Available from: Mojca Pajnik Retrieved on: 31 January 2016

Available from: Mojca Pajnik Retrieved on: 31 January 2016

PRECARIOUS MIGRANT LABOUR ACROSS EUROPE EDITED BY MOJCA PAJNIK A N D G I OVA N N A C A M PA N I

PRECARIOUS MIGRANT LABOUR ACROSS EUROPE EDITED BY MOJCA PAJNIK AND GIOVANNA CAMPANI

REVIEWED BY: MARZIA GRASSI, PHD, UNIVERSITY OF LISBON, PORTUGAL KARMEN MEDICA, PHD, UNIVERSITY OF PRIMORSKA, SLOVENIA

DESIGN: IRENA WÖLLE PRINT: STANE PEKLAJ PRINT RUN: 300 COPIES, FIRST EDITION

© MIROVNI INŠTITUT, 2011 THE PUBLISHING OF THIS BOOK WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS

BOOK SERIES: POLITIKE SYMPOSION EDITOR: MOJCA PAJNIK

PUBLISHER: PEACE INSTITUTE INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STUDIES METELKOVA 6 1000 LJUBLJANA SI-1000 LJUBLJANA E: [email protected] WWW.MIROVNI-INSTITUT.SI COVER: ELIAS PALIDDA, ALIENS (2009)

CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana 331.556.4(4)(082) PRECARIOUS migrant labour across Europe / edited by Mojca Pajnik and Giovanna Campani. - 1st ed. - Ljubjana : Peace Institute, Institute for Contemporary Social an Political Studies, 2011. (Book series Politike symposion) ISBN 978-961-6455-62-6 1. Pajnik, Mojca, 1974255200512

CONTENTS

7

MOJCA PAJNIK, GIOVANNA CAMPANI INTRODUCTION

15 MARIA KONTOS THE LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION OF THIRD COUNTRY MIGRANTS IN GERMANY AND THE IMPACT OF RECENT POLICIES: INTEGRATION POLICY AS POLICY OF EXCLUSION? 45 GIOVANNA CAMPANI, TIZIANA CHIAPPELLI, OLIVIA SALIMBENI LABOUR MARKET, MIGRATION AND POPULISM: THE SUBORDINATED INTEGRATION OF THIRD COUNTRY MIGRANTS 73 NICOS TRIMIKLINIOTIS, CORINA DEMETRIOU LABOUR INTEGRATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN CYPRUS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 97 MOJCA PAJNIK, VERONIKA BAJT “THIRD COUNTRY” MIGRANT WORKERS AS “THIRD CLASS NON-CITIZENS” IN SLOVENIA 119 ANDREA PETŐ, DÓRA DEZSŐ, NOÉMI KAKUCS “IT IS BETTER ‘HERE-HOME’ THAN ‘THERE-HOME’” – LOW-SECTOR MIGRANT WORKERS AS TEMPORARY AGENTS IN THE HUNGARIAN LABOUR MARKET 145 AINO SAARINEN NON-WORK MIGRATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE IN FINLAND: THREE THIRD COUNTRY MIGRANT CASES / FOUR PHASES OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES 171 CONTRIBUTORS 177 INDEX

INTRODUCTION M O J C A P A J N I K , G I OVA N N A C A M PA N I

The collection of papers Precarious Migrant Labour across Europe explores current trends of labour market stratification in relation to migration and integration policies in European societies. It offers an overview of the position of so-called third country migrants in Europe, and looks at the differences and similarities in national labour markets and national policies in a common framework. This framework is characterized by global trends in the productive system (changed from fordist to post-fordist) and by national policies, and was influenced in a more or less significant way by the European Union. Contributions emanate from the research project PRIMTS, Prospects for Integration of Migrants from “Third Countries” and their Labour Market Situations: Towards Policies and Action funded by the European Commission (European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals “Community Actions” 2007), which was conducted in the period 2008–2010. The project explored the positions of male and female migrants, specifically third country migrants, who fill the labour demand of different economic sectors such as construction, farming, or care sector in the post-2000 period. It was the assumption of the project that work conditions, which are often precarious, determine migrants’ lives as economically and socially insecure. Migration policies in most EU states exhibit a trend in designing entry requirements for migrants according to specific national labour market needs. Migrants classified as entering with an attempt to work are steered into professions that are considered as a deficit by the national labour market demands, or as too dirty, difficult, and dangerous to be performed by the “domestic” workforce. The approach used in the project combined the analysis of economic structures and the study of policies with a qualitative research approach attentive to the agency of migrants. Since policies are most often detached from migrants’ realities, the research considered migrants as “partners in communication”; by employing lightly structured, depth biographical narrative interviews, and in-person focus groups as methods of analysis the primary focus of the research was to gather and analyze migrants’ work-related biogra7

PRECARIOUS MIGRANT LABOUR ACROSS EUROPE

phies, and to show what they tell us about the contemporary framing of migration across Europe. Labour migration is not a new research topic. However, the changing productive structures and economic contexts that have been defined as post-fordist influence migrants’ incorporation in the labour market and in general migrants’ lives very differently. Decades ago Michael Piore’s (1980) Birds of Passage showed how migrant workers in the 1970s (similar to today) were appointed to more than 10% of active labourers and they performed the 3D jobs. Morokvasic’s (1984) meaningful title Birds of Passage are also Women importantly pointed to the lack of theory and research on the topic of female migration. In the period that has followed some authors have shown how labour market-related statuses essentially determine migrants lives (Brubaker 1989), and how they function to sustain growth in global capitalist economies (Sassen 1998). The present collection explores migration and labour in contemporary European societies. It aims to bridge the gap in contemporary research where a void is observed in endeavours that would elaborate on a labour dimension of contemporary migration and integration. Even though third country migrants’ labour market positions were the focus of our research, we acknowledged the problematic character of categorizing migrants (as third country, family reunion, or asylum-seeking migrants, etc.) the consequences of which are unfavourable to migrant populations. Normatively, categorizations, although of legal value, sustain divisions in societies, and group people according to national affiliation or motive of migration. These categorizations determine their access to residence permits, work permits, family reunion requirements, citizenship, etc. Inventing categories of migrants not only has as a consequence the sustainment of migrants in rightless positions at the edge of societies (cf. Arendt 1948/1976; Benhabib 2004), but it also does little justice to migrants whose realities, related to the prescribed statuses, are in constant flux. PRIMTS fieldwork shows how a legal migrant today becomes illegal tomorrow, or, how a migrant engaged in legal work also works illegally in the black market. The project explored meanings of the “double labour market” dividing guaranteed and insecure jobs, or regular and irregular ones that sustain the precarious positions of migrant workers. It was an intention of the project to reshape current status-oriented policies to include migrants’ transnational activities. This was the reason the project focused on opening up space for migrant narrations, and as well to provide analyses of current migration and integration management from a bottom-up perspective. 8

INTRODUCTION

The collection cuts across the EU by providing analyses of various experiences in migration history and labour market integration of countries with: a longer tradition of migration (Germany), a pronounced regional component (Finland, Cyprus), a Mediterranean one (Italy) and those with a socialist past (Slovenia, Hungary). Chapters are also clustered with reference to general divisions in patterns of migration that refer to North-South / East-West divides, and with references to “old” and “new” countries of migration. The collection considers the transnational character of debates in migration while specifically elaborating on connections between migration and labour. Although focused to debate country specificities, chapters explore various aspects of migrants’ realities that cut across national states. Chapters point to transnational dimensions of migration and global consequences of migration policies, while at the same time recognizing that migration discourses and policies are embedded in historically, culturally, and socially-determined, national contexts. The collection devises country-specific case studies in which contributors debate the precarious positions of migrants based on: 1) analyses of data on (un)employment trends; and 2) the distribution of industry and sector branches employing migrant workers or engaging them via informal routes in the black market. It is a common feature of chapters to include the analyses of the migrants’ labour market from the perspective of a critical policy evaluation. Moreover, specific attention is given to capture gender bias in patterns of migrant employment and treatment of migrant women. It comes as a no surprise that all chapters detect the location of migrant women in service-oriented sectors that are largely black economies that reproduce the gender, class, and ethnic divides. It is also a common feature of chapters that they detect the specific rationale of current migration policies which channel migrants to the precarious “traditionally migrant” sectors of the economy, where they are additionally burdened by a high level of job insecurity, low payment, a low level of social benefits, and where they face de-skilling, language barriers, and discrimination in the workplace. These writings also confirm the thesis that current economies of European societies produce “conditioned lives” (Pajnik 2011) of migrants where legal statuses – be it temporary regular or irregular –, labour market realities of unstable jobs, and insecure work relations produce what appears to be the forced flexibilization of migrants that serves the needs of global capital (Campani 2007; Munck 2007). An important topic of the book is integration, a complex notion that is debated by politicians and scholars. Independently from the definition, 9


integration cannot be thought without the agency of migrants themselves. Evaluation of existing data on (un)employment conditions for migrants, and of migration and integration policies coupled with migrant narratives devises a specific critique of integration as a policy that positively influences migrants. In the last decade numerous publications have emerged that accept integration as a per se desirable concept and analyse migrants’ integration (Niessen et al., 2007; Niessen 2009) where a lack of critical reflection of the concept is observed. Replacing the undesirable and politically incorrect assimilationism, integration was praised as providing an alternative and as stimulating debates and policies towards processes of equalization of migrants in relation to the “nationals.” Theoretical considerations of integration, however, soon began to examine integration as a way of “migrant’s recolonization” (Balibar 2004) that serves to preserve “the national” which leaves the concept with limited potential for equalization. Three types of migrant incorporation approaches are distinguished by the literature, these being assimilation, exclusion, and integration (Tambiah 2000). Also, several research projects funded by the EU in the last decade have pointed to the problematic character of integration. What is becoming a more and more contested concept in scientific debates (and is backed by empirical evidence), however, persists in the EU policy agenda on migration. The PRIMTS project detected the conditioning character of integration while exploring integration in relation to migrant labour. As a result, we question whether the concept potentially practices mutual cooperation, where citizens (as “beyond-nationals”) deliberate as equals. On the contrary, because it is unable to provide the space for true, two-way communication, integration has become a concept that feeds the various processes of nationalization, such as those of protecting the national labour market from migrants (Trimikliniotis 2011). Moreover, potential positive aspects of integration are also reduced by the fact that integration is increasingly being promoted side-byside with migration prevention (see Kontos in this collection). Here the argument is increasingly employed by EU countries that migrants’ integration should be preferred to actual immigration. Instrumentalization of integration is also present in strategies at the national and EU levels that frame migrants’ integration in those demographic discourses that promote economic utilitarianism, i.e. the argument that migrants’ labour is necessary for sustaining the EU economy and labour market demands. Although such arguments may quiet racist attitudes towards migrants, their limits lie in the instrumentalization of migrants, the factual treat10

INTRODUCTION

ments of migrants as “necessary labourers” that can, however, easily become unnecessary tomorrow. It has thus become apparent that integration derives from a strongly national state-centred social order, which prioritizes nationality status. Integration as a kind of moral social order of specific national states supports forms of associative membership only to the extent when these correlate with national interests. The primordial ethno-cultural nation whose implications have largely been criticized (Habermas 1998; Balibar 2004) is still a prerequisite of integration that doesn’t really seem to bring communities closer, but on the contrary, can be viewed as drawing strong demarcation lines between “real nationals” and “migrants.” Integration produces migrants as an “object group” and as such doesn’t overcome the frame “which prevents seeing the objects of integratory policies as anything except immigrés” (Favell 2001, 73). Such an attitude is exemplified in labour market policies that are oriented to protect national labourers from migrants’ penetration, best seen in populist-racist rhetoric across the EU spreading slogans such as “migrants are eating our jobs,” to use only the mildest version of these xenophobic outbreaks. For example, to protect its labour market Hungary facilitates transnationalism of its co-ethnics living as minorities in the neighbouring countries through preferentialism in migration-related legislation. Research has shown that the protective measures are directed towards channelling low-sector labour migrants into the informal economy. This satisfies the Hungarian labour market’s need for disposable workers – who appear when in need and disappear when unwanted (see Pető, Dezső and Kakucs in this collection). Our approach to integration has been pragmatic: we have certainly looked at the academic debate, however, in the various case studies, we have taken into account public discourses that deal with integration, and have analysed policies and various measures of integration in dealing with migration. In Cyprus integration policies sustain the problematic assumption that labour immigration to the country is a temporary phenomenon and desirable only when it covers labour shortages in sectors which are unpopular with Cypriots. Consequently, the adopted policies are transient and short-term, which reproduces the precariousness of migrant workers. Similarly, integration bills in Slovenia leave migrant men and women on the outskirts of integration where they endure harsh living and working conditions. Consequently, much more than mere policy adjustments are needed to comprehensively grasp the current trends in migrant labour, because it seems that migration management – as 11


this is currently practiced – remains a problem and not a solution to the situation of migrants’ “recolonization” (see chapters by Trimikliniotis and Demetriou; Pajnik and Bajt). Such approaches clearly don’t help improve migrants’ labour market positions. Chapters show how rising informal economies are increasingly possible because of migrants’ cheap labour. The Italian economy (see Campani, Chiappelli and Salimbeni) is largely sustained by informal migrant labour that makes up as much as 30% of the GDP. This is a structural cause that produces irregular migration and creates an obstacle to the integration of regular migrants. The concept of “subordinated integration” becomes the key to understanding the acceptance of migrants into Italian society via their incorporation into a labour market that needs a labour force for manual and unqualified jobs in sectors where the informal economy is important (small and very small enterprises, traditional productive activities, tourism industry, Mediterranean agriculture, services to private persons, etc.). The reconceptualization of integration would thus require responses to such an anomaly in the labour market. Also, recognition of alternative ways of migrant participation would be needed, for example with recognition of migrant entrepreneurship, labour market niches exemplified by ethnic economies, the exchange of economic and cultural resources via interaction processes of diasporic communities, etc. In contrast to more or less restrictive migration regimes across European societies, the Nordic residence-based welfare model brings a slightly better situation for migrants in Finland when compared with other countries. Specifically, Finland has seen looser labour market policies that don’t tie migrants to specific employers, and they grant work opportunities to family migrants unlike in many other European countries. High rates of unionization and social solidarity have also brought higher visibility of migrants in political life. Finland has also adopted effective integration measures at the local level. However (see Saarinen), fallacies of the Nordic model point to the fact that despite universalist claims, this model also sustains the exclusion of migrants, produces their irregularity, and fosters the illegal economy, which are all coupled with rising populist discourses also in the North.

12

INTRODUCTION

References Arendt, Hannah. 1948/1976. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt. Balibar, Étienne. 2004. We, The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brubaker, William Rogers. 1989. Membership without Citizenship: The Economic and Social Rights of Noncitizens. In Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America, ed. W. R. Brubaker, 145–181. New York: New University Press of America. Campani, Giovanna, ed. 2007. Migranti nel mondo globale. Rome: Sinnos. Favell, Adrian. 2001. Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain. Houndmills: Palgrave. Habermas, Jürgen. 1998. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Morokvasic, Mirjana. 1984. ‘Birds of Passage are also Women ...’, International Migration Review 18 (4): 886–907. Munck, Ronaldo. 2007. Migrazioni irregolari ed economia informale: “lato oscuro” della globalizzazione o nuova normalità? In Migranti nel mondo globale, ed. G. Campani, 12–21. Rome: Sinnos. Niessen, Jan. 2009. Legal Frameworks for the Integration of Third-country Nationals. Boston: Leiden. Niessen, Jan, Thomas Huddleston, Laura Citron in cooperation with Andrew Geddes, Dirk Jacobs. 2007. Migrant Integration Policy Index. Brussels: British Council and Migration Policy Group. Piore, Michael J. 1980. Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour and Industrial Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pajnik, Mojca. 2011. Impossibilities of Social Citizenship: On the Statelessness of Migrants. In Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe, ed. G. Lazaridis, 239–257. Aldershot: Ashgate. Sassen, Saskia. 1998. Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money. New York: The New York Press. Tambiah, Stanley J. 2000. Transnational Movements, Diaspora, and Multiple Modernities. Daedalus 129 (1, Multiple Modernities): 163–194. Trimikliniotis, Nicos, ed. Forthcoming in 2011. Contested Integration, Migration and Societal Transformation: European Dilemmas and Challenges. Nicosia: University of Nicosia Press.

13

THE LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION OF THIRD COUNTRY MIGRANTS IN GERMANY AND THE IMPACT OF RECENT POLICIES: INTEGRATION POLICY AS POLICY OF EXCLUSION? MARIA KONTOS

Introduction The aim of this chapter is to give an overview on labour market integration, employment, and unemployment of third country migrants in Germany. The chapter also outlines the policies that underline their working and living conditions. Starting in the mid 1950s all the way up to the recruitment stop in 1973, and despite of the expectation of a rotating migration, the old labour immigration regime enabled the integration of recruited migrants in socially insured employment – albeit in unskilled positions in industrial production – and in social rights.1 New immigrant populations entering Germany in recent decades have been confronted with an entirely different situation: a deregulated labour market and high unemployment, a restricted legal framework opening opportunities only for precarious work positions and aggravating access to social rights. Diversity of social statuses and rights make the division between old (guest workers’ ethnic groups) and new migrant populations an important analytical device when studying the situation of migrants generally and third country migrants specifically. An aspect aggravating the analysis of working and living conditions of third country nationals in Germany is that most research on migration focuses on old migrant populations – especially the Turkish population. Among the newer migrant populations, it is the Polish group that has attracted most attention (Morokvasic 1994; Irek 1998; Miera 2007; Babka von Gostomski 2008). Analyses conducted on behalf of policy making in1

Trade union policy was to avoid a discriminating treatment of labour migrants that could weaken the negotiating power of the unions and could eventually lead to a decrease in salaries for native workers, disintegrating in this way their movement altogether. 15


stitutions2 equate migrants with foreigners without focusing on thirdcountry nationals. Until recently, statistical data on migration and the social situation of migrants was based on the binary pattern of foreigners versus Germans, also taking into account the nationality of the migrants. In 2005, despite some concerns that this might create or strengthen a categorization of Germans into first and second class citizens,3 the Federal Office for Statistics introduced the category “Persons with a Migration Background” in the annual Micro Census surveys4 and expanded in this way data collection in the category of naturalized migrants. A consideration that led to making visible naturalized migrants5 was that the acquisition of formal citizenship does not automatically imply successful social integration (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007). The first part of this chapter outlines the specific situation of third country nationals in Germany in the context of the historical developments of migration and labour market policy in Germany after WWII. A historical perspective allows highlighting the differences in the social positioning of third country nationals in old and new migrations, as well as in relation to the situation of former third country nationals – i.e., citizens of the new EU member states with still no right of free movement – in the framework of labour market deregulation and flexibilization and the expansion of low-wage work in specific economic sectors. The second part of the chapter deals with the main migration and integration policy trends in the last years, highlighting the ambivalences of policies demonstrated on the coexistence of integration policies and policies of control and exclusion. This ambivalence will be discussed on the interconnection between integration policy with the labour market policy and the transformation of the integration courses from an offer for integration to an instrument enabling control over migrants by legitimizing exclusionary measures. 2

Major publications of this type include the “Migration Report” published regularly by the Federal Government since 2000; the “Report of the Commissioner of the Federal Government for Migration Refugees and Integration on the Situation of Foreign Men and Women in Germany”; “Population and Employment. Population with Migration Background” which has been presenting the results of the annual Micro Census results since 2005; “Representative Social Survey” (Repräsentativuntersuchung) which describes the situation of migrants in Germany has been published in five-year intervals since the 1980s; and reports issued by the Federal Agency for Employment.

3

Personal communication by an officer of the Federal Office for Statistics, 2 March 2009.

4

The Micro Census is a calculation of the figures on the basis of a representative sample.

5

The change is based on a modification to the Micro Census Law made in 2003 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). 16

THE LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION

OF

THIRD COUNTRY MIGRANT S ...

Third Country Migrants in the German Labour Market THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS AND IMMIGRATION FLOWS The share of persons with a migration background in the population increased from 18.4% in 2006 to 18.7% in 2007. A total of 7.3 million of these persons are foreigners, and 8.1 million are German citizens (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008a, 7). The biggest ethnic group of people with a migration background are those from Turkey followed by Italy, Poland, Greece, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Kazakhstan (BAMF 2008a, 46). The share of foreigners in the population has remained stable in recent years, amounting to 8.9% in 2007. With 4.4 million persons, third country nationals comprise the gross proportion of foreigners in Germany, while EU foreigners, with 2.3 million, are about one half that figure. Moreover, a characteristic of the last two decades is the growing significance of irregular migration and informal work in Germany. The share of women in the inflows, i.e., those immigrating during the year (40% in 1994 and 43% in 2007) is higher than their share in the outflows, i.e., those who emigrate within the year (36% and 39% for the same period) (BAMF 2008a, 30). This trend entails a process of “feminization” of foreign populations in Germany, although the share of men among the foreigners in total is still slightly higher than that of women (50.8% in relation to 48.5%) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008a). Some ethnic groups are characterized through the high percentage of women or men, respectively. Due to marriage migration, the percentage of female immigrants in inflows from Thailand in 2007 was 76.3%. Other countries with high percentages of female migrants inflows are Kenya (75.4%), Peru (71%), the Ukraine (63.7%), Estonia (69.9%), the Russian Federation (62.7%), Lithuania (62.7%), and the Philippines (62.4%). Males are overrepresented in inflows from Algeria (78.5%), Croatia (74.9%), Lebanon (73.5%), BosniaHerzegovina (72.9%), Iraq (71.7%), Tunisia (69.9%), India (69%), and Poland (67.7%) (BAMF 2008a, 30). There is a clear regional concentration of migrant workers in the old federal states in the western part of the country. Of the migrants living in Germany, 95.9% live in the old federal states and 4.1% in the new federal states (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008b). Most migrants are concentrated in the urban agglomerations of the Ruhr region and in large cities (BAMF 2008b, 26). Since 1973, there has officially been 17


no labour immigration policy in Germany, as the ban on recruiting foreign labour remains in effect. New immigration flows of third country nationals – including former third country nationals – consist mainly of the following categories: a) Labour migrants entering Germany on the basis of exceptions from the recruitment stop: Exceptions refer to labour shortages regarding specific skills and vocations. Some of these categories call for temporary migrants, allowed to work in the country for a fixed period of time. Main categories are: – Workers with a specific contract, and for a fixed period of time, working for an employer residing in one the EU and non-EU countries with which the Federal Labour Agency has made agreements.6 – Seasonal workers in agriculture and the restaurant sector. They come predominantly from the new EU member countries (EU8), but also from Croatia. Each worker may work for up to six months per year in Germany (BAMF 2008a, 82). – Domestic workers recruited on the basis of bilateral agreements with countries that are today EU members (EU8). They may work for a period of three years and re-admission is possible only after the applicant has spent three years outside of Germany. – Au pairs may be recruited for up to two years. – Nurses recruitment on the basis of bilateral agreements with some of the CEE countries. Most of the recruited nurses come from Croatia. b) Immigrating members of families of German citizens or of migrants with residence rights: The majority of immigrating people fall under the family reunion scheme. Marriage migrants come predominantly from Turkey, the states of the former Yugoslavia, the Russian Federation, Morocco, and Thailand. In particular, female marriage migration has increased significantly in recent years. Between 1996 and 2005, 163,769 women entered the country as the spouse of a German citizen and 188,012 as the spouse of a non-German male (Deutscher Bundestag 2005). c) Asylum seekers: Due to radical changes in the German Asylum Law that enable the deportation of asylum seekers to the last safe third country they had passed though prior to entering Germany, and the denial of 6

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro (former FR of Yugoslavia), Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Hungary. 18


OF


asylum for applicants from countries that are listed as safe (Leise 2007), the number of asylum seekers has decreased from 39,084 in 2000 to 5,933 in 2008. A large number of rejected asylum seekers could not be deported to their countries of origin for humanitarian and/or other reasons. These received the status of “toleration”7 which does not enable access to the labour market, allowing only limited access to social benefits. d) Highly skilled migrants: A central aim of German immigration policy is to attract qualified migrants. However, early in the current decade, the Green Card was only being utilized by a small number of third country nationals. Efforts to attract more highly qualified migrants led to further changes in migration regulations (BAMF 2008a). e) Irregular migrants: A large number of irregular migrants are assumed to be working in informal labour markets, estimations ranging from 500,000 to 1 million (Alt 2004; Krieger et al. 2006; Cyrus 2004). These are third country nationals and former third country nationals, i.e., new EU member states citizens without the right of the free movement. Through the EU enlargements, a number of the latter could gain a legal residence status after the expiration of the transition clauses in 2011 and 2013, respectively.

THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN THE LABOUR MARKET Being traditionally highly concentrated in the sector of industrial production, migrants have been most affected by declines in these sectors over the course of economic restructuring. Continuing de-industrialization is reflected in decreasing numbers of socially insured employees from 29 million in June 1992 to 27 million in June 2000, reaching the lowest level of 26 million in 2005 and increasing again slightly to 27 million in June 2008. The number of socially insured working foreigners decreased from 1.9 million in June 2000 to 1.7 in June 2005, increasing again to 1.9 million in June 2008 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2009). Barriers to the labour market have led to a lower activity rates among migrants in relation to their native counterparts. For the years between 2003 and 2008, the activity rate of foreigners revolved around the 30% 7

Tolerated migrants are migrants who have been obliged to leave the German territory but who have received a postponement of deportation that enables them to remain in Germany. The postponement is short-term, lasting from some weeks to some months. Toleration refers to persons with no right to stay but who are documented (see Kontos et al. 2006). 19


mark, while the activity rate of Germans increased from 50.3% in 2003 to 52.1% in 2008. Regarding activity rates and the sectors in which they find employment, there are clear differences between migrant men and migrant women. The increasing share of women among socially insured employed migrants (in 2000 34% of the employed foreigners were migrant women, in 2007 it was 36%), as well as registered unemployed persons (in 2000 17% of unemployed foreigners were women, in 2007 it was 20%) (see Kontos 2009) denotes the increased activity rate of migrant women in recent years. Male migrants are most frequently employed in manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and services. Female migrants are active in restaurants, the domestic and care sector, and the sex industry. Table 1 demonstrates the distribution of third country nationals in position in the labour market: TABLE 1: THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN THE LABOUR MARKET, 2000–2007 Year

Gainful employed

Self-employed

Assisting family members

Salaried employees

Wage earners

Uneployed

2000

1,923

89

8

434

1,260

418

2001

1,958

95

10

520

1,209

421

2002

1,951

115

10

557

1,151

454

2003

1,911

113

9

563

1,115

454

2004

1,857

120

13

488

1,092

616

2005

1,534

126

12

486

873

510

2006

1,809

140

12

586

950

538

2007

1,718

140

18

533

1,013

453

Source: Micro Census 2000–2007

We observe a steady decline in the numbers of all gainfully employed third country nationals followed by an increase in 2006, a year of economic growth. The same trend characterizes the salaried work. In the category of salaried workers there is an increase until 2003, and then a fluctuation. Only the self-employed experienced a steady increase, while the numbers of assisting family members fluctuated over time with a clear tendency of rising after 2006. Self-employed migrants from old migrant populations are concentrated in the food sector, trade, and restaurants. They frequently operate family businesses, as demonstrated by increasing numbers of assisting family members. Turks, Moroccans, and 20


OF


citizens of states successors of former Yugoslavia are also entrepreneurially active as subcontractors in construction (Kontos 2008; Dana 2006). The labour market in Germany remains tense, and the number of longterm unemployed remains high through the years, rising from 2000 until 2004, and then falling again. In September 2006, the unemployment rates for all was quoted at 10.1%, 1.1% lower than in the same month in 2005. The unemployment rate for females was 11.8%, higher than that for men, whereas unemployment among foreigners was 23.6%, thus more than double the overall average (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2006a). In 2007, 26% of third country nationals have been unemployed.8 Moreover, foreigners tend to remain unemployed longer than natives do, as their share among the long-term unemployed is higher with a tendency to increase. Higher unemployment of third-country migrants is also due to legal status, EU citizens having priority in placement in the labour market, as well as due to discrimination affecting third country migrants.

LABOUR MARKET INEQUALITY OR (IM)MOBILITY OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS FROM THE OLD IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS Literature on older migrations to Germany focuses on both EU and nonEU migrants. In the 1970s, the Marxian concept of the “industrial reserve army” had been broadly utilized in understanding the situation of “guest workers” (Nikolinakos 1973; Castles and Kosack 1973). Efforts have been undertaken to understand the class consciousness of these farmers/ workers, especially by studying the specific characteristics of their mobilizations in the early 1970s. From the 1980s on, research on the labour market situation of migrants has been shaped by pragmatic questions concerning factors determining and explaining the dynamics of inequality in the labour market, rather than by systemic references. Research has stressed a slight convergence in the labour market positions of migrants with that of natives. This is indicated through increased percentages of salaried/white collar workers and decreased percentages of waged/blue collar workers among migrants, and explained through the economic restructuring and the downsizing in the industrial sector (Granato and Kalter 2001). The broad consolidation of migrants as an underclass has been explained as an effect of selective immigration. Old migrant populations had low qualifications, and their position on the la8

This is a result of our own calculations as the Labour Agency does not deliver unemployment rates for third country nationals or for single nationalities (see Kontos 2009). 21


bour market was an effect of further mechanisms determining the heritage of inequality, such as decisions made by parents regarding the investment in education and human capital of their children (ibid.), or the impact of parental social class on the scholastic achievement of their children (Bender and Seifert 1996). Some researchers stress the segmentation of the labour market as well as the impermeability of the borders dividing labour market segments as the main factors determining the position of migrants in an underclass, and the lack of social mobility (Seifert 2001). One topic for research has been social mobility among second generation migrants. Hard competition in the market for vocational training positions yields blocked access to the vocations in core sectors of the economy (Bender and Seifert 1996). Today, far more migrants than native young people are without an apprenticeship. Despite educational success, young migrant women find fewer opportunities on the apprenticeship market, and have to endure longer waiting periods to get an apprenticeship. Their concentration in specific, gendered vocations is the result of processes of adaptation to the apprenticeship market and the overall labour market situation (Granato 2004, 15). The most recent “Representative Social Survey” (Babka von Gostomski 2008) confirms that there have been considerable improvements in the qualification and mobility of migrants in manual work. The number of Turks with vocational training in crafts increased from 21% in 1995 to 32.8% in 2001. Regarding the transition from waged/blue collar to salaried/white collar occupations, there has also been a clear increase. Migrant women are better represented in comparison to men in salaried/white collar jobs (Stichs 2008). Social mobility among migrants has been debated under the concept of human capital. However, differences in the social mobility processes among ethnic groups cannot be explained with the human capital theory, but as ethnic disadvantage (Bender and Seifert 1996, 493). Seibert and Solga (2005) utilized the signalling theory to understand the true meaning of certificates for opportunities in the labour market. According to this theory, vocational education certificates alone do not represent composite vocational skills and knowledge. Education “may serve as a pure screening device or filter, through which employers identify individuals with certain qualities that the educational process tests and certifies but does not itself produce” (Hirsch 1977, 47). Such information references attributes like intelligence, motivation, and discipline are qualities that employers cannot examine themselves. This constitutes the basis for 22


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selection and sorting. Possessing a certificate should increase one’s opportunities in being accepted for a job. However, other attributes of the candidate are also perceived as indicators for achievement. Concerning ethnicity, there could be an assumption that the status of a foreigner might be related to administrative barriers for employment and the cultural belongingness of the candidate might signal less cultural knowledge and a lack of soft skills, and therefore a lower capacity for achievement. This phenomenon is also debated as statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973), and is the basis for general assumptions on the achievement capacity of members of ethnic groups. This means that even if migrants possess a vocational certificate, they might be disadvantaged in relation to native candidates for the same job. Frank Kalter (2006) suggested taking into account the capital sorts of young Turkish adults in order to fully understand their relative failure in the labour market. Deficits in the German language and the specific ethnic networks in which they operate are major factors. Search, information, and investment strategies employed by young Turkish adults are most relevant for the outcomes of efforts to attain labour market integration. Thus, processes related to labour market disadvantage should be localized to the pre-market field. Another topic of research has been the social relations in the workplace. Scholars have shown that a cooperative form of interaction is predominant in the workplace. Conflicts and discrimination are rare, while day-to-day interactions foster acceptance among employees. This acceptance results in a successful social integration in the workplace, which, however, is not being extended to include time after work. The rules organizing work are decisive for the pragmatically-oriented cooperation; however, the need for collaboration in the workplace gives rise to mechanisms of mutual recognition which are supported by the interest of the actors to secure acceptable social relations. Another mechanism is the repression of ethnic differences in the workplace and the predominance of universal norms. In this way differences are externalized (Schmidt 2006). Research has also addressed self-employment as a means for social integration. Some scholars evaluate self-employment among migrants as a mere survival strategy (Pütz 2004; Bögenhold 1989; Bukow 1993); others stress the intrinsic meaning of self-employment (Kontos 2003, 2007; Apitzsch and Kontos 2003; Leung 2004). Other investigated the gendered role of ethnic and family resources for the entrepreneurial activities of migrant men and women, and the incorporation of (cheap/unpaid) family labour in family businesses (Hillmann 2001; Apitzsch and Kontos 23


2008). Relations within family businesses of migrants and the impact these relations have on integration processes of family members in society have been analyzed, especially in relation to the impact of the economic and family logic on the family relations and children’s wellbeing, school achievement, and social upward mobility (Kontos 2005).

RECENT THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN SPECIFIC INDUSTRY AND SERVICE SECTOR BRANCHES While debates on the old migrant populations focus on the role of human capital for social mobility, research on the new migrants addresses rather the devaluation of human capital in migration as new migrants are broadly affected by deskilling processes (Englman and Müller 2007). Recent third country nationals, even those with qualifications, work in sectors with most precarious working conditions. Widespread discrimination practices and the lack of the specific cultural capital demanded in Germany, as well as appropriate social capital connecting with professional fields, hinder the utilization of qualifications in the labour market (Kontos and Voswinkel 2010). In the following we outline the situation of third country migrants in the sectors with high concentration of third country nationals.

CONSTRUCTION A segmented labour market has emerged in the construction sector in Germany with poorly paid EU migrant workers and workers with no regular status on the one side, and Germans and settled migrant workers paid according to valid German tariff agreements on the other (Hunger 2001). In June 2008, the Federal Agency for Labour Statistics referenced 102,002 foreigners working in construction with social insurance coverage amounting to 6.65% of the total labour force in the sector. According to the Trade Union for Building, Forestry, Agriculture and Environment (IG BAU), there are currently 300,000 informal workers, both Germans and migrants active in this sector. Third country nationals with a stable legal status in Germany, especially citizens of Turkey and the countries of the former Yugoslavia, are often subcontracted entrepreneurs in construction, employing co-ethnics and other migrants. Thus, in this sector, third country nationals are found among regular workers, the self-employed, and irregular migrant workers. Reports on the working conditions in and accommodation related to the construction sector often expose scandalous situations of over-exploitation. Moreover, security stan24


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dards decrease and the number of accidents on construction sites has risen in recent years (Hunger 2001). Efforts to set up corrective measures to ease this situation were developed by trade unions, employers associations, and some political parties and led, in 1996, to the Law for Posted Workers (Entsendegesetz) that foresees minimum wages in construction and some other branches. In 2004, the Trade Union for Building, Forestry, Agriculture and Environment (IG BAU) founded the “European Migrant Workers’ Union” with the aim of addressing posted and seasonal workers, in order to provide them with legal assistance, advice, and support especially in cases of illness or accident. This was the first time a German trade union undertook efforts to organize irregular workers.

AGRICULTURE According to data provided by the Federal Agency, there were 31,091 foreign workers employed under the social security system in agriculture in June 2008. They comprised 10.38% of the official labour force. As in construction, a range of categories of other migrant workers are also active in this sector, including seasonal and irregular workers. In 1991, bilateral agreements with Poland, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were signed, regulating the recruitment of seasonal workers in agriculture and catering. The agreement foresaw up to 180,000 work contracts per year, each limited to a maximum of three months. Yet in 2001, 243,639 work permits for seasonal work were issued in agriculture alone (Labour Agency 2002). This emphasizes the strong demand for seasonal migrant work in Germany. As of January 2005, the period for individual contracts was extended to four months in the hotel and catering branch, and contracts for work on fruit, vegetable, vineyard, hops, and tobacco farms can now be made for up to one year (Buscher and Stüber 2005). This migration regime will be valid until 2011, when Germany will withdraw the suspension of the free movement of labour affecting the new EU member states (EU8). Labour market experts estimate that in agriculture, the number of irregular migrants is equivalent to the number of legal migrant workers (Cyrus 2004; Dietz 2004). Working conditions are extremely poor in this sector, shaped by arbitrariness and over-exploitation. Bad to miserable living conditions characterize the accommodations available (Heck 2006). A mandatory clause in the contracts of migrant workers in agriculture regulates their accommodation and lodging conditions. While wages are mostly under the legal minimum, it is not unusual for workers to have costs for accom25


modation and meals retained from their wages (Korczynska 2002). Migrant workers are expected to accept irregular time schedules, working up to 10 hours a day for the entire week, without allowances for overtime or weekend work. This seems to be the rule for both irregular and regular migrants (Cyrus 2004; Dietz 2004).

GASTRONOMY With 21.92%, restaurants and hospitality are the sectors with a high share of migrant workers employed with social security coverage. This share corresponds to 168,671 employees. However, specialists estimate that approx. 500,000 migrants are active in this branch (Bundesagentur 2007); some of them are self-employed and assisting family members not registered in the social insurance system. Others are seasonal workers, recruited in the new EU member states in CEE or Croatia and the number of irregular migrant workers is estimated to be high. In addition to small ethnic business restaurants where we find third country nationals as employers and employees, we also encounter numerous third country nationals as employees in fast food chains. 80% to 90% of McDonald’s employees are migrants. The company declares itself to be proud of employing people from 120 nations,9 while the trade union in the food sector NGG suspects exploitation and dependency if not even work relationships driven by blackmail (Keller 2003).

THE DOMESTIC SECTOR The Federal Agency registers only 5,496 migrant workers in households with personnel. They comprise 15.68% of the total labour force here. The number of irregular migrant workers is much higher. About 90% of all domestic workers are believed to be migrants, mostly women, with the tendency to increase their share (Harstall 2005). Estimations run to approximately 2 million undeclared domestic workers in Germany (Sievers and Bunzenthal 2004). The number of undocumented live-in and live-out caretakers for elderly people is estimated between 80,000 and 100,000 (Friedrichs 2005). As a result of the Employment Ordinance Reform in 2002, migrant domestic workers can be recruited by the Labour Office in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Czech Republic for full-time, socially insured work in families with a person in need of care/help (Frings 2005; Kontos et al. 2006). Recruitment agree9

See IUBA. 2006. (13 January 2006). 26


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ments foresee a temporary stay in Germany for a maximum of three years (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2008). Due to the high costs of regular domestic and care work, the number of migrant women recruited is quite low, amounting 3,051 in 2008. It is obvious that when the suspension of the right to free movement for citizens of the new EU member states runs out, the recruitment procedure will lose its validity. Migrant women working as live-ins are, to a large extent, citizens of the new EU member states (Irek 1998; Miera 2007; Lutz 2007; Gather et al. 2002), however, the share of irregular third country nationals (mostly from the Philippines) is also quite large. Living in the private sphere of the employer protects them from spot checks by the authorities and deportation. A number of migrant women in the domestic sector have vocational skills they cannot utilize gainfully in the labour market (Kontos et al. 2006).

INDUSTRIAL CLEANING According to the Micro Census conducted in 2002, 24% of employees in the cleaning and waste management sectors were foreigners. In the urban centres of West Germany, in middle- and large-sized cleaning firms, between 70% and 95% of the employees are migrants. Women constitute 80% of this labour force. Migrant women are usually employed on the basis of minor employment (Gather et al. 2005). Migrants from Turkey and the non-EU states of the former Yugoslavia may be found to be foremen, or even responsible for a specific object. Meanwhile, recent third country migrants from new migrant populations can be found in the most precarious positions in the bottom of the hierarchies, in mini jobs and part time work with time limited contracts. Irregular migrants are also present here. Working conditions are characterized through unsocial working hours, as the buildings have to be cleaned before the work day begins or after it has closed.

SEX INDUSTRY On 1 January 2002, the Prostitution Law came into effect. It decriminalizes prostitution and has as its targets the establishment of better working conditions and social insurance for women voluntarily working in prostitution, as well as the regulation of this informal labour market (Kontos and Shinozaki 2010). The new law enables prostitutes to work either as self-employed, or as dependant employees with access to health care, unemployment, and pension funds. The law intends to decrease social discrimination and exploitation, as well as to prevent the exposure 27


of sex workers to violence and organized crime. The situation of third country migrant prostitutes, however, could not be improved with the new law, as most of them are undocumented and cannot benefit from the legalization of prostitution.10 According to estimates 60% of the around 400,000 women assumed to work in prostitution in Germany are migrants, half of these are third country migrants. The dominant discourse on the prostitution of migrants focuses on questions of sexual exploitation assuming that driving force behind migrant women entering prostitution is that they are victims of trafficking (Hughes 2000). Women’s organizations active in this sector and scholars bring opposing evidence (Munk 2006a; Augustin 2006). According to Henning (1997), the majority of Latin American prostitutes came to Germany on their own, in order to earn money. However, even women who voluntarily travel to engage in prostitution do not always anticipate the extremely bad working conditions they will have to endure. Moreover, given the lack of legal possibilities to enter and work in Germany, women who are willing to work in the sex industry are dependent upon mediators who promise support, such as pimps and owners of brothels, clubs, and bars.

Migrant Employment and the Economic Crisis The recent economic crisis has been less harmful for the German labour market than expected. In 2008, shrinking of economic activities in the range of 6% has been forecasted, and the unemployment was soon expected to reach the mark of 5 million. For combating the coming economic crisis, the government decided for an 80 billion euro stimulus package to support the economy, and the firms have been reacting to the crisis by putting employees on “reduced work.” In order to avoid layoffs, the “reduced working week benefit” has been extended from the current 18 months to two years. In relation to the dimensions of the global economic crisis and in relation to other OECD countries, the numbers of unemployed remained relatively low in Germany. Moreover, due to high export rates, German economy soon recovered, and in March 2010 the unemployment rate started to drop. In the following months the economic growth remained positive; in October 2010 the unemployment rate fell to 7% and the number of the unemployed to 3.15 million. The un10

In 2004, the situation changed for a great number of undocumented prostitutes from the accession countries, as they now have the opportunity to legalize their stay in Germany by declaring their work as self-employment. 28


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employment rate of the foreigners fell from 15.5% in March to 14.7% in October 2010.11 However, there is evidence that the decrease of unemployment has been accompanied by the increase of the low wage sector, precarious employment, and especially agency work. In fact, the Labour Agency reports an increase of the numbers of third country nationals in unemployment for 2009. From a gender perspective, the economic crisis seems to produce more male than female unemployed. The gross of the third country nationals are employed in manufacturing and in construction, sectors that have been struck by the current economic crisis. Another sector hit by the economic crisis are the restaurants that employ both male and female third country nationals. The sector of domestic and care work, a domain of (mostly irregular) migrant women, was not expected to be struck by the crisis, as the need for these services is embedded in structural care deficits.

The Impact of Integration Policy on the Labour Market Integration of Third Country Nationals FROM THE NEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION TO A SELECTIVE INTEGRATION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY Since the late ’90s, issues of integration have prevailed in public debates, such as concerns on the lack of integration of migrants and the lack of integration prospects for their children given high rates of school failure (Liebig and Widmaier 2009), the emergence of so-called “parallel societies,” as well as rising fears of upcoming Islamic fundamentalism. Demographic development and shortages of skilled labour were additional concerns. Within this arena of multiple social and economic concerns (Bauder 2008), a new integration and migration policy emerged, aimed at serving social and economic needs and at establishing a framework for the control and domestication of migrant populations. Measures challenging the principle “Germany is no immigration country” and endorsing integration coexist with exclusionary measures. As a result of the needs for labour, the opening of labour immigration channels has been called for by some social groups, including employers’ associations. Since the turn of the century, a range of legislative work has been effected in order to reform the regulations regarding 11

See Bundeagentur für Arbeit, Monatsbericht, October 2010. 29


residence status and rights, as well as naturalization – basic preconditions for integration – and to introduce specific integration support in terms of language training and courses on civic affairs and the political system. At the same time, restrictive migration regulations that impede family reunification, for example, and focus on the values of the German political order, reveal a selective and assimilationist integration concept on the one hand, and the aim at promoting the immigration of high qualified and enterprising immigrants on the other. The Nationality Act came into force in January 2000 and was the first step in a new policy. On a symbolic level, it incorporated the intention of promoting integration (Baringhorst et al. 2006). The main innovation was the introduction of the principle of ius soli for migrants’ children born in Germany, who may now, under certain conditions, receive German citizenship. Naturalization of adult migrants was also made easier with a reduction of the number of years one must have lived in Germany to become eligible for naturalization from 15 to 8. In 2007, a test of knowledge about the German political system, culture, and society as a precondition for the naturalization was introduced. With this test, women’s and other human rights are, on the one hand, confirmed as central values of society; on the other hand, they are used as instruments for exclusion of migrants from citizenship rights. The Green Card Regulation was adopted in 2000 in the wake of labour market shortages of IT specialists. IT experts from third countries could now work in Germany for a period of up to five years. The prerequisite for such work permits was a university degree in information and communications technology, or proof of a salary offer of at least 51,000 euro per year (gross). The Immigration Act (Act to Steer and Limit Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of Union Citizens and Foreigners), in force since 2005, was the main shift in integration policy. Its objectives are to control and restrict immigration and to attract better educated migrants, to facilitate the integration of newly admitted foreigners, and to simplify the legal status regulations. Moreover, migrants from abroad may be accepted as self-employed if their business plan has secure financing (at least 1 million euro) and if it creates jobs (at least 10 employees). The integration policy set out in the Immigration Act is narrow and selective, addressing “lawful and permanent residents” only (Frings 2005). Migrants supposed to stay only temporarily are not targeted by this policy, nor are irregular migrants. The main instruments of integration policy foreseen by the Immigration Act are integration courses, i.e., 30


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language courses and introduction to the political system and society, offered to newcomers. The aim of the integration courses is to oblige immigrants to adhere to the democratic values of German society (Die Bundesregierung 2007). The Amendment of the Immigration Act in 2007 by the EU-Directives Implementation Act officially had the purpose of transposing 11 EU Directives on migration and asylum issues into national law. Critics stress that the emphasis of the amendment has been more on the implementation of restrictions in relation to immigration, residence rights, and naturalization. In the name of preventing forced marriages, the minimum age for immigrating spouses has been raised from 16 to 18 years, and basic proficiency in the German language is required prior to their immigration. Also important is that a main target of the amendment was the harmonization of the Immigration Act with labour market legislation. In the amended act, the principle of “supporting and challenging” immigrants in their efforts to integrate into German society is codified. The same principle, referring to the (re-)integration of unemployed into the labour market, is codified in the restrictive labour market laws, and is based on the assumption that integration is the sole responsibility of the unemployed individual and that the state should punish failure of integration. A contractual understanding of integration is inherent in this assumption: the state offers the means for integrating and the migrant, or the unemployed, has to make the effort to integrate. The appropriateness of the means is determined by the state (Kontos 2008). At the same time, the amended act eased further the immigration of “desired migrants.” The amount of investment capital required in order for an enterprising immigrant to enter the country has been reduced to 500,000 euro. Moreover, a time-limited provision has been included for the stabilization of the legal status of selected tolerated migrants, most of whom are rejected asylum seekers whose deportation has been suspended, in some cases, for several years (BAMF 2008a). The Steering Labour Migration Act 2009 introduced a range of regulations that make the immigration of highly skilled migrants and entrepreneurs easier. Moreover, qualified persons among the “tolerated” people in Germany are given the possibility to receive a regular residence permit and full access to the labour market. The planned Act for the Recognition of Foreign Diplomas to come into force in 2011 will establish the right of qualified migrants to have their foreign diplomas recognized in a transparent and short procedure (Englman and Müller 2007; Kontos and Voswinkel 2010). 31


Projected integration policy 2009–2013: The coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and FDP for their common legislative work in the period 2009–2013 contains integration and migration policy goals. There is an intention to consolidate the centralization of integration policy. It is of paramount importance that the contractualization of integration policy has been decided. The newcomers, but also migrants living for a longer time in Germany, will have to sign “integration agreements” and will be assessed according to whether they have fulfilled the agreement.12 With this, sanctions are legitimized in the case of non-integration of individual migrants.13

SOCIAL POLICIES AFFECTING THIRD COUNTRY MIGRANTS’ ACCESS TO THE LABOUR MARKET The social position of migrants is affected by migration policies because they are decisive in the legal status entitling them to social rights accorded by the welfare system, i.e., the complex system for the management of the membership and inclusion of the population (see Soysal 1994). A regulated labour market, together with a well-established welfare system, are major inclusion mechanisms in a hierarchically structured multi-ethnic society. These mechanisms began to crumble as a result of the deregulation of the labour market, ongoing high unemployment, and the downsizing of the welfare system. Thus, migrants are affected by a range of policies shaping legal conditions for entering labour markets, regulating labour market sectors, and enabling the unemployed to re-enter the labour market, or those combating undeclared work. Policies entail mechanisms that might thwart the integration of third country migrants into both the labour market and society. For instance, the “priority principle” prioritizes Germans and migrants equated to them – i.e., EU citizens, recognized refugees including Jews from the countries of the former Soviet Union, and migrants with a settlement permit – over third country migrants with temporary limited residence permit. Before issuing a residence permit in combination with a work permit, the Aliens Office requests approval from the Federal Labour Agency, which is only granted if the job for which the migrant has applied cannot be filled by a member of the prioritized groups. 12

See the 2009 Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP: Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt. (5 July 2010).

13

See Deutschland 2006, 2009. 32


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The deregulation of the labour market has resulted in the expansion of the low wage sectors of the economy. Migrants in general, and TCNs in particular are mostly employed in the low wage sectors of construction, agriculture, care and domestic work, hospitality, retail, and services. Despite full-time employment or accumulation of part-time jobs, many of the employees in the low wage segments earn less than they need to survive and are forced to apply for supplementary income in the framework of social benefits.14 A counter mechanism to the fall of the wages is the adoption of minimum wages. The need to limit the excessive competition between German firms and firms from other EU countries operating in the framework of the EU Service Directive became a topic of concern so that, in 1996, the Posting of Workers Act made minimum wages mandatory for workers posted in construction and valid for all workers in the branch. The act was expanded later to include other low wage sectors like roofing, industrial cleaning, repair of electrical machines, mail, and garbage services. Since the amendment of the act in April 2009, minimum wages may also be established, if social partners apply for this, in care of the elderly and domestic care, security services, coal mining, industrial laundries, and adult education. Despite the adoption of minimum wages in some branches, in the wake of the flexibilization of labour markets, and the increase of low-wage work in Germany since the mid 1990s (Kalina and Weinkopf 2009), as well as in combination with the restrictive migration regime, a range of various types of precariousness has been produced. Since the 1990s, labour market and taxation policies have been developed to offer incentives for the regularization of the growing informal labour markets. The instrument of “minor employment,” i.e., employment for only a few hours a week, remunerated up to a certain salary and exempt from payment of social insurance contributions, is meant to formalize irregular part-time work. On 1 April 2003, the maximum salary for minor employment was increased from 325 to 400 euro and the restriction on the maximum number of working hours was removed. A new employment category, the “mini job,” was established. Minor employment is now widespread in sectors where high numbers of TCNs work such as domestic work sector, restaurants, industrial cleaning, retail and other services, and construction. Minor employment is an instrument for the formalization of informal work and at the same time an instru14

Almost 1 million people applied for the supplementary income in 2005 (Kontos et al. 2006). 33


ment of deregularization and flexibilization of the labour market. The number of people engaged in minor employment increased in the last years, from 5.5 million in June 2003 to 7.1 million in March 2010 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2010). Especially migrant women are highly represented in minor employment; 15% of third country nationals are working in minor employment. In contrast, EU migrants have with 12% a lower rate of minor employment and persons without a migration background an even lower rate (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008b). Moreover, temporary agency work is also increasing. Temporary agency workers are paid lower wages than regular workers,15 they have fewer rights, and are less likely to be socially-integrated in the work life, which has a considerable impact on the collective action of workers (IGMigration 2007).16 In 2006, there were 598,964 temporary agency workers, among which 14%, i.e., 82,964 were foreign men (63,303) and women (19,661) (ibid.). The share of the temporary agency workers with a migration background is assumed also to be increasing.

UNEMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS: MECHANISMS OF CONTROL AND EXCLUSION Problems of social integration emerge not only from the immigration process and the deregulation of the labour market, but also from (longterm) unemployment affecting migrants and non-migrants. Being unemployed, migrants are affected by the general policies addressing the unemployed, but they are also subject to the “priority principle” which favours natives, EU citizens, and migrants equated with them. Third country migrants with a short-term permit of stay may be placed in a job only when no EU citizen or long-term resident migrant is available. The legal framework for the re-integration policies into the labour market has been deeply affected by the policies of welfare state downsizing. The so called “Hartz Reform” of the labour market laws involves a series of laws aimed at reducing the costs of unemployment and of labour, and at reinforcing labour market flexibility. It entails the reduction of social benefits and the introduction of new structures and rules that increase the pressure on the unemployed to adapt to the demands of the 15

Despite the Equal Pay Commandment, supported by the Anti-discrimination Law of 2003, the temporary subcontracted workers are paid less than ordinary workers (IGMigration 2007, 8).

16

Trade unions stress the need to achieve equal pay and treatment of temporary subcontracted workers. 34


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labour market. The reform of the Immigration Act has strengthened the interaction of the integration policy with policies towards the unemployed, thus creating new instruments of control and exclusion of those that are thought not to be integrated. As previously mentioned, the reform of the labour market policy is inspired by the philosophy expressed in the principle of “support and challenge” which has also been codified in the amended Immigration Act and which highlights the responsibility of the individual for the integration process in labour market and society. The philosophy of personal responsibility for integration results in a contractual ideology underlying integration policy and enables sanctions like cuts in social benefits. The social benefits’ recipient has to sign an “integration agreement” with their personal officer. This “agreement” fixes the support for integration that is granted to the unemployed, and the kind of efforts they have to make for integrating into the labour market, as well as how they will prove that they have performed their obligations. Support measures are at the discretion of the officer; there are no rights that can be claimed by the unemployed. The main instruments for reintegrating the unemployed into the labour market are vocational training, the job creation scheme, and the promotion of self-employment. The offer of these support measures to the unemployed is, however, shrinking. Measures for the re-integration of unemployed work towards the creation of devalued and minimally paid jobs. A measure currently in operation is the so-called one-euro-job scheme (Frings 2005). These are jobs additionally created and offered by the public administration or welfare organizations in sectors of public interest. The unemployed is obliged to accept the offer of a one-euro-job, earning one euro per hour, in addition to unemployment benefits. Placement in a training course is granted at the discretion of the Labour Agency official. The financial means allocated to training measures are also decreasing. The reform of the migration/integration and labour market policies have strengthened the conflation of the mechanisms by interconnecting sanctions embedded in both bodies of legislation. The interaction of the new legislations materialises in the instrument of the integration courses. The amended Labour Market Law obliges unemployed migrant recipients of social benefits to attend integration courses. The Labour Agencies have to inform the Foreigners Department about “lack of integration efforts.” At the same time, the amended Immigration Act opened the possibility to oblige naturalized migrant recipients of social benefits to attend integration courses. The migrants can be punished if they do 35


not fulfil their obligations; for example, a residence permit may not be extended or their social benefits might be reduced.

THE INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING OF MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICY AND THE TURN TOWARDS THE POLICY OF SYMBOLIC CORPORATISM The Grand Coalition between the CDU/CSU and SPD under the leadership of the CDU/CSU, in government from 2005 to 2009, centralized and upgraded integration policy. Integration policy was now made a key social policy topic, and a transverse task.17 The centralization of integration policy denotes the walling off of the policy decisions from the influence of social groups. The new policy that replaces the non-integration policy of previous decades, introduces a strong assimilationist focus18 and new corporatist practices. A trait of German migration policy-making in the years of migrant labour recruitment has been to take into consideration the interests of the social partners and the positions formulated by the welfare organizations. New in the most recent praxis of corporatism, implemented through the Integration Summit and the Islam Conference, is the corporatist inclusion, not only of established social organizations, but also of migrant organizations. A concept of official discourse is now the “social dialogue process” (ibid.). Despite the limited influence given to the migrant organizations and the efforts to oblige them to support the policy of the government – Thränhardt (2010) points that this is rather an “enacted symbolism of corporatism” than the chance to participate in political decisions – the new corporatist integration policy opens up some opportunities for participation and symbolic revaluation of migrant organizations. It is the first time that migrant organizations are recognized as representatives of the migrants, and the corporatist structure gives them the chance to formulate their positions and to expect the government to react to them.

Conclusions Labour market deregulation and flexibilization, and the expansion of the low wage sector in Germany, results in third country nationals’ la17

See Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2009.

18

The assimilationist focus has been expressed in the critique on the multiculturalist model and through the claim that migrants have to adopt the “guiding culture” (Leitkultur) of the natives (Bauder 2009). 36


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bour market opportunities only for precarious jobs on the margins of economy. Migrants are pushed to poorly paid jobs that frequently do not cover the minimum costs of living and force them, despite employment, to be dependent on social benefits. Moreover, the downsizing of the welfare state diminishes their integration prospects. Despite the “turn” that was celebrated some years ago, integration and migration policy in Germany remains highly ambiguous and for many of the third country migrants it retains the traits of the non-integration mode of incorporation characteristic of previous decades. The migration and integration policies of the last decade are structured in two strands. One strand entails legislative work that has introduced a range of restrictions and instruments for controlling migrant populations. Restrictions on immigration of spouses hinder family reunification and in conjunction with labour market policies integration policy develops instruments of control and increases assimilationist expectations and pressure on migrants. The privatization of responsibility for the integration process and the contractualization of integration policy are emerging practices with far-reaching effects for marginalized migrants and natives. Through the transfer of the responsibility of integration to the migrants, integration policy is now ratifying the integration of the integrated and sanctioning through exclusion those who fail to prove their integration. At the same time, the need for skilled labour has pushed the government to develop policies for the utilization of the potential of qualified migrants working in deskilled positions. A selective integration policy offers integration chances to qualified migrants in deskilled work positions or with the status of toleration, i.e., opportunities to recognize their certificates and a stable legal status. The other strand of policy is that the selective integration policy that ratifies the integration of some and the exclusion of others is accompanied by the centralization of the policy and the creation of instruments of corporatism, i.e., instruments to create consensus among social actors, such as channels of communication and social recognition of migrant organizations. The inclusion of migrants’ organizations in the negotiation of policy and policy implementation is a new development. Though the new corporatist arrangements bear the character of symbolic rather than material policy, the norms of integration, participation, and recognition of migrant organizations as responsible for the integration processes might fuel dynamics that give power to migrants’ claims. A more inclusive integration policy could arise due to the unintended outcomes of policy, rather than due to the intended ones. 37


It is interesting that the new repressive legislation addresses not only third country migrants, but also EU citizens. The Immigration Act has now established the instruments to oblige also naturalized migrants who are recipients of social benefits to the attendance of integration courses. Similarly, the corporatist integration policy addresses the entire group of people with a migration background, and, with this, also EU and naturalized migrants. Here, selection takes place bottom up. As the analysis of the biographical interviews in the PRIMTS project showed, many new third country migrants are not involved in ethnic networks and ethnic communities, most important for labour market integration, because of the newness of the migration of the ethnic group and its dispersion within Germany (Kontos 2010). Without access to ethnic organizations, they are excluded from the direct benefits of the new corporatist policy.

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Kontos, Maria, and Kyoko Shinozaki. 2010. Integration of New Female Migrants in the German Labour Market and Society. In Women in New Migrations. Current Debates in European Societies, eds. Krystyna Slany, Maria Kontos and Maria Liapi, 83–121. Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press. Korczynska, Joana. 2002. Individuelle Kosten und Nutzen der Saisonarbeit von Polen in Deutschland. Analyse und Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung von 1999/2000. In Die Migration von Polen nach Deutschland, ed. Christoph Pallaske, 205–225. Baden-Baden: IfER. Krieger, Wolfgang, Monika Ludwig, Patrick Schupp, and Annegret Will. 2006. Lebenslage illegal. Menschen ohne Aufenthaltsstatus in Frankfurt am Main. Karlsruhe: von Loeper Literaturverlag. Labour Agency. 2002. Annual Report 2001. Nürnberg: Bundesagentur für Arbeit. Leise, Eric. 2007. Germany to Regularize “Tolerated” Asylum Seekers. Migration Policy Institute (27 July 2009). Leung, Maggi Wai.-Han. 2004. Chinese Migration in Germany. Making Home in Transnational Space. London: IKO Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Liebig Thomas, and Sarah Widmaier. 2009. Children of Immigrants in the Labour Markets of the EU and OECD Countries: An Overview. OECD Social WP 97. Lutz, Helma. 2007. Vom Weltmarkt in den Privathaushalt. Die neuen Dienstmädchen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich. Miera, Frauke. 2007. Migration aus Polen nach Berlin. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Mitrovic, Emilija, and Dorothea Müller, eds. 2009. Sexarbeit – ein Beruf mit Interessenvertretung? Working in the Sex Industry – Jobs with Representation of Interests? Marburg: BdWi-Verlag. Morokvasic, Mirjana. 1994. Pendeln statt auswandern. Das Beispiel der Polen. In Wanderungsraum Europa. Menschen und Grenzen in Bewegung, eds. Mirjana Morokvasic and Hedwig Rudolph, 166–87. Berlin: Sigma. Munk, Veronica. 2006a. Hamburg – mehr als eine Reeperbahn. Osteuropa 56 (6): 255–259. ———. 2006b. Migration und Sexarbeit. Dilemmata der Illegalität. Osteuropa 56: 55–66. Nikolinakos, Marios. 1973. Politische Ökonomie der Gastarbeiterfrage. Migration und Kapitalismus. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. Schmidt, Werner. 2006. Pragmatische Zusammenarbeit. Zeitschrift für Soziologie 35 (6), 465–484. Seibert, Holger, and Heike Solga. 2005. Gleiche Chancen dank einer abgeschlossenen Ausbildung? Zeitschrift für Soziologie 34 (5): 364–382. 42


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LABOUR MARKET, MIGRATION, AND POPULISM: THE SUBORDINATED INTEGRATION OF THIRD COUNTRY MIGRANTS G I OVA N N A C A M PA N I , T I Z I A N A C H I A P P E L L I , O L I V I A S A L I M B E N I

Introduction In order to highlight third country nationals’ (TCN) integration processes in the Italian context, the chapter, based on the data collected for the PRIMTS research project (state of art, statistics, and fieldwork), analyzes the demographic, economic, social, and political factors that have shaped the migratory flows and the immigrants’ position in labour market and society. The PRIMTS project’s approach takes into account the definitions of integration at the background of the possible indicators of immigrants’ incorporation in the society (regular permit, work, and housing) and in relationship to political “models” expressing a certain idea of the social relations. This implies that the incorporation of migrants in the host society can be achieved in different ways, by various policies and institutional arrangements, following the different “models” that are usually divided between assimilation and integration (with various nuances) (Tambiah 2000). A large part of the chapter will focus on policies, laws, and proceedings concerning immigration that have been introduced in Italy in the course of the last 15 years. Through the combined analysis of statistical data, existing studies, and policies it is possible to define the type of incorporation of TCN in the Italian labour market and a sort of “Italian model” of integration, producing effects on TCN everyday lives. Over the past 20 years, Italy, together with Spain, has received the most immigrants of all European countries. According to the 2010 Caritas Dossier Report, there are approximately 4.919 million legal residents that are not citizens of Italy (or foreign regular residents in Italy) (Caritas Migrantes 2010). According to the Istat, National Institute of Statistics,1 foreign regular residents are 4.235 million.2 this number represents 1

Istat, Istituto nazionale di statistica (14 September 2010).

2

This difference is due to the fact that Caritas includes all the persons that are regular resident, but that are not inscribed in the foreigners’ register, namely the minors. 45


7.2% of the Italian population, whereas in the EU as a whole the foreign regular residents comprise 6.2% of the total population. It is estimated that an additional 500,000–700,000 irregular migrants live (and work) in the Italian territory (OECD 2000; Caritas Migrantes 2009, 2010). The number of irregular migrants in Italy is high compared to most EU member states, with the exception of Greece: the chapter highlights the profound reasons – partly structural (the demography, the economic system, and the welfare model), partly political – consequence of a “bad” political action3 – at the origin of this large irregular presence.4 The political action appears inadequate to the issues immigration raises: it shows incapacity to match migrant labour demand with labour offer and to define a clear national frame for integration. Long bureaucratic proceedings for permit renewals maintain immigrants in precarious conditions. After over 30 years of immigration the “emergency” policies approach is still predominant. In fact, the same structural and political reasons produce irregular migration and make obstacles to the integration of regular immigrants,5 producing, instead, what has been defined a “subordinated integration,” a concept elaborated by Italian sociologist Maurizio Ambrosini (1999). The concept of “subordinated integration” is the key to understand the acceptance of immigrants into Italian society via the incorporation in a labour market that needs labour force for manual and unqualified jobs abandoned by the national labour force. The Italian economic system, where small and very small enterprises, traditional productive activities, tourism industry, Mediterranean agriculture, and services to private persons are still very important, needs unqualified labour force. Immigrant work is hence deeply embedded in the characters of the Italian labour market and society, but the

3

Here, “bad” does not signify a value judgment: it just means a policy that cannot realize the objectives that it has announced.

4

The discredit of the Italian political class – and especially Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi – is clearly shown by the comments of the American Embassy in Rome (both under a republican and a democratic administration), as it has been revealed by Wikileaks. The bottom has been absolutely reached in the last months of 2010; Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has been accused of buying votes in order to ensure his government survives, i.e., paying for the apartment of one deputy of the opposition. Italy’s political practices have nothing to do with any decent Western democratic country.

5

The number of irregular residents has declined between 2008 – it was question, then, of one million people – and 2009, partly because of the last regularization process in 2009 that has concerned 300,000 people, and partly because of the economic crisis and the high Italian unemployment rate. In the present conjuncture, Italy has become less attractive. 46

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acceptance of the immigrants is subordinated to the acceptance of the jobs refused by Italians. Newcomers should remain in the last position, giving the priority to Italians for the access to the most qualified jobs and to the use of the little welfare as communal housing. The Bossi Fini Law has reinforced this logic (...) a precarious point of balance between need of immigrants and acceptance of immigrants (Ambrosini 1999, 39).

This subordinated condition of the immigrants appears as a structural fact. The measures introduced by the European Union policies for employment so far have had limited impact on the position of third country nationals in the Italian labour market. The specificity of the Italian context that produces a “subordinated integration” is clearly perceived by immigrants. Individual success stories of integration exist, but they are locally “framed.” The processes of settlement are highly “localized,” according to regions, areas, and ethnic groups. Each local context, each ethnic group would need a specific study in order to grasp the Italian mosaic. There is a sort of “selection” in terms of ethnic origin and qualifications (the most qualified migrants avoid Italy and try to go to Northern Europe). The process of “de-skilling” concerning immigrants is clearly revealed by the statistical data and by numerous studies (e.g., Chiappelli 2010). When possible, new migrants choose to leave for another country. In recent years, the wish to leave Italy has been common to immigrants and to qualified Italians. Italy is becoming again an emigration country for what concerns highly qualified people, intellectuals, and students.6 During the focus group done in the town of Prato,7 all immigrant participants insisted on the fact that in 6

See, for example, a recent article of the Time magazine “Arrivederci, Italia: Why Young Italians Are Leaving,” by Stephan Faris / Rome, 18 October 2010 (18 October 2010). The article describes the accelerating flight of young Italians from a country where, as Pier Luigi Celli, Director General of Rome’s LUISS University, wrote in a letter to his son: “It is no longer a place where it’s possible to stay with pride (...) That’s why, with my heart suffering more than ever, my advice is that you, having finished your studies, take the road abroad. Choose to go where they still value loyalty, respect, and the recognition of merit and results.” See also the blog of Sergio Nava “The Flight of Talent,” which covers the exodus. Read more: (19 October 2010).

7

According to PRIMTS project fieldwork, we organized a focus group discussion in which nine persons participated: five women and four men. Thanks to the focus group, we succeeded in adding more information and deepening many issues that already emerged during the interviews, which in phase of analysis we found worthy of further investigation. For that reason, we paid particular attention in choosing the participants for the focus group, selecting people coming from different regions not included in in47


Italy employment opportunities for foreigners are worse than elsewhere in Europe or in America, and that there are also diminished hopes for their children, because school policies for promoting the integration of immigrant children are non-existent. They concluded: In Italy children do not have a good future, only people who work in the trades. Even if they study they don’t find work, just in the trades. (Sulim, 25, Ghana, unemployed, focus group)

This statement could be shared by the majority of the Italian parents.

The Structural Factors Shaping Immigration and Integration Processes Italy’s passage from an emigration to immigration country began at the end of the 1970s, when its own mass emigration ended and northern European states adopted restrictive immigration policies. Third country nationals (called at the time extra-comunitari) began immigrating to Italy by the mid-1970s (there were only 156,179 legally resident foreigners in 1971), but the migratory inflow increased during the second half of the 1980s, when it was estimated at more than 100,000 people per year. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the transformations in Eastern Europe and the Balkans opened a new phase of migration, characterized by rapid growth. The interaction of push and pull factors, corresponding to the combination of contingent and structural causes makes the analysis of the Italian migratory phenomenon extremely complex. However, some structural factors that shape the characters of the Italian immigration can be grasped: first of all the demographic evolution of the Italian population, characterized by a low birth rate and an aging population; secondly the typology of the welfare state system, in which family and no-profit organizations play a crucial role in front of the state provisions, and, finally, the importance of the so-called “informal, hidden, or black economy” in the Italian labour market. These three factors have produced a strong

terviewee sample, such as the African area (Togo, Eritrea, Ghana, Mali, Liberia) and Asia (Sri Lanka). A Romanian woman also participated in the focus group, which helped shed light on the situation of being a TCN – with all the difficulties linked to obtaining and renewing her visa, her work permit, and her residence status – and of being an EU citizen. Her experience was very valuable in order to assess what changes occur in immigration conditions when a person no longer has to face the problem of being – or the risk of becoming – irregular. 48

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demand for foreign workers, concerning mainly low-qualified and lowpaid work. A) The Italian birth rate and the aging population All across Europe, birth rates are falling and the population is aging. Italy, however, is one of the countries with the lowest fertility rate (it passed from 1.18 children per woman in 1995 – the lowest point – to 1.41 in 2008), and the oldest population (in 2008, one in five Italians was over 65 years old). The limited growth in birth rate between 1995 and 2008 is a consequence of immigration.8 B) The Italian welfare state An in-depth analysis of the Italian welfare state, on which various scholars have written studies and analysis (see Gosta Esping-Andersen 1996), is beyond the scope of this chapter. Most scholars (Saraceno 2007, 2008; Saraceno et al. 2009; Trifiletti 1999, 2005) highlight the numerous negative traits, such as the inadequate provision of social services (in contrast with monetary transfers from the wages), the territorial fragmentation in the regulation and organization of social services, the lack of a last resort minimum income scheme. Such a negative picture should be ascribed to the combination of many factors, deeply rooted in the development of Italian welfare, namely: a) the role of Catholic institutions, b) the decentralization of social assistance; and c) the ambivalent nature of most assistance schemes. As to the first factor, the diffusion and the autonomy of Catholic institutions carrying out functions of care and assistance to needy people is much greater in Italy than in other European countries. Besides, the traditional, implicit delegation of charity functions to Catholic bodies usually has implied a limited public intervention in this field. The role of the Catholic institutions is particularly relevant in the reception process of immigrants. Besides the Catholic Church, various volunteer associations and no profit social service cooperatives act on behalf of local authorities. Especially in the case of elderly people, the inadequate provisions of social services oblige the families to find individual solutions for the care of the old people. Immigrant workers – mainly women9 – represent the answer to this problem: they are hired 8

See (7 August 2010).

9

See FeMiPol working papers by Campani et al. 2006 (12 December 2009). 49


as badanti caregiver, to look after the old persons at home. Their work conditions are fully unregulated and very hard. I always say that being a caregiver is like being under house arrest. (Dolores, 43, Colombia, live-in care assistant)

C) The informal economy Most international organizations (OECD, European Union) point to the importance of informal economy in the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of Italy (together with Greece and Spain). The data, however, are controversial. Istat, taking into account the data of 2008, estimates the added value of the informal economy between 16.3% and 17.5% of the GDP. Friederich Schneider, who, in recent years, estimates for informal economies in various countries for the OECD, gives different data, between 22% and 27% in the last 10 years.10 According to Feld and Schneider (2010), for 2007, the underground economy made up 22.3% of GDP for Italy. Only Greece, with 25.1%, had a higher figure. The figures for Spain were 19.3%; for Portugal, 19.2%. The figure for the US was 7.2%; in Japan, 9.0%; in the UK, 10.6%; France, 11.8%; Canada, 12.6%; and Germany, 14.6%. Other sources have estimated the percentage of informal economy between the 27–29% with the highest rate 29.4% in 2003 (Eurispes).11 It could reach around 30% of the national product, according to various estimates of scholars and international organizations (Allasino et al. 2004).12 The productive sectors where informal economy is the highest are agriculture, services (tourism – hotels and restaurants), construction work, but also various industrial sectors as garment industry or leather.

Informal Economy, Labour Market, and Immigrant Work These three factors fuel an important demand for low-qualified and lowpaid immigrant labour force: families, who cannot count on welfare for the care of children; and especially elderly people, who need cheap domestic and care work. Also a part of this demand are small and mediumsized companies that employ grey and black work, and that are totally or 10

See also The World Bank data: (1 March 2010).

11

Eurispes, Istituto di Studi Politici, Economici e Sociali (24 September 2010).

12

See ILO (International Labour Organization) Report: (13 October 2010). 50

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partially in the informal economies that need workers ready to accept these work conditions. It must be stressed that an informal economy is not necessarily based on open exploitation: though degrading working conditions are common, there are also many cases where there is a positive trade-off between higher wages and employment insecurity, thanks to the possibility of avoiding taxes and social security contributions. Nevertheless, this represents a clear loss of income for the state. Istat’s estimations for the number of workers (both foreigners and Italians) in the informal economy is for 2010: 2,500,000 of around 23,000,000 persons employed in 2009, which means more than 10% of the actives. This number is more or less the same for the last 10 years, or is even growing. Consequently, the fight the Italian state has made against the informal economy, which has been growing steadily since the ’70s, has not been effective.13 We can wonder why. To tackle black work and an informal economy, the centre-left government established a national committee (Comitato per l’Emersione del Lavoro Non Regolare; law n. 448/1998) to manage and coordinate the fight. Local committees (CLES: Comitati per il Lavoro e l’Emersione del Sommerso) were also founded in the provinces to improve the coordination among the social partners, trade associations, and the tax audit authorities. Between 2002 and 2004, the centre-right fought against the informal economy by creating incentives for entrepreneurs to legalize their activities (reduction of the social security contributions, grants tax relievers for the previous shadow economy activities, tax amnesties, etc.). Studies show that the empirical results of these measures are quantitatively disappointing. Roberto Dell’Anno and Friedrich Schneider insist that the indiscriminate amnesties for employers are ineffective and they reveal the ambiguous policies of the Italian government, which does not provide “a fair and equal tax treatment among the economic agents but makes regularly indiscriminate tax amnesties that provide a ‘reward’ for the tax cheaters and shadow economy workers.” Consequently “[s]uch initiatives increase the people’s distrust towards the State, and decrease their tax morale. Such policy measures provide strong incentives to work again in the shadow economy and to wait and speculate for the next tax amnesty” (Dell’Anno and Schneider 2003, 97–98).14 13

See Gabriele Battaglia’s on-line thesis available at: (15 September 2009).

14

They also try to provide some recommendations for policymakers (Dell’Anno and Schneider 2003, 97–98): [I]n order to reduce the size of the hidden economy, we suggest the following measures: (i) A greater flexibility and simplification of Italian labour market 51


It must also be stressed that there are differences between the North and the South of the country. In the northern part, more rich and industrialized, the informal economy is more characterized by “grey work” – a combination of regular and irregular work, while in the South the work is often completely “black.” There is a large area of “grey” work where the formal and informal economies are often intermingled in a labour market characterized by processes of deregulation, flexibilization, and de-qualification of the work. This is another character of the Italian economy, whose general strategy to survive in a global world is the compression of the wages (instead of innovation). This trend is clearly described by Pietro Basso (2007, 6): With the vanishing or collapsing of its corporations – Italsider, Olivetti, Montedison, Ferruzzi, Sir, Parmalat, Fiat (despite the recent signs of recovery), Telecom – Italy is left with little more than a batch of industrial districts15 composed of small and medium firms with high labour intensity, and hard pressed by the feverish industrial dynamism of China and the other emergent nations. A national economy in such (relatively) bad shape can hope to cling to the end-carriage of the “group of the great” only by energetically compressing its labour costs. Enter the immigrant workers: recourse to this workforce serves, precisely, to reduce the overall cost of labour.

Recent data published by Istat shows that the growth in employment in the last 10 years has mainly concerned low-qualified jobs, and that most of them have been taken by foreigners (Bonafede and Di Pace 2010). They are the ones who are ready to accept the heaviest, most precarious, most dangerous, least paid, and socially penalized jobs. Another study of Istat shows that immigrants generally receive the lowest wages; they are frequently paid less than contractual regulations prescribe – especially in regulations; (ii) A granting of tax relief for those who decide to leave shadow activities. This policy should go “hand in hand” with the structural tax reform. The conditional amnesties for the tax evaders are effective only if they appear as extraordinary in the taxpayers’ view; (iii) Improved efficiency of the rule of law; e.g. by improving the enforcement action against the tax dodgers and by reducing the chronic slowness of the Italian judicial system; (iv) The previous measures should be combined by a massive reduction of tax rates and the social security burden. 15

The term “industrial district” is used to refer to the complex phenomenon in which economic specialization arises with the agglomerations of small and medium firms located in specific areas. In particular, it indicates the concentration of firms in particular sectors and localities in northern and central Italy after the Second World War. Such clusters were able to establish a strong position in world markets in a number of so-called “traditional products” – shoes, leather handbags, knitwear, furniture, tiles, musical instruments, food processing – and also in the industries which supply machinery to these sectors. 52

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small firms, which are precisely the ones that need immigrant labour the most.16 This is confirmed by our fieldwork: Italians are paid 7 or 8 euros an hour, foreigners 3 or 4 without a contract. (Assan, 48, Somalia, blue-collar worker, focus group)

An indicator of the work conditions that third country nationals experience in this type of labour market is given by the rate of work accidents. Incomplete data from INAIL17 (Istituto Nazionale per l’Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro – the Italian Workers’ Compensation Authority or National Institute for Industrial Accident Insurance) show that one out of every nine industrial accidents reported (11%) involves an immigrant worker. The official accident rate among immigrant workers is twice that of Italian workers. This is due to various factors: first of all they are overrepresented in sectors as construction and agriculture where work accidents are more frequent than in others; secondly they are often in the informal economy, where security rules at the workplace are less respected; third they are poorly trained for the work they are supposed to do and overexploited (long working days, etc.) – all factors that are at the origin of the accidents. The above mentioned three structural factors have shaped immigrant labour demand and the immigrants’ position in the labour market, which has, of course, a great influence on the integration processes. It must also be stressed that, by now, the low-qualified jobs are not especially touched by the economic crisis. The impact of the crisis seems to concern 16

In its 2002 Rapporto annuale. La situazione del paese nel 2001, Istat gives the following estimate of this wage disparity between immigrant and Italian workers: 24.2% in manufacturing, 17.8% in construction, 16.5% in commerce, 8.5% in hotels and catering, 37.1% in other professional activities. Between 1999 and 2001 this differential increased in all the sectors mentioned. We need to take into account the fact that immigrant wages are generally “inflated” by a number of overtime hours that is greater than that of Italian workers. If Istat were to base the comparison on hourly rather than gross monthly wages, the differentials would be even greater. It would also be interesting to examine the ways in which wages are paid, beginning with the meeting – or not meeting – of dates of payment. Basso (2007, 2): “I wish to cite an extreme – but indicative – case, which came to light in a study I directed on Italian shipyards: at Fincantieri in Monfalcone, the owner of one of the infinity (up to 700!) of small subcontracting firms had his Bangladeshi employees get down on their knees to receive their wages.” The most recent Istat report speaks of 40% differences in wages between Italians and immigrants.

17

INAIL’s main objectives are: the reduction of workplace accidents, the insurance of workers involved in risky jobs and the reintegration of work accident victims in the labour market and social life. This type of insurance, which is compulsory for all employers hiring people for work which the law defines as risky, protects workers from any kind of damage resulting from work-related accidents and occupational diseases, thereby freeing employers from any civil liability. 53


more the work conditions that are getting worse. Let us now look at the political action of the governments that have been in power in the last 10 years.

A Populist Political Season The governments that have been in power in the last 10 years (eight years out of 10 it was the centre-right coalition under Berlusconi) can be considered as part of the long political season that started in 1992 with the crisis of the main political parties, after the discovery of a huge corruption system involving politicians, businessmen, and, in general, the industrial world (the processes and the condemnation that followed go under the name of Mani Pulite). This season18 has been characterized by the disappearing of traditional parties that have ruled Italy until the early ‘90s (Christian Democrats and Socialists),19 and by the growth of populist forces that have succeeded in taking power, namely Silvio Berlusconi’s party, Forza Italia, transformed in “Il Popolo delle Libertà” in 2007, and the Northern League. In the case of Italy, the term populism can be referred to two main characters: the “personalization” of policy, after a long period of “parties regime,”20 and the simplification of the political discourse in an opposition We – the Others (we, the good people – Berlusconi defines his party, the Party of Love – they, the communists, the left, the intellectuals, foreigners, the immigrants, etc.). The Northern League in particular is playing ethnic anti-immigrants arguments in order to gain an electoral audience. It is no ideological exaggeration to define the Northern League political discourse as “entrepreneurship of racism, security, and fear”. The speeches of the Northern League politicians and local administrators clearly demonstrate that this definition is no exaggeration. Let’s just look at a speech given in 2008 by an important member of the Northern League, Giancarlo Gentilini, who has also been mayor of Treviso, a medium-sized town in Veneto, a half an hour from Venice (it was made at 18

The crisis of the Berlusconi system of power has been opened by Gianfranco Fini, who has founded a new movement inspired by the European right. Moreover, Berlusconi is now accused of abuse of power and sex with minors.

19

The Christian Democrats and the Socialists were destroyed by the scandals. In the same years, the Communist Party transformed themselves into a “Democratic of the Left Party,” after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

20

The historical parties leaders tended to keep a low profile in reaction to the historical experience of fascism. This does not mean that some leaders were not charismatic leaders for their people (i.e., the communist Togliatti). 54

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the occasion of a meeting of the Northern League against the opening of mosques). This speech paid Gentilini a fee of 4,000 euro. The tribunal of Venice has also forbidden him to speak out in public (the judgment was pronounced on 26 October 2009), but for one speech condemned, hundreds are pronounced. Just a few sentences of Gentilini’s speech:21 I want the revolution against the “clandestines.” I want the revolution against the camps of the nomads and the Gypsies. I destroyed two in Treviso. And now there are no camps any more. I want to eliminate the children who steal from the old people! If Maroni has said zero tolerance, I say double zero tolerance. I want the revolution against those who want to open the mosques and the Islamic centres. Here, even the Church says, let them pray. No! They must go pray in the deserts! I will open a factory of carpets to give them, but they must go to pray in the deserts. (…) I want the revolution against the call centres, whose customers eat in the night and piss against the walls: they should go to piss in their mosques. I want the revolution against the veils and the burqa of the women. I want to see women’s faces, because under the veil maybe there is a terrorist with a gun between the legs.

The Northern League is no marginal party. In the third Berlusconi’s government, they have obtained the Ministry of the Interior (Maroni). Moreover, Berlusconi, in his constantly populist discourse, does not hesitate to use racist arguments (or sexist or homophobic) in order to seduce a part of the electorate.22 The multiplication of the racist discourse in politics in Italy has been denounced by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance of the Council of Europe, as well as Thomas Hammarberg, the Commissioner for Human Rights: The use of racist and xenophobic discourse in politics has intensified and targets in particular non-EU citizens, Roma, Sinti, and Muslims. Members of these groups have continued to experience prejudice and discrimination across a wide range of areas.23 The hostile environment to non-dominant, vulnerable social groups has recently been fostered by statements of certain national and local political figures as well as by a number of mass media in the country. In meetings with Commissioner representatives of important NGOs deplored an almost total lack of rejection of xenophobic statements by senior politicians. Representatives of Roma and Sinti felt that such lack of reaction, combined with the “security package,” had further encouraged violence 21

In order to have a better idea of the context, see the speech: (1 August 2010).

22

See Campani and Chiappelli (2010).

23

See ECRI’s Third Report on Italy. Strasbourg: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Council of Europe, 16 May 2006. < http://hudoc.ecri.coe.int/XMLEcri/ ENGLISH/Cycle_03/03_CbC_eng/ITA-CbC-III-2006-19-ENG.pdf> (21 December 2010). 55


and hate speech against their communities. They expressed a fairly dramatic need for protection.24

The Impossible Match between Labour Offer and Supply: The Bossi-Fini Law and the Production of Irregular Migrants The violent racist discourses that we have quoted (they are not an exception; it would be possible to produce a full Encyclopedia with them) have a clear electoral goal. The “shameless xenophobes” of the Northern League (the definition was given by the New York Times in the fall 2008) know very well that the economy of the regions where they get support needs immigrants, and so do Italian families. During the years when the centre-right has been in power, foreigners have grown 345,000 persons every year, almost 3 million between 2001 and 2009. In 2001, when the centre-right arrived into power, foreigners were 1,335,000 and they were 2,939,000 in 2006, when the centre-left won (they were in power two years). In the last two years of the Berlusconi government, immigrants have again increased by around one million. This data concerns regular migrants (many of them became regular because of amnesties or regularization processes): as we have already remarked, a stock of irregular migrants between 500,000 and one million people is estimated on the Italian territory every year. Italian migratory policies (including the ones of the anti-immigrant centre-right) have been and continue to be incapable of reducing the “stock” of irregular migrants, who are present in the national territory. It must also be stressed that, as all scholars working on immigration and all NGOs or trade unions dealing with immigrants know very well, irregular migrants do work: in agriculture, in houses as domestic helpers, but also in industries. This is the case, just to give an example, of the few immigrants, still irregular, who have been interviewed during the PRIMTS’ fieldwork. Let us just take the example of one interviewed in the sample: a migrant from Nigeria, Ibrahim. He works in the agricultural sector picking tomatoes or digging up potatoes. When there is no work in the fields Ibrahim works as a bricklayer, doorman, or whatever he and 24

See point 13 of Commissioner’s Memorandum (21 December 2010). See also (3 September 2009). 56

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his friends manage to find. These are always cash in hand jobs since Ibrahim does not have a stay permit and the employers feed and clothe him.25 The case of Ibrahim makes it evident that migratory policies have been and are unable to assure the match between labour supply and demand, which is fuelled by the informal economy and the families’ needs. It shows as well that, in spite of the Northern League’s screams against the “clandestines,” these ones may survive in Italy and are not deported. Why? In order to clarify these paradoxes, the analysis of the legal frame to manage migratory flows must be done. Since the early 1980s, the Italian migratory system has been characterized by a contradiction between the strong demand for foreign workers and the lack of provisions allowing the match between labour supply and demand. The majority of immigrants presently in Italy has entered irregularly, or has experienced a period of irregularity at one point or another of their migratory journey. Most immigrants have obtained their permits through regularization. Regularisation has always been a provision of Italian immigration policy reform. Each change in legislation since 1986 – at roughly four-year intervals – has been accompanied by a mass regularisation, although in each case the government thunders. This is the last regularisation. (…) It should be noted that regularisations are common in Italy in areas other than immigration. There have been numerous tax amnesties, employment “emersion” regularisations for undeclared workers, and even amnesties for illegally constructed buildings (Chaloff 2005, 4).

Various international observers have criticized these legalizations, because they do not represent a long-term solution (Abella 2000). An attempt to create a long-term solution and to obtain the labour demand and supply match was done by the Prodi government in 1998 with the adoption of the Law no. 40/1998 that introduced a quota system in order to assure a reasonable management of the incoming flows.26 The measures contained in this law aimed to manage the issue of irregular migration and fix the directives for an “Italian model” of integration. As a result of this law migrants could now enter the country on the basis of 25

It must be noted that Ibrahim emphasizes the fact that now he is much better off than he was in Nigeria since his village was very poor.

26

There were three parameters defining the division of the national quota of immigrants: type of labour (sub-divisions among seasonal work, contract dependent, and independent work), job category (occasional sub quotas are given to certain categories, e.g., nurses), and nationality (quotas reserved for specific nationalities). The last parameter is exclusively related to foreign policy objectives (i.e., bilateral agreements signed with single states) and not to labour market needs. 57


the quota established by one or more annual decrees, according to labour market needs. Moreover, sponsorship27 and the job-seeker visa provided for the allocation of an annual quota of residence permits to people in search of a job. The arrival of a right-wing government into power in 2001, after a campaign based on security issues, marked a shift towards a restrictive approach in flows management and the abandoning of the integration project. Since 2001, the Bossi-Fini law has had a heavy impact on immigrant life, namely in terms of bureaucratic proceedings, difficulties in becoming regular, and risks of becoming irregular. The basic principle of the Bossi-Fini law is a tight link between work contracts and employment, on the one hand, and the residence permit on the other. The link between employment and residence permits becomes a fundamental element for managing entries into the country. The so-called “sponsor mechanism” by which migrants could enter Italy notwithstanding the granting of a job, the Bossi-Fini law creates a very complicated and bureaucratic system for granting entry authorization, limited to those cases in which an employer explicitly needs the worker. The fundamental conditions for the authorization, given by the Sportello Unico per l’Immigrazione, are the work contract and the guarantees of accommodation for the migrant. Permission is only granted to a foreign worker once the office ensures that no Italians are willing to take on that job. These conditions are so restrictive that very few immigrants use them. In our sample, out of 25, just one person could use this mechanism, thanks to an international cooperation project providing domestic workers to Italian families. The residence permit for work is made dependent on a combined employment and residence contract (contratto di soggiorno-lavoro). It cannot last more than the contract, which means nine months for seasonal workers, one year for temporary workers, two years for non-temporary workers. It can be renewed for the same amount of time. Compared to previous legislation, this is a marked reduction in the average duration of residence permits. Law 189/2002 also changed the number of years of documented residence required to obtain a permanent residence per-

27

Such workers could enter the country sponsored by private individuals, regions, municipalities, and associations listed in a register. Sponsors had to deposit a guarantee, demonstrate a sufficient income, offer decent accommodation, and pay the contributions for public health insurance. 58

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mit from five years to six. This has had negative repercussions on integration policy as defined previously in Law 40.28 Workers who become unemployed have the right to register on job placement lists and to reside legally in the territory for six months with a legal residence permit. After six months of unemployment regular immigrant risks becoming irregular. The rules introduced by Law 189/2002 increase the precariousness of the immigrants, who find it difficult to maintain regular status in a labour market characterized by a high level of informal economy (Sciortino 2004). In 2008–2009, when the centre-right returned to power, after an electoral campaign focused on the security-migration nexus, stricter bureaucratic rules were introduced. The new provisions were introduced by Law 94/2009 of 15 July 2009 on Measures in the Field of Public Security, reflecting the Northern League propaganda that followed a series of interventions against the weakest part of the immigrants, the Roma (who are regular migrants because they are EU citizens). The list of the measures introduced by this Security Decree reminds of the gride, the 17th century redundant list of interdictions – completely ineffective – promoted by the Spanish ruler, which have become a symbol of inefficiency (Alessandro Manzoni, author of the national novel The Betrothed makes fun of the grida). This is the list of the Maroni’s “grida”: – The TCN arriving in Italy without a stay permit may be detained in an identification and expulsion centre for up to 180 days. Up until recently the maximum stay period was 60 days. (As if there were enough places in the Detention Centres that are overcrowded.) – Arrest for exploitation of unregistered tenants. Owners of properties rented to foreigners who are not officially registered at the time of stipulation of the contract or renewal of the rental contract can be imprisoned for up to three years. (In the country where most landlords rent “black” to anybody, families, students, tourists, etc.; in the country of the mafia, the camorra, the n’drangheta, etc.)

28

This provision overtly contradicts the 2003 EU Council Directive in which long-term resident third country nationals are to be granted permanent status after a period of five years. The Prodi government, elected in April 2006 for a short period of two years, issued a legislative decree which abides by the above EU directive together with another decree which smooths access to family reunification. See (5 November 2010). 59


– Anyone applying to become an Italian citizen must pay a tax of 200 euro. (This will be effective. It is common for the Italian government to take money from immigrants in the form of bureaucratic taxes.) – Anyone applying for a stay permit or applying for a renewal of a stay permit at its expiration date must pay from 80 to 200 Euros. The exact amount will be established by the Ministries of the Interior and Economy at a later date (See previous comma.) – The non-community citizen who intends to marry an Italian citizen (or citizen of the community in Italy) must possess a regular stay permit. The permit will be requested for access to public services, with the exception of medical care or enrolling at schools. (Let us see what happens if Gorge Clooney wants to marry Elisabetta Canalis. This is a class issue.) – Anyone applying for an EC permit for long stays (ex stay permit) must first pass an examination in the Italian language. (It is not clear who is going to do the exam: the Northern League wants to introduce local dialects in the schools.) – Application for citizenship following matrimony with an Italian citizen may be made only after two years instead of six months, as it was previously. (This will have some impact, but, in any case, proceedings to obtain the Italian citizenship are very long.) – Up until now the state was obliged to respond within six months following application for a member of the family to arrive in Italy. Following the period of six months, if no reply had been received, the principle of no reply being equivalent to consent was applied so that the family member could under these circumstances apply to the consulate for an entry permit. Now this principle has been abolished and an answer must first be received from the Sportello Unico. This new regulation is applicable also to anyone who has already applied and is awaiting a reply. (This rule makes the family reunification more complex.) – For every request for registration in the municipal rolls, or change of residence, the related municipality may request proof of suitable lodging. (This can make life more difficult in the municipalities ruled by the Northern League, allowing the mayors to persecute the immigrants. Other municipalities will not care.) – The stay permit based on points has been introduced. In practice this means that the immigrant who is applying to live in Italy signs a sort of “credit-based” agreement with the state where there is a commitment to achieve established integration-based objectives within the period stated in the stay permit. The loss of “credits” will lead to revocation of 60

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the permit, or expulsion. The application of this principle has been postponed and will be applied in a later decree which should become active in six months. Moreover, the Security Decree has authorized “patrols” (ronde), namely citizens associations to patrol local areas and notify security forces of social unrest. Participants will be registered and must first be trained by ex-officers of the law. There is already a contrast with the Constitutional Court and the Council of State. Finally, persons of no fixed abode will be registered at the Viminale, the Ministry of the Interior. Theoretically! In other words: the Security Decree is a clear example of populist propaganda, reminding the “grida” of the 17th century Italy under Spanish rule, which will make life more difficult for the weakest part of the irregular migrants, while the others will continue to work for the Italian families and employers.

The Shifting between Regular and Irregular Positions The general problem is that the restrictive approach of the Bossi-Fini law, followed by the provisions contained in the Security Decree, is unfit to regulate immigration in a country whose labour market has such a high percentage of informal economy and precarious, flexible work; on the contrary, this approach stimulates irregular migration, black labour, vulnerability, and mistrust, thus placing migrants in a weaker power position in the labour market and society (Basso 2007; Campani 2008; Chaloff 2005; Reyneri 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Zincone 2000, 2001, 2009). Moreover, the lack of pursuable mechanisms for regular labour-driven migration encourages the use of irregular migration channels. This does not mean, however, that irregular immigration comes mainly from the rotten skiffs that try to cross the Mediterranean with their human charge. Desperate people trying to cross the Mediterranean with unsafe boats certainly exist in Algiers, Casablanca, Tangier or Tunisia, while sub-saharian Africans cross the desert for the new Eldorado, Europe, ending up in a Libyan jail. This is a shame for Europe. Still, the numbers of the immigrants landing on Italian shores from Africa are relatively low. 2008 was the year when the highest number of boat-people in Gibraltar or the Sicily channel arrived in Italy; their number was limited to 38,000 persons, many of whom were asylum seekers. We have interviewed one of the persons who crossed the Mediterranean with a boat, Ibrahim, from Nigeria (he landed in Spain from Tuni61


sia). In his village, in Nigeria, Ibrahim came into contact with people who organized trips to Europe. Ibrahim was interested in the proposal. He put aside some money, which “was very little, they said that they told us that in Europe we would work to pay for the trip” and after six months he arrived in Spain with false documents. Ibrahim told about his trip to Europe: We made a lot of stops but we did not use dinghies. We had false documents and we embarked on a ship which arrived in Spain from Tunisia. (Ibrahim, 29, Nigeria, agricultural and construction worker)

In Spain, Ibrahim remained hidden for 15 days. He was discovered by the police and sent away. Ibrahim took a train to Germany, but he was discovered there too, and was sent away again. Finally, through friends who lived in Italy, he managed to make it to Naples. Ibrahim does not have a stay permit and this makes him feel bad. He also knows that “for the moment there’s no mention of getting a stay permit,” but he does not consider this to be so serious because: when the police stop you they take you to police headquarters and you stay there for a day even and then they send you away with a piece of paper … but then … (Ibrahim, 29, Nigeria, agricultural and construction worker)

. . . then nothing happens: the irregular migrants that are expelled are, in fact, a tiny minority. Ibrahim can return to his job. This case of Ibrahim shows as well the demagogic character of the Security Decree that obviously cannot be effective. However, the trajectory of Ibrahim does not correspond to the one of the majority of the irregular migrants in Italy, who entered regularly, with tourist visas. In fact, at the origin of the irregular migration there is legal entry – tourism, business, and other temporary reasons – and, once in Italy, when the tourist visa has expired, a shift towards irregularity. And this happens precisely because there is no mechanism to pass from the status of irregular to the one of regular, even if you have a job. Finally, the simplest ways to become regular are amnesties or regularizations.

The Subordinated Integration and Its Supporters The intersection between a deregulated, flexible labour market and legislation that strictly links residence and work permits produces an explosive “mix” that puts immigrants in a very vulnerable position. The question of the possession of a regular stay permit becomes the key to the 62

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work, living, and social stability of immigrants, opening for them the opportunity to access a series of rights that unfortunately are not just something they can expect: the certainty of work and social security in case of accident or injury, the opportunity to find a dignified living situation at reasonable prices, and to be able to help their children join them. But even once the documents have been obtained, the need to renew them each year – with all the complications and the bureaucratic slowness becomes a tiring and frustrating experience. The risk of becoming irregular again is always present. The tension around the issue of the permit has become dramatic in recent years: demonstrations and protests against the bureaucratic proceedings have multiplied. In autumn 2010, a peculiar protest has taken place: On 30 October, six immigrants have been living for some weeks on the top of a crane of 35 meters high in the subway construction area of Brescia. After some attacks conducted by police, the immigrants were forced to descend on 16 November because of terrible weather conditions. As of the 18th, two of them had been deported to their country of origin, without having the possibility to explain their actions, to contact their lawyer, or to defend themselves in a tribunal with regular due process.29 In another case, nine immigrants have been living on the roof of the “Carlo Erba” tower in Imbonati Street in Milan since 10 November. One of them, due to cold weather conditions, descended from the tower on 27 November in order to get medical assistance. The doctor who took care of him, a volunteer of the NGO Emergency, is under investigation for having cured an immigrant without a stay permit (aid and abet of irregular immigration), even if in Italy the sanitary service is legally granted to everybody.30 Both these protests share the same goal: to denounce the fact that many immigrants who have submitted the request for regularization more than a year before have not yet obtained the permit from the Italian state. When the bureaucratic inefficiency in a modern country that is a member of the EU pushes people to find such extreme forms of contest for their rights, we can wonder if there is not some “method” in it. As Polonius says in an aside to the audience, referring to Hamlet: “Though this be madness, yet there is method in it.” (Shakespeare II, ii, 223–224). 29

See, for instance, the chronicle of the facts at and (1 December 2010).

30

See, for instance, (18 November 2010). 63


The “method” – let us call it, “the Italian model” – can be synthesized in the concept of “subordinated integration,” which was described in the introduction: immigrants are placed and kept in a very vulnerable position in front of the employers, with very low salaries and few or no social rights through a sapient combination of inefficiency and discriminatory laws and rules. The newcomers should remain in the lowest position, giving priority to Italians for access to the most qualified jobs, but also to the use of the meager welfare as communal housing. In fact, the vulnerable position is “interesting” for employers who need immigrant work, and for families who cannot count on a welfare state for children and elderly and need private solutions at reasonable costs (and they find them in immigrant women’s work). Moreover, local administrations that are constantly under stress because of the continuous budget reductions imposed by the government and have difficulties ensuring welfare to the citizens (namely social housing) may find some advantage in the “subordinated integration”: irregular migrants – or regular migrants waiting for their permit over eight months − cannot put pressure on the limited welfare resources as regular immigrants do. The apparently inefficient migratory policies accompany, in fact, the process of “subordinated integration.” According to Basso (2007), “subordinated integration” corresponds exactly to what the Italian labour market, the Italian society, and Italian politics need and, in a certain way, want for immigrants: Italy today, with its enterprises and its middle – and upper-class families, has an inexhaustible demand for low-cost labour with rock-bottom rights: a demand of unprecedented urgency for “flexible” hands, minds, bodies, and – in many respects – hearts; a demand for people who are willing, out of necessity, to accept the unacceptable, at least during the first, very difficult part of their stay here with us (Basso 2007, 5).

A consequence of “subordinated integration” is the de-qualification of immigrant workers. According to CERFE Association31 about 77% of migrant women and 66% of migrant men in Italy are in a process of progressive de-qualification, as they are unable to use the skills and knowledge they have acquired either outside or while in Italy. Alternatively, migrants also hide their qualifications in order to make job-seeking easier, and apply only for low-skilled, low-paid jobs in which the necessity for cheap labour is always present. 31

See (7 September 2010). 64

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Integration as a Local Fact: The Role of NGOs In spite of the national policies, the issue of integration cannot be avoided by the local administrations (municipalities, provinces and regions): it is at the local level that various actions, going in the direction of the development of integration policies are implemented, especially through Assessorati alle politiche sociali (Town Boards for Social Policies), or the Assessorati al lavoro (Town Boards for Work, which sometimes also have competences on so-called immigration with Delega all’Immigrazione). The main practice of the Assessorati has been the management of the economic resorts coming from the central government for promoting integration and the support to NGOs active in the assistance to immigrants, or, where they already existed, immigrants’ associations. This has certainly encouraged the development of a community life among immigrants. In a second phase, the local authorities have tried to structure a more coherent policy based on the integration or the synergy between the public intervention, services, and NGOs. However, the difference between a local reality and another one is extremely important, which makes integration mainly a local phenomenon. This is so, for example, with the housing problem. Housing is a big issue. In order to obtain a regular stay permit, an immigrant must demonstrate to have a regular work contract and an adequate housing situation. At the same time, landlords require a lot of guarantees such as the payslips and, according to the Security Decree, cannot rent to a nonregular immigrant (he/she could be accused to encourage (aid and abet) irregular immigration, which is a penal charge). Here there is a short circuit: for the obtainment or the renewal of the stay permit, an immigrant must prove having a regular work contract and adequate housing, but at the same time, the law requires that an immigrant signs a regular contract − and to rent a house, an immigrant needs to possess a regular stay permit. Raluka said: Without work you cannot find a house and vice versa: how can I find a house and a job if you don’t give me a job since I have no house, there are some things a bit strange! (Raluka, 38, Romania, cultural mediator/translator, focus group)

Other two interviewees, talking about their difficulties to find a rental house without an employment contract, told that they made a fake work contract to be able to rent a house, taking on the burden to pay themselves the contributions to the Italian government; according to their tale, many other people have adopted the same stratagem in order to 65


renew their stay permits, paying a lot of money for taxes and contributions. Moreover, interviewed immigrants speak about discrimination in that specific area even when they have all the legal requirements: A lot of Italian friends have said this to me, that at first we don’t trust you because of the colour of your skin, because they are not used to seeing it, but when we get to know each other they know that we are good and don’t have problems … (Anta, 35, Senegal, trainee at a school cafeteria)

The situation of live-in care givers is different: as long as they live with their employers the accommodation is assured, even if that means a deprivation of personal autonomy with all the consequences we have already described. Problems arise when they try to find different work and a different housing situation. The only good practice met during the interviews was one by the Municipality of Bologna which, for a short period, helped migrants with work in finding a flat. The public administration, in that case, provided references for the immigrants. Thus, owners were solicited to rent their flats even to foreigners, with the assurance that in any case they will not lose money. Sometimes, as another interviewee experienced, the employer helped the immigrant working for him to find a housing insertion. In any case, in addition to all these difficulties, one of the major problems is the high price of apartments compared to their salary. Most of our interviewees declared that, at least for a period, they have had to share their flat with many other people. What is, in fact national, as support to integration, are the NGOs and the trade unions. We have seen that NGOs also play a vital role in the Italian welfare system. In the absence of publically funded programs to help immigrants, NGOs often step in to provide assistance. The Catholic Church has also long history of helping immigrants. NGOs provide welfare or humanitarian services. They do not, as a rule, provide services aimed at encouraging emancipation or fighting against discrimination. The vast majority of immigrants who benefit from the services of NGOs are not the poorest, but are those who have nevertheless achieved a minimum degree of interaction with the host society. To address the main areas of exclusion faced by migrants, NGOs intervene as follows: a) Legal assistance: NGOs have provided assistance during the amnesties. They also assist with residence and work permit procedures, family reunification, and access to all public and private services. However, le66

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gal casework including representation at court is seldom offered. Only cases of migrant women forced into prostitution and minors awaiting rehabilitation are taken up. b) Housing: NGO responses to housing problems have been insufficient. While around 20% of organizations (mostly Catholic) offer temporary accommodation facilities, no action has been taken to help migrants fight discrimination in the housing sector and find accommodation on the private property market. c) Health: in theory, health care is guaranteed for all by law. As observed in the literature, very often the immigrants arrive healthy and fall ill in Italy, precisely because of the conditions in which they are forced to live and work (Pasini 2003). There have been important efforts by hundreds of voluntary doctors and social workers who have set up special surgeries which treat more patients than the public health system. They have also raised awareness among medical and nursing staff in public structures. d) Employment: officially no NGO deals with this problem, because current laws and regulations do not allow it. In actual fact, all the NGOs make use of the networks of relations and acquaintances to help immigrants who are looking for jobs. The Catholic NGOs are the most active, taking on a role of selection and guarantee for the employers. As far as the protection of the foreign worker is concerned, the action of NGOs and trade unions remains fairly poor. Communication and co-operation between different actors operating in the migration field is an important pre-requisite for successful integration practices. The process of integration of immigrants is not only taking place at the level of the “individual immigrant,” whose integration is then measured in terms of housing, employment, education, and social and cultural adaptation to the new society, it also takes place at the collective level of the immigrant group. Organizations of immigrants are the expression of mobilized resources and ambitions, and at this level the mechanisms of the integration process also apply (Penninx 2003). Even though many NGOs provide assistance to migrant communities, hardly any support the development of sustainable services and networks run by migrants themselves. Consequently, many migrants and organizations led by migrants regard the help offered by NGOs as an act of paternalism. NGOs still tend to see migrants as beneficiaries of services, not partners in dialogue and action. Trade unions provide assistance to immigrants who already have work and are members of their organizations. The three main trade unions 67


(CGIL,32 CISL33 and UIL34) show a visible and consistent presence of foreign workers. As of 2005 approximately 200,000 immigrant workers were enrolled in CGIL trade union (8% of total members – in some of CGIL’s sub-departments migrants compose circa 30% of members, e.g., FILLEA for civil construction). These numbers show that trade unions give some voice and political representation to migrants, in spite of the difficulties to organize them at the workplace. In fact, trade unions face limitations in organizing workers who are employed in the informal economy, and it is precisely in this sector that immigrants are concentrated.

Conclusions From the picture we have drawn of the Italian context, TCN immigrants do not have many opportunities to integrate in the Italian society on a satisfactory level. The individual cases of “successful immigration” depend mainly from the local contexts and the existing networks than from general provisions. Without tackling the structural problem of irregular immigrants, even for regular migrants, the many bureaucratic barriers affecting immigrants (e.g., stay permits, the conditions requested for family reunification, regular housing, etc.), already increased since the Bossi-Fini law came into force, thanks to the “Security Packet” are at present even higher. As we have seen, the size and demands of the Italian economy (formal and informal), combined with the families’ needs, and the imposition of Law 189/2002 have made it impossible for labour supply to meet labour demand, thus “producing” a structurally necessary pool of irregular migrants. Moreover, Law 189/2002 abandoned the integration policies embodied in Law 40/98. Since the mid-’90s, the racist and anti-immigrant populist discourse of right-wing groups such as the Northern League, has made it more difficult to introduce integration policies and to promote social cohesion in a de facto multicultural country. Such discourse creates moral panic, social stress, and conditions of conflict and tension, without tackling the structural problem of irregular immigration.

32

CGIL, Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (20 December 2010).

33

CISL, Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori (20 December 2010).

34

UIL, Unione Italiana del Lavoro (20 December 2010). 68

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It is impossible to understand immigrant policies in Italy without taking into account the role of populism in present-day Italian politics. One consequence of the form of populism described in this paper is that immigration has been presented by powerful political groups as a battle between “us and them” and the actions of the government are not aimed at reducing social conflict. The laws and policies currently in place do not take a rational “problem-solving” approach, nor do they respect the international conventions that Italy has signed and should – theoretically – implement. However, the subordinated integration does not respond only to populism, but to the specificities of the Italian labour market and to the “survival strategies” of an economy facing globalization. Migration policies have to be structured in a broader frame of reform. A lack of “rational” and “pursuable” mechanisms of regular labourdriven migration stimulates the use of irregular migration channels. The only way to truly prevent irregular migration is to facilitate a labourdriven human movement. The real priority is not information/awareness-raising, but the promotion of regular channels of movement for work reasons. A definition of “realistic” migration policies is necessary, i.e., which foresee human mobility for economic reasons and introduce “rationally” constructed and “reasonably” pursuable regular migration channels. This however needs a profound change throughout the Italian economic model.

References Abella, M. I. 2000. Migration and Employment of Undocumented Workers: Do Sanctions and Amnesties Work? In Irregular Migration: Dynamics, Impact, Policy Options. Eurosocial Report No. 67, eds. A. Gächter, H. Waldrauch and D. Çinar, 205–215. Vienna: European Centre. Allasino, E., E. Reyneri, E. Venturini, and G. Zincone. 2004. La discriminazione dei lavoratori immigrati nel mercato del lavoro in Italia. Geneva: International Migration Papers, ILO. Ambrosini, M. 1999. Utili invasori. L’inserimento degli immigrati nel mercato del lavoro italiano. Milan: Franco Angeli. Basso, P. 2007. Immigrants and Trade Unions in Italy. Paper presented at the National Conference, IntGen Research Project, October 2006, Florence, Italy. Bonafede, A., and M. Di Pace. 2010. Silvio IV, il bluff del lavoro. La Repubblica, Affari e Finanza, 8 November, 21–22. . 69


Campani, G. 2008. Migranti nel mondo globale. Rome: Sinnos. Campani, G., and T. Chiappelli. 2008. Biographical Interviews in the Italian Sample: Migrant Women between Exclusion and Inclusion. Working Paper 6, FeMiPol project report. ———. 2010. Current Challenges to Migrant Integration: Xenophobia and Racism: The Case of Italy. Project Brief 2, PRIMTS project: (24 July 2010). Campani, G., T. Chiappelli, I. Cabral, and A. Manetti. 2006. Mapping of Policies Affecting Female Migrants and Policy Analysis: The Italian Case. Working Paper 1, FeMiPol project report (23 October 2009). Caritas Migrantes. 2009. Immigrazione: XIX Dossier Statistico. Rome: Idos. ———. 2010. Immigrazione: XX Dossier Statistico. Rome: Idos. Chaloff, J. 2005. Immigration as a Labour Market Strategy: Italy. In Immigration as a Labour Market Strategy – European and North American Perspectives, eds. J. Niessen and Y. Schibel, 1–19. Brussels: Migration Policy Group. Chiappelli, T. 2010. Voci di donne migranti, tra mondi lontani e vicini. In Genere e globalizzazione, ed. G. Campani, 197–278. Pisa: ETS. Dell’Anno, R., and F. Schneider. 2003. The Shadow Economy of Italy and other OECD Countries: What Do We Know? Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice XXI (2–3): 97–120. Espining Andersen, G. 1996. Welfare States in Transition: Social Security in a Global Economy. London: Sage. Feld, L. P., and F. Schneider. 2010. Survey on the Shadow Economy and Undeclared Earnings in OECD Countries. (12 December 2010). OECD. 2000. Some Lessons from Recent Regularisation Programmes. In Combating the Illegal Employment of Foreign Workers. Paris: OECD. Pasini, N. 2003. Health. In The Eighth Italian Report on Migrations 2002, 95–107. Milan: ISMU Foundation. Penninx, R. 2003. Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State. In Migration Information Source. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. (3 April 2009). Reyneri, E. 2003. Immigration and the Underground Economy in New Receiving South European Countries. International Review of Sociology 13 (1): 117–143. ———. 2004a. Education and the Occupational Pathways of Migrants in Italy. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30 (6): 1145–1162. ———. 2004b. Immigrants in a Segmented and Often Undeclared Labour Market. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 9 (1): 71–93. 70

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Saraceno, C. 2007. Mutamenti della famiglia e politiche sociali in Italia. Bologna: il Mulino. ———. 2008. Families, Ageing and Social Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Saraceno, C., A. Brandolini, and A. Schizzerotto. 2009. Dimensioni della disuguaglianza in Italia: povertà, salute, abitazione. Bologna: Il Mulino. Sciortino, G. 2004. Le frontiere e i controlli. In L’immigrazione straniera in Lombardia. La terza indagine regionale, ed. G. C. Blangiardo, 109–121. Milan: Osservatorio Regionale per l’integrazione e la multietnicità, Rapporto 2003. Tambiah, S. J. 2000. Transnational Movements, Diaspora, and Multiple Modernities. Daedalus 129 (1, Multiple Modernities): 163–194. Trifiletti R. 1999. Southern European Welfare Regimes and the Worsening Position of Women. Journal of European Social Policy 9 (1): 49–64. ———. 2005. Responsabilità familiari e welfare regimes. La Rivista delle Politiche Sociali 4 (ottobre-dicembre): 339–350. Zincone, G. 2000. Primo rapporto sull’integrazione degli immigrati in Italia – Commissione per le Politiche di integrazione degli immigrati in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino. ———. 2001. Secondo rapporto sull’integrazione degli immigrati in Italia – Commissione per le Politiche di integrazione degli immigrati in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino. ———. 2009. Immigrazione: segnali di integrazione. Sanità, scuola e casa. Bologna: Il Mulino.

71

LABOUR INTEGRATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN CYPRUS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL NICOS TRIMIKLINIOTIS, CORINA DEMETRIOU

Introduction Mapping and evaluating the area of migrant labour integration in Cyprus is not an easy task as the issue of integration has for years been a non-starter. Until the end of 2010, when the first national action plan on integration was adopted, the policy framework could only be schematically imagined. It ought to be noted from the outset that there is an inherent contextual problem relating to the de facto division of Cyprus, which was set up as a bi-communal and bilingual country; this paper only covers the area under control of the Republic of Cyprus, i.e., the southern part of the country.1 The current regime for the employment of third country nationals (TCNs) is the result of the labour shortages which were associated with the dramatic economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, referred to as “the economic miracle” (Christodoulou 1992). This was the basic reason for radical change of policy in 1990 which allowed migrant workers in Cyprus. The so-called “economic miracle” of the late 1970s and 1980s was structured by a number of “external” factors, following the devastation which resulted from the Turkish occupation of the north since 1974. In turn, this created the conditions for accumulation by disposession based on the labour of 13000 Greek-Cypriot dispossessed displaced persons. Prior to 1990, immigration policy was restrictive, hence very few migrants were allowed. When Cyprus first opened its doors to migrant labour in 1989, it was considered by policy-makers that “foreign labour” was required only temporarily to cover the developmental needs arising from the shortage of labour. As a result, the policy aimed at creating a regime of short-term contracts for migrants restricted to specific sectors of the economy (Planning Bureau 1989; Trimikliniotis 1999). Migrant labour was intended to be a short-term affair. Policy makers conceptual1

Few studies have been published on the question of migration, migrants and settlers in the north. The issue is controversial and there are disputed views on the subject (see Hatay 2007, 2008 and Faiz 2008). 73


ized that, via technological innovation and the re-training of the Cypriot labour force, the economy would eventually adjust and restructure, and the need for “foreign labour” would cease (Planning Bureau 1989; Matsis and Charalambous 1993). Hence, according to the original policy considerations there was no need to debate a “migration policy” as such, never mind an “integration policy.” At the time, this assessment may have had some credibility, even though the logic is problematic from its inception. If one was to examine the actual transformation in the employment and socio-economic reality in Cyprus in the 1990s (see Matsis and Charalambous 1993; Trimikliniotis 1999, 2010a, 2010b) it would become apparent from the early days, at least from early to mid 1990s, that the assumption on which this policy was based was false. Twenty years since the change of policy, the official number of non-Cypriots residing in the area under the control of the Republic of Cyprus, the vast majority of whom are migrant workers, is estimated to be over 180,195: 2 97,638 are EU citizens, the other 66,187 are TCNs, and there are 7,803 students. From the TCNs, about 35,000 are domestic workers and a large number work in farms and agriculture. 3,413 TCNs work in international companies and another 9,123 have work permits. Also, there are 2,270 asylum seekers and refugees. The irregular migrants are estimated to be around 25,000– 30,000.3 During 2009 there was a reduction of the inflow of irregular migrants from the Turkish-controlled north of Cyprus. In 2008 the number was 5,162, whilst up until September 2009 there were only 3,154.4 There is little if any literature on the subject reflecting the absence of public debate on the general subject of “integration.” If anything, the public debate is one which concentrates on “the numbers’ game,” with allegations that migrants and asylum seekers receive “too many benefits” and are responsible for the rise in crime, car accidents, and diseases.5 What follows is an attempt to piece together and locate the knowledge derived from disparate sources, including academic and research papers as well as various technical reports, such as governmental and 2

Figures provided by the Population Archive in October 2010.

3

This is the figure provided by the Ministry of Interior based on the estimation of the migration authorities in a letter to the authors, dated 23 March 2010, for the purposes of the Report on Cyprus for the International Migration Organisation, see Trimikliniotis (2010b).

4

In the same meeting the Minister of Justice announced that with the completion of the construction of a detention centre for irregular migrants at the village of Menoyia by 2010, a total of 256 can be detained. See (26 October 2009).

5

These are the findings of almost all the studies on the subject. 74

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non-governmental reports, policy documents and other publications. These provide us with insight into the role of local actors, policy-makers, the assumptions underpinning policies, and the contestations over the making and implementation of policies. Attempts to study the integration policies of Cyprus for the period leading up and in the immediate aftermath to the 2004 accession to the EU (i.e., 2000–2006) have been made; however, it was difficult to locate and evaluate something that resembled an “integration” policy as such. From its inception immigration policy had been inappropriate: the “model” is based on the same problematic assumptions that labour immigration to Cyprus is a temporary phenomenon to cover labour shortages in specific areas which are unpopular with Cypriots. It follows from this logic that any policy measures must be transient and short-term in nature, until there is labour retraining, technological innovation, and adjustments in the Cypriot labour force (see Planning Bureau 1989; Matsis and Charalambous 1993; Trimikliniotis 1999, 2010a, 2010b; Trimikliniotis and Pantelides 2003). Policy-makers persistently defend the short-term visa model for specific jobs and specific employers, a kind of Gastarbeiter model (Trimikliniotis 1999; Trimikliniotis and Pantelides 2003; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2006, 2008). In previous work on the subject, reference was made to the existence of an “immigration-integration conundrum” (Trimikliniotis 2006; cf. Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla 2010). Up to 2006–2007, no official or Ministry could be identified as being in charge of coordination or development of integration; there was simply no declared integration policy. A useful starting point for analysis of the situation as it stands before the introduction of the new policy is the overview provided for the purposes of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX),6 which locates Cyprus in a generally unfavourable integration position, which provides a point of departure and comparison across the EU: Cyprus is one of only five EU member states where the majority of non-nationals are from other EU countries, 5.7% of the total population is from outside the EU. Asylum seekers and international students make up a large part of the immigration flows. Legislative developments have been restricted to the delayed transposition of the EC Directives on family reunion and 6

See the Cypriot country situation for Migrant Integration Policy Index, available at (26 June 2010). 75


long-term residence, as well as some minor amendments to the laws transposing the two anti-discrimination Directives, in order to bring the transposing legislation in line with the equality acquis. The study analyzes the areas in which Cyprus fares well in comparison to other EU countries and where it is “weak”: Anti-discrimination is the strongest of the six areas of integration policy measured by MIPEX, although it is still a full 40 percentage points away from best practice. Political participation scores unfavourably, with several critically weak policy dimensions. Even with the transposition of the EC Directives on family reunion and long-term residence, Cyprus has the worst score on family reunion out of the 28 MIPEX countries, the second worst on longterm residence, and the fourth worst on labour market access. All major studies on third country migrant workers in Cyprus point to the same conclusion: that they remain in “a vulnerable position,”7 in spite of the improvements to the institutional and legal framework, as recognized by the Third ECRI Report on Cyprus.8

Overview and Critical Evaluation of Country Specificities: Immigration and Integration Policies in Perspective The regional and international reasons that account for the migratory flows to Cyprus are the following: On the one hand, economic developments such as the worldwide growth in tourism and migration flows resulted in economic growth which increased the demand for labour in Cyprus. On the other hand, political developments such as the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the migration of labour from ex-Soviet countries, but also to the migration of a large number of Pontiacs from the Caucasus region who were granted Greek nationality and were thus able to enter Cyprus with relative ease. In addition, the Gulf war, successive crises in the Gulf region, and unrest in Israel/Palestine have caused the inflow into Cyprus of both economic as well as political refugees from the affected countries. The process of accession to the EU is thought to have made Cyprus an attractive destination for migrants and asylum seekers, and the response of policy-makers was to keenly transform 7

See ECRI’s Second Report on Cyprus. Strasbourg: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Council of Europe, 3 July 2001.

8

See ECRI’s Third Report on Cyprus. Strasbourg: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Council of Europe, 16 May 2006, p. 6. 76

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themselves to “border-guards of Europe.”9 Cyprus is a prime instance of a southern European country which “functions as the ‘entrance hall’ to the EU, and often serves as a ‘waiting room’ for many migrants who have the northern European countries as a destination” (Anthias and Lazaridis 1999, 3). New migration has the conditions for the “racialisation of migrant workers” (Trimikliniotis 1999) and the patterns of discrimination and ill treatment, particularly of migrants are well-documented.10 The current economic crisis is an issue that is beginning to creep into the immigration and employment debates in Cyprus. Unemployment is climbing upward, and even though it remains the second lowest rate in the EU it has doubled over the last year. According to figures released by Eurostat, unemployment in Cyprus reached 6.2% in November 2009, which marks an increase of 0.1% compared to October 2009. Despite this, Cyprus presents the fourth best unemployment rate in the EU. Cypriot unemployment was mainly affected by job cuts in the tourist and construction sectors due to the financial crisis. Unemployment among men in Cyprus reached 6.2% in November (6% in October) and 6.3% among women (6.2% in October), while unemployment for young people under 25 years old reached 14.7% in September.11 Some trade unions are calling for more restrictions in the employment of TCNs, although the employers’ federation is firmly in favour of more migrant workers to fill in the jobs that Cypriots are unwilling to take. Fringe and extreme right groups and initiatives have emerged connecting unemployment to the presence of migrant workers; some of these articulate a clearly racist discourse and have repeatedly used violence against migrants in the streets.

9

During his address to the EU summit in Thessalonica, the former President of Cyprus referred to the experience of Cyprus in dealing with migrants and asylum seekers and offered to share “expertise” with the European Community.

10

See the 2001 ECRI Second Report on Cyprus. Strasbourg: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Council of Europe, 3 July 2001.

11

See the Cyprus News Agency (26 October 2009). In terms of the actual figures, the average number of registered unemployed persons for the entire year 2009 reached 17,505, compared to 11,541 in 2008, recording an increase of 51.7%. The increase was mainly recorded in the sectors of construction, trade, hotels and restaurants, real estate and business activities, manufacturing as well as to newcomers in the labour market. According to the latest figures released by the Statistical Service, the number of unemployed persons in Cyprus, registered at the District Labour Offices on the last day of December 2009, reached 21,530. These figures show that, based on the seasonally adjusted data, the number of registered unemployed reached 19,745 persons in December, recording a decrease of 2.8%. 77


The New Integration Policy: Signs of Change The term used by the Interior Minister for the new integration policy, adopted in October 2010, is entaksi.12 The term is the state-of-the-art in Greek terminology, employed instead of ensomatosi,13 which contains notions of “incorporation,” demonstrating awareness of the current debates on the subject amongst Greek scholars against assimilation policies,14 in contrast with his predecessors, who were often accused of making statements which were inflammatory and contributed to xenophobic climate.15 The newly adopted National Inclusion Policy (NIP) includes elements of support and information of TCNs who are legally residing in the country, utilizing and/or activating local government, and the participation of civil society. Gender mainstreaming has been identified as a priority target within all policies.16 The Interior Minister has stated that his Ministry will be monitoring the progressive harmonization of participation in public life of migrants with long-term stay so that “the conditions are created which will allow them to exercise their rights as citizens.” He added that the success of this task will depend on whether “all kinds of associations and organization, from athletic organizations to political parties accept migrants in their ranks” by implementing equal opportunities policies, electing migrants in all responsible levels of representation, and cooperating with migrant organizations.17 12

In Greek the term is ένταξη.

13

In Greek the term is ενσωμáτωση.

14

For the Greek debates on the subject the book by Pavlou and Christopoulos (2004) remains one of the best on the current policy debates, particularly in the Greek and European context.

15

Some nationalists and far-right politicians and fringe groups have repeatedly accused the Minister of Interior as being too “pro-migrant.” The most recent accusations came following his condemnation of heavy-handed policing and arrests of TCNs in the city centre of the Cypriot capital, Nicosia, in November 2009. On the contrary, the philosophy and discourse of the Minister was commended by many experts during the European Conference on Free Movement of Workers, which was addressed by the Cypriot Ministers of Interior, Neoclis Sylikiotis and the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance, Sotiroulla Charalambous. This was communicated to the author by a number of experts who were impressed by the emphasis on human rights, inclusion, non-discrimination, the enhancement of labour rights, which provided a positive vision for migrant labour to Cyprus and Europe at large, TCNs, and EU nationals.

16

This is under the supervision and direction of Equality Unit of the Ministry of Justice and Public Order (Μονáδα Ισóτητας του Υπουργεíου Δικαιοσυνης και Δημóσιας Τáξης) and the National Mechanism for the Rights of Women (Εθνικóς Μηχανισμóς για τα Δικαιϖματα της Γυναíκα).

17

The mechanisms identified by the Interior Minister as necessary for the implementation of the NIP and the monitoring of its success include valid and accurate statistical 78

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Beyond the legislative changes, a number of accompanying measures are foreseen, such as: – Actions for provision of relevant information, awareness-raising and training; – Language classes; – Promotion of equal treatment at work; – Access to justice; – Seminars for employers and employees on labour relations, vocational training, health provisions at schools, and maternal services (all provided free-of-charge irrespective of nationality); – Educational measures for the integration of children at schools; – European Refugee Fund projects and projects under the EQUAL Community Programme.

Regularization and Immigration Control The issue of integration must be connected to the general issues of immigration control. There is an operative paradox when dealing with immigration regulation, as tougher immigration control reproduces irregularity; hence many countries are forced to adopt regularization policies (Trimikliniotis 2009). In the case of Cyprus there is no debate on regularization: the “Cyprus problem” dominates the political scene and the population issue is one of the contested points in the current negotiations to resolve this long-lasting conflict. It would be safe to predict that until the Cyprus problem is resolved one way or another, regularization will not form part of the agenda of policy makers. In reality the political debate, which is largely media-generated and media-amplified, depicts “the problem” of “too much immigration” and “failure to control the flow of migrants.” Anti-immigrant politicians and media discourses connect migration to asylum seekers in what is invariably a constantly replayed “numbers’ game.”18 In any case, the official figures show that there was a reduction of the applications for asylum to 1,180 applications when compared to 2,500 for the same period. This is attributed to “better surveillance of the ‘Green Line’ and the expediting of the application procedure” which reduced the motive of the applicants to obtain benefits whilst the application was pending: pending applicadata; the development of valid indicators (quantitative and qualitative) of inclusion/integration; systematic evaluation and review of such indicators; and utilization of such data for the development of realistic action plans. 18

See Trimikliniotis 1999; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2006; Charakis 2005. 79


tions were massively reduced from 8,500 in 2008 to 1,500 in 2009. The Minister of Interior has stated that during 2009 there was a reduction of the inflow of irregular migrants from the northern Turkish occupied part of Cyprus: whilst in 2008 the number of irregular migrants from the north was 5,162, in 2009 up until September there were only 3,154.19 At the time of writing, Cyprus had not yet transposed the EU Directive20 which sets minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying TCNs, 21 although national legislation does provide for certain sanctions.22

Gender and Regional/Local Dimension in Integration Mechanisms Little concern has been given in the literature on gender in Cyprus: studies on employment have so far failed to examine the migrant women as part of female labour of Cyprus in the same way that the few studies that exist on labour in Cyprus generally do not consider migrant labour as part of the working class, as pointed out in other works (see Trimikliniotis and Souroulla 2010; cf. Trimikliniotis 1999). However, more recently literature on migrant labour and migration in Cyprus has increasingly begun to consider the issues relating to the hierarchies in the labour market, discrimination and exploitation of various categories and social groups, geographical factors, and gender specificities.23 In general, the position of women in the labour market, both migrant and Cypriot, the legislative framework for gender equality, and collective bargaining show a serious gender gap, with women having a lower employment rate and lower salaries. Women are over-represented in low-skilled jobs, and there are indications that they fill a significant number of jobs in the clandestine economy. This last category includes the 19

Statement by the Minister of Interior speaking before the House of Representatives (Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs), 25 October 2009, Alicia, 27 October 2009.

20

2009/52/EC.

21

Officials from the Ministry of Interior have informed the authors that the Ministry of Interior is currently discussing transposition measures for the Directive with the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labour and the Police.

22

Article 14B of the Aliens and Immigration Law Cap. 155.

23

See Trimikliniotis 1999; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla 2010; Charakis 2005; Panayiotopoulos 1995; see also (23 December 2010). 80

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large number of female migrant workers employed in the so-called “sex industry,” as well as many migrants employed as domestic workers. It should be noted that the largest increase in employment was related to private households that employ domestic staff, and was due to the continued increase of migrants employed as domestic workers (see Soumeli and Trimikliniotis 2004). Whether as an issue of public discourse or violation of employment/ human rights of domestic workers and in particular South-East Asians (Kadir 2001; Lenz 2006), or a general issue of belonging and participation of women migrants in civic life (Trimikliniotis 2003), the exclusion and racism targeting migrant women assumes specific forms and raises its own particularities.

TCNs and the Labour Market Studies have shown that TCNs had a major impact on the economy and are believed to have contributed up to 54% of the growth since they first arrived in Cyprus.24 Nevertheless, the institutional framework covering the employment of TCNs carries the following characteristics: (a) Work permits are granted to employers on the condition that the migrant worker applied for is attached to a specific employer (the applicant) without the freedom to change jobs unless the original employer consents to such change or there is a labour dispute; and (b) Work permits are granted on an annual basis and with a maximum ceiling of five years in order to exclude the possibility of having to grant to TCNs the status of a long-term migrant, structurally producing and reproducing a framework of precariousness and exclusion. There are major gaps in the employment policies as a result of which patterns of inequality in the labour market can be located, particularly if one examines the kind of jobs TCNs are concentrated in, at the lower echelons of the labour hierarchy. The pre-condition for granting them employment and entry permit is that they take up jobs that Cypriots do not wish to do, which are typically low-skill, pay, and status. TCNs have little, if any opportunity for training and betterment and no opportunity whatsoever to progress or advance 24

See the findings of Michael et al. (2005), which examined the economic effects of the work of migrant workers in Cyprus. Using econometric analysis they estimated parametrically, on the basis of the available data at that time, the effect of migrant workers’ labour in the total gross domestic product of the Cypriot economy and of each sector separately. The results provided ample evidence of the importance of foreign workers for the economy as a whole and each sector individually. 81


in the employment ladder in terms of promotion or career move, as their stay is dependent on the particular job and employer (see Trimikliniotis and Pantelides 2003; Charakis 2005). The inequality and exclusion of TCNs in the labour market has resulted in a higher share in labour accidents and exposure to extreme weather conditions (life-threatening high temperature and humidity). This is due to the fact that their employment is concentrated in manual, low-skill jobs in sectors which are much more prone to labour accidents (e.g., construction) where employers persistently fail to comply with the guidelines issued by Labour Inspection Department of the Ministry of Labour.

UNEMPLOYMENT Given that it is a precondition for a third country migrant to have a job in order to obtain a work permit, it is not possible to establish a link between unemployment and TCNs, although migrant youth whose families have a less precarious presence in Cyprus may be facing unemployment.25 We have recently seen xenophobic and anti-immigration discourses connecting migrants to the rise of unemployment. A study published in 2009, that examined the impact of immigration on unemployment, labour force participation and part-time employment26 found that, despite the sharp increase of the number of migrant workers in Cyprus in the last 15 years, the presence of migrant workers has not affected total unemployment or total labour force participation in Cyprus; parttime employment seems to be marginally affected overall. However, the presence of migrant workers affects the probability of unemployment, labour force participation, and part-time employment of some age and education groups. The study found that the presence of migrant workers increased the probability of unemployment for younger individuals in the 20–29 age group, while there is no significant impact on unemployment for older people: educational attainment does not seem to play a very important role. Among people aged 20–24 years, a percentage unit increase in the share of migrant workers increases the probability of 25

It has been suggested during an interview with one leader of a Pontiac group that there may be a problem with young Pontiacs who find it difficult to find work (see Nicos Trimikliniotis (2001) The Educational Problems of the Pontiacs in Cyprus: Preliminary Research and Report on Primary Education. Report on behalf of the Cyprus Association of Sociologists submitted to the Ministry of Education). Pontiacs are of Greek origin that migrated from the Caucasus region and Georgia to Cyprus after 1989.

26

The study used data from the EU Labour Force Surveys for the period 1999–2005. See Christofides et al. (2009). 82

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unemployment by 0.28%; whilst for individuals aged 25–29, there is a slightly different impact according to education level; 0.39% for tertiaryeducated individuals, 0.35% for individuals with primary education and 0.26% for individuals with secondary education. It found no statistically significant impact for individuals with upper secondary / non tertiary education of any age. The study concluded that over the period 1999– 2005 there was no significant overall impact of migrant workers on total labour force participation.

DISCRIMINATION AND EXCLUSION Even though there is no official and non-official statistical data or other information available dealing with incidents of racism, discrimination, and the situation of TCNs in employment, there are sound studies showing evidence of discrimination, marginalization, and exploitation. From the data on TCNs in employment and the types of jobs they perform, it is possible to draw some conclusions as to their position in the labour market and in society-at-large. It is possible to infer that the position of migration employment remains vulnerable and trends illustrate that there are problems of discrimination and non-integration in employment.27 The Third ECRI Report on Cyprus confirms the findings of the Second ECRI Report that TCNs continue to form the most vulnerable group despite institutional developments brought about by Cyprus’ EU accession in 2004. Evidence of non-compliance by the employers with contract terms is abundant. Various Annual Reports of the Labour Office28 of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance state that that the policy is to ensure equal treatment between Cypriots and non-Cypriot workers. However, other studies suggest that “it is generally admitted by all interested parties that there is exploitation of foreign labour force in Cyprus and especially on subjects such as pay, labour/industrial relations, and working conditions.”29 This is attributed to inadequate information, the general feeling of social exclusion, and marginalization due to the inabil27

See Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2006, 2008).

28

See (5 June 2010).

29

Presentation of Preliminary Results of a Research, 2006: European Mobility Year in an Enlarged Europe, on behalf of the Labour Department of the Ministry of Labour, 2 October 2006, Lefkosia. The research is based on interviews of stratified samples from all echelons of working life of 850 Cypriots, 200 workers from different European countries and uses methods of questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, and focus groups. 83


ity and unwillingness of Cypriots to accept cultural diversity. The study has located barriers such as language, educational, and family reasons, non-recognition of academic qualifications, and the great distance between Cyprus and continental Europe.30 Lower pay for migrant workers was discussed by the migrants interviewed for the purposes of PRIMTS project, confirming that irregular migrants are often paid much less than Cypriots or regular migrants. Ahmet, an unemployed Bulgarian worker in search for construction work alleges that non-European migrants accept to work with much less than EU nationals: For example now the others, Russians, Pakistanis, I don’t know, others as well, they work for 40 euros. Their price is lower. But they do not deposit anything, they are all illegal. (Ahmet, 26, Bulgaria, unemployed)

Sometimes employers register migrant workers as farm workers but use them for various other tasks unrelated to their job description, and thus pay them less than what those jobs require. Sugath, a Sri Lankan migrant registered as a farm worker interviewed for PRIMTS reported that his job regularly includes fixing parquets, curtains, floating screed etc. but is paid less than the other workers who are employed to perform such tasks: I am working with one Romanian, Hungarian, and a Cypriot the boss also ... and they are getting more salary, they are getting 1,000 euro. But I am also doing that, the same job and they are paying me 402 euro only. Less salary but what can I do? I need the job. (Sugath, 43, Sri Lanka, farm worker)

Other migrants, however, stated that they knew of EU nationals who were also paid less than Cypriots. Gomul, a Bangladeshi migrant spoke about the discrimination he faced together with other non-Cypriots EU workers which took the form of lower pay for the same kind of job when compared with Cypriots: I know that other Romanian they also know they are given less money, but they’re not complaining. They tell if you like to work, work, if you don’t like, you may go home. They say like this! (Gomul, 32, Bangladesh, printer)

Many studies have located that colour remains a signifier of racism (Trimikliniotis 1999, 2005; Charakis 2005; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 30

See Press Release and power point presentation of the study Barriers to Mobility from and to Cyprus. See Trimikliniotis (2010a). 84

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2008). The empirical findings of the PRIMTS study indicate that there is widespread discrimination and if one is black, he or she is more likely to be stopped and searched. This is what Natham, who works in construction, has noted: Those who had white colour, let’s say Syrians, Iranians, Iraqis, they are okay, because the police will pass to the place, they will see white people are working … Okay, if they see a black there, they will go and ask “What is your paper?” So, is very risky for a black to be working illegally and then you don’t even have chance to be taken by this employer. (Natham, 35, Congo, mediator)

The Cyprus Equality Body has ruled that the treatment of foreign female domestic workers is discriminatory on the ground of race or ethnic origin and located indirect discrimination in the low salaries paid to migrant domestic workers31 compared to Cypriot workers. The fact that there is evidence of discrimination and violation of the employment working conditions of domestic workers was already recorded by many studies (see Trimikliniotis 1999; Kadir 2001; Trimikliniotis and Pantelides 2003; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2007, 2008). The Third ECRI Report also points to indirect discrimination against non-EU workers “when collective agreements stipulate unreasonably disadvantageous conditions for sectors mainly operated by these workers.” The ECRI Report refers to “exploitation and abuse by (...) employers” of domestic and other foreign workers, noting that there have been some changes in the procedures; however, “the close link still existing between employment with a specific employer and the residence permit” continues to be critical and as a result “domestic and other foreign workers are still reported to endure serious situations of exploitation and abuse in order to avoid deportation.” In the PRIMTS study it was found that gender issues are inscribed in the labour of domestic work for instance and are manifested in the distortions and abuses in encounters with Cypriot women, but more directly apparent when examining the relations with men. Some domestic workers particularly referred to the sexual harassment which may force female migrant worker escape from their employers: Lena: Yes, they don’t give food, because they don’t want to spend money for us, they buy everything for themselves, but they don’t give food for us, that is why girls are run31

Calculated at CYP 0.82 per hour, contrasted with CYP 4 – CYP 5 per hour for Cypriots carrying out the same work: Cyprus Ombudswoman Report File No. A.K.I 2/2005, dated 4 November 2005, page 4. 85


ning. Some girls are running, to make boyfriend, but not all the girls are same ... they make like this, so employer think like this, it’s not true, all girls have too much problems. They are not same, no food sometime, Madam are shouting, telling to do bad work also. Moderator: What they do? Lena: They [the employer] ask to do sex! Many run away from employers! I pay for the agent, they also didn’t do anything for my release paper, one agent, I paid 300 euros. Moderator: What did she do? Lena: She didn’t do anything for me ... I have my case until now, not finish ... Also one agent said that she will do my release paper, she also took 300 euros from me, she took money and didn’t do anything. Mabel: I heard my three, four girls from India. She, err, don’t find nothing job; she is taking 300 euros. Also, Dora, another agent, she take money and do nothing. (Lena, 25, India, irregular domestic worker; Mabel, 26, India, irregular domestic worker, focus group)

The study of the Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies32 illustrates that the discrimination against domestic migrant workers employed in Cyprus is specifically structured by a number of factors routed in the policy regulating their stay, working conditions, and employment position and shows violations of the contractual and labour rights. These workers are forced to work more than seven hours per day that their contract provides and are essentially always on call by their employer. Christina, a Sri Lankan migrant domestic worker interviewed for the purposes of PRIMTS, noted that employers sometimes forget that domestic workers are human: When we come here we spend a lot of money and we miss our families. Physically, emotionally we are tired because we are human. They have to think also reasonably for our side. But sometimes they think: “Ok, this is my maid and I can do whatever I want with her.” They forget that we are human also. (Christina, 27, Sri Lanka, domestic worker)

32

The Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies (MIGS, see (13 October 2010)), in collaboration with Intercollege is coordinating a transnational project entitled “Integration of Female Migrant Domestic Workers: Strategies for Employment and Civic Participation,” funded under the INTI Preparatory Actions 2005, Integration for third country nationals of the European Commission. They have published a leaflet which contains the results of the project with regards to the situation of female migrant domestic workers in each of the five partner countries, as well as policy recommendations on EU level. It is available in English and Greek; see (15 October 2010). 86

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Policy Assessment of Informal Economy and Undeclared Work Data on undeclared work is fragmentary and based on estimates and rough guess. Cyprus’ “black market economy” is worth more than an estimated 486 million pounds (972 million dollars) annually, representing 9.17% of its gross domestic product (GDP).33 Irregular or undocumented or clandestine migrant workers form a significant portion of what is known as the “informal” or “black economy,” and can be seen as part of the phenomenon of “undeclared work.” The current policy on the informal economy and undeclared work is to crack it down essentially by repressive measures. Undocumented migration has additional and specific characteristics that derive from their third country national status which make their position in “undeclared” work particularly vulnerable as they face, if discovered, detention, fines, and imprisonment as well as deportation. In Cyprus, irregular or undocumented migrants are primarily “overstayers,” i.e., workers who have entered the country legally but remain after their visa conditions have expired. They are employed in sectors of the economy with extremely harsh working conditions such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing, and the entertainment business. Media reports bring out the plight of such workers, who are said to be paid minimal wages, far below the official minimum wage acceptable to Cypriots (statutory or terms agreed in the collective agreements), endure long working hours, unhealthy and unsafe working conditions, and it is not uncommon that they are harassed, not to mention the practice of some employers to withhold their wages, particularly in the case of seasonal workers. Some fall victims to labour trafficking and have to survive under slavery-like conditions. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights34 criticized the practice of the authorities in Cyprus to criminally prosecute persons who enter the country unlawfully or who reside in Cyprus unlawfully and suggested the handling of such cases at the administrative level, which would also contribute to the alleviation of the problem of the over33

See AKEL (2004) Black Economy in Cyprus, Nicosia, for a study on the so-called “informal sector.” According to this study the biggest sector in the island’s illegal economy is drug trafficking, worth 136 million Cyprus pounds each year, and prostitution worth 40 million Cyprus pounds.

34

Report of the European Commissioner for Human Rights Alvaro Robles on Cyprus, submitted to the European Council on 12 February 2004. 87


crowding of jails, where the illegal immigrants are held. Also the Third ECRI Report on Cyprus records that the working conditions in the sectors of the farming and agriculture industry, which is almost entirely made up by migrant workers, are “extremely poor”: wages are well below the minimum fixed by collective sectors of the economy. The Report refers to NGO claims that asylum seekers are pushed towards the irregular labour market and recommends that the Cypriot authorities ensure that asylum seekers are not discriminated against in exercising the right to employment granted to them by law. No measures were taken towards implementing these recommendations. There is no mechanism for irregular migrants to lodge complaints against their employers. Irregular migrants are reluctant to file complaints for fear that they will be returned to their home country when caught; in fact there have been instances reported in the media as well as in reports of the Ombudsman where migrant workers in legal employment were forcibly expelled from the country when they filed complaints against their employers. Evidence of non-compliance by employers with labour laws is abundant, whilst few initiatives have taken place to unionize or otherwise organize migrant workers. Under Cypriot law, assistance to third country nationals to lodge complaints is not considered as facilitation of unauthorized residence under domestic rules implementing the relevant Council Directive35 defining the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence, or under other national regulations. The Aliens and Immigration Law36 criminalizes assistance to unlawfully enter, transit or stay into any member state, however this provision cannot be interpreted as including assistance to file complaints. In late 2009 immigration law was amended so as to criminalize the renting of accommodation to undocumented migrants.37 The law has attracted criticism from MPs and human rights NGOs that it attempts to turn the average citizen into police spies, but no consideration was given to the impact of this law upon the migrants themselves.

Critical Evaluation of Other Policies Affecting TCNs The Cyprus National Action Plan for Employment 2004–2006 (NAPE) set out certain goals which have not been met. The relevant section, Guide35

Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002.

36

Article 19(A).

37

Law amending the Aliens and Immigration Law No. 143(I)/2009. 88

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line 7 of the NAPE titled “Promote the integration of and combat discrimination against people at a disadvantage in the labour market,” is silent on measures to combat discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. On the contrary, it praises the current system which attaches migrant workers’ entry visas to specific employers, as a measure, which has minimized unemployment amongst third country nationals. Referring to the Pontiac migrants in Cyprus, the Guideline states that they do not face unemployment problems due to the conditions of full employment and thanks to the “special education measures for these people aiming at their social integration (e.g. supportive teaching, language learning, and special activities).” Despite the abundance of evidence and research, the NAPE did not recognize the existence of any social exclusion problems among migrants. The promotion measures it set forward for the elimination of social exclusion are general and not focused on any group in particular (with the exception of measures for persons with disabilities). The National Action Plan for Social Inclusion for the period 2004–2006 published by the Cyprus Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance in July 2004 lists migrant workers as one of the vulnerable groups as “groups at risk,” but does not foresee any measures to address this. When social partners who were asked to comment on the Plan, the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) and to a lesser extent the Democratic Labour Federation of Cyprus – DEOK raised an issue with the way in which discrimination against migrants was dealt with in the Plan. PEO pointed out the need for institutional transformation to improve the vulnerable position of migrant workers especially against deportation due to interruption of their employment relationship and stressed the need for adequate medical insurance and the need to safeguard their social insurance rights. The National Action plan, without providing any detail, pledges that “the key priority for the social protection system of Cyprus is to maintain its successful performance in countering social exclusion and to respond with a sustainable approach to the socio-economic challenges of the future.” The National Report on the Strategies on Social Protection and Social Integration 2008–2010 (p. 10) prioritizes TCNs’ integration as a measure for the promotion of active inclusion of vulnerable groups. This includes references to full integration in Cypriot society, access to social services, vocational training for refugees, protection of unaccompanied minors, and provision of language course. In setting the main challenges, priorities, and goals, the Report refers to the need for immediate measures to 89


combat poverty and social exclusion (pp. 16–17): amongst the groups at risk are “economic migrants and refugees, especially third country nationals” (p. 17). Amongst the various measures proposed it also includes “cultural support and social integration of adults and children of TCNs.” The Report does not contain any definition of integration and the measures are general and vague. The subheading “Development of actions for inclusion of TCNs” (p. 25) pronounces that during the period 2008– 2010 a number of programmes will be developed aiming at the intervention and action for “the smooth integration of aliens in Cypriot society” and their support/promotion in the labour market via measures that would achieve the EU integration goals.

Trade Unions and Civic Activities The current institutional framework hardly provides the space for the civic participation of immigrants. It is, therefore, hard to differentiate between restrictive and encouraging legal conditions. There are obviously “restrictive conditions” that prohibit political participation in elections (restrictions in voting, in standing for office), unless full citizenship is granted, but there are no formal prohibitions of membership in parties and organizations, rights for self-organization, public rallies, etc., although there have been cases where the contract of employment of migrants in certain sectors prohibited involvement in political activity. Overall, the situation in Cyprus can be described as rather disappointing on the issue of the civic participation of TCNs. Even though the rights guaranteed under the Constitution and the ECHR are generally respected, with some exceptions, migrants face a tough regime because, on the whole, issues relating to their stay are considered as falling outside these rights. The anti-discrimination legislation transposing Directives 43/2000 and 78/2000 has had little impact on the situation of migrants in Cyprus and this is mostly restricted to their conditions of work. The main focus of the migrant support NGOs in Cyprus is to protect the basic rights of migrants in labour disputes. Lack of funding and understaffing, however, restricts the activities of many NGOs and civic participation such as foreigners/immigrant committees, quotas and subsidies to ethnic organizations have not been on top of their agendas. Over the last years, some migrant support initiatives have developed. However, the sector remains underdeveloped and the media does not always give it the space and attention it requires. 90

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There have not been any trade unions as such set up by immigrants, although a small number of organizations or associations of immigrants are gradually beginning to emerge. One of these organizations was set up by and consists of migrant workers from Bulgaria, whose intention is to focus on labour issues, including conditions of employment. Another organization that was set up with the assistance of UNHCR is that of recognized refugees; its activities have for various reasons been very limited and restricted to employment related issues and to assisting asylum seekers with the asylum procedure. Immigrants are allowed and encouraged to join the mainstream trade unions. It is argued that trade unions have not been very successful in taking action to support or demonstrate their solidarity to migrant workers (Trimikliniotis 1999). In spite of the ideological differences and the varying degrees of emphasis between the trade unions in Cyprus,38 there is a consensus39 in their reluctance to accept the presence of migrant workers in Cyprus, who are regularly blamed for rising unemployment.40 During the 1990s, trade unions adopted a defensive approach towards migrant workers, and made regular xenophobic remarks. It was common for trade unionists, particularly those on the right of the political spectrum, to claim that “they [migrant workers] are stealing our bread.”41 Interestingly, even the 38

One must distinguish between trade unions, as there are differences in emphasis and ideological leanings. PEO has to be seen in conjunction with the left wing party AKEL and the broad Left. SEK (Confederation of Labour of Cyprus) is ideologically and organically tied to the Right-wing party DESY (Democratic Rally).

39

In December 1996, there was even common action by trade unions taken against migrant workers in the hotel industry in Paphos; see reports in Haravgi, 12 December 1996 and Phileleftheros, 13 December 1996. Today, all trade unions regularly express their misgivings about the numbers of migrant workers in Cyprus and even call for more restrictions. Only the PEO has taken a strong stance to condemn the recent wave of anti-immigrant fervour in the media, with MPs from all the parties, with exception of AKEL, marching against the presence of migrants and particularly irregular migrants.

40

In addition to SEK and DEOK, the argument that unemployment is linked with immigration is still maintained today by the Cyprus Ministry of Labour, but disputed by the employers’ union OEB who argue that more permits for the employment of migrant workers must be issued if the targeted rate of growth is to be achieved (see reports: “OEB: Oi allodapoi den epireazoun tin anergia” in Phileleftheros (28 September 2005); “I apasxolisi allodapon den epirazei tin anergia” in Phileleftheros (9 October 2005)). In a recent press conference, the Minister of Labour referred to a study made by his Ministry, which attributes the recent rise in unemployment primarily to immigration (Christophorou, C. “Xenoi afxisan tin anergia” in Phileleftheros (10 August 2005)), however when we asked the Ministry for a copy of this study we did not receive any response.

41

SEK spokesman in Phileleftheros (2 December 1997). 91


super-exploitation and human rights violations of migrant workers have been invoked as justification for their deportation.42 The trade unions of the Left are more cautious and adopt a more sympathetic approach towards migrants, but they have not done very much to organize migrant workers in their ranks. Over the last 10 years, the left-wing trade union PEO has shifted towards a generally more sympathetic approach towards migrant workers and a number of initiatives were taken to support them, including the setting up of the Migrant Workers’ Bureau in 2003 to address exclusively the problems of migrant workers, the employment of a number of migrant workers as trade unionists/liaisons with the migrant communities, and a large conference in 2004 for the rights of migrant workers which was widely attended by migrant workers themselves. The PEO has advocated for the need to take measures to combat the widespread discrimination against migrant workers, especially in sectors where collective agreements are not in existence. There are sectors of the labour market that have traditionally been trade union strongholds, such as the construction industry, where approximately 50% of the workforce is made up of migrant workers; in such sectors trade unions have eventually started to recruit migrant workers as members and they advocate for their rights. However in sectors which have not been unionized, such as the agricultural and farming sector which is predominantly made up of migrant workers, trade unions have failed to unionize them, partly due to employers’ hostility, and partly to the difficulty of unionizing seasonal labour, but also due to an absence of a sense of priority by the unions. It is apparent that there are structural barriers to the proper representation, organizing, and articulating the case for migrant workers by the trade unions. The migrant workers more actively involved in the trade unions are the Greek nationals of Pontiac origin and the Bulgarian nationals; this may be attributed partly to the fact that their countries of origin have a history of unionization, when compared to other migrants in Cyprus, but primarily to the fact that their residence status in Cyprus is more secure than that of other migrants and are less likely to face deportations if they lose their jobs.

42

Interview with Assistant General Secretary of SEK, Demetris Kittenis, Ergatiki Foni (30 October 1996). 92

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Conclusions Integration requires a serious change in the whole way in which migrants are perceived and are structurally located in society. In particular, it requires a radical reform of the current immigration model which needs to shift from the short-term temporary model to a policy of granting long-term status to migrants who have a vested interest in adapting and producing in Cypriot society. At policy level, the whole approach to immigration policy must break away from the ideology of “control” and, in particular, border control and move towards a more proactive and positive approach towards immigrants and immigration. The basis of the model of reception of migrant workers must be based on a multicultural model that promotes equality and non-discrimination, participation and dialogue, belonging, and respect for difference. The policy of repression followed in Cyprus has proven to be ineffective in controlling migration flows and merely reproduces the problem of exclusion and discrimination. As argued elsewhere (Trimikliniotis 2009), the current regimes of regulation of the most vulnerable groups, the “weakest link” of labour and the backbone of undeclared labour and clandestine migrant labour is in fact produced and reproduced by the way migrant regulation is organized, somewhere in between immigration regulation and labour regulation. It is the process of legislating and what one scholar called “institutional precariousness” (Watts 1999, 129– 148) caught inside the contradiction between severe and repressive immigration control on the one hand, and ineffective labour market regulation on the other. The reproduction of racist ideologies by “scapegoating” migrants is the guise behind which extreme Right and racist ideas are being bred. A longer-term vision ought to be adopted learning from the experiences of southern Europe: only via the regularization of undocumented workers can we progress towards this vision.

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———. 2003. Report on Measures to Combat Discrimination in the 13 Candidate Countries: A Comparison between Council Directives and National Legislation on the Grounds of Racial or Ethnic Origin, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Disabilities, Age, Religion or Belief – Report on Cyprus. Expert report for EU Commission on behalf of MEDE Consultancies and the Migration Policy Group. ———. 2005. The European Dilemma: Institutional Patterns and Politics of “Racial” Discrimination, the Case of Cyprus. Xenophobia Research Project, EU Fifth Framework Programme 2002–2005. ———. 2006. Integration and Migration of Female Immigrants in the Labour and Market and Society – Policy Assessment and Policy Recommendation. Paper presented at a seminar held on 18 October 2006, at the Goethe-Zentrum, Nicosia. ———. 2009. The Use and Abuse of Undeclared and Unprotected Labour: Migration, Europeanisation and the Role of Trade Unions. In European Perspectives on Exclusion and Subordination: The Political Economy of Migration, ed. A. Neergaard, 177–200. Maastricht: Shaker. ———. 2010. Free Movement of Workers in Cyprus and the EU. (2 December 2010). ———. 2010a. Cyprus, Part 1, Migration and the Labour Markets in the European Union (2000–2009). Independent Network of Labour Migration and Integration Experts (LMIE-INET). Report on Cyprus for International Migration Organisation (20 January 2011). ———. 2010b. Cyprus, Part 2, Labour Market Integration Policies in the European Union (2000–2009). Independent Network of Labour Migration and Integration Experts (LMIE-INET). Report on Cyprus for International Migration Organisation (20 January 2011). Trimikliniotis, Nicos, and Corina Demetriou. 2005. Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Cyprus. POLITIS Project report: (11 December 2010). ———. 2006. Combating Ethnic and Racial Discrimination and Promoting Equality: Trends and Developments 2000–2005. RAXEN Special Study. ———. 2007. Cyprus. In European Immigration: A Sourcebook, eds. A. Triandafyllidou and R. Gropas, 45–58. Aldershot: Ashgate. 95


———. 2008. Evaluating the Anti-discrimination Law in the Republic of Cyprus: A Critical Reflection. The Cyprus Review 20 (2, Rethinking Migration, Discrimination and Multiculturalism in a Post-tourist Society): 79–116. (12 October 2010). Trimikliniotis, Nicos, and Mihaela Fulias-Souroulla. 2010. Female Migration and Integration-Related Policies in Cyprus. In Women in New Migrations: Current Debates in European Societies, eds. K. Slany, M. Kontos and M. Liapi, 233–259. Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press. Trimikliniotis, Nicos, and Panayiotis Pantelides. 2003. Mapping Discrimination in Cyprus: Ethnic Discrimination in the Labour Market. The Cyprus Review 15 (1): 121–148. Watts, Julie R. 1999. Italian and Spanish Labour Leaders. Unconventional Immigration Policy References. In Immigrants and the Informal Economy in Southern Europe, eds. M. Baldwin-Edwards and J. Arango. London: Frank Cass.

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“THIRD COUNTRY” MIGRANT WORKERS AS “THIRD CLASS NON-CITIZENS” IN SLOVENIA MOJCA PAJNIK, VERONIKA BAJT

Introduction In the early 2000s, Slovenia’s economic situation had been characterized by high levels of economic growth, an increase in job vacancies, greater activity rates, and a decline in (official) unemployment figures. These trends contributed to increased shares of migrant workers, who predominantly fill positions that are unattractive to “domestic” workers, particularly in lower sectors of the economy. Following the dramatic downturn in economic activity of Slovenia’s main trading partners, external demand has declined substantially in recent years, leaving the economy increasingly affected by the global economic and social crisis. Exacerbating the already prominent negative effects of the growing flexibility of the labour market, the most vulnerable groups in the labour market have been hit hard by the crisis; particularly holders of fixedterm employment contracts, first-time job seekers, workers with low levels of education, those above the age of 50, and generally those employed in the low-skills sectors of industry.1 Work conditions in general are getting worse, while the precariousness of short-term employment contracts is related to less social security, resulting in the expanding segment of overworked, underpaid, and generally exploited workers whose employment status is constantly under threat. Among them, the position of “third country” migrant workers is the most unstable. Our research focuses on, and shows that “third country” migrants, particularly migrant men and women in precarious situations whose labour market experiences correspond to the low-skilled and low-paid sectors of work, are continuously dismissed as poorly educated and so are a replaceable workforce that is only needed in terms of economic prof1

The figures for 2010 have shown that the largest share of the unemployed was in manufacturing and construction. See, for instance, the latest official statistical data on registered unemployment at or (29 December 2010). 97


its. EU policies for inviting the preferred, “needed” high-skilled migrants are clearly at odds with the actual situation of the national labour markets’ wants for unskilled labour. This chapter pays particular attention to the nuances, in terms of how labour policies in Slovenia define migrants in relation to the labour market and how work relations reflect protectionist-prone migration policies. In order to explore precarious labour market positions of “third country” migrant men and women in Slovenia, the chapter begins by introducing the country’s specific migration history and gives an overview of the current debates regarding migrant labour. We then present the most recent and available official statistical data on migrant composition, on migrant (un)employment trends, and on sectors of their work. We also focus on the gender dimension of migrant employment, and explore the nature of the sectors of the economy that are largely sustained by the migrant workforce. Then, we question Slovenia’s current labour policies in relation to its overall migration and integration bills that leave migrant men and women on the outskirts of integration (Balibar 2004), additionally burdened by a high level of job insecurity, low salaries, a low level of social benefits, together with deskilling, language barriers, and discrimination in the workplace. The chapter draws on official statistical data that provides the most comprehensive overview of the current migrant population in Slovenia and, as well on biographical fieldwork materials as invaluable sources of migrant participation in the research as active partners, speaking about their work and migration experiences. The interviews and the focus group conducted with migrant men and women in Slovenia between April and November 2009 foremost provide a forum to give meaning to labour integration from the migrants’ point of view.

Migration for Work in Slovenia Slovenia has seen increasing immigration from the late 1990s onwards, while migration from other republics of Yugoslavia already began in the 1950s. The migrations within Yugoslavia intensified due to processes of industrialization and urbanization that made Slovenia one of the popular destinations for economic migration, particularly from the southeastern regions of the country. A pronounced economic migration to Slovenia began as migrants settled in industrial cities, the capital Ljubljana, and in the coastal regions − especially in the 1970s when the Western European states that had been the primary countries of destination 98

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for Yugoslav migrants started limiting immigration. This trend has significantly affected the current composition of the migrant population since the vast majority of migrants come from former Yugoslav republics. The geographical, cultural, and linguistic proximity remain deciding factors for former co-nationals to continue migrating to Slovenia despite the substantial change in their status, since these migrants are now considered by EU policies as “third country nationals.” As for the matter of migration research, first theoretical considerations date back to the 1970s and relate to Peter Klinar’s (1976) sociological consideration of the globalized dimensions of migration, since he theorized about not only inner Yugoslav migratory processes, but international migrations as well. Klinar’s thematization of tensions in the relations between the country of immigration and the migrant communities continue to be of theoretical relevance for contemporary studies. The monograph by Silva Mežnarić (1986) “Bosanci”: a kuda idu Slovenci nedeljom? (“Bosnians”: Where do Slovenes go on Sundays?) presented the first empirical, sociological research on migrant workers from other Yugoslav republics that was conducted in Slovenia during the 1975–1983 period. Pointing to the fact that social distance existed between the Slovenes and the migrants from other republics, the author argued that symbolic conflicts that are played out at the level of different languages, cultures, and national rituals are in fact tensions created by unequal access to the main sources of power and control in the society. After a reasonably “quiet” decade, the present situation is marked by an increase in empirical research in the field of studies of migration, with a notable recent interest in integration and the aspect of gender in these processes (Bajt and Pajnik 2010). Existing literature in Slovenia deals with migration in relation to the labour market and work only occasionally (Malačič 2008; Medica et al. 2010; Pajnik et al. 2010), while the lack of studies dealing specifically with “third country” migrants’ positions is even more apparent.2 The main focus so far being on naturalized migrants and the so-called second and third migrant generation in Slovenia (cf. Bešter 2005, 2007; Komac 2007), we here bridge the gap in research and literature by focusing on migrants who come to Slovenia primarily with intent to find employment, and whose statuses are defined primarily on the temporary nature of their stay.

2

See Bešter (2009) and Cukut (2008) for recent exceptions. 99


TABLE 1: FOREIGN POPULATION IN SLOVENIA BY CITIZENSHIP AND GENDER, 1 JANUARY 2010 Country of citizenship

Men

Women

Total

Country of citizenship

Men

Women

Total

Total

60156

22160

82316

Europe

58964

20945

79909

Netherlands

76

37

113

Albania

36

23

59

Poland

71

109

180

Austria

213

167

380

Romania

65

130

195

Belarus

62

18

44

Russian Federation

150

380

530

Bosnia-Herzegovina

31590

7436

39026

Serbia

6440

2342

8782

Bulgaria

565

205

770

Slovakia

155

201

356

Croatia

5214

2561

7775

Switzerland

43

37

80

Czech Republic

46

95

141

Ukraine

306

829

1135

France

106

78

184

United Kingdom

221

131

352

Germany

377

365

742

Other countries

185

147

332

Hungary

73

83

156

Africa

113

37

150

Italy

464

272

736

Asia

723

705

1428

Kosovo

6077

1851

7928

America, South

58

92

150

183

281

464

Macedonia, FYRO

6047

3040

9087

America, North and Central

Moldova

108

146

254

Australia and Oceania

48

27

75

Montenegro

318

236

554

Unknown country of citizenship

67

73

140

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Statistical Yearbook 2010

On 1 January 2010, of Slovenia’s total population of 2 million, 82,316 were foreign citizens, representing 4% of the total population.3 Male migrants represented 73%, most of whom come with the purpose of finding employment, while 27% are women, mostly connected to family reunification provisions. The data further shows that at the beginning of 2010 the vast majority of the foreign-born population had citizenship of Yugoslavia’s successor states, which represents 88.2% of Slovenia’s total foreign population (see Table 1). Only 2.9% of migrants came from countries outside of Europe; 60% are from Asia (mainly from China, increasingly also from Thailand).4 Even though the shares of “third country” migrants from Africa, Asia, and Latin America are very small, their numbers have 3

Data taken from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia Report, available at http://www.stat.si/doc/statinf/05-si-007-1001.pdf (15 February 2011).

4

Official data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia Statistical Yearbook 2010, available at http://www.stat.si/letopis/2009/04_09/04-33-09.htm (15 February 2011). 100

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increased in recent years (e.g., nationals of the Dominican Republic, USA, and Philippines). This is confirmed by official Employment Service of Slovenia data on valid work permits for January 2011.5 These show (see Table 2) that a good half of the entire foreign population is from Bosnia-Herzegovina (38,263 or 52% of all valid work permits), with a further 11.5% from Croatia (8,489), 8.9% from Kosovo (6,548), 8.6% from Serbia (6,328), 6.9% from Macedonia (5,103), and 6.2% from Serbia and Montenegro combined (4,617). Citizens of the former Soviet Union (mainly from Ukraine with 1,164 valid work permits and the Russian Federation with 536 permits) represent the second largest group of “foreign” residents, together with Chinese nationals (697 work permits), and followed by Moldovan (214), Dominican (181), Thai (147), Albanian (110), US (81), Turkish (78), and Filipino nationals (72). TABLE 2: VALID WORK PERMITS BY TYPE, JANUARY 2011 Personal Work Permit

Employment Permit

Permit for Work

Total

Total

57.462

11.726

4.813

74.001

Yugoslavia Successor States

54.475

10.561

4.312

69.348

Bosnia-Herzegovina

32.551

4.945

767

38.263

Croatia

6.850

1.195

444

8.489

Kosovo

4.778

958

812

6.548

Serbia

3.726

1.785

817

6.328

Macedonia

2.012

1.649

1.442

5.103

Serbia & Montenegro

4.398

2

4

4.404

Montenegro

160

27

26

213

Other Countries

2.987

1.165

501

4.653

Ukraine

740

319

105

1.164

China

328

277

92

697

Russian Federation

307

95

134

536

Moldova

149

56

9

214

Dominican Republic

83

95

3

181

Thailand

33

112

2

147

Albania

78

15

17

110

USA

38

15

28

81

Turkey

35

16

27

78

Philippines

27

38

7

72

Source: Employment Service of Slovenia 5

Official data of the Employment Service of Slovenia, available at http://www.ess.gov. si/trg_dela/trg_dela_v_stevilkah/zaposlovanje_tujcev (7 March 2011). 101


Data on valid work permits for July 2010 also show that the majority of migrant workers were between 30 and 40 years old, confirming official statistical average age for “foreigners” being 33 years old.6 Based on the same Employment Service data, almost half of all migrant workers are employed in construction (41%), a sector that would not be able to function and operate without the cheap and hard-working migrant labour force. This is followed by manufacturing (12%), motor and traffic storage (6%), and then various business activities, commerce and food service activities, where employment of migrants from China, Dominican Republic, and India can be noted. Whereas migrants from the former Yugoslav republics dominate the construction sector and their shares are prominent in all other sectors as well, it is also interesting to note the pronounced gendered sectorial distribution of Thai migrant women’s employment in health centres and spas as masseuses, as well as a more general prevalence of, for instance, Ukrainian and Moldovan female migrants’ employment in nightclubs, bars, and restaurants. Despite the fact that male migrant workers are in much higher demand and hence represent a majority, migrant women in Slovenia are also increasingly filling in positions in the informal sectors of the labour market, particularly in invisible domestic work and care work. Slovenia’s unfavourable demographic situation relates to potential structural deficits in the labour market (Kovač 2003) and it seems inevitable that migrants will continue to be needed to satisfy labour shortages. Both the Strategy of Economic Migrations from 2007 and the Slovenian Development Strategy from 2005 recognize migration as a valuable response to demographic changes and a needed mechanism to sustain economic growth. Yet the discourse employed by such documents is far from problem-free, since they tend to instrumentalize migrants for achievements of EU economies, leaving aside migrants’ needs and aspirations, as well as the situation in their countries of birth (cf. Pajnik and Bajt 2010a) – as exemplified by women migrating for care work to the West, while leaving behind families that also need caring. Female employment, traditionally high in Slovenia because of its socialist legacy (cf. Corrin 1993; Einhorn 1993), particularly affects the general structuring of life trajectories of women. Despite the lack of empirical research, the predominant Slovene pattern of caring for the young, the sick, and the elderly remains a double burden for women. High fe6

Information available at http://www.stat.si/novica_prikazi.aspx?id=2666 (17 September 2010). 102

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male activity rates since the mid 1940s remain characteristic for Slovenia, where most women work full-time and return to the labour market after one year paid maternity and parental leave. Yet, important changes are occurring in the labour market and the aging population will also significantly influence the organization of everyday family life (Švab 2001). The limited research for Slovenia shows that demand for domestic and care work is predominantly met through the help of informal sources such as family members, close relatives, friends and neighbours, and performed outside of labour market rules and free of charge (Šadl 2006; Hrženjak 2007). In terms of gender specificities, the analysis of sectors where our interview partners work largely corresponds to the typical distribution of female and male professions. Most of the male interview partners worked in various construction jobs or as mechanics, drivers, cooks, etc. – professions that are typically deemed to be occupied by men. On the other hand, the women in our sample have predominantly worked as kitchen aides, study aides, cleaners, and in administration.

Regulating and Conditioning Migrant Employment According to the 2003 Employment Strategy Guidelines the policy objective of the EU was to achieve a significant reduction in the unemployment gap between non-EU and EU-nationals by 2010. The reality, however, is different, and practice shows that the pragmatic and utilitarian strategies of employing migrant workers sustain millions in precarious statuses on the edges of European societies. Policies and practices across the EU vary considerably with regard to granting legal access to labour market for migrants. What is common, however, is that migrants who enter EU communities are confronted with “the strategy of circular conditioning” when they want to access the labour market, and they need to subject to various condition setting mechanisms (i.e., work permit, residence permit, access to social services, etc.) (Pajnik 2011). Since Slovenia’s EU accession in 2004, “third country nationals” are required to have work and residence permits to stay in the country legally, and are subject to quota restrictions on employment. These rules profoundly affect their status and positions in the labour market and in society in general. We interviewed two migrants who had worked and lived in Slovenia before their current migration experience. Fikret and Milutin both came to Slovenia for the first time in 1987 and 1977, respectively, in times of Yugoslavia as internal migrants from other federal re103


publics (Fikret from Bosnia, Milutin from Serbia). Both fondly remember their prior migration experience, which was much better in comparison to their present day life in Slovenia. In his narrative, Milutin frequently refers to great times he spent in Slovenia during his military service and afterwards, working. Both migrants have less fond memories of their present day experiences, especially in connection to their first employment. They refer to similar problems with difficult work conditions, payment problems, and dreadful attitudes from employers. Well, I came to Slovenia in ‘87. (...) I worked at the railways for five years. But when there was the war, I got stuck down there at home, I mean in Bosnia, I couldn’t return back. (...) I have a wife and two children, and my salary is around 550 euro. I have an apartment here, I pay it 100 euro, I need 250 euro for food, how then can I feed my wife and children. It’s not that I complain about Slovenia, but I know that it can be better. As I said, I worked in Slovenia before, before the war, in ‘87, ‘88, I worked for the railways and at that time I earned much more, and it was much better. (Fikret, 40, Bosnia-Herzegovina, builder)7 The first time I came was in 1977 when I was serving the army at Vrhnika (...) I really enjoyed it here and when I finished with the army, I don’t know, there was no work down there [in Serbia] (...) I got a job, like many people from Serbia, in Gorica. I found there. First I worked a bit at the railways (...) Since I was young, I couldn’t choose, you get a job wherever you can and so I worked there for a few months. I worked as a welder. I finished a course for security guards in Ljubljana and I worked as a security guard down at the hydroelectric power station on the Soča river (...) This was good, the pay was good, the salary was great. (Milutin, 49, Serbia, bus driver)

In most EU countries, including Slovenia, migrant workers experience significantly higher levels of unemployment and underemployment than “domestic” workers. While this is allegedly caused by the current economic crisis, our research confirms that even in times of economic growth many migrants are unable to make use of their skills, frequently working in low skilled, temporary, and badly paid jobs. “Third country” migrants are also over-represented in informal segments of labour market. Their prominent lack of access to legal employment forces them to become undocumented and undeclared workers in order to survive, and so migrants experience a higher degree of vulnerability and receive little or no legal and social protection. 7

Interviews were conducted in the language as selected by the migrant partners; mostly in Slovene or in the migrant’s mother tongue. The cited excerpts were translated into English and every effort was made to preserve their particular speech. The interview partner’s pseudonym, age, country of birth and labour market position at the time of the interview are listed in brackets. 104

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Unlike EU nationals, who are free to move and search for employments across the EU, migrants with “third country” status need to obtain work and residence permits and for migrants entering with intent to work, a valid work permit is considered a prerequisite for a residence permit.8 Since one of the key conditions for issuing work permits is the general situation on Slovenia’s national labour market, migrants are subject to quota restrictions.9 This means that the prerequisite for issuing a work permit is that unused quotas are still available, as well as the non-existence of adequate “domestic” unemployed persons.10 The period between 2004 and 2008 saw a rise in quotas from 17,100 to 32,000. The financial and economic crisis, however, resulted in the lowering of quotas for 2009 to a maximum of 24,000. A quota of only 12,000 was set for 2010, showing a 62.5% decrease in the last two years – mirroring visibly protectionist policy responses and reactions to the shrinking economy (cf. Pajnik and Bajt 2010a). Labour market experiences of our interview partners largely depend on their status, the type of work contract and the type of work permit they possessed (if any). They speak of various ways that their work permits bound their status and permission to stay, while those arriving in Slovenia under the family reunion policies at the same time experience difficulties in finding an employer to hire them (cf. Pajnik and Bajt 2010b). In general, migrant narratives portray how much their status determines their overall position in Slovenia’s labour market, and consequent8

In Slovenia, a temporary residence permit is issued for the duration of the work permit, initially with a maximum duration of one year. Permanent residence, however, awards more rights in terms of socio-economic and political provisions and may only be granted to migrants who have been residing in Slovenia for a period of five years. The particulars regarding residence are defined in the Aliens Act and regarding employment in the Employment and Work of Aliens Act.

9

Quotas as a means of limiting employment of foreign workforce were introduced in 2004, and take into account the labour market situation and non-existence of domestic unemployed persons. The highest number of foreign workers is defined by law as a maximum of 5% of Slovenia’s active population and the quota is set annually by the government. No specific gender provisions apply for work permit quotas, though the data shows that only a handful of work permits are issued to women.

10

Unlike employment permits and permits for work, which are more restrictive because they only allow a migrant to work for a specific employer, personal work permits are exempt from quota restrictions, are not tied to labour market demand, and allow their holders to move freely between employers. In principle, a personal work permit gives a migrant the same rights as enjoyed by Slovene nationals, including the right to register as unemployed. However, in practice even migrants with personal work permits often encounter various obstacles in terms of equal access to the labour market, as well as in terms of accessing the same level of rights. 105


ly also their access to various welfare provisions, such as social and health care. The existing migration and labour market policies affect migrants’ labour market access by categorizing them according to their mode of entry.11 Policies, whilst determining the migrants’ status and the possibilities that stem from it, often also have an implicit influence on how migrants are perceived by relevant state institutions and the wider society. Thus, migrants from “third countries” are often stigmatized as having low education and low skills, as such not being able to compete equally with EU nationals for many jobs. This perception, though to a certain degree corresponding to the actual educational background of some migrant workers, is also strongly related to their (in)ability to have their educational qualifications recognized. Without proper certificates that could prove their educational background, but even more importantly, responding to the particular labour market demands for migrant labour, many migrants are left with little other choice but to take on the available low-skilled and low-paid jobs. Hence, even highly educated migrants encounter significant difficulties when they want to have their education recognized and they often face deskilling. For instance, a Russian woman Nataša who almost achieved her PhD in Moscow now works as a teaching aide, while Fatlindi from Kosovo performs physical labour as a hired contractor in roofing and carpentry, despite his university degree in economics. In addition, three university educated women in our sample are unemployed despite having competitive skills and useful work qualifications (i.e., a pharmacist, a manager, and a Slavic languages professor).

PROTECTIONIST LABOUR POLICIES AS A RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC DECLINE Whereas Slovenia exhibited increasing trends in activity rates between 2003 and 2007, and according to official data unemployment levels in this period fell, unemployment rates started to increase with the global eco11

It is of a particular concern that asylum seekers in Slovenia are prevented from working immediately after having applied for asylum; a restrictive provision that has been highly criticised by NGOs, who argue that such a regulation encourages migrants to engage in illicit work. Namely, most asylum seekers accept illicit work because they have no other source of funds. This is exemplified in our sample by Ali, a 42-year-old Iranian national, whose refugee status does not ensure access to the labour market – even though it is supposed to equate refugees’ position with that of Slovene nationals, including being the recipient of all the active employment policy programmes. Ali still had to resort to illicit work because he was unable to find a job legally. 106

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nomic and social crisis, commencing in autumn 2008. The unemployment rates rose from 4.3 to 6.4% between the end of 2008 and 2009, while in April 2010 the registered unemployment rate was already 10.6%. Significantly, the number of persons employed in construction has been falling, as has the number of persons employed in other sectors of migrant employment. New restrictions were applied, ones designed to prevent migrants from entering the labour market. In February 2009, Rules on Work Permits, on Registration and De-registration of Work and on the Supervision of the Employment and Work of Aliens were amended to include a stipulation that allows employment of “third country” migrants only if there are no suitable unemployed Slovene (or EU/EEA) citizens available for the job. This effectively means that the so-called deficit professions, which were part of the “uncontrolled labour market,” are now being controlled. The government justified this change as a part of its measures aimed against recession, which means protecting jobs of Slovene nationals. Also, in June 2009, the government accepted the Decree on Restrictions and Prohibition of Employment and Work of Aliens that substantially limited employment of migrants.12 The Decree has been criticised by NGOs and researchers for its discriminatory treatment of migrants, and for using short-sighted measures to tackle the recession.13 As a response to popu12

The Decree that was prepared by the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs was again accepted by the government in April 2010 and is currently still in effect. The Decree was factually a response to a question raised by MP Zmago Jelinčič of the Slovenian National Party (SNS). The basis for such a measure was justified by the necessity to respond to other countries’ warnings issued to Slovenia because of “third country” migrants, whose work and residence permits were issued in Slovenia, but were found working or residing “illegally” in other countries, and which was labelled as “abusing” the Schengen visa system.

13

Among other stipulations, the Decree prohibits seasonal work in all sectors apart from agriculture and forestry; denies employing migrants from certain regions by setting up a regional quota system based on migrants’ country of birth: 95% of the quota should be distributed among the nationals of Yugoslavia successor states, except those coming from Kosovo. The remaining 5% should be distributed among citizens of Kosovo and all other “third country nationals.” This system discriminates against people from Kosovo, as well as all other “third country” migrants, and also violates the equality and nondiscrimination clause of the Constitution. The Decree also prohibits issuing work permits for certain occupations; employment in the entertainment sector is severely limited, since work permits for nightclub dancers can now only be issued to “foreigners” who do not need visas to enter Slovenia, or nationals of countries with visa alleviation agreements with the EU. The reasons for this measure lie in the suspicion that women from “third countries” are victims of forced prostitution and human trafficking. The Decree also aims to prevent employers from “lending” employees. Artistic and entertainment workers are now only able to perform their job in one location. For more, see Pajnik and Bajt (2010a). 107


list demands to protect the “domestic” workforce, the measures stipulated in the Decree actually release the government and state apparatus from its responsibility to make policies that could alleviate the economic crisis. This shows how the crisis resonates in actual anti-migration policies, such as the banning of visas, the tightening of border controls, or limiting employment of migrants to allegedly “protect” the “national” labour force. Moreover, the actual demand for migrant labour remains poorly reflected in state policies, which define and regulate the migrants’ positions primarily in terms of limitations. The current employment policies for “foreigners” are further accompanied by populist rhetoric and anti-migration discourses that sustain migrants in “rightless” positions where not only are their human rights not respected, but they are not even allowed to claim them (Pajnik 2009). In the labour market, “third country” migrants thus experience heightened fear of job loss, in addition to the fact that they find it excessively hard to ensure employment in the first place because of the necessity to secure employment permits. They are the least protected category of workers, since even the trade unions favour the “domestic” worker rather than defend the rights of all workers indiscriminately. The underlying reasons for such a precarious status of migrant workers rests in the lack of implementation of policy provisions that state equality of treatment for both “domestic” and “foreign” workforce. Namely, in reality employers often disregard legal requirements and circumvent policy regulations, which all allows them to put their “foreign” employees in disadvantaged positions of dependence, low pay, harsh working conditions, and extended working hours – a situation that has recently escalated in terms of the worrisome position of a significant share of all workers in Slovenia. With a shrinking industrial sector, the power of trade unions is in decline. Though the recent crisis has brought forth the importance of trade unions once again in Slovenia, as they attempt to resume their former role of an equal or at least vital partner in the social dialogue, they have in fact lost their once great potential and power. In terms of the role that the trade unions play for workers, much depends on the particular sector of work. While some unions appear to draw more media attention, organizing public demonstrations and actively opposing governmental partners in social dialogue, others remain conspicuously stagnant in their role. A low level of unionization of migrant workers in general represents a significant problem. Even though officially the membership in trade unions in Slovenia is open to all, in practice, however, there are violations of the rights of migrant workers, particularly in sectors that are 108

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not unionized. There are no migrants elected to leadership positions of any trade union and the fact that they are mostly only temporarily employed is additionally prohibiting their participation at leadership levels. Even though the trade unions have a more open approach to membership and exhibit no obvious formal corporate closure for the defence of “domestic” workers, the reality shows that the trade unions have taken a step back from advocating migrant workers’ rights. While unions have been concerned about upholding collective agreements in order to defend the rights and position of all workers, we may question the extent to which they have in reality opted for protecting the “domestic” members rather than opening up the labour market and increasing opportunities for migrant workers in Slovenia. Most of the trade unions have hence tacitly responded to the growing xenophobic policies and nationalistic and racist public discourse that use protectionist rhetoric of “putting Slovenes first.” Even though the level of unionization of certain sectors is high and our sample confirms that most construction workers are members of a trade union, unions in Slovenia do not factually constitute the main body for migrants’ access to decision-making processes. The Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs may praise itself for being open to receiving feedback from the field, since migrants can contact the Ministry and provide feedback information on the implementation of the procedures in practice, yet the reality is that the migrant voice is rarely heard, even through the unions are to play a role of an advocate and speaker of their rights. But, trade unions are a little, a little without power too. I know it, say, in the past, when I worked for the railways, the trade unions were quite strong, they were quite strong and, say, they protected workers. But now the trade unions are without power, without power. You see, in every country, naturally, if you don’t have someone to protect the worker, everything goes to ruins, it’s normal: Who makes a country? Workers make it. Who builds a country? Workers build it. It’s normal. If you don’t protect workers … (Fikret, 40, Bosnia-Herzegovina, builder)

Trends in Migrant Labour Migration policies in most EU states exhibit a trend in designing entry requirements for migrants according to the specific national labour market needs. Migrants classified as entering with intent to work are geared toward professions that are considered as “deficit” by the national labour market demands, or as too dirty, difficult, and dangerous to be 109


performed by the “domestic” workforce. In Slovenia, this is reflected in the fact that most migrants are employed in construction, where – due to prevalent sub-contracting – they often find themselves in the grip of private entrepreneurs who exploit their vulnerable situation of dependency because work permits tie them to one employer. Migrant workers are therefore often exposed to prolonged periods of not receiving their agreed salary, not being properly registered, and thus devoid of social and health care provisions, they may also experience harsh living conditions in substandard housing, for which they nevertheless need to pay substantial sums of money. It is also possible to tease out the peculiarities of the so-called food service sector of migrant employment. Describing their jobs as exhaustive, the two cooks and two kitchen aides in our sample all mention the requirement to work constantly, including on weekends and holidays, with one cook even running between five different kitchens in one day. Putting in long working hours, most migrants in our sample mention they were never paid any overtime, many also note receiving a salary that was less than the agreed amount. Tamara, for instance, describes her job as a never-ending list of chores and obligations: At my job I do the dirtiest part of work, I wash dishes. I make salads, sweets, and I do all of that in the same day (....) When everybody goes to party, I work, I mean, I am, I have no time for myself, I have no time for a friend, I cannot go out because I don’t know weekends. I work 8 hours, and after 8 hours I always stay another hour, you know, and all that … (Tamara, 26, Serbia, kitchen aide)

Most of our interview partners had a bad experience with their first employment in Slovenia. “Typical” migrant problems were disclosed from their narrations. The majority of them talk about working long hours, having bad salaries or at least receiving less than agreed upon initially, having no insurance, not getting free days and vacations, experiences with bad attitudes from the bosses or co-workers, being treated unfairly, having lived in indecent conditions, and so forth. And yet, the first employment experiences of our interviewees show that most of them, though dissatisfied with their work situation and how they were being treated, did not protest or confront their employers or co-workers. This is connected primarily to their fear of losing their job, again confirming the precariousness of the migrants’ situation. Moreover, many explain that they were not aware of their rights. At the same time, many migrants also have experiences in the black labour market, a situation where formally they have no rights, and a particular circum110

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stance where it is even harder to speak out. Since keeping a job is necessary in order to ensure prolongation of a migrant’s legal stay in Slovenia, some of employers have quickly learned to seize the opportunity to capitalize on the migrant workforce that is reluctant to complain, let alone leave, no matter what the work conditions and how low the pay – at least initially.14 Even though the experiences of migrant men and women in our sample differ, they nevertheless frequently describe negative experiences in their first job, which made them leave as soon as they fulfilled the 2-year minimum criteria for a personal work permit (which allowed them to disengage from one particular employer). At the same time, the narratives show various techniques that migrants adopt when attempting to cope with the exploitative and/or discriminatory work arrangements. A prominent strategy, adopted by many migrant workers tied to one specific employer, is to “stick with it”; bear it out and wait for the prescribed period of two years to pass in order for them to leave as soon as they are formally able to get a work permit elsewhere. In contrast, some interview partners describe how they decided to leave their first employer even earlier. They decided to take their chances no matter what because they simply did not wish to endure the harsh work conditions any longer. Such examples speak of migrants’ active role in determining their lives and the course of their careers despite the numerous obstacles provided by the stringent labour legislation and migration policies which obstruct their equal access to the labour market and tie them to one employer, regardless of many violations that may occur. This strategy frequently entails migrants searching for other employers who are willing to give them a job, while arranging some sort of transfer with the previous employer in terms of the migrant’s work permit. This is a risky strategy, since it puts migrants in a highly sensitive situation of relying on the fairness of the first employer to arrange the necessary undocumented transfers. It also often results 14

With recent changes to the migration policy, as of December 2009 nationals of Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro are no longer required to obtain visas for entry into the Schengen area, recently joined also by citizens of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This “visa liberalization” does not, however, mean that the entry is entirely open for migrants from these countries, as certain conditions still have to be met (e.g., only holders of biometric passports are allowed visa-free entry, traveller’s insurance is necessary, and a sufficient amount of cash for every day of stay in Slovenia, resulting in the fact that migrants might still face a hassle at border crossings). The changes, nevertheless, do ease the situation of “third country nationals” in Slovenia whose work contracts may expire, since our sample shows that on account of this change they report fewer concerns in terms of being expelled. 111


in the initial employer withholding at least a part of their salaries, which they may never be able to get. A significant problem that reflects the precariousness of migrants’ position in Slovenia’s labour market is that they are mostly tied to shortterm work contracts. Despite labour legislation which states that after two consecutive years of employment at one employer an employee is entitled to a permanent work contract, our fieldwork confirmed that the employers frequently do not do so. This practice of protracted prolongation of fixed-term employment contracts is far from limited only to migrant workers, since a trend has been noted in Slovenia that a rising number of employees are put in precarious labour market positions on account of their short-term work contracts. Employers thus shift their responsibility for social security on workers, capitalizing their profits by bypassing the legal requirement to enable stable employment. Hiring workers in general for short-term periods on fixed-term contracts is their preferred choice, for it brings the least social security and rights for the employee, while the employer may find it more convenient to hire a new person upon the expiration of such a work contract. If the employer is no longer satisfied with a migrant worker on a short-term contract, they simply do not extend their work contract. In fact, they may also terminate the contract beforehand as has been exemplified by the recent economic crisis when a growing number of migrants were let go for no apparent reason. More specifically, migrant workers are caught in the position of non-existent bargaining potential for improving their work conditions.

INFORMAL AND UNDECLARED WORK Despite its obvious existence, confirmed by our fieldwork, undeclared work and informal economy are not a major political priority in Slovenia.15 This changed in early 2011 when the government acknowledged cases of abuse and violations of rights, specifically in construction sector. Based on various estimates, the share of gross domestic product made by undeclared labour is between 17 and 25%.16 Even though the relevant legal provisions are to discourage employers from engaging 15

A law to define and tackle undeclared work was only adopted in 2000 and amended in 2006 to encourage the declaration of economic activity. For more, see Prevention of Illegal Work and Employment Act.

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See Renoy et al. (2004) and, for instance, latest estimates that speak of informal economy representing 27% of GDP in Slovenia (24 December 2010). 112

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people in illicit work, migrant workers are a population still significantly affected by informal economy. Whereas they may begin their migration experience as documented workers and only fall into undocumented status when, for example, their work permits expire, they may also arrive as undocumented migrants, or they may simply assume their employment status to be in order while in fact their employer fails to secure all the necessary documents. Our fieldwork confirms many migrants are at least occasionally forced to resort to undocumented work in order to supplement their earnings or to earn anything at all. While working in the black market may be their wilful decision based on their precarious situation that allows no other formal way of employment, often migrants are also in fact working as undocumented workers without being aware of it at all. This is the consequence of too many employers still bending the rules, not registering their workers in general, not paying social contributions, and the like. At the same time, women in our sample, who came to Slovenia on family reunion provisions, speak of difficulties finding an employer willing to hire them, even though their “family migrant” status allows easier access to residence (cf. Pajnik and Bajt 2010b). And when not able to draw on such policy provisions, it is in general even harder for migrant women to access the labour market because of reliance on quotas to secure work permits, which remain highly male-based. It is therefore quite common that migrant women find themselves in gendered black market jobs of cleaning, babysitting, and domestic and care work in general. In addition, they may be offered to work as waitresses or to engage in sexualized work in nightclubs and bars, as dancers, strippers, or prostitutes. The reality of easier hiring of a “domestic” worker instead of a migrant prevents many migrants from securing an employer willing to invest the time and effort needed for procuring the necessary documents in order to hire a “foreign” employee. Fatima, a 47-year-old woman from Bosnia, working as a (undocumented) cleaner, explains how nobody wanted to hire her: I found a kitchen and the lady said that she couldn’t get a work permit for me. And I couldn’t [do] that job, because nobody takes a worker without a work permit. Fines are high and every worker pays a fine too, so it’s a risk for him too. (…) And I too am afraid. Because I said, I’m afraid because of this fine. And maybe expulsion from Slovenia too, because my mother is here, she is ill. And if she dies I cannot come to Slovenia. So because of it I’m afraid to work illegally, because she needs help and I cannot bring her to Croatia. (Fatima, 47, Bosnia-Herzegovina, domestic worker)

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Fatima shares her concerns about being an undocumented worker, a reality and a worry shared by many other undocumented migrants, namely the fear of being discovered, prosecuted, and deported. Our sample exhibits several stories of undocumented work performed by migrants. Not being able to work in his profession as a medical doctor for almost a year after coming to live in Slovenia, Bukefal, a 28-year-old from Macedonia, was forced to search for any kind of work because of financial need. He was offered physical and unskilled undocumented jobs; first he worked nightshifts in a carwash, being paid in cash every week, earning around 400–500 euro a month. He also worked as an undocumented stocker in a department store, under another person’s name, while using a student referral.17 He earned four euro per hour and worked 10 hours a day, also on Saturdays. Even though a specific story on the surface, Bukefal’s labour market experiences show a notable resemblance to other interview partners who also engaged in illicit employment in order to earn some money, particularly when their documents prevented them from finding any legal employment. These narratives also show a worrisome lack of any social or health insurance, which is both a result of the migrants’ undocumented work that only provides money but no other labour rights, as well as the consequence of rigid rules that prevent migrants from equal access to the labour market, e.g., being denied salaries for traineeship work simply because they are not nationals of EU member states. Moreover, rather than seeing their undocumented labour market experiences as problematic only for their own situation and lack of social security that stems from illicit work, our interview partners also point out the fact that black market economy does not contribute anything to the state. Fatima speaks about the state’s monetary loss in terms of not 17

Since contractual, short-term student work has long been a cheap option for employers in Slovenia, who do not have to worry about social insurance costs, the practice of “lending” so-called student referrals to people who do not have a student status is widespread (a prerequisite to be able to work on a student referral is being enrolled at one of the universities as a full-time student). The government has been trying to crack down on this practice (limiting the amount of yearly tax-free income per student, enforcing more stringent penalties for violations of regulations, etc.), however, in reality the “lending” of referrals remains quite pervasive. The practice of “lending” referrals involves paying a certain pre-agreed percent of the earnings to the person who “lends” their name to the person actually performing the work. It is quite significant that Bukefal worked using a friend’s student referral because – despite having a student status – as a “foreigner” he was not entitled to the same rights as Slovene students. He notes that he could not take advantage of the numerous privileges enjoyed by the student population in Slovenia, including subsidized meals and being allowed to work as a student. 114

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paying taxes on account of her undocumented work relationship with her employer: I only wanted, if I have work then I’ll pay taxes to the state. It means that I will not work illegally. I want to work normally, by the law, so the state gets from me too. Because if you work illegally, you don’t have taxes. And I, like, I work regularly, I have taxes and give something to the state. So I think, I’d say that it’s a sort of bad, that they close door for them and they cannot have more people who want to work if the employer, no matter, finds, a worker finds an employer. I mean, why the state doesn’t give work to that worker and it then gets something in the state budget? This contribution on taxes and, I don’t know what to say. (Fatima, 47, Bosnia-Herzegovina, domestic worker)

The narratives also express the fear that migrant workers experience in terms of being threatened by their employers that their salary will be reduced or even withheld entirely. Ali’s narrative shows how migrants, especially if their work is undocumented, are particularly vulnerable because their employers may not want to pay for their work. Ali was threatened by his employer, who owed him money, that he would call the police and report Ali as a terrorist. This incident reveals how utterly exposed many migrants are to all sorts of dishonest blackmail practices and pressures; many in fact never manage to get the money that is owed to them and decide to move on, trying to forget the unpleasant experience rather than attempting to resolve it. This speaks of the need to enforce the implementation of all the relevant policies in practice, preventing exploitation, extortion, and discrimination of migrants. Their “foreigner” status exposes them to potentially higher levels of abuse. And I found an illegal job, actually in dry construction, like, dry fitting in construction. I worked for about two months, they paid me some money but they didn’t pay the rest, I called them for some time. And they said they would pay. For some time it was my fault, every time … For some time I called them every day. “I’ll pay today, tomorrow.” I didn’t get the money today, all in all, he owed me 600 to 700 euro, in fact he didn’t pay and then he switched off the phone. I mean, he disconnected the phone, right? He never answered again, and I couldn’t find him anymore. (...) I need that money, definitely, because I worked honestly. And I earned my money. (Ali, 42, Iran, forklift operator)

Conclusion Many changes in Slovenia’s migration and integration policy have been adopted in recent years to meet the legal framework of the EU. In some ways the restrictions such as requirements for residence permits, family reunification provisions, and some procedures in employment have been 115


relaxed. However, employment policies that once welcomed migrants to decrease the workforce deficit in Slovenia’s aging population have changed significantly in the last years. The current policies contain prohibitions that work against migrant employment and, in some cases, even breach the anti-discrimination provisions of the Slovene Constitution. This chapter has shown how migration and labour market policies in Slovenia leave “third country” workers faced with significant obstacles both in the labour market and when attempting to enter it. The obstacles arise from the fact that many of them work as undocumented workers, which gives them no social security, and from the fact that in its attempts to counter the global recession the government has adopted provisions that restrict the work of “foreigners” in order to protect “domestic” workers. Many social policies remain devoid of actual implementation in practice, while the social protection and rights stem from employment and unemployment provisions, which are only guaranteed to migrants with permanent residence permits. The majority of migrant workers in Slovenia have only temporary residence permits, which means they have no social security. They are especially vulnerable since the securing of their social rights is left to the discretion of their employers, many of whom have recently been exposed for their blatant disregard of workers’ rights in general. Data presented and analyzed in this chapter point to fallacies of current migration and integration regimes as these are performed in national contexts, as well as at the EU level. Migrants’ accounts denote the fact that migration regimes together with protectionist labour markets are far from successful in their advocacy of policies that are aimed at equalizing migrant workers, regardless of statuses or passports, with socalled domestic workers. The chapter indicates that much more than mere policy adjustments are needed to be able to grasp in a comprehensive manner the current trends in migrant labour, for it seems that migration management, as this is currently practiced, remains a problem and not a solution to the situation of migrants’ recolonization.

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References Bajt, Veronika, and Mojca Pajnik. 2010. Studying Migration in Slovenia: The Need for Tracing Gender. In Women in New Migrations: Current Debates in European Societies, eds. Krystyna Slany, Maria Kontos and Maria Liapi, 299–322. Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press. Balibar Étienne. 2004. We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Bešter, Romana. 2005. Ekonomska integracija priseljencev iz prostora nekdanje Jugoslavije in njihovih potomcev v Sloveniji. In Percepcije slovenske integracijske politike, eds. Miran Komac and Mojca Medvešek, 559–590. Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja. Bešter, Romana. 2007. Socialnoekonomska integracija priseljencev iz prostora nekdanje Jugoslavije in njihovih potomcev v Sloveniji. In Priseljenci, ed. Miran Komac, 219–255. Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja. Bešter, Romana. 2009. Pravni okvir, relevanten za integracijo imigrantov v Sloveniji. Razprave in gradivo 58: 61–90. Corrin, Chris. 1992. Introduction to Superwomen and the Double Burden: Women’s Experience of Change in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1–27. London: Scarlet Press. Cukut, Sanja. 2008. Izkušnje migrantk v Sloveniji pred in po njeni osamosvojitvi. Dve domovini, 28: 73–92. Einhorn, Barbara. 1993. Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women’s Movements in East Central Europe. London: Verso. Hrženjak, Majda. 2007. Invisible Work. Ljubljana: Mirovni inštitut. Klinar, Peter. 1976. Mednarodne migracije: Sociološki vidiki mednarodnih migracij v luči odnosov med imigrantsko družbo in imigrantskimi skupnostmi. Maribor: Obzorja. Komac, Miran, ed. 2007. Priseljenci. Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja. Kovač, Bogomir. 2003. Globalization, Migration and Economic Development on the Margins of Slovenia’s Migration Policy Dilemma. In Migration – Globalization – European Union, eds. Mojca Pajnik and Simona Zavratnik Zimic, 213– 255. Ljubljana: Mirovni inštitut. Malačič, Janez. 2008. Migracije in delo tujcev v Sloveniji. In Slovenija pred demografskimi izzivi 21. stoletja: Zbornik 11. mednarodne multikonference Informacijska družba – IS 2008, 13.–14. oktober 2008: zvezek B, 36–40. Ljubljana: Inštitut Jožef Štefan. 117


Medica, Karmen, Goran Lukič, Milan Bufon, eds. 2010. Migranti v Sloveniji – med integracijo in alienacijo. Koper: ZRS, Univerzitetna založba Annales. Mežnarić, Silva. 1986. “Bosanci”: a kuda idu Slovenci nedeljom? Ljubljana: ZSMS. Pajnik, Mojca. 2009. Brezdržavljanskost migrantov in pravica imeti pravico. Časopis za kritiko znanosti 37 (238): 138–147. Pajnik, Mojca. 2011. Impossibilities of Social Citizenship: On the Statelessness of Migrants. In Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe, ed. Gabriella Lazaridis, 239–257. Aldershot: Ashgate. Pajnik, Mojca, and Veronika Bajt. 2010a. Migrant Remittances in Times of Economic Decline: Coping with Protectionist Policies in Slovenia. Migration Letters 7 (2): 179–189. Pajnik, Mojca, and Veronika Bajt. 2010b. Migrant Women’s Transnationalism: Family Patterns and Policies. International Migration. Forthcoming in print. Pajnik, Mojca, Veronika Bajt, and Sanja Herič. 2010. Migranti in trg dela v Sloveniji (Migrants in the Labour Market in Slovenia). Dve domovini 32: 151–167. Renoy, Piet, Staffan Ivarsson, Olga Van der Wusten-Gritsai, and Emco Meijer. 2004. Undeclared Work in an Enlarged Union. An Analysis of Undeclared Work: An In-depth Study of Specific Items. Brussels: DG Employment & Social Affairs, European Commission. (3 May 2010). Šadl, Zdenka. 2006. Plačano gospodinjsko delo v Sloveniji. Družboslovne razprave XXII (53): 33–54. Švab, Alenka. 2001. Družina: od modernosti k postmodernosti. Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče.

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“IT IS BETTER ‘HERE-HOME’ THAN ‘THEREHOME’1” – LOW-SECTOR MIGRANT WORKERS AS TEMPORARY AGENTS IN THE HUNGARIAN LABOUR MARKET ANDREA PETŐ, DÓRA DEZSŐ, NOÉMI KAKUCS

Introduction The phenomenon of international migration, an inevitable consequence of globalization and regionalization, has challenged the Westphalian order of the world, and has great implications for democratic politics and civic participation. While migration, with women having a special role in it, is regarded as a means to meet major welfare problems of the developed, but aging Western European societies of the 21st century, it also poses a serious threat to various social models which fail to integrate or even exclude migrants from mainstream society. Current integration policies declare integration as a two-way process that should equalize migrants’ opportunities with those of “nationals.” However, these policies often remain at a descriptive level, and the integration strategies often appear blind to addressing the specific migrants’ positions. Low-sector labour migrants from third countries, both men and women, constitute one of the most vulnerable migrant groups whose integration would require policies that would specifically address their situations. The existing integration practices do not sufficiently consider the fact that third country nationals’ (TCNs) marginalized positions in the labour market strongly determine their lives and hinder their possibilities of integration. The present chapter aims at assessing current Hungarian national policies pertaining to migration and integration with a particular focus on their relation to migrant’s labour market participation, while aiming to grasp migrants’ particular experiences with migration into Hungary. Ethnic Hungarian, low-sector labour migrants’ special status and practices are highlighted in the prevailing favourable policy environment. The analysis is based on a comprehensive review of statistical data on migration since 2000, an assessment of policy documents pertaining to 1

In Hungarian language there are pairs of demonstratives to frame distance in time and space. In this quotation, given by a migrant, “here-home” refers to Hungary, the host country while “there-home” to Romania, the country of origin. 119


migration, and informative material from field work. These data sources provide insights into the particularities of the Hungarian migration system and of the legal and institutional frameworks developed by national authorities. The interviews and the focus group discussion also shed light on the opportunities and constraints of the current setup and its effects on migrants’ lives. The interview sample is comprised of migrants who have arrived from third countries, reflecting migrant distribution based on country of origin, economic sectors they tend to engage in, as well as regional distribution in the host country. Ethnic Hungarian migrant interviews and cross-border labour migration are examined as a specific case for the purposes of this chapter.2

HUNGARY AND THE “MIGRATION ISSUE” Hungary has been perceived as having a mediating/transitory role between East and West due to its geographic, economic, and cultural character; and also more as an “emigration” rather than an “immigration” country. Hungary has been mainly a transit country for migrants heading west, but it has also become a target country for special groups of foreign migrants. When dealing with international migration in the Hungarian context, one has to take into consideration the country’s demographic, social conditions, and its historical context. First, Hungary is one of the countries in Europe most affected by population decrease, with shrinking birth rates paralleled with the steadily growing rate of aging and dependent population. Such demographic conditions in principle favour international migration as immigration is viewed as a source for supplying economically active people to satisfy current labour market demands. Second, the economic activity rate of the native labour force, for both men and women, is one of the lowest in the European Union, thus one could argue that there is no need for a foreign labour force, as the current labour market demand could be easily satisfied with native labour. Lastly, while Hungary throughout the years has developed into a net migration country, the proportion of migrants is relatively low in comparison to other European countries. Furthermore, immigration to Hungary has a specific ethnic character, 2

The interviews and the focus group discussion were conducted between June 2009–February 2010. But for a few exceptions, the sample included third country migrants who: (i) have migrated to Hungary after 2000, (ii) are employed in different sectors, and (iii) have different statuses (legal vs. illegal migrants, refugees, residence permit holders, settlement permit holders, naturalized). 120

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namely the majority of migrants are of Hungarian ethnicity. Thus, so far, there have been no spectacular problems related to the social segregation of immigrants, or cultural or religious conflicts between migrants and their host society to trigger public and professional debates. Migration as such is not a central issue for Hungarian political parties, and it stirs only occasional short-lived debates among professionals, in the media or the general public. Debates about labour migration are rather limited in their scope, as they frequently refer to the fact that the adoption of more liberal rules for the employment of foreigners would jeopardize the labour market prospects of resident Hungarians.

BACKGROUND DATA ON IMMIGRANTS TO HUNGARY Hungary has been open to international migration since the political changes of 1989. The most significant group (approx. two-thirds) of immigrants settling in the country arrive from countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – i.e., neighbouring countries such as Romania, former Yugoslavia, and the Ukraine. Most, but not all of these migrants are ethnic Hungarians (Sik 1999; Hablicsek and Tóth 2002; Tóth 2005; Melegh 2006). While in Romania the hostile political climate triggered the mass migration of ethnic Hungarians in the early 1990s, the war in Yugoslavia forced ethnic Hungarians, but also Croats and Muslim Bosnians to flee from the conflict zones. Between 1988 and 1992, from Romania, more than 118,000 persons arrived in the country, and the number of ethnic Hungarians migrating to Hungary was continuous and steady until 2005, when it dropped significantly. Between 1991 and 1994 some 70,000 people arrived from Yugoslavia, but most of them returned after the end of the war (Tóth 2005). Thus, the majority of migrants not only become invisible, and seemingly integrate into the host society, but also contribute to the maintenance of the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of the whole society as such. The immigration of ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries very much resembles internal migration given the fact that they are native Hungarian speakers and share the same cultural, religious, and historical heritage as the host nation. On the other hand, these immigrants are still considered to some extent as foreigners by the host population (Sik and Tóth 2003). A smaller but important population group is comprised of people from Asian countries, mostly China and Vietnam, who have formed parallel societies and are considered to be part of the Chinese diaspora. While they speak only a minimum level of Hungarian that covers their business 121


needs, they formed strong and cohesive communities within the host society through, for example, their own school, medical center, etc. A large number of Chinese citizens arrived in Hungary starting from 1988, when the visa obligation for Chinese citizens was lifted. An estimated number of 30–40,000 Chinese citizens arrived in Hungary until the visa obligation was re-introduced in 1992. Since then, immigration from China has continued, but its level has dropped significantly (Sik 2008). More migrant groups reached the country as political and social turmoil in the Central-European region ended. Besides the continuously high number of migrants coming from neighbouring countries (Romania, the Ukraine, and countries of former Yugoslavia), a growing number of citizens have moved to Hungary from Western European countries, many of whom arrived as managers of multinational companies. From time to time waves of migrants from other conflict areas (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, etc.) also reached the country, however, on a lower scale, and usually temporarily (Tóth 2005; Futó 2008a). All in all, however, the number of immigrants living in Hungary is relatively low compared to the rest of Europe. The proportion of immigrants was estimated, in 2007, to be approx. 1.6% of the total population of 10.08 million inhabitants. Even so, due to a natural population decrease and the parallel process of immigration (foreign population being younger and more active than natives, as presented below), the ratio of foreign population in the total population is slowly growing (Futó 2008a). Among foreigners, the ratio of persons in an active age is an overwhelming 83.3% while the ratio of children and especially people above 65 is low. This is strongly linked to economic migration, since most of the foreigners arrive to Hungary in order to work. However, ageing can be seen in case of the foreigner population as well, the ratio of migrants above 60 is steadily increasing. These immigrants are either secondary migrants – i.e., elderly parents of migrants who come primarily for family reunification, or pensioners who migrate because of better retirement prospects. Immigrants in Hungary tend to have higher education levels than the native population. However, research shows that a large percent do not find employment corresponding to their level of education (Gödri 2005). The gender and age distribution of immigrants has changed significantly in recent years, as more and more women migrants arrive, almost as many as men.3 However, there was no system3

According to the data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office the distribution between men and women among the legal migrants has been around 55% men and 45% 122

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atic change in the ratio of legal labour immigrants: two-thirds of them are still men. This might mean that either women migrate more often for family reunification purposes, or they are involved in irregular employment in higher numbers. Budapest is the main target for immigrants, as every third migrant lives in the capital. But the number of immigrants is considerable in five other counties, too. These are Pest county (14%), Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (5%), Csongrád (6%), Bács-Kiskun (3%), and Hajdú-Bihar (4%) (Futó 2008a). Immigrants strongly concentrate in some parts of Hungary, depending on their home country. Ethnic Hungarians from Romania concentrate mainly in the capital (approx. 33%) and its surroundings (21%). Some ethnic Hungarian migrants head towards the western part of Hungary exclusively for settlement purposes. On the other hand, short-term migrants who perform seasonal work and commute back to their home countries live in the eastern counties of Hungary. Immigrants coming from Ukraine or from the former republics of Yugoslavia, beyond the capital, can be found in bigger numbers in respective counties near the Eastern and Southern borders (Juhász et al. 2006; Futó 2008a, 2008b; Sik 2008).

Transnationalism as Reflected in the Hungarian Context While for Hungary it has not posed problems yet, the incorporation of migrants in the host society can be achieved by various policies and institutional arrangements. Three types of migrant incorporation approaches are usually distinguished by the literature, these being: assimilation, exclusion, and integration (Tambiah 2000). When looking at migration policies within European countries one can identify that assimilationist models, that are largely one-way processes expecting the migrants to adapt to the host society with the aim to become indistinguishable from the majority, are being replaced by integrationist measures. The latter are being envisioned as relational activities including migrant populations, requiring mutual deliberation and a dynamic, multi-directional process of mutual understandings. Migrants’ integration is being enabled by state policies in the areas of employment, education, and training, and by equal-opportunity and affirmative-action legislation. Howevwomen. See: (22 August 2010). 123


er, integration’s success is still largely defined by the host countries’ perspectives. Moreover, the implementation of such policies implies that integration can be achieved only over a longer period of time, and migrant integration becomes evident only by the second generation. Tambiah (2000, 168) differentiates between three stages of integration: (i) participation in the labour market; (ii) access to social services, education and housing; and (iii) acquiring citizenship. However, formal integration, namely citizenship acquisition, does not automatically mean that the cultural and social integration of migrants has also been accomplished. The reasons for this can be manifold. It has become evident that increasing number of migrant communities want to keep their social and cultural distinctiveness even though they become economically and educationally integrated, which leads to the formation of diasporic communities, such as the Chinese community in Hungary. On the other hand, Glick-Schiller et al. (1995) argue that contemporary labour migrants are faced with the situation that full (economic, legal, social, and cultural) inclusion in the countries where they resettle is either not possible or not desirable. Thus, they tend to maintain linkages with their countries of origin. The current transformations in technologies, transportation, and communication facilitate the maintenance of existing, and the emergence of new transnational linkages of migrants. Transnational analysis of migration trends offers an alternative perspective on understanding migrants’ simultaneous attachments to different communities (host society and country of origin). There is vast literature on particular aspects of migrants’ transnational social life both in American and European scholarship that focuses on different forms of transnational linkages and practices stressing different aspects of transnationalism (see for example Ögelman 2003; Caglar 2006; Collyer 2008; Guarzino et al. 2003). Migrant transnational practices are also shaped by the political institutions both of the host and the sending countries. Much research focuses on the challenges migration poses to the nation-states and their ability to regulate their citizens. Literature on transnationalism also focuses on the nation-states’ ability to reconfigure themselves, to redefine national belonging so that they maintain the ties with their transnational constituencies to profit from the remittances of migrants (see for example Guarzino et al. 2003; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). The typology4 created 4

Vertovec (1999) maps six different conceptual areas within transnational studies: transnationalism as a social morphology, as a type of consciousness; as a mode of cultural 124

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by Vertovec (1999) provides a useful tool in analyzing the transnational practices of various Hungarian migrants groups – i.e., Hungarian migrants who left the country for political or economic reasons, but also ethnic Hungarian migrants coming to Hungary either because of political reasons or out of economic necessity. Looking at the role of the Hungarian state towards immigrants of ethnic Hungarian background is especially relevant as, with Hungary being both the lost mother nation and the host country for these migrants, one can notice that the state has continuously shown an ambivalent relationship towards these migrants. On a rhetorical level it favours them to stay in their birthplace, the territories lost after the Treaty of Versailles in 1920, while the practices of the Hungarian migration regime show that this group of migrants is the most welcome and measures are taken to facilitate their entry to the country. The transnational practices in the case of our sample – ethnic Hungarian migrants from adjacent countries engaged in low-sector employment in Hungary – manifested mainly in their mobility between the country of origin and the host society. This underlines Caglar’s (2006) argument that transnational ties in the form of transnational political activities are less characteristic during the transition period of migration. Thus, in our case, Morokvasic’s (2004) argument that transnationalism is more a space to develop practices that optimize migrants’ economic output, and her “settled in mobility” concept to characterize the situation of Eastern European short time migrants prove to be most useful when analyzing our data. As the quote chosen for our title suggests, many migrant workers are attached to two places, to two “homes,” one there, in the country of origin and one here, in the receiving country. By declaring that it is better here, i.e., in Hungary, their current situation is reflected on, and we intend to pinpoint their two-folded reality as influenced by their labour migration. Their actual situation is perceived as a perplexing phenomenon for the outsider, just as one migrant describes how she looked at these mobile people before her joining this “here and there life”: … how can they feel [themselves], what can it be like there, or how does it work for them that they are so happy to come back home, but they are going back there straight away… (Eva, 58, Romania, domestic worker)

production; as an avenue of capital; as a site of political engagement; and (re)construction of place and locality. 125


By analyzing individual life stories of migrants, one can identify how the various levels of transnational practices and experiences shape one another, and how local level actors are influenced but also influence national and global forces. Thus, the chapter will first highlight some characteristics of the political institutions in Hungary that, while adhering to the common European norms on migration, on the one hand, shape migratory patterns, and, on the other hand, advocate the mobility of work force, which in our case leads to the emergence of migrant communities networking and commuting across the borders. Second, moving at micro level, the chapter will present how transnational experience is lived at an individual level, and whether labour migrants are indeed “settled in mobility.”

Hungary Facilitating Transnationalism at the State Level While many researchers cry for a comprehensive migration policy, the current Hungarian migration policy, no matter how fragmented it is, apart from being restrictive in nature, can be characterized by exercising discretion in favour of ethnic Hungarians living outside of the country’s borders. The main factors influencing the development of the Hungarian migration policy were the overwhelming number of refugees from Yugoslavia, the question of ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders, and the EU policy on migration Hungary has had to align with. One can easily claim that the main stream of migration policy has been determined by harmonisation and transposition of Directives, the Schengen acquis, the Hague Programme and other pieces of EU-legislation. Accordingly, since the early 1990s, one can detect a linear development in the Hungarian legislative and institutional framework pertaining to migration. Migration has been first and foremost dealt with as a security issue and the policy position regarding labour migration has been of restrictive nature (Hárs 2009). Policy and legal developments in various EU member states often served as a legitimacy basis for the subsequent governments opting for new – and usually more restrictive – approaches in regulating the entry and stay of foreigners in the country.

HUNGARIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR IM/MIGRATION The question of immigrants and refugees was initially addressed in the late 1980s, and later regulated by the Constitution and various legal pro126

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visions, respectively.5 Prior to the democratic transition, the Constitution treated the issue of immigration mainly as an issue of political solidarity.6 The first legal provisions pertaining to migrants and refugees were introduced and accepted by the last parliament and government before the first democratic elections in 1990. Parallel to this, however, a less specific, nevertheless very important additional provision of the Constitution stressed the sense of responsibility with respect to Hungarians living outside of the country’s borders.7 This provision expresses the underlying thought of not only the Hungarian foreign and neighbourhood policy, but also the immigration policy. The question of how to treat ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary’s borders has since been one of the most influential factors in shaping the country’s various policies. It has definitely created several occasions full of tension in Hungarian foreign policy, and it has also contributed to the emergence of ambivalence in the Hungarian immigration policy. According to Hárs (2009), from the various pieces of legislation, one can identify the picture of ideal/desirable immigrants – these settlers in Hungary should be law-abiding persons with no criminal records; healthy; able to speak Hungarian; 5

The legislation on migration has been changed several times since 1990. The main legal provisions are the following: (i) Act 29/1989 on Emigration and Immigration, regulating return migration of emigrant Hungarians and delineating the image of ideal immigrants; (ii) 1993 Act on Hungarian Citizenship, introducing the conditions of eased naturalization process in the cases of non-Hungarian citizens having ancestors with Hungarian citizenship targeting immigrants from the neighbouring countries with ethnic Hungarian background; (iii) 1994 Act on the Entry, Stay, and Immigration of Foreigners in Hungary; (iv) Act XXXIX of 2001 on Entry and Stay of Foreigners, introducing new visa requirements in line with the common EU standards; (v) 2001 Act LXII on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries; (vi) Act No. I of 2007 on the Entry and Residence of Persons with the Right of Free Movement and Residence (Free Act) and (vii) Act No. II of 2007 on the Entry and Stay of Third Country Nationals (TCN Act). The latter two pieces of legislation are transposing various requirements of several EU directives (Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification; Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents; Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service; and, Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research).

6

The Article 65. Par. 1. of the Constitution (1949) stipulates that “[o]n terms laid down in the law, the Republic of Hungary ensures the right of asylum for foreign citizens persecuted in their homeland and for those displaced persons who are at their place of stay harassed on grounds of race, religion, nationality, language or political affiliation.”

7

Article 6. Par. 3. of the Constitution (1949) stipulates that “[t]he Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for what happens to Hungarians living outside of its borders and promotes the fostering of their relations with Hungary.” 127


with proper residence and subsistence in Hungary above the level of the average Hungarian standards; should be highly motivated to immigrate into and settle in Hungary; and should be able to integrate smoothly into the Hungarian society. Legislative changes aiming at harmonization with the EU Immigration and Asylum acquis were paralleled with the creation of a separate legislative act referring to the Hungarians living across the border. The 2001 Act LXII on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries (Status Law), adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on 19 June 2001 and entered into force on 1 January 2002, provided benefits and assistance to persons who are of Hungarian identity but of foreign nationality (citizenship), and who reside in any of the countries neighbouring Hungary, except for Austria. The Status Law provided automatically, or upon request, various rights and benefits in the areas of culture, education, and schooling (such as eligibility provided to researchers and academics to participate and be granted Hungarian state awards and state scholarship; access to the various levels of the Hungarian education system including participation in tertiary education with limited numbers available at state-financed training places, for example; or providing beginning of schoolyear support for textbooks and learning material schooling equipment for minors in primary school with Hungarian as the language of instruction), travelling benefits, as well as preferential treatment in access to employment (employment for three months per year in possession of a labour visa and permit within the annual quota; as well as contribution to fees and charges incurred during the licensing process). While the objective of the act was to support Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries to maintain their cultural heritage, some of the provisions laid down in the act apparently conflicted with the prevailing European standards of minority protection and anti-discrimination. Consequently, the act not only provoked unexpected reactions on the part of two of Hungary’s neighbouring countries (Romania and Slovakia – both having a sizeable Hungarian community), but also was discussed intensively by international institutions, including the Council of Europe, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the European Commission among others (Gál 2004; Tóth 2004). While the Status Law was an open instance of positive discrimination among non-Hungarian citizens along ethnic lines, the preferentialism of the Hungarian legislation towards ethnic Hungarians from the neighbouring countries is manifested in some other regulations, too. One such case is the eased naturalization. This procedure is used in the cases of 128

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non-Hungarian citizens having ancestors with Hungarian citizenship, given that the basic conditions are met. While the number of naturalization cases in general is low,8 their vast majority happens along special (exceptional) measures and ethnic lines.9 The majority of immigrants of Hungarian ethnicity from adjacent countries acquire Hungarian citizenship this way. This practice very much contradicts the widespread criticism formulated about the Hungarian immigration and naturalization system, which is blamed for being indifferent towards ethnic Hungarians who “return to their motherland.” This does not take into account the fact that certain benefits for ethnic Hungarians and persons of Hungarian ancestry are enshrined in the immigration and naturalization process. With respect to the entry and residence requirements in the country, the policies aligned with the EU requirements managed to incorporate such a concession that granted facilitated entry and residence in Hungary for ethnic Hungarians. A special – ethnic – visa, exceeding up to five years excluding remunerated work, was introduced in 2005 to overcome the negative impact of the strict visa requirements laid down by the Act XXXIX of 2001 on Entry and Stay of Foreigners, on ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries (i.e., Romania, Serbia and Ukraine). Ethnic Hungarians still receive preferential treatment under the law even after the legislative changes in 2007. To overcome the negative effect of the restrictive legislation on third country nationals (TCNs) with ethnic Hungarian background (after 2007 affecting Serbian and Ukrainian citizens only), the Act No. II of 2007 on the Entry and Stay of Third Country Nationals (TCN Act) introduced an innovative element in the regulation pertaining to family reunification – i.e., TCNs who migrate to Hungary because of family (re)unification purposes obtain “free mover” status if they have a family relationship with a Hungarian citizen. Besides, the TCN Act provides a special visa and residence permit for TCNs on the basis of bilateral treaties if the individual is coming to Hungary for the purpose of Hungarian language practice, maintaining national cultural traditions, non-scholarly curricula or self-education, or to maintain family and friendly contacts in Hungary (Art. 27). This renewable 8

In 2009, out of 4,951 naturalization applications submitted, approx. 59% were submitted by Romanian citizens, 18% by Serbian citizens and 14% by Ukrainian citizens. For further details see (3 February 2010).

9

Applicants of Hungarian ancestry can ask for naturalization after one year of legal residence in Hungary; contrasting the general waiting period of 7 years applied in the case of non-ethnic Hungarian applicants. 129


“national” permit is valid for five years, and it is intended to compensate those adversely affected by the termination of the visa-free regime. The TCN Act introduced a settlement permit category as a continuation of the former system labelled as a “national settlement permit” for ex-nationals or descendants of an (ex-)national of Hungary (Art. 35, Art. 36, Art. 37) (Tóth 2007, 8). It can clearly be seen that the Hungarian legislation on migration has continuously found ways to ensure that ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries enjoy to some extent positive discrimination in getting access to entering the country. This is demanded not only because of national sentiments (obligation/feeling of responsibility towards the Hungarians living on the territories lost after the First World War) but also because of economic interest – i.e., these migrants supply the lowpaid and low-skilled labour force upon market demand. While in the public and political discourse national sentiments towards ethnic Hungarians are more prominently expressed and mainly with reference to their maintaining their Hungarian identity, policies on migration actually facilitate their de facto labour migration to Hungary. Further ambivalence manifested here is that while on discursive level what is emphasized is that ethnic Hungarians should keep their identity while staying in their homeland; in fact, through their mass migration to Hungary, these migrants provide demographic life-line for the aging Hungarian population declining in numbers.

MIGRANT WORKERS’ EMPLOYMENT IN HUNGARY The main characteristic of foreigner’s employment10 in Hungary is that the majority of foreign workers come from the neighbouring countries. The historical and cultural heritage, the common language, geographical proximity enabling commuting, as well as labour market demand all facilitate the migration of ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring coun10

A note needs to be made at this point why the term “foreigner” and not only TCN (vs. EEA – European Economic Area – nationals) is used throughout the chapter. Hungary, as opposed to most accession countries of 2004, has not opened its labour market to all EU member states’ citizens. Instead, it created an elaborated and complex system based on reciprocal agreements with individual EEA member states. In keeping with the principle of reciprocity, the Hungarian legislation regulating foreign employment was being modified every other year as a response to the modifications in the labour legislations of other EU member states. As a result, legislative documents, official statistics and research materials have used “foreigners” as a standard category until very recently. 130

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tries for labour purposes (Juhász et al. 2006; Futó 2008a). Apart from a few sectoral or regional exceptions, immigrant labour, however, has no significant effect on the domestic labour market, as the proportion of immigrants is rather low in Hungary, therefore employment policies do not treat migrant labour as an issue of strategic importance (FSZH 2007). The number of foreign citizens in the labour market is slowly but continuously increasing, especially the number of Romanian citizens, while the number of other migrant groups is rather stagnating, dynamic growth is not detectable. There is a large group of foreign citizens living and working in Hungary which is well qualified and is employed in higher positions. There is also a wide range of informal workers in Hungary, but it is hard to determine the extent of illegal foreign work, or to describe its structure with statistics. The majority of foreigners, both legal and illegal, work in the capital, Budapest, and the surrounding metropolitan areas. Many others work in the counties to the south, south-east, and east of the country, near the borders with the Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, and Croatia. Increasing numbers of foreigners are employed – mostly legally – in the western, more developed regions of Hungary (Futó 2008a, 2008b; Juhász et al. 2006; Sik, 2008). Facing native labour shortage, the employment sectors such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing, domestic sector, and trade employ immigrant labourers in high numbers. For details see Figure 1.11

11

In 2009, the number of general work permits (seasonal permits not counted) issued in the construction and manufacturing industries halved as compared to the corresponding figures in 2008. The huge drop in the number of work permits issued in 2009 mainly affected the construction and manufacturing sectors, as it was the export oriented manufacturing sector and the construction sector which were affected most by the global financial crisis. The drop in the number of work permits issued is also due to the change of status of Romanian citizens with respect to labour market access in Hungary. Thus, the loss in the numbers of work permits issued is compensated by the increase in the number of labour registrations applicable in the case of EU nationals. 131


FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF WORK PERMITS IN DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SECTORS, 2008–2009

Source: Own calculation based on Public Employment Service data

The pattern of labour migration is specific to each migrant group. While Chinese and Asian minorities work in retail and catering trade, migrants from the adjacent countries take up work in manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and services (Juhász et al. 2006). Chinese and other Asians entered the trade sector as early as the 1990s, when trading in cheap Chinese products replaced the petty trading of citizens of the neighbouring countries who commuted between their home countries and Hungary. This form of circular migration of ethnic Hungarians was booming in the 1980s and 1990s, their place, however, has been taken over in the 1990s by Chinese retailers (Sik 2000, 2008). Ethnic Hungarians from the adjacent countries entered labour intensive sectors such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing, and service provision. Migrants from the Ukraine are typically cross-border commuters, working seasonally in construction and agriculture. Apart from taking up lowskilled jobs, migrants with Romanian citizenship predominantly offer skilled work, but also seasonal work, home caring, and nursing services (Juhász et al. 2006). The domestic sector in Hungary is one of the main sources of illegal employment and is also characterized by strong gender and ethnic dimension, namely it is Hungarian speaking migrant women originating from the neighbouring countries who are employed to perform care and domestic work as domestic servants, cleaners, nurses (A Munkaadó Lapja 2007). 132

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It is not only the historical and cultural heritage, the common language, geographical proximity, as well as the availability of seasonal employment that facilitates the illegal employment of ethnic Hungarians coming from neighbouring countries, but also the general conditions of the Hungarian labour market. In Hungary, undocumented work is rather widespread and tolerated by the wider community. Irregular work takes up such forms like working without labour contract, or registration, employment with nominal contract, and foreign employment without a permit. The primary reasons of vast illegal employment in Hungary should be looked for in the general labour market regulations and conditions – i.e., high taxes, employer’s contribution rate, etc. (Futó 2008a). According to various estimations, undocumented work among the native population is estimated to reach a maximum of 30%, while the share of migrants in the undocumented labour market is not higher than among the overall labour force (i.e., around 10%) (FSZH 2007). To advance the prevalent labour market conditions, a unique instrument – employment with “temporary work book” (alkalmi munkavállalói könyv) – was developed in 1997 primarily with the aim to whiten the Hungarian shadow economy, and to raise the economic activity of native individuals of productive age. The use of this temporary work settlement has been widespread in the construction sector, agriculture, trade, and service provision – exactly the sectors having high rates of migrant labour. Thus it has proved to be of relevance for migrants, too, as they were also eligible to use this arrangement under certain conditions. First, its scope extended to migrants with a residence permit only. Later, in 2005, however, the scheme was modified and a separate “green temporary work book” was introduced for short-term labour migrants which entitled its holder to seasonal agricultural work only (Frey 2005). The “green temporary work book” was introduced exactly with the aim to acknowledge the presence of foreigners without residence permit (nationals of Romania, Ukraine and Serbia) in the Hungarian labour market, albeit only in one specific work sector – agriculture. The popularity of this employment scheme has been growing since 2002, but lately it has also become associated with the shadow economy because of the widespread cases of misuse (like under-reporting employment periods, disguising regular employment as temporary, as well as tax-evasion) (Semjén et al. 2008). To eliminate the ambiguities and ease the administrative burden of this form of employment, in early 2009 the government decided to revise the regulation on temporary employment. The 2009 modifications pertaining to temporary work (as per No. T/11083 133


Bill on Eased Employment) extend to sectors with high migrant participation, and also regulate the involvement of TCN migrants in such work relations. However, the regulation is still restrictive: TCNs can be employed only for seasonal agricultural work and domestic work. Nonetheless, the regulation opens up one more sector for TCN labour market participation in a legal way, thus acknowledging the market demand for cheap TCN labour in the domestic sector. It is yet to be seen whether the bill would indeed serve the purposes it was redesigned for, i.e., to facilitate labour force mobility and to combat undocumented work in general. With respect to immigrant labour, however, it can serve as a tool for regularizing temporary migrants’ stay engaged in circular migration, even if for a short period of time. One particular provision of the 2001 Status Law has been extended to the realm of labour market as well. It catered for the eased employment of those citizens of Hungarian descent who obtained the “Hungarian Certificate” (Magyar igazolvány). If they wanted to undertake employment in Hungary and had a valid “Hungarian Certificate,” they were subject to eased licensing procedure. A work permit had to be obtained for them, too, but the permit could be issued without waiting – without prior inspection of the labour market, and despite the existence of an eligible native labour force – for a period of no longer than three months per year. Furthermore, the possibility of reimbursing the costs associated with obtaining the documents necessary for the permit also existed. This instrument is yet another instance of the Hungarian legislation’s preferentialism pertaining to immigrants of Hungarian ethnicity. This arrangement only allowed three months work in Hungary per year, but unlike in the case of the “green temporary work book,” sectoral restrictions were not applicable. However, this settlement has proven to be unsuccessful as the number of work permits issued under the 2001 Status Law was negligible. This was due to the fact that the easement did not compensate for the administrative burden immigrants seeking legal employment in Hungary needed.

Experiencing Transnationalism at Personal Level Migrant workers arrive primarily out of economic necessity, recounted as “I was forced to do this,” which reflects the economic collapse and transformation in the CEE region where the loss of employment turned masses of people towards labour migration. First of all, labour migrants 134

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rightly recognize the structural imbalance between their country of origin and the countries they migrate to for economic purposes. In case of Hungary, such “forced” workers arrive predominantly from Romania and Ukraine, populating sectors such as agriculture, construction, and the domestic services. These workers experience deskilling, low-pay, and often exploitation in their work, moreover, they struggle with a negative reception, especially from the fellow, native workers’ side. Nonetheless, ethnic Hungarians arrive by taking advantage of the situation facilitated by various factors, all conducive to their entering the labour market in Hungary: I saw that there is work to do, you can work, you can also earn money, so I said then rather here-home than there-home. (Janos, 42, Romania, private entrepreneur)

The eased procedures for entry (e.g., getting visas for free) and immigration (e.g., less time required if one proves “Hungarianness”) greatly contribute to the labour migration of ethnic Hungarians as is presented in the previous sections. However, research (Németh et al. 2009; Berde et al. 2009) has also demonstrated that sharing the language of the host country is a crucial factor in the case of migrants with ethnic Hungarian background. While the Ukraine and Romania are emigration countries where the labour force migrated in large numbers to Western European countries like Italy, France, etc., only a limited number of their citizens emigrating chose Hungary, the majority of whom being ethnic Hungarians. Moreover, the geographical proximity of these migrants’ homes plays a key role in their decision on where to take up work. Often it is worth and economically more beneficial migrating to the neighbouring country than commuting to work within one’s native country, as Piroska’s case indicates: There is no job in the factories and if you need to commute then the bus takes a quarter of your wages. So, this is not, not good. So we came here too to work, because it might be more profitable. It can be that we earn one month’s wage in ten days here. So this is also why we came here. (…) It is not worth commuting to work because the wages are so small that it is not worth it commuting. (Piroska, 45, Ukraine, agricultural worker)

We present in the following, based on the individual interviews, what strategies ethnic Hungarian migrant workers in low sectors of the economy employ to satisfy their needs, and how these practices in effect meet 135


the host country’s demand for a “reserve labour force” which is available when in need and disappear when redundant. In addition, ethnic Hungarians live and are present in two places, or to borrow Morokvasic’s term (2004), are “settled in mobility,” and for these migrants integration (other than participating in the labour market) becomes a distant notion, nonetheless a problematic one. Unless they arrive through legal and formal channels to take up jobs in the manufacturing sector, migrants are recruited informally through weak tie migrant networks – by an acquaintance from their home settlement and arrive to Hungary to take up irregular jobs and join an already existing brigade or group of people (Németh et al. 2009). The host country’s tolerance of such informal recruitment practices can be interpreted as directly supportive of transnational networks that supply labour markets in demand of cheap and flexible labour (Morokvasic 2004). Such informality is apparent in the following case where even an initial loan structure is present, characteristic of trafficking cases: My friend called me and told me “Listen, I have a big problem, I need to discuss something with you. Could you come over because it is rather long on the phone.” So I said, “Of course, am getting dressed.” I went to her and she told me “Listen,” it was 2003 February, “My husband and others are building in Pest, in X district on X hill.” Because her husband was leading the group, and they build with 4–5 people, and “There is an old woman with the family, 91-year-old, and she needs someone. My husband called home to ask me to look for someone, because the Madam requested it. And I really thought about you if you would go or not.” (…) and I said “Listen, I have no passport, and not even enough money.” And she said, “Listen, they cover all expenses, I give you the money and they will give it back to my husband.” (…) so this is how it was managed. My friend helped me out. (…) and this man from my village together with the Master waited for me at the western railway station, by train, by K [name of train] I came, so everything turned out just fine! (Eva, 58, Romania, domestic worker)

Although not openly spoken about, the majority of low-skilled migrants start their “work career” in Hungary as irregular workers. Without having a mediator who already has connections in the host country it is almost impossible for migrants to enter the labour market. You can get a work permit if there is a company behind you. If there is no one behind you and you are left at your powers, then it is a huge energy investment, and suppose you are one who lives in Vojvodina and you do not have friends or other connections, it is very difficult to find work. (Robert, 38, Serbia, unemployed)

People recruited through such mediation are therefore invisible and unprotected against potential labour exploitation, not only by the person 136

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or company for whom the actual services are delivered, but also within the group. An alarming example is a domestic worker’s story who has to do caring work, as well as cook for the whole construction brigade of five, and a family of six people, and herself. So then the old woman, I also had to cook for the men who were building, the Madam left in the morning for work and told me what to cook, two-course lunch, by when she returned for 3, then she had the men settled, I did not have to help her in that because I could not leave her mother. She could not walk, I was pushing her in a wheelchair, bathed her everyday, measured her blood pressure, gave her drugs, breakfast, always had to massage her feet, back with this and that, so nine months passed by like this. But I was at home twice, but they gave me only three days because they could not leave the old woman with anyone. The old woman was quite nippy, because she had words which stabbed me. And I say to her on one occasion, “Aunt E. I am struggling here with you, and you always, I see it, that you are looking for what you can pick at” and she says, “Struggling? You get such good money.” Well? I got ninety thousand forints a month that year. But I say, I cooked, for as many as were working there plus the family. So! (Eva, 58, Romania, domestic worker)

As they acquire more local knowledge, they still establish personal contacts in an informal way; however, they negotiate on their own behalf and terms. Depending on the sector, and the length of migrants’ residence and employment history in the host country, they can change their statuses from performing undeclared work to a registered job performance, for example in the construction sector. However, in the feminized domestic sector, undeclared work is the standard, thus such a move is actually impossible. Still, even in performing domestic work migrant workers can achieve better statuses, and so lessen the level of their labour exploitation by making themselves independent from the employer – for example, changing from a live-in caregiver position to a live-out cleaner/caregiver set-up. By becoming independent individuals in an informal or formal economy, migrant workers also cut off the only existing social network they possess, and continue their life in Hungary in relative social isolation, being left only to one’s own devices. Concerning their family relations, it is also widespread among low-sector migrant workers that they leave their families behind in the countries of origin. As a result “the family” is a dominant theme in their narrations around which many concepts evolve that these migrants build their perceived life upon. “Working for the family,” “we do more good for the family,” and “sending earnings home” are recurring descriptions in their stories, emphasizing their familial responsibilities, and justifying their presence in both spaces while 137


retaining the mobile and flexible characteristics of their life and work. As one migrant man introduces himself in a patriarchal, male breadwinner style: I start with that I have family, two children, wife, no one works. And one can say that I came here to work… there is no job opportunity in Ukraine. The two sons and my wife do not work. By and large I earn our living. (Nimet, 51, the Ukraine, agricultural worker)

The earnings in Hungary add to the family budget and sometimes are indeed a great contribution to it, if not the only source. Still, its value is often downplayed especially in narratives where the “forced labour” notion, i.e., the migrant is in Hungary out of economic necessity only, is strong: It [the earned money] might sound a lot, but at home it is, if we go home we convert it, like nothing. Because we buy a carload of wood or pay the gas, everything, that is it. What I earn here is hardly enough for anything. It only adds to the family budget. So it is not that much. We work hard for our money with no effect. (Piroska, 45, the Ukraine, agricultural worker)

If the family is left behind, which is often the case, ethnic Hungarians migrating to Hungary for work do not consider their migration country as a destination. They do not want to establish themselves in the host country; they behave more like guest workers. Their stay in the country is only for/about work, which is manifested by the fact that they tend to stay close to their place of work, and quite often they opt for staying in workers’ dorms (Németh et al. 2009). One, for example looks at her experience in Hungary in this way, “Well, I picture myself coming to work as if I was coming on an excursion.” Thus, they maintain a notion of temporariness even if they have been working in Hungary for more than five years. Instead of the “classical” migration to a new place to re-settle, many migrate in order to stay, i.e., uphold or raise their family’s standard of living, in the countries of origin. The descriptions of how these migrants try to make sense of their realities confirm Morokvasic’s argument of migration’s changing character in the CEE countries, which the author terms as these migrants are in fact “settled in mobility” for a longer period of time, that is to say, to get used to being, even literally, present in two places: the host country where they earn their living, the “here-home” and the country of origin, “therehome” where they remit these earnings in order for their families to be able to stay there. Even though these migrant workers spend considerably more time in the host country “as if on an excursion,” they remain 138

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emotionally attached, and feel more belonging to their countries of origin. Some can organize a regular yearly routine whereby they spend time and work in their countries of origin as well, either as their own choice or as a practical necessity. Such work organization is typical for example in the agricultural sector where the seasonal workforce is on demand, but can be managed in the domestic sector, too. Under ethnic Hungarian low-sector migrant workers’ specific conditions the notion of integration is either incomprehensible, or at best problematic: On the one hand, these individuals are seemingly invisible in the host society given their cultural and linguistic sameness, and they make efforts to melt into the receiving community, and thus to “go native.” Therefore, state-facilitated integration mechanisms are not needed. On the other hand, such migrant workers see themselves as temporary agents, not wishing to stay forever, only taking advantages of prevailing policy and economic environments, thus their intention to fully integrate into the host society remains challenged. Additionally, full social and cultural integration of these migrants cannot be achieved without the existence of a family and larger social network, as a number of migrant workers underline the family’s actual presence and their support as a crucial factor of one’s integration. The current state of affairs apparently satisfies both the ethnic Hungarian low-sector migrant workers who do not wish to stay for long – rather viewing their existence in Hungary as temporary but welcoming the eased procedures to enter the country – and the Hungarian labour market’s need for disposable workers, who appear when in need and disappear when unwanted. The mobile ethnic Hungarians create no problems for the state; they do not need special measures applied and integration policies as such. Partly due to the fact that most are single individuals and undeclared workers, they barely voice their demands for social and welfare provisions. Thus, they do not pose an additional burden on the receiving state, which in turn largely overlooks these migrant workers’ interests and rights.

Concluding Thoughts on Transnationalism at the State and Personal Levels The present chapter assessed Hungary’s current migration and employment policies and how the country facilitates transnationalism of its ethnic minorities in the neighbouring countries. Contrasting the state level with the personal level we presented low-sector labour migrants’ lived 139


experiences. Hungary receives dominantly ethnic Hungarian migrants from the neighbouring countries, and it is assumed that their integration into Hungarian society is unproblematic in general, and into the Hungarian labour market in particular. Yet, our research has shown that many low-sector labour migrants establish undocumented work relations in the host society and if they wish to settle and regularize their stay they need to meander their way through the administrative hardships of the current migration regulations. While the migration legislation does have selective and preferential practices tailored for Hungarian co-ethnics that facilitate their entry into the country, the protective measures and other characteristics of the Hungarian labour market, which cannot even absorb its own native labour force, direct towards channelling these low-sector labour migrants into the informal economy. Although migration patterns in Hungary, as anywhere else, reflect current economic realities and interest of the migrant individuals, the Hungarian government so far has ignored the labour and market aspects of migration. Instead, Hungary tends to focus on legal regulation and strict control (which are fully in line with EU standards), which noticeably lead to a protection of the Hungarian labour market from a foreign labour force, especially TCN labour. Migration to Hungary, on the other hand, has a very strong ethnic dimension. Thus, preferentialism catering to the needs of ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries has been developed and maintained in this restrictive migration regime. Various legal and institutional practices have been created by the host country that facilitate the transnational migration of ethnic Hungarians, and migrants take advantage of these. As our case demonstrated, low-sector labour migrants use this facilitated transnational migratory space more to move around as directed by economic prospects in order to maintain or increase their social status “there-home,” rather than settling “here-home.” What remains in practice is wide-spread circular migration of ethnic Hungarians across borders.

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Guarzino, L. E., A. Portes, and W. Haller. 2003. Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants. The American Journal of Sociology 108 (6): 1222–1248. Hablicsek, L., and P. P. Tóth. 2002. The Role of International Migration in Maintaining Hungary’s Population Size 2000–2050. Working Papers on Population, Family and Welfare No.1. Budapest: Central Statistical Office, Demographic Research Institute. Hárs, Á. 2009. Immigration Countries in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary. IDEA Working Papers No. 12. Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Migration and Refugee Studies of the Ethnic and National Minority Studies Institute. Juhász, J., J. Csikvári, P. Makara, and M. Szaitz. 2006. Migráció és feketemunka Európában – Migration and Irregular Work in Europe (MIGIWE). Budapest: MTA Földrajztudományi Kutatóintézet, Panta Rhei Társadalomkutató Bt. Melegh, A. 2006. On the East/West Slope. Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on Eastern Europe. Budapest: CEU Press. Morokvasic, M. 2004. “Settled in Mobility”: Engendering Post-Wall Migration in Europe. Feminist Review 77 (Labour Migrations: Women on the Move): 7–25. Németh, N., A. Csite, B. Csurgó, Á. Jakobi, G. B. Megyesi, T. Réti, and Á. Szécsi. 2009. Kutatási jelentés a román állampolgárságú munkavállalók magyarországi jelenlétének vizsgálatáról [Report on the Presence of Romanian Citizens in the Hungarian Labour Market]. Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet. Ögelman, N. 2003. Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics among Germany’s Turks. International Migration Review 37 (1): 163– 193. Ostergaard-Nielsen, E. 2003. The Politics of Migrants’ Transnational Political Practices. International Migration Review 37 (3): 760–786. Semjén A., I. J. Tóth, and Á. Makó. 2008. Az alkalmi munkavállalói könyvvel történő foglalkoztatás jellemzői: Egy 2008. áprilisi kérdőíves munkavállalói adatfelvétel eredményei [Employment with the Temporary Work Booklet: The Findings of a Survey of Employees in April 2008]. Budapest: MTA KTI. (14 March 2010). Sik, E. 1999. Külföldiek Magyarországon és a velük kapcsolatos nézetek a helyi önkormányzatokban [Foreigners in Hungary and Views about Them in Local Self-governments]. Budapest: Társadalomkutatási Informatikai Egyesülés. ———. 2000. KGST-piacok és feketemunka - Magyarország 1999 [Comecon-markets and Black Labour – Hungary 1999]. Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia. 142

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NON-WORK MIGRATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE IN FINLAND: THREE TCN CASES AND FOUR PHASES OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES AINO SAARINEN

Late Immigration and the Nordic Regime1 Three of the Nordic countries – the Norden – have been evaluated by the Migration Policy Index (MIPEX 2007, 8–9) as “favourable” (Sweden) or “relatively favourable” (Finland, Norway).2 From this angle, it is justified to pay attention to the various welfare regimes in different parts of Europe, not only individual countries. On a time line, frameworks arise from the historically liberal, conservative, or the mentioned social-democratic welfare models. The Nordic social-democratic model has been praised for its social and gender equality, and not without reason: throughout the 1990s–2000s, global human development indexes, for instance, have scored them in the 10 top welfare countries of the world (HDR 1991, 118; 2007–2008, 229). In addition to the issue of social welfare, overall political inclusion is another key element in the Nordic model, especially from a gender standpoint: the global gender empowerment index has scored the Nordic countries as the top five countries (HDR 2007–2008, 330). No wonder that in feminist criticism, the Norden has been seen both socially and politically as “women-friendly” (Siim 2000, 118–123). The MIPEX index is normative, and is based on legislation and policies, while the other aforementioned indexes reflect on the state of affairs – but only in view of the populations as a whole; no index seems to compare the situation of national majorities and various minorities. It would certainly be of interest in the Norden to ponder whether the Nordic model – outlined both nationally and by the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers – has been and is still applicable in times of increas1

Warmest thanks to the other PRIMTS team members – Virve Hietala and Maija Jäppinen.

2

Iceland was not included. Denmark has distanced itself from the group, so that the term “the Nordic model” can be questioned. It is important to note that gender is not included as a category in the index. 145


ing migration, and to the European Union/European Economic Agreement (EU/EEA) membership. In brief, it is necessary to ask whether, and to what extent the Nordic countries – leaning on universal, residencebased social security – are “migrant-friendly” too, also in a gender perspective. This issue will be discussed by analyzing the Finnish immigration policies till the end-2000s, and then concentrating on a few cases from the angle of social and gender equality. The issues are approached through some key admission groups of non-work related immigration – returnees, humanitarian migrants, and marriage migrants – as they throughout the immigration history and the PRIMTS research period have been the majority of newcomers to Finland. All along various time lines, or “waiting rooms,” are taken up as well to analyze the obstacles confronted by migrants on their way toward access and integration (or disintegration); after all, in Finland it seems to have taken some 10 years to enter the labour market for more permanent positions. Lastly, there will be some remarks on the prospects for transitioning from policy targets to policy makers. The primary material consists of statistics, and governmental and parliamentary documents: legislation, degrees, resolutions, proposals, and work group reports, and, moreover, the PRIMTS narrations (Jäppinen 2010). Secondary literature, research on, and criticism of the state of affairs will be used for asking questions from the view of migrants especially. Normatively, it is about the economic and social and, moreover, cultural justice – a perspective that has been marginal in Finnish research at least until the mid-2000s.

Four Phases of Migration Policies in Finland Immigration to Finland has stayed at a low level. In the 1970–1980s, it was comprised of sporadic humanitarian migration from South America and Asia; in the 1990s, of a returnee and marriage migration from the Eastern European countries and, moreover, of humanitarian migration, this time from Africa, the Middle East, other parts of Asia, and SouthEastern Europe. In the mid-2000s, immigration was also comprised of work migration, especially from Eastern Europe and Asia. The third country nationals (TCNs) have formed more than half of the migrants; by gender, almost half of them are women. In total, in 2008, out of the 5,326,300 inhabitants only 143,300 (2.7%) were of foreign citizenship and 218,600 (4.1%) foreign-born; the three most numerous foreign languages were Russian, Estonian, and Somali; all TCN languages till 2004 when Estonia joined the EU. In the same year, Finland received a record net 146

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migration increasing to over 15,400 people as both work migration and humanitarian migration were, in Finnish terms, on a high level.3 As to the admission category, in the 1990s – early 2000s, over 60% arrived for family formation or family reunification, whereas the work-related migrants comprised less than 10%.4 During the economic boom ending in 2008, work migrants already formed 30% of the first and second time applicants for residence permits (excluding asylum seekers); the next year, work migration was on the wane already.5 Simultaneously, the number of persons who were granted citizenship rose to 6,700 foreigners; out of them well over half (57%) were women. This is not surprising as the number of marriage migrants had been significant both in the 1990s and 2000s.6 So, in comparison to many Western European countries Finland is a very new immigration country; in fact, in the 1970s, Finland was still an emigration country. Consequently, the political response has been delayed, but this has also been due to local developments. The national economic regression in the 1990s was the main political issue throughout the decade. In the beginning of the 2000s, the attention finally turned from the unemployment rate toward the employment rate. Immigration became a political issue along with the economic recovery and, on the other hand, the pending “aging crisis.” So, attracting work migrants was the main worry at the end of the 2000s – till late 2008, the advent of the global economic recession. In sum, major waves of non-work migration coincided with high rates of national unemployment, meaning that Finland had put the Nordic principle of residence-based social security to full use in a context that was economically unfavourable. The immigration and integration policies can be divided into four main phases; the phases are of course not clear-cut but partly overlapping; the MIPEX measurements are based on the last two (cf. Haavisto et al. 2010). At first, Finland reacted, as a Nordic country, to UN humanitarian appeals with regard to sporadic refugees and the UN Refugee Agency’s (UNCHR) quota for refugees. Reading the main documents from the parliament and the government, this phase can be entitled “fulfilling humanitarian obligations.” From the end of the 1980s on, a series of legisla3

Statistics Finland (6 October 2010). In detail, see Saarinen and Hietala 2009; Saarinen 2010.

4

See Proposal for Immigration Programme 2009.

5

The Migri (6 October 2010).

6

Statistics Finland (6 October 2010). 147


tive and policy reforms continued in order to arrange the influx of refugees. The second phase is in essence proactive, and took place during the dissolution of the socialist regime. During this period, entitled here the “national-ethnic obligation,” Ingrian Finns that arrived across the eastern border were welcomed. In a few years, their special treatment was formalized. At the same time, the policies around human rights became multiplied in the sense that they targeted − more expressively than earlier – not only the old national minorities (the Swedish-speaking, Sami, and Roma people) but also migrants, and non-national minorities. A committee set up in the mid-1990s finished its work with its first report on anti-racist policies. The reference bodies were the UN and the Council of Europe, whereas the EU was still playing a side role. In 2001, this process ended with a detailed governmental work plan to be implemented at the national, regional, and local levels. Joining the EU in 1995 became the third phase. Reforms of the relevant national acts have been carried out annually, and since then, the EU has influenced the pre-existing policies of humanitarian migration outlined in the Nordic and UN spirit. The new policy framework can be characterised as “managed immigration” in the sense of controlled immigration. Hastening the asylum application process was soon put onto the agenda. Mentions of tightening the border control, in congruence with the Dublin Convention and the Schengen Agreement, appeared first time in the immigration legislation at the end of the 1990s.7 In more detail, the preparations to adopt the Finnish policies to EU humanitarian policies started at the end of the 1990s. New ways and means to promote the integration of legal immigrants were also being processed. In 1999, Finland was one of the first EU countries to execute the Integration Act (493/1999); this was however designed in the Nordic and UN frameworks and, clearly, interwoven with the principle on residence-based social security. Interestingly, in the same context, the government stressed that work immigration was not desirable. A follow-up report was published in the early 2000s,8 this time with more links to the EU. The new non-discrimination policies from the mid-2000s9 were directly linked to the EU regulations, but the Minority Ombudsman, in reference to the EU Directive on Equal Treatment (2000/43/EC), was already 7

See the Aliens Act 1183/1997; 179/2001.

8

See Government Report 5/2002 (6 October 2010).

9

See Non-discrimination Act 21/2004. 148


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nominated in 2001.10 As to the highest level policy agendas, as an issue of its own, immigration was first mentioned in the government declaration as late as in 2003. The first immigration programme was finalized in the middle of the economic upturn for calling, for the first time, for a more foreign work force.11 In brief, in some five years an essential change with regard to work migration had taken place. This predicted the fourth and proactive phase in 2007, when the centreright government allied with the greens and the Swedish (minority) party took office. These last years can be characterized as “immigration as a resource,” which refers to both anticipation of a shortage in the labour force and the aging of population; in Finland, the demographic “crisis” was predicted to be more drastic than in any other EU country in the 2010s already, when the especially great, after-war generation would leave the labour market (Torvi 2007). To tackle immigration as a whole, the institutional reform was comprehensive. The migration issues were moved from the Ministry of Labour to the Ministry of the Interior; a firsttime minister – jointly for immigration and EU issues – was appointed; and the former Directorate of Migration, set up for emigration issues in the 1970s, was transformed into the Finnish Immigration Service (the Migri) to grant the first stay permit and, later, citizenship. The responsibilities and liabilities of regional employment and economic centres, and the local employment offices and the police were also re-organized, and the role of the local welfare offices was strengthened. All in all, the national political administration was for normative and strategic planning, whereas the Migri became a tool for practical decision-making, and the local level for dealing with migrants directly. In one word, the pace was hectic. After these major reforms, a new follow up-report of the integration and non-discrimination acts was completed. The report was itself delayed, but on the other hand several ministry-level reports on the labour market, social welfare, education, and, as a separate issue, trafficking in people had too been finalised by the turn of 2008–2009. The latest working group report is especially aimed at advancing selective work migration. The report had naturally gone out of date already by its issuance in 2009, which makes the newest action plan of the integration programme problematic as well.12 10

See Act on the Minority Ombudsman 660/2001.

11

See Government Migration Policy Programme 2006.

12

See Action Plan for Labour Migration 2009 and Immigrants’ Effective Integration 2009. 149


In sum, since the mid-2000s till the turn of 2008–2009, all planning was based on prospects for economic growth. In congruence with the spirit of the late-1990s, the normative statements spoke for a “safe and diverse” country, and a “two-way integration.” This suggested that the majority too had to be self-critical, for instance, with regard to discrimination at work to take steps toward a genuine trans-cultural society. But dramatic changes in the economic sphere and political challenges arising from newly increased humanitarian migration have put the Nordic principles to test. At present, a fifth phase seems to be opening up. It can probably be entitled “contested immigration.” Debates in media and so-called “social media” and, along with them, the formal mobilisation and intervention in the name of “criticism” of immigration from civil society have all become intensified. The political machinery, up to the parliamentary level, is involved too; the national elections in 2007 and local elections in 2008 were the first turning points (Jaakkola 2009, 22–52; Saarinen and Jäppinen 2009, 2010; Haavisto et al. 2010). For now, the parties are updating their immigration programmes for the national elections in the spring 2011. In the end, it is about the Nordic regime as a whole, economic and social justice and political inclusion, this time in view of cultural justice. The controversies centre very much round the residence-based welfare system and non-work migration.

The Regime in View of Non-work Migration: Three TCN Cases These overall phases and turns will be analyzed through a few cases which serve as crystallisations of the universalist and “women-friendly” Nordic regime (Siim 2000, 108–148; cf. Lister 1997, 14, 174–179). At the centre of attention are non-work migrants arriving from third counties as ethnic returnees, humanitarian migrants, and marriage migrants. However, as they are also expected to be economically active, they are viewed from the angle of intersections of labour market integration and welfare regime (obligations and rights that are intertwined with gender). Of interest is, as it has been all along, to what extent the Nordic norms, principles, and practices apply to TCNs. In the last instance, this opens up tensions between the Nordic and EU models, a major theme for future debates on migration and the EU. Economic inclusion and social justice have been the central values of the collective identity and policy-making in the Norden; welfare univer150


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salism and women-friendliness both stem from them. Economic and social rights, functioning at a more concrete level, are also tightly interwoven and form as such a key fabric of citizenship (Siim 2000, 113–126; Brochmann 2002). In detail, in the middle of recession and simultaneously increasing migration, extending full social rights to all resident population was re-confirmed in the Constitution; the Constitution, for its part, was congruent with the Act on Residence and Domiciles (201/1994), and renewed in the mid-1990s. The latter act connects the migrant, too, to a named municipality with regard to civic obligations, such as taxation, as well as rights, social benefits, and welfare services; to be a resident, the immigrant has to have a residence permit and the “intention” to stay (Aliens Act 511/1996; 301/2004). Next, it is central that the Act on Residence-based Social Security (1573/1993) is linked to some 20 individual laws on fundamental rights regarding work, health, social security, education, and housing. Overall non-discrimination and equality principles are also included in the 1995 Constitution. Lastly, speaking about the Nordic regime, the rights − excluding the national vote and the right to re-enter the country − include political rights. They are relatively extensive (MIPEX 2007, 62–64) as local institutions are open to foreigners after two years of residence. This is important because municipalities are the main forum for welfare rights and services. Together the set of rights forms an intertwined dynamic which is supposed to promote social solidarity in society; from this angle, the Nordic regime ought to be “migrant-friendly” as well. As supported by practice-oriented policy programmes, they are to work for the equality of opportunities, “active citizenship,” which is now more multi-sectional than ever, also in view of cultural justice (Lister 1997, 22–23, 39; Siim 2006). The universalist arrangements were originally set up within the Nordic regime basing on the Nordic Passport Union from 1954,13 that is, within the period of stable national economies and – excluding Sweden − little migration from outside the Norden. In the new situation the basic parameters have been challenged. However, as the EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights (2000/C 364/01) has left the decision-making relating to social welfare in the main to the national bodies, no essential amendments have even been made in the two last policy phases. In Finland in particular, this has been especially important as larger numbers of migrants started to arrive in the middle of recession, and were by a great majority non-work migrants and TCNs. 13

See (6 November 2010). 151


RETURNEE MIGRANTS – THE INGRIAN QUESTION In the first phase of migration policies in the 1970–1980s, the Nordic principles were actualized in view of humanitarian migration, sporadic and minor in scale. In the mid-1980s, migrant-refugees from Chile and Vietnam were accompanied by the UNCHR quota refugees, annually only a few hundred; all together they have totalled some 15,000 this far.14 Many who have arrived since had been in an external waiting room for long, years even: So I went to visit the UN office. (…) During two years I was trying to do different kind of jobs and somehow to survive there. And after that the UN contacted me. Sincerely I had not heard about a country called Finland. They told me Finland is accepting refugees and “If you want we can send you there, maybe your life will get better there.” And as I did not have any choice, I did not say “No” to them, of course I wanted to stay in Turkey because people who live there, this is my nation, these are my citizens (…) And even I didn’t want to leave, I decided to leave. (…) They brought us here. Of course I’m thankful to them because they helped me. They bought me tickets for the plane ... because I did not have any money. So I came here. They met us in airport, they showed one apartment and told that “You are going to stay here.” (Naser, 31, Iran, trainee in a pizza restaurant)

Originally, the reception centres for UNCHR refugees were built as a kind of “flow-through” institutions for hiring and organizing basic services; learning Finnish was of course one of the first things for settling down in a country they maybe had not heard of before. Basically, the immigrants were to move rapidly to the local level as new settlers of these municipalities. Within the residence-based welfare system, their obligations and rights were to be equal to the natives as long-term, if not even permanent settlers. The Act on the Reception Centres of Asylum Seekers (1465/1991) directed the subsequent liabilities to local authorities; in the settlement years, the financial responsibility belonged to the state.15 At the turn of the 1980–90s, due to the final collapse of the Soviet Union, however, a new wave of migrants presented another and not so marginal challenge; actually, they were specifically invited (relatively spontaneously) by the Finnish president in 1990. In the end, in spite of being privileged as compared to refugees, they too found themselves in an external waiting room. All in all, it has been estimated that from 1990 till 2009, some 20,000 people have settled down as “returnees” from the Soviet 14

The Migri (4 October 2010).

15

See Decree on Temporary Location 21/1991. 152


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Union – Russia and Estonia, mostly from the St. Petersburg and SovietEstonian border areas. However, no accurate statistics are available as the inhabitants in Finland are not categorized by ethnicity. This special returnee immigration has undergone several turns. The Ingrians, who came close both culturally and regionally, received special treatment as kin people; along with Russian-speaking family members. Besides some exceptions, the Ingrians never had Finnish citizenship, but were of Finnish origin from the 17th century (Liebkind et al. 2004, 23–29);16 parallels can be found in various national legislations promoting the ius sanguinis principle (Castles and Davidson 2000, 11). The spirit of the policy can be characterised as responding to the “national-ethnic obligation.” Ingrians settled down according to their own choice, but in parallel to the refugees the state compensated the welfare costs to the municipalities for a short period. The permissive administrative interpretations of the Aliens Act were soon formalized by the Amendment of the Aliens Act (511/1996). As the years have gone by, however, the eligibility criteria have become tighter and numerous. At first, being an Ingrian or Ingrian in a descendant line – having one parent or one (later two) grandparent, to be proved in “reliable ways” – was enough for getting the permit. Participation in the returnee training organized by the Finnish authorities became obligatory along with this special legislation. In the early 2000s, the pre-hand requirements included, also, passing the test of Finnish (or Swedish) and, moreover, that the immigrant had acquired housing either privately or through the municipal social housing system.17 However, the right to work, also for the family members, was already included in the first permit; it was, exceptionally, continual from the start on. Remarkably, no requirement was set to be economically self-sufficient for either the returnee or his/her family members. By the mid-2000s, however, it was evident that this “flexible” admission gate was stiff with all its training and queuing systems that forced people to stay in the external waiting room almost forever. In brief, to be registered, interviewed, go through the in16

In the 17th century the Swedish state (Finland was part of Sweden till early 19th century, before being attached to Russia until 1917) moved some of its Eastern-Finnish population to the Eastern border area between Sweden and Russia since 1617. In 2003 (see Aliens Act 218/2003), two new sub-categories were added to this special category: firstly, people who during the WW2 had been moved from the territory under occupation of the Finnish or German army in Finland and, secondly, those who had joined the Finnish army as kinsman veterans. After the war, most of them were sent back as the Peace Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union ordered.

17

See Aliens Act 218/2003. 153


tegration training and language examination and find housing, it can take even 10–15 years to enter and settle down. But it might be justified to also speak about an “internal” waiting room too, as integration into Finnish society has not been as successful as anticipated. Against high hopes, the Ingrians have stayed more marginal in the labour market than, for instance, ethnic Russians, out of whom a little more than one-fourth (28%) were unemployed in 2006 (Martikainen 2007). In other words, the Soviet heritage at its best – good education and experience in paid work, in terms of gender, the mother-worker model – has not been rewarded. The special obstacle was, of course, timing. As mentioned, the major waves of this immigration coincided with economic regression: since the early 1990s, unemployment has continued to rise so that of the national population one-sixth (15%) were without a job, and the number was three times higher among the immigrants, nearing even one half (46%). As to the returnees, their situation was characterized as bad as was the situation of the refugees (Liebkind et al. 2004, 27; Jaakkola and Reuter 2007). Elderly Ingrians speaking Finnish or Russian and Finnish have especially not been able to access the labour market even during the booming years; due to their older age they were not among the first persons to be hired. On the other hand, younger Ingrians who had lost the Ingrian language and other cultural roots due to the Soviet repression were not much more successful (Liebkind et al. 2004, 26–27; Jaakkola and Reuter 2007). In the worst position were probably Russian family members who every now and then became exposed to everyday violence and had to look for a job that was “safe.” Oh, I forgot, I haven’t told about one very important thing. When I – I almost forgot [to tell] about this completely – when I came to work (…) I was twice in a troublesome situation. One of them was, when there was violence. It went even to court. (Vanya, 42, Russia, taxi driver)

In the end, many Ingrians had to cope with the basic “last resort” social assistance stipulated for temporary purposes. Many have of course retired already, but this has not been of much help. Only a few had worked longer; the pensions were minimal at the same time as the pensions from the Soviet Union – Russia were meagre as well. In the early 2000s, the problem of long-term or even permanent dependence of elderly people with little prospects in the labour market was solved by targeted means. The Act on Special Assistance to Migrants (1192/2002) was tailored for pension-aged or disabled Ingrian returnees. The benefit is at the level of the Finnish old-age pension, but it is means-tested. Moreover, and impor154


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tantly, the receivers are eligible for it after five years of residence. But for these first five years they have to find other means of insuring themselves. Today, at the policy level, the “national-ethnic obligation” seems to have been discharged. The present government informed right away in 2007 on the plans for repealing the Ingrian statute. In 2010, preparation of closing this gate has been proceeding to the parliament with three preambles: length of the process; loss of cultural roots; and, lastly, the minor scale: the Ingrians make up only 2–3% of all annual incomers now. So, after an interim period of 2011–2016, they must arrive among ordinary TCNs, without special privileges. In conclusion, the “Ingrian question,” high on the agenda in the second phase of immigration policies, is no more there. Interestingly, seeing “immigration as a resource” means that they will be welcomed as work migrants – but only when needed. Economic regression will be in the political records for some time.

HUMANITARIAN MIGRANTS – THREE “WAITING ROOMS” The Ingrians were soon followed by numerous humanitarian migrants from the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. All together, in the 1990–2000s, Finland has received well over 50,000 humanitarian migrants (including the UNHCR people and family members), the absolute majority being TCNs (Martikainen 2007). Consequently, the Constitution and the acts on residence and social security were to be applied to ever larger and heterogeneous groups, this time from other cultures and great distances. The practical solution outlined in the early 1990s proved inadequate. In the late-1990s, the Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers (439/1999) replaced the Act on the Reception Centres; when fulfilling the “humanitarian obligations” the reference countries were still the other Nordic countries. The act was special in several ways as compared the EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights (2000/C 364/01) as it enlarged the target group by speaking of “immigrants,” not only refugees. In practice, irrespective of these normative statements, the attention was directed to humanitarian migrants only. Interestingly, the Finnish term “kotouttaminen” invented for the new act comes from the Finnish word for “home” and thus refers symbolically to belonging and a “permission” to settle down even permanently. In Finland, the asylum seekers have the right to work after three months of start of the process but, as elsewhere, they confront discrimination in getting a job. Follow-up studies (Forsander 2007) have revealed 155


that in the early 2000s, it had taken some 10 years to get a more stable position. In the booming years the situation has turned to the better, but not by its structures. Cross-sectionally, out of the EU/EEAs less than 20% were unemployed, whereas out of the European TCNs 20–40% and the non-European TCNs over 40% were without work; in some culturally and regionally most distant sub-groups – Somalis, Afghanis, Iranians, and Iraqis – the rate rose to 60–80% (Martikainen 2007). The statistics confirm a trend toward a tri-partite employment market. It divides migrants to cultural hierarchies, “high-flyers” from the EU/EEA countries and, on the other hand, survivors and precarious people from third countries; their precarious status is intentionally misused by employers as they can count on hiring these people under any conditions (Himanen and Könönen 2010). From a process angle, for humanitarian migrants there are at least three waiting rooms. The Integration Act is by its essence an application of economic inclusion and social universalism. It comprises both the obligation to work and the right to utilize social support and services for all. In a time perspective, humanitarian migrants are gradually to proceed through the admission gate to become “ordinary” residents, cope independently, and be integrated to paid work and related social security. The reception centres at the first gate aim at guaranteeing at least the minimum of civic rights, to ensure a person’s or a family’s accommodation and daily meals, social and health services, and interpretation services; some work and training activities and language courses are also available. But the later process is not as fluid as presumed. The first waiting room is on arrival already. At the turn of the 1990s–2000s, the standard time for the permit process was one year; in the mid-2000s, it was shortened to half a year; today, it has re-arisen to one year, and some critics claim that it may be drawn out to two years (Norrback 2008, 25).18 After getting the permission to stay, humanitarian migrants who have not sought for an accommodation on their own are welcomed to leave the centre. Leaving might however become the second waiting room as, paradoxically, social universalism can turn against migrants. The problems and obstacles are rooted in the link between the domicile and the residence-based social security. The obligations directed to the domicile municipalities to care for welfare of humanitarian migrants have be18

Since the mid-2000s, part of the applications has been handled separately, in a couple of months; the decisions are normally negative. 156


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come heavier than estimated, for reasons arising from two quarters: firstly, problems in labour market integration and, secondly, the division of public liabilities between the national and local levels. As mentioned, migrants are eligible for training and other integrationrelated rights and benefits, either a social assistance benefit or a threeyear labour market subsidy. The language course is of course a “must” but a series of trainings can become an almost never-ending process: But for a long time I was searching a job. At first, I attended a language course, when I finished there an integration course. (…) then I go to the employment office (…) and they say “Take this course, maybe you will find a job then.” (Fanx, 47, Ethiopia, bus driver)

Getting a job does not always help much because being in temporary and/or part-time employment and on low wages leads to a “poverty trap.” As a result, even in case of longer-term gainful employment migrants are not always self-sufficient but become “working poor” who must make use of benefits by combining their meagre earnings with the last resort social assistance. This concerns especially families with many children and non-working mothers and single mothers (Katainen 2009; Sarvimäki 2008; Linnanmäki 2009). One reason for this is that often migrants are not aware of their rights, as to special extra payments for overtime or evening or night or weekend work (Jäppinen 2010). Occasionally, the job offers can be so bad that the job seeker ends up in an “inactivity trap”: it might be profitable to refuse the job offer in favour of social assistance. This vicious situation was confirmed recently also in an analysis by a ministerial special rapporteur (Arajärvi 2009, 111), who also revealed contradictions in the “jungle” of welfare rights as a whole. But staying in the second waiting room can result from “inter-state” problems too. During and after the regression, when the state has continued to offload a lot of welfare liabilities to the municipalities, many of the state subsidies at this lower level have lost much of their value. For instance, the special subsidy guaranteed to the municipalities by the refugee and integration legislation has not risen at all between 1993–2009 (Jokelainen 2009). An increase of 10% in the state integration subsidy in 2010 is certainly too little to solve the problem.19 In recent years, municipalities have started to make a cost-benefit analysis to compare the benefits and services migrants receive to the taxes they pay (Sarvimäki 19

See Ministry of the Interior press release, 29 December 2009 (6 October 2010). 157


2008). Not surprisingly, some of them have even refused to accept humanitarian migrants as new municipal citizens by denying help in accommodation.20 In sum, the lines of people seeking for a domicile have become (again) longer, and part of the quota refugees – the group in need of most support – has not been able to leave their camps at all. This was noted also in the report of another ministerial special rapporteur that was set to work soon after the start of the fourth policy phase (Norrback 2008, 19). Lastly, the list of hardships includes re-structuring of public administration. According to the Constitution, the state must “actively protect” the labour force and open access to paid work but in reality, as one of the ministerial special rapporteurs (Arajärvi 2009, 92–93) has stressed, ongoing effectivization of public administration has reduced the resources at the employment offices − right at a time when they are most needed. All in all, prolongation of planning of the individual integration and employment plans at the local level forms a third waiting room. As proved also by the PRIMTS narrations (Jäppinen 2010), humanitarian migrants with low-level education especially cannot cope in the present “self-help” employment system. To date, the Integration Act has been amended numerous times and a major reform is again on the agenda. The aim of the newest policy – often called the “three paths proposal” is firstly, to involve children and young people more intensively than before; secondly, to organize anew a separate reception for humanitarian migrants; and thirdly, to include all other categories as well.21 On the basis of afore-mentioned critical reports, it is understandable to be sceptical. Providing that no more resources are directed to the integration services, the proposals − drafted out in the spirit of “immigration as a resource” and making promises of tailor-made integration services – are a mixed blessing in view of humanitarian migrants. Interestingly, the work migrants would get a fiveyear permit with no or only little intervention from the state, but they too would attend the integration courses to empower them as to their work rights. In general, at the same time, measures for active recruitment of a professional, highly-qualified work force from the TC neighbouring areas, and some specially named other areas are highlighted. In brief, con20

See Ministry of the Interior press release, 29 December 2010 (6 October 2010).

21

See Effective Integration of Immigrants 2009 and Action Plan for Labour Migration 2009; cf. Tuomaala and Torvi 2008. 158


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trary to the aims, employment and integration hierarchies between migrants might even grow. In conclusion, as to humanitarian migration, factually, the state has not lived up to the Nordic values and principles stressing economic inclusion and social solidarity in view of cultural justice. The policy of “fulfilling the humanitarian obligation” is in contradiction with the “immigration as a resource” policy at least as long as humanitarian migrants are lining up in different waiting rooms – as “active citizens” in the negative meaning of the term, that is, very much on their own. At the macro-structural level, the expansion of the tri-partite employment market let alone growth of grey economy are direct threats. Worth a final note is that long-term welfare dependence that characterises most of all humanitarian migrants evokes hostility and racism even within the formal political institutions let alone among ordinary people (Saarinen and Jäppinen 2010). In the end, the residence-based welfare model can be at stake. One thing happened to me. I work a lot. There was lack of [drivers] and I pay taxes. (...) I scrutinized my pay slip, how much I get myself, cash money, how much I pay taxes, how much something else like the unemployment payment. And I see that I pay taxes 1,000 euro. I look around [at the bus top], and there is one man coming, a Finn, he says: “Damn it, you Somali man, you eat our taxes!” (Fanx, 47, Ethiopia, bus driver)

MARRIAGE MIGRANTS – GENDER AND PERSONAL DEPENDENCY The Norden has been characterized by a high level of gender equality and women’s inclusion in decision-making. Equality between women and men was, as stressed, one of the central Nordic values during the late1960s and late-1980s; in Finland it was crystallized in the Equality Act (609/1986) from the period of intensive Nordic cooperation. Today, there are good grounds to consider a “gender paradox” (Siim and Skjeie 2007), analyze the results of the much-praised state feminism, and ask whether the Norden is “women-friendly” toward migrant women too (also Saarinen et al. 2008). This is central as the state-centred welfare model has leaned on economic inclusion so that women too have paid work and are parties of two wage-earner families for whom the public, institutionalized care of children and elderly people has been set up. Women as single providers are too obliged to enter paid work. Consequently, gender equality and women’s economic inclusion ought to have been a key fibre in all policies for immigration. However, irrespective of the size of the category, in policies, female marriage migrants have been close to invisible and stayed as such. At the same time, EU-inspired “managed immi159


gration” policies have already targeted them badly. On the whole, a new challenge in the Norden is sexualized othering due to phenomena related to prostitution: group-level stigmatization has been attached to the major ethnic groups in this admission category (Sverdljuk 2009; Penttinen 2008; Lehti and Aromaa 2002; Reuter and Kyntäjä 2006). Altogether, Finland has received well over 30,000 marriage migrants in the period of 1990–2009; a majority of them are women. Nationally seen, the largest group of these women come from the Soviet Union – Russia: in the mid-2000s, they formed four-tenths of all bi-national marriages (42% in 2005). The second largest group of female marriage migrants arrived from Asia, Thailand, and the Philippines; in the same years, they formed more than one tenth (12%) in this admission category (Martikainen 2007). The waiting rooms for TC marriage migrants are gendered in their special ways. To get the first stay permit, marriage migrant (with the sponsor) must prove that the relationship is intimate and has lasted for some time. Preventing “fake marriages” is here as well a task, which is directed to the border and permit authorities, the Migri, and the local police. They have a key role in being on guard to protect the state against misuse in regard to the route that is not in public control to the same extent as humanitarian and work migration. In the early 2000s, the process was essentially re-formatted. During the “managed immigration” policy phase, the access process became more specified and prolonged, first at the degree level, later at the legislative level, as the major reform of the Aliens Act aimed at harmonizing with the EU resolutions in Amsterdam and Tampere.22 The dynamics comprised, firstly, dividing the admission categories clearly to categories for presumably continual (A) and temporary (B) stay; and secondly, as to the latter group, extending the period needed for the permanent resident status from two to four years. Finally, as earlier, the temporary permit for marriage migrants is preconditioned by the continuation of the sponsor-partnership. So, as to most marriage migrants, Finland now applies the “four-year rule,” and re-evaluations and intimate interventions from the side of authorities are legitimized for all these years (Saarinen 2009; Pellander 2010). All in all, TCN marriage migrants have become long-term dependants of their private ties and status, which is in stark contradiction with the Nordic principles of women’s personal autonomy and integrity (cf. Lotherington and Fjørtoft 2006; Sverdljuk 2009). 22

See Aliens Degree 131/2002; Aliens Act 301/2004; Treaty of Amsterdam 1997; Tampere Summit 1999. 160


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This reform can prove out even fatal because during the first years when these new residents ought to concentrate on entering the labour market, they can be exposed to violence in a relationship. Not all are aware of this or they trust the future partner. I only saw to that the man was not married [laugh] or an alcoholic. Everything else – they are small things. (Olga, 47, Russia, self-employed on a family farm)

In the worst case the relationship is broken, which leaves the woman in an uncertain situation (Saarinen 2009). Then, the alternative way for preserving the stay permit is to have a work contract and be economically self-sufficient. This has, of course, not been easy. As mentioned, in the recession years, major parts of TCN marriage migrants did not have access to paid work and were not able to benefit from the (future) integration policies as yet. Consequently, exclusion from the labour market did not show in the statistics as many did not care to register themselves as unemployed. In later years, the Integration Act was not of much help because at the policy level it bypassed marriage migrants as it assumed that they were gainfully employed and included in the work-based social security. In some respects, however, the act changed the situation; from 1999 on, for a limited three-year period, marriage migrants were entitled to make use of special training and language courses and the labour market subsidy; no notice was, however, given to the fact that in these three years they were tied up with building families and adapting to new life styles (Hägg 2008). No wonder that even during the economic upturn, the major group, women from the Soviet Union – Russia, were, irrespective of all the talk of “immigration as a resource,” more often unemployed than the EU/EEA women − let alone the natives. In 2008, the cross-sectional rate was still over one-fourth (28%) (Arajärvi 2009, 4–5), a high figure because migrants from the former socialist mother-worker regime are, like Nordic women, well educated, experienced in paid work and the use of social care for children. As such they are “ideal” migrants who ought to cope well in this regime. At best, women get help and support from the husband in the most vulnerable times, like when they are waiting for the first stay permit. However, even after that they often find out how complex the admission and integration gate can be. I have already mentioned my very depressing part here: at first five months and that experience of mine, from työvoimatoimisto [employment office] and Kela [Social Insurance Institution]. (…) For työvoimatoimisto and Kela it is [as a source of informa161


tion] just my husband; he told me that “Ok, we need to go to the työvoimatoimisto.” But everything within, or what is really going on, we don’t also know that, because he has never been there. (Irene, 31, Philippines, restaurant worker)

Later on, part of the economic-social dynamics − mentioned in the interviews throughout the 2000s (Saarinen 2007, 2009) – is exclusion from social rights due to private ties. Economic inclusion and independence is not as guaranteed as presented at the normative level. Employment figures have risen but are by their “quality” worse than before: in the tripartite employment market, women are more often than men in precarious positions, on short-term and part-time contracts. Consequently, they are placed outside the union’s wage-based unemployment support, which is individual and not means-tested. When they, after the integration period, turn for public rights for social assistance or the labour market subsidy, many of their applications are discarded because these subsidies are means-tested − in a family context: the income of the male partner may be too “high.” Another negative factor is the gendered pay gap, that women earn only some 80% of men’s salaries. In other words, women are secondary wage-earners, and the principles of individualism and the two wage-earner model are not applied. For good reason, some scholars speak even about a “weak male breadwinner model” (Latvala 2008). In the end, Finland has proved “unfriendly” towards many women migrants, even in the “immigration as a resource” phase calling for a more qualified work force. Lack of economic integration and proper information on social rights also comes up in a most awkward context. Thai and Philippine women, out of whom an especially large part (four-fifths) have arrived for marriage and partnership, are for their part “different” from natives, less educated and less experienced in paid work, in sum, economically vulnerable. In statistics, Thai women, however, seem to be as well (or badly) integrated as Russian women: in the mid-2000s, “only” one-fourth of them have been registered as unemployed. In this case, a response to exclusion and discrimination and lack of work-related resources has been self-employment; in practice Thai entrepreneurs employ Thai women. Upon closer look, even in the first years of the economic upturn, these enterprises have concentrated on a few branches, the restaurant business, personal services, and maintenance.23 As to women, they were offered work in massage institutions, in reality, sex work as some of these institutions were hidden brothels. 23

See Statistics Finland (2009). 162


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The problem was brought up by the media in the mid-2000s, and this time, the immigration authorities and institutions tackled the problem. Thanks to many years of committee work and in-depth information on the position of Thai women especially, there are plans and even new projects for tailored education and training programmes to combat the lack of first-hand qualifications at arrival. Also, a special programme for Thai women’s integration and combatting against violence in close relationships has been finalized.24 More generally, the practice-oriented attention to Thai women is of benefit to all female marriage migrants as the all-embracing “three paths” integration proposal now includes marriage migrants, as well. At best, this reform can promote cultural respect, important for these major groups of female marriage migrants who have, more often than others, been exposed to cultural disrespect by attachment to prostitution and presented as sexualized others. The normative statements from the UN and numerous Finnish legislative reforms and programmes for combating gendered violence, for the good of Finnish women in the mid-1990s, have thus become concretized in view of migrant women too. Too bad however that the resources – from the EU funds – seem to be drawing to a close already. Moreover, in the legislation there is still a peculiar detail that makes even the EU look more “women-friendly” than Finland. The amendment of the Aliens Act in 2006 in order to promote free movement of people inside the EU, the partners of EU citizens, and those with a EU-P permanent residence card are protected against deportation in case of violence whereas the partners of Finnish citizens do not have, explicitly, a similar right to stay in the country in a similar situation.25 So, self-evidently, a legislative reform of the Aliens Act to combat violence in a Finnish-migrant relationship is needed too. In conclusion, as to marriage migrants, personal dependency and lack of substantial economic and social rights can result in vulnerabilities and vicious situations; in their extreme, women can be deported to their country of origin; reforms made in the “managed immigration” phase are most questionable in a gender view. In recent years, sexual othering has certainly contributed to hostile sentiments against migrants; in this one-sided light, it seems to go unnoticed who the clients have been – mostly native Nordic men (Ihamäki 2004). 24

See Action Plan to Promote Thai Women’s Independence and Integration 2010 (17 May 2010).

25

See Aliens Act 360/2007. 163


Concluding Remarks – On the Importance of Political Inclusion In Finland the majority of immigrants have been non-work migrants. This was also the case during the economic upturn in 2004–2008, in the “immigration as a resource” policy phase, which seems to vitalize many elements from the “managed immigration” policies. A tri-partite employment market has developed at the same rate as the increase in migration. TCN migrants are often found on the lower steps, in precarious, low-paid positions. In the same years, social solidarity and universalism, that is, the Nordic-type of residence-based welfare model has been formally intact. A dual morality is however evident: all are expected to do paid work, but large parts are in fact excluded and discriminated, even 10 years after settling down, even in economic upturns. Consequently, many long-term unemployed TCN returnees and humanitarian migrants have been doomed to poverty, social dependence, and “inactivity traps.” The inter-state mechanisms, the much-criticized division of costs and liabilities between the national and local state have harmed the integration policies and turned out an obstacle in becoming resident-migrant with full fundamental rights. The situation of female TCN marriage migrants is, with one word, also dubious, and not in congruence with the Nordic principles, economic autonomy, social rights, and personal integrity of women. At worst, moving to macro-level trends, there is evidence that TCN immigrants are turned into irregular workers in the growing illegal economy (Adam and Laitinen 2006; Jäppinen 2010).26 This harms the Nordic regime known for legality and high rates of unionization. But the regime as a whole is changing. In the overall “tri-partite contract model” between both the labour market parties and the state, the state contributed by regulating the level of minimum wage and also taxation and social benefits. The arrangement secured a decent standard of living for (almost) all and the overall income transfer and economic equality (Ristikari 2006). After the mid-2000s, however, the all-binding general contract has been replaced by separate contracts within each branch, on economic matters only. There are no more effective general political mechanisms to level the wages and salaries between low vs. highly paid people, or between women and men. The fragmentation erodes the formerly relatively equal economic structures. Overall, the pay gaps have been ex26

See also Government Action Programme in Regard to Grey Economy 2009. 164


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panded since the 1990s regression at the same time as the non-work-related public benefits have shrunk as compared to the earned income (Jokelainen 2009; Toivonen 2008). Self-evidently, among the losers are TCN migrants as they have special problems in their labour market integration. From this angle too, the “immigration as a resource” policies must be approached critically: more work migrants are invited right when the principles of economic inclusion and social equalization are breaking up in the Finnish society. No wonder that at the all-Nordic level politicians now have put onto the agenda the issue of the future of the Nordic model.27 There are other new systemic tensions in sight too – the general atmosphere is becoming harder, and expressions of xenophobia have become more frequent (cf. FRA 2009). One of the warning signals is hostility especially toward humanitarian migration (Saarinen and Jäppinen 2009, 2010). In the worst scenario the residence-based welfare model as a whole can be at stake; the phase to be entitled “contested immigration” is clearly opening up. Along with it, moves to the direction of EU type arrangements which control the access tightly and centre round the work-based welfare and security, are one of the real options. Prospects for political inclusion of migrants should therefore be the priority issue: the future policies should be outlined not on or for the migrants, but with them. In this respect Finland makes a dual case. Formally, TCN migrants have the key political rights and liberties relatively soon at least at the local level. In reality, they are on the margins. Only some 15% of migrant people entitled to the municipal vote have used their right in the 2000s.28 Out of the local decision-makers migrants make a tiny minority – even in the most multi-cultural regions: in Helsinki, for instance, only some 1%, even though close to 10% of voters have a migrant background (Saarinen 2008). The state of affairs was criticised by MIPEX (2007, 64) also in regard to a lack of two-way links between the decision-making institutions and civil society. The problems consist of at least two kinds. The stress in political participation from below is on implementation of policies, not form27

In 2010, a scholarly book arguing for a Nordic Union Federation to be realized in 10–15 years was launched by the NCM and NC. Later, the new President of the NC declared that one of the aims of his period will be updating the Nordic welfare model in the globalized and European-ized world (“First Steps toward a Nordic Union Federation.” News and Events. 27 October 2010. ; (10 December 2010)).

28

See Ministry of the Interior press release, 6 October 2008 (6 October 2010). 165


ing them. In addition, the representatives of migrants are selected from above, by the state. In view of gender, the state of affairs is unbearable. Since the 1970s, the Nordic political regime has been engendering but it is not opening access to immigrant women. In this respect, the Action Plan to Promote Thai Women’s Independence and Integration is encouraging as it involved migrant women in the planning process and through their own organizations already. It is an example of good practice also because the plan includes several concrete proposals for developing “low threshold” and “searching” work methods. They would certainly be useful also in the tri-partite employment market in general, in these times of increasing migration and precarious, even illegal work. As to these trends, both statistics and critical research is only evolving now. As to the national level political institutions, there is also a positive trend developing: in the summer 2010, a group of migrants from various parts of the world and various admission categories has initiated a forum entitled the “Migrants’ Parliament.” The election is planned to take place in the spring 2011, simultaneously with the national parliamentary election in which the “migration issue” will be one of the central themes. In the longer run, maybe the new “parliament,” said to be the first of its kind in the world, can become a channel for promoting mobilization and, moreover, mediation, negotiation, and creation of deliberative forms of democracy across the native-newcomer divide. It is certainly needed but not easy: migrants are a heterogeneous group and, moreover, a major part of the TCNs arrive from non-democratic or unstable regimes and have little experience of challenging the power-holders (Saarinen 2009). In any case, these kinds of initiatives must be concretized as the evolving new – fifth – phase in the Finnish migration politics is far from beneficial to migrants. Equality of opportunities, “active citizenship” in the Nordic meaning, both as obligations and rights and real opportunities can be guaranteed only by guaranteeing the presence of migrants in the political process itself.

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logue in the Barents Region, eds. Aino Saarinen and Elaine Carey-Belanger, Gender Research: Methodology and Practice, Vol. 7; Femina Borealis, Vol. 9., 127–144. Arkhangelsk: Pomor State University. Jaakkola, Magdalena. 2009. Maahanmuuttajat suomalaisten näkökulmasta. Helsinki: Helsingin kaupungin tietokeskus. Jaakkola, Magdalena, and Anni Reuter. 2007. Maahanmuuttajanaiset entisen Neuvostoliiton alueelta: Resurssit ja sijoittuminen työmarkkinoille. In Maahanmuuttajanaisedet: Kotoutuminen, perhe ja työ, eds. Tuomas Martikainen and Marja Tiilikainen. Väestöntutkimusalitoksen julkaisusarja D 46/2007, 335–358. Helsinki: Väestöliitto. Jokelainen, Matti. 2009. Työttömyys, työmarkkinainstituutio ja työttömyysvakuutus 15 maassa vuosina 1970–2005. Nettityöpapereita 6/2009. Kelan tutkimusosasto. Kela/Fpa. (17 May 2010). Jäppinen, Maija. 2010. Interviews and Focus Groups Analysis Report – the Case of Finland. Working Paper 3, PRIMTS project report. Katainen, Antti. 2009. Ulkomaalainen saa huonompaa palkka useimmilla aloilla. Statistics Finland. (17 May 2010). Latvala, Minna. 2008. Työmarkkinatuen tarveharkinta kohdistuu useammin naisiin. Sosiaalivakuutus 5 (26): 26–29. Lehti, Martti, and Kauko Aromaa. 2002. Naiskauppa, laiton siirtolaisuus ja Suomi. Nykytilanne, lainsäädäntö ja tutkimuslähteet. Oikeuspoliittisen tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisuja 186. Helsinki: Oikeuspoliittinen tutkimuslaitos. Liebkind, Karmela, Simo Mannila, Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti, Margareta Jaakkola, Eve Kyntäjä, and Anni Reuter. 2004. Venäläinen, virolainen, suomalainen. Kolmen maahanmuuttajaryhmän kotoutuminen Suomeen. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Linnanmäki, Suvi. 2009. Maahanmuuttajat ja toimeentulotuki Helsingissä 2008. In Kaupunkiköyhyyden monet kasvot, eds. Vesa Keskinen, Markus Laine, Martti Tuominen and Tyyne Hakkarainen, 143–156. Helsinki: Helsingin kaupungin tietokeskus. Lister, Ruth. 1997. Citizenship. Feminist Perspectives. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Lotherington, Ann-Therese, and Kjersti Fjørtoft. 2006. Russiske invandrerkvinner i ekteskapets lenker. NIKKmagasin 2: 30–31. Martikainen, Tuomas. 2007. Maahanmuuttajaväestön sukupuolittuneisuus, perheellistyminen ja sukupolvisuus. In Maahanmuuttajanaisedet: Kotoutuminen, perhe ja työ, eds. Tuomas Martikainen and Marja Tiilikainen. Väestöntutkimuslaitoksen julkaisusarja D 46/2007, 38–67. Helsinki: Väestöliitto. 168


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Life, Social Justice and Citizenship. (10 December 2010). Saarinen, Aino, and Maija Jäppinen. 2009. Current Challenges to Migration. Xenophobia and Racism. Project Brief 2, PRIMTS project (24 July 2010). ———. 2010. Toward a Migrant-friendly Finland – Together with Migrants. Perspectives on European Security. STETE Yearbook 2010, eds. Kati Lepojärvi, Vera Lindman, Irina Khaldarova and Essi Hynninen. Helsinki: The Finnish Committee for European Security. Sarvimäki, Matti. 2008. Assimilation to a Welfare State: Labor Market Performance and Use of Social Benefits by Immigrants to Finland. VATT Discussion Papers 454. Helsinki: Government Institute for Economic Research. Siim, Birte. 2000. Gender and Citizenship. Politics and Agency in France, Britain and Denmark. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2006. Den multikulturelle udfordning for vælferdsstaten. NIKKmagasin 1– 2006: 25–27. Siim, Birte, and Hege Skjeie. 2007. Tracks, Intersections and Dead Ends: Multicultural Challenges to State Feminism in Denmark and Norway. Workshop Paper presented at the 14th Nordic Migration Researchers’ Conference, held on 14–16 November 2007, Bergen. Sverdljuk, Jana. 2009. Contradicting the “Prostitution Stigma”. Narratives of Russian Migrant Women Living in Norway. In Complying with Colonialism. Gender, Race and Ethnicity in the Nordic Region, eds. Suvi Keskinen, Salla Tuori, Sari Irni and Diana Mulinari, 137–154. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Statistics Finland. 2009. Special Report for PRIMTS Project on the Integration of Immigrants in the Finnish Labour Market in 2006 (unpublished). Toivonen, Auli. 2008. Työttömyysturvan pitää puskuroida työelämän epävarmuutta. Sosiaalivakutuutus 6: 24–27. Torvi, Kai. 2007. Maahanmuutto vastauksena työvoiman saatavuuteen. TEM analyyseja 3/2007. Helsinki: Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö. Tuomaala, Mika, and Kai Torvi. 2008. Kohti työperustaista maahanmuuttoa: ulkomailta palkattavan työvoiman tarpeen arviointi. TEM analyyseja 9/2008. Helsinki: Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö.

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CONTRIBUTORS VERONIKA BAJT holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Bristol, UK. She works as researcher at the Peace Institute in Ljubljana. Her field of research includes migration, gender, nationalism and national identity construction; she has published on topics of migration (and gender and labour market), nationalism, Muslims’ religious discrimination, national identity construction and practices of Othering in media discourse. She is also a visiting lecturer at the International University Institute for European Studies in Gorizia and taught at the Sociology Department of the Masaryk University in Brno. ADDRESS: Peace Institute, Metelkova 6, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia E-mail: [email protected] GIOVANNA CAMPANI is full professor of Pedagogy and Gender Anthropology at the University of Florence, Faculty of Education. Since many years she has been researching on international migrations, gender and migration, racism and anti-racism, social inclusion, trafficking. She has been coordinator or partner in numerous international and European projects. Her publications – in various languages (Italian, English, French, German, Spanish) – include many articles and books. Among her books are: Genere e globalizzazione, ed. (ETS, Pisa, 2010), Dalle minoranze agli immigrati: la questione del pluralismo culturale e religioso in Italia (Unicopli, Milan, 2008), Migranti nel mondo globale, ed. (Sinnos, Roma, 2007), La fortezza e i ragazzini. Minori stranieri non accompagnati, with O. Salimbeni (Franco Angeli, Milan, 2006), Perché siamo musulmane (Guerini, Milan, 2003). ADDRESS: Department of Education, University of Florence, Via Laura 48, 50121, Florence, Italy. E-mail: [email protected] TIZIANA CHIAPPELLI, research assistant at the University of Florence, Department of Education. Main research fields: sociology of religions; sociology of migrations (esp. in gender perspective); school system inclusion for cultural minorities. Participating at several research projects at the EU level such as: RomEco-Roma Integration in Economy (2005); Leonardo-Intercultural Communication (2008); “FeMiPol. Integration of Female Immigrants in Labour Mar171


ket and Society: Policy Assessment and Policy Recommendations” (2008); “INCLUD-ED. Strategies for Inclusion and Social Cohesion in Europe from Education” (2006–2011), “PRIMTS-Prospects for Integration of Migrants from “Third countries” and their Labour Market Situations: Towards Policies and Action” (2008–2010); “L-Pack-for Immigrants’ Integration” (2011–2013). ADDRESS: Department of Education, University of Florence, Via Laura 48, 50121, Florence, Italy E-mail: [email protected] CORINA DEMETRIOU is a leading legal expert and researcher on fundamental rights. She has many years of experience in legal practice, legal research and NGO involvement in the field of human rights. She is the national expert for Cyprus of the European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-discrimination Field. Also, she is senior expert on fundamental rights for the RAXEN and FRALEX and has co-authored the Reports of the Cypriot RAXEN and FRALEX team. She has written numerous other reports and articles on anti-racism, integration, immigration policies and reconciliation. ADDRESS: Symfiliosi, Law Office of Andis Triantafyllides & Co., 3, Arch. Makarios III Avenue, Capital Centre, P.O. 21255, 1505 Nicosia, Cyprus E-mail: [email protected] DÓRA DEZSŐ worked as an associate researcher at the Central European University within the PRIMTS project. She holds a Master of Arts Degree in Gender Studies and a European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation. Previously she worked in the civil sector in Hungary and was seconded to South East European missions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and coordinated democratisation, rule of law and human rights projects. Her professional interests include the gender aspects of postconflict institution-building; the gendered division of labour; equality policies; and effective social dialogue in public policy making. ADDRESS: Central European University, Nador u. 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary E-mail: [email protected] NOÉMI KAKUCS worked as an associate researcher at the Central European University within the PRIMTS project. She completed an MA at the Gender Studies Department of CEU in 2006. Previously, she participated as research assistant in the EU FP6 funded InTune (Integrated and United: A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe) project. Her research interests include anti-discrimination and gender equality policies and their implementation and institutionalization in Central and Eastern Europe. ADDRESS: Central European University, Nador u. 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary E-mail: [email protected] 172

CONTRIBUTORS

MARIA KONTOS, PhD, is senior research fellow at the Institute of Social Research at Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main and lecturer at Goethe University. She was coordinator of the 6th FP project “Integration of Female Immigrants in Labour Market and Society. Policy Assessment and Policy Recommendations” (FeMiPol). She has published on migration and integration policy, migration, gender and care, labour market integration of migrants, self-employment and ethnic entrepreneurship. Among her recent publications are the co-edited volumes “Women in New Migrations. Current Debates in European Societies”, JUP, Cracow, 2010, and “Female Migrants in Europe. The Paradoxes of Integration”, Springer, Amsterdam, forthcoming. ADDRESS: Institute of Social Research at J.W. Goethe University, Senckenberganlage, 2660325 Frankfurt am Main, Germany E-mail: [email protected] MOJCA PAJNIK is a senior research associate at the Peace Institute and assistant professor at the Faculty for Social Sciences (University of Ljubljana). Her expertise lies in fields of migrations, media and gender studies. She is author of Prostitution and Human Trafficking: Perspectives of Gender, Labour and Migration (2008), co-author of Where in the Puzzle: Trafficking from, to and through Slovenia and of Immigrants, who are you?: Research on Immigrants in Slovenia (2002). She has co-edited Alternative Media and the Politics of Resistance (2008) and Migration – Globalization – European Union (2003). ADDRESS: Peace Institute, Metelkova 6, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. E-mail: [email protected] ANDREA PETŐ, Prof. Dr habil., associate professor at the Department of Gender Studies at the Central European University. Her books: Nõhistóriák. A politizáló magyar nõk története (1945-1951) (Budapest, Seneca 1998); Women in Hungarian Politics 1945-1951 (Columbia University Press/East European Monographs New York, 2003); Rajk Júlia (Balassi, Budapest, 2001); Geschlecht, Politik und Stalinismus in Ungarn. Eine Biographie von Júlia Rajk. Studien zur Geschichte Ungarns, Bd. 12 (Gabriele Schäfer Verlag, 2007); Napasszonyok és Holdkisasszonyok. A mai magyar konzervatív női politizálás alaktana, (Women of Sun and Girls of Moon. Morphology of Contemporary Hungarian Women Doing Politics) (Budapest, Balassi, 2003). Awards: the Officer’s Cross Order of Merit of The Republic of Hungary (Magyar Koztarsasagi Erdemrend Tisztikeresztje) (2005); Bolyai Prize of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (2006). ADDRESS: Central European University, Nador u. 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary E-mail: [email protected]

173


AINO SAARINEN (D.Soc.Sc) is principal investigator at Aleksanteri Institute, Helsinki University and adjunct professor at Tampere University and Oulu University. At the turn of 1990s–2000s, she was head of research at Nordic Institute for Women’s Studies and Gender Research (Oslo) and visiting professor at Nevsky Institute (St. Petersburg). She has led Nordic-Russian networks and projects, including Russian Women as Immigrants in Norden, and published on feminist theories, mobilisation against gender violence, organising in transnational settings and migration in Acta Sociologica, Naistutkimus/Kvinnoforskning, Kvinnovetenskaplig tidskrift and Signs. In 2010, she co-edited with Maija Jäppinen and Meri Kulmala Gazing at Welfare, Gender and Agency in Post-socialist Countries (Cambridge Scholars Publishing). ADDRESS: University of Helsinki, Aleksanteri Institute – Finnish Centre for Russian and Eastern European Studies, P.O.Box 42, Unioninkatu 33, Helsinki, Finland E-mail: [email protected] OLIVIA SALIMBENI, PhD, is research asssistant at the University of Florence, Department of Education. She is an expert in migration and labour market issues. She has participated in several European projects, such as “HeiRat I – Marriage as Immigration Gate: The Situation of Female Marriage Migrants from Third Countries in the EU Member States” (2002), “FeMiPol – Integration of Female Immigrants in Labour Market and Society. Policy Assessment and Policy Recommendations” (2008), “INCLUD-ED – Strategies for inclusion and social cohesion in Europe from education” (2006–2011) and “PRIMTS – Prospects for Integration of Migrants from Third Countries and their Labour Market Situation: Towards Policies and Action” (2008–2010). Her books include La fortezza e i ragazzini. Minori stranieri non accompagnati, with G. Campani, Franco Angeli, Milan (2006) and Storie Minori. Realtà ed accoglienza per i minori stranieri in Italia, ETS, Pisa (forthcoming). ADDRESS: Department of Education, University of Florence, Via Laura 48, 50121, Florence, Italy E-mail: [email protected] NICOS TRIMIKLINIOTIS is senior research consultant at PRIO Cyprus Centre. He is director of the Centre for the Study of Migration, Inter-ethnic and Labour Relations and Assistant Professor of Law and Sociology (University of Nicosia/ Symfiliosi) including the Cyprus National Focal Point for Racism (RAXEN) and Fundamental Human Rights (FRALEX); he is part on the ODYSSEUS Network, the Network of Legal Experts on Free Movement of Workers and the IOM Independent Network of Labour Migration and Integration Experts for the IOM. 174

CONTRIBUTORS

He researches and publishes works on migration, integration, fundamental rights, discrimination, nationality and free movement, and constitutional/ state theory and labour law; ethnic conflict/resolution, federalism and reconciliation. ADDRESS: Symfiliosi, Law Office of Andis Triantafyllides & Co., 3, Arch. Makarios III Avenue, Capital Centre, P.O. 21255, 1505 Nicosia, Cyprus E.mail: [email protected]

175

INDEX China 52, 101–2, 121–2; Chinese 101,

accommodation (see also housing) 24, 25, 58, 66–8, 88, 156, 158

121–2, 124, 132

activity rate 19–20, 97, 103, 106, 120

citizenship 8, 16, 30, 60, 90, 100, 124, 127–9, 132, 146–7, 149, 151, 153, 166

Afghanistan 122, 155

clandestine (see also economy, black;

Africa 48, 61, 100, 101, 146

economy, grey; economy, informal;

aging population 48–9, 103, 116, 119,

economy,

120, 130, 147, 149

shadow;

work,

illegal;

work, undocumented) 55, 57, 80, 87, agriculture 12, 18, 20, 24–5, 33, 46, 50, 53,

93

56, 62, 74, 87–8, 92, 107, 131–5, 138–9 construction 7, 20–1, 24–5, 29, 33, 50, 53, anti-migrant 54, 56, 68, 79, 82, 91, 108

62, 63, 68, 77, 82, 84–5, 87, 92, 97, 102–

Asia 48, 100–1, 121, 146, 160; Asians 81,

3, 107, 109–10, 115, 131–3, 135, 137

121, 132

Council of Europe 55, 78, 128, 148

assimilation 10, 30, 36, 37, 45, 78, 123

economic crisis (see also recession)

asylum seekers (see also migrants, hu-

28–9, 46, 54, 77, 97, 104–5, 107–8, 112,

manitarian; refugees)

131

badanti (see also work, care; caregiver)

Croatia 17, 18, 25–6, 100–1, 113, 131; Cro-

50

ats 121

Berlusconi 46, 54–6

deskilling 24, 98, 106, 135

biographical method 7, 38, 98

diasporic communities 12, 121, 124

birth rate 48-9, 120

economy (see also clandestine; work, illegal; work, undocumented)

Bosnia-Herzegovina 17, 18, 100–1, 104, 109, 111, 113–5; Bosnians 99, 121

black 8, 9, 48, 50–2, 59, 61, 87, 113–4

Bossi-Fini law 47, 56, 58, 61, 68

grey 159, 164

caregiver (see also badanti) 50, 66, 137

informal 11–2, 17, 19, 27, 33, 48, 50–3,

caretaker 26

57, 59, 61, 68, 87, 102, 112–3, 131, 137,

catering 25, 53, 132, 140

140

Central Eastern Europe (CEE) 18, 26,

shadow 51, 133

121–2, 134, 138, 234

entertainment sector 87, 107 177


employment minor 27, 33–4

marriage 18, 146–7, 150, 159–61, 163– 4, 174

illegal 132–3

temporary 18, 139

self- 23, 28, 35

undocumented 26, 28, 87, 88, 93, 104, 113–4, 116

Estonia 17, 153; Estonians 146

migration

family business 20, 23–4

circular 103, 132, 134, 140

family reunion 8, 18, 75–6, 105, 113

labour 8, 120–1, 125–6, 130, 132, 134–5

food sector 20, 26, 52, 102, 110, 122

temporary 11, 75, 93

gender 9, 22, 23, 29, 78, 80, 85, 98, 99, 102–3, 105, 113, 122, 132, 145–6, 150, 154, 159–60, 162–3, 166

minimum wage 25, 33, 87, 164

health care 27, 67, 106, 110

MIPEX 75–6, 145, 147, 151, 165

housing (see also accommodation) 45, 47, 64–8, 110, 124, 151, 153–4

Morokvasic M. 8, 125, 136, 138

human capital 22, 24

Northern League, the 54–7, 59–60, 68

India 17, 86, 102

Philippines, the 17, 27, 101, 160, 162

integration, subordinated 45–7, 62, 64, 69

populism 54, 69

work 146–7, 149–50, 160

naturalization 30–1, 127, 128–9

prostitution 27–8, 67, 87, 107, 160, 163

Iran 115, 152, 155; Iranians 85, 106, 156 Iraq 17, 122, 155; Iraqis 85, 156

quota 57–8, 90, 103, 105, 107, 113, 128, 147, 152, 158

Kosovo 101, 106–7, 122

racism 54, 55, 81, 83, 85, 159

language 9, 23, 30–1, 60, 79, 84, 89, 98, 99, 104, 106, 127, 130, 133, 135, 146, 154, 156–7, 161

recession (see also economic crisis) 107, 116, 147, 151, 161 refugees (see also asylum seekers; migrants, humanitarian) 32 74, 76, 89– 91, 106, 120, 126–7, 147–8, 152–5, 158

live-in 26–7, 50, 66, 137 live-out 26, 137 low-sector 11, 119, 125, 137, 139–40

regularization 33–4, 46, 56, 57, 62, 63, 79, 93, 134

manufacturing 20, 29, 53, 77, 87, 97, 102, 131–2, 136

remittances 124, 138

migrants

residence permit 8, 31, 32, 36, 58–9, 85, 103, 105, 107, 116, 120, 129, 133, 147, 151

humanitarian (see also asylum seekers; refugees) 19, 146–8, 150, 152, 155– 6, 158–160, 164–5

restaurant sector 18, 20, 26, 29, 33, 50, 77, 102, 152, 162

irregular 19, 25, 27, 30, 46, 56, 61

retail 33, 132 178

INDEX

work

Romania 18, 25, 26, 65, 100, 119, 121–3, 125, 128, 129, 133, 135–7; Romanians

care (see also domestic workers) 7,

48, 84, 129, 131, 132

20, 26–7, 29, 33, 49, 50, 102–3, 113, 132,

Russia 17, 18, 100, 101, 153, 154, 160, 161;

159, 161

84, 106, 154, 162

illegal 131, 166

Schengen 107, 111, 126, 148

low-skilled 65, 80, 97, 106, 130

Serbia 17, 18, 100, 101, 104, 110, 111, 129,

part-time 27, 33, 82, 157, 162

131, 133, 136

seasonal 12, 25–6, 57–8, 87, 107, 123,

sex industry 20, 27–8

132, 139

Slovakia 18, 25, 26, 128

temporary 9, 34, 104, 133, 157

social capital 24

undocumented (see also clandestine;

social security 25–6, 51, 52, 63, 97, 112,

economy,

115, 116, 146, 147, 148, 151, 155–6, 161

black;

economy,

grey;

economy, informal; economy, shadow; work, illegal) 114, 115, 133–4, 140

social services 49, 59, 103, 124

workers

socialism 9, 102, 148, 161 Somalia 53, 155

agricultural 135, 138

Tambiah, S. J. 10, 45, 123–4

collar 21

temporary stay 27, 32, 99, 105, 116, 134,

construction 109

160

domestic 18, 26, 58, 74, 81, 85–6, 97,

Thailand 17, 18, 100–1, 160; Thai women

104, 108–9, 113–6, 125, 136–7 (see also

102, 162–3, 166

work, care)

trade union 15, 24–6, 34, 56, 66–8, 77,

entertainment 107–8

90–2, 108–9

farm 21, 84

trafficking 28, 87, 107, 136, 149

guest 15, 21, 138

transnationalism 8–9, 11, 123–6, 134,

informal 24

136, 139–40

irregular 25, 136, 164

Turkey 17, 18, 24, 27, 152

seasonal 18, 25, 26, 58, 87

Ukraine 17, 100, 101, 121, 122, 123, 131,

sex 28

132, 133, 135, 138; Ukrainians 102,

subcontracted 34

129 Vertovec, S. 124–5

temporary 34, 58

Vietnam 121, 152

undeclared 57, 104, 139

welfare system 12, 32, 34, 37, 46, 48, 49,

undocumented 93, 113–4, 116

64, 66, 145, 150, 152, 159, 164–5

work accidents 26, 53, 63, 82 179


work permit 8, 25, 30, 32, 48, 62, 66, 74, 81, 82, 101–3, 105, 107, 110–3, 131–2, 134, 136 Yugoslavia, former 18, 21, 24, 27, 98–9, 100, 102, 103, 107, 121–3, 126, 155

180