerner (1990); Gerson (1988); Green (1987); Gurr (1987); Herman and Van der Laan (1980); Ivianski (1977); Jenkins (1985); Khaduri (1988); Merari (1990); Miller (1986); Miller (1988); Morris and Watson (1986); Nedava (1979); Negt (1977); Pisano (1979); Pockrass (1987); Post (1984, 1986); Puchinski (1991); Rappaport (1990); Raufer (1987); Russel and Miller (1977); Salvioni and Stephenson (1985); Schbley (1980);Van Hasssel (1977); Weinberg and Eubank (1987); Yaeger (1991). Bandura (1990); Becker (1981); Brunet (1989); Burchael (1990); Carmichael (1982); Falk (1990); Fitzgerald (1978); Galvin (1983); Gobetz (1987); Gunter (1987); Gutteridge (1990); Hamilton (1977a, 1977b); Heichelman and Hartwig (1983); Jenkins (1980); Johnson (1990); Kaplan (1978, 1981); Laqueur (1990); Leeman (1987); Machan (1987); Mannoni (1992); Michalowski et al. (1988); Moutet and Junod (1984); Olsin (1988); Oots and Wigele (1985); Pearlstein (1991); Post (1987, 1988); Rushworth (1990); Schechterman (1987); Sechaud (1989); Shaw (1986); Stohl (1990); Taylor and Ryan (1988); Tittmar (1992); Turco (1987); Turk (1982); Vinci (1979); Wilkinson (1990); Ziniam (1978). Alleman (1980); Crenshaw (1990b); Friedland and Merari (1985); Gottschalk and Lefebvre (1995); Holton (1978); Horowitz (1977); Jenkins (1981); Kendler (1983); May (1974); Merari and Friedland (1987); Possony (1989); Provizor (1987); Reich (1990); Simmons and Mitch (1985); Walter (1969). Inspired by Bernard Henry-Levy. 1996. La Purete Dangereuse. Paris: Poche (untranslated). Comparative analysis between these interviews and the Unabomber’s manifesto (Gottschalk, Gottschalk, and Simi, 1997) suggests that similar social psychological dispositions are found in these very different texts.

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