Campaign Consultants and Responsible Party ...

Campaign Consultants and Responsible Party Government

David B. Magleby Brigham Young University Department of Political Science Kelly D. Patterson Brigham Young University Department of Political Science Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy James A. Thurber American University Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies

Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Marriott Wardman Hotel, August 27-September 3, 2000.

2 Campaign Consultants and Responsible Party Government1

David B. Magleby Brigham Young University Department of Political Science Kelly D. Patterson Brigham Young University Department of Political Science James A. Thurber American University Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies

Abstract This paper looks at some of recommendations made for a stronger two-party system by the Committee on Political Parties. It examines the history of political parties since the recommendations and explores some of the reasons why the linkages between voters, parties, and representatives have evolved in different directions than originally envisioned by the Committee. We argue that the rise of campaign consultants has been one of the major developments to encourage the candidate-centeredness of the current party system. We use principal-agent theory to explain why consultants and candidates may not be able to achieve party-centered goals under particular conditions. We also use a unique data set that measures the attitudes of political consultants toward the current electoral system. We conclude that the goals of the consultants and the parties may be too diverse to achieve some of the recommendations made by the Committee on Political Parties in its report Toward a More Responsible Party System.

1

The authors are grateful to the Pew Charitable Trust for their very generous grant that made this research possible. The Department of Political Science and the College of Family, Home, and Social Sciences at Brigham Young University also provided funds to support this research. We would like to thank Matthew Singer and Robert Floyd for their very able research assistance on this project.

3 Campaign Consultants and Responsible Party Government Fifty years ago, the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Political Parties concluded that “the expanding responsibilities of modern government have brought about so extensive an interlacing of governmental action with the country’s economic and social life that the need for coordinated and coherent [programs] has become paramount.” (1950, 31). However, its report, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, also showed that both major American political parties were “ill-equipped to organize [their] members in the legislative and executive branches into a government held together and guided by the party program” (1950, v). The Committee outlined a broad reform program that it hoped would make parties more “responsible, democratic, and effective”(1950, 17). Cultural changes, legal and institutional reforms, and technological developments have significantly altered the structures and activities of American political parties since the mid-fifties. While scholars debate whether these developments have resulted in party decline or regeneration, most would agree that today’s parties differ from those evaluated by the Committee on Political Parties fifty years ago. The rise of political consultants has arguably been one of the most significant developments in the current party system. How does this development affect the analysis and recommendations of the report? Has it moved parties closer toward realizing the goals envisioned by those who wrote the report? In this paper we hope to take a fresh look at the aims of the report by considering the impact of political consultants on the party system. First, we briefly evaluate the recommendations made by the Committee and tease out the critical relationships identified in the report. Next we describe changes in the party and electoral system since the report was issued. This section includes a discussion of the rise of political consultants and their

4 relationship to the political parties. In the last section we review principal-agent theory and use it to evaluate relationships between the various components of the current party system, including political consultants. We use survey data collected from professional campaign consultants to assess whether their presence changes the predicted relationship between the parties and the candidates and how the relationship may differ from the kind of connections between citizens and representatives deemed crucial by the responsible party model. The Responsible Party Model Representative government’s central feature is that a mediating assembly is set between a country’s citizenry and the political decision-making process (Brennan and Hamlin 1999). The challenge for representative government is that while each citizen is represented, no single policy maker can make policy decisions unilaterally. Therefore, voters cannot reasonably hold any one individual responsible for policy outcomes (Committee on Political Parties 1950, v). One remedy for such a problem can be found in responsible political parties (Dulio and Thurber 2000). When sufficiently organized, parties can unify legislators from different constituencies behind a specific policy program. When voters evaluate the individual candidates, they can assess the record of the candidate with regard to the accomplishments of a particular program. The legislator cannot escape responsibility by claiming the she did not have any influence in the outcome. The individual legislator has influence because the party has sufficient organizational capacity to impose its will on the chamber. Parties serve as agents of the electorate to design broad policy agendas and to compel elected officials to implement these programs. Individuals evaluate the parties’ efforts to deliver on their responsibility at the ballot box. As the Committee states, “for the great many of Americans, the most valuable opportunity to influence the course of public affairs is the choice they are able to make between the

5 parties in the principal elections” (Committee on Political Parties 1950, 15). Following this logic, elections should be contests between two competing policy programs, not just a choice between two separate candidates. This model breaks down, however, if parties fail to develop, present, and implement coherent policy programs. For a party system to achieve this level of coherence, political parties must be effective, responsible, and democratic. Effectiveness refers to the ability of the party to create a well-defined policy agenda and to control the means necessary to implement those programs when it governs. A governing party would be considered effective if it can claim responsibility for: the general management of the government, for its manner of getting results, for the results achieved, for the consequences of inaction as well as action, for the intended and unintended outcome of its conduct of public affairs, for all that it plans to do, for all that it might have foreseen, for the leadership it provides, for the acts of all its agents, and for what it says as well as what it does (Committee on Political Parties 1950, 22). Effective party governance also requires a strong opposition party devoted to both criticizing the majority party and to building its own policy programs (Committee on Political Parties 18). The responsible party model endorses party-line votes while arguing that the need for reelection by a national constituency will prevent the parties from digging in behind ideological walls. In an effective system, party and electoral forces induce all the parties’ candidates to run on the same policy stands and to remain united behind these policies when in office. “Effective” party government is closely linked to “responsible” party government. Responsibility means that the electorate can hold a party responsible for policy implementation and outcomes during its tenure (Committee on Political Parties, 1950, 2). The key to responsibility is party unity. If policy coalitions change by issue, according to the Committee on Political Parties:

6 The public usually finds it difficult to understand the new situation and to reconcile it with the purpose of the ballot. Moreover, on that basis it is next to impossible to hold either party responsible for its political record. This is a serious source of public discontent. (19, emphasis added). However, it is not enough that parties be unified; their messages must be distinct. Parties should have access to methods of communication to make their policy goals clear to the electorate, emphasizing contrasts with the other party. Public debate must be kept on a realistic (i.e., no unsubstantiated charges) and practical (i.e., party-centered) level. “When party policies cannot be defined in terms of a concrete program, party debate tears itself loose from the facts. The wild fictions are used to excite the imagination of the public” (Committee on Political Parties 22-3). The model also emphasizes that party leaders need to be responsible to their party members in instituting the agreed upon policy programs. Responsibility leads to the third characteristic of the responsible party model: the need for parties to operate democratically. This refers to more than institutional processes, however. A “democratic” party system is one where all decisions are made within an openly acknowledged concern for the public interest (Committee on Political Parties 1950, 2). Parties are legitimate political actors because, between the two, if they reach out and consult with their local organizations, they will represent most of the country. The democratic standard was included in the model because it set political parties apart from interest groups. Interest groups cannot attempt to define public policy democratically because, while they allow points of view that were previously underrepresented access to the political system, they are not responsible to broad segments of the public for their activities. Coherent public policies do not emerge as the mathematical result of the claims of all the pressure groups” (Committee on Political Parties 19, emphasis added).

7 The key to resisting interest group pressure is party integration (see also Cross 1998). Integration implies unity of goals and methods. The authors consider integration as the key to party responsibility, effectiveness, and democracy. Their model outlines ways parties can unite their members behind a single coherent policy agenda, reduce dissent and factions, and prevent individual officials from presenting independent messages and from straying from the party-line on controversial issues. First, responsible parties will unite their members behind the party agenda by encouraging them to participate in its creation. Discussion resolves conflict between factions, unites constituencies, and brokers disputes between interest groups. Involving many individuals in defining a policy agenda does more than generate profitable discussion, it gives them a stake in its success (Committee on parties 1950, 21-2). Parties will use more direct methods to integrate elected officials, because each official has more opportunities to undermine the party’s agenda or message and each must deal with local constituencies. Democratic parties coordinate and control officials by providing them access to campaign resources in exchange for their service. “Discipline is less a matter of what the parties do to their congressional candidates than what the parties do for them” (ibid 20, emphasis in original). In this manner voters have a single, integrated entity that they can hold accountable for the particular policies pursued by the government.(see E. E. Schattschneider, The SemiSoverign People). The Parties Since 1950 and the Rise of Campaign Consultants A great deal has changed since the publication of the Committee on Political Parties’ report. While many of the institutions and relationships analyzed in “Toward a More Responsible Party System” continue, technological developments and institutional reforms have changed the manner in which campaigns are conducted and the role of parties in these contests. It seems that the very ability of parties to enforce loyalty on their candidates through campaigns has eroded even further in the decades

8 since the report was published. Though there is some debate about the extent of these changes (Patterson 1996), the party system clearly must cope with the increasingly candidate-centered nature of campaigns and the growing prominence of professional political consultants (Wattenberg 1987, 1996; Desart 1995; Polsby 1983; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979; Thurber and Nelson, 1995). The rise of candidate-centered campaigns has its antecedents in the conduct of campaigns and the way in which candidates finance those campaigns. Perhaps the most noticeable change of the candidate-centered era is the means by which campaigns are conducted. The growth of TV and radio as the preferred medium for waging campaigns and the development of mass mailing as an advertising strategy have affected both the style and substance of campaigning (West 1993; Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000a). Campaign functions once performed by the parties became the provenance of the candidates and their individual organizations. Where party organizations once assumed some control over campaign messages and themes, candidates now bear most of the responsibility for shaping advertisements, designing flyers, and adapting issues and messages to fit the new media (see Herrnson, Patterson, and Pitney 1997 in Broken Contract). Federalism only exacerbates the trend toward candidate-centered campaigns. Each district has different media constraints and needs, both of which have always required that individual candidates to develop a strategy peculiar to that race. However, as the candidate-centered system gained steam, formal party organizations and normal citizens have increasingly found themselves on the sidelines watching individual candidates wage increasingly sophisticated campaigns (Herrnson 1995a; see also Kolodny and Logan 1998). The number of Americans contacted by volunteers decreased over the last three decades, while the amount of Americans receiving their political information from the media increased (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The majority of these volunteers had previously come from

9 the party, so this shift has affected services provided by local party organizations (See also Herrnson 1995b and Baer 1995). As the candidate-centered system developed, candidates sought the means to pay for the increasingly expensive services needed to wage credible campaigns. Candidates needed money to pay for the development and distribution of the campaign’s message. Excesses in the presidential and congressional arenas led to passage of the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). This legislation and subsequent amendments encouraged candidates to establish their own campaign organizations, removed financial control from the party, and required individual candidates to design their own fundraising strategies. Today, candidates in presidential and congressional elections generate most of their funds from outside the political parties to pursue their individual campaigns. Limits on individual donations have increased the need for fundraising advice and fundraising strategies that often extend well beyond the boundaries of a particular state or congressional district. Candidates realize the need to develop personal appeal and power to use the media to successfully attract contributions (Polsby 1983, 61). The complexity of campaign finance law and the distaste which candidates have for the activity encourage candidates to seek some form of professional assistance when it comes to fundraising (Himes 1995). All of these activities require large and experienced staff, a necessity that creates another expense for the campaign to meet (See also Kolodny 2000, and Herrnson 1995b). Whether perceived or real, candidates believe that their campaigns need a cadre of professionals able to perform these tasks. American political parties have been unable to provide these tasks needed by candidates in the candidate-centered system (Kolodny 2000). Their failure provided a niche for a new cadre of professionals. While candidates have long had personal staffs, the last half-century has a seen an

10 explosion in the number of individuals specializing in campaign tasks. Individual entrepreneurs now perform many of the tasks once performed by parties. Consulting began as a side-business of public relations firms who provided advice to individual candidates or to the political parties (Thurber and Nelson 2000; Johnson 1998, 1; Luntz 1988). In 1933 the team of Whitaker and Baker became the first full time campaign-only consultants. They designed a negative campaign to defeat California gubernatorial candidate Upton Sinclair and participated in several other high profile campaigns (Johnson 1998, 1; Mitchell 1992). However, it was not until the 1960s that the campaign consulting industry really began to professionalize. During this period consultants became experts not only in communications and technology but also in resource allocation or “the art of campaigning” (Nimmo 1970). Today there are more than 7000 consultants (Johnson 1998, 3). While these firms represent a small fraction of the public relations industry, their size and professionalism is growing. In 1992, 63.7% of all candidates for the House of Representatives reported hiring at least one consultant. The percentage rose to 76.8% in the 1998 races (Abbe et. al 2000). Incumbent and open-seat candidates are the most likely to hire professional consultants (Medvic and Lenart 1997; Abbe et. al 2000). Political consultants are entrepreneurs. Their goals are to produce results for their clients on election day and to gain a reputation as effective campaigners. Without such a reputation, business quickly dries up. The industry has specialized to the point where professional consultants now provide a wide variety of services: polling, organizing and producing direct mail, managing press relations, developing and purchasing media ads, mobilizing volunteers, and crafting opposition research (for a more detailed breakdown of the consulting industry, see Johnson 2000, Thurber 1999, Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 1998, Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000b). Congressional campaigns, particularly

11 those of incumbents, prefer to hire pollsters, media consultants, and fundraisers (Medvic and Lenart 1997). Presidential campaigns normally hire the full range. Scholarship on the consulting industry has focused on describing the activities typically used by consultants to accomplish their goals (see Thurber 1998 and Thurber 2000 for a summary of this literature). However, what effect does the campaign consulting industry have on the relationship between candidates, parties, and the electorate? Do consultants promote responsible party government? Scholarship on the subject is limited in scope and narrow in depth. In part this is a reflection of the general lack of attention given the subject of political consultants by election scholars. Previously, one of the authors described the study of political consultants as “a subfield in search of a theory” (Thurber 1998 and Thurber 2000). There are two general treatments of the relationship between consultants and political parties in scholarly literature: the adversarial and allied views (Kolodny and Logan 1998, Kolodny 2000). The adversarial view emphasizes the origin of consultants in public relations and advertising rather than politics. Central to this argument is that consultants value winning elections more than achieving policy outcomes. Accordingly, consultants are motivated by economic gain and a desire to build a reputation for achieving success (Kolodny and Logan 1998, 155). Individual consultants assess the political climate and recommend policy positions and campaign strategies that increase the probability of an electoral victory, focusing on building short term rather than long-term coalitions. The case study is the chosen methodological approach to support this claim. (Thurber 2000). The allied view suggests that consultants provide technical services that are beyond political parties’ institutional capacity to deliver (Thurber 1999). As the role of consultants grew under the FECA restrictions, parties had the option of marginalizing the consultants or joining them. Parties then

12 “positioned themselves as brokers between candidates and the private campaign industry” (Kolodny 1998, 1-2). Parties provide “transactional services” (Herrnson 1988) by matching candidates to consultants while consultants fundraise, shape issues, perform opposition and demographic research, and perform individualized services for all the party’s candidates (Kolodny 1997). This scholarly view generally rejects the party decline thesis, concluding instead that “the campaign techniques [consultants] provide have not destroyed the parties but have strengthened them” (Luntz 1988, 144). The literature in this area suggests several reasons why parties and consultants both benefit from this symbiotic relationship. First, consultants actually are agents of the parties. Prior to each election cycle, the Congressional Campaign Committees prepare a list of consultants that have previously demonstrated skill and loyalty to help candidates choose a consultant. Hiring a consultant off this list can be a prerequisite for receiving party funding (Kolodny and Logan 1998, 156). Parties also hire consultants that have demonstrated loyalty to work for them between election cycles (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000b; Kolodny 2000, Kolodny and Logan 1998; Johnson 2000). This view suggests that a competitive consultant market makes these two activities vital for consultant firms to remain in business, which subsequently makes them beholden to the parties. While some scholars make this argument, they also report data that indicate that some consultants might also be fairly independent of the parties. Among the general consultant population, 47 percent responded that the parties were not helpful in securing clients while only 36 percent say that the parties were very helpful in recruiting clients (Kolodny and Logan 1998, 157). The data do not indicate if there are differences between large, established firms and new firms, each of which has different risk assumptions and hence may have different relationships with the parties.

13 This argument also raises the question about how consultants balance their responsibilities to the party with their responsibilities to the candidate. Obviously, the key to continued party employment is success in getting candidates elected. However, this approach places consultants in the bind of wanting to adjust the party message for short-term success but to minimize such tinkering for long-term party employment. One possible solution to this dilemma would be for the consultant to either water down the message in order to focus on voter mobilization strategies or to develop negative campaigns. A second theory advanced by the allied view involves the socialization of consultants. Recent research reports that over 50 percent of consultants have worked for political parties in some capacity (Thurber 1999; Kolodny 2000). This explanation does not ignore the adversarial view’s observation that political consultants originated as a subfield of public relations. It does, however, argue that the initial experiences of the consultants shape their conduct and attitudes toward the political parties. Seeking party employment presupposes similar ideologies and goals. Working with party officials and local organizations reinforces their worldview and makes them personalize party programs. Further, consultants learn the tools of the trade through these initial experiences, which might limit their propensity to directly undermine party goals (Thurber 1999). If this socialization theory explains the positive relationships between parties and consultants, then consultants who previously worked for the parties would use different campaign techniques and have different views than those who have no previous party experience. Consultants with party experience are significantly more likely to coordinate their campaign strategy with party organizations. Interestingly, this shift in consultant backgrounds coincides with a possible resurgence of political parties (DeSart 1995, Herrnson 1986). However, the research in this area still needs to assess whether such consultants have different views of parties or prefer to use different techniques than those who had never

14 worked for parties. This theory also needs to explain how almost half of the consultants with no previous party employment would relate to the parties. Further, any socialization thesis would have to explain why consultants choose to leave party service. If this explanation for the movement of individuals from party employment to professional consulting states that they “craved more freedom” or “sought more significant monetary rewards” then it needs to acknowledge limits on the extent to which consults would seek to achieve party goals. We will say more about this problem later when we apply the principal-agent theory to relationships between parties and consultants. But for the moment, the movement of individuals from political parties to consulting raises the possibility of a conflict of interest between the parties and the consultants that, without institutional constraints, can minimize cooperation between them. Theorizing about Parties and Consultants The previous discussion of the impact of consultants on the party system assumes that there is such a thing as an ideal party system that can be either enhanced or damaged. The very categorization of “allied” and “adversarial” views assumes a standard usage of democracy against which the work of consultants can be measured. Yet it is the explicit recognition of such a standard that seems to be missing from the discussion. The anniversary of “Toward a More Responsible Party System” provides the framework for such a definition. The report outlines a particular set of relationships between actors within the political system. While it posits an idealized view of how parties should operate, it does provide a standard by which the effects of political consultants can be judged. It is certainly possible to deduce from the report how relationships should occur between candidates, parties, and voters. It is also possible to assess the way in which consultants may or may not affect these relationships. The report affords us the opportunity to assess the extent to which parties may be more or less

15 “responsible.” Individual theorists can and do differ about the desirability of responsibility in the system. However, some normative standard is needed to conduct productively a debate over the extent to which the presence of consultants may affect responsible party government. In the end, the discipline can at least conclude that consultants may enhance or detract from this particular version of responsibility, a small step, but one that merits attention so that the discipline does not continue to struggle with conceptual clarity (Patterson 1996; Pomper 1992; Geer 1998). We believe that looking at the vast amounts of anecdotal, descriptive, and survey research in the field through the lens of principal agent theory provides the best method for understanding the interactions between consultants and the more familiar political actors specified in the responsible party model. Principal agent theory models how a system of incentives and restraints in a hierarchical relationship determines outcomes by looking at these interactions in terms of a contract. Agency problems involve at least two players: a principal who holds authority to take certain actions and an agent to whom the principal delegates authority. The principal enters into a contract with an agent with the expectation that the agent will work for the principal’s benefit. By delegating responsibilities, the principal can overcome inefficiency as long as tasks are assigned to the party with a comparative advantage in performing them (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). However, this contractual relation is potentially troublesome for several reasons. First, only the agent has complete knowledge about his skills and work ethic. Secondly, only the agent has complete information about the outcomes of his labor. Third, and most importantly, the principal and the agent each have different goals and attitudes toward risk. These forces may encourage agents to use the powers granted them to pursue interests not those of the principal.

16 Principal agent theory’s central assumptions are that individuals are rationally self-interested and that information is a commodity (for a general discussion of this literature and its assumptions, see Moe 1984, Bohren 1998, Eisenhardt 1989). Individuals in this paradigm have no moral aversion to misrepresenting their abilities or activities unless they are compelled to do otherwise. The agent also has motivation initially to misrepresent his abilities, either out of dishonesty or fear that the other potential agents will misrepresent their qualifications in order to get the job. Once the principal hires an agent, he cannot completely monitor the agent’s activities or perfectly measure their effect without investing in information systems. More importantly, however, the principal and agent have different goals: the principal desires the long-term outcome at a minimal cost but the agent desires the maximum remuneration for the minimum effort (Bohren 1998). This difference is not universal; similar backgrounds, self-selection, and the anticipation of a future relationship can reduce the variance between the two parties’ goals. Similarly, if a competitive market or other economic circumstances make the agent risk averse, he is less likely to shirk his responsibilities and more likely to invest in building trust and a long-term relationship. But, however slight, differences in goals and sources of compensation cause the two parties to have different risk structures. This provides incentives for the agent not to pursue the principal’s goals or to do so inefficiently. In this situation, the agent “is induced to pursue the principal’s objectives only to the extent that the incentive structure imposed in their contract renders such behavior advantageous” (Moe 1984 756). The principal’s challenge, in this scenario, is to design a contract that will best induce positive behavior out of his agent (Eisenhardt 1989). Principal agent theory recognizes two general contract types: outcome-based and behavior-based. Outcome-based contracts provide the agent a portion of the final

17 product, while behavior-based contract provides the agent with a salary for his services. Behaviorbased contracts are more efficient from the principal’s perspective, but they do not prevent an unscrupulous agent from shirking his responsibilities2. Principals will use behavior-based contracts when the risk of shirking is small, especially if they have effective information systems. Outcome-based contracts minimize the possibility of shirking by aligning the interests of the agent with those of the principal, thus reducing the goal conflict. These contracts are more expensive for the principle, however, because he must either compromise on his goals with the agent or provide more benefits to him. Principal agent theory has been widely applied in explaining economic interactions. Political scientists have also recently recognized its value in explaining interactions within hierarchical relationships. While political scientists most commonly apply the theory to explain the relationship between elected officials and the bureaucracy (Moe 1984), it also helps to explain how the Supreme Court affects appellate court decisions (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994), the behavior of congressional committees (Maltzman 1995), and party leadership (Rhode and Shepsle 1987, Vega and Peters 1996, Sinclair 1999). Michelle Taylor uses principal agent theory to show how political parties in Costa Rica use incentives to exert control over legislators (1992). We argue that the key relationships in the responsible party model are of a principal-agent variety, and that the Committee’s description of the ideal party unknowingly applies the theory’s contract logic to make parties more effective, democratic, and responsible. For example, candidates are the agents of their constituents, parties are agents of their members, and, in the responsible party

2

The term “shirk” carries multiple meanings in the principle-agent literature. First, it implies an obligation that is being evaded. Second, it could mean the aversion of the obligation to deliberate. Third, it describes attempts by the

18 model, candidates are agents of the party in implementing their agendas. The periodic need for reelection provides the principals the opportunity to evaluate their agents’ activities. However, the authors of the responsible party model recognize the potential for goal conflict between the principals and the agents. Officials have reelection and other personal benefits as their goal; they legislate in order to advance these goals (Sinclair 1999, 423). While constituents desire effective policies from Congress, they also desire services from their local representatives and party officials. Parties desire to be in power so that they can implement their policy agenda, and their need to service a national constituency also forces them to rely on policy making rather than pork-barreling. However, candidates desiring reelection will focus on constituent service instead of policy-making (Mayhew 1974). They will also reject the responsible party’s issue-based campaign for either personality-based or negative campaigns if doing so would increase their chances of reelection. These goal differences create some of the deficiencies in the American two-party system cited by the Committee on Parties. The responsible party model explains how parties can enter into contractual arrangements to prevent its agents from shirking. Since local individuals desire either influence or a specific policy agenda, parties should encourage local officials to invest effort to form the agenda. This is equivalent to an outcome-based contract reducing the goal divergence between the party and its local agents. Parties, in the responsible party model, should provide electoral services (money, polling, advertising, endorsements) to those candidates that work to implement their policies and promote their messages and can deny these benefits or even work against (by not renominating) those officials who do not. If the parties have a monopoly on the resources candidates need to get elected, candidates will not risk losing party favor. This is equivalent to implementing a behavior-based contract to its legislative agents.

agent to conceal his evasion of his responsibilities.

19 A behavior-based contract will be efficient in this situation as long as parties have information and legislator and candidate activities and the agents are risk averse (dependent on parties for the services needed to be reelected). Parties do not have these abilities in the current candidate-centered system. We must recognize that professional consultants add another dimension to the relationships between candidates and parties making it even more difficult for the principals (parties) to enforce contracts with their agents (candidates). The potential exists for consultants to help candidates pursue goals different from those of the party (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000b). Such a difficulty evaporates if consultants share party goals, a position sometimes hinted at by the socialization theory. However, the matching of party goals and consultant goals does not seem tenable if we assume that consultants hired by the parties are exclusively agents of the parties. Certainly, the principal-agent theory predicts different types of relationships between parties and consultants than by a socialization theory. We previously outlined how several forces undermined the ability of parties to hold a monopoly over election services. This potentially changes the party’s ability to contract with the consultants because the consultants need not be as risk averse. However, the literature on consultants recognizes that consultants have relationships with both candidates and the parties. How do consultants mix these two responsibilities? To answer this question, we first must determine what motivates consultants: Partisanship? Money? Influence? Or is it something else? Also, what attitude do consultants have toward risk? Do they perceive party employment or earning notoriety for winning campaigns as being more important to gain employment? For example, principal agent theory hypothesizes that if consultants are risk averse and reliant on parties for further employment, then they are less likely to shirk and more likely to invest in building trust (Eisenhardt 1989, Bohren 1988). Also, what type of

20 relationship, if any, do consultants have with parties: outcome based or behavior based (does the party hire them for results or does it direct them to perform specific activities?). To evaluate the effect of consultants on the responsible party model, we must also examine how they affect the activities of candidates. If consultants really do substitute for political parties, do they change the type of message the candidates present or do they at least see the need to coordinate messages with the party? Do they cause candidates, either through tacit encouragement or by providing them independence from the party, to abandon or neglect the party agenda once in office? Have they enhanced or decreased the role of interest groups in deciding campaigns? Consultants and the Possibility of Responsible Party Government The framework provided by principal agent theory points us toward the motivations of political consultants and the possible differences in goals that may exist between the parties and the consultants. Consultants begin these particular careers for a variety of reasons; some of these goals coincide with those of a political party while others do not. The most overwhelming reason cited by consultants for entering the business of political consulting are their “political beliefs or ideology” (See Table 1). A significant majority of consultants carried strong beliefs and ideologies that they thought they could see instituted by working for particular campaigns (Political consultants have expressed similar sentiments in other studies (Hamburger 2000)). No more than twenty percent of those consultants polled cite any other reason as their main motivation. Most interesting for the realization of a responsible party model is the 7% who claimed that they wished to help their party to become the majority party in government. The “thrill of competition” and “money” were cited more often than the party motivation. (Table 1 about here)

21 Consultants can pursue their careers for reasons different than those they held when they began them. When asked what their main motivation is for being a professional consultant, a significant plurality still mentioned their political beliefs or ideology (See Table 2). However, money becomes more important as a motivation for continuing as a consultant than it was for beginning as a consultants. Almost one-quarter of the consultants say that they are a professional consultant because of the money that they could earn. The other motivations show little or no change. The goal of making a particular party a majority does not provide the motivation to most political consultants currently working in the field. These initial observations about the motivations of consultants are important in the application of the principal-agent theory. Consultants clearly have goals different from those of the party. They may be hired by the party, but they are not expressly concerned with the same goals as the party. (Table 2 about here) This leads us to whether or not their experience with a party may change their motivations. If individuals have spent time working with the party, they may be better disposed to helping parties achieve particular goals (Kolodny 2000). Many of today’s consultants have experience with political parties, with almost 45% reporting having worked for a national, state, or local political party or party committee. However, there are only slight differences in the motivations for becoming a political consultant between those who have worked for the party and those who have not: neither group of individuals is much more likely to cite a desire to help the party become a majority as a reason for becoming a political consultant (See Table 3). A majority of those who have worked and those who have not worked for a party both state that they became political consultants to pursue their beliefs and ideology. (Table 3 about here)

22 When consultants are asked why they currently pursue their career, a slightly different story surfaces. Once again, there is only a small difference between those who worked for the party and those who did not work for the party when helping their party to become a majority is the motivation (See Table 4). Individuals who once worked for the party are only slightly more likely to cite majority status as a motivation, where individuals who worked for their party are more motivated by their political beliefs and ideology. Furthermore, individuals who did not work for the party are more inclined to list the thrill of competition as a reason for being a consultant. This finding perpetuates the popular image of political consultants as hired guns, but these are more likely to be individuals who did not work for the party. The individuals who have no experience in political parties seem to be more motivated by the thrill of the game itself while beliefs and ideology more likely motivate those who worked for the party. (Table 4 about here) These data do not present a very clear picture, however. While a desire to achieve majority status does not motivate consultants, beliefs and ideology do. Consultants do not practice their trade to help parties attain the holy grail of achievement: majority status. Such a finding means that consultants and parties differ substantially over interests, a difference that creates friction in the principal-agent relationship. However, both beliefs and ideology motivate consultants and the prominence of these motivations can and does serve the interest of the party. Consultants tend to work for either one party or the other. Almost 40% of those polled report their firm only worked for Democrats while almost 30% of the consultants said their firms only worked for Republicans. Almost 30% said their firms worked for both parties, but here some firms have consultants that work exclusively for both parties, so the question probably understates the extent to which consultants align themselves with one of the two

23 parties. This affiliation with one of the two parties does suggest that consultants probably view parties as vehicles for helping them to elect candidates who share their beliefs and ideology. To the extent that parties and consultants share roughly similar beliefs and ideology, then some integration does become possible. Candidates, parties, and consultants are more likely to agree on the message to disseminate to voters thereby achieving some semblance of unity. However, a complication arises when parties and candidates have essentially different messages or when a candidate believes that a message different from the party is necessary for victory. Responsible parties must communicate a clear message to voters containing enough policy content that voters can make distinctions between them. Candidates should adhere to this message so that voters can hold candidates and the parties accountable for the achievement of the goals. Consultants believe that they are much better suited to perform all of the activities pertaining to message development than are the parties. In other words, a conflict arises between the parties’ need to communicate a coherent party-wide message to voters and the consultants’ belief that they need the freedom to pursue a strategy that maximizes the candidate’s chances to secure victory, even if this strategy downplays or contradicts the party message. The possible conflict between the parties and the consultants surfaces when consultants reveal the extent to which they believe they provide services of which parties are incapable of providing. Fiftyfive percent of consultants strongly agree and another 34% somewhat agree with the statement that they provide services that parties cannot (See Table 5). Only a total of 10% of the consultant somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with the statement. Interestingly, there is little or no difference between those who have worked for the party and those who have not. Both groups of individuals

24 overwhelmingly agree that they provide services of which parties are incapable of providing (See Table 6). (Tables 5 and 6 about here) The bulk of the services they believe that the parties cannot provide concerns message development and dissemination. A significant majority of consultants strongly agree or somewhat agree with the statement that they replace political parties when it comes to providing management or strategic advice and when dealing with the media or campaign advertising (See Table 7). In both cases over 85% of the consultants agree that they replace the political parties. Over 80% of the consultants believe they replace parties with regard to polling and direct mail. Therefore, in all of those areas where a particular institution crafts and disseminates messages to voters, an overwhelming majority of the consultants believe they have replaced the political parties. (Table 7 about here) Just because consultants believe that parties are incapable of providing particular services does not mean that they do not see the parties as helpful. When the consultants were asked to rate how helpful the parties could be, a majority of them said that all of the services they provided, except management or strategy advice, were very or somewhat helpful (See Table 8). Once again, however, consultants differentiated between the various services. Consultants were more likely to say that parties were more helpful in areas not traditionally associated with the creation and dissemination of messages, such as campaign fundraising, opposition research, and polling. Only 56% said the parties were very helpful or somewhat helpful with their coordinated advertisements. Surprisingly, get-out-the-vote operations were rated behind polling but just ahead of direct mailings. (Table 8 about here)

25 The low opinion that consultants have of the helpfulness of some of the services provided by the parties does not bode well for the future of political parties. Most political consultants believe that role of political parties at the national, state, and local levels has decreased very much or somewhat (See Table 9). Concurrently, political consultants agree overwhelmingly that the role of consultants at the national, state, and local levels has increased very much or somewhat. The data suggest that consultants think that some of the activities performed by the parties are helpful, but that the consultants themselves perform most of the important activities. They also do not believe that the role of parties has increased. Consultants clearly perceive a void in the services needed to conduct a campaign, a void that they see themselves as filling. (Table 9 about here) How do we interpret these data in light of the principal-agent theory? First, the data suggest that consultants do not share similar goals as the party. While a party is motivated by a desire to maximize the number of individuals who hold office—a necessary condition to control the policy apparatus—consultants appear to be motivated by individuals beliefs and ideology. The parties and consultants may share similar beliefs and ideology, but in the cases where there is divergence, the consultants have reasons to push for the election of the individual candidate. Second, the responsible party model envisions a contract between voters and parties when it comes to message development and unity, but in the current candidate-centered system, the real relationship is between candidates and voters. Little exists to bind consultants who advise the candidates to the parties’ message. Indeed, consultants work for the candidates and the contract is really between those two entities. Hence, consultants who are referred by parties still have incentive to shirk.

26 Principal agent theory can also help to explain how consultants welcome cooperation with the parties in some facets of the campaign but not in others. Because they want to secure employment from the parties but they also want to be successful, consultants welcome party help positively in such activities as mobilizing and other organizational contexts, but discourage or resent party intrusion in such activities as message development and advertising. Both of these findings can be inferred from the survey data from the consultants. The importance that consultants attach to message development and dissemination is seen in the consultants who work in both candidate and initiative campaigns. These consultants who work in initiative campaigns cite the freedom to develop and advertise campaign themes in initiative campaigns (Magleby and Patterson 1998). They compare and contrast the autonomy in initiative campaigns against the constraints they believe they face in candidate campaigns. Overall, consultants clearly perceive themselves as professionals who should be allowed to apply their craft with few constraints in order to achieve their penultimate goal: victory for a particular candidate or initiative. While party goals may receive some consideration, they do not provide motivation for what the consultants do. Ultimately, the motivation to pursue party goals wanes in the face of the overwhelming need to secure victory for the individual candidate. In the wake of these conflicting goals and motivations, it is practically impossible for consultants to help parties become effective and responsible Conclusion Our actual claims for this paper are relatively modest. There are compelling reasons to conclude that the type of integration envisioned by the responsible party model is not possible in a candidate-centered environment where consultants play an increasingly important role. This conclusion is not novel; party scholars have argued this point for three decades. What is important to note,

27 however, is that little evidence exists to conclude that the presence of political consultants furthers the aims of the responsible party model, as some theories seem to indicate. In the responsible party model, contracts between the voters and the parties assume primary importance. In today’s campaign environment, contracts between the consultants and the candidates become the focus of attention. Party goals of issue coordination and pursuit of majorities can and do receive some attention, but in the immediate pursuit to achieve electoral success, the party is in no position to achieve such outcomebased contracts. This conclusion need not be an indictment of political consultants and their growing presence in the campaign environment. Whether or not the rise of political consultants enhances democracy depends heavily on the assumptions made about democracy and its relationship to the party system (Dulio and Thurber 2000). Particular versions of democracy are actually possible without significant portions of the responsible party component. The current version of American democracy stresses a particular brand of responsiveness over the collective responsibility and accountability built into the responsibility party model (Pomper 1992). Professional consultants may simply perform a variety of tasks that help the American party system to meet the norms of responsiveness and flexibility contained in other characterizations of democracy.

28 Works Cited

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32 Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The semisovereign people: A realist's view of democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1985. The new American political party. American Political Science Review 79 (Dec): 1152-69. Shea, Daniel M. 1996. Campaign craft: The strategies, tactics, and art of political campaign management. Westport, CT: Praeger. Sinclair, Barbara. 1999. Transformation leader or faithful agent? Principal-agent theory and House Majority Party leadership. Legislative Studies Quarterly 24 (August): 421-49. Songer, Donald R., Jeffrey A. Segal, and Charles M. Cameron. 1994. The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions. American Journal of Political Science 38 (Aug): 673-96. Taylor, Michelle M. 1992. Formal versus Informal Incentive Structures and Legislator Behavior: Evidence from Costa Rica. The Journal of Politics 54 (Nov): 1055-73. Thurber, James A. 1995. The transformation of American campaigns. In Campaigns and elections American style, eds. James A Thurber and Candice J. Nielson. 1-13. San Francisco: Westview Press. Thurber, James A. 1998. The study of campaign consultants: A subfield in search of a theory. PS: Political Science & Politics 31 (June): 145-9. Thurber, James A. 1999. National survey of professional campaign consultants: Who are they and what do they believe?. Washington, D.C.: Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies. Thurber, James A. 2000. Introduction to the study of campaign consultants. In Campaign warriors: Political consultants in elections, eds. James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 1-10. Thurber, James A., and Candice J Nelson. Eds. 2000. Campaign warriors: Political consultants in elections. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Thurber, James A., Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio. 2000. Political consulting: A portrait of the industry. Washington, D.C.: Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies. Thurber, James A., Candice J. Nelson, and David A. Dulio. Eds. 2000a. Crowded Airwaves: Campaign advertising in elections. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

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34

Table 1 Main Motivations for Becoming a Professional Consultant 3

Your political beliefs or ideology

Number 264

52.3%

The thrill of the competition

92

18.2%

The money you could earn

55

10.9%

To help your party be the majority in government

37

7.3%

The political power and influence which personally comes with the job

22

4.4%

Total Respondents

Percent

505

3

Source: Unless otherwise noted, all of the data in the following tables come from Thurber, James A. 1999. National survey of professional campaign consultants: Who are they and what do they believe?. Washington, D.C.: Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies. Study Methodology: Yankelovich partners conducted 505 half-hour interviews of professional campaign consultants between April 5th and May 14, 1999. Respondents either were currently working as a political campaign consultant or had done so in the past year. Those who worked exclusively in media production or for a telephone bank were excluded The study was conducted under a grant provided by the Pew Charitable Trusts. The margin of error for the total sample is +/- 4.4%

35

Table 2 Main Motivations for Being a Professional Consultant

Your political beliefs or ideology

Number 212

42%

The thrill of the competition

80

15.8%

The money you could earn

123

24.4%

To help your party be the majority in government

38

7.5%

The political power and influence which comes with the job

21

4.2%

Total Respondents

Percent

505

Table 3 Main Motivations for Becoming a Professional Consultant by Whether or Not They Ever Worked for a Political Party Motivation

DK/NA

Your political beliefs or ideology

Ever Worked for a Party? Yes No 124 54.9% 140 50.5%

Total 264 52.3%

The thrill of the competition

43

19.0%

48

17.3%

1

92

18.2%

The money you could earn

15

6.6%

40

14.4%

55

10.9%

To help your party become majority

20

8.8%

17

6.1%

37

7.3%

Political power and influence

10

4.4%

12

4.3%

22

4.4%

Other

8

3.5%

14

5.1%

23

4.6%

DK/Refused

6

2.7%

6

2.2%

12

2.4%

Total

226 100%

277 100%

1

2

50%

50%

100%

505 100%

36

Table 4 Main Motivations for Being a Professional Consultant by Whether or Not They Ever Worked for a Political Party Motivation

DK/NA

Your political beliefs or ideology

Ever Worked for a Party? Yes No 105 46.5% 107 38.6%

Total 212 42.0%

The thrill of the competition

26

11.5%

53

19.1%

1

50%

80

The money you could earn

54

23.9%

68

24.5%

1

50%

123 24.4%

To help your party become majority

21

9.3%

17

6.1%

38

7.5%

Political power and influence

9

4.0%

12

4.3%

21

4.2%

Other

8

3.5%

16

5.81%

24

4.8%

DK/Refused

3

1.3%

4

1.4%

7

1.4%

Total

226 100%

277 100%

2

100%

15.8%

505 100%

Table 5 Percentage of Political Consultants Who Agree that Consultants Provide Services Political Parties are Incapable of Strongly Agree

Number 279

55.2%

Percent

Somewhat Agree

170

33.7%

Somewhat Disagree

36

7.1%

Strongly Disagree

15

3.0%

DK/ Refused

5

1.0%

Total

505

100%

37

Table 6 Percentage of Political Consultants Who Agree that Consultants Provide Services Political Parties are Incapable of by Whether or Not They Ever Worked for a Political Party

DK/NA

Strongly Agree

Ever Worked for a Party? Yes No 128 56.6% 151 54.5%

Total 279 55.2%

Somewhat Agree

70

31.0%

99

35.7%

1

50%

170 33.7%

Somewhat Disagree

17

7.5%

18

35.7%

1

50%

36

7.1%

Strongly Disagree

9

4.0%

6

2.2%

15

3.0%

Political power and influence

9

4.0%

12

4.3%

21

4.2%

DK/Refused

2

.9%

3

1.1%

5

1.0%

Total

226 100%

277 100%

2

100%

505 100%

Table 7 Percentage of Political Consultants Who Strongly Agree or Somewhat Agree that Consultants Replace Parties in the Following Services: Management or strategic advice

Percent 87.7%

Frequency 443

Media or campaign advertising

85.3%

431

Polling

84.4%

426

Direct mail

81.6%

412

Opposition research

73.9%

373

Campaign finance or fundraising

69.7%

352

Get out the vote or field operations

55%

278

Total Respondents (505)

38

Table 8 Percentage of Political Consultants Who say that the Services of Parties in the Following Areas are Either Very Helpful or Somewhat Helpful: Campaign Funds

Percent 86.6%

Frequency 355

Opposition Research

79.0%

324

Polling

71.7%

294

Get Out the Vote Operations

65.6%

296

Direct mailings

62.9%

258

Coordinated Advertisements

56.8%

233

Get out the vote or field operations

37.1%

152

Total Respondents (410)

Table 9 Percentage of Political Consultants Who Say that the Role of the Political Parties or the Role of Consultants Has Increased Very Much or Somewhat: Political Parties

Consultants

At the National Level

31.1%

(157)

79.6%

(402)

At the State Level

29.3%

(148)

87.9%

(444)

At the Local Level

19.8%

(100)

86.3%

(436)

Total Respondents

505

505