Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments: Evaluating the 1996 ...

BIASED ASSIMILATION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL MUNRO ARGUMENTS ET AL.

BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 24(1), 15–26 Copyright © 2002, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments: Evaluating the 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate Geoffrey D. Munro Department of Psychology St. Mary’s College of Maryland

Peter H. Ditto Department of Psychology and Social Behavior University of California, Irvine

Lisa K. Lockhart Department of Psychology and Sociology Texas A&M University–Kingsville

Angela Fagerlin, Mitchell Gready, and Elizabeth Peterson Department of Psychology Kent State University

The tendency for people to rate attitude-confirming information more positively than attitude-disconfirming information (biased assimilation) was studied in a naturalistic context. Participants watched and evaluated the first 1996 Presidential Debate between Bill Clinton and Bob Dole. Regression analyses revealed that predebate attitudes but not expectations predicted postdebate argument evaluations and perceived attitude change. Participants evaluated the arguments that confirmed their predebate attitudes as being stronger than the arguments that disconfirmed their predebate attitudes, and they perceived their postdebate attitudes to have become more extreme than their predebate attitudes. Self-reported affective responses mediated the association between predebate attitudes and postdebate argument evaluations. The role of affect in information-processing theories and the significance of the findings for sociopolitical debates are discussed.

By exposing people to opposing political viewpoints, public debates like those preceding presidential elections are thought by many to lead a significant percentage of people to undergo a rational analysis of the full range of arguments and, ultimately, to change their opinions. Certainly, it is not difficult to call to mind historical examples of presidential debates that seem to have had a significant effect on public opinion. John F. Kennedy’s telegenic performance in his 1960 debate against Richard Nixon is thought by many to have boosted him into the presidency. Similarly, many political pundits believe that Ronald Reagan’s strong outing versus Jimmy Carter in 1980 legitimized his candidacy and cata-

Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. Geoffrey D. Munro, Department of Psychology, St. Mary’s College of Maryland, St. Mary’s City, MD 20686. E-mail: [email protected]

lyzed his victory 1 week later on election day. In fact, some survey data support the anecdotal evidence by suggesting that Reagan’s performance did indeed produce a significant change in the opinions of those with relatively low levels of political knowledge (Davis, 1982; Lanoue, 1992). Considerably more data, on the other hand, suggest that rather than changing people’s opinions, debates simply reinforce viewers’ prior attitudes (Bothwell & Brigham, 1983; E. Katz & Feldman, 1962; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Sears & Chaffee, 1979). Sigelman and Sigelman (1984) even found this to be true of the 1980 Carter–Reagan debate that was thought to have had such a strong impact in changing voters’ opinions. This research continued to investigate attitude change and attitude reinforcement by studying the effects of the first 1996 Presidential Debate in a setting that retained the naturalism of a national opinion survey while controlling for the confounds inherent in survey research.

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BIASED ASSIMILATION AND ATTITUDE RESISTANCE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL INFORMATION From a social psychological viewpoint, the finding that people’s political attitudes are resistant to change is not surprising. One of the hallmarks of social cognition research is that when a person forms a belief, attitude, or expectation, that cognition becomes relatively resistant to change regardless of whether information presented subsequently supports or refutes it. Research on the primacy effect (Asch, 1946; Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968; Langer & Roth, 1975; McAndrew, 1981), anchoring and insufficient adjustment (Cervone & Peake, 1986; Plous, 1989; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and the belief perseverance effect (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Jelalian & Miller, 1984; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975) demonstrates that initial attitudes and beliefs often bias the way that subsequent information is processed. Specifically, rather than accommodating the new information, the new information is assimilated to the existing cognition. The seminal work of Hastorf and Cantril (1954) exemplifies the tendency of an existing cognition like a schema to bias the interpretation of subsequent information. On viewing an especially rough and heated football game between rivals Dartmouth and Princeton, Dartmouth students observed more flagrant violations committed by Princeton players, whereas Princeton students observed more flagrant violations committed by Dartmouth players. Presumably, the existing cognition that the football team representing one’s own university consisted of tough but fair sportsmen influenced the interpretations of the violence that ensued during the game. Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) demonstrated that this effect generalized to the processing of sociopolitical information. They showed that peoples’ attitudes toward capital punishment affected their evaluations of the methodologies of two scientific studies, one with procapital punishment conclusions and one with anticapital punishment conclusions. Participants displayed a biased assimilation of the mixed evidence. Proponents of the death penalty appeared to accept and integrate the results of the study suggesting that the death penalty effectively reduces crime, but they seemed to discount and reject the results of the study suggesting that the death penalty does not reduce crime. Opponents of the death penalty rated the studies in the opposite manner. In addition, Lord et al. showed that after reading and evaluating the two studies, participants reported that their attitudes toward capital punishment had become more extreme. This was termed attitude polarization. The Lord et al. (1979) study has spawned a large body of research and theoretical debate. Two issues in particular have received a great deal of attention. First, having been studied exclusively in the laboratory, it is difficult to know whether biased assimilation would generalize to more naturalistic set-

tings. Second, theoretical debate has emerged as a result of investigations attempting to uncover the causal mechanism underlying biased assimilation.

THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF BIASED ASSIMILATION AND ATTITUDE POLARIZATION The basic effect first documented by Lord et al. (1979) has been replicated with several different kinds of information and a variety of issues. Although the original study found the biased assimilation effect using methodologically detailed descriptions of scientific studies, it has also been found using much shorter evidence summaries (McHoskey, 1995), persuasive essays presented via audiotape (Zuwerink & Devine, 1996), and logical arguments containing a single premise and conclusion (Edwards & Smith, 1996). Furthermore, the effect has been shown with a variety of issues including capital punishment (Lord et al., 1979; Miller, McHoskey, Bane, & Dowd, 1993; Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995), the safety of nuclear power (Plous, 1991), the ban on gays in the military (Zuwerink & Devine, 1996), stereotypes associated with homosexuality (Munro & Ditto, 1997), and theories regarding the JFK assassination (McHoskey, 1995). In each of the aforementioned studies, however, the information presented to participants was either constructed or selected by the researcher(s). It is likely that the materials were chosen so that opposing pieces of information would be equally balanced and thus open to alternative interpretations. In essence, the materials were selected because they would maximize the possibility that biased assimilation would occur. One question posed in this research is, “Will the biased assimilation effect replicate in response to naturally occurring and potentially unbalanced information like the arguments presented in a political debate?” The first goal of this research was to determine whether or not biased assimilation can be generalized to a more naturalistic setting using information presented in “real time.” Specifically, will viewers of the 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate rate the arguments of their favored candidate more positively than the arguments of the opposing candidate? Another issue related to the external validity of biased assimilation and attitude polarization is the duration of the effects. Do the effects persist over time or are they limited to the timeframe of the experimental session? If the effects are shortlived and disappear soon after the participants exit the laboratory, then the effect might simply be an interesting bias found in response to certain materials presented in a laboratory context rather than a bias that might ultimately underlie behavioral actions and hold important real-world implications. This research will further assess the external validity of biased assimilation and attitude polarization by measuring participants’ reactions to the information not only directly af-

BIASED ASSIMILATION OF SOCIOPOLITICAL ARGUMENTS

ter the presentation of the information but also 1 week later. The endurance of people’s reactions to a presidential debate, of course, has important implications for actual voting behavior that occurs at the very least 1 week after the debate.

BIASED ASSIMILATION: A COGNITIVE OR MOTIVATIONAL PHENOMENON In addition to the external validity question, biased assimilation and the original interpretation of the effect have been at the crux of a recent theoretical debate. Biased assimilation was originally presented by Lord et al. (1979) as a purely cognitive bias consistent with the more general social psychological finding that expectations bias the processing of subsequent information in a manner that serves to increase the probability that the expectancy perseveres (Darley & Gross, 1983; Duncan, 1976; Hamilton & Rose, 1980; Merton, 1957; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968; Snyder & Swann, 1978; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). Others have argued that biased assimilation could easily have been interpreted as a motivationally based bias (Aronson, 1989, 1992; Berkowitz & Devine, 1989) consistent with cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Although the theoretical argument in support of the motivational interpretation was cogent and persuasive, it was also convincingly counterargued that without empirical evidence there is no need to expand on the more parsimonious cognitive explanation (Lord, 1989, 1992). More recently, empirical studies have begun to inform this debate. Edwards and Smith (1996) showed that increased emotional conviction toward an issue is associated with increased bias against arguments disconfirming one’s prior beliefs. Zuwerink and Devine (1996) found that resistance to change one’s attitude was mediated by both thought listings and self-reported affect. They concluded that attitude resistance is both a cognitive and an affective phenomenon. Finally, from data collected using a conceptual replication of the Lord et al. (1979) paradigm, Munro and Ditto (1997) constructed a path model that was consistent with an affective–motivational account of biased assimilation. In this model, it was found that differential affective reactions to attitude-confirming and attitude-disconfirming information mediated the effect of prior attitude on evaluations of the quality of the information (i.e., biased assimilation). Reframing the theoretical debate in terms of viewers’ reactions to a presidential debate, the central issue is the mechanism underlying peoples’ evaluations of the candidates and their arguments. Is it a rational analysis in which the arguments are evaluated in relation to one’s prior knowledge and expectations about the debate? Or, is it an emotional process in which the arguments are evaluated in relation to the affect that is felt in response to the presentations of the particular candidates? The expectancy view holds that those in favor of

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a particular candidate expect that candidate to win, and any information that disconfirms the expectation is processed in a way that puts it at an evaluative disadvantage relative to information that confirms the expectation. In contrast, the affective–motivational view holds that those in favor of a particular candidate have positive feelings toward that candidate, and any information attacking the favored candidate creates negative affect motivating the individual to evaluate it more negatively than information supporting the favored candidate. Consistent with the affective–motivational account, research has shown that peoples’ emotional reactions to presidential candidates are better predictors of overall voting preferences than are beliefs about candidates’ personality traits and behaviors (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982). Therefore, the second goal of this research was to examine whether or not emotional reactions to presidential candidates also predict evaluative reactions to the arguments presented by the candidates during a political debate. To examine the role of affect as a potential mediator of the link between prior attitudes and evaluations of the debate arguments, participants’ emotional reactions to the presentations of the two candidates during the debate were measured. Also, the role of expectancy in affecting evaluations of the debate arguments was investigated by measuring participants’ predebate expectations about the outcome of the debate.

METHOD Participants Seventy undergraduates (34 women and 36 men) at a medium-sized state university received course credit for their participation in the study. Of the 70 participants, 60 were successfully contacted by telephone before the second presidential debate. All analyses include only those participants that completed the measure in question. Procedure The first debate between Democratic President Bill Clinton and the Republican challenger Bob Dole took place on October 6, 1996. Participants arrived at the experimental session half an hour before the live broadcast of the Clinton–Dole debate. During this time, participants completed consent forms as well as several measures assessing attitudes toward the election, feelings toward the candidates, and expectations about which candidate would win the debate. The television was turned off so participants were not exposed to any of the media predictions or commentaries that occurred immediately prior to the debate. The live broadcast of the debate was then projected on a film screen in a medium-sized classroom at precisely

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the time when the debate started. Participants were instructed to watch the debate and evaluate the arguments of each candidate to the best of their abilities. At the end of the debate, the television projection was immediately terminated so that none of the postdebate media analyses or commentaries was presented to participants. Therefore, the arguments presented by each candidate during the debate were presented in “real time” as the debate was happening. After the debate, participants completed a set of postdebate measures. Participants were then asked to provide their first names and telephone numbers if they would agree to be called in the coming weeks to answer several more questions. All participants provided this information. Between 7 and 10 days later, participants were called and asked to respond to a set of follow-up measures.

Predebate Measures Before the debate, participants responded to three sets of questions assessing (a) interest and involvement in the presidential campaign, (b) attitudes regarding the election and feelings toward the candidates, and (c) expectations regarding the debate.

Involvement assessment. Participants responded to four questions assessing their interest and involvement in the presidential campaign. The first question was, “Would you have watched the presidential debate even if this experiment had not been offered?” on a scale ranging from 1 (absolutely yes) to 3 (don’t know) to 5 (absolutely not). The next three questions assessed emotional involvement in the campaign, strength of feelings about the election, and the amount of knowledge participants felt they had about the platforms of the candidates. Participants responded on 9-point rating scales where higher numbers indicated a greater amount of the construct. These three items were found to have acceptable interitem reliability (α = .80) and were thus averaged into one involvement index.

Attitudes and feelings assessment. Prior attitudes toward the upcoming election were assessed by having participants indicate their “current position about the presidential election” on a scale ranging from –4 (strongly favor Clinton) to 0 (unsure or neither) to +4 (strongly favor Dole). Two items assessed feelings toward the candidates, “How do you feel about Bill Clinton (Bob Dole) as a person?” on scales ranging from –4 (strongly dislike) to 0 (no feelings) to +4 (strongly like). After reverse scoring the feelings toward Clinton measure, these three items were averaged into one predebate attitude composite (α = .73), where negative numbers indicate more favorable attitudes and feelings toward

Clinton and positive numbers indicate more favorable attitudes and feelings toward Dole.

Expectancy assessment. Participants’ expectations regarding the outcome of the debate were assessed with the question “Who do you think will win the debate?” on a scale ranging from –4 (definitely Clinton) to 0 (neither Clinton nor Dole) to +4 (definitely Dole).

Postdebate Measures Immediately following the debate, participants responded to four sets of questions assessing (a) evaluations of the debate, (b) affective reactions to the debaters, (c) cognitive responses generated during the debate, and (d) postdebate political attitudes.

Evaluations of the debate. The first set of questions assessed biased assimilation by measuring evaluations of the debate itself. The first question was, “In your opinion, who won the debate?” with a rating scale ranging from –4 (definitely Clinton) to 0 (neither Clinton nor Dole) to +4 (definitely Dole). The next two questions assessed the quality of the arguments of the two debaters using the questions, “How strong were the arguments presented by Clinton (Dole)?” and “How convincing was Clinton (Dole)?” with rating scales ranging from 1 (very weak/unconvincing) to 9 (very strong/convincing). Affective reactions. The third set of questions assessed affective reactions to the two debaters, “To what extent did listening to Clinton (Dole) make you feel”? Participants responded to the items “angry,” “irritated,” “happy,” and “pleased” on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Cognitive responses. Participants were asked to “list any thoughts or feelings you had while listening to the arguments of Clinton (Dole).” After writing each thought or feeling, they indicated with the appropriate symbol whether the thought or feeling was favorable (+), unfavorable (–), or neutral (0) toward the argument. Postdebate political attitudes. Participants responded to several questions assessing the degree to which their political attitudes had changed as a result of watching the debate. First, as a measure of perceived attitude change, they rated how much “the arguments presented in the debate caused my opinion about the presidential election to move” on a scale ranging from –4 (strongly toward supporting Clinton) to 0 (no change) to +4 (strongly toward supporting Dole). A question that paralleled


the predebate attitude assessment was also included. Participants rated their current positions about the presidential election “given the arguments presented in the debate.”

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haps reflecting public opinion of Clinton as a more gifted communicator than Dole, participants reported expecting that Clinton would probably win the debate (M = –1.63). Bivariate correlations between the predebate measures are also displayed in Table 1.1

Follow-Up Measures Beginning 1 week after the first debate, participants were called by telephone and asked to answer several more questions regarding the debate. Of those who were contacted, all agreed to participate. Sixty of the 70 participants present at the debate were contacted. Those that were not contacted by the day of the second 1996 Presidential Debate (October 16, 1996) were not called again. During the follow-up telephone interview, participants responded to two sets of questions that were analogous to those presented after the debate. First, they responded to several questions assessing their evaluations of the debate, including their opinion about who won the debate and the quality of the arguments presented by each debater. Second, they were again asked a set of political attitude questions assessing how much they perceived their opinions to have changed because of the debate and their current position regarding the election. No affective reactions or cognitive responses were obtained at the 1-week follow-up interview.

RESULTS Overview of Analyses There were three goals for organizing the data analyses. First, a group of descriptive analyses was conducted with the aim of providing a characterization of this sample regarding opinions concerning the presidential election. Second, regression analyses were conducted to determine whether responses to the predebate measures predicted postdebate reactions. Third, a group of mediational regression analyses was conducted to examine the role of affective reactions during the debate as potentially important components of any effect of the predebate measures on postdebate reactions.

Descriptive Analyses Descriptive analyses conducted on the predebate measures indicated that the distributions did not deviate greatly from the assumptions of normality. As can be seen in Table 1, participants as a group scored near the midpoint of the scales measuring whether they would have watched the debate (M = 3.54) and their involvement in the election (M = 4.74). The predebate attitude index reflected the United States voting population in that Clinton was rated more favorably and liked more than Dole (M = –0.91). Also, per-

Association of Predebate With Immediate Postdebate and Follow-Up Measures

To assess the association between the predebate and postdebate measures, multiple regression analyses were conducted. For each postdebate variable, the four predebate variables (watch, involvement, predebate attitude, and expectancy) were simultaneously entered as predictor variables. There are two effects in particular that bear special mention. First, the biased assimilation effect would be supported if predebate attitude significantly predicts evaluations of the debate. Second, the disconfirmed expectancies argument would be supported if expectancy significantly predicts evaluations of the debate. The disconfirmed expectancies argument suggests that those in favor of Clinton, for example, expect Clinton to win and any information that disconfirms this expectation (pro-Dole or anti-Clinton arguments) is processed more deeply and evaluated more critically than information that confirms the expectation (pro-Clinton or anti-Dole arguments). The other two variables were included in the analyses to determine whether one’s involvement in the election or likelihood of watching the debate might predict postdebate measures in a way that would clarify the debate evaluation process.2

Biased assimilation. Biased assimilation was assessed by examining responses to the debate evaluation measures. First, the question assessing which candidate partici-

1Several of the predebate measures were correlated. Most notably, the predebate attitude index is positively correlated with the expectation measure (r = .39). No attempt to combine the expectation measure with the predebate attitude index was made, however, because of the important theoretical distinction between the two constructs. Furthermore, collinearity diagnostics indicated that collinearity among the predebate measures was not a problem for the subsequently presented regression analyses. Tolerance values were always .74 or higher, and the variance inflation factor never exceeded 1.35. 2In addition, hierarchical regression analyses with the interactions between the predebate measures entered as a second step were conducted. These analyses were specifically aimed at exploring any interactions involving the involvement variable. Given that past research suggests that attitude strength moderates biased assimilation (Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995), it seemed reasonable to test for the possibility that predebate attitudes bias participants’ evaluations of the debate only for people with strong involvement in the presidential campaign. However, no significant interactions were revealed. The hierarchical regressions and variable interactions will not be discussed.

20 TABLE1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson’s Correlations of Predebate, Postdebate, and Follow-Up Measures Measures Predebate measures 1. Watch 2. Involvement 3. Attitude 4. Expectancy Postdebate measures 5. Perceived winner 6. Quality index 7. Positive affect 8. Negative affect 9. Positive cognitive responses 10. Negative cognitive responses 11. Perceived attitude change 12. Actual attitude change Follow-up measures 14. Perceived winner 15. Quality index 16. Perceived attitude change 17. Actual attitude change ap

< .05. bp < .01.

M

SD

1

2

3

4

3.54 4.74 –0.91 –1.63

1.18 2.06 1.76 1.36

— .41b .04 .18

— –.27a –.10

— .39b

—

–1.26 –1.82 –1.11 2.37 –1.26 1.26 –0.16 –0.33

2.43 3.52 4.20 3.83 2.92 2.87 2.43 1.56

–.31 –.28a –.34b .29a –.10 .15 –.17 –.13

.53b .59b .68b –.72b .61b –.58b .50b .07

–0.90 –1.33 0.10 0.00

2.23 3.57 2.21 1.68

–.28a .28a –.11 –.13

.61b .61b .41b .03

–.09 .13 .11 –.03 .12 –.08 .10 .12 .07 .07– .28a .26a

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

.28a .21 .24a –.25a .28a –.26a –.01 –.05

— .79b .81b –.75b .69b –.57b .57b .54b

— .76b –.78b .76b –.63b .49b .50b

— –.86b .73b –.63b .59b .56b

— –.72b .62b –.53b –.48b

— –.83b .65b .50b

— –.59b –.43b

— .33b

—

.30a .23 .06 .05

.79b .83b .41b .50b

.76b .83b .43b .39b

.83b .80b .59b .50b

–.67b –.75b –.50b –.41b

.66b .72b .53b .35b

–.60b –.60b –.42b –.24

.57b .60b .49b .19

.44b .47b .40b .65b

13

14

15

16

— .81b .56b .38b

— .54b .46b

— .38b

—


pants thought won the debate (perceived winner) was examined. Second, a Clinton quality index and a Dole quality index were created by averaging responses to the questions assessing ratings of the strength of the arguments and convincingness of each debater, Clinton r(70) = .78, p < .001; Dole r(70) = .69, p < .001. In accordance with past research (Lord et al., 1979; Munro & Ditto, 1997), these two indexes were then combined into a quality index difference score by subtracting the Clinton quality index from the Dole quality index. For both of the biased assimilation measures, predebate attitude was the only significant predictor (perceived winner: β = .46, t[69] = 3.98, p < .001; quality index difference score: β = .57, t[69] = 5.15, p < .001).3 A summary of the regression analyses can be found in Table 2. Those who held more favorable predebate attitudes and feelings toward Dole were more likely to have perceived Dole to have won the debate and rated the arguments of Dole more favorably relative to the arguments of Clinton. Supporting the biased assimilation effect, prior attitudes bias participants’ postdebate ratings of who won the debate and their evaluations of the arguments presented during the debate. On the other hand, the disconfirmed expectancies argument was not supported as expectancy did not uniquely predict evaluations of the debate.

Affect. Affective reactions to the two debaters were examined by creating two factors out of the four affect items. The items “happy” and “pleased” were highly correlated (Clinton: r[70] = .84, p < .001; Dole: r[70] = .83, p < .001) and were thus averaged into a positive affect index. Similarly, the items “angry” and “irritated” (Clinton: r[70] = .73, p < .001; Dole: r[70] = .81, p < .001) were averaged into a negative affect index. Affect difference scores were created by subtracting each of the two Clinton affect factors from the corresponding Dole affect factors. For both affect difference scores, predebate attitude was the only significant predictor (positive: β = .66, t[69] = 6.65, p < .001; negative: β = –.71, t[69] = –7.42, p < .001). These analyses indicate that those who held more favorable prior attitudes and feelings toward Dole reported more positive and less negative affect in response to Dole relative to Clinton. A regression summary table can be found in the top half of Table 3. Biased cognitive elaboration. Biased cognitive elaboration was assessed by examining self-coded positive and negative cognitive responses generated toward each debater.

3In addition, the Clinton quality index and the Dole quality index were an-

alyzed independently. The results were identical to those of the perceived winner measure and quality index difference score—only predebate attitude was a significant predictor.

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Positive and negative cognitive response difference scores were created by subtracting each type of response generated after listening to Clinton from each type of response generated after listening to Dole.4 For both cognitive response difference scores, predebate attitude was a significant predictor (positive: β = .62, t[69] = 5.77, p < .001; negative: β = –.58, t[69] = –5.11, p < .001). Those who held more favorable prior attitudes and feelings toward Dole reported more positive and less negative cognitions in response to Dole relative to Clinton. In addition, for the positive cognitive response difference score, ratings of the likelihood that participants would have watched the debate was a significant predictor, β = .23, t(69) = 2.10, p < .05. Those who reported a greater likelihood that they would have watched the debate reported more positive and less negative cognitions in response to Clinton relative to Dole. A summary of the regression analyses can be found in the bottom half of Table 3.

Attitude change. In practical terms, the most important measures assessing the actual effects of the debate on viewers’ political opinions were those measuring attitude change. The first attitude change measure was the degree to which participants perceived their opinion to have moved as a result of the debate (perceived attitude change). Predebate attitude was the only significant predictor of perceived attitude change, β = .59, t(68) = 5.02, p < .001.5 Those who held more favorable prior attitudes toward Dole were more likely to have perceived their postdebate attitudes as having moved in the direction of Dole. The perceived attitude change measure can be contrasted with an actual attitude change measure created by subtracting responses to the postdebate measure from responses to the predebate measure of participants’ current attitudes toward the election. The regression analysis on the actual attitude change measure revealed no significant predictors (see Table 4 for a summary). One-week follow-up measures. The follow-up measures were submitted to the same analyses as reported earlier with one exception. For each follow-up measure the analogous immediate postdebate measure was entered as a predictor variable in addition to the four predebate measures. For example, for the follow-up measure assessing perceived winner, the predebate measures watch, involvement, predebate attitude, and expectancy as well as the immediate postdebate

4A neutral cognitive response difference score was also created and analyzed, revealing no significant effects. It will not be further discussed. 5The inconsistent degrees of freedom for all analyses involving the immediate postdebate measure assessing perceived attitude change are a result of the choice of one participant not to answer that question.

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MUNRO ET AL. TABLE 2 Summary of Regression Analyses for Immediate Postdebate (and Follow-Up) Biased Assimilation Measures B

SE B

β

0.98 (0.22) 0.63 (0.35) 0.17 (0.07) –0.18 (–0.06) 0.13 (0.07) — (0.59)

1.70 (1.17) 0.16 (0.12) 0.20 (0.14) 0.14 (0.10) 0.24 (0.17) — (0.08)

.46** (.28**) .10 (.04) –.15 (–.05) .06 (.03) — (.63**)

7.05 (0.66) 1.13 (0.30) –0.01 (0.07) 0.15 (–0.12) –0.36 (–0.05) — (0.76)

2.37 (1.93) 0.22 (0.20) 0.28 (0.22) 0.19 (0.15) 0.33 (0.26) — (0.10)

.57** (.15) –.01 (.03) .09 (–.07) –.12 (–.02) — (.72**)

Dependent Variables and Predictor Variables Immediate postdebate (follow-up) perceived winner Constant Predebate attitude Expectancy Involvement Watch Perceived winner Immediate postdebate (follow-up) quality index difference score Constant Predebate attitude Expectancy Involvement Watch Quality index difference score

Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate follow-up analyses. Immediate postdebate perceived winner: R2 = .32, MSerror = 4.24; follow-up perceived winner: R2 = .69, MSerror = 1.67. Immediate postdebate quality index difference score: R2 = .38, MSerror = 8.21; follow-up quality index difference score: R2 = .71, MSerror = 4.05 (ps < .001). *p < .05. **p < .01.

TABLE 3 Summary of Regression Analyses for Affect and Cognitive Response Measures Dependent Variables and Predictor Variables Positive (negative) affect difference score Constant Predebate attitude Expectancy Involvement Watch Positive (negative) cognitive response difference score Constant Predebate attitude Expectancy Involvement Watch

B

SE B

β

7.07 (–7.54) 1.57 (–1.54) –0.05 (0.10) –0.27 (0.19) 0.28 (–0.03)

2.52 (2.23) 0.24 (0.21) 0.30 (0.26) 0.21 (0.18) 0.36 (0.31)

.66** (–.71**) –.02 (.04) –.13 (.10) .08 (–.01)

9.27 (–7.20) 1.02 (–0.94) 0.22 (–0.13) 0.24 (–0.10) 0.56 (–0.34)

1.91 (1.98) 0.18 (0.18) 0.23 (0.23) 0.16 (0.16) 0.27 (0.28)

.62** (–.58**) .10 (–.06) .17 (.07) .23* (–.14)

Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate negative affect or negative cognitive responses analyses. Positive affect difference score: R2 = .50, MSerror = 9.40; negative affect difference score: R2 = .53, MSerror = 7.29; positive cognitive response difference score: R2 = .41, MSerror = 5.32; negative cognitive response difference score: R2 = .35, MSerror = 5.72 (ps < .001). *p < .05. **p < .01.

measure assessing perceived winner were all entered simultaneously as predictor variables. If the predebate attitude index does not significantly predict the follow-up measure, then it would suggest that predebate attitude does not have any additional effect during the 1-week delay. If the predebate attitude index does significantly predict the follow-up measure, then it would suggest that predebate attitude does have an additional effect on the follow-up measure over and above the immediate postdebate effect. If another predebate measure significantly predicts the follow-up measure, then it would suggest that a delayed effect is present that does not appear until after the immediate postdebate assessment.

The two biased assimilation measures revealed somewhat inconsistent findings. On both measures, the analogous immediate postdebate measures were significant predictors (perceived winner: β = .63, t[59] = 7.15, p < .001; quality index difference score: β = .72, t[59] = 7.55, p < .001). In addition, predebate attitude was a significant predictor on the perceived winner measure, β = .28, t(59) = 3.05, p < .01. However, neither predebate attitude nor any other predebate measure was a significant predictor on the quality index difference score, β = .15, t(59) = 1.46, p < .15 (see Table 2 for a summary). Therefore, for each measure, the strong positive correlation between the follow-up mea-


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TABLE 4 Summary of Regression Analyses for Immediate Postdebate (and Follow-Up) Attitude Change Measures Dependent Variables and Predictor Variables Immediate postdebate (follow-up) perceived attitude change Constant Predebate attitude Expectancy Involvement Watch Perceived attitude change Immediate postdebate (follow-up) actual attitude change Constant Predebate attitude Expectancy Involvement Watch Actual attitude change

β

B

SE B

2.28 (–0.77) 0.81 (0.40) –0.40 (–0.05) 0.00 (0.14) 0.17 (0.63) —(0.30)

1.73 (1.67) 0.16 (0.17) 0.21 (0.21) 0.14 (0.14) 0.24 (0.24) — (0.12)

.59** (.33*) –.22 (–.03) .00 (.13) .08 (.34*) — (.32*)

–0.35 (–1.64) 0.07 (–0.01) –0.09 (0.17) –0.07 (0.03) 0.10 (0.35) — (0.69)

1.31 (1.13) 0.12 (0.10) 0.16 (0.14) 0.11 (0.09) 0.18 (0.16) — (0.10)

.08 (–.01) –.08 (.14) –.09 (.04) .08 (.25*) — (.65**)

Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate follow-up analyses. Immediate postdebate perceived attitude change: R2 = .31, MSerror = 4.36; follow-up perceived attitude change: R2 = .37, MSerror = 3.37 (ps < .001). Immediate postdebate actual attitude change: R2 = .03, MSerror = 2.50 (p = .73); follow-up actual attitude change: R2 = .49, MSerror = 1.58 (p < .001). *p < .05. **p < .01.

sure and its analogous immediate postdebate measure suggests that the biased assimilation effect remains after 1 week. Furthermore, the perceived winner measure revealed predebate attitude to be a significant predictor over and above the predictive power of the analogous immediate postdebate measure. This suggests modest support for a longer lasting effect of predebate attitude on evaluations—a bias that continues to occur even beyond the immediate reactions to the debate information. The attitude change measures also revealed inconsistent findings with regard to the predictive value of predebate attitude. For both the perceived attitude change and actual attitude change measures, the analogous immediate postdebate measures were significant predictors (perceived attitude change: β = .32, t[58] = 2.53, p < .02; actual attitude change: β = .65, t[59] = 6.58, p < .001). In addition, the likelihood that the participant would have watched the debate measure was a significant predictor for both attitude change measures (perceived attitude change: β = .34, t[58] = 2.65, p < .02; actual attitude change: β = .25, t[59] = 2.18, p < .001). These findings indicate that those who reported being less likely to watch the debate perceived their attitudes to have changed in the direction of Dole 1 week after the debate and their attitudes did change in the direction of Dole (as assessed by the pre–post measure of actual attitude change). Because this variable was not associated with the attitude change measures immediately after the debate, these effects represent a delayed effect. Finally, predebate attitude was a significant predictor of perceived attitude change, β = .33, t(58) = 2.33, p < .03 (see Table 4 for a summary). This indicates that those who had more favorable predebate attitudes and feelings toward Clinton (Dole) perceived their attitudes to have moved in the direction of Clinton (Dole) 1 week after the debate. Again, this

effect of prior attitude on perceived attitude change 1 week after the debate represents a continued change over and above that explained by the analogous immediate postdebate measure.

The Underlying Mechanisms of Biased Assimilation The analyses presented thus far establish that (a) prior attitudes are associated with evaluative reactions to the debate arguments and (b) expectancies are not uniquely associated with evaluative reactions to the debate arguments. The next goal of the analyses was to investigate the role of both positive and negative affect as possible mediating factors. Those in favor of Clinton, for example, may have negative affective reactions to any information attacking Clinton or supporting Dole, thus motivating those individuals to negatively evaluate that information in comparison to information supporting Clinton or attacking Dole. If this affective account of biased assimilation were true, positive and negative affect would mediate the link between prior attitudes and debate evaluations. To conduct the mediational regression analyses, the recommendations put forth by Baron and Kenny (1986) were followed. Three regression equations were created for each potential mediator. First, the immediate postdebate quality index difference score (the most widely used measure of biased assimilation) was regressed on predebate attitude. Predebate attitude significantly predicted the quality index difference score, β = .59, t(69) = 5.99, p < .001. Second, the potential mediators (positive and negative affect difference scores) were regressed on predebate attitude in two separate analyses. Predebate attitude significantly pre-

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dicted both positive and negative affect difference scores. The more favorable prior attitudes were toward Dole, the more positive affect was reported in response to Dole relative to Clinton, β = .68, t(69) = 7.71, p < .001; and the more negative affect was reported in response to Clinton relative to Dole, β = –.72, t(69) = –8.59, p < .001. Third and most important, the biased assimilation measure was simultaneously regressed on the potential mediators and predebate attitude. Predebate attitude no longer significantly predicted quality index difference scores for either the analysis assessing positive affect as the potential mediator (β = .14, t[69] = 1.25, p = .22) or the analysis assessing negative affect as the potential mediator (β = .06, t[69] = 0.51, p = .62). In contrast, both of the potential mediators remained significant predictors of quality index difference scores (positive affect: β = .66, t[69] = 6.11, p < .001; negative affect: β = –.74, t[69] = –6.67, p < .001).6 To assess the role of affect as a potential mediator of biased cognitive elaboration, the same strategy was repeated in four separate mediational analyses using positive and negative affect difference scores as potential mediators between predebate attitude and positive and negative cognitive response difference scores. Predebate attitude significantly predicted both the positive and negative cognitive response difference scores (positive: β = .60, t[69] = 6.25, p < .001; negative: β = –.58, t[69] = –5.80, p < .001). As reported previously, predebate attitude significantly predicted both potential mediators, positive and negative affect difference scores. Finally, when each dependent variable was simultaneously regressed on predebate attitude and the potential mediators, positive and negative affect were significant predictors (all |β| > .54 and p values < .01), whereas predebate attitude was not (all |β| < .13 and p values > .05). In total, the mediational analyses indicate that the positive and negative affect difference scores meet the criteria of true mediators (Baron & Kenny, 1986) between predebate attitude and biased evaluations and cognitive elaborations of the debate.

DISCUSSION Considering the importance of the U.S. Presidential Election, it is comforting to believe that presidential debates sway some significant portion of the voting public toward the candidate with the stronger political arguments. The results of

6The mediational analyses were repeated several times using perceived winner, the Clinton quality index, and the Dole quality index as dependent variables in the place of the quality index difference score. The results were virtually identical to those reported for the quality index difference score in that both positive and negative affect difference scores were found to be true mediators between predebate attitude and whichever measure of biased assimilation was used as the dependent variable.

this research paint a somewhat less idealistic picture. First, people seem to process the arguments in a biased manner by evaluating the reasoning of their predebate favored candidate more positively than that of their predebate opposed candidate. Second, rather than being a rational analysis of the logical arguments presented in the debate, debate evaluations can hinge more on peoples’ affective responses to the debater. Each of the major findings and the significance of the findings in terms of past research and theory are discussed next. Biased Assimilation Supporting a host of laboratory studies, this research demonstrates that the biased assimilation effect can be found in a setting involving the presentation of naturally occurring information not specifically constructed to reveal the phenomenon. The regression analyses consistently showed that participants viewing the first 1996 U.S. Presidential Debate did indeed undergo a biased assimilation of the arguments presented in the debate such that arguments confirming prior attitudes were rated more positively than arguments disconfirming prior attitudes. Rather than evaluating the arguments in a fair and objective manner based on their logical validity, our prior attitudes bias the manner in which we evaluate the arguments leading us to favor those arguments that support the prior attitudes. Furthermore, not only did prior attitudes predict argument evaluations and the perceived winner immediately after the debate, but also the immediate postdebate measures predicted the analogous follow-up measures. These results suggest that biased assimilation is not a transient reaction to carefully constructed laboratory materials that disappears shortly after the presentation of those materials. On the contrary, there was some support for the possibility that prior attitudes not only have an immediate effect on judgments of the perceived winner but also a delayed effect. Although we did not collect data on participants’ postdebate exposure to media commentary, one could speculate that this delayed effect is a result of participants’ assimilation of any media commentary viewed during the period between the end of the experimental session and the follow-up questioning. One question that remains unanswered is the question of symmetry. Although the regression analyses revealed that the biased assimilation effect was significant for the entire sample, the inability to easily determine the objective winner of the debate precludes us from knowing whether or not a subset of unbiased participants exists. It is entirely possible that a truly objective analysis of the arguments would reveal Clinton (or Dole) to be the consensus winner. If so, one could make the argument that those who favored Clinton (or Dole) prior to the debate are actually not displaying the biased assimilation effect. Without being able to objectively determine the outcome of the debate, the symmetry and strength of the bias in the face of unbalanced information remains hidden. Future research could address this important question by


varying the objective quality of the arguments on either side of the debate. An argument quality manipulation could effectively assess the symmetry and strength of the biased assimilation effect by determining how much, if it all, argument quality moderates biased assimilation. Affect and the Evaluation of Sociopolitical Arguments It is not difficult to recall instances of political discussions ending in heated arguments and damaged relationships. Sociopolitical positions on subjects like abortion rights, tax increases, and welfare seem to be able to turn up the fire underneath people. This is true both in the pleasing feeling of knowing your position has been validated by others and the unease that arises when your position is being attacked. This research empirically supports the conjecture that sociopolitical arguments are processed in a less than purely rational, logical manner by indicating that the evaluation of sociopolitical arguments is strongly associated with affect. First, predebate attitude, a composite of participants’ current positions regarding the election and their feelings toward the two candidates, uniquely and significantly predicted each of the postdebate evaluation measures. People seem to have difficulty dissociating their feelings toward the candidates not only from their positions regarding the election (Abelson et al., 1982) but also from their evaluations of the information presented by the candidates. If we hold positive feelings toward a presidential candidate, we also tend to rate their arguments positively. On the other hand, negative feelings toward a candidate are associated with negative argument evaluations. Although the predebate attitude composite consistently predicted debate evaluations, the expectancy measure consistently failed to uniquely predict debate evaluations. Therefore, no support for the disconfirmed expectancies account of biased assimilation was found in this research. It should be noted, however, that expectancy and predebate attitude were significantly correlated. Future research could be aimed at investigating the nature of this relation. Second, differential affective reactions to the favored and opposed candidate were shown to mediate the link between prior attitudes and peoples’ evaluations and cognitive elaborations of the arguments of the debaters. The desire to perceive the arguments as being supportive of the attitude may create specific affective reactions when the arguments are initially perceived as being unsupportive. These emotions then influence the manner in which the arguments are processed. Attitude-disconfirming arguments produce increased negative and decreased positive affect leading people to generate a greater number of negative and fewer positive cognitions on the way toward more negative overall evaluations of the arguments. Attitude-confirming arguments, on the other hand, produce increased positive and decreased negative affect, more positive and fewer negative cognitions,

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and more positive overall evaluations of the arguments. Mediational analyses are, of course, not a substitute for well-controlled experimental research demonstrating a causal role for affect, but they do suggest that the data are consistent with the affective-motivational account (Munro & Ditto, 1997). Attitude Change in Reactions to Sociopolitical Debates Although there is a bias to more positively evaluate one’s predebate favorite, this does not necessarily influence opinions. In support of past research (Miller et al., 1993; Munro & Ditto, 1997), opinion change in the form of polarization was found for the measure of participants’ perceived attitude change, whereas no opinion change was found for the measure of actual attitude change. Of course the actual attitude change measure is limited in its assessment of polarization because of the possibility of ceiling and floor effects (Lord et al., 1979; Miller et al.). Those with strong predebate attitudes toward the candidates would be constrained by the scale from reporting a more extreme attitude after the debate. Given these findings, this research suggests at the least that sociopolitical debates produce no change in the opinion of viewers as a group and at the most that debates reinforce peoples’ predebate opinions. Conclusions This research suggests that viewers of major sociopolitical debates like those between the democratic and republican candidates for U.S. president are biased by their predebate feelings and attitudes toward the candidates and the emotional reactions that ensue. However, the 1996 presidential campaign featured an incumbent seeking re-election during times of economic prosperity. Therefore, viewers may have been less motivated to think deeply about the arguments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) than they might have been under a period of economic crisis. Similarly, data were collected from college students who because of their generational or developmental cohort may be less willing or able to critically analyze political information. Instead, they may have relied on superficial characteristics like their feelings toward the candidates. Therefore, it would be premature to suggest that debates never lead viewers to change their opinions to the candidate with the stronger logical arguments. Still, although the circumstances surrounding future debates might create very different reactions, one also has to wonder whether televised media images, sound-bites, and political spin-doctoring haven’t tipped the scales toward more superficial and emotional responding at the expense of thorough and thoughtful analysis. Ultimately, this research poses the question of whether or not the ideal function of public debates—to provoke a thoughtful analysis of opposing arguments—might not be better served.

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