Between commandments and laws: Religiosity ... - Springer Link

Crime, Law & Social Change 38: 185–209, 2002. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Between commandments and laws: Religiosity, political ideology, and legal obedience in Israel DANA YAGIL1 & ARYE RATTNER2 1 Department of Human Services, 2 Department of Sociology, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel (∗ corresponding author, e-mail: [email protected])

Abstract. This paper presents three surveys designed to examine the effect of religiosity and political ideology on legal disobedience among Israeli citizens. In addition to samples of the general Jewish population (N = 1,728), the surveys included samples of three groups characterized by a combination of religiosity and right-wing political orientation: Yeshiva (religious seminary) students (N = 464), ultra-orthodox Jews (N = 217), and settlers in the occupied territories (N = 361). The results show that acceptance of the rule of law is weaker among ultra-orthodox and right-wing respondents. Furthermore, compared to the general population of Jews, Yeshiva students and ultra-orthodox Jews expressed lower levels of commitment to legal obedience. Comparison of attitudes before and after the occurrence of controversial legal and political events indicated that such events have a generalized effect on legal obedience.

Introduction A citizen’s obligation to comply with state laws has intrigued scholars throughout the ages. Philosophers, in particular, have argued for and against the absolutism of state laws over matters of private conscience, and social scientists have approached this issue by analyzing the factors that affect commitment to the rule of law, such as moral reasoning ((Kohlberg, 1969), normative compliance (Tyler, 1990), and legal culture (Bierbrauer, 1994; Gibson and Caldeira, 1996). Models of compliance with the law have been elaborated explaining variance in legal obedience and the circumstances under which laws are put aside in favor of personal interests, conscience, or ideology (Gibson and Caldeira, 1996). Such issues are highly relevant in Israeli society, a society that has experienced a number of dramatic manifestations of ideologically-based legal disobedience, including illegal demonstrations, refusal to evacuate settlements, and acts of violence against Palestinian Arabs. Such acts have typically been committed by individuals or groups characterized by a combination of religiosity and right-wing political ideology. This study reports three surveys of selected groups in Israel’s population focusing on situations in which otherwise law-abiding citizens express readiness to take the law into their own hands in order to achieve what they consider legitimate ends.

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Religious beliefs and state laws The relationship between political ideology and religiosity, on the one hand, and legal obedience, on the other, has traditionally been discussed within the framework of moral reasoning. Kohlberg’s (1969) theory of moral development incorporates potential conflict between commitment to the rule of law and individual moral considerations. In ‘preconventional’ morality, social norms are either not comprehended or ignored. This stage is characterized by avoidance of punishment, reward seeking behavior, and the granting of legitimacy only to established authority. The rule of law becomes central in arriving at moral judgments in the stage of “conventional” morality in which legitimacy is granted to established authority based on its intentions or unquestioned respect, and withdrawn only when lawbreaking seems to prevail in society. “Postconventional” morality views the legitimacy of authority as dependent on its ability to observe democratic procedure and carry out the obligations contained in the “social contract.” Another type of postconventional morality grants legitimacy to a system seen as functioning in accordance with universal principles of justice, equality and human rights. In this stage, moral decisions are made according to the principles upon which social norms are based. When social conventions and moral principles stand in conflict, reasoning at the postconventional stage leads to judgments based on principle rather than convention (Glover, 1997; Jasinka-Kania, 1989; Kohlberg, 1981; Colby and Kohlberg, 1987). Kohlberg (1981) argued that religiosity and moral reasoning represent two distinct aspects of human concern. Moral decision making is grounded on rational arguments of justice whereas religious reasoning is based on the revelations of religious authorities. Richards and Davison (1992) went even further, maintaining that conservative religious people may give a higher priority to divine law than to rules of justice and morality. Rest et al. (1999) expressed a similar view: “. . . The orthodox worldview is crystallized in the stage of development when people are acquiring the schema of maintaining norms. . . If a person is born into a family and subculture that is fundamentalist, the normative system that the person embraces may become rooted in a religious rather than a secular base.” (p. 121). Indeed, Gibson and Caldeira (1996), using the Catholic proportion of the population as an indicator of modernity, found weaker support for the rule of state laws in traditional societies in which authorities such as the church, clans and families carry a great deal of weight. Bierbrauer (1994) found that members of collectivist cultures showed greater readiness to abide by the norms of religion and tradition and members of individualistic cultures rely on state laws as legitimate sources in situations involving authority.

BETWEEN COMMANDMENTS AND LAWS

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Religion, however, does not contradict state laws by definition; it may even encourage compliance with the law. In the case of Christianity, Hirschi and Stark (1969) maintain that the church encourages respect for the law and cooperation with legal authorities. A similar stand was developed in Judaism to prevent conflict between religious rules and the laws of the countries in which Jews reside, thereby transforming compliance with state laws into a religious law. Nevertheless, although legal obedience is expected, both Christianity and Judaism emphasize total commitment to religious laws. Furthermore, both religions present numerous myths communicating the message that compliance with religious laws justifies limitless heroic acts, including self-sacrifice. Accordingly, the faithful may be expected to give priority to religious laws over state laws when the two are in fundamental conflict. The effect of political ideology on legal obedience Studies of the relationship between political values and legal obedience, which are usually based on moral reasoning, have produced mixed results. Several studies show that right-wing ideology is related to conventional moral reasoning in which the rule of the law is highly respected, whereas left-wing ideology is related to higher level, principled reasoning drawing on abstract principles such as democracy and human rights (Lind, Sendberger and Bargel, 1985; Nassi, Abramovitz and Youmans, 1983; Simpson, 1994). Other studies have demonstrated that right- as well as left-wing voters express both conventional and principled reasoning if the content of the moral reasoning measure is free from ideological biases (Elmer, Renwick and Malone, 1983; Sparks and Durkin, 1987). Sparks and Durkin (1987) maintain that political arguments represent expressions of individuals or groups with regard to the prevailing social order. Because the political left is usually committed to change, it is in conflict with society’s rules and, therefore, is more likely to draw on principle than on convention in arguing its position. In contrast, the political right is more likely to respect the law because it supports the existing order. Beyond this generalization, however, laws sometimes support change rather than the status quo. In such situations, the political right is likely to experience conflict between respect for the law and objection to change. The current political situation in Israel is a case in point: The right wing is faced by the conflict between commitment to state law (governmental action involving withdrawal from the occupied territories as part of the peace process) and its political-ideological opposition to territorial compromise. The left wing in Israel sees the rule of law as a means to preserve values such as democracy and human rights, and lack of respect for the law is identified with forcefulness and corruption. Interestingly, the one study examining moral reasoning and

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political ideology in Israel found similar levels of moral reasoning among members of left-wing and right-wing groups (Gross, 1996). Religiosity, ideology and the rule of law in Israel The relationship between legal obedience and political ideology and religiosity can be conceptualized in terms of value hierarchy rather than one integrated system of beliefs (Shamir and Arian, 1994). This approach allows for different value components to be at odds and suggests the need for the setting of priorities. “One way people may vary with regard to a consensual value supported by most members of society is in how they rank it when it is in conflict with other cherished values. . . Value competition is a major characteristic of politics and of people’s belief system” (Shamir and Arian, 1994, p. 251). The Israeli legal culture is characterized by a variety of contradicting values competing for dominance such as democracy, national security, Judaism, a Jewish state, and a “greater” Israel (Bar-Tal and Jacobson, 1998; Barzilai, 1997; Shamir and Arian, 1994). Some of these values are inherent in both the religious and the political value systems. For example, religiosity grants high priority to the values of a greater Israel due to the biblical right of the Jewish people to settle across the entire area of the land of Israel. According to rightwing political ideology, a greater Israel provides an answer to the right of the Israeli people to territory and security (Shamir and Arian, 1994). Indeed, in their study of religious settlers, Bar-Tal, Jacobson and Freund (1995) maintain that control of the occupied territories combines security and religious considerations. These values, however, are perceived as jeopardized by governmental actions involving the evacuation of settlements or the signing of agreements requiring the transfer of territory to Palestinians. Consequently, the combination of religiosity and extremist right-wing political ideology has led to events in which otherwise law-abiding citizens have taken the law into their own hands. A prominent example of a movement prone to such action is provided by the “Gush Emunim,” an ideological group of settlers affiliated to rightwing and religious parties, founded in 1974 with the goal of maintaining the borders of a greater Israel (Gross, 1996). Gush Emunin members have consistently refused to comply with court orders to evacuate settlements, and considerable support was found among them for aggressive and violent measures as a means to achieve their goals (Weisburd, 1989). Even more extreme acts of illegalism occurred with the establishment of an organization calling itself “the Jewish Underground” whose members were mostly orthodox religious right-wing activists who committed violent acts against the Palestinian population. These acts were supported by a number of political and orthodox


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leaders opposed to withdrawal from the occupied territories as part of the peace process (Karpin and Friedman, 1998). Finally, the attempts of both orthodox and right-wing ideological groups to delegitimize Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin as a traitor led to his assassination in November 1995 by an orthodox right-wing extremist who believed and openly declared that his act was justified in order to halt the peace negotiations and that he was acting “in the name of God” (Bar-Tal and Vertzberger, 1997). The assassination, which perceived by many as a threat to democracy in Israel (Raviv et al., 2000) was described as “the result of the perception that there exists a higher authority than the law and, in its name, any action is justifiable, no matter how despicable . . .” (Anita Shapira, Yedioth Aharonoth, 10/11/95). The study Research aims and hypotheses The present study has three main aims: 1. To examine the effect of political ideology and religiosity on acceptance of the rule of law. Previous studies (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987; Elmer, Renwick and Malone, 1983; Glover, 1997; Lind, Sendberger and Bargel, 1985; Nassi, Abramovitz and Youmans, 1983; Simpson, 1994; Sparks and Durkin, 1987) examined the relative importance assigned to compliance with the law in moral judgment. The main focus of this study is commitment to the rule of the law. The inclusion of both political ideology and religiosity in the same study allows for the examination of the combined effect of the two variables. The effect is examined with regard to both the general population and specific religious and ideological groups in the Israeli society. Religiosity is expected to be negatively related to legal obedience. The existence of a set of alternative religious laws is expected to result in lower levels of acceptance of the secular juridical system as well as higher levels of readiness to take the law into one’s own hands when the two systems are in conflict. Right-wing political ideology is also expected to be related to lower levels of legal obedience: The legal system is identified with the government whose operations are perceived by the political right as representing left-wing ideology and as jeopardizing the security interests of Israel. Furthermore, because many of the values of religiosity and right-wing political ideology are similar, these two variables are expected to have an additive effect in terms of legal disobedience. 2. To examine aspects of the legal obedience in specific groups in the Israeli society. Ultra-orthodox Jews, settlers in the occupied territories, and reli-

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gious seminary (henceforth, Yeshiva) students hold two main characteristics in common: First, many of their members are orthodox with a right-wing orientation. Second, members of these groups have in the past taken the law into their own hands for ideological reasons. Each of these three groups represents a different aspect of ideological orientation in the Israeli society: The Yeshiva students were selected from religious seminaries known for their extreme right-wing political beliefs combined with a moderate level of religiosity. The ultra-orthodox Jews, on the other hand, are extreme in terms of their religiosity but their right-wing political orientation is often more moderate and motivated mainly by religious considerations. In general, the settlers in the occupied territories belong to the political right who chose to live in the territories for ideological reasons. Moreover, they comprise a group that is not only ideologically but also personally involved in the controversial issues surrounding evacuation of settlements. It was expected that members of these groups, who are characterized by a combination of religiosity and right-wing political ideology, would express lower levels of legal obedience than the general population. 3. To examine the effect of controversial events on legal obedience. Many illegal actions in Israel constitute reactions to events perceived as contradicting the fundamental values of ideological groups. Tyler (1990) maintains that normative compliance with the law is affected by procedural justice issues such as feelings of dignity, respect and positive valuation of one’s own group. Citizens who see the law as a neutral force embodying accepted social values and law enforcement authorities as just and fair are likely to accept the rule of law. If, however, the law is perceived as biased and the law enforcement authorities as discriminatory, commitment to the rule of law is likely to be affected (Gibson and Caldeira, 1996; Tyler, 1990). Therefore, it was expected that legal and political events that conflict with religious and/or right-wing values would be associated with lower levels of legal obedience among orthodox and right-wing respondents. The study consists of three surveys of attitudes to legal obedience. Survey I compares the attitudes of Yeshiva students with those of the general population. Survey II compares the attitudes of settlers in the occupied territories and ultra-orthodox Jews with those of the general population. Survey III examines the effect of two events on commitment to legal obedience: a controversial Supreme Court ruling regarding an orthodox political leader and the Camp David peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Attitudes of settlers, ultraorthodox Jews and the general population to the law at the time of their occurrence (Survey III, Time II) were compared with attitudes expressed by members of these groups in Survey II (Time I).


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The three surveys examined several aspects of legal obedience: – evaluation of the law enforcement authorities (courts and police); – normative commitment to the law (the belief that laws should be always obeyed); – perceived supremacy of other rules and laws (religious and moral laws) over state laws; – the behavioral aspect of legal obedience (readiness to take the law into one’s own hands on ideological grounds).

Survey I The first survey, conducted on April 1999, compared the attitudes of respondents representing the general Jewish population with those of Yeshiva students. Because the students are both orthodox and right wing, the separate effects of ideology and religiosity were examined only with regard to the general population. Methods1 Respondents The survey population of consisted of two groups: – A sample of 400 Israeli Jews selected randomly from the general population using a method based on telephone numbers: In this group, 62 percent defined themselves as secular and 38 percent defined themselves as traditional or orthodox; 50.3 percent of the respondents were male, average age was 39.21 years (SD = 16.79), and average number of years of education was 13.53 (SD = 2.90). Only 247 respondents reported voting for parties that could be identified as either left or right wing; of these 57 percent voted for left-wing parties and 43 percent for rightwing parties. The research questions were presented to the respondents by means of telephone interviews conducted by a survey company. – 464 male students enrolled in four religious seminaries (Yeshivas): The Yeshiva students comprised a homogenous group in terms of gender, age, and education. In this group, interviewers acting on behalf of the research team personally administered the research questionnaire. Measures Data were collected by means of a questionnaire especially constructed for the study consisting of statements denoting attitudes to the law and the Israeli 1 Surveys I and II included Israeli Arabs; the results obtained for this group will be presented separately.

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justice system. The items measured the following aspects of attitudes to the law: 1. Evaluation of the functioning of the police and the courts: “The courts fulfill their functions fairly and equally towards one and all”; “People like you are treated fairly in the courts”; “The courts fulfill their functions well”; “The Israeli police fulfill their functions fairly and equally towards one and all”; “The Israeli police functions well”; “People like you are treated fairly by the police.” (Cronbach’s alpha reliability, .79.) 2. Perceived supremacy of other rules and laws over state laws: “I am under no obligation to obey a law that contradicts my conscience”; “I am not obliged to obey a law that contradicts my religious beliefs”. 3. Lack of normative commitment to state laws (“normative noncompliance”): “It doesn’t matter if you sometimes disobey unimportant laws”; “You can disobey a law on the condition that you don’t harm anyone”; “If a law is unjust, you don’t have to obey it”; “You have to obey all the laws irrespective of whether they seem logical or not.” (Cronbach’s alpha reliability, .84.) 4. Readiness to take the law into one’s own hands was examined by items representing conflict between the rule of law and personal rights, religious laws and the value of national security (based on Gibson and Caldeira, 1996): “You have the right to respond to physical assault by physical assault”; “You have the right to respond to damage to property by damage to property”; “You have the right to remove advertising announcements that offend public morality”; “It is permissible to resort to violence in order to stop the government from endangering the security of the state.” (Cronbach’s alpha reliability, .66.) Responses were given on a five-point scale (1 = Absolutely disagree; 5 = Absolutely agree). Religiosity was self-reported in response to the following question: “Do you define yourself as: secular/traditional/orthodox /ultraorthodox?” Political orientation was determined by self-reported voting in the last general election. Results The effect of political ideology and religiosity on legal obedience Respondents of the general population were categorized into four groups according to political ideology (right wing, left wing) and religiosity (secular, traditional/orthodox /ultra-orthodox). Two-way analyses of variance were performed with ideology and religiosity as the independent variables and aspects of legal obedience as the dependent variables. The results show a significant main effect of political ideology on readiness to take the law into one’s own hands (F(1,244) = 5.37, p < .05). Right-wing voters expressed

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Table 1. Means and standard deviations of legal obedience (based on Survey I)

Evaluation of law enforcement authorities Normative noncompliance Supremacy of conscience Supremacy of religious laws Readiness to take the law into one’s own hands

General population (N = 400)

Yeshiva students (N = 464)

T

3.48 (.72) 2.12 (.83) 2.33 (1.36) 2.29 (1.17) 1.63 (.72)

3.44 (.53) 2.24 (.69) 2.63 (.97) 3.45 (.86) 1.81 (.49)

.74 2.36∗ 3.76∗∗ 16.52∗∗ 4.25∗∗

∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01.

higher levels of readiness to take the law into their own hands, compared to left-wing voters (M = 1.50 and M = 1.67, respectively). A significant main effect of religiosity was found with regard to perceived supremacy of religious laws over state laws (F(1,235) = 4.80, p < .05): Orthodox respondents had a higher tendency to perceive religious laws as superior, compared to secular respondents ((M = 2.58 and M = 2.19, respectively). An interaction effect was found for perceived supremacy of conscience over state laws (F(1,236) = 7.90, p < .05). Orthodox left-wing voters were more prone to believe in the supremacy of conscience, compared to secular left-wing voters (M = 2.59 and M = 1.97, respectively). However, secular right-wing voters had a higher tendency to believe in the supremacy of conscience, compared to orthodox right-wing voters (M = 2.63, M = 2.16).

Legal obedience among Yeshiva students The attitudes of the Yeshiva students and the general population were compared using t-tests for independent samples. Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations and t- values of this analysis. The results show that Yeshiva students believe more in the supremacy of conscience and religious laws over state laws, and express higher levels of normative noncompliance and readiness to take the law into their hands, compared to the general population. In summary, the results of the first survey show that political ideology affects readiness to take the law into one’s hands and religiosity affects perceived supremacy of religious laws over state laws. As expected, legal obedience is weaker among orthodox respondents and right-wing voters. Thus, compared to the general population, Yeshiva students, who are both orthodox and right wing, expressed lower levels of legal obedience.

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Survey II This survey was conducted on March 2000. Three groups were examined: settlers in the occupied territories, ultra-orthodox Jews and respondents representing the general Jewish population. The variables included in this survey were identical to those examined in the first survey with the addition of several items. The items contained in the first survey were presented again in order to examine the stability of the results over time and with different respondents. Methods Respondents The survey population consisted of three groups: – A random sample of 1,034 Jews, based on telephone numbers: In this group, 60 percent defined themselves as secular and 40 percent as traditional or orthodox; 48.4 percent were male, average age was 41.64 years (SD = 16.52), and average number of years of education was 13.75 (SD = 2.84); 57 percent voted for left-wing and 43 percent for right-wing political parties. – A group of 106 ultra-orthodox Jews: In this group, 33 percent were male, average age was 35.46 years (SD = 14.57), and average number of years of education was 14.57 (SD = 3.21); 98 percent voted for right-wing parties. – A group of 262 Jewish settlers in the occupied territories: In this group, 47.5 percent were male, average age was 36.97 years (SD = 12.47), and average number of years of education was 14.43 (SD = 2.74); 23 percent reported voting for left-wing and 77 percent for right-wing parties; 36 percent described themselves as secular, 57 percent as traditional or orthodox, and 7 percent as ultra-orthodox. To enable a comparison between ultra-orthodox respondents and settlers, the ultra-orthodox settlers (N = 17) were not included in the analyses. Measures The same variables measured in Survey I were included in this survey with the following modifications: 1. Items measuring trust in law enforcement authorities were added to the questionnaire. Respondents rated their trust in the police, the courts and the Supreme Court on a 10-point scale (1 = No trust at all” to 10 = “Complete trust”). (Cronbach’s alpha reliability, .87.) 2. The scale measuring readiness to take the law into one’s hands was extended by adding the following items: “It is permissible to resort to illegal


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activities if the court or the government makes a decision that contradicts your conscience”; “It is permissible to resort to illegal activities if the court or the government makes a decision that contradicts your religious belief”; “It is permissible to resort to illegal activities if the court or the government makes a decision that jeopardizes national security “; “You would object to the evacuation of settlements as a part of the peace process even if you have to resort to illegal actions”; “A governmental decision to sign a peace contract that includes the transfer of territories would justify illegal actions”. (Cronbach’s alpha reliability of this scale, .81.) 3. The scale measuring evaluation of police and court was extended by adding two items referring to the adaptability of actions to events to the six items employed in the first survey: “The severity of police reactions is proportional to the severity of the incidents it copes with”; “The severity of punishments handed down by the court is proportional to the severity of the offense”. (Cronbach’s alpha reliability of the eight items, .84.) The questionnaires were administered by means of telephone interviews using the same method as that employed in Survey I. Results The effect of political ideology and religiosity on legal obedience In this survey, political ideology was found to affect almost all aspects of legal obedience. Compared to left-wing voters, right-wing voters expressed lower evaluations of the law enforcement authorities, perceived religious laws as superior to state laws, were less committed to state laws, and were more ready to take the law into their own hands. As in the first survey, religiosity was found to affect perceived supremacy of religious laws over state laws. Furthermore, in Survey II, religiosity was also found to affect readiness to take the law into one’s own hands, with orthodox respondents expressing stronger readiness, compared to secular respondents. An effect of religiosity on attitudes toward the authorities was found when trust in the Supreme Court was analyzed separately (F(1,1127) = 11.43, p < .01): Orthodox respondents expressed lower levels of trust in the Supreme Court, compared to secular respondents (M = 7.87 and M = 8.51, respectively). Political ideology and religiosity were found to have an interactive effect on perceived supremacy of religious laws over state laws, expressed in high levels of perceived supremacy among orthodox right-wing voters. An interaction effect was also found with regard to normative noncompliance, expressed in high levels of noncompliance among secular right-wing voters. Thus, the direction of the effects of religiosity and political ideology found in this survey is similar to that found in Survey I: In both surveys, right-wing

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Table 2a. Means and standard deviations of attitudes toward the law by political ideology and religiosity (based on Survey II)

Evaluation of authorities Trust in authorities Normative noncompliance Supremacy of conscience Supremacy of religious laws Readiness to take the law into one’s own hands

Left wing ideology Right wing ideology Total Secular Orthodox Secular Orthodox Secular Orthodox Left

Right

3.52 (.72) 7.62 (1.55) 1.56 (.86) 2.61 (1.61) 1.15 (.53) 1.33 (.50)

3.19 (.86) 6.59 (2.23) 1.95 (.94) 2.72 (1.62) 2.62 (1.66) 1.95 (.94)

3.54 (.77) 7.59 (1.81) 1.74 (1.07) 2.79 (1.72) 1.99 (1.34) 1.56 (.74)

3.21 (.88) 6.80 (2.08) 2.02 (1.13) 2.73 (1.57) 1.60 (1.15) 1.78 (.85)

3.19 (.85) 6.50 (2.28) 1.67 (1.00) 2.71 (1.64) 3.09 (1.64) 1.94 (.93)

3.39 (.80) 7.32 (1.81) 1.76 (1.01) 2.65 (1.59) 1.32 (.82) 1.50 (.68)

3.31 (.86) 6.92 (2.18) 1.68 (1.00) 2.68 (1.66) 2.83 (1.62) 1.84 (.90)

3.52 (.73) 7.61 (1.61) 1.38 (.57) 2.66 (1.64) 1.34 (.87) 1.38 (.57)

Table 2b. F values of the effect of political ideology and religiosity on attitudes toward the law (based on Survey II) Interaction

Evaluation of authorities Trust in authorities Normative noncompliance Supremacy of conscience Supremacy of religious laws Readiness to take the law into one’s hands

Main effect of religiosity

Main effect of political ideology

.13

.00

26.50∗∗

.73

1.17

38.06∗∗

11.09∗∗

1.15

6.18∗∗

.53

.34

.01

11.59∗∗

149.70∗∗

66.82∗∗

.00

14.66∗∗

55.26∗∗

∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01.

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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of attitudes toward the law among settlers, ultra-orthodox Jews and the general population (based on Survey II)

Evaluation of law enforcement authorities Trust in law enforcement authorities Supremacy of religious laws Supremacy of conscience Normative noncompliance Taking the law into one’s own hands

General population

Settlers

UltraOrthodox

3.39 (.83) 7.23 (1.97) 1.86 (1.37) 2.73 (1.64) 1.77 (1.03) 1.64 (.79)

3.21 (.80) 6.78 (2.08) 2.48 (1.65) 2.43 (1.50) 1.56 (.89) 1.70 (.78)

2.39 (.92) 4.26 (2.36) 4.67 (.93) 2.74 (1.71) 1.73 (1.04) 1.97 (.86)

F 66.59∗∗ 100.03∗∗ 187.79∗∗ 2.88 3.91∗ 8.18∗∗

∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01.

voters and orthodox respondents expressed lower levels of legal obedience, compared to left-wing voters and secular respondents. Note, however, that the results of Survey II provide a more comprehensive effect of religiosity and ideology on legal obedience than the results of Survey I. This difference may be attributable to the larger sample size of Survey II. Table 2a presents means and standard deviations of attitudes to the law by political ideology and religiosity and Table 2b presents the F values of the effect political ideology and religiosity obtained in the analyses of variance. Legal obedience of settlers and ultra-orthodox respondents Legal obedience of settlers in the occupied territories, ultra-orthodox respondents and respondents representing the general population were compared by one-way analyses of variance. Means and standard deviations of attitudes toward the law and F values are presented in Table 3. Significant differences were found between the groups in most aspects of legal obedience. Post-hoc Scheffe tests were employed to examine the significance of the differences between each pair of groups. The results show that the groups differ significantly from each other with regard to trust in law enforcement authorities as well as perceived supremacy of religious laws: Ultra-orthodox respondents and settlers expressed lower levels of trust in the authorities and stronger belief in the supremacy of religious laws, compared to respondents in the

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general population. Ultra-orthodox respondents also expressed higher levels of readiness to take the law into their own hands, compared to members of the other groups. Thus, the two groups examined in this study (settlers in the occupied territories and ultra-orthodox Jews) are similar to the Yeshiva students examined in Survey I with regard to two aspects of legal obedience: belief in the supremacy of religious laws over state laws and skepticism with regard to the functioning of law enforcement authorities. Yeshiva students and ultra-orthodox respondents (but not settlers) also expressed higher levels of readiness to take the law into their own hands, compared to the other groups.

Survey III This survey, conducted on July 2000, examined situational effects in addition to the persona variables of religiosity and political ideology examined in Surveys I and II. The first event was a Supreme Court ruling: Arye Deri, a highly influential leader of a religious party was found guilty of accepting bribes and sentenced to a prison term. The verdict led to widespread public protest and demonstrations by Deri’s followers who claimed that he was innocent and that the verdict reflected discrimination by the law enforcement authorities against Jews of Middle-Eastern and North African (Sephardic) origin. The second event was the Camp David peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The political right was highly concerned that Prime Minister Barak, at the time, head of the Labor Party, would “go too far” with concessions and the transfer of territories to the Palestinians. The survey was conducted a few days after the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Deri and during the Camp David peace negotiations. Methods Respondents The survey population consisted of three groups: – A random sample of 294 Israeli Jews, based on telephone numbers: In this group, 54.5 percent were male, average age was 43.33 years (SD = 17.16), and average number of years of education was 13.61 (SD = 2.95); 52.7 percent voted for left-wing political parties and 60 percent defined themselves as secular. – A group of 111 ultra-orthodox Jews: In this group, 30 percent were males, average age was 32.62 years (SD = 11.55), and average number of years of education was 14.14 (SD = 3.06); none of these respondents voted for left-wing political parties.


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– A group of 99 Jewish settlers in the occupied territories: In this group, 43.4 percent were male, average age was 37.19 years (SD = 11.89), and average number of years of education was 14.53 (SD = 2.91); 18.9 percent reported voting for left-wing parties and 35.4 percent described themselves as secular. Measures 1. Evaluation of court functioning was examined by three items: “The courts fulfill their functions fairly”; “The courts fulfill their functions equally towards one and all”; “People like you are treated fairly in the courts.” (Cronbach’s alpha reliability, .87.) 2. Trust in law enforcement authorities was measured by three items requiring respondents to rate their trust in the police, courts and the Supreme Court on a 10-point scale (1 = No trust at all” to 10 = “Complete trust”). (Cronbach’s alpha reliability, .80.) 3. Perceived supremacy of religious laws over state laws was measured by one item: “Religious laws are more important to me than state laws.” 4. Lack of normative commitment to state laws (“normative noncompliance”) was measured by one item: “If a law is unjust, you don’t have to obey it.” 5. Readiness to take the law into one’s own hands was examined by one item: “It is permissible to resort to violence in order to stop the government from endangering the security of the state”; Responses were given on a 5-point scale (1 = Absolutely disagree; 5 = Absolutely agree). Religiosity was self-reported in response to the following question: “Do you define yourself as: secular/traditional/orthodox /ultra-orthodox?” Results The effect of political ideology and religiosity on legal obedience by time of survey Differences between the attitudes expressed at Time I and Time II do not necessarily reflect the effect of the events. Nevertheless, it is postulated that that commitment to legal obedience among orthodox respondents and rightwing voters will be affected by such events. The data were analyzed with a series of three-way analyses of variance. The independent variables were time of survey (Time I = Survey II, Time II = Survey III), religiosity (secular, traditional/orthodox/ultra-orthodox), and political ideology (left wing, right wing). The dependent variables were attitudes toward the law as described in the Measures section. Table 4a presents means and standard deviations and Table 4b presents the F values of the main effects and the interactions.

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Table 4a. Means and standard deviations of attitudes toward the law by political ideology, religiosity, and time period (based on Surveys II and III) Court Trust – Noncompliance Supremacy- Readiness Supreme Religion Court Left Secular wing

Time I 3.85 (1.03) Time II 3.97 (1.10) Orthodox Time I 3.66 (1.09) Time II 3.37 (1.21) Right Secular Time I 3.71 wing (1.19) Time II 3.64 (1.27) Orthodox Time I 3.52 (1.18) Time II 3.28 (1.33) Total Left 3.78 (1.07) Right 3.53 (1.22) Secular 3.83 (1.08) Orthodox 3.54 (1.17) Time I 3.71 (1.10) Time II 3.62 (1.24)

8.62 (1.83) 8.96 (1.59) 8.27 (2.31) 7.31 (2.96) 8.11 (2.27) 8.23 (2.30) 7.45 (2.79) 6.88 (3.24) 8.50 (2.04) 7.58 (2.74) 8.56 (1.92) 7.73 (2.70) 8.21 (2.29) 7.98 (2.64)

1.76 (1.27) 1.71 (1.33) 2.25 (1.57) 2.06 (1.58) 1.83 (1.36) 2.22 (1.54) 1.74 (1.30) 2.32 (1.69) 1.92 (1.41) 1.89 (1.42) 1.79 (1.31) 2.04 (1.50) 1.88 (1.38) 2.02 (1.53)

1.46 (1.06) 1.20 (.68) 2.95 (1.74) 1.97 (1.34) 1.67 (1.17) 1.54 (1.19) 3.16 (1.63) 3.16 (1.69) 1.92 (1.48) 2.66 (1.67) 1.46 (1.05) 3.01 (1.69) 2.24 (1.62) 1.95 (1.48)

1.49 (.85) 1.58 (1.08) 1.58 (.92) 1.66 (1.01) 1.70 (.93) 2.39 (1.45) 2.34 (1.31) 2.49 (1.47) 2.10 (1.25) 2.24 (1.40) 1.53 (.91) 2.22 (1.30) 1.78 (1.09) 1.99 (1.33)

∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01.

Court .48 evaluation Trust in .80 Supreme Court Noncompliance .65 Supremacy of 4.12∗ religious laws Readiness to 2.55 take the law into one’s own hands

Three-way interaction: Time∗ ideology∗ religiosity

.00 3.74∗ 4.25∗∗ 2.86

.05 7.98∗∗ 7.04∗∗ 3.87∗∗

7.89∗∗ .01 3.74 2.86

.47

9.03∗∗

3.02 10.71∗∗

2.31

1.96

60.91∗∗

.64 21.49∗∗

12.60∗∗

4.46∗

7.37∗∗

3.94∗ 164.90∗∗

32.27∗∗

15.63∗∗

Two-way Main effect Main effect Main effect Interaction: of time of ideology of religiosity Religiosity∗ Ideology

.18

Two-way Interaction: Time∗ Ideology

2.96

Two-way Interaction: Time∗ religiosity

Table 4b. F values of the effect of political ideology, religiosity and time on attitudes toward the law (based on Surveys II and III)


201

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A significant three-way interaction was found for perceived supremacy of religious laws over state laws: At Time II, orthodox left-wing voters expressed lower levels of belief in the supremacy of religious laws than at Time I (M = 1.97 and M = 2.95, respectively). A two-way interaction between time and religiosity was found with regard to trust in the Supreme Court: Orthodox respondents expressed lower levels of trust at Time II than at Time I (M = 7.96 and M = 6.84, respectively), whereas no significant differences were found among secular respondents (M = 8.48, at Time I and M = 8.64 at Time II). Although it cannot be determined with certainty that the differences between the second and the third surveys are due to the Supreme Court ruling in the Deri case, the fact that differences were found only among orthodox respondents suggests that the imprisonment of their leader affected their view of the justice system. Several two-way interactions were found between time of survey and political ideology: At Time II, right-wing voters expressed higher levels of normative noncompliance than at Time I (M = 2.31 and M = 1.77, respectively), whereas the attitudes of left-wing voters did not change significantly (M = 1.97 at Time I and M = 1.79 at Time II). A significant interaction was also found for readiness to take the law into one’s own hands: among right-wing voters, readiness to take the law into one’s own hands increased from Time I to Time II (M = 2.22 and M = 2.50, respectively), whereas among left-wing voters, it decreased (M = 1.91 and M = 1.62, respectively). A similar pattern of change was found for belief in the supremacy of religious laws over state laws: Among right-wing voters, it increased from Time I to Time II (M = 2.07 and M = 2.99, respectively) and among left-wing voters, it decreased (M = 2.07 and M = 1.51, respectively). Two-way interactions were found between political ideology and religiosity: Normative noncompliance was higher among the orthodox left (M = 2.23,) than among the other respondents (M = 1.75 among the secular left; M = 1.87 among the orthodox right, and M = 1.93 among the secular right). Another significant interaction effect was found for belief in the supremacy of religious laws: Among the orthodox right, it was stronger (M = 3.16) than among the other respondents (M = 1.41 among the secular left; M = 1.63 among the secular right, and M = 2.85 among the orthodox left). Time of survey was found to have a main effect on belief in the superiority of religious laws (M = 2.24 at Time I and M = 1.95 at Time II) and on readiness to take the law into one’s own hands (M = 1.78 at Time I and M = 1.99 at Time II). A main effect of political ideology was found with regard to all variables except normative noncompliance: In all aspects of legal obedience, left-wing voters expressed higher levels of commitment to the rule of law, compared to right-wing voters. Finally, a main effect of religiosity was found


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with regard to all aspects of legal obedience: Orthodox respondents expressed lower levels of acceptance of the rule of law, compared to secular respondents (see Table 4a). The data of the third survey was also analyzed separately from the data of Survey II to examine whether the findings of the second survey are replicated. The results show a significant main effect of religiosity (F(1,276) = 9.01, p < .01) with regard to evaluation of court functioning: Secular respondents evaluated the court more positively, compared to orthodox respondents (M = 3.88 and M = 3.31, respectively). A significant religiosity effect was also found with regard to trust in law enforcement authorities (F(1,275) = 8.08, p < .01): Orthodox respondents expressed less trust, compared to secular respondents (M = 6.37 and M = 7.26, respectively). Political ideology was found to have a significant main effect on readiness to take the law into one’s own hands (F(1,276) = 23.24, p < .01): Right-wing voters were more ready to take the law into their own hands, compared to left-wing voters (M = 2.23 and M = 1.81, respectively). Finally, with regard to perceived supremacy of religious laws over state laws, there are significant effects of religiosity (F(1,268) = 53.96, p < .01) and political ideology (F(1,268) = 20.17, p < .01) as well as a significant interaction effect (F(1,268) = 7.19, p < .01). The means indicate that compared to secular respondents, orthodox respondents are more likely to perceive religious laws as superior (M = 1.29 and M = 2.82, respectively), right-wing more so than left-wing orthodox voters (M = 2.59 and M = 1.38, respectively). Orthodox right-wing respondents expressed the strongest belief in the superiority of religious laws (M = 3.15 compared to M = 1.20 among secular left-wing voters; M = 1.50 among orthodox left-wing voters, and M = 1.38 among secular right-wing voters). The results of Survey III clearly replicate the results of Survey II regarding weaker commitment to legal obedience among orthodox respondents and right-wing voters.

Legal obedience of settlers and ultra-orthodox respondents Legal obedience of settlers in the occupied territories, ultra-orthodox respondents and respondents representing the general population were compared by one-way analyses of variance. Means, standard deviations and F values are presented in Table 5. The results are similar to those of Survey II: Ultra-orthodox respondents differ from the other two groups and express lower levels of legal obedience in most areas. Settlers, however, differ from respondents of the general population only with regard to perceived supremacy of religious laws over state laws.

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Table 5. Means and standard deviations of attitudes toward the law among settlers, ultra-orthodox Jews and the general population (based on Survey III)

Evaluation of court Trust in Law enforcement authorities Supremacy of religious laws Normative noncompliance Readiness to take the law into one’s own hands

General population (N = 294)

Settlers

Ultra-orthodox

(N = 111)

(N = 99)

3.56 (1.23) 6.75 (2.30)

3.55 (1.26) 6.63 (2.38)

1.86 (1.01) 4.02 (2.24)

1.88 (1.46) 2.09 (1.59) 2.02 (1.34)

2.43 (1.65) 1.98 (1.49) 2.06 (1.27)

4.85 (.56) 2.30 (1.62) 2.67 (1.45)

F

86.36∗∗ 58.87∗∗

192.73∗∗ 1.10 8.67∗∗

∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01.

Discussion

Social scientists have offered two types of explanation for noncompliance with the law. One explanation suggests that the roots of legal disobedience are to be found in the legal system itself. According to this view, people disobey state laws if the law is perceived to be not neutral or when law enforcement authorities are perceived as biased and unjust (Gibson and Caldeira, 1996; Tyler, 1990). The second explanation suggests that noncompliance may result from the perception of an alternative set of values as superior to state laws. Accordingly, noncompliance with the law may result not from rejection of the legal system, but from the higher value assigned to other laws, rules or values. When state laws and values perceived as superior come into conflict, the superior values will take precedence over state laws (Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1999; Shamir and Arian, 1994). This paper draws on both perspectives in examining the relationship between religiosity and political ideology and legal obedience. The results of three surveys conducted at different times and with different respondents show consistent effects of citizens’ belief systems on legal obedience.


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The effect of religiosity and political ideology Orthodox respondents express stronger belief in the supremacy of religious laws over state laws than other citizens. Thus, religious laws are perceived as more compelling than state laws. This finding is in line with the claim that among the orthodox, religious laws take highest priority (Kohlberg, 1981; Richards and Davison, 1992; Rest et al., 1999). In terms of value hierarchy (Shamir and Arian, 1994), the results suggest that among the orthodox, commitment to religious laws is higher on the value hierarchy than acceptance of secular state laws. It could be argued that the ultimate test of the relative importance of these two sets of laws is presented in the case of a contradiction between state laws and religious laws. In Israel, such tests present themselves quite frequently. Judaism contains a comprehensive set of rules which, for the orthodox, dictate behavior is every aspect of daily life. State laws, which often reflect the values of the secular majority, often stand in contradiction to religious laws. These contradictions inevitably provoke conflict between secular and ultra-orthodox citizens in Israel on issues such as the Sabbath opening of places of entertainment and recreation, the display in public places of billboards perceived as offensive by the ultra-orthodox community. In such instances, members of the ultra-orthodox community are quick to engage in actions such as illegal, sometimes violent, demonstrations. The results of the present study suggest that such behavior stems from belief in the supremacy of religious laws over state laws. Religiosity was also found to affect another aspect of commitment to the rule of law, namely, attitudes toward law enforcement authorities: Orthodox respondents expressed more negative evaluations and less trust in law enforcement authorities than secular respondents did. This effect of religiosity may be explained by the fact that not only do orthodox respondents possess an alternative set of rules, but they also have an alternative juridical system consisting of rabbinical courts, which rule according to religious laws. Readiness to take the law into one’s own hands is stronger among ultraorthodox respondents than among the other respondents. A possible explanation for this finding is that the existence of an alternative set of laws undermines respect for state laws which, in turn, results in a lower threshold for illegal activities. Thus, the perception of state laws as “second-class” laws may lead to the conclusion that it is permissible to engage in illegal action in what is considered “a just cause.” Furthermore, the mere existence of an alternative set of laws may make it easier to violate state laws without relinquishing a person’s basic sense of order and structure. Right-wing voters were also found to be more ready to take the law into their own hands. These results support the notion that people’s attitudes toward the law depend on the compatibility of the law with their ideology

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(Elmer, Renwick and Malone, 1983; Sparks and Durkin, 1987). Thus, when the law is perceived as facilitating changes that run counter to conservative values, it will not be supported by right-wing voters. The items measuring readiness to take the law into one’s own hands in the present study described hypothetical situations in which only right-wing values are jeopardized: Clearly, future studies should also include situations in which left-wing values are threatened. Finally, it should be noted that although the effect of ideology was examined separately from that of religiosity, the separation of the two variables is somewhat artificial because many orthodox people belong to the political right. Furthermore, in Israel, religious values relating to the “land of Israel” (greater Israel) are almost inseparable from right-wing ideology. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that religious laws are perceived as superior to state laws by the political right and not just by the orthodox. Legal obedience among orthodox right wing groups The effect of religiosity and political ideology is expressed in various aspects of legal obedience among members of religious right-wing groups. Yeshiva students, settlers in the occupied territories, and ultra-orthodox Jews are more likely to perceive religious laws as superior to state laws, compared to respondents in the general population. Yeshiva students and ultra-orthodox respondents expressed higher levels of readiness to take the law into their own hands, and the settlers were most similar to respondents of the general population in their attitudes toward the law. These results suggest that the personal involvement of the settlers in the controversial political issues concerning the territories does not affect their commitment to the rule of law. Furthermore, although many settlers are right-wing voters and/or orthodox, this is a less homogenous group than the other two and, therefore, the effects of ideology and religion are less distinguishable. The effect of legal and political events The differences between attitudes expressed in the second and the third surveys cannot be unequivocally interpreted as representing the effect of the events because there may be many other alternative explanations. This is a cross-sectional study and, therefore, an obvious alternative explanation is that the different attitudes reflect the different characteristics of the respondents in the two surveys rather than the effect of the events. Nevertheless, the results indicate that, as expected, at the time of the Supreme Court ruling and the Camp David peace negotiations, right-wing voters and orthodox respondents were less committed to legal obedience, compared to the general population.


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Furthermore, some aspects of legal obedience were stronger among left-wing voters and secular respondents at Time II than at Time I. These results suggest that legal obedience may be affected by legal and political events. Thus, a citizen’s acceptance of the rule of law may depend to some extent on the compatibility of court rulings and governmental decisions with his or her religious beliefs and political attitudes. The results suggest that this effect is not restricted to readiness to engage in illegal activities in order to defend important values. Rather, controversial events seem to affect a person’s entire system of attitudes toward the law and legal authorities. The effect of events enacted by the authorities is likely to depend on a person’s initial attitudes toward these authorities. A controversial Supreme Court ruling may stimulate cognitive dissonance between belief in the authority of the court and the cognition that the court has ruled against cherished values. The magnitude of the dissonance as well as its reduction will depend on the relative importance of the dissonant cognitions (Festinger, 1957). Thus, if a citizen thinks very highly of the Supreme Court and its ruling contradicts a matter of moderate importance, he or she will be likely to accept the ruling and perhaps adopt a different point of view on the matter in question. However, for ultra-orthodox Jews, respect for the Supreme Court was low from the outset and its ruling in the case of Deri conflicted with important values. The dissonance was therefore resolved by derogation of the Supreme Court rather than changing their view of a much admired leader. Moreover, the perception of their leader as a victim of discrimination had the added advantage of enhancing cohesion among the followers, which served them well in expressing their antagonism toward the secular establishment. Summary Right-wing political ideology and religiosity are related to weaker commitment to legal obedience. These effects are also expressed in lower levels of legal obedience among members of groups in the Israeli society characterized by a combination of religiosity and a right-wing orientation, namely, Yeshiva students and ultra-orthodox Jews. Among orthodox respondents and rightwing voters, acceptance of the rule of law was found to decrease following events that contradict their ideology. Legal disobedience is not restricted to attitudes alone but is also expressed in readiness to take the law into one’s own hands as a means to further ideological goals. In Israeli society, such behavior was found to be more prevalent among right-wing voters and orthodox citizens and, therefore, the present paper focused on these groups. Although this study was conducted in Israel, with its unique political situation, and religiosity is represented by Judaism, we believe that the basic conclusions drawn from the findings are generalizeable across other political,

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cultural and religious systems. The existence of an alternative set of laws perceived to take precedence over state laws is likely to be a characteristic of most religions regardless of their content. Furthermore, when the legal system supports radical change, right-wing voters are likely to express low levels of respect for the law regardless of the specific social-political context in which the changes take place.

Acknowledgements The study was supported by the Research Foundation of the Israeli Ministry for Science, Culture and Sport. We would like to thank Ami Pedhazur for his help in administrating the questionnaires to Yeshiva students.

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