BACK FROM

HOMEWARD BOUND: A cost-benefit analysis favoured troop redeployment PRAMOD PUSHKARNA

T H E N AT I O N ■ T R O O P W I T H D R AWA L

BACK FROM

THE BRINK By pulling back its troops from the border, India signals a phased reduction in tensions with Pakistan. But was the build up worth it?

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by Shishir GUPTA

ANY CENTURIES AGO Chinese strategic expert Sun Tzu wrote: “To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme achievement; supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” By announcing the “redeployment” of troops on the international border last week, India may not have accomplished the task of breaking Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf ’s resistance to dismantling the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. Yet, it has been largely successful in bringing the international focus on Pakistan as the new home of pan-Islamic jehadis after the war in Afghanistan and in ensuring “free and

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fair” elections in Kashmir. After the meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) and Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on October 16, Defence Minister George Fernandes said, “The army has now been asked to be redeployed from positions on the international border with Pakistan without impairing its capacity to respond decisively to any emergency ... There will be no lowering of vigil in Jammu and Kashmir.” Essentially, this means that the three strike formations—about two lakh troops—of the Indian Army, currently deployed on forward locations from Punjab to Gujarat, will be progressively pulled back to their peace-time locations. According to senior army officials, the “redeployment” will be reviewed every fortnight on the basis of Pakistani

PLUSES ■ Recognition from the international

community that there are Pakistansponsored terrorists, not freedom fighters, operating in Kashmir. ■ Pressure on Islamabad to end infiltration in Kashmir and uproot terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan.

MINUSES ■ Indian credibility to take decisive

action against Pakistan undermined. ■ Shows Operation Parakram as a

futile exercise with Pakistan not budging on cross-border terrorism. moves and the new posture will show “credible offensive intent”. Islamabad, on its part, also followed the Indian initiative a day later by withdrawing its troops from its eastern borders. On the Indian side, the first to be moved out will be troops involved in supply and logistics, followed by formations supporting the offensive edge of the army. By January 15, 2003, the three Strike Corps—XXI, I and II—will have moved towards their peace-time headquarters in Bhopal, Mathura and Ambala respectively. There will be no movement from Jammu and Kashmir; troops from the Nagrota-based XVI, Srinagar-based XV and Leh-based XIV Corps will continue to man the Line of Control (LoC). While the early warning formations of the holding or defensive corps will remain deployed near the OCTOBER 28, 2002 ◆ INDIA TODAY

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AP PHOTO/AMAN SHARMA

WAGES

2002-3

65,000

OF WAR

OPERATION PARAKRAM: Biggest hike of Rs 6,000 CRORE over 2001-2.

It cost more than Rs 8,000 crore for India to tell Pakistan that it meant business

48,504 OPERATION VIJAY: Post Kargil budget touches

by Shankkar AIYAR

ED, BLACK AND WHITE. Through night and blood to light, is how the 19th century German students who established the Weimar Republic described their national colours. To put it simply, no price is too high for the defence of nationhood. But there is a cost, beyond the cliched ranting of decelerating investment and GDP growth. The 10-month deployment of over half a million troops has cost the country over Rs 8,000 crore. Consider the dimensions of the expenses. Since December 2001, the combatants have been mobilised on the Indo-Pak border to lock eyeballs with the enemy. Troops and equipment were transported from the eastern front and the southern bases to the borders of Gujarat, Rajasthan and Punjab in 2,500 trucks and 500 special trains. Translate this into rupees and factor the cost of commercial opportunity lost. Mere mobilisation of the troops cost Rs 3,000 crore and it will cost another Rs 3,000 crore to get them back to the barracks. Deployment is more than placement of men and machines. Nearly the entire border and areas around the Line of Control (LoC) were mined. It cost the Government Rs 850 crore in giving compensation to civilians during the mobilisation period. And how do the variables pan out? Just field-area allowances cost the Government nearly Rs 1,000 crore in 10 months. Add the ammunition expended in firing across the LoC and the international border. Every shot fired costs around Rs 15, the boom of a 130 mm field gun costs more than Rs 20,000 per shell, that of the 155 mm Bofors howitzer is Rs 48,000, while laser-guided artillery shells cost more than Rs 75,000 per blast.

Rs 54,461 CRORE

R

INDO-PAK WAR: Expenditure rises to Rs 969 CRORE in 1967-68

KASHMIR WAR: A year later budget shoots up to Rs 255

CRORE

Defence budgets since Independence

INDO-CHINA WAR: Postdebacle defence spend rises to

BANGLADESH WAR: Budget

Rs 474 CRORE

1947-48

1961-62

189

309

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

1964-65

806

1971-72

1,525

rises from Rs 1,199 crore in 1970-71 to Rs 1,652 CRORE in 1972-73

Graphic by YOGESH CHAUDHARY

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1999-2000

Figures are in Rs crore

MUSCLE POWER

BOOMING BARRELS

TANK POWER

Over 5,00,000 troops locked eyeballs with the enemy across 2,912 km. Just field-area allowances cost the Government over Rs 1,000 crore.

An estimated 15 per cent of the 337,030 million tonne stockpile of ordnance, worth Rs 750 crore, may have been used up in the low-intensity conflict.

Over 3,500 tanks form an integral part of the army’s arsenal.The tanks guzzle a litre of fuel per kilometre. Just fuel used by the tanks cost Rs 27 crore.

The army may move on its stomach but it needs fuel. Since December 2001, over 3,000 tanks, which consume a litre of fuel per kilometre, have been mobilised. In battle conditions, the tanks need to move around 110 km to advance just 20 km. In the past 10 months, these tanks have been put through war simulations. Assuming that they move 10 km a day in training, it works out to Rs 300 per tank or Rs 9 lakh every day and a fuel bill of Rs 27 crore. For a complete picture, include the fuel consumed by other mechanised

divisions, general transport vehicles and guzzlers like aircraft and ships. Unlike in the US, war accounting in India does not include sunk costs like wages, regular allowances and equipment cost. B.G. Joshi, former financial adviser to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), points out that in the Indian system the cost of war is essentially that of mobilisation, ordnance expended, fuel consumed, wear and tear of equipment and special allowances. A review of the costs incurred during the Kargil conflict gives one a pic-

ture of the costs. The Government claimed that the 74-day Operation Vijay cost only Rs 1,894 crore when the cost of 155 mm shells fired (estimates put the number at 2.5 lakh) alone was about Rs 1,000 crore. Not surprisingly defence spending exceeded allocations by Rs 2,409 crore in 1999-2000. This does not include cost of replenishment of equipment in the following years. The bill for supplies bought from ordnance factories has risen from Rs 3,876 crore in 2000-1 to Rs 5,972 crore in 2001-2. So has the

petro bill. The army’s fuel expenses shot up from Rs 593.05 crore in 19992000 to Rs 1,008.91 crore in 2001-2, much of which went in replenishing depleted war reserves. The effect of Kargil on defence spending has been significant. Capital expenditure increased from Rs 12,631 crore in 1999-2000 to Rs 21,411 crore for 2002-3. Revenue expenditure, including wages, welfare and allowances, rose from Rs 35,893 crore in 1999-2000 to Rs 43,589 crore this year. In the past three years, the Government poured in Rs 1,11,461 crore in the defence budget—Rs 79,725 crore as revenue expenditure and Rs 31,736 crore for new technology, armaments and replenishment. Indeed the decade-long conflict has seen the defence budget shooting up from Rs 16,350 crore in 1991-92 to Rs 65,000 crore in 2002-3. The rise, however, has to be seen in perspective. With the import of tech armoury, the defence budget has got dollarised and the hike reflects the depreciation of the rupee. Also, about 75 per cent of the expenditure is on salaries, allowances, welfare and training. The hike in capital expenditure was also for acquiring new assets and technology from AWACS to T-90 battle tanks and frequencyhopping radios, which is part of the drive to modernise the force. While India expends 2.8 per cent of the GDP, Pakistan spends nearly 4.8 per cent on defence—a large portion is utilised to fund the low-intensity conflict. Besides the high cost operations—it costs Rs 10 crore a day to maintain troops along the LOC to prevent another Kargil—the costs for India escalates in terms of higher spending for hinterland security Experts believe India should reorient its defence spending. A.K. Ghosh, former financial adviser at MoD, thinks India needs to move away from the mindset that money spent equals security. In other words, the low-intensity conflict cannot be won by mere deployment of divisions or massive budgets. As General (retd) V.P. Malik, National Security Advisory Board member, who presented the cost-benefit analysis to the Government, says, “Instead of preparing for high intensity wars which are less likely, we should spend more on preparations for limited or low intensity wars.” Perhaps India needs to work out its political objectives more carefully before it mobilises its troops the next time. ■

borders, the strike element, which includes Indian Air Force fighters, will return to their bases after 10 months of Operation Parakram. The decision to redeploy—an euphemism for withdrawal—was taken after a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the continued troop deployment was presented by the National Security Advisory Board to the NSC headed by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The factors that weighed in favour of troop withdrawal were the military and diplomatic effectiveness of the Indian posture, mounting cost of deployment and increased stress levels among the deployed troops. The move was a fait accompli after Vajpayee told the western media during his three-nation trip this month that there would be no war with Pakistan. But force levels will not be cut in Jammu and Kashmir in the light of the “rebirth of the Taliban” in its new incarnation as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal party in the Pakistani elections held this month. OWEVER, not everybody in the security establishment is happy with the troop pull-back at this juncture. South Block officials feel India always ends up doing the right things at the wrong time. Their perception is that troops could have been withdrawn after June 6, when Musharraf gave a commitment to “permanently” end cross-border terrorism and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. The argument that continued troop deployment helped in the Jammu and Kashmir elections does not hold good for them. “Pakistan pushed in terrorists in September, directed the Hurriyat leadership to boycott elections and engineered violence during the polls. Basically, there has been no change in Islamabad’s behaviour,” says a senior government official. “A unilateral pullback in June would have earned Delhi kudos from the international community. There are no brownie points for India now as international attention is focused on Iraq.” It seems the only weapons now left in the Indian arsenal are diplomatic de-escalation and a bilateral dialogue with Pakistan. Lt-General Vinay Shankar, former director-general (Artillery), puts it more succinctly, saying that the Indian mindset lacks the will to act. India had the opportunity of exercising the military option after the attack on Parliament in December 2001 and the Kaluchak massacre in June this year. It seems that having used the threat of war as diplomacy, India now needs to master the conduct of war by other means too. ■

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