What light does Haffner shed on the rise of Hitler and the failure of Weimar? .....
the British government, led by Winston Churchill, put 'Operation Dynamo' into.
The Haberdashers’ History Journal
Timeline 2013/14
Timeline Editorial Team Editor – Jack Lewy Co-Editor – Adam Nash Copy Editor – Alexander Griffith Junior School Editor - Pranav Subhedar Middle School Editor - Trystan Lever Senior School Editor - Max Marlow Trips Editor - Alex Levine
Staff Editor – Ian St. John
A note from the Editor… Some would argue that history repeats itself. This year’s edition of Timeline, the Haberdashers’ History Journal, both celebrates and abhors this fact, as we explore different accounts of historical events which seem to recur throughout the generations. We will examine conflict, which seems to pertain despite social progression: Harry Mistry writes an account of Germany in WWII, David Verghese offers an explanatory article about the end of the Ottoman Empire, and Pranav Subhedar questions human nature in his history of Leviathan. The front cover of the publication tells a similar story, an infamous yet intriguing artistic piece from revolutionary Russia –which is subtly suggesting that the red wedge of the red army is to defeat the Whites in the Civil War. Thank you to my Timeline team, who so readily responded when I needed help putting together this edition of Haberdashers’ renowned history magazine. Please sit back, and enjoy this year’s publication. Jack Lewy, Editor
Contents Historical insights The Holodomor: Logic, Legacy and Legality – Jack Lewy The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire – David Verghese Why did the American colonists win the War of Independence 1775-1783? – Jake Sacks The Mighty Vikings – Curing Myths – Shay Ahluwalia Dunkirk – Triumph or Disaster? – Max Marlow A history of War Memorials – Alex Szlezinger Biographical What motivated Thomas Hobbes to write Leviathan? – Pranav Subhedar Vernon Blake: Gearing Pioneer, Painter, Philosopher, Polymath – Alexander Griffith Book Reviews Book Review: In the Ruins of the Reich – Harry Mistry Land of the Seven Rivers, A Brief History of India’s Geography – Dr St. John Robert K. Massie’s Peter the Great – His life and world – Pranav Subhedar Critical Review of Sir Robert Peel by Norman Gash – Daniel Gold What light does Haffner shed on the rise of Hitler and the failure of Weimar? – Peter Sequira Trips The Battlefields Trip – Alexander Vilardo and Edward Day HABS History Trip to Berlin and Dresden – Alex Levine and Harry Mistry
Historical Insights
The Holodomor: Logic, Legacy and Legality. Our Editor, Jack Lewy, investigates a forgotten famine.
Many aspects of history have been forgotten over time, this has never been truer than when considering the barbarity of Joseph Stalin, whose atrocities successive Russian governments had significant politically oriented reasons to keep hidden in history. However this was undermined by Premier Gorbachev’s principles of Glasnost and Perestroika in the 1980s, which introduced heaps of incriminating information into the public domain, furthering the case which suggests that Stalin was one of the most destructive men in recent history. So why is it that many Western governments today still refute the Holodomor’s credibility as genocide worthy of international attention? The incident which I refer to as the ‘Holodomor’ occurred throughout 1932-33 in the Ukraine, and was a forced starvation of the Ukrainian people through an intentional lack of food provisions by Soviet central government , leading to the unprecedented peacetime deaths of millions of innocent citizens. The reasons for the famine have been the subject of much debate over the past seventy years. One possible reason was the impact of the Soviet Union’s industrialisation which brought with it some significant economic problems-the Soviet’s had no notion of civil liberty or utilitarianism so preferred starving a small section of the population to having the entire population suffer a little. It can also be argued in a more sinister light that Stalin used the famine to attack aspects of Ukrainian nationalism, because the populist feelings of national self-determination in the region were becoming much more prevalent. If this mass-murder was an attempt to eliminate an apparent form of political expression, then it falls under the title of genocide. This is where the contention lies in history: many nations and international bodies refute that the reason behind the Holodomor was the elimination of nationalist sentiments, and therefore refute that this was genocide. Irrespective of the status as genocide, the Holodomor was undoubtedly an atrocity denied my many. In the 1930s Soviet leadership undertook extensive efforts to prevent the spread of any information about the famine by keeping all communication between different areas top secret. Outside the Soviet Union, governments of the West adopted a passive attitude toward the famine, although most of them had become aware of the true suffering in Ukraine through confidential diplomatic channels. In November 1933, the United States, under its new president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, even chose to formally recognise Stalin’s Communist government and also negotiated a sweeping new trade agreement. The following year, the pattern of denial in the West culminated with the admission of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations. Stalin’s Five Year Plan for the modernisation of the Soviet Union depended largely on the purchase of massive amounts of manufactured goods and technology from Western nations. Those nations were unwilling to disrupt lucrative trade agreements with the Soviet Union in order to pursue the matter of the famine. The information was so well hidden from Western media that even Walter Duranty denied its existence, the winner of the 1932 Pulitzer Prize for journalism due to his work on Russia. More recent figures such as Boris Borisov, Mario Sousa and Jeff Coplon have also claimed that the Holodmor was either a fabrication or that its death toll was highly exaggerated. Therefore the Holodomor is extremely important, not just for its direct impact on millions of lives but also as representative of a political problem which has been present throughout history. This problem was expressed best by Stalin himself: “A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic.” When considering historical incidents, it is very easy to forget the magnitude and forget the significant impact an atrocity can have on lives. The casual disregard shown by Western powers and influential figures emphasises this point, obviously the human condition finds it difficult to empathise when not directly engaged with an issue. Stalin himself did not see the children starving in the streets of Kharkiv, but was instead signing papers from his comfortable office in Moscow. There is a strong sense of double standards which continues throughout Russian history, and this is just one very clear example of those double standards but unfortunately with devastating consequences.
The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire, David Verghese explores the history of the last Romans:
The Ottoman Empire was undoubtedly one of the most important empires ever to have existed, and certainly the most colourful. At its height it extended from Algeria in the west to Kuwait in the east; Yemen in the south to Hungary in the north. This massive, multi-ethnic empire contained Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Armenians and Jews; it lasted from the fall of Constantinople in 1453 until its eventual dismemberment in the aftermath of the First World War. Yet surprisingly few pages are devoted to this monumental entity which affected European and world history throughout its existence. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Empire was its end. This proud, apparently strong entity simply collapsed at the end of the war, heralding the end of the Caliphate, the end of the Ottoman dynasty which headed it, and the beginning of a republican Turkey bereft of empire. But the end of the Ottoman Empire was only the culmination of a long line of events, the inevitable conclusion of which was the end of the Empire. Indeed, for the last hundred or so years of its existence it was clear that the Empire was doomed. There are a variety of reasons for this; the downfall of such a large state can never be ascribed to a single factor. But it is certain that, in finding why it occurred, we may learn much about the dynamics and life cycles of empires like it. The first key reason for the fall of the empire was the nationalism present within all of the empire’s territories. The vast span of the empire ended up being one of its greatest weaknesses. Although Anatolia provided a solid block of ethnically homogenous Turks, there was no linguistic or cultural unifying factor within the rest of the empire. Many of the territories had long and proud histories as independent nations – Greece, for instance, is still (despite recent incidents) considered to be a cradle of Western civilisation. These nations were not happy at Ottoman domination – in particular the idea of Christians being ruled by Muslims. In Christian lands the Ottomans actively maintained this distinction between subject and ruler by imposing an odious levy – the jizya – upon non-Muslim peoples as a “protection tax”, as well as having numerous restrictions upon the rights of Christians. Christians (or Jews, for that matter) could not own a horse, could not raise their head higher than that of a Muslim, and were made to move into the street if they came across a Muslim. Even in Arab countries (countries which were religiously identical but ethnically different), there was an obvious and large difference between the locals and the Turks. The Turks acted as absentee landlords; much of the land of countries like Iraq or Syria were held in fief to the Emperor as Timar, and the Arab fellaheen were often atrociously treated, whilst the Turks cultivated a ruling class of Arab elites. All of this formed a widespread sense of anger against the Ottomans; this, combined with an acute sense of the ethnic differences, turned into strong nationalism. From 1803 and the departure of the Greeks, to Egypt’s takeover by the British in 1882, almost all major nationalities within the Empire left. The Ottoman Empire as a multinational empire could not exist when the will of the conquered was strongly against the Ottomans, and the rulers did little to help. This incipient nationalism in the non-Turkish parts of the empire was aggravated by the increasing viciousness and incompetence of imperial officials. An empire as large as the Ottoman Empire was an administrative nightmare, and the idea of an absolute monarchy was impossible to reconcile with the rule of 30 million human beings. Therefore the empire was highly devolved. Individual ethnic groups such as Greeks, Jews or Serbs were organised into millets of ethnically homogenous individuals, which had autonomy over most areas of life. Although this may have appeared to be a good idea at first, it swiftly fuelled the fires of nationalism. Having tasted freedom in the form of this autonomy, they were not content to acquiesce to this semi-independence. The Ottoman response to this was an inevitable sharp reaction. After “national awakenings” in many millets, several ethnic groups became more vociferous in demanding autonomy; the Armenians, the Assyrians and the Jews in particular. As World War One began, the Turkish authorities threw in their lot with Germany, placing themselves against Russia and France. These millets, which had
previously been an irritation, became a liability. Thus these ethnic groups were massively persecuted; in the case of the Armenians, there was almost certainly an attempt at genocide, with thousands of Armenians being slaughtered, starved or driven into the desert. After such persecution, it became impossible that the Ottoman Empire could ever include more than one ethnic group. It appears to be a sad but true rule of thumb that an empire which stops expanding is doomed. Throughout history we can find examples of this, and the Ottomans were no exception. The history of the Caliphate can be divided into three rough sections; a period of rapid, terrifying growth from 1453 (the conquest of Constantinople) to Battle of Vienna in 1683; a long period of little or no change from 1683 until the independence of Greece in 1803; and then a precipitous decline until its eventual end in 1923. During its growth – the period in which it was actively following an expansionist policy – it was undoubtedly the most important force in Europe. Its forces marched to the gates of Vienna, and it rivalled the Hapsburgs for supremacy in Eastern Europe – in fact, it would easily have dominated the Hapsburgs had it not been for the timely intervention of the Poles. Because it was a threat, it was considered credible by the Christian powers and thus it was not threatened or attacked with a view to destruction. Moreover, because there was an expansionist impetus, the Ottoman military was forced to remain up-to-date with the rest of the world. At this time there was little difference between European and non-European armies (excluding the isolated Native Americans). But the Sultanate eventually began to stagnate. After the failure of Vienna, Emperors began to concentrate less on military conquest, and more on worldly pleasures. The power of the Imperial Harem and its attendant eunuchs grew massively; court intrigues embroiled Istanbul. And as the metropole became more decadent, this provided an opportunity for ambitious governors of the provinces to take advantage of the effective power vacuum. Yet despite this the central government failed to do anything; a sense of lethargy pervaded the Empire. This also meant military stagnation. Whilst Europe advanced exponentially in ways of killing as many people as possible, the Ottoman Army became disorganised, mutinous and incompetent. A valiant attempt to reform it in the aftermath of 1803 succeeded to some extent – Turkey’s performance in the First World War was, per capita, much more impressive than her Axis partners. But the damage had been done. Although the old British doggerel “Whatever happens we have got, the Maxim gun and they have not” was not entirely true in the case of the Ottoman Empire, it was not a first-class army. The long period of stagnation meant that the th attempts to recapture past glory in the 19 century were doomed to failure.
An external reason came from the imperialist ambitions of the European Great Powers. During the period of the decline of th the Ottoman Empire (the 19 century), the world was being divvied up into colonies. Almost every non-European country east of the meridian was conquered; the only survivors were those whose fate could not be decided (Morocco or China), who acted as buffer states (Siam or Afghanistan) or were genuinely able to resist conquest (Ethiopia being a solitary example, possibly joined with Persia). In the midst of this imperial world stood the Ottoman Empire – the link between Asia and Africa. Its position was hugely strategic for a variety of reasons. For Britain, it was essential to have a foothold in the Empire to protect both India and Africa (the Empire abutted the Suez Canal and the Arabian Sea, both part of the vital imperial trade route). The Germans had their eyes on the Ottoman Empire to augment their meagre possessions in Africa. Tsarist Russia wanted a warm-water port on the Mediterranean. Even some countries which were decidedly not “Great” had plans for the Empire. Greece desired to finish its irredentist program by conquering the remaining parts of the Empire which were majority Greek (mainly in coastal areas of Anatolia). Italy eventually took Libya from the Ottomans, and desired more power in the Middle East. The various colonial powers became more bellicose as time went on; as mentioned, Italy seized Libya without much of a fight, whilst Britain had de facto ruled Egypt since 1882. Britain had been slowly taking over Arab possessions such as Aden, Kuwait and Bahrain, deftly manipulating tribal loyalties to ensure that various strategic points in the Persian Gulf and beyond were British protectorates. Even Germany had been intervening in the Empire heavily; the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway was a thinly disguised attempt to gain a foothold in Arabia; the treaty gave the Kaiser sovereignty over the railway, and German military advisers were training the Ottoman th Army. Having already lost much of its’ land and strength throughout the 19 century, it was little surprise that the Great Powers decided to dismember it after the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War One when the Empire was on its’ knees. Only the valiant efforts of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk saved Anatolia itself from conquest – although it too was divided into occupation zones, a war of independence liberated Turkey, at the cost of turning it into a pseudo-fascist society which then proceeded to turn itself into a mono-ethnic state through the thinly veiled ethnic cleansing of Greeks from Izmir and Asia Minor. The Ottoman Emperors liked to think of themselves as the direct successors of the Roman Empire, tracing a direct line from Rome to Byzantium to the Sultanate. The Romans too were once lords and masters of the world; the Romans too faded away to a dismal end and are remembered now only in history books. Edward Gibbon once said of the Romans; “instead of inquiring why the Roman empire was destroyed, we should rather be surprised that it had subsisted so long.” Perhaps the same could be said about the Ottoman Empire; proud, magnificent, glorious but ultimately doomed to failure. No state could resist the combination of outside imperialist ambitions and internal incompetence & indifference. But we can be sure that throughout their former domains, the Ottomans will always be remembered.
Why did the American colonists win the War of Independence 1775-1783? Jake Sacks describes the events leading to the American Revolution:
Great Britain was one of the world’s greatest powers in 1775, controlling a huge empire stretching across the world which included countries such as India, South Africa and Canada. Here are some key reasons as to why the American colonists won the War of Independence: The first reason was the pure lack of proficiency of the British Army. With a fighting force of only 36,000 men, it was physically impossible for the British to conquer and occupy the vast tracts of land that made up the thirteen colonies of the original Union. From this point alone it should have become clear that the war was going to become difficult. To make matters worse, leadership of British troops was very poor. General Thomas Gag e, in command of British forces in North America when the rebellion started, was criticised for being too lenient, allowing the rebels to take an early advantage. A lot of the potential commanders turned down appointment due to the conflicting views on the matter, making it even harder for the British cause. The redcoats (British soldiers) also had very little self-discipline: gambling, looting, promiscuity and heavy drinking were common problems among all ranks alike. Communication was a huge factor contributing to the triumph of the colonists. The British supply line stretched 3000 + miles across the Atlantic Ocean. Troops, money, ammunition, supplies, and other war materials had to be shipped into America from outside, creating not only extra cost but a serious time lag as well, that the British simply could not afford. For the colonists these items were more readily available from local sources, granting them a crucial advantage. Furthermore, communications between British commanders and their political masters in London were subject to the same problem; it could take anything up to six months for letters, dispatches, or orders to reach the intended recipient, and thereby it could be up to a year for a reply to be received. Consequently over this time period the information sent would be out-dated and most likely not applicable to the situation, causing serious difficulties for the British cause. A third issue was the fact that the British seriously underestimated the Loyalists (Americans supporting the British) in terms of both importance and loyalty to the crown. Approximately a third (at least) of the colonists were Loyalists, but neither the British army nor government ever really trusted them fully. They tended to see all American colonists as rebels, real or potential. Colonists were not regarded as suitable material for the regular army. It took 3 years to fully train regular soldiers, who were subject to fierce discipline; something that the British saw as close to impossible for colonists. So, the potential of Loyalist support was never fully exploited. Supplies, soldiers, intelligence, all could have been gathered in much greater amounts than those actually achieved if the British had fully embraced all the Loyalist support that existed. One of the most important reasons that led to Colonist victory was the foreign help they received. Compared to the Americans, the British had no major allies. The rebels received support from France, Netherlands and Spain, whilst Britain only received troops from small German states. Spain's involvement resulted in the expulsion of British armies from West Florida, securing the American southern flank. French involvement proved decisive with their much needed provision of a navy to challenge the British; a French naval victory just outside Chesapeake Bay led to a siege by combined French and Continental armies that forced a second British army to surrender at Yorktown, Virginia in 1781. Furthermore, declarations of war against Britain by France, Spain, and the Netherlands globalised the conflict, diverting British resources away from America.
Finally, Lord North, British Prime Minister and architect of British policy, was incompetent. He gave his field commanders unrealistic objectives, ignoring the time delay in receiving clear information about the military situation, and insufficient resources with which to achieve even sensible strategic goals. As a result, there was considerable opposition to the war in Parliament from the very beginning, which compounded North's problems, as seen previously with the reluctance of generals to take command of the British Army. For all the reasons mentioned above the British, previously seen as the world’s greatest power, failed to overpower the colonists in the American War of Independence that ultimately resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Paris, which officially recognised the United States as a sovereign nation.
The Mighty Vikings – Curing Myths, Shay Ahluwalia questions the legitimacy of Viking stereotypes
The Vikings have strangely been depicted throughout history as a barbaric race of ruthless marauders, pillaging, raping and burning everything they saw. However, there has been a gradual shift in our view of their history, with other aspects being shed light on. So who really were the Vikings? What must be recognised as undeniable is that their culture has left perhaps one of the most enduring and fascinating marks on Britain. Usually when we think of the ancient Vikings, it is the notorious image of bloodthirsty raiders, that springs to mind. Rarely are we given a true insight into the captivating and vast culture that rests behind this portrait. The story of the Vikings in Britain is one of conquest, expulsion, extortion and reconquest. Their lasting legacy was the formation of the independent kingdoms of England and Scotland. The Vikings were the original jack-of-all-trades; explorers, warriors, merchants, and pirates, who raided, traded, explored and settled in wide areas of Europe, Asia and the North Atlantic islands from the late 8th to the mid11th century. Famed for their longships, they travelled as far east as Constantinople and the Volga River in Russia, and as far west as Iceland, Greenland, and Newfoundland, and as far south as Nekor. This period of Viking expansion – known as the Viking Age – forms a major part of the medieval history of Scandinavia, Great Britain, Ireland and the rest of Medieval Europe. Popular conceptions of the Vikings often differ from the complex picture that emerges from archaeology and written sources. A romanticised picture of Vikings as Germanic noble savages began to take root in the 18th century, and this developed and became widely propagated during the 19th-century Viking revival. The typically highly clichéd representation of the Vikings as violent brutes or intrepid adventurers owes much to the modern Viking myth which had taken shape by the early 20th century. This is not the true story of the mighty Vikings. In truth, most of the people who lived in the Nordic Countries during this period were not Vikings. The term Viking when used correctly refers only to those men who went out on raids. The general people were Norse and not as we know them. They were highly skilled craftsmen, peaceful brokers, industrious farmers and burly hunters. They were democrats who founded the world’s oldest surviving Parliament while Britain was still mired in feudalism. They were traders whose economic network stretched from today’s Iraq all the way to the Canadian Arctic. They were master metalworkers, fashioning exquisite jewellery from silver, gold and bronze. Above all, they were intrepid explorers whose restless hearts brought them to North America some 500 years before Christopher Columbus. This all contributed to the strongest elements of Viking life, religious beliefs and family conservation rather than bloodshed as we have come to perceive it. The myth attributed to the Vikings extends further. They didn’t wear the horned helmets so popularly portrayed in the fiction of Beowulf and How to Train Your Dragon. And while rape and pillage were part of the agenda, they were a small part of Norse life. They weren’t Christian until the late 10th century, yet they were not irreligious. Instead they worshipped a pantheon of Gods like the Greeks and Romans, including Odin, Thor
and Freya. These have incredibly remained in our culture as the names of the days of our week – Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. They were also far more sophisticated than the berserker image would let on. Their oral literature included epic poems and sagas such as Skáldskaparmal and Heimskringla, just as vast in drama and scope as the works of Homer. These in turn have hugely influenced works such as Jules Verne’s Journey to the Centre of the Earth and William Shakespeare’s Hamlet, which is of course set in the Kingdom of Denmark and itself based on a Norse legend composed by Saxo Grammaticus in Latin around 1200 AD. Furthermore, the Norse relished a challenge and were highly skilled at games like Backgammon and Chess, which they amused themselves with during the evenings and throughout the long, dark winters. Another common misrepresentation of the Norse that must be dismissed is the use of human skulls as drinking cups. This developed in tandem with the bloodthirsty image attributed to the Norse yet is also wholly distorted. Similarly, the image of the Norse as wild-haired, dirty savages is also untrue. In reality, they were actually considered excessively clean due to their custom of bathing every Saturday, using the natural hot springs as baths, and combing their hair often. They were the original gentlemen. Most importantly, the Norse made the finest ships of the age and these were consistent with the image we have come to know, of colossal, sturdy, wooden longboats mounted by the head of a dragon to frighten away sea monsters and spirits. Sleek and streamlined, powered by both sails and oars, quick and highly manoeuvrable, the boats could operate equally well in shallow waterways and on the open seas. The Norse used these magnificent crafts to search far and wide for luxury goods like silk and glass. This was the greatest Norse passion – exploring. Though they didn't just pillage and run; sometimes they came to stay. Dublin became a Viking town; so did Lincoln and York, along with much of the surrounding territory in northern and eastern England. In Scotland, Vikings maintained their language and political links to their homeland well into the 15th century. Their other hugely profitable forays around the world were repeated annually as the raiders expanded. Incredibly cunning was the Viking Erik the Red who following exile from Iceland discovered Greenland. In a show of early salesmanship, he successfully convinced the people of Iceland that Greenland held great opportunity knowing that any thriving settlement in Greenland would need as many people as possible. He explained that “people would be attracted to go there if it had a favourable name”. Thus Greenland was founded on the basis of an ingenious con. Even more ironic, as Greenland's overlord, Erik the Red took a cut of virtually everyone's profits from the export of furs and ivory. They truly were the Mighty Vikings.
Dunkirk – Triumph or Disaster? Senior School Editor Max Marlow looks back at the events of Dunkirk
In 1940, Hitler had invaded Holland, Belgium and France within the space of two months. The speed at which the operation was going at was all part of the Germans’ tactics, so called ‘Blitzkrieg’, meaning ‘lightning war’. The advance was so quick that parts of the French army and the British Expeditionary Force were caught by surprise and pushed back into Dunkirk, a seaport that is located between the Belgian coast and Calais. The entire British Army needed to get away as soon as possible or there was a risk that over 300,000 troops would be lossed, so on May 27th 1940, the British government, led by Winston Churchill, put ‘Operation Dynamo’ into action. The plan was to evacuate the troops to Britain by ship, but many varieties of transportation were in addition, including fishing boats and pleasure streamers. In the end most of the soldiers were evacuated. People wonder if the whole operation was a success or if it went terribly wrong due to what occurred throughout the course of these events.
Triumph? When Churchill had put his plans into action, nobody thought he could evacuate as many as he did, and that itself is a triumph. In a time when there was no hope, a small change in plan made a massive difference. This action saved the life of thousands. The story of Dunkirk hit the media with an extremely positive response, raising the hopes of many civilians as Britain lived another day. A quote from the BBC six o’clock news bulletin on May 31st 1940, “Bloody Marvellous” contrasts the casualties counted to the bravery and patriotic attitude shown on the beaches of Dunkirk. It was a triumph to bring hope back to the people of Britain who were uncertain about the reasoning of war. This triumph in the media was also a good way of encouraging young people to join the army as people became proud of the idea of doing ‘their duty’. Although, the reliability of the media can be questioned as they want the people to believe they care about the country so in a way they are forced to praise the events happening on the beaches of Dunkirk when they may believe the soldiers don’t deserve it at all. It has appeared as a miracle that they managed to fit so many people into the little space allowed by the small boats on offer, but although there was a great avoiding of further causalities, the events that happened at Dunkirk can also be seen as a ‘disaster’.
Disaster? With the troops evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk, Hitler had scored a crushing victory. Over 1,000,000 Dutch, Belgian, French and British prisoners-of-war has been taken in and 1,200 field guns, 1,250 anti-aircraft
guns, 11,000 machine guns and 75,000 vehicles were left on the beaches for Hitler to take in the German artillery. Not only did they lose through kind, but they lost economically too. Churchill’s plan to evacuate as many as possible can also be seen to have failed as a million were left behind, with German fighter planes slaughtering the victims at Dunkirk waiting to be rescued. There was not a single British reporter at Dunkirk at the time, so the government had to somehow tell those at home what was going on. It was obvious the country’s morale was to be kept at a high and so in way, what people were hearing of Dunkirk back in Britain was partially lies. Therefore, the information given through the media evidently cannot be a reliable source. One could further argue that the only triumph of moving people out of Dunkirk was down to luck, as many Navy ships were sunk and as said before, it was a miracle so many could fit into the boats there. The order was put to chaos of who gets on the boats first and sources tell officers were prepared to kill other officers of the same background for a place of survival. In an overall conclusion, it is hard to see which side is the more reliable, Dunkirk being a triumph or a disaster, as we can argue the saving of lives and the increase in morale causing Britain to win the war was good enough to suffice the heavy economic and strategically miss-placed loss of the French and British Troops.
A history of War Memorials Alex Szlezinger reports about one lasting legacy of WW1
Until the twentieth century, the British public did not give much thought to its war dead (in the Napoleonic wars, dead soldiers were dumped in mass graves). Instead, victories were commemorated by erecting a statue of the commanding officer paid for by public donations (for example, Nelson’s Column). When the Second Boer War ended in 1902, some memorials were built, but this was insignificant compared to the 37,000 war memorials that were raised to commemorate the dead of the Great War. During the Great War, it became clear that statues of the generals (who had become controversial figures) would not satisfy the grieving nation. In the first place, so many people had died (956,703 British and Commonwealth troops) that there were few families untouched by grief. Many had been widowed or orphaned by the war and disfigured and disabled soldiers were to be seen everywhere. Early on in the war, the government had abandoned the idea of bringing corpses home for burial and it was important to give their families a focus for their grief. This was even more important for the enormous number of dead whose bodies were lost or unidentifiable since they would have no grave at all. In summer 1918, a temporary memorial was put up in Hyde Park which was hugely popular, with over 100,000 people coming to see it during the first week. When the Peace Treaty was signed with Germany in June 1919, the government had not planned a war memorial in London. However, the French invited Britain to a victory parade in Paris to include a march past a pillar, known as a cenotaph (meaning empty grave) incorporating a raised coffin to represent the war dead. Lloyd George, the prime minister, thought this was an excellent idea and he asked Edwin Lutyens, the celebrated architect, to make a similar structure in London for a parade to be held on 19 July 1919, five days after the Paris event. The Peace Parade (as it became known) was regarded as a success and after the parade had passed, widows and families covered the base of the Cenotaph with flowers. The original idea was that, as in Paris, the cenotaph would be temporary, but hundreds of thousands of people came to see it. The government wanted to dismantle it (by 1920, it was rotting) but there was a public outcry to keep it. Lutyens later wrote, “Time passed and the plain fact emerged and grew stronger every hour that the Cenotaph was what the people wanted and that they wanted to have the wood and plaster original replaced by an identical memorial in lasting stone. It was a mass feeling too deep to express itself more fitly than by the piles of ever fresh flowers which loving hands placed on the Cenotaph every day”. As a result, Lutyens was commissioned to turn the temporary structure of wood and plaster into a permanent memorial. Rudyard Kipling, a member of the War Graves Commission and whose son had died in the war, suggested the phrase, “Our Glorious Dead” which was inscribed on both the temporary and permanent Cenotaphs. To modern eyes, this may seem to glorify war, but the strength of the public’s feeling is shown by the following, which was proposed (but rejected) as an alternative to Kipling’s words:“To the ever living memory of the men and women who, in the late five years long war, begun and prolonged by the Germans in wanton lust of power and plunder and with bestial savageness and treachery till then incredible, sacrificed their lives for the life and honour of Britain and mankind, to each and all of them in gratitude and pride, we dedicate and consecrate this shrine.”
King George V unveiled the permanent Cenotaph exactly two years after the Armistice. In a ceremony full of emotion, the King led a grateful nation in paying homage to its war dead. The ceremony was (and is) repeated each year, both at the Cenotaph and at local war memorials. In 1920, wearing poppies became another way of remembering the war dead which allowed the British Legion to use the money raised from the sale of poppies to help the war injured and the bereaved. The government may have felt that there was no further need for national war memorials. However, in other countries, governments had created a tomb of the Unknown Soldier and there was a general feeling, whipped up by the national press, that Britain should do the same. The government soon relented and, unlike the Cenotaph, chose a religious site, Westminster Abbey. This emphasised the importance of the sacrifice, since the lowly, unknown soldier was buried alongside monarchs and prime ministers. The ceremony itself was attended by the King, Prime Minister and cabinet and the generals and some 40,000 people filed past the tomb later that day. In the meantime, local committees (usually chaired by the mayor) were formed to build local memorials. There was a feeling that a memorial would not be “worthy” unless it was financed by locally (which was just as well as the government had no intention of paying for them). Raising the money proved to be much harder than anticipated and in many areas, the memorial had to be scaled down to fit the money raised. There was much for the local committees to decide. First, they had to decide the form of the memorial. Many people wanted to build utilitarian memorials. A local example is at Aldenham where a War Memorial Hall was built and other examples include sponsoring hospital beds or wards, clocks, fountains and sports fields. The committees had to decide what the memorial would look like and where it would be sited. Many communities used a smaller version of the Cenotaph or the Cross of Sacrifice that had been designed by Reginald Blomfield for war cemeteries, but others used their own designs. The committees compiled a list of soldiers to be placed on the memorial (this required difficult judgements like whether soldiers who died of influenza should be included). They also had to decide whether ranks should be shown on the memorial (most were not). Committees also had to decide what inscription should be placed on the memorial. All committees stressed the bravery and self-sacrifice of the soldiers and many wanted to emphasise that those who survived were under an obligation to remember those died. At Radlett, the memorial quotes Henry V, “Awake remembrance of these valiant dead”, to make this point. Although we often think of the war as the pointless waste of a generation, in the 1920s, it was thought that the war had been fought for important principles that were often referred to in the memorial. At Golders Green, for example, on the memorial clock tower that was built in 1923, the four faces bear the inscription “Honour, Courage, Loyalty, and Justice”, combining the qualities displayed by the men with the principle (justice) for which they were fighting. In 1928, General Sir Douglas Haig, who had led the British Expeditionary Force, died. His funeral was probably the largest public gathering in Britain between the wars. In the following year, there was a wave of literature that was critical of the war including Siegfried Sassoon’s war memoirs, Journey's End by R.C. Sheriff; and Remarque’s All Quiet on The Western Front. These helped to establish the notion that the war had been a pointless slaughter. Most of the war memorials had been built by 1929, but many had not (the last memorial
before World War 2 was unveiled in summer 1939). In the 1930s, reflecting the public mood, inscriptions dropped the references to principles for which the war had been fought and instead emphasised the gravity of the sacrifice that had been made. The way in which the Great War was commemorated set the pattern for the way in which the dead of subsequent wars are remembered. The Cenotaph service was expanded to cover all of the twentieth century wars and the names of the dead from those wars were simply added to the Great War memorials. Even where new memorials were built (eg the memorial at St Paul's to the firemen who died in the Blitz), they largely took the form of those built in the 1920s. Although the current Remembrance Day ceremony does not have the raw emotion and poignancy of that first ceremony in 1920, it is important not to underestimate its political significance. In 1930, the government tried to make some relatively minor changes to the annual ceremony at the Cenotaph. It was accused of disrespect and the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, was forced to apologise in Parliament. Some fifty years later, in 1981, Michael Foot, then leader of the opposition, was accused of the same transgression when he attended the ceremony wearing a “donkey jacket”. Even today, the ceremony at the Cenotaph is one of the few occasions that the prime minister and his cabinet cannot miss. Bibliography Memorials of the Great War in Britain: The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance by Alex King Lest We Forget: How We Remember the Dead edited by Maggie Andrews, Charles Bagot Jewitt), Nigel Hunt (Chapter 24, The Cenotaph and the Spirit of Remembrance) Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars by George L. Mosse
Biographical Articles
What motivated Thomas Hobbes to write Leviathan, Junior School Editor Pranav Subhedar examines the history of philosophy:
First published in 1651, Hobbes’ masterpiece Leviathan is the culmination of over a decade of development in the author’s 1 arguments in relation to what Hobbes called ‘the science of morality’ . Using some common themes of political th philosophy in the 17 century, Hobbes bases his argument upon the selfish demeanour of man in nature, wherein internal 2 conflict and conflict was not uncommon. Indeed, Hobbes is known to have said “Fear and I were both born twins” and there is a convincing argument to suggest that Leviathan was born out of an inherent fear of a reversion to a ‘state of war’, as he called it – most thinkers referred to this as the state of nature. This interpretation naturally leads onto Hobbes’ possible eagerness to influence the Engagement Controversy; this was a debate over the legitimacy of Parliamentary rule and it seems (at least superficially) that Hobbes endorses Parliament’s rule for the interests of public peace. Alternatively, it can be argued that Leviathan was written with the same objective as Machiavelli’s Il Principe – as a guideline of how to govern. Observing aspects of Hobbes’ life gives another interesting argument; one could argue that Hobbes’ motivation for writing any sort of philosophy was to use scientific proofs in the style of Galileo to provide a philosophical proof. It will be argued that this last motivation is the most convincing and provides the best explanation for why Hobbes decided to write Leviathan. To arrive at a credible conclusion, it must be that any possible motivation must be coherent to both the context of the time and the text. The reason for this is that, if a motivation is relevant in terms of just the context of the time (i.e. if it is a motivation which most th 17 century philosophers had for writing their works) but has little to no evidence to suggest this in terms of the text, then it cannot be said to be valid because it is not a view which is attributable to Leviathan. In the same way, if the text provides plenty of evidence to suggest that Hobbes’ motivation was ‘x’, but this motivation is inconsistent with Hobbes’ attitude and beliefs, then this cannot be valid either as this is merely a result of a misunderstanding or an incorrect interpretation of the text. Hence, the aim of this essay is to find a motivation which can be explained both by the context of the time and by Hobbes’ own behaviour and beliefs (which we can know with some certainty) and by evidence in the text as well. Observing the nature of the first two sections of Leviathan, it is tempting to argue that Hobbes’ observations of the cruelties of Civil War and the fractious times after the war made Hobbes argue what he did in the book ‘Of Man’, which is the first part of Leviathan. He argues that, without a Commonwealth or Social Contract to bind them to 3 laws, humans are in a state of war. In this state of war, the life of man is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” . Hobbes then argues that when humans are in a state of war, we are bound to “a law of nature… by which a man is 4 forbidden to do, that, which is destructive to his life…” This view of the completely self-interested nature of man is likely to have been a product of the horrors of Civil War. Many of the engagements in the war were strategic sieges, and the ensuing pillage was devastating to the victims. It was said that the actions of the soldiers at Batumley “were fitter for a
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Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, (Cambridge 2001) p. 88 Richard Tuck, Hobbes: a very short introduction, (Oxford 1989) p. 2 3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Compiled by J.A Gaskin, (Oxford 1996) p. 84 4 Leviathan, p. 86 2
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Cannibal then… a soldier… *the civilians+ will resolve to run the greatest hazards rather than to fall into their hands.” . Furthermore, there is the fact that 3.7% - 190,000 people – died either from combat or disease in England as a direct result of the war; this corroborates with Hobbes’ interpretation of the nature of Man’s life in the state of nature. In Ireland, given the actions of the Third Civil War, 41% (roughly 600,000 people) died. This was a devastating conflict on all accounts, but those fortunate enough to escape conflict still faced a gross infringement on their rights; “Kent was paying 6 more each month in assessments than it had for an entire year of Ship Money” and it is possible that this was what motivated Hobbes to write Leviathan. According to Quentin Skinner, Hobbes “was motivated by the discovery that Civil 7 Wars have not sufficiently taught men…” and the section “Of Man” seems to have been heavily influenced by the actions of recent years and Hobbes’ view on society and man in general seems to have been motivated by such events. However, this stops being true when we step back from the text and surrounding context and observe Hobbes’ other works. It is certainly compelling to argue that the horrors of war influenced Hobbes to write a damning thesis on man, but that would be false. This is for three reasons; the concept which is considered abhorrent in Leviathan is the primacy of self-preservation in the state of nature. Hobbes argues that, in the state of nature, “there be no property, no dominion, no mine and thine; but only that to be every man’s, that he 8 can get, and for so long, as he can keep it” . This view is not unique to Hobbes and it certainly was not an observation made on the basis of the English Civil War. An intellectual revolution, wherein Ciceronian ideals of rhetoric were challenged and the Stoics were popularised gave birth th to the philosophy of Montaigne and Lipsius in the late 16 century – in their scepticism, which was derived from the Stoics, they broke down all of the ‘universal principles’ of philosophy into just one: self-preservation. It is likely that Hobbes studied these two, given his extensive travels and tenures in Europe. Their argument was that “the wise man took 9 his own survival to be his central obligation” and there is a natural progression of this into what Hobbes said; after all, it is not a huge step to make to assume that if your self-preservation is your ultimate goal, then you can do all that you can to ensure that it happens – and that everyone around you is entitled to act in the same way. As a result, it is very unlikely that Hobbes’ motivation for writing Leviathan was a result of the Civil War; his seemingly negative view of man is actually 10 something which he probably believed even before he wrote Leviathan – it formed the “fundamental right” of all Hobbesian ethics. In regards to his view on the state of nature, it is plausible to observe that this was not at all motivated by the horrors of war for a further two reasons. The first is that Hobbes talks about fundamental laws of nature well before 1651; De Cive introduces this concept and De Cive precedes the Civil War. The second reason is that, just like the doctrine of self-preservation, the doctrine of the state of nature is not wholly attributable to Hobbes. Hugo Grotius, in his 1625 ‘Laws of War and Peace’ introduced a secular, minimalistic core of human rights that gave rise to a state of nature – this happened before the Civil War. Hence, despite the fact that it is a neat argument to make, it seems that it is false to argue that the horrors of war alone motivated Hobbes to write as he did about human nature and the use of contracts Hence, it is quite probably correct to argue that Hobbes’ motivation for writing Leviathan was to change the approach and th deliberation of academia. In the early 17 century, inductive arguments were the norm in so far as most philosophers didn’t use what were considered scientific, irrefutable proofs. This was something was Hobbes abhorred. His ‘career’ as a political philosopher came after (and for a short amount of time, during) his career as a metaphysician and mathematician. In the 1630’s, Hobbes dedicated much of his life to reading Descartes and the ideas of using ‘clear and distinct perception’ to distinguish between what is irrefutably true and what is not influenced Hobbes greatly. This is what motivated his approach of authorship in ‘Elements of Law’ and ‘De Cive’ and it is therefore very likely that he was motivated to write Leviathan for a very similar reason. It is very likely that Hobbes read Billingsley who said arguments that were
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Diane Purkiss, The English Civil War, (Harper) pg. 290 David.L.Smith, The Double Crown, (Blackwell Publishing) p. 149 7 Skinner, Visions of Politics, p. 307 8 Leviathan, p. 85 9 Tuck, Hobbes, p. 10 10 Ibid, p. 14 6
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mathematical (i.e. deductive) were “necessary and invincible” in that they cannot be disproven. An example of this is below: 1.) Hobbes is a man. 2.) All men are mortal. -Therefore Hobbes is mortal. Hence, it is arguable that Hobbes motivation to do philosophy was to deductively prove arguments traditionally annexed to political philosophy. Hobbes himself said that his earlier books, Elements of Law and De Cive were both works of 12 science. The first was a science of “justice and policy” and of the latter, Hobbes said that the science of politics is “no 13 older than… De Cive” – it is therefore logical to argue that Leviathan was written as a book to outline the science of morality. This argument is given further weight when one considers Hobbes’ philosophical background. Hobbes was known to have asked the Earl of Newcastle, under whom he was a scholar, to attain a copy of Galileo’s Dialogues for his study. He even met the man on his tours of Europe and it is very likely that Hobbes was impressed by this way of approaching an argument. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that Hobbes and Mersenne, a French philosopher 14 who wanted to develop an “ethical science” , shared a close friendship. As a result, it is highly probable that Hobbes’ motivation to write Leviathan was to apply these scientific methods to philosophy and perfect them. This is more convincing than the argument that Hobbes was interested in sophism because of the fact that Hobbes had written in this style before; in Elements of Law and De Cive, he was able to make a science of justice and of politics. It is a logical extension to say that Leviathan was written for a similar reason. It must also be remembered that Hobbes was not a traditional sophist; he was a critic of rhetoric and it is very unlikely that Leviathan was written to convince the authorities or to sway opinion. Evidence from the text helps substantiate this point: in the first section of the book, Hobbes extensively deduces ‘truths’ about the world. For example, in chapter X, he defines power as: “The greatest of human powers, is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is the power of a commonwealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such 15 as is the power of a faction or of divers factions leagued” This is similar in purpose to the argument above; just as I defined Hobbes to be a man, he is defining what power is. This could be rephrased as saying that the greatest power is when a sovereign has his subject’s support. Then Hobbes says that 16 “reputation of power, is power, because it draweth with is the adherence of those that need protection” . Hence, if one were to reformulate Hobbes’ argument: 1.) The greatest power is when a sovereign has the people’s support. 2.) Reputation of power gives the people’s support. -Therefore, reputation of power is the greatest power. Given the fact that, if premise one and two are correct, then the conclusion must be correct, this argument is undoubtedly deductive. This is but one example of a way in which Hobbes tries to deductively prove his theory. Another example of Hobbes’ utilization of deductive proofs can be found in Chapter XVIII:
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Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, (Cambridge 1996) p. 297 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 298 13 Reason and Rhetoric, p. 298 14 Tuck, Hobbes, p. 19 15 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 58 16 Ibid, p. 58 12
“Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions, and judgements of the sovereign instituted; it follows, that whatsoever he doth, it can be injury to any of his 17 subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused injustice.” . To reformulate this: 1.) The subjects sanction the actions of the sovereign. 2.) It is illogical to take injury by actions you have sanctioned. -Therefore, the subjects cannot take injury by the actions of the sovereign. Once more, this is an example of Hobbes using a deductive argument to evaluate a ‘truth’. Hobbes tries to use deductive arguments to prove almost every ‘truth’ he claims about sovereign authority and the state of nature – this is what makes Leviathan a science of morality and this is was suggests that Hobbes’ motivation was to change the approach of moral philosophers. This argument is very strong on the basis that it fulfils both of my criteria for this essay. It is compatible with Hobbes’ own beliefs and the context of the time; further proof of this, if any is needed, is that Hobbes even emigrated to France to be closer to those French sceptics Mersenne and Descartes – one of the reasons he came back to England was because Mersenne had died in 1649, and he had lost any intellectual motivation to remain in France. It is also compatible with the text; as shown above, Hobbes uses deductive arguments extensively – putting both facts together points to the conclusion that Hobbes’ motivation to write Leviathan was purely academic. I think, however, that it would be premature to stop here. The publication date of Leviathan is simply too interesting to th discard the argument that Hobbes published it to add to the Engagement Controversy. Regicide on the 30 of January 1649 had created a large amount of internal debate over the legitimacy of Parliamentary government. After all, until 1641 and the passing of the ‘Triennial Act’ and the ‘Act of no dissolution without consent’ the king had supreme control over the affairs of Parliament. The king had the right to call and dissolve Parliament as he saw fit – it seemed odd, then, that Parliament was now trying to rule without consent (or even without the presence of) a divinely ordained monarch. Clearly, for their victory over the monarchy to be complete, Parliament needed their position to be justified and their rule to be 18 not just accepted, but welcomed. As Quentin Skinner phrases it “There was a need… for a theory of political obligation” 19 to legitimise “the new government” . Hence, given the conclusion and general themes of Leviathan, it appears to be highly probable that Hobbes intended to write this as a justification of Parliamentary authority. The early defenders of this position, called ‘engagers’, appealed to Biblical authority to create this theory of political obligation. One of these defenders was Rous, who cited Romans 13 (St.Paul’s letter concerning sovereign authority), which appealed to divine authority to justify the rule of law: Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of the one who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval, for he is God's servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain. For he is the servant of God, an avenger who carries out God's wrath on the wrongdoer. Therefore one must 20 be in subjection, not only to avoid God's wrath but also for the sake of conscience. However, this un-secular approach was not seen as adequate to sanction Parliamentary rule, possibly because the divinely ordained monarch (Charles II) was not on the throne or even in the country. Hence, this was not where the controversy ended. We know that Hobbes was interested in finding objective truths about the world – he rarely cited divine authority and by the time Hobbes was writing Leviathan, a secular defence of Parliament was set into motion by Ascham. Hence, it 17
Ibid, p. 117 Visions of Politics, p. 287 19 Ibid, p. 287 18
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http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Romans+13&version=ESV
is very likely that Leviathan was written as an engager’s manifesto which was able to remove all invocations of “God’s 21 providence” . There is a significant amount of evidence in Leviathan which could be interpreted to defend the view that Hobbes was an engager – he argues that “any power with the capacity to protect must be regarded as legitimate and 22 entitled to obedience” . This must be regarded as an Engager’s argument because Parliament was the only power in England with the capacity to protect the populace, as the New Model Army was in fact a standing army, around 7000 men. Further evidence of this in the text can be found; “Whether he be of the congregation or not… he must either submit to 23 their decrees or be in a state of war.” In this, Hobbes is essentially sanctioning the acts of Parliament – he is saying that it is better to simply comply with their rule and accept their doctrines because not doing so will break the state of peace and will cause one to enter into a state of war where everyone is in conflict. More evidence which seems to show that Hobbes was an engager, and was therefore writing Leviathan with the motivation of influencing the Engagement Controversy in England, can be found in the review. And because I find by divers English books lately printed, that the Civil War have not yet sufficiently taught men, in what point of time it is, that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror; nor what is conquest; how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his laws; therefore for further satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of time, wherein a man becomes subject to a conqueror, is that point, wherein having liberty to submit to him, he 24 consenteth, either by express words, or by other sufficient sign, to be his subject. . This passage is interesting because it explicitly mentions other authors who concern themselves with this issue and it mentions that they have provided an incomplete or inaccurate account of what is true. One can also infer that Hobbes also believes that Englishmen have consented to Parliamentary rule; the ‘sign’ given could be the fact that the people did not resist Parliament’s rule, and not resisting is surely some sort of consent to Parliamentary rule. Using Hobbes’ earlier arguments, given that Parliament is the instituted sovereign power, the people should show total obedience towards them. If this argument is relevant to the context and the text, then it undoubtedly a work which is concerned with the Engagement Controversy – this means that the motivation for Leviathan could be interpreted as above. This argument could be convincing, given my parameters. The contextual facts could be interpreted as aligning correctly to suggest that Hobbes was trying to influence the Engagement Controversy – the text also provides significant such evidence. This is certainly what Quentin Skinner would argue, but I am inclined to disagree. This is because the contextual facts are somewhat ambiguous. Hobbes was not a Parliamentarian – he was a fervent royalist. He even worked to refine the artillery technique available to the Cavalier Earl of Newcastle in his tenure under him. It is therefore unlikely that he would have sanctioned a view so abhorrent to him so strongly. Furthermore, the fact that, when it was published, Leviathan was seen as “offering an authoritative presentation of political theory at which they *the lay defenders of engagement+ had 25 already arrived” shows that his views were not new nor were they revolutionary. If Hobbes’ true motivation was to influence the Engagement Controversy, then it would have been more prudent to have published Leviathan almost a year before he did. It would not have made sense to have so painstakingly refined his technique of argument if the goal was to sanction Parliamentary rule. This is because the goal of Leviathan was not to sanction Parliamentary rule; as shown by looking at only the contextual evidence, the lengthy amount of time it took to publish and Hobbes’ natural disposition shows that Hobbes’ motivation for writing Leviathan indeed has to be for intellectual reasons. I think that it is merely a 21
Visions of Politics, p. 297 Ibid, p. 305 23 Leviathan, p. 117 24 Ibid, p. 468 25 Visions of Politics, p. 303/304 22
coincidence that it was published when it was; thoughts of engagement may have been at the back of Hobbes’ mind, but it could not plausibly have been his primary motivation for writing Leviathan. As for the text itself, there is extremely ambiguous evidence to suggest that Hobbes wrote Leviathan to influence the Engagement Controversy. This is because Leviathan does not aim to come down on one side or another; it aims to provide an objective science of morality, if we consider the above paragraph. Indeed, Hobbes says “No man that hath sovereign 26 power can be justly put to death.” - if this is put into the context of Regicide, then it could be interpreted as a document which actually denounces Parliament. When Hobbes says: “To resist the sword of the commonwealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath liberty; because such liberty, takes away from the sovereign, the means of protecting 27 us” . One must observe that this is ambiguous. This could be interpreted as an attack on those MP’s who warned Pym, Holles, Strode, Hampden and Hesilridge before the king Charles arrested them, or it could be telling Englishmen not to resist Parliament. It is ambiguous and tough to interpret because to interpret this in the context of the Engagement Controversy is somewhat of a fool’s errand. Hobbes clearly did not intend this to apply directly to the Engagement Controversy – he wrote this to make a general rule of how sovereign power operates. Hence, despite the fact that it is certainly compelling to argue that Hobbes was motivated by the Engagement Controversy, the ambiguity of this position in regards to the text, and the inconsistency of this position in regards to the context of the time and Hobbes’ own beliefs means that this argument cannot be made. It will then be concluded that Hobbes’ motivation for writing Leviathan was purely academic; his search for a ‘science of philosophy’ was what motivated him to write Elements of Law and De Cive and it follows that the motivation for Leviathan was to create a science of morality. This view is coherent to the text, in that Hobbes makes extensive use of deductive, scientific arguments and to the context Hobbes’ life in that he was more concerned with science than anything else. To argue that anything else was his primary motivation is false by my parameters, because it is incoherent with either the context of the time, the text itself or both. Bibliography: Alan Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution, (Cambridge 2006) Compiled by J.A Gaskin, written by Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Oxford 1996) Noel Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes, (Oxford 2002) Diane Purkiss,The English Civil War, (Harper Press 2006) Conrad Russell, The Crisis of Parliaments, (Oxford 1971) Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, (Cambridge 2001) Quentin Skinner,Reason and Rhetoric in the philosophy of Hobbes,(Cambridge 1996) David.L.Smith, The Double Crown, (Blackwell Publishing 1998) Richard Tuck, Hobbes: a very short introduction, (Oxford 1989)
26 27
Leviathan, p. 118 Ibid, p. 145
Vernon Blake: Gearing Pioneer, Painter, Philosopher, Polymath, Copy Editor Alex Griffith reviews Vernon Blake, in his first venture into the history of cycling For me, one of the most interesting figures in cycling history is Vernon Blake. A great cyclist and a technical innovator, some of his ideas are taking many years to be adopted. Just before the Great War after a move to France, he came under the influence of Paul de Vivie (Velocio) and became an advocate of wide ratio gearing, specifically the floating chain system. He was probably the inventor of the cantilever brake and created a mountain bike some sixty odd years before the ATB was ‘invented’ in Marin County, USA. He was also a painter, sculptor, mountaineer, linguist and writer: a polymath. He was born in 1875 in Redhill, the son of a doctor. Blake first came to prominence in the cycling world when in 1894 he won the Anfield 100. He was a member of the North Road C.C. from March 1892 to May 1896. He seems to have had little interest in conventional cycle racing; preferring long distance challenging such as London to Edinburgh. He was also a tricyclist, competing in the North Road 24 of 1894 and famously paced a very tired F T Bidlake enabling him to finish in second place with 331 miles. He was an early-off road pioneer, in his twenties taking in three of the toughest passes in the Lake District, Sty Head, Black Sail and Scarth Gap during the course of a day. According to his daughter, whilst still in his teens he made a trip to Constantinople and returned penniless in just shorts, singlet and alpaca jacket. Upon arrival at Dover he got into an argument in French with an Immigration Officer and only a telegram from his father enabled him to return to Britain. Blake was also a keen mountaineer, climbing extensively in the Lake District and the Alps. Around 1896 on Mount Blanc he injured himself seriously, his ice axe puncturing one of his lungs. Whilst recovering in France he began painting, yet another of his talents. In 1910 he returned to Paris, renting a studio and then later that year moved to Les Baux in Provence, buying a house there the following year. Although he was clearly a talented painter (his style could be described as impressionistic) he was also known for another art form, sculpture. In the early 1920’s he created six war memorials in Provence all in the vicinity of Avignon. The scale of these memorials has to be seen at first hand to be appreciated, some featuring life-size allegorical figures( angels, liberty) as well as realistic depictions of solders in bas relief. According to G H Stancer (CTC editor – National Cycling Charity) writing in 1924 “it must be remembered that all his memorials are erected in small unimportant places and I predict that the memorials will make the villages famous. The noble design …would befit the dignity of a great city let alone a village …they are a remarkable contrast to the type of memorial we are pitifully familiar with in our own country.” Around 1911 Blake met Velocio, who has been described as the father of multiple gearing. Velocio often included Les Baux on his runs so it is possible they met there. Blake was an instant convert to the floating chain with which Velocio was experimenting at the time. In a bid to reduce friction and never being happy with rear derailleurs, Velocio removed the sprung tension arm replacing it with a small steel roller he called the steel finger (le doigt en acier) under the freewheel (which prevented the chain coming off) This was combined with a triple chainring on the front and he would just let the chain dangle down when using the smaller chainrings. Up changes were made manually with a small metal hook and down changes by using the heel of his shoe. Blake soon became very skilled at changing whilst riding. When the rear wheel was fitted with a double cog, a range of six gears was possible. Blake’s admiration for Velocio is self-evident in the article he wrote for Cycling 14th January 1915 subtitled “The Remarkable Cycling Exploits of a Famous French Tourist.” He describes how at the age of 62 Velocio over the course of three days was able to cover more than four hundred miles in hilly terrain. Blake had a solution to
one of the problems encountered by modern mountain bikers when using the small chainring in very muddy conditions: that of ‘chain suck’: “A muddy chain often refuses to fall away from the smallest chain wheel and is carried up again on the back half of the chain wheel. This difficulty is easily got rid of by placing close to the side of the chain wheel and under the bracket at the point the chain should detach itself, a small crescent shaped piece of metal(fig 5) (he christened this a ‘décrocheur’ from the French verb to unhook) which throws the chain off should it start to stick.” (3) In the 1920’s Blake wrote extensively in Cycling, over thirty five articles in the decade, whilst at the same time writing ten articles for the CTC Gazette. He championed French developments, not just in gearing but also braking, hubs, and use of alloys. In 1924 Blake wrote a long article on the Integral, an innovative double down tube frame design. He is full of praise for its other technical advances e.g. annular bearings (“the bearings of the future”), vertical drop-outs and the chainwheel mounted inside the frame. His only point of disagreement is the cottered crank, articulating the thoughts of many cyclists: “How much longer are we to be thus inflicted? How long are cotter pins to be ruthlessly hammered into the light machinery of a bicycle? In his advocacy of variable gears he argues that two sets of three gears are sufficient for “strenuous foreign riding”. Blake argues strongly against the prevailing view that longer crank length gives more leverage and hence lower gears, saying that crank length is a factor of leg length. Writing in 1927 he argues for a low gear of 30”, below which he thinks you are better off walking. He challenges the prevailing view that low gears are of no use. His main criticism of hub gears, apart from the limited range is that most of the riding is done in top which is not the direct drive. In the late 1920’s he experimented an outer oval chainring . In the mid 1920’s Blake wrote extensively on the tourist trials organised by the Touring Club of France. With their complex system of penalty points, they were designed to provide an objective assessment of equipment especially gearing. Reporting on the 1924 trials for the CTC Gazette Blake laments the fact that there is nothing similar in Britain concluding that the trade would oppose a thorough test as it would expose major weaknesses in their products. He also advocated French style point to point road races but run as time trials. Blake’s frustration with the English cult of secrecy around time trials is all too obvious.
The First Mountain Bike? Published posthumously in the CTC Gazette of July 1930 is an account of a cycle which, after a lifetime of experimenting, he felt best suited to his type of riding. It is worth remembering that at the time French roads were far worse than their British counterparts. In summary the specification was: Steel frame partly welded and partly brazed made from Reynolds tubes and built by a small St Etienne builder (in 1928). Painted with aluminium powder and varnished.
26” x 2” balloon tyres, light tread and run under-inflated. Steel hollow 7” cranks of tubular oval section. Blake refers to their great strength over alloy cranks. Gearing: 3 chainwheels welded together: 46, 38 and 24. Fitted with two decrocheurs (device to prevent the chain jamming whilst on the middle and smallest ring) under the bottom bracket. Gear ratios are from 83” to 34”. Cantilever brakes which he patented September 1926. All parts made of duralumin (an aluminium/copper alloy with 7-8% copper as a hardening and resilience additive) including the brake levers with a huge weight saving. Saddle, a waterproof rubber model he is thinking of changing due to weight. Brazed on Radios combination dynamo and light on left front fork with a wing nut for swift removal to prevent damage, as Blake says is essential when travelling by rail. Total weight about 30 lbs. which he points out is good given it is a six speed model, as a light single speed would be around 22 lbs. Blake emphasises it is important to strike a balance between weight-saving and efficiency/comfort. He points out the gearing adds quite bit of weight but this is far outweighed by its benefits. Somewhat at odds with this is the mention of drilling wings nuts to save weight. This is the machine that has been referred to as the first Mountain Bike. Although the machine is illustrated with mudguards, Blake says he normally rides without due to the dry climate in the South of France. Also because he could not get anything but the heaviest steel ones wide enough for the 2” tyres. To put into context just how innovative this was, British club cyclists were pretty much all on fixed wheel. Only a very small number of tourists such as Cliff Pratt, the founder of the CTC York Rally and Neville Whall (who used the pseudonym Hodites, Greek for wanderer) who led CTC continental tours, had variable gears. F.W Evans had just started advertising the Standard Cyclo (the earliest reference I can find is the CTC Gazette July 1929). So what kind of man was Blake? A number of myths and legends seem to have grown up about him and feature in the writings of Stancer and Whall. Perhaps some of these were self-created. These included that when he moved to Les Baux the house was really just a cave, that he created the war memorials alone and without remuneration and this work caused his death. There is also a question mark over the exact extent of his travelling, one article in Cycling suggests that he visited China but the obituary in The Times contradicts this. Bidlake described him as wayward and indeed he was unconventional even by today’s standards. Perhaps unsurprisingly he was self-centred, conceited and very opinionated. Not someone to suffer fools gladly. Balanced against this he was clearly someone people felt and great deal of affection and well-liked and respected. During the course of this research I have concluded he was eccentric, single minded, an iconoclast, a polymath and at heart a cyclist. He was a distinctive figure in his customary white cotton trousers and pink cotton shirt undone at the chest. Blake suffered from a number of illnesses. He had contracted Malta fever (the human form of cattle brucellosis) in his travels in the Middle East and he also suffered from heart and kidney failure. He died on Good Friday, 19th April 1930 in a nursing home in Avignon where he was buried without a permanent tomb.
Book Reviews
Book Review: In the Ruins of the Reich, Harry Mistry reviews Douglas Botting’s insight into the world of Nazi Germany
‘Never before had four civilised industrial nations tried to work together to govern a country inhabited by a fifth’ For the unininitiated, to look back on the Nazi Regime is to see Hitler elected to office by the German people, and subsequently to jump to the conclusion that these ‘disillusioned people’ had but themselves to blame for the horrific conflict that would ensue. Just a few years after the war, East and West Germany would be pitted on the front line of the th Cold War which was to consume much of the rest of the 20 century. But what of the German people in between these two significant eras, who the world would look upon with contempt, burdened by a stigma that would haunt them even to the present day? Botting, in this book, attempts to provide a broad outline of life in Germany from the twilight of the Second World War to the first major confrontation – if it can be called that in the literal sense - of the Cold War, the Berlin Blockade. What I found so interesting about this book was discovering what daily life was like for the ordinary German people, a perspective that is often overlooked when considering the period between the Nazi Regime and the Cold War. It was, I found, quite incredible to put together a picture of domestic German life of a time when the worlds’ eyes had turned to larger scale conflicts. Botting focuses on the monumental daily struggles of life in Germany and how each day seemed to be a fight for survival. The book also puts into perspective the struggle of the Germans in contrast to that of the British. When British citizens had relative peace and stability after the war, with the introduction of a welfare state, the Germans saw a divided and uncertain future, with everyone living in constant fear of exploitation, crime and abuse. Botting starts with a vivid description of the final days of the war, exploring the often overlooked propaganda war that besieged the Germans, with leaflets calling for surrender falling from the sky alongside leaflets rallying for a final stand against the Bolshevik horrors that awaited them. Using resources from national archives, diary entries and personal testimonies, Botting brings to life the contrasting nature of American and Red Army advances. The Americans raided farms for food and took art and alcohol whereas many Red Army soldiers were so bemused by the advanced technology of the Reich, notably wrist-watches, that they wore enough to cover their forearms. The advances through the Third Reich’s territory revealed to the world for the first time the horrors that had occurred behind the Nazi front lines. In exploring this fascinating topic, Botting focuses on the well documented discovery of Bergen-Belsen, a German camp probably most famous for it’s outbreak of typhus that killed so many in the winter of 1944-45, most notably, Anne Frank. Botting devotes a whole chapter to the discovery of Bergen-Belsen and other prominent German camps such as Buchenwald (where Elie Wiesel was liberated) and Nordhausen, a reflection of how significant these discoveries were in global news at the time. The growing public outrage towards the end of the war is an interesting topic in itself, given that the Allied Governments had had in depth knowledge of such events for years; yet this is an issue Botting decides to only touch upon, instead taking a more descriptive approach of events using many personal accounts. Perhaps the topic that Botting gives most weight to is the treatment of German women. He sensitively explores the recollections of many Fräulein and their horrific experiences during 1945 and the occupation. What is striking is that relations between frontline advancing infantry and German women had initially been quite cordial, with many describing the ‘friendly, generous and polite’ Red Army soldiers. However, as Botting points out, these front line soldiers were the more disciplined, well trained ‘quality’ Red Army soldiers, unlike the ‘quantity’ soldiers that would follow, who gave the Red Army its vast size and horrific reputation. This reputation was born out of the true horrors of sexual violence on an unprecedented scale. Vivid memories and moving accounts substantiate Botting’s description of the brutality, the
numbers involved stretched into the hundreds of thousands, and the book can hardly do them justice in depicting such atrocities. The way in which Botting approaches this topic is particularly sensitive, enabling the reader to not only be captivated by an awe of such events, but to also be moved, feeling a deep and despairing empathy for the victims. Furthermore, a significant mention is made of the German Trümmerfrauen, those women who would work tirelessly day and night clearing rubble left by air raids in devastated cities such as Berlin, Hamburg and Dresden to mention just a few. Botting emphasises how these workers had to continue in their strife long after the war, in a monumental effort that served to exemplify the commitment humans would make in order to survive. The desperation that resulted from continual hard labour and fear of mal-treatment saw the flourishing of an enormous Black Market, which provided a lifeline for so many who were left with nothing after the war. With the division of Germany into four zones, in some areas rations were provided by the Zonal Authorities, which amounted to little more in calorific value than concentration camp inmates had received and the Black Market provided an industrious forum for trade. Botting describes how anything from cigarettes to Persian rugs could be bought, the cigarettes almost becoming the new German tender, shedding light on the importance of the Black Market. Botting’s book is an attempt to present the most salient issues for the ordinary German people at the time, and highlights the contrast with the quality of life experienced by the occupation authorities. At times the book can become rather heavy in detail; however this does not detract from the fact that it is a fascinating read, which touches upon issues that are often obscured by the cloak of international relations that marked the start of the Cold War.
Book Review: Land of the Seven Rivers, A Brief History of India’s Geography, Dr Ian StJohn reviews Sanjeev Sanyal’s recent publication Land of the Seven Rivers is an affable book that meanders, rather like the rivers it describes, through the familiar landscape of the history of the Indian sub-continent. Along the way we pass most of the landmarks one would expect: the Harappans, the Vedas, Ashoka, the Ramayana and Mahabharata, the various cities of Delhi, the Mughals, the British and their mapmakers, Partition, as well as the rise of a new India exemplified by the rapid growth of Gurgaon, a centre for the call-centre industry south of Delhi and characterised by ‘gleaming office towers, metro-stations, malls, luxury hotels and millions of jobs.’ (p. 291) There are some curious byways along the journey. Why, for instance, are no lions depicted upon Harappan seals? The climate was too moist for them apparently – although this causes some difficulties for one of the book’s most unexpected propositions: namely, that the Vedic hymns (where lions are mentioned) were the product of the Harappan civilisation. Sanyal quotes from recent genetic testing that suggests that although there are genetic linkages between Europeans and North Indians, the particular variants of the genes found in both places point to the two populations splitting from common ancestors in the region of the Persian gulf at least 8,000 years ago – much earlier than traditional accounts of an Aryan invasion from central Asia around 1,500 BC would suggest. There was no Aryan invasion bringing the Vedic religion and the author concludes that ‘My own sense is that the Harappans were a multi-ethnic society, rather like India today. The Rig Vedic people could well have been part of this bubbling mix.’ (p. 57) According to Sanyal, the Land of the Seven Rivers is ‘an attempt to write a brief and eclectic history of India’s geography. It is about the changes in India’s natural and human landscape, about ancient trade routes and cultural linkages, the rise and fall of cities, about dead rivers and the legends that keep them alive.’ (p. 3) As this description suggests, it is very much an impressionistic survey and to call it a history of India’s geography is rather exaggerated. Geographical aspects are considered and referred to – rivers, roads, the building of cities etc. – but they are not integrated into the narrative: they are incidents to be noted as are others of a non-geographical nature. There is little real attempt to situate the events within a geographical context in terms of the relief of the land, the varieties of soil or climate, the types and productivity of agriculture, the systems of irrigation or land tenure and their relationship to social and political structures. The following passage might be considered indicative: I do not want to leave the reader with the impression that medieval India was only about the building, pillaging, abandoning and rebuilding of cities. One must remember that most of the population lived in rural areas. Babur tells us that Indian villagers rarely invested in either irrigation or in building permanent homes. Instead, they were ever prepared to abandon their villages and take refuge in the forests. This is how the common people had coped with the previous three centuries of invasion and war. (p. 166) Clearly a passage such as this hardly addresses the nature of rural life under the early Mughals in the manner that might be expected in a book about the relationship between Indians and their lived environment, and the impressions of Babur are surely not the first and by no means the last word on the practises of the Indian villagers.
Of course, one should not be too hard on the author here for he does not claim to have set out to provide a systematic geographical treatment of Indian history. Rather, as he admits, ‘the book focuses on a somewhat different set of questions: Is there any truth in ancient legends about the Great Flood? Why do Indians call their country Bharat? What do the epics tell us about how Indians perceived the geography of their country in the Iron Age? Why did the Buddha give his first sermon at Sarnath, just outside Varanasi? What was it like to sail on an Indian Ocean merchant ship in the fifth century AD…..’ and so on. (p. 3) As will be apparent, this is a light-touch selective review of Indian history for the general reader by an author who, as a professional economist, is far from a specialist in Indian history. This has some merits. The book covers a wide range of material in a manner that does not fatigue or overwhelm the reader in the way that more detailed histories of India so often do. Sanyal skips deftly between regions and civilisations, and his rather naïve written style will be approachable to many readers unfamiliar with the material presented. A passage like the following is typical: However, one should not get the impression that Delhi was a city merely of grand palaces and imperial mosques. The majority of the people of Delhi were common folk – shopkeepers, artisans, servants, soldiers and so on. These people lived in huts made of mud and straw that were built between and around the great palaces of the nobility. In other words, Shahjehanabad suffered severely from slums, that perennial problem of modern cities…There were also shops selling a variety of kebabs and meat preparations. Old Delhi remains home to some excellent kebab shops. (pp. 197-8) A pleasing feature of the book is the space it devotes to the extensions of Indian civilisation into South East Asia – into countries like Vietnam, Thailand, and Java – matters which conventional accounts of this scope often neglect and which yet illustrate for the author a shift that occurred in the mentality of Indians, from a risk-taking entrepreneurial culture that led merchants to found new Indian settlements overseas to, by around 1000 AD, a more rigid and closed civilisation much less open to the possibilities of travel and trade beyond India. The key to India’s recent economic and social resurgence has been, argues Sanyal, its recovery of its earlier spirit of discovery and trade and communication with the rest of the world – as represented by the ‘Indian diaspora’, some 25-30 million strong, which ‘thanks to globalization and technology…can now maintain business, personal and cultural links with India in ways that would have been unthinkable a generation ago.’ (p. 301) Land of the Seven Rivers is, in brief, an impressionistic survey of the long sweep of Indian history, beginning with the first humans entering India from the Persian Gulf and culminating in the rise of a modern, shiny, and increasingly urban India as the sub-continent enters the 21st Century. Lacking serious analysis or the kind of detail that can open to the reader real insights into the lives and problems confronting Indians of past times, it is a book for the general reader or traveller looking for an engaging but not overly demanding introduction to the historical background to contemporary India.
Robert K. Massie: Peter the Great – His life and world, Pranav Subhedar reviews Massie’s biography of Peter the Great It is rather simplistic to say it this way, but this book is genuinely engrossing. It is readable as it refrains from using overly complex sentences, yet informative. I would say that it is suitable (even recommended) for someone with little to no background knowledge of the subject. This book is described as a biography, but I think it is somewhat more than that. Massie quickly entraps the reader in a vivid, thorough description of Moscow. Rather than intimidating the reader with a catalogue of Peter’s achievements, Massie’s description of Russia’s emergence as a Baltic power from a technologically bereft backwater reads like a novel. This journey starts almost 20 years before Peter’s ascent to undisputed power, and this book sharply hones in on two concepts that the early modern historian holds dear - foreign policy and religion – to put an effective backdrop on the events. Rather than making the comparisons between Peter and his ancestors himself, Massie presents to you the facts and allows you to make your own opinion of the issues. Massie gives the reader a comprehensive, almost loving description of Peter; the reader is not in the dark about any of his habits, from his facial twitch to his gargantuan height – not only does this provide another layer of detail, it shows that this book is a coming together of a very broad number of sources; not only court documents, but diaries of Peter and many of his associates. The degree of effort and thought that has been put in is evident to the reader, which goes a long way in making it an enjoyable read. There are two points upon which this book excels: firstly, it substantiates almost all subjective claims with contemporary evidence. A whole chapter is dedicated to the relationship between Peter and his first son, and interspersed between narratives from the author is a series of letters between the two. This follows a running theme in this book; Massie allows you (for the most part) to make up your own mind about the man whilst nudging you with his own opinions. A second stand-out point of this book is the fact that it leaves no gaps in the reader’s knowledge; if Massie mentions a foreign monarch, there is almost always a chapter dedicated to this monarch. For example, before moving on to the Great Northern War, Massie tells the reader about Charles XII of Sweden, the adversary facing Peter. During his detailing of the Great Embassy, a short biography of such figures such as William III of England, the Sun King Louis XIV and August of Saxony are given. This allows the reader to build a broad range of knowledge about much of Europe in the turn of the 17th century. To make a slight criticism of this book would be to say that it is too disjointed. Massie splits up the book into 5 sections detailing from the time of the birth of Peter to his death. This sometimes leads to Massie taking a teleological approach to explanation at points. For example, in the 2nd section, Massie writes that the Swede’s mistreatment of Peter in Riga in the time of the Great Embassy was the reason for him ransacking the town almost 20 years later; Massie substantiates this with some documentation but provides almost no other reasons as to why Riga was manhandled; this is my only qualm with a largely well-written book. However, this shortcoming is very small, and for the overwhelmingly large part, Massie provides lucid analysis for the momentous events of Peter’s life. It is on this basis that I recommend this book; it is suited for someone with no previous knowledge of the early modern period, and unlike some of the other books cataloguing the early modern period, is very readable.
Critical Review of Sir Robert Peel by Norman Gash Daniel Gold reviews Norman Gash’s biography of one of Britain’s Prime Ministers
Norman Gash’s Sir Robert Peel was an enlightening read, bringing great depth and detail to its analysis. Gash’s overall argument is encapsulated in a sentence in his epilogue claiming that Peel’s “place as the founder of modern Conservatism is unchallengeable” . There are three main areas that need to be addressed in determining the validity of such a bold statement. Firstly, there is the extent and involvement that Peel had in bringing his party from a measly opposition to strong ministry. Secondly, there is the impact of increasing the grant to the Maynooth seminary. Thirdly, the causes and effects of Peel’s repeal of the Corn Laws that Gash presents, in order to assess whether Gash’s argument merits his conclusion. Whilst Gash slightly overemphasises the role that Peel had in party organisation and discipline, he still gives quite a fair judgement as he recognises the key work of others in the party as well. In his analysis of the conservative opposition preceding the Hundred Days Ministry, Gash claims that “it was at Peel’s suggestion that the decision was taken to serve late suppers at the [Carlton] club so that members could go there after the evening’s debates in the Commons”. To give the impression of Peel being a key influence in developing party organisation and unity is somewhat hyperbolic, given it was in fact Bonham and Atwood who were the key individuals. However, the credit which Gash gives Peel for the success of his policy of ‘governing in opposition’ in encouraging Whig defections is entirely justified. Gash argues that in 1834, “Against the extreme Irish wing the ministers could rely on massive majorities drawn from both sides of the House. But the occasions that necessitated them enabled Peel once again to come forward as the disinterested supporter of government authority and a policy of moderation” . Gash’s argument is particularly useful as it shows how Peel was able to be seen as a politician acting in the middle-class interest, yet at the same time, it acknowledges that ‘governing in opposition’ was only a successful policy because of the government disunity. The praise Gash gives to Peel for his role in maintaining a somewhat cordial relationship between the Upper and Lower Houses is also justified. Gash notes that Peel’s “chief concern had been to prevent separate action by Stanley in the lower House and separate action by Wellington in the upper” and that “he had succeeded; and in the process had further eroded the position of the Whigs”. Whilst Gash somewhat underplays the still prevalent tensions between the Tories in the Lords and Commons, he is right in explaining that Peel was the major peacemaker between Tory Lords and Commoners and as a result of preventing an irreversible severing of relations, he was able to have more control over government policy, which was the basis of his ‘governing in opposition’ policy. Gash’s consideration of the causes of the vast increases of conservative seats leading to 1841 is particularly interesting. His remark that “many forces had been at work to produce this result and most of them had little or nothing to do with Peel” (p. 234) seems to do Peel some injustice. Whilst much of the party organisation had been the work of individuals such as Bonham and Fremantle, the policy of ‘governing in opposition’, which portrayed Peel as a responsible statesman as well as encouraged many Whig defections, was most certainly the work of Peel.
Gash’s best area of analysis on Peel is over the causes and consequences of his concessions to the Catholic Church, most notably, the increasing of the grant to the Maynooth seminary in Ireland. Whilst many biographies of Peel, such as T. A. Jenkins’ almost exclusively points towards crises in Ireland as the reason for Peel’s increase of the Maynooth grant, Gash notes that “reserved himself in his own religious professions, [Peel] did not relish religious exhibitionism, sectarian monomania, or collective sanctimoniousness either in private or public life” and this suggests that a contributory factor towards Peel’s willingness to improve the condition for Catholics was his religious tolerance, not merely a means to encourage more respectable Irish Catholics to become ordained as Priests. Unsurprisingly, Gash argues that “of all Peel’s measures, the Maynooth bill had come nearest to a repudiation of the classic constitutional doctrines, the defence of Church and State, on which the Conservative party had been built up in the thirties” and this is a very accurate statement; Peel’s outright defiance of a traditional Tory belief by reaching out to the Irish Catholics with intentions of conciliation undoubtedly damaged the party. Given the dramatic fall of Peel following the repeal of the Corn Laws, it is unsurprising that the motivation for Peel to repeal of the Corn Laws remains a controversial topic for debate. Gash’s praise for Peel’s reduction, but not abolition, of the Corn Laws in his 1842 budget is particularly fair. He praises Peel for considering “the intangible factors – the relations between landlord and tenant, the need for stable prices and the avoidance of any sudden shock to a great national interest”. Gash’s exploration of Peel’s careful planning and unwillingness to rush policies is key in explaining why a party full of agriculturalists did not collapse when the Corn Law tariffs were reduced and why this in turn made him such a great statesman, as he was able to pursue his policies without tearing apart his party. This is further added with the praise Gash gives Peel for his 1845 budget for being “one of Peel’s masterpieces”. However, whilst it is understandable and very true that Peel should be praised for developing free-trade policies without causing too great a shock t o the agriculturalists, this seems to contradict Gash’s argument relating to Repeal itself in 1846. Given that Gash also considers Peel’s behaviour in 1846 as courageous and not foolish, despite upsetting the agriculturalists greatly, this seems to undermine the basis for Gash’s praise for Peel in 1842 which was that he achieved so much without upsetting the agriculturalists too much. Gash claims that “the absence of a proposal to suspend the Corn Laws and the postponement of complete abolition until 1849 robbed the argument [by Peel that the cause of repeal was the Irish potato famine+ of its crisis atmosphere”. Whilst Gash acknowledges that Peel’s argument was believed by a mere few, he seems to be one of those few, as he notes that “when the crisis came in Ireland *Peel+ had to consider first what must be done to avert a great calamity” adding that “there can be little doubt ... of the genuineness of Peel’s concern” . To suggest that the Irish potato famine was the
main motivation for Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws seems a case of falling for Peel’s oratorical skill; it is clear that the argument presented in Jenkins’ Sir Robert Peel is the more accurate one which is that Peel used the opportunity of Ireland to make his free trade policy seem necessary to prevent mass starvation. Undoubtedly he did care about Ireland; the determination to ship American grain to Ireland proves this. However, it seems fallacious to argue that Peel’s main intentions in repealing were to help Ireland. Perhaps the final blow of the Corn Laws was the reference to Cobden in Peel’s resignation speech. Gash argues that “it is difficult to believe that this *antagonising the protectionists+ was Peel’s object”. This argument is too kind to Peel; given that he pursued a policy which he knew the bulk of his party disapproved of and when it came to voting, about 2/3 of his party opposed him, it would not be surprising if Peel did indeed intend this as a final insult to the protectionist members of his party who failed to see his free-trade vision. In conclusion, Norman Gash’s Sir Robert Peel makes a strong case for considering the Prime Minister as the founder of modern Conservatism. In the three areas of party discipline when in opposition, the increase of the Maynooth grant and the repeal of the Corn Laws, whilst some arguments seem to given Peel too much credit and some too little, they are on the whole balanced. Gash can call him a founder of modern Conservatism for his role in ‘governing in opposition’ even though other members of the Conservative party, such as Atwood, Bonham and Fremantle had an equally, if not more, important role in disciplining the party. He can be considered a founder of modern Conservatism for his role in increasing the grant to the Maynooth seminary, as he sacrificed the confidence of the majority of his party in order to pursue a policy that although not particularly successful, showed toleration towards the Irish. However, Gash credits Peel too much for his work in repealing the Corn Laws. Whilst Peel was most definitely courageous, he did so out of free-trade convictions. However, he most definitely did not repeal primarily because of a concern for the Irish, as otherwise, he would not have waited until 1849. On this basis, he was not a founder of modern Conservatism for his repeal of the Corn Laws. On balance though, Gash was right in proving that Peel had a significant enough impact in enough aspects of politics to be considered the founder of modern Conservatism.
What light does Haffner’s Defying Hitler shed on the rise of Hitler and the failure of Weimar? Peter Sequira answers an age-old question for young Habs Historians
Defying Hitler by Sebastian Haffner is an excellent source in documenting the failure of Weimar and the rise of Hitler. The fact that it is written by someone who had first-hand experience of these important events is helpful in showing us how ordinary German’s felt about these events. This article will discuss which areas Haffner chose to shed light on, clearly the most important ones in his view and how he chooses to portray them. Haffner describes how Weimar was crippled from the start. He describes in great detail the Spartacist uprising of 1919, but the statement which stands out the most is when Haffner states ‘by 1919 even the Hitler Youth had almost been formed’. This tells us that Hitler’s rise to power had already started, even though he probably did not realise it. The fact that Haffner believes that the Hitler Youth had almost been formed means that Hitler would have a strong youth base on which to construct his campaign and ultimately his rise to the power. Haffner also states ‘Oddly enough, the Republic held up’. This tells us that Haffner himself was less than confident in the strength of Weimar, as if he was assuming that its fall was inevitable, a predestined fate. From Haffner’s writing we can also tell that the hyperinflation of 1923 was a key factor in both Hitler’s rise to power and the demise of Weimar. Firstly, he describes the hyperinflation itself but then goes on to talk about the impact of this afterwards. He states, ‘The Government fell amidst fierce fighting’, this shows that Weimar was not stable and that in a time of crisis like the hyperinflation, cracks started to appear in it. This shows that hyperinflation was the beginning of the end and the beginning of Weimar’s failure. It showed that the government could be overturned, though it required violence and it became clear to the people that the lack of strong leadership and the weakness of the endless coalitions were hardly beneficial to the survival of the country. Haffner also states, ‘now we began to expect the downfall of the state’, this tells us that the general feeling of the Germans at that time was that Weimar was nearing its end. This shows that it was truly the beginning of the end for the Republic as the general public had lost confidence in it, opening the door for strong populist leaders to seize control, like Hitler. Furthermore, Haffner shows through his writing that he believed in one reason which caused the failure of Weimar and how Hitler rose to power. It was the resentfulness and the ‘old thrilling magic of the national war game’ – sport. Haffner implies throughout the account that the German people never quite got over the loss of the First World War and they still resented things such as the Treaty of Versailles. He devoted a chapter of his book to outline one of the ways in which this resentment was released by the German people, in sport. ‘The lure of the war game…was being exercised and maintained’, Haffner tells us that the Weimar is in trouble from the start as the German people want to find an outlet for their love of ‘the war game’. They seemed to prefer a strong leader who could bring them glory rather than a democracy which struggled to maintain order and form a single party government. This could imply that the German people wanted a leader like Hitler and that it would not be a struggle for him to get into power, especially if the only apparent opposition was the weak and feeble Weimar. The main point which Haffner makes about Hitler’s rise to power is in relation to Brüning. ‘Brüning had nothing to offer the country but poverty’ and ‘the question was whether Hitler would come to power’ are both statements which summarise this theme. The German people had become disaffected with Weimar and
Versailles, with poverty and depression. Brüning was capable only of extending the poverty in desperate attempts to get Germany back on her feet again, however to ordinary Germans it did not feel this way. The Germans wanted something more, they wanted a strong leader in whom they could trust and rely on to make Germany strong again. This is where Hitler came in. When Haffner states ‘the Nazis, hitherto a ridiculous splinter party became the second largest faction in the house’ he describes exactly how the Nazis and by process of extension, Hitler came to power. However, this is not the only reason Haffner outlines as to how Hitler came to power is summarised in one question ‘Whom could we follow?’ Haffner goes on to describe how the Germans had no one else they could really vote for, though the Left Wing parties where available he shrewdly states ‘beaten even before the battle started’. This means that the Germans had their hands tied; it was obvious to politically shrewd people such as Haffner that Hitler in power by that point was inevitable, the weight of events in favour of him was just too large and Weimar too weak to deal with it. The fact that Haffner states that there was no other political option other than Hitler means Hitler was by this stage already effectively in power, he simply had to go through the apparently already decided election process. In conclusion, Sebastian Haffner’s book ‘Defying Hitler’ is an excellent primary source which allows us to have a first-hand account of what it was like to live in Germany during the troubled times of Weimar and Hitler. It sheds light on Weimar weaknesses, the fact that it was doomed from the start and how events such as the hyperinflation crippled it. He also tells a startlingly impartial account of the rise of Hitler, giving us only the cold facts about Hitler and the peoples’ views of him. All in all, ‘Defying Hitler’ is an excellent window into this troubled and arguably most important part of Germany’s past.
Trips
The Battlefields Trip, Alex Vilardo and Edward Day describe the Year 10 Battlefields Trip
Standing beneath the mighty silhouette of the Thiepval memorial in northern France, I not only felt incredibly small, but also rather sad. I stood, with my eyes scanning the endless lists of names that line the walls of the memorial. The inscription of names on this memorial is reserved for those missing, or unidentified, soldiers who have no known grave. A large inscription on an internal surface of the memorial reads “Here are recorded names of officers and men of the British Armies who fell on the Somme battlefields between July 1915 and March 1918 but to whom the fortune of war denied the known and honored burial given to their comrades in death.” These words were very powerful, and also interesting. On the Portland stone piers are engraved the names of over 72,000 men who were lost in the Somme battles between July 1916 and March 1918, over 90% of whom died in the first Battle of the Somme between 1 July and 18 November 1916. The Thiepval Memorial also serves as an Anglo-French battle memorial to commemorate the joint nature of the 1916 offensive. The magnitude of this structure could not be any more of a fitting monument to the sacrifice made by these brave men and women. It was the best possible way to finish our tour of northern France battlefields and monuments, for this was a monument to the end; the end of war, the end of violence and the end of innocence. The end of war on an industrial scale, but its message wouldn’t last, as we all know. In the wake of this, we now all remember the Great War, and all those who fought for it. The memorial is also a sign of peaceful cooperation something that I feel will become more important in the years to come. The message of this mighty monument is phrased beautifully in an inscription on the cross, it states “That the world may remember the common sacrifice of two and a half million dead, here have been laid side by side Soldiers of France and of the British Empire in eternal comradeship.” Afterwards, we visited the Loch Nagar crater located south of La Boiselle. It was then the largest manmade crater ever made. The crater was filled with around 50 tonnes of Explosives and was then detonated by the British Army Tunnelling Corps. It was blown up at about 7:28AM which was 2 minutes before Zero Time, where the troops would come out of the trenches and fight. This explosion would be the signal and would let the troops know that they were coming out and should be prepared to fight. Some would never return. The Crater was so huge that they said that they could feel and hear it all the way in London. They also said it shattered Windows hundreds of miles away. The British army thought that this large explosion would distract and disorientate the Germans, however they were very wrong. As this prepared the Germans and they knew that they would soon be attacked by the English. It did destroy the German strongpoints and was quite successful, but there were some big problems. The Germans were able to come out quickly and took their position on the opposite side of the crater. The English were unable to attack them and they were pinned down. The Germans continually fired on them until they had to give up. They finally retreated back into the Trenches after sustaining heavy losses and many deaths. When we went to the crater during the trip, we could see the vast amounts of explosive that must have been used to blow it up. There was a huge hole in the chalk which was about the size of the Aske hall. It really was very iconic and one of the things that stood out the most. We saw the large memorial that was placed here and showed how many people died that day during the battle.
History Trip to Berlin and Dresden Trips Editor Alex Levine, and Harry Mistry recount the school history trip, using information provided by Mr Simm Every October half term, Year 11 and Sixth form students studying History have the opportunity to travel to countries in Central or Eastern Europe to experience history close up, and at first hand. HABS students are able to experience not only the history and culture of these countries, but also the effect that the course of history has had on these regions and their impact on today’s society. In recent years, history trips have been to the Czech Republic and Poland, and this year students and teachers made the 2 hour journey to Germany to visit Berlin and Dresden. Though Germany is geographically close to the UK, the past century has seen a huge difference in their respective historical paths, with a lingering impact to this day. HABS students and teachers arriving in Berlin over half term already had some ideas about the city, with Berlin being a city that all students study in the GCSE History course on the Third Reich. Over the 20th Century Berlin had played host to many personalities that had been encountered in the classroom and in books. Famous figures such as Kaiser Wilhelm II, Rosa Luxembourg, Karl Liebknecht, Joseph Goebbels, Walter Ulbricht, Helmut Kohl and Adolf Hitler, who among many others, played key roles in shaping the landscape of 20th Century history. These names have shaped history to such an extent, that the effects of their actions still remain prominent today throughout Berlin and Germany. After a short journey from Luton Airport, the students arrived at ‘Berlin Schönefeld Airport’, an airport that in itself has large historical importance, as it became a major hub of Soviet Air Forces and Military Administration in the DDR (East Germany).Upon arrival, the HABS boys were greeted by their tour guide Gabriel, an avid European Historian, Journalist and Lecturer, who was a fluent Berliner, having lived there for 8 years. Gabriel proved to be a truly excellent guide throughout the whole trip. After a short coach journey, students arrived in the heart of old Imperial Berlin, and spent most of the first day walking through this beautiful area, in which boys were able to take in the view of the Museum Island and the Deutscher Dom. As well as taking in these attractions, students considered the establishment of a new German state in 1871 and examined the importance of the army in the new state. The army was significant as it had not only been an initially effective guarantor of security and freedom, but later a significant social, political and often oppressive force throughout Germany in the 20th Century. The disastrous consequences of the army’s dominant position in shaping the policies of the German state were plain to see in 1914, with the outbreak of the First World War. Yet while their gamble on victory had failed, students were reminded by Gabriel of the myth of the ‘Stab-in-the-back’, which was so effectively propagated after the war and allowed the army to emerge after the First World War with its reputation intact. The result was that those who had gambled on war as a means of resolving Germany’s problems returned to power in the following decades. This was clear to
see by 1925, when former Field Marshal Hindenburg had become President. Germany’s Chancellor by January 1933 was also a former soldier turned politician, whose actions were to influence history more than any other German in the last century, with devastating effects that would become a key theme throughout much of the remainder of the trip. The next day, students visited the Brandenburg Gate, a former city gate that had been rebuilt in the late 18th Century as a neoclassical triumphal arch with a stunning Quadriga on top, and which was used used by the Nazis as a party symbol when the Nazis ascended to power. When looking out from the Brandenburg Gate it is hard not to see the destruction and violent impact of recent German history. This is reflected in the Reichstag nearby, as well as in the Siegessaule (Berlin Victory Column which symbolized Prussian victory over Denmark, Austria and France in the mid 19th Century), the Soviet War Memorial and the Holocaust Memorial. With the Holocaust Memorial in particular at the forefront of their minds, the group set off down to the Wannsee Villa (in the district of Wannsee) where they received an excellent talk, in a lakeside villa, dedicated to explaining the decision making behind the logistical implementation of what was chillingly referred to by the Nazis as the ‘Final Solution of the Jewish Question’. Boys were also given a document, which set out the minutes of the Nazi meeting on 20th January 1942 that would decide the fate of Europe’s Jews. The following day, teachers and students were taken to see the infamous Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp and its Memorial. The camp is located just north of Berlin in a small town, Oranienburg, with the cold words ‘Arbeit Macht Frei’ forged onto the entrance gate. It served as a chilling reminder to those who had been present at Auschwitz on the History trip last year. The camp served many purposes, most prominently that of the incarceration of Soviet Prisoners of War, Political prisoners, criminals and other groups the Nazis accused of being socially degenerate. Though the camp was not primarily made to incarcerate Jews, it served as a transit camp for German Jews transported to Auschwitz in 1942. The camp also provided an SS training zone, where sadistic, notorious guards such as 'Pistol' Schubert and 'Iron' Gustav learnt their trade. The Camp's memorial displayed remnants of the large brick factory that made bricks intended to build Berlin into 'Germania', Hitler's envisaged capital of the 'Thousand Year Reich'. Gabriel also recounted the story of the incarceration of Herschel Grynszpan, the man who killed a German Diplomat in France in November 1938, providing an adequate scapegoat for Goebbels to orchestrate Kristallnacht, a portent of more devastating later events. The final day in Berlin began with a trip to Treptow Park, the sight of a massive Soviet War Memorial. The memorial combines a mass grave for tens of thousands of Soviet war dead, who fell during the fighting for Berlin in 1945, with a series of friezes which provide a Stalinist interpretation of the Great Fatherland war and the ‘liberation’ of Europe from Nazism. Towering above the memorial park is the powerful image of a Soviet soldier, cradling a young child in one hand and wielding a sword with the other, while
standing over a broken Swastika. The sculpture, sitting high above the park, slams in to perspective the enormity of the effects the war had, not only on Germany and its people, but on other European nations too. Later that day students and teachers gained a fuller picture of the liberation envisaged by Stalin and his successors when visiting Bernauer Strasse, a street in Berlin, which provided students with a vivid account of the building of the Berlin Wall on the night of the 12th-13th August 1961. The students went on to explore the frightening world of Hohenschönhausen prison, where the Stasi (East German State Security) detained and interrogated those who sought to leave the DDR, or displayed “subversive tendencies”. While here, students also witnessed the ‘Anti-Fascist Protection Barrier’ (the killing ground area between the two walls) and a watchtower that had been preserved from the original building of the wall, providing a clear view of how the wall would have appeared in the early 1960s. Around the Wall was a memorial to those who died trying to escape, and the touching images of some who successfully escaped, caught on camera. After an extremely thought provoking experience in Berlin, the second part of the trip took students and teachers to Dresden, the former capital of the Saxon dukes and a magnificent city of culture, which was devastated by the English Bomber Command on 13th February 1945. Over 300,000 incendiary bombs began a blaze that culminated in a ‘firestorm’, which killed 25,000 inhabitants, leaving much of the city destroyed, and left the Soviets with a titanic rebuilding effort throughout the latter part of the 20th Century. Students visited the recently opened Military History Museum in the heart of the city, designed by Daniel Libeskind, and were impressed by the ingenuity of the building’s architecture and the exhibition. However, it was the incredible tour guide, Cosima, who brought the history of the city to life during a walk through the restored old city. Her talk focused not so much on the destruction of that night in February 1945, but on both the determination of the local people to save what remained of the city’s fabric from attempts by the DDR authorities to wipe it out altogether, and their efforts to restore it. She was able to link this to her own involvement in the struggle for greater freedom, which broke out in the autumn of 1989, and gave a very moving account of the demonstrations in the city that ultimately led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989 and the unification of Germany. Thanks must go to Mr Simm and Dr Sloan for organising the trip extremely well and leading everyone through Germany with great enthusiasm. Thanks must also go to Gabriel, who once again put together a tour which was combined with humour, culture, a litany of lessons for life. Above all it gave everyone on the trip a vivid narrative of German history through which they could both address some of the most troubling controversies and issues of the past, and interpret the challenges and crises of the present. Everyone on the trip came away not only having learnt more about German history, but also admiring man’s capacity for reconstruction and renewal in the light of one of the darker epochs of human history.
