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Tenderness and Sympathy: Distinct Empathic Emotions Elicited by Different Forms of Need David A. Lishner, C. Daniel Batson and Elizabeth Huss Pers Soc Psychol Bull 2011 37: 614 DOI: 10.1177/0146167211403157 The online version of this article can be found at: http://psp.sagepub.com/content/37/5/614

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403157 et al.Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

PSP37510.1177/0146167211403157Lishner

Article

Tenderness and Sympathy: Distinct Empathic Emotions Elicited by Different Forms of Need

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 37(5) 614–625 © 2011 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0146167211403157 http://pspb.sagepub.com

David A. Lishner1, C. Daniel Batson2, and Elizabeth Huss1

Abstract Current need and vulnerability are two different forms of need. Integrating (a) cognitive-appraisal theories of emotion with (b) a view of human parental nurturance as emotionally based and cognitively generalizable, this article proposes that these two forms of need elicit distinct empathic emotions: Vulnerability evokes feelings of tenderness, whereas current need evokes feelings of sympathy. Results of two experiments support this proposal. Vulnerable targets elicited tenderness even when there was no current need; nonvulnerable targets did not. Sympathy was low when there was no evidence of current need but high when there was evidence of current need. Other forms of need and other empathic emotions are proposed, as are motivational and behavioral consequences of the distinction between tenderness and sympathy. Keywords current need, empathic concern, tenderness, sympathy, vulnerability Received December 20, 2009; revision accepted November 20, 2010 Empathic concern refers to other-oriented emotions elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need (Batson, 1987, 1991; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981). These other-oriented emotions include feelings of tenderness, sympathy, compassion, softheartedness, and the like. Understanding what evokes empathic emotions is important because research shows that they have powerful motivational consequences (see Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, for reviews). Empathic concern has long been considered to be a product of (a) perceiving another person to be in need and (b) adopting that person’s perspective (i.e., imagining his or her thoughts and feelings—Batson, 1987, 1991; Stotland, 1969). Recently, Batson, Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, and Ortiz (2007) provided evidence of an additional antecedent. In the normal flow of behavior, intrinsic valuing of the other’s welfare precedes and produces adoption of the other’s perspective, and in combination with perceived need, valuing the other’s welfare evokes empathic concern. Considerable attention has been given to the role of perspective taking as an antecedent of empathic concern (from Stotland, 1969, and Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978, to the present), and some attention has been given to valuing of the other’s welfare (Batson, Eklund, et al., 2007), but very little has been given to perceived need. This omission is easily explained given the definition above: “Someone in need”

is explicitly stated as a precondition for empathic concern. However, some recent claims about the nature and origin of empathic concern (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005; Dijker, 2001, 2010; Lishner, Oceja, Stocks, & Zaspel, 2008) suggest that the role played by the perception of need deserves more careful attention. These claims suggest that empathic emotions are embodied responses based on cognitive generalization of parental nurturance, which functions to promote the protection and care of offspring and young (on the embodiment of emotions, including empathic emotions, see Damasio, 1994, 1999; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009; for functional perspectives on emotion, see Batson, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992; Keltner & Haidt, 1999, 2001). We wish to build on these claims to suggest that one can and should distinguish two major empathic emotions— tenderness and sympathy—on the basis of the types of need that elicit them.

1

University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, WI, USA University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA

2

Corresponding Author: David A. Lishner, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, 800 Algoma Blvd., Oshkosh, WI 54901 Email: [email protected]


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need is evidence of vulnerability. Therefore, the appraisal conditions that elicit sympathy should also elicit tenderness.

Two Forms of Need: Current Need and Vulnerability Cognitive-appraisal theories of emotion contend that distinct emotions arise in response to different appraisals of valuerelevant situations (Arnold, 1960; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). With regard to empathic emotions, a key component of the cognitive appraisal is perception of the other as in need. But not all needs are the same. Although one would not expect a different emotion for every difference in need (e.g., a hurt foot vs. a hurt hand), one would expect different emotions for functionally different forms of need (Batson et al., 1992). Perception of need involves perception of a negative discrepancy between a person’s current state and what one desires for that person on one or more dimensions of wellbeing (Batson, 1987). Dimensions of well-being include the absence of physical pain, negative affect, stress, danger, and disease, as well as the presence of physical pleasure, positive affect, satisfaction, and security. Within this general framework, it is possible—and we believe important—to distinguish two functionally different forms of need. The first form is current need, which involves perception of an existing discrepancy on one or more dimensions of well-being. We suggest that appraisal of current need is a necessary condition for feeling what is commonly described as sympathy— concern felt for another in need (see Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Wispé, 1986). The second form of need is vulnerability. Even when no discrepancy exists between what is and what is desirable, a person may be seen as vulnerable to future discrepancies. We suggest that appraisal of vulnerability is a necessary condition for feeling what is commonly described as tenderness—an expansive, “warm-and-fuzzy” feeling often elicited by the delicate and defenseless (for similar suggestions, see Dijker, 2001, 2010; Kalawski, 2010). Given that current need is what one usually means by need, and given that sympathy is widely recognized as a prototypic empathic emotion (de Waal, 2008; Eisenberg, 2000; Wispé, 1986), let us say a bit more about vulnerability and tenderness. An appraisal of vulnerability is especially likely if the target is viewed as comparatively weak and defenseless. Think of your reaction at seeing a young child happily running across a playground or at seeing this child safely asleep in bed. Think of your reaction at seeing a puppy in similar situations. There is no current need. Still, the young child’s—or puppy’s—vulnerability is apt to trigger feelings of tenderness. We suspect that seeing the playing or sleeping child (puppy) would trigger little sympathy. However, sympathy is likely to arise if you imagine the child (puppy) in current need—hurt, afraid, or lonely. This thought experiment suggests that although feelings of tenderness and sympathy often occur together, one may at times feel tenderness without feeling sympathy, but not vice versa. Because one must be vulnerable to a given need to experience it, current

Generalized Parental Nurturance Why should we feel anything for vulnerable others when they have no current need? If, as has been suggested (Batson et al., 2005; Lishner et al., 2008), empathic emotions are based on cognitive generalization of parental nurturance as it has evolved in humans, an answer presents itself. Were human parents not intensely interested in the welfare of their young— so interested as to put up with endless hassles, exhaustion, and even risks to their personal safety—our species would quickly die out (Bartels & Zeki, 2004; Bell, 2001; Hoffman, 1981; MacLean, 1990; Taylor, 2002; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). The human parental instinct goes well beyond nursing, providing other kinds of food, protecting, and keeping the young close—the activities that characterize parental care in most other mammalian species. It also includes anticipation of future needs (“She won’t like the fireworks; they’ll be too loud”). A century ago, William McDougall (1908) proposed that tenderness felt even for strangers is grounded in the evolved desire to protect our vulnerable young (see Taylor, 2002, for a similar argument). McDougall (1908) spoke of the “parental instinct,” which he considered to be the most powerful of all instincts, and the associated “tender emotion.” McDougall did not consider instincts to be automatic, reflexive responses. Each of his instincts included a cognitive, an affective, and a motivational component. Experience and learning could shape the cognitive and motivational components, but the affective component was fixed. It defined the character of the instinct. McDougall claimed that the tender emotion defined the character of the parental instinct and that the function of this instinct was to protect one’s offspring. However, he also claimed that as a result of cognitive generalization, tender emotion can be elicited by a wide range of targets if their current state indicates some form of vulnerability. Not only may the tender emotion be elicited by any child in need, it may even be elicited by the mere sight or thought of a perfectly happy child; for its feebleness, its delicacy, its obvious incapacity to supply its own needs, its liability to a thousand different ills, suggest to the mind its need for protection. By a further extension of the same kind, the emotion may be evoked by the sight of any very young animal, especially if in distress. . . . In a similar direct fashion the distress of any adult (towards whom we harbor no hostile sentiment) evokes the emotion; but in this case it is more apt to be complicated by sympathetic pain. . . . The child, or any other helpless and delicate thing, may call it out in the pure form without alloy of sympathetic pain. (McDougall, 1908, p. 63)


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Thus, McDougall claimed that through cognitive generalization based on learning and experience, the tender emotion is felt even for adults (for whom we feel no antipathy) when we perceive them in current need. Such cognitive generalization may be facilitated by three factors: (a) human cognitive capacity, including symbolic thought and analogic reasoning; (b) our capacity to experience appraisal-based emotion and goal-directed motivation; and (c) lack of evolutionary advantage in early human hunter–gatherer bands for strict limitation of tender feelings and parental nurturance to offspring. In these bands, those in need were often one’s children or close kin, and survival of one’s genes was tightly tied to the welfare even of those who were not close kin (Hrdy, 2009; Kelly, 1995; Sober & Wilson, 1998). To the extent that the human nurturant impulse relies on appraisal-based other-oriented emotions such as tenderness and sympathy, it should be relatively easy to generalize. In contemporary society, the prospect of such generalization seems more plausible when one thinks of the tender care typically provided by nannies and workers in day care centers, by adoptive parents, and by pet owners.

An Apparent Empirical Discrepancy The proposed linkage of sympathy to an appraisal of current need and tenderness to an appraisal of vulnerability offers insight into an apparent discrepancy found in the research literature. Participants exposed to adults in clear current need report high levels of both sympathy and tenderness; these two empathic emotions tend to co-occur (Batson, 1987; Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Fultz, Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988). However, in their research on emotion prototypes, Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, and O’Connor (1987) found that most people place tenderness and sympathy in different semantic categories. Tenderness is in a positively valenced category characterized by caring, love, and affection, whereas sympathy is in a negatively valenced category along with pity. (Shaver et al., 1987, also found that a minority of their research participants placed sympathy and pity with tenderness, love, and caring.) This apparent empirical discrepancy makes sense in light of the distinction between current need and vulnerability and their role in evoking sympathy and tenderness, respectively. As McDougall (1908) observed, witnessing an adult in current need evokes both “sympathetic pain” and tenderness because current need implies vulnerability, which explains the close association between reports of sympathy and tenderness by research participants confronted with adults in clear current need (and by Shaver et al.’s, 1987, minority). But when given a chance to compare and contrast emotion terms, most people distinguish between these two empathic emotions. Our analysis suggests that people do so because they discriminate between the two forms of need that contribute to the different appraisal conditions for sympathy and tenderness.

The Present Research We conducted two experiments to test the proposal that appraisals of vulnerability and of current need evoke tenderness and sympathy, respectively. Specifically, we tested two hypotheses. The cognitive-appraisal distinction between current need and vulnerability, coupled with McDougall’s (1908) suggestion that perceived vulnerability evokes the tender emotion, led to our first hypothesis. Hypothesis 1: An appraisal of vulnerability evokes tenderness. This appraisal condition can be satisfied either by chronic vulnerability (as in the case of a child) or by acute vulnerability (as in the case of an adult in current need). The suggestion that sympathy requires an appraisal of current need led to our second hypothesis. Hypothesis 2: An appraisal of current need evokes sympathy. Each of these hypotheses is predicated on the assumption that no antipathy exists toward the person in need (Batson, Eklund, et al., 2007; McDougall, 1908).

Experiment 1 In Experiment 1, participants were led to imagine a person in a particular situation. We manipulated both chronic vulnerability and current need in a 2 (low vs. high chronic vulnerability) × 2 (low vs. high current need) betweengroups design. In line with McDougall’s (1908) ideas about vulnerability and the tender emotion, chronic vulnerability was manipulated by varying the age of the target—either a 20-year-old adult (low) or a 2-year-old child (high). Current need was manipulated by having participants imagine the target either playing with a Frisbee (low current need) or struggling to walk with a leg in a heavy plaster cast (high current need). To eliminate extraneous between-condition variation and to focus attention on the key appraisal information about age and current need, we provided only this information about the target person and situation.

Predictions Appraised vulnerability and, according to Hypothesis 1, tenderness should be high in the child/playing, child/struggling, and adult/struggling conditions, but low in the adult/playing condition. Hypothesis 1 states that either chronic vulnerability (as in the case of a child) or acute vulnerability (as in the case of an adult in current need) can produce appraisal of vulnerability. At the same time, it seemed unlikely that the acute vulnerability of a struggling adult would generate an appraisal of as much vulnerability—and, therefore, as much


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Lishner et al. tenderness—as the chronic vulnerability of a child (whether playing or struggling). Regardless of the age of the target, struggling with the cast should produce an appraisal of current need, whereas playing should not. In addition, it seemed likely that imagining a struggling child would create higher appraisal of current need than would imagining a struggling adult. Accordingly, if Hypothesis 2 is correct, sympathy should be high only in the adult/struggling and child/struggling conditions—and likely higher in the latter than the former.

Method Participants. Eighty undergraduates at the University of Kansas (40 women, 40 men) received partial credit toward an introductory psychology class research requirement in return for taking part in Experiment 1. Using a randomized block procedure, 10 women and 10 men were assigned to each cell of the 2 (chronic vulnerability: adult vs. child) × 2 (current need: playing vs. struggling) design. It was not necessary to exclude any participants for suspicion. Procedure. Experiment 1 was run in sessions of anywhere from 1 to 10 participants. On arrival, the experimenter handed participants a packet with a cover page, titled “Feelings When Encountering Strangers,” that introduced the research: On a typical day, we encounter many different strangers in a range of different situations. These strangers, whom we shall call social targets, can include a variety of people. In this brief survey, we are interested in some possible feelings evoked by different social targets in different situations. To prevent participants from thinking that the survey concerned reactions to only two targets and two situations, the cover page stated that an extensive list of targets and situations existed and each participant would be randomly assigned one pairing. Manipulation of chronic vulnerability. On the next page of the packet, all participants read that they had been assigned Target 4. For those in the adult (low chronic vulnerability) condition, Target 4 was “A 20-year-old woman (man)”; for those in the child (high chronic vulnerability) condition, Target 4 was “A 2-year-old girl (boy).” Sex of participant and sex of target were always the same. Manipulation of current need. Next, all participants read that they had been assigned Situation 5. For those in the playing (low current need) condition, instructions for Situation 5 read: Imagine that you are walking across campus, and you see this target and a young woman playing happily with a Frisbee.

Please take about 1 minute to imagine the target in this situation. When you have finished imagining, please turn to the next page and begin filling out the questionnaires. For those in the struggling (high current need) condition, the second paragraph of the instructions was the same, but the first paragraph read: Imagine that you are walking across campus, and you see this target being helped by a young woman as this target struggles to walk with one leg in a heavy plaster cast. Experimental materials were prepared in advance using a method that enabled the experimenter to remain unaware of the target–situation pairing each participant received until after completing all measures. Feelings questionnaire. Once participants finished imagining the target in the situation and turned the page, they found a feelings questionnaire that listed 20 emotion adjectives. The list included tender and sympathetic, as well as four other adjectives used in much prior research to assess empathic concern: compassionate, softhearted, warm, and moved (Batson, Eklund, et al., 2007; Batson et al., 1987; Batson et al., 2005). Instructions asked participants to “indicate the extent to which you experienced each of the following feelings while imagining this target in the situation” (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). Reactions questionnaire. A reactions questionnaire followed the feelings questionnaire. To assess appraisal of current need, participants were asked, “How good or bad overall did you imagine the target was feeling?” (–4 = extremely bad, 0 = neutral, 4 = extremely good). To assess appraised vulnerability, participants were asked, “How vulnerable was the target you imagined?” (1 = not at all vulnerable, 9 = extremely vulnerable). Debriefing. After participants completed the questionnaires, the experimenter explained the true purpose of the research and the reason for the minor deceptions involved, answered any questions, and thanked participants for taking part in the study.

Results and Discussion Preliminary analyses including gender as a factor revealed only one significant gender effect, a main effect on ratings of feeling tender. Women reported feeling more tenderness than did men. Given that this main effect did not qualify interpretation of the results in relation to the predictions, we report results collapsed across gender. Appraisal of current need and vulnerability. As expected, participants thought the playing adult and child felt better than the adult and child struggling with the cast (for means, see row 1 of Table 1). This difference produced a significant


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Table 1. Mean Ratings of Appraised Current Need, Appraised Vulnerability, Feeling Tender, Feeling Sympathetic, and Feeling Four Other Empathic Concern Emotions (Experiment 1) Condition Measure

Adult/ playing

Adult/ struggling

Current need 3.00 −.40 Vulnerability 2.85 4.95 Tender 3.20 3.75 Sympathetic 1.10 5.05 Other empathic concern emotions Compassionate 2.50 4.25 Softhearted 3.95 4.60 Warm 4.50 3.40 Moved 2.70 3.70

Child/ playing

Child/ struggling

3.30 7.20 4.85 1.95

−1.70 7.75 4.75 6.05

3.70 5.05 5.25 3.85

5.50 5.30 4.00 4.10

Note: N = 20 (10 women, 10 men) in each experimental condition. Current need was assessed by: “How good or bad overall did you imagine the target was feeling?” (–4 = extremely bad, 0 = neutral, 4 = extremely good).Vulnerability was assessed by: “How vulnerable was the target you imagined?” (1 = not at all vulnerable, 9 = extremely vulnerable). Tender, sympathetic, and the four other empathic concern emotions were rated on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely).

current need main effect, F(1, 76) = 232.75, p < .001. The Chronic Vulnerability × Current Need interaction also was significant, F(1, 76) = 8.44, p < .01, but the chronic vulnerability (adult vs. child) main effect was not, F(1, 76) = 3.30, ns. As expected, there was no significant difference in judged feelings of the adult and child in the playing condition (t < 1.0), but the struggling child was judged to feel worse than the struggling adult, t(76) = 3.34, p < .002. Given the significant difference between the playing and struggling means for both the adult and child (both ts > 8.00, ps < .001), we concluded that the manipulation of current need was successful for both targets. At the same time, as anticipated, participants perceived struggling with the cast to be worse for a 2-yearold than for a 20-year-old. Appraisal of vulnerability also was as expected: low in the adult/playing cell, moderately high in the adult/struggling cell, and high in both the child/playing and the child/ struggling cells (for means, see row 2 of Table 1). This pattern produced a significant main effect for both chronic vulnerability, F(1, 76) = 84.30, p < .001, and current need, F(1, 76) = 11.58, p < .002, as well as a significant interaction, F(1, 76) = 3.96, p < .05. A planned comparison testing the predicted pattern of vulnerability (coefficients –2, 0, 1, 1, with cells ordered as just specified) was significant, F(1, 76) = 94.05, p < .001, whereas the residual between-groups variance was not, F(2, 76) = 2.90, ns. Participants saw the 2-yearold as vulnerable regardless of current need, t < 1.0. In contrast, participants saw the 20-year-old as more vulnerable when struggling with the cast than when playing with a Frisbee, t(38) = 3.97, p < .001. Tenderness and sympathy. Rows 3 and 4 of Table 1 present the mean ratings of feeling tender and sympathetic in each

condition of Experiment 1 (ratings for the other four empathic concern adjectives are in rows 5-8). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, ratings of feeling tender patterned much like the ratings of vulnerability: low in the adult/playing cell (M = 3.20), moderately high in the adult/struggling cell (M = 3.75), and high in both the child/playing (M = 4.85) and the child/ struggling (M = 4.75) cells. This pattern of means produced a significant main effect for chronic vulnerability, F(1, 76) = 14.56, p < .001, but not for current need, and no significant interaction, both Fs < 1.0. As with ratings of vulnerability, a planned comparison testing the specific predicted pattern (coefficients –2, 0, 1, 1, with cells ordered as just specified) was significant, F(1, 76) = 14.15, p < .001, whereas the residual between-groups variance was not, F(2, 76) = 0.85. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, participants reported feeling more sympathetic in the adult/struggling cell (M = 5.05) and the child/struggling cell (M = 6.05) than in the adult/ playing cell (M = 1.10) and the child/playing cell (M = 1.95), producing a significant current need main effect, F(1, 76) = 211.10, p < .001. The chronic vulnerability main effect also was significant, F(1, 76) = 11.15, p < .002, but the interaction was not, F < 1.0. Participants reported feeling more sympathy for the 2-year-old than the 20-year-old regardless of current need; however, sympathy for the playing child was quite low relative to sympathy for the struggling adult or child. Looking at the other empathic concern adjectives, compassionate showed a pattern that seemed to be a mix of the patterns for tender and sympathetic although a bit more like the latter. Softhearted and moved showed patterns more similar to tender. Warm showed a unique pattern; ratings were higher in the playing (low current need) conditions than in the struggling (high current need) conditions. Warm seemed to track positivity. Associations of tenderness and sympathy with each other and with the other empathic concern adjectives. Next, we examined the association of reports of feeling tender and sympathetic, as well as the association of each with the four other empathic concern adjectives (compassionate, softhearted, warm, and moved). In presenting these correlations, we distinguish between the three conditions in which feelings of tenderness and sympathy were hypothesized to be congruent—perceived vulnerability and current need either both low or both high (adult/playing, adult/struggling, child/struggling)—and the condition in which feelings of tenderness and sympathy were hypothesized to be incongruent—vulnerability high and current need low (child/playing). These correlations are presented in Table 2. As predicted, ratings of feeling tender and sympathetic were significantly positively correlated in the congruent conditions, r(58) = .48, p < .001, but not in the incongruent condition. With one exception, the other four adjectives were positively correlated with both tender and sympathetic in the congruent conditions (warm was not correlated with sympathetic). In the incongruent condition, softhearted and warm were significantly associated with tender,


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Lishner et al. Table 2. Correlations of Tender and Sympathetic and of Other Empathic Concern Emotions With Each When Vulnerability and Current Need Were Hypothesized to Be Either Congruent or Incongruent (Experiment 1) Hypothesized relation Emotion Sympathetic Compassionate Softhearted Warm Moved

Congruent

Incongruent

Tender

Sympathetic

Tender

Sympathetic

.48* .76* .73* .57* .64*

.77* .52* .00 .48*

.06 .12 .53* .82* .39

.37 .27 −.03 .07

Note: Congruence (vulnerability and current need either both high or both low) was hypothesized for the adult/playing, adult/struggling, and child/struggling conditions. Incongruence (vulnerability high and current need low) was hypothesized for the child/playing condition. *p < .05 (two-tailed).

but none of the four other empathic concern adjectives were significantly associated with sympathetic. In sum, the results of Experiment 1 supported both hypotheses. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, perceived vulnerability was produced by both chronic vulnerability (a child, whether playing or struggling) and current need (an adult struggling), and feelings of tenderness patterned much as perceived vulnerability. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, feelings of sympathy varied with perceived current need. Furthermore, reports of tenderness and sympathy were significantly positively correlated in conditions in which levels of perceived vulnerability and current need were hypothesized to be congruent (both low or both high) but not when levels of perceived vulnerability and current need were hypothesized to be incongruent (vulnerability high, current need low). In the congruent conditions, responses to the four other empathic concern adjectives significantly correlated with both tenderness and sympathy (with the exception of the warm– sympathetic correlation). However, in the incongruent condition, reported sympathy was not significantly related to any of the other empathy adjectives. The major limitation of Experiment 1 was that it relied on imagined hypothetical scenarios. Therefore, we ran a second experiment, a conceptual replication of the 2 × 2 design of Experiment 1, using a procedure that involved higher experimental realism.

Experiment 2 In Experiment 2, participants read a pilot newspaper feature article that they were led to believe was about a real person, Kayla. Chronic vulnerability and current need were manipulated by altering Kayla’s age (adult, child) and situation (relaxing in a park, struggling with rehabilitation exercises for a broken leg) to once again create a 2 (low vs. high chronic vulnerability) × 2 (low vs. high current need) between-groups

design. Predictions for Experiment 2 were the same as for Experiment 1.

Method Participants. Participants in Experiment 2 were 56 undergraduate women at the University of Wisconsin Oshkosh who received partial course credit or extra credit in return for taking part. All participants were female because the two experimenters were female, and we wished to minimize selfpresentation concerns by keeping the gender of participant and experimenter the same (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Given the limited gender effects in Experiment 1, we did not consider restriction to one gender a problem. Using a randomized block procedure, 14 participants were assigned to each cell of the 2 (chronic vulnerability: adult vs. child) × 2 (current need: relaxing vs. broken leg) design. Two additional women (one in the adult/relaxing condition, one in the child/broken leg condition) were excluded from analyses and replaced, the first because she did not understand procedural instructions and the second because she had worked with a child in need while volunteering at same medical institution named in the article. It was not necessary to exclude any participants for suspicion. Procedure. Participants were run individually. On arrival, they were seated in a research cubicle and left alone to read a written introduction. The introduction explained that the research was being conducted as a service for the university student newspaper, which was considering introducing a new feature, “Helping Hands,” that would allow students to report their experiences serving as volunteers in the local community. Each participant would be randomly assigned one of eight brief pilot articles written for this feature by student volunteers. The articles were about the most memorable person the volunteer encountered on his or her first day. After reading the introduction, participants were asked to choose a number between 1 and 8. The experimenter then left, ostensibly to get the chosen article. In fact, without looking, she slid the previously randomly assigned version of an article by Molly Green about her encounter with Kayla into a folder with the chosen number. (There were four versions, one for each cell of the 2 × 2 design.) This procedure allowed the experimenter to remain unaware of experimental condition until after all measures were taken. The experimenter returned with the folder and two questionnaires, instructing the participant to read the article first, then complete the questionnaires in the specified order. The experimenter left the participant alone to follow this procedure. Manipulation of chronic vulnerability and current need. Chronic vulnerability (adult vs. child) was manipulated by describing Kayla as either a “20-year old woman” (low chronic vulnerability) or a “3-year old girl” (high chronic vulnerability). Current need was manipulated by whether Kayla was relaxing on a blanket in a park while her parents and siblings


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played nearby (low current need) or was struggling with rehabilitation exercises after suffering a badly broken leg (high current need). In the relaxing condition, participants read in part: I came across a 20-year old woman [3-year old girl] lying on a blanket in the sunshine. Spread around her on the blanket were several magazines [picture books] she was happily reading. As I was passing by, she greeted me and after talking a bit I learned her name was Kayla. She was visiting the park that morning with her family (her parents were nearby watching her brother and sister play on the playground equipment). When I asked her why she wasn’t over with them, she smiled and said she was too busy reading right now. Then she smiled again, “But in a few minutes I might take a little nap.” . . . I’ll always remember Kayla, lying on that blanket, basking in the sun, and reading. She seemed so at ease, enjoying a few moments to herself in the park. In the broken leg condition (adapted from Batson et al., 2005), participants read in part: Kayla’s rehabilitation exercises sounded like a real ordeal, but when I went to get her she was more than ready. Soon she was hobbling around the therapy room as best she could with that bulky cast. She would try to walk without assistance, but the pain was so great that she could only take 3 or 4 steps. Yet she kept trying. Once she slipped and fell, and let out a cry of pain. Still, she got up and tried again. Kayla just wouldn’t quit. . . . I’ll always remember Kayla—both her pain and her persistence. Even though you could tell that it hurt, she wanted to be up and active as soon as possible. The adult and child versions of each article were identical except for the bracketed distinctions noted above. Questionnaires. Once participants finished reading the article, they completed a feelings questionnaire with the same 20 emotion adjectives and response scale used in Experiment 1. Then they completed a reactions questionnaire. To assess appraisal of current need, participants were asked: “How great was the current need of the person whom the volunteer encountered?” (1 = not at all great, 9 = very great); to assess appraisal of vulnerability, participants were asked: “How vulnerable was the person whom the volunteer encountered?” (1 = not at all vulnerable, 9 = extremely vulnerable). Debriefing. Once participants completed the two questionnaires, the experimenter returned, collected the questionnaires, and asked participants to describe their reactions to the pilot article. The ensuing discussion permitted assessment of suspicion and was followed by a full debriefing.

Results and Discussion Appraisal of current need and vulnerability. As expected, participants in Experiment 2 rated the current need of the relaxing adult and child lower than the current need of the adult and child struggling with a broken leg (for means, see row 1 of Table 3). This difference produced a significant current need main effect, F(1, 52) = 123.46, p < .001. Neither the chronic vulnerability (adult vs. child) main effect nor the Chronic Vulnerability × Current Need interaction was significant, both Fs(1, 52) < 1.0. Like Experiment 1, the current need manipulation appeared to be highly successful. However, in Experiment 2, participants perceived no difference in current need between the adult and child in either current need condition—likely because of the more vivid and impactful description of Kayla’s struggles with her broken leg. Appraisal of vulnerability also was as expected—with one exception. Vulnerability was rated low in the adult/ relaxing cell, moderately high in the adult/broken leg cell and child/relaxing cells, and high in the child/broken leg cell (for means, see row 2 of Table 3). This pattern produced a significant main effect for both chronic vulnerability, F(1, 52) = 9.13, p < .005, and current need, F(1, 52) = 21.14, p < .001, but not a significant interaction, F < 1.0. A planned comparison testing the predicted pattern of vulnerability (coefficients –2, 0, 1, 1, with cells ordered as just specified) was significant, F(1, 52) = 20.78, p < .001. However, because of the relatively low vulnerability rating in the child/relaxing cell, the residual between-groups variance also was significant, F(2, 52) = 5.12, p < .02. Perhaps with her parents nearby, participants did not judge the relaxing 3-year-old Kayla to be as vulnerable as the 2-year-old playing Frisbee in Experiment 1. Still, she was judged to be significantly more vulnerable than the relaxing 20-year-old Kayla, t(26) = 2.30, p < .03. Tenderness and sympathy. Rows 3 and 4 of Table 3 present the mean ratings of feeling tender and sympathetic in each condition of Experiment 2 (ratings for the other four empathic concern adjectives are again in rows 5-8). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, ratings of feeling tender patterned much like the ratings of vulnerability: low in the adult/relaxing cell (M = 2.86), moderately high in the adult/broken leg and child/relaxing cells (both Ms = 4.29), and high in the child/ broken leg cell (M = 5.14). This pattern of means produced significant main effects for chronic vulnerability and current need, both Fs(1, 52) = 5.76, ps < .02, but no significant interaction, F < 1.0. As with ratings of appraised vulnerability, a planned comparison testing the specific predicted pattern (coefficients –2, 0, 1, 1, with cells ordered as just specified) was significant, F(1, 52) = 10.14, p < .003. However, for the adjective tender, the residual between-groups variance was not significant, F(2, 52) = 0.88. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, ratings of feeling sympathetic patterned much like the ratings of current need: higher in the adult/broken leg cell (M = 5.71) and the child/broken leg


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Lishner et al. Table 3. Mean Ratings of Appraised Current Need, Appraised Vulnerability, Feeling Tender, Feeling Sympathetic, and Feeling Four Other Empathic Concern Emotions (Experiment 2) Condition Measure

Adult/ relaxing

Adult/ broken leg

Current need 2.50 7.14 Vulnerable 2.36 5.14 Tender 2.86 4.29 Sympathetic 1.64 5.71 Other empathic concern emotions Compassionate 3.00 4.36 Softhearted 3.49 5.29 Warm 4.70 4.21 Moved 2.43 4.71

Child/ relaxing

Child/ broken leg

2.07 4.29 4.29 2.07

7.07 6.50 5.14 6.07

3.36 4.93 5.07 3.00

5.57 5.86 4.64 5.14

Note: N = 14 women in each experimental condition. Current need was assessed by: “How great was the current need of the person whom the volunteer encountered?” (1 = not at all great, 9 = very great).Vulnerability was assessed by: “How vulnerable was the person whom the volunteer encountered?” (1 = not at all vulnerable, 9 = extremely vulnerable). Tender, sympathetic, and the four other empathic concern emotions were rated on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely).

cell (M = 6.07) than in the adult/relaxing cell (M = 1.64) and the child/relaxing cell (M = 2.07). This pattern of means produced a significant current need main effect, F(1, 52) = 121.08, p < .001. Neither the chronic vulnerability main effect nor the interaction was significant, both Fs(1, 52) < 1.15. Looking at the other empathic concern adjectives, patterns were generally similar to those in Experiment 1. Compassionate showed a mixed pattern that was a bit more like the pattern for sympathetic. Softhearted and moved showed patterns similar to tender. Once again, warm showed a unique pattern that seemed sensitive to positivity; it was rated higher in the relaxing conditions (low current need) than in the broken leg conditions (high current need). Associations of tenderness and sympathy with each other and with the other empathic concern adjectives. As before, we next examined the association of reports of feeling tender and sympathetic, as well as the association of each with the four other empathic concern adjectives (compassionate, softhearted, warm, and moved) separately for the congruent and incongruent conditions. These correlations are presented in Table 4. Once again, ratings of feeling tender and sympathetic were significantly positively correlated in the congruent conditions, r(40) = .69, p < .001, but not in the incongruent condition. Furthermore, with the same one exception, the other four adjectives were positively correlated with both tender and sympathetic in the congruent conditions (warm was not significantly correlated with sympathetic). In the incongruent condition, softhearted and warm were again significantly associated with tender, but none of the four other empathic concern adjectives were significantly associated with sympathetic.

Table 4. Correlations of Tender and Sympathetic and of Other Empathic Concern Emotions With Each When Vulnerability and Current Need Were Hypothesized to Be Either Congruent or Incongruent (Experiment 2) Hypothesized relation Emotion Sympathetic Compassionate Softhearted Warm Moved

Congruent

Incongruent

Tender

Sympathetic

Tender

Sympathetic

.69* .85* .71* .51* .70*

.59* .70* .20 .75*

.13 .48 .64* .80* .19

−.24 −.26 .10 −.09

Note: Congruence (vulnerability and current need either both high or both low) was hypothesized for the adult/relaxing, adult/broken leg, and child/broken leg conditions. Incongruence (vulnerability high and current need low) was hypothesized for the child/relaxing condition. *p < .05 (two-tailed).

In sum, we again independently manipulated chronic vulnerability and current need in Experiment 2, but rather than asking participants to imagine hypothetical scenarios (as in Experiment 1), we had them read about what they thought was a real person who was either in current need or was not. Like Experiment 1, results of Experiment 2 clearly supported both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, the pattern of correlations of tenderness and sympathy with each other and with the four other empathic concern adjectives were similar to the patterns found in Experiment 1.

General Discussion Among the antecedents of empathic concern, perceived need has been taken for granted. Recent claims about the nature and origin of empathic emotion suggest that it deserves more attention. Combining (a) a cognitive-appraisal analysis of emotion with (b) McDougall’s (1908) analysis of the parental instinct and associated tender emotion, we distinguished two forms of need—current need and vulnerability. We proposed that appraisal of vulnerability evokes other-oriented tenderness (Hypothesis 1), whereas appraisal of current need evokes sympathy (Hypothesis 2). Hypothesis 1 specified that appraised vulnerability could be produced either by chronic vulnerability (e.g., a child) or by acute vulnerability (e.g., an adult in current need). Results of our two experiments provided consistent support for each of these hypotheses. In Experiment 1, participants imagined a target who was either chronically vulnerable (a 2-year-old child) or not (a 20-year-old adult) engaged in one of two situations—playing with a Frisbee or struggling to walk with a cast. In Experiment 2, participants read a report by a student volunteer of her encounter with Kayla, who was either chronically vulnerable (a 3-year-old child) or not (a 20-year-old adult) in one of two situations—relaxing in a park or struggling with rehabilitation exercises for a broken


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leg. In each experiment, we measured appraised vulnerability and current need, as well as tenderness and sympathy. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, participants in Experiment 1 who imagined an adult struggling to walk with a cast (high acute vulnerability) or a young child, either playing (high chronic vulnerability) or struggling with a cast (high chronic and acute vulnerability), reported higher ratings of vulnerability and tenderness than did participants who imagined an adult playing (low chronic and acute vulnerability). Much the same pattern was found in response to Kayla in Experiment 2. Consistent with the proposal that appraised current need is necessary to evoke sympathy (Hypothesis 2), participants rated current need higher and reported feeling more sympathy for either an adult or a child struggling with a cast rather than playing with a Frisbee (Experiment 1) or after reading about an adult or a child struggling with rehabilitation exercises rather than relaxing in a park (Experiment 2). In each experiment, ratings of tenderness and sympathy were positively correlated across the conditions in which appraised vulnerability and current need were hypothesized to be congruent (both low or both high) but were not positively correlated in the condition in which the appraisals were hypothesized to be incongruent (vulnerability high, current need low). In sum, our results provide consistent support for the proposal that tenderness and sympathy appear to be distinct empathic emotions elicited by different forms of need. Some participants reported feeling both tender and sympathetic; some reported feeling tender but not sympathetic; some reported neither. This variation closely tracked the variation in appraised vulnerability and current need, respectively.

Can Acute Vulnerability Evoke Tenderness? We have suggested that perception of current need in an adult carries with it a perception of acute vulnerability, which in turn evokes feelings of tenderness. Perhaps, however, this suggestion is wrong. Given that the adult target in need in each of our experiments had a broken leg and difficulty walking, perhaps this adult was perceived as more childlike or chronically disabled and this, rather than the perception of current need, evoked feelings of tenderness. There are two issues here: (a) Can a current need that does not imply chronic dependence or disability evoke tenderness? (b) If a current need disappears, does tenderness disappear as well—that is, are the effects of current need on tenderness acute or chronic? Results from three earlier experiments speak to both issues. (a) Batson, Turk, Shaw, and Klein (1995, Experiment 2) had research participants indicate their feelings for another participant, Lynn, who had been assigned to a positiveconsequences task on which she could earn raffle tickets for correct responses (no current need). Then, after the experimenter “discovered” that Lynn had actually been assigned to a negative-consequences task on which she would receive

electric shocks for incorrect responses (current need), participants were asked to complete the feelings questionnaire again. Although assignment to a negative-consequences task implied no chronic dependence or disability (i.e., no chronic vulnerability), learning that Lynn would receive shocks led to a significant increase in feeling both tender and sympathetic toward her, ps < .03 and .001, respectively. (b) Batson et al. (1995, Experiment 4) reversed this need sequence. Female undergraduates first reported their feelings for Kathy McDavis, a graduate student in education having difficulty getting volunteers for her master’s thesis research (current need). The experimenter then discovered a memo from the education department that participants were supposed to read before filling out any questionnaires. Participants were asked to read the memo and fill out the questionnaires again. The memo stated that Kathy no longer needed volunteers; she had finished her research at the end of the previous semester (no current need). Highlighting the acute nature of her perceived vulnerability, the information that Kathy no longer needed participants led to a significant decrease in feeling both tender and sympathetic, ps < .005 and .001, respectively. (c) Batson and Merino-Brammell (1995) replicated these decreases in a between-groups design, as well as with repeated measures. From the results of these experiments, it seems clear that needs that do not imply chronic vulnerability can evoke feelings of tenderness (and sympathy) and that when the need disappears, so do feelings of tenderness (and sympathy). These results seem consistent with our suggestion that acute vulnerability (current need) can evoke tenderness for another even if he or she possesses no characteristics signaling chronic vulnerability. We hasten to add, however, that we do not doubt that cues of chronic vulnerability (childlike qualities, disability) also can evoke tenderness, as suggested by the work of Dijker (2001, 2010) and Lishner et al. (2008). In future research it may be worthwhile to determine conditions under which current need can lead to a perception of chronic vulnerability.

Support for McDougall’s Functional Analysis? To find that vulnerability is a necessary condition for tenderness is consistent with McDougall’s (1908) claim that other-oriented tenderness has its roots in the human parental instinct, which can be generalized beyond offspring to other vulnerable targets. However, our experiments did not directly test his claim. Without a substantial advance in either gene research or neurophysiology, it is not clear that McDougall’s claim is directly testable. Still, we think it important to note that our results are consistent with his claim (as are the results of Batson et al., 2005; Lishner et al., 2008). At this point, generalized parental nurturance seems at least as plausible an account of the evolutionary origins of empathic concern as several more popular accounts, including affective resonance (Preston


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Lishner et al. & de Waal, 2002), kin selection (Hamilton, 1964), and perceived similarity (Dawkins, 1976; Rushton, Russell, & Wells, 1984). (See Batson, 2010, for a review of the relevant evidence.)

Appraisal of Need Is Not Enough to Evoke Empathic Concern Appraised need may be a necessary condition for feeling empathic concern, but it is not sufficient. One may see an enemy suffer—or a homeless person in despair—and feel little tenderness or sympathy. To feel these empathic emotions it is also necessary to adopt the other’s perspective or to place at least moderate value on the other’s welfare (which, as long as there is no antipathy, people typically do, even for strangers; Batson, Eklund, et al., 2007). Without one or both of these additional antecedents, one may recognize current need or vulnerability but feel little empathic concern. Conversely, without appraisal of some form of need, one may adopt another’s perspective or value the other’s welfare but feel little empathic concern. Both appraisal of need and either perspective taking or valuing (or both) are necessary antecedents of empathic concern (Batson, 1987, 1991; Batson, Eklund, et al., 2007).

Other Empathic Emotions; Other Forms of Need If tenderness and sympathy are evoked by appraisals of vulnerability and current need, respectively, then what forms of need might account for other empathic emotions? The pattern of means and associations for the four other adjectives commonly used to assess empathic concern (Tables 1-4) suggest that two of them—softhearted and moved—are closely akin to tenderness and, so, are likely evoked by appraised vulnerability (see Niezink, 2008, for data consistent with this suggestion). Across both experiments, softhearted showed high positive correlations with feelings of tenderness regardless of whether feelings of tenderness and sympathy were hypothesized to be congruent or incongruent; for moved, the correlation was weaker in the incongruent condition. In both experiments, warm also consistently correlated with tender, but the pattern of means across conditions suggested that warm was tracking positivity. Reported warmth was greater in low- than in high-current-need conditions. Ratings of the adjective compassionate produced a pattern that was mixed, although a bit more similar to the pattern for sympathetic. In Experiment 1, its correlations with tender and sympathetic were generally consistent with this interpretation. However, in Experiment 2, compassionate was positively associated with tender in both congruent and incongruent conditions, and positively associated with sympathetic only in the congruent conditions. These findings suggest that in some contexts compassionate may track appraisals of current need and feelings of sympathy more readily than the other three

empathic emotions (again, see Niezink, 2008, for data consistent with this suggestion), but in other contexts it may track appraisals of vulnerability and feelings of tenderness. Given these mixed findings, future research will be necessary to clearly understand self-reports of compassion. More broadly, functionally important forms of need other than current need and vulnerability should evoke their own distinct empathic emotions. One possibility is empathic anger, which seems to be evoked by the intentional harm of a cared-for other (Batson, Kennedy, et al., 2007; Hoffman, 2000; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). Another possibility is the empathic embarrassment felt when a cared-for other commits a faux pas (Miller, 1987; Stocks, Lishner, Waits, & Downum, 2008).

Motivational and Behavioral Consequences Why is it important to consider different forms of need and of empathic emotion? Once again, both cognitive-appraisal and functional analyses offer an answer. Each contends that emotion produces motivation that is responsive to the environmental conditions that led to the cognitive appraisal evoking the emotion (Batson et al., 1992; Frijda, 1988; Keltner & Haidt, 1999, 2001; Scherer, 1984). As noted at the outset, there is much evidence that empathic emotions have motivational consequences. Specifically, there is much evidence that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation, with the ultimate goal of relieving the need that elicited the empathic concern (see Batson, 1991; Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990). The present conceptual analysis and reported research permit a more fine-grained analysis. Different forms of empathic emotion produced by different appraisals of need should produce different forms of altruistic motivation designed to relieve the specific form of need that evoked the emotion. Sympathy should produce altruistic motivation directed toward the ultimate goal of addressing the current need that evoked the sympathy (Dovidio et al., 1990). Often (but not always; see Batson, 1991), this motivation will lead to helping behavior. Tenderness should produce altruistic motivation directed toward the ultimate goal of addressing the target’s vulnerability. Tenderness evoked by chronic vulnerability should create a desire to protect and shield the other from harm. Rather than immediate helping, this motivation should promote more long-range forms of assistance that, if possible, help the target overcome vulnerability through growth, training, and education. This motivation should also generate vigilance on behalf of the target. The person feeling tenderness should want to monitor the target’s situation, looking out for potential threats and dangers as well as potential sources of pleasure (cf. Clark, Mills, & Powell, 1986; Collins, Ford, Guichard, Kane, & Feeney, 2010). These two forms of altruistic motivation both have an ultimate goal of increasing the other’s welfare by addressing need, but because they seek to address different forms of need, they have different specific ultimate goals and lead to


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different sets of behavior. The terms succorance and nuturance, respectively, reflect the distinction between these two types of helping. Clearly, recognizing different forms of need has broad implications, not only for emotion but also for motivation and behavior.

Conclusion Our research underscores the importance of embedding any analysis of empathic emotions such as tenderness and sympathy in a functional sequence of cognitive appraisal, embodied emotion, and motivation. These emotions are not mindlessly or automatically “caught” when we encounter someone in distress. Rather, they are a product of nuanced cognitive analysis of the other’s situation and are distinctively tuned to reflect that analysis. So constituted, they can facilitate appropriate response to the various needs of those for whom we care. No small feat. Acknowledgment Thanks to Darci Wildemuth, who assisted with data collection for Experiment 2.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding The authors received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

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