Challenging Collectivist Traditions: Individualism and the ... - TARA

Challenging Collectivist Traditions: Individualism and the Management of Industrial Relations i n Greenfield Sites

PATRICK GUNNIGLE,* MICHAEL MORLEY and THOMAS TURNER University of Limerick,

Limerick

Abstract: T h i s paper explores developments in i n d u s t r i a l relations and H u m a n Resource Management (HRM) in newly established ("greenfield") companies in the Republic of Ireland as a means of informing the debate on changing patterns of industrial relations. I n particular, the paper focuses on the issue of individualism as a key dimension of management approaches to industrial relations. It is based on an empirical study of management approaches to industrial relations using a data set of new firms established in Ireland in the period 1987-1992.

I INTRODUCTION

T

his paper examines the development of so called "individualist" manage­ m e n t approaches to i n d u s t r i a l relations using a database of firms w h i c h established at greenfield sites i n the Republic of I r e l a n d i n the period 19871992. A n i m p o r t a n t theme i n the extant l i t e r a t u r e is the contention t h a t f i r m s locating at greenfield sites are l i k e l y to adopt an increasingly i n d i v i d u a l i s t focus i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s a n d pursue some key features o f H u m a n

*Currently V i s i t i n g F u l b r i g h t Scholar i n the Department of Management, S a n Diego State University.

Resource M a n a g e m e n t ( H R M ) such as flexible w o r k i n g , enhanced q u a l i t y i n i t i a t i v e s and employee involvement (Beaumont, 1985, 1986; Beaumont and Townley, 1985; Kochan et al. 1986; Guest, 1989). Indeed some commentators have identified a greenfield site as a requisite condition for the adoption of an i n d i v i d u a l i s t H R M focus i n i n d u s t r i a l relations management (Beaumont 1985; B l y t o n and T u r n b u l l 1992, 1994). I n d i v i d u a l i s m is therefore i m p o r t a n t , b o t h as an i n d i c a t o r of change i n management approaches to i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s a n d as a measure of the extent of adoption of so called " H R M styles". I n t e r m s of the specific i m p l i c a t i o n s for i n d u s t r i a l relations, i t is suggested t h a t the adoption of such management styles presents an explicit challenge to t r a d e unions and collective b a r g a i n i n g (Beaumont, 1991). The essence of such challenge is a reduced emphasis on collective bargaining and m a n a g e m e n t - t r a d e u n i o n interactions, w i t h the focus shifting from manage­ m e n t - u n i o n to m a n a g e m e n t - i n d i v i d u a l employee interactions (Guest, 1989; Purcell, 1987; Beaumont, 1991, 1992; Storey and Bacon, 1993). The Republic of I r e l a n d is a particularly appropriate context for testing the extent of a n i n d i v i d u a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l relations. Despite t h e presence of some p r o m i n e n t examples of managerial styles other t h a n those based o n t r a d i t i o n a l p l u r a l i s m , the evidence to date does not p o i n t to significant decline or change i n the t r a d i t i o n a l p l u r a l i s t model ( M u r p h y and Roche, 1994; Roche, 1994). Numerous reasons have been advanced to explain t h e c o n t i n u i t y of t h e pluralist/collectivist t r a d i t i o n , the most persuasive of w h i c h have been a r t i c u l a t e d by Roche and T u r n e r (1994) who point to the impact of the socio-political context i n Ireland: ... i t is t h e d i s t i n c t i v e features of the social and political context i n I r e l a n d w h i c h i n large measure account for the contrasting effects of h u m a n resource policies ...as compared w i t h the U n i t e d States or the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . (Roche and Turner (1994), p. 8). I n particular, Roche and T u r n e r point to the continued legitimacy of trade unions a n d t r a d e u n i o n membership i n I r e l a n d , and l i n k t h i s to the h i s ­ torically i n t i m a t e involvement of the trade u n i o n movement i n the nationalist struggle a n d also to the c u r r e n t sequence of centralised, corporatist style agreements on pay and other aspects of social and economic policy (Roche and Turner, 1994, Roche and Kochan, 1996). The I r i s h empirical evidence t h u s appears at odds w i t h the t r e n d of severe erosion of the p l u r a l i s t t r a d i t i o n so i n g r a i n e d i n the US and U K l i t e r a t u r e (see, for example, Kochan et al., 1986; Bassett, 1987; Beaumont, 1987, 1995; M c L o u g h l i n a n d G o u r l a y , 1992; M i l l w a r d et al., 1992). However, t h i s evidence is l a r g e l y based on n a t i o n a l u n i o n density statistics or studies of longer established firms. I t is therefore opportune to consider developments

i n the newer "greenfield" sector w h i c h has been the locus of m u c h of Ireland's recent i n d u s t r i a l development. T h i s paper reviews measures considered i n d i c a t i v e of i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l relations. Findings on levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m are t h e n compared w i t h measures of collectivism i n i n d u s t r i a l relations. The paper also considers t h e m a j o r e x p l a n a t o r y factors i m p a c t i n g on v a r i a t i o n i n levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m and collectivism i n i n d u s t r i a l relations.

I I I N D U S T R I A L R E L A T I O N S I N G R E E N F I E L D SITES I t is widely accepted that, i n establishing a greenfield site facility, manage­ m e n t possess considerable strategic discretion to decide on i t s "preferred" i n d u s t r i a l relations style and on related policies and practices (Beaumont, 1995). I t is therefore reasonable to suggest t h a t i f employers are adopting more i n d i v i d u a l i s t approaches, the evidence of such change should be most evident i n greenfield sites. This paper is based on a study of all greenfield site firms established i n the m a n u f a c t u r i n g and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y t r a d e d services sectors i n t h e Republic of I r e l a n d i n the period 1987-1992. The study excluded firms w i t h less t h a n 100 employees. The study population amounted to 53 firms. The research was conducted u s i n g a methodologically p l u r a l i s t approach i n v o l v i n g : (a) q u a l i t a t i v e semi-structured interviews w i t h senior managers i n a l l sites; (b) s t a t i s t i c a l analysis of a questionnaire based survey completed by t h e senior manager responsible for personnel/IR i n each site; (c) consideration of research findings to three H R M / I R "expert" panels. Table 1, w h i c h outlines the p r i n c i p a l activity and country of origin of the fifty three firms, h i g h l i g h t s the dominance of U S owned start-ups i n I r e l a n d and the concentration of such firms i n w h a t have been termed "high technology" sectors.

I l l MEASURING INDIVIDUALISM I N INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y l i t e r a t u r e i d e n t i f i e s an increased m a n a g e m e n t emphasis on the development of an i n d i v i d u a l i s t orientation i n m a n a g e m e n t employee relations as one of the most i m p o r t a n t developments i n i n d u s t r i a l relations i n the past decade (Beaumont, 1985, 1991; Beaumont and Townley, 1985; K o c h a n et al., 1986; Guest, 1989; Storey, 1992; Bacon a n d Storey, 1993). However, beyond Purcell's (1987) and Bacon a n d Storey's (1993) a t t e m p t s to explore the discrete components of i n d i v i d u a l i s m , i t r e m a i n s q u i t e an amorphous concept. The most popular conception of h i g h i n d i ­ v i d u a l i s m identified i n the l i t e r a t u r e incorporates a strong " h u m a n capital" perspective whereby workers are seen as a critical resource (Beer etal., 1984;

Table 1: Greenfield Establishments

1987-1992 by Activity and

Country

of Origin

Electrical & Instrument Engineering Office/Data processing equipment/machinery Mechanical engineering: *Motor parts/vehicles *Other Rubber and Plastics Textiles, Clothing Food & Drink Transport & Communications Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Software Information/Data processing services Paper, Printing & Publishing Other services TOTAL

Irish

US

1

6

2

1

0

10

0

6

0

3

0

9

0 0 0 3 2 2 0 1

1 1 1 0 0 0 1 6

2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0

0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

3 4 4 3 2 2 2 7

0 1 1

5 0 0

0 0 0

0 0 0

0 0 0

5 1 1

11

27

8

6

1

53

European

Japan

Other

TOTAL

W a l t o n , 1985). I t is argued t h a t managements pursuing this style w i l l seek to develop t h i s " c r i t i c a l resource" t h r o u g h a c o m b i n a t i o n of " i n d i v i d u a l i s t " h u m a n resource m a n a g e m e n t ( H R M ) policies i n areas such as t r a i n i n g , job/work organisation and r e w a r d systems (Kochan et al., 1986; Purcell, 1987; Beaumont, 1992). C r i t i c a l manifestations of higher i n d i v i d u a l i s m include the use of performance r e l a t e d pay systems l i n k e d to f o r m a l appraisals of i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e a n d increased d i r e c t management-employee communications. I n t h i s paper the following variables are used to evaluate the extent of i n d i v i d u a l i s m : • Sophistication of the Employment and Socialisation System: measured t h r o u g h a n e v a l u a t i o n of t h e degree of sophistication a n d r e l a t i v e emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n the management of h u m a n resource "flows". • Communications: based on a n analysis of t h e l e v e l , n a t u r e a n d sophistication of management-employee communications. • Performance-Related Pay: m e a s u r e d t h r o u g h a n analysis of t h e incidence of performance-related pay systems and the u t i l i s a t i o n of

formal performance appraisals to aid performance-related pay decisions among manual/operative grades. • Employee Involvement: measured t h r o u g h an analysis of the extent to w h i c h management utilises explicit techniques to facilitate employee involvement i n decision-making. • Employee Autonomy: measured t h r o u g h a n analysis of the extent to w h i c h management seek to facilitate/promote employee autonomy. T h e choice of variables a n d t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of scales was h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h e t h e o r e t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e on i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l relations (see for example, Beaumont, 1985; Beaumont and Townley, 1985; Purcell, 1987; Storey, 1992; Storey and Bacon, 1993). The results on each i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n d i c a t o r were f u r t h e r combined to produce a n o v e r a l l composite measure of i n d i v i d u a l i s m on a scale from low to h i g h i n d i v i d u a l i s m (1-3). F u r t h e r details on the methods used to translate the study findings into reasonable indicators of i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l relations are o u t l i n e d i n Appendix 1. These variables are used to evaluate levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n I r i s h greenfield sites and the s u m m a r y findings are presented i n Table 2. The means, s t a n d a r d deviations a n d Cronbach A l p h a coefficients ( r e l i a b i l i t y indicators) of scales on each key variable are presented. T h e s u m m a r y p i c t u r e e m e r g i n g from Table 2 suggests t h a t levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n I r i s h greenfield companies are j u s t below the m i d p o i n t of the range w i t h the composite indicator receiving a score of 1.91. T h i s holds t r u e for most of the indicators measured. I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t indicators w h i c h measure levels of employee involvement and autonomy score lowest. The highest scoring indicator (above the m i d p o i n t of the range) addressed t h e use of performance r e l a t e d pay based on appraisals of i n d i v i d u a l employee performance among m a n u a l / o p e r a t i v e grades. T h e s t a n d a r d deviation scores are quite h i g h i n d i c a t i n g considerable disparity i n the nature of i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n the study population. I V C A T E G O R I S I N G M A N A G E M E N T STYLES I N I N D U S T R I A L RELATIONS: COLLECTIVISM A N D I N D I V I D U A L I S M We have noted t h a t h i g h levels of collectivism, and specifically trade u n i o n r e c o g n i t i o n a n d density, are i n t e g r a l to the t r a d i t i o n a l p l u r a l i s t model, considered characteristic of i n d u s t r i a l relations i n I r e l a n d (Roche, 1989, 1994; B r e w s t e r a n d Hegewisch, 1994; Roche a n d T u r n e r , 1994; H i l l e r y , 1994). T h u s , f i n d i n g s on levels of collectivism, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y t r a d e u n i o n recognition, are c r i t i c a l indicators of change i n enterprise level i n d u s t r i a l relations (Beaumont, 1985; 1992).

Table 2: Levels of Individualism Variables

in Greenfield Sites

Variable Description

Mean

Std. Dev.

alpha

Employment System

T h i s variable was based on four indicators: (i) Sophistication of selection techniques; (ii) Sophistication of induction/socialisation; (iii) Techniques used to facilitate employee development; (iv) L i n e management capacity i n employee development. A n overall employment system variable was constructed by aggregating these 4 indicators on a scale of 1-3.

1.91

0.71

0.71 (N=4)

Communications

This variable comprises of two indicators: (i) extent of formal employee briefing of non-managerial employees on business strategy and financial performance; (ii) Trends in direct management-employee communications.These two variables were aggregated to produce a n overall measure on a scale of 1-3 (Low to High).

1.98

0.89

0.75 (N=2)

Performance Related Pay

Measures the incidence of performance related pay and utilisation of formal performance appraisals to aid P R P decisions among manual/operative grades. Findings on these indicators were aggregated into an overall P R P measure scored on a scale of 1-3.

2.02

0.91

0.81 (N=2)

Employee Involvement

Measures extent to which management utilises explicit techniques to facilitate employee involvement (e.g., briefing groups, quality groups/circles, etc.) and scored on a scale of 1-3.

1.89

0.82

0.81 (N=6)

Employee Autonomy

Measures extent of management seek to facilitate/promote employee autonomy. This variable comprises of four key indicators: (i) Level of responsibility of non-managerial employees for quality; (ii) Level of employee responsibility for work allocation; (iii) extent to which job design reflects a managerial desire to maximise individual employee's skills/abilities; (iv) The dominant supervisory style i n the company. Findings on these indicators were aggregated into a n overall measure of employee autonomy scored on a scale of 1-3.

L79

0.86

0.65 (N=4)

Individualism

Overall composite indicator of individualism i n industrial relations based on aggregation of above five variables.

1.91

0.69

0.64 (N=5)

This paper utilises four key indicators to measure levels of collectivism i n i n d u s t r i a l relations: (i) Trade union presence: measured t h r o u g h a n analysis of levels of trade u n i o n recognition a n d trade u n i o n density; ( i i ) Pattern of trade union organisation: measured t h o u g h an e x a m i n a t i o n of the n a t u r e of trade u n i o n recognition and impact of trade unions on workplace i n d u s t r i a l relations; (iii) Role of trade unions and other employee representative bodies: based on a n e v a l u a t i o n o f the role of trade unions a n d other employee representative bodies i n management-employee communications/interactions; (iv) Employer association membership and utilisation: based on t h e extent to w h i c h greenfield companies are i n membership of employer associations a n d on the p a t t e r n of u t i l i s a t i o n of employer association services. These indicators are also combined to construct an overall composite measure of collectivism. The rationale and methodology u n d e r p i n n i n g the selection a n d construction of these measures is outlined i n Appendix 2. Individualism and Collectivism in Industrial Relations: Complementary or Countervailing? D r a w i n g on t h e extant l i t e r a t u r e we can identify t w o hypotheses w h i c h help i n t e r p r e t and explain the i n t e r p l a y of collectivism and i n d i v i d u a l i s m as dimensions of management styles i n i n d u s t r i a l relations i n greenfield sites. F i r s t , we can draw on some of the "non-union" l i t e r a t u r e to hypothesise t h a t high individualism will counterpoise low collectivism (Foulkes, 1980, 1981; K o c h a n et al., 1986; Beaumont, 1991; B e a u m o n t and H a r r i s , 1994, 1995; M c L o u g h l i n and Gourlay, 1992). I n t h i s model, t e r m e d the "countervailing hypothesis", i t m i g h t be expected t h a t greenfield firms characterised by low collectivism w i l l adopt h i g h l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i n d u s t r i a l relations policies w h i c h seek to negate the need for collective employee representation (Beaumont, 1985; B e a u m o n t a n d H a r r i s , 1994; M c L o u g h l i n a n d Gourlay, 1992; Guest a n d Hoque, 1994). A second a n d c o n t r a s t i n g hypothesis, t e r m e d t h e "dualist hypothesis", states t h a t high individualism will complement high collectivism". This implies t h a t greenfield firms w i l l concurrently adopt h i g h levels of collectivism and individualism and employ w h a t are t e r m e d "dualist" i n d u s t r i a l relations styles (also see Purcell, 1987; Storey, 1992). I t is argued t h a t d u a l i s t styles m a y be appropriate where there is a strong t r a d i t i o n of collective employee representation (Kochan et al., 1986). I n the I r i s h context i t m i g h t plausibly be suggested t h a t the "dualist" approach is the most l i k e l y pattern, given the strong legitimacy of trade unions and collective b a r g a i n i n g (Gunnigle et al., 1994; Roche and Turner, 1994; Roche and Kochan, 1996). Findings on the measures of collectivism and i n d i v i d u a l i s m are combined i n Table 3 to provide a summary picture of management styles i n i n d u s t r i a l relations on these t w o dimensions. T h i s table helps i l l u s t r a t e w h e t h e r t h e

emergent styles serve to support the "countervailing hypothesis" (high i n d i v i d u a l i s m counterpoises low collectivism) or the "dualist hypothesis" (high i n d i v i d u a l i s m complements h i g h collectivism). Table 3: Management Styles in Industrial Relations: Collectivism and Individualism Individualism 1 (Low)

1 (Low)

28% (15)

6% (3) ANTI-UN

2 (Medium)

2 (Medium) 3 (High)

6% (3) 17% (9)

17% (9) SOFT-HRM

JON-

INCLINED

INCLINED

Collectivism

3 (High)

15% (8) 9% (5)

0

2% (1)

TRADITIONAL-

DUALISM-

INCLINED

INCLINED

F o u r clear categorisations of management styles i n i n d u s t r i a l relations emerge from Table 3, n a m e l y "anti-union", "soft H R M " , " t r a d i t i o n a l " and " d u a l i s m " i n c l i n e d styles. T w e n t y t w o (42 per cent) of the 53 companies studied were placed i n t o these four categorisations. The failure to clearly place the r e m a i n i n g companies into any of these four styles is not surprising, a n d is i n l i n e w i t h previous analyses o f management styles i n i n d u s t r i a l relations w h i c h identify difficulties w i t h placing m a n y firms w i t h i n "idealt y p i c a l " management style categorisations (Deaton, 1985). Classifications of t h i s n a t u r e are i n h e r e n t l y l i m i t i n g and may not reflect organisational r e a l i t y i n t h e sense t h a t t h e r e m a y be a n absence of a clear a n d p r e f e r r e d m a n a g e m e n t style i n some companies or companies m a y be i n t r a n s i t i o n between styles (Fox, 1974; P u r c e l l and Sisson, 1983; Deaton, 1985; Poole, 1986; Purcell, 1987). T h e evidence presented i n Table 3 and Table 4 (below) indicates t h a t i n d i v i d u a l i s m c l e a r l y counterpoises c o l l e c t i v i s m i n I r i s h g r e e n f i e l d companies. T h i s f i n d i n g suggests t h a t we should accept the "countervailing hypothesis". O n almost a l l o f the measures there is a negative relationship between i n d i v i d u a l i s m a n d collectivism. The findings i n Table 3 provide l i t t l e evidence of a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p between collectivism and i n d i v i d u a l i s m . T h i s evidence indicates t h a t we must therefore reject the "dualist hypothesis" a n d conclude t h a t "dualist" i n d u s t r i a l relations styles are not common i n I r i s h greenfield companies. These findings should be qualified by the fact t h a t many companies r e m a i n

Table 4: Collectivism and Individualism:

Bivariate

Correlations

INDIVIDUALISM Employee Autonomy Trade Union Presence COLLECTIVISM

Direct Communications

Employment System

Employee Involvement

Performance Related Pay

INDIVIDUALISM

-.20 (ns)

-.33*

-.31*

-.17 (ns)

— 62***

-.50***

Trade Union Organisation

-.12 (ns)

-.18 (ns)

-.19 (ns)

.002 (ns)

— 51***

-.28*

Collective Communi­ cations

-.23 (ns)

-.45**

-.37**

-.26 (ns)

— 67***

— 54***

Employer Organisation

-.23 (ns)

.-.26 (ns)

-.06 (ns)

-.12 (ns)

_40**

-.35**

COLLECTIVISM

-.24 (ns)

.-.33*

.-.25 (ns)

-.12 (ns)

-.60***

_ 40,***

* = P < 0.05; ** P = < 0.01; *** P = < 0.001; n.s. = not significant.

un-categorised or "stuck i n the middle". To f u r t h e r investigate the issue of collectivism and i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l relations i t is useful to look more closely at t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between these approaches. Table 4 outlines the b i v a r i a t e correlations between b o t h the overall (composite) and constituent measures of collectivism and i n d i v i d u a l i s m . The data presented i n Table 4 provides quite a clear picture of the r e l a t i o n ­ ship between collectivism a n d i n d i v i d u a l i s m as dimensions of management styles i n i n d u s t r i a l relations. O n almost every measure there is a negative r e l a t i o n s h i p between collectivism and i n d i v i d u a l i s m . T h i s negative r e l a t i o n ­ ship is most pronounced i n the area of performance related pay. T h i s variable measured t h e extent to w h i c h f i r m s used performance r e l a t e d pay (PRP) systems based on formal appraisals of i n d i v i d u a l employee performance. The use o f such P R P systems is p r o b a b l y t h e most r o b u s t i n d i c a t o r o f i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l relations (Beaumont, 1985; Beaumont and H a r r i s , 1994; Bacon a n d Storey, 1993). Table 4 indicates t h a t there is a significant inverse r e l a t i o n s h i p between the use of such PRP systems and a l l measures of c o l l e c t i v i s m . T h i s inverse r e l a t i o n s h i p is most p o i n t e d i n r e l a t i o n to measures of trade u n i o n recognition and density ("presence") and the role of t r a d e u n i o n s / o t h e r employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e bodies i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ("collective communications"). I t is clear t h a t PRP systems are most l i k e l y to be employed where there are low levels of u n i o n recognition and membership and where there is l i t t l e or no role for collective employee representation. O v e r a l l , t h e data supports t h e proposition t h a t i n d i v i d u a l i s m counter­ poises collectivism. There is l i t t l e evidence o f "dualist" i n d u s t r i a l relations styles. I n d e e d , t h e evidence indicates i n c r e a s i n g p o l a r i s a t i o n between collectivist and i n d i v i d u a l i s t approaches. I t appears t h a t the t r e n d is towards a d i m i n u t i o n o f collectivism a n d a pronounced shift i n favour o f more i n d i v i d u a l i s t m a n a g e m e n t approaches. I n e v a l u a t i n g the i m p l i c a t i o n s of these findings one can only make a q u a l i t a t i v e assessment of the extent to w h i c h t h e evidence from greenfield sites is i n d i c a t i v e of change i n I r i s h i n d u s t r i a l relations. W i t h t h i s caveat i n m i n d , the w e i g h t of evidence points to s u b s t a n t i a l change i n I r i s h i n d u s t r i a l relations. I n p a r t i c u l a r , we can i d e n t i f y s i g n i f i c a n t erosion of t h e " t r a d i t i o n a l p l u r a l i s t " model, a major increase i n t h e n o n - u n i o n approaches a n d g r o w i n g opposition to u n i o n recognition.

V L E V E L S OF I N D I V I D U A L I S M : E X P L A I N I N G T H E VARIATIONS A range o f factors have been advanced to explain variations i n manage­ m e n t approaches to i n d u s t r i a l relations, such as size, labour costs, per­ formance a n d sector (Beaumont, 1985, 1986, 1992; Beaumont and H a r r i s ,

1994; Roche a n d T u r n e r , 1994; T u r n e r , 1994; Storey a n d Sisson, 1994). However, w h i l e the e x t a n t l i t e r a t u r e identifies a range of causal factors w h i c h may explain variations i n i n d u s t r i a l relations, there is no consensus on the r e l a t i v e significance of these factors, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a greenfield site context (Beaumont, 1985; Kochan et al., 1986; Roche and T u r n e r , 1994). I n t h i s section we attempt to identify the relative importance of each factor a n d d i s t i n g u i s h those factors w h i c h most s i g n i f i c a n t l y e x p l a i n v a r i a t i o n s i n i n d u s t r i a l relations i n greenfield sites on the dimension of i n d i v i d u a l i s m . To evaluate the m a i n explanatory factors i m p a c t i n g u p o n v a r i a t i o n s i n management styles i n i n d u s t r i a l relations, a range of independent variables were i d e n t i f i e d a n d constructed based on the e x t a n t l i t e r a t u r e (see, for example, Kochan et al., 1986). The m a i n variables were grouped as follows: (i) S t r u c t u r a l variables: size, workforce profile; (ii) Sectoral variables: i n d u s t r i a l sector, a c t i v i t y , technology; ( i i i ) Economic variables: labour costs, perfor­ mance; (iv) M a r k e t variables: m a r k e t g r o w t h , m a r k e t share, level of product/ service diversity and (v) Country of ownership. Explanations of Variations in Individualism in Industrial Relations T h e i m p a c t of the independent variables on levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l relations are summarised i n Table 5. I n E q u a t i o n (1) i n d i v i d u a l i s m is regressed on a l l the independent variables, except ownership, u s i n g the stepwise m e t h o d . T h e e x t e n t of i n d i v i d u a l i s m is p o s i t i v e l y associated w i t h male employment (beta = 0.23*) a n d negatively associated w i t h the p r o p o r t i o n of m a n u a l employees (beta = -0.34**) a n d t h e extent to w h i c h companies sell t h e i r products or services on a n a t i o n a l basis (beta = -0.25*). These findings indicate t h a t more i n d i v i d u a l i s t i n d u s t r i a l relations styles are pursued among companies w h i c h employ larger numbers of male, w h i t e collar workers and whose m a i n markets are i n t e r n a t i o n a l rather t h a n national. A p a r t from the standard independent variables, E q u a t i o n (1) also included collectivism as a potential explanatory variable. The findings here confirm our earlier analysis of the relationship between collectivism and i n d i v i d u a l ­ i s m . C o l l e c t i v i s m is t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e , b e i n g s t r o n g l y a n d n e g a t i v e l y associated w i t h levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m (beta = -0.49***). B y i n t r o d u c i n g t h e o w n e r s h i p v a r i a b l e i n E q u a t i o n (2), we f i n d t h a t U S ownership emerges as t h e most significant factor positively i m p a c t i n g on i n d i v i d u a l i s m (beta = 0.57***) and e x p l a i n i n g 65 per cent of the reported variance i n overall levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m . Levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m are also positively associated w i t h company size (beta = 0.37**).

Table 5: Determinants

of Individualism DEPENDENT

in Industrial VARIABLE:

Relations Individualism

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Equation (1)

Equation (2)

Structural Size Manual Gender Temporary

0.17 -0.34 0.23 -0.15

0.37 -0.29 0.09 -0.25

Sectoral Sector Activity Hi/Lo Tech

-0.08 (ns) -0.01(ns) 0.16 (ns)

0.01 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.16 (ns)

Economic Labcosts Perform

-0.09 (ns) 0.06 (ns)

-0.01 (ns) 0.01 (ns)

Market Market Diverse Matrix

-0.25 * 0.01 (ns) 0.13 (ns)

-0.21 (ns) -0.12 (ns) -0.12 (ns)

3.01 ***

0.57 *** -0.02 (ns) -0.13 (ns) 2.3 ***

Collectivism

—0.49 ***

0.17 (ns)

R(2) F RATIO N DW

0.46 12.0 *** 53 1.92

(ns) ** * (ns)

Ownership USA IRISH EUROPEAN CONSTANT+

** ** (ns) *

0.51 14.5*** 53 1.89

* = P < 0.05; ** P = < 0.01; *** P =< 0.001; ns = not significant. + Ownership was entered as a dummy variable i n all equations with the A s i a n coded companies taking the value of the constant. The coefficient reported for the constant is the unstandardised coefficient ((3). To assess t h e s t r e n g t h of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s , the constituent indicators of i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l relations were disaggregated and regressed on the independent indicators to provide a more in-depth picture of the r e l a t i o n s h i p

between the independent variables and levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m . T h i s data is presented i n Table 6. Table 6: Explanatory Variables and Constituent Indicators as of Individualism DEPENDENT

Determinants

VARIABLES

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Employee Autonomy

Employment System

Direct Communications

Employee Involvement

Performance Related Pay

Structural Size

-0.01 (ns)

0.17 (ns)

0.1 (ns)

Manual

-0.18 (ns)

_0.42 ***

-0.43***

Gender

0.37 **

0.18 (ns)

-0.20 (ns)

0.04 (ns)

Temporary

-0.04 (ns)

0.2 (ns)* -0.31 ** 0.50 ***

-0.10 (ns) 0.02 (ns) 0.04 (ns)

0.26*

0.11 (ns)

-0.11 (ns)

Sectoral Sector Activity Hi/Lo Tech

0.08 (ns)

0.01 (ns) *

-0.17 (ns)

-0.01 (ns)

0.11 (ns)

-0.44*** 0.06 (ns)

0.11 (ns)

0.10 (ns)

-0.12 (ns)

0.10 (ns)

0.09 (ns)

0.25*

0.09 (ns)

0.04 (ns)

0.17 (ns) -0.02 (ns)

Economic Labcosts

-0.10 (ns)

-0.27*

-0.01 (ns)

-0.08 (ns)

-0.10 (ns) -0.02 (ns)

-0.08 (ns)

Perform Market Market Diverse Matrix

-0.04 (ns) 0.13 (ns) 0.39 **

-0.10 (ns) -0.06 (ns) 0.13 (ns)

-0.07 (ns) 0.09 (ns) 0.09 (ns)

-0T08 (ns) -0.03 (ns) 0.26*

-0.12 (ns)

0.12 (ns)

0.08 (ns)

-0.28 * -0.16 (ns)

0.05 (ns)

Ownership USA IRISH EUROPEAN Constants Collectivism

0.05 (ns) -0.39 *** -0.19 (ns)

-0.11 (ns)

0.30 (ns)

4.13 ***

2.0 ***

-0.06 (ns)

-0.07 (ns)

0.48 13.0*** 53

14.8 ***

-0.21 (ns)

R(2)

0.17

F RATIO

6.4 **

N DW

0.33 **

0.14 (ns) -0.15 (ns) -0.07 (ns)

53 1.56

2.4

-0.03 (ns)

0.52 53 2.05

0.00 (ns)

1.4**

-0.20 (ns) -0.09 (ns)

0.03 (ns) 3 I ***

-0.05 (ns)

-0.60 ***

0.40 9.6 *** 53

29.0 ***

1.73

0.35 53 1.75

* = P < 0.05; ** P = < 0.01; *** P =< 0.001; ns = not significant. + Ownership was entered as a dummy variable in all equations with the Asian coded companies taking the value of the constant. The coefficient reported for the constant is the unstandardised^ coefficient ((5).

T h i s analysis finds t h a t t h e p r o p o r t i o n of male employees is positively r e l a t e d to levels o f employee a u t o n o m y (beta = 0.37**) a n d employee i n v o l v e m e n t (beta = 0.5***). Product m a r k e t performance is also positively associated w i t h autonomy (beta = 0.39**) and employee involvement (beta = 0.26*). T h i s f i n d i n g presents q u i t e a conventional picture, suggesting t h a t companies i n more comfortable t r a d i n g positions, and e m p l o y i n g propor­ t i o n a t e l y more m a l e employees, are most l i k e l y to be characterised b y i n d u s t r i a l relations styles w h i c h afford employees greater levels of autonomy a n d i n v o l v e m e n t (also see M a r c h i n g t o n , 1990). The evidence presented i n Table 6 suggests t h a t the level o f sophistication of the employment system a n d the r e l a t i v e emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n the management of h u m a n resource "flows" is significantly and negatively related to the p r o p o r t i o n of m a n u a l w o r k e r s e m p l o y e d (beta = - 0 . 4 2 * * * ) , t h e p r o p o r t i o n of t o t a l production/services costs accounted for by labour costs (beta = - . 2 7 * ) and indigenous ownership (beta = -0.39***). A g a i n the negative relationship w i t h m a n u a l employment is not s u r p r i s i n g and is i n line w i t h the extant l i t e r a t u r e w h i c h suggests levels of sophistication a n d i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l relations are positively associated w i t h w h i t e collar type employment (Beer et al., 1984; T u r n e r , 1994). The i m p a c t of the r a t i o of labour costs to t o t a l costs is i n t e r e s t i n g a n d appears r e l a t e d to the negative i m p a c t of I r i s h o w n e r s h i p o n t h e e x t e n t of sophistication i n the management of h u m a n resource flows. N u m e r o u s studies have pointed to the contrasts i n c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y between indigenous and foreign owned companies i n I r e l a n d . For example, McAleese a n d M a t t h e w s (1987) and Foley (1990) have pointed to t h e l i m i t e d presence of indigenous companies i n h i g h technology sectors compared to the European U n i o n average and t h e i r p r i m a r y reliance on local m a r k e t s . I n the area of communications, the evidence i n Table 6 indicates t h a t the level, nature and sophistication of communications w i t h employees is significantly a n d positively related to U S ownership (beta = 0.33**), location i n "advanced" i n d u s t r i a l sectors (beta = 0.25*) a n d t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t e m p o r a r y w o r k e r s (beta = 0.26*). The positive impact of US ownership and level of technology is i n line w i t h our earlier discussions on overall levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m . The positive i m p a c t of temporary w o r k is a l i t t l e s u r p r i s i n g b u t is perhaps best understood i n r e l a t i o n to employment patterns i n m a n y U S owned companies i n the electronics and software sectors. M a n y of these companies place a strong emphasis on direct communications w i t h i n d i v i d u a l employees. However, m a n y also employ a cadre of temporary workers to help t h e company deal w i t h f l u c t u a t i o n s i n demand and also to buffer more permanent grades against lay-offs. I t is i m p o r t a n t to point out t h a t a strong e m p h a s i s o n i n d i v i d u a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s s h o u l d not be i n t e r p r e t e d as i m p l y i n g h i g h levels of employee influence or autonomy. Also the relationship

between temporary w o r k i n g and a strong communications focus may indeed be i n d i r e c t : t h i s means t h a t i n effect companies w i t h h i g h e r levels of temporary w o r k i n g may place a strong emphasis on communications b u t the focus of t h e i r communications effort may be on t h e i r permanent r a t h e r t h a n t h e i r temporary grades. The f i n a l indicator of i n d i v i d u a l i s m analysed i n Table 6 is arguably the most c r i t i c a l , n a m e l y the extent of u t i l i s a t i o n of performance r e l a t e d pay (PRP) systems based on i n d i v i d u a l performance appraisals among m a n u a l / operative grades. O n t h i s measure, the findings are q u i t e emphatic: the incidence of PRP systems based on i n d i v i d u a l appraisals is significantly a n d negatively associated w i t h levels of collectivism (beta = -0.6***). Identifying the Key Explanatory Factors As noted above, a broad range of factors have been i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e as possible explanations of v a r i a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s (Beaumont, 1985; Kochan et al., 1986; Poole, 1986; Purcell, 1987). F r o m these studies i t is possible to hypothesise t h a t the incidence of management styles industrial relations characterised by high levels of individualism will be positively associated with US ownership, location in advanced industrial sectors, low labour costs, and strong product market performance. I t is useful to examine the results for each potential explanatory factor o u t l i n e d i n the hypothesis. Due to the possibility of a h i g h level of collinearity between U S ownership and location i n h i g h technology sectors, the impact of b o t h these factors are considered together. US Ownership and Location in Advanced Industrial Sectors I n t h i s s t u d y c o u n t r y of ownership was used as a p r o x y v a r i a b l e to evaluate t h e i m p a c t of m a n a g e r i a l values on v a r i a t i o n s i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . T h e r a t i o n a l e for t h i s approach is based on t h e premise t h a t m a n a g e r i a l preferences i n i n d u s t r i a l relations w i l l be most s i g n i f i c a n t l y exposed i n greenfield sites and t h a t the a c t u a l styles chosen w i l l closely reflect u n d e r l y i n g m a n a g e r i a l values associated w i t h country of ownership ( L a w l e r , 1982; B e a u m o n t , 1985, 1986; B e a u m o n t a n d T o w n l e y , 1985; W h i t a k e r , 1986; Poole, 1986). I r e l a n d is a p a r t i c u l a r l y appropriate case for e v a l u a t i n g t h e i m p a c t of ownership on variations i n management styles i n i n d u s t r i a l relations. I t is a small, open economy and has pursued a policy of actively encouraging direct foreign i n v e s t m e n t since the early 1960s. Despite t h i s h i g h level of foreign investment and tentative suggestions t h a t ownership significantly impacts on i n d u s t r i a l relations ( M u r r a y 1984; Toner, 1987), i t is i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t t h e most representative analyses of i n d u s t r i a l relations i n I r i s h organisations d i d

not identify company ownership as a significant variable (Roche and T u r n e r , 1994; T u r n e r , 1994). B o t h these papers focused on longer established ("brownfield") companies and tested the impact of a broad range of standard independent variables on h u m a n resource policy outcomes, most p a r t i c u l a r l y t r a d e u n i o n recognition. The authors found t h a t company ownership d i d not have any significant impact on levels of unionisation. I n contrast, company ownership, and specifically U S ownership, emerges as consistently the single most significant variable e x p l a i n i n g variations i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n g r e e n f i e l d sites. O n t h e c o l l e c t i v i s m d i m e n s i o n company ownership exerted the greatest impact, explaining 82 per cent of the r e p o r t e d v a r i a n c e i n levels o f c o l l e c t i v i s m . Levels of c o l l e c t i v i s m were positively associated w i t h European ownership and negatively associated w i t h U S ownership. T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y the case i n r e l a t i o n to the critical indicators of trade u n i o n presence. Non-union companies were predominantly U S owned, w h i l e , i n contrast, a l l of the European companies recognised trade unions. O n the i n d i v i d u a l i s m dimension, U S ownership emerged as the most s i g n i f i c a n t factor p o s i t i v e l y i m p a c t i n g on levels o f i n d i v i d u a l i s m a n d e x p l a i n i n g 65 per cent of t h e r e p o r t e d variance. The c r i t i c a l i m p a c t o f ownership is f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t e d i n Table 7 below, w h i c h presents the mean a n d s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n scores on t h e dimensions o f c o l l e c t i v i s m a n d i n d i v i d u a l i s m disaggregated by ownership. This table clearly illustrates the considerable contrast between U S and other companies on the dimensions of collectivism and i n d i v i d u a l i s m . U S companies score highest on the i n d i v i d u a l ­ i s m measures a n d lowest on collectivism measures. Conversely, European owned companies score highest on measures of collectivism and lowest on individualism. Table 7: Company Ownership, COLLECTIVISM

Collectivism (1-3)*

Nationality

Mean

Std. dev.

USA ASIAN IRISH EUROPEAN

1.30 1.86 2.09 2.88

0.87 0.90 0.67 0.35

and

Individualism INDIVIDUALISM Mean 2.30 1.86 1.46 1.25

(1-3)

Std. dev 0.54 0.38 0.69 0.46

l=low; 2=medium; 3=high for collectivism and individualism.

These f i n d i n g s clearly identify company ownership and specifically U S ownership as a c r i t i c a l factor significantly i m p a c t i n g on i n d u s t r i a l relations i n greenfield sites. However, a number of authors have pointed to the strong p o s s i b i l i t y o f h i g h levels of c o l l i n e a r i t y between l o c a t i o n i n advanced

i n d u s t r i a l sectors and U S ownership (Beaumont and H a r r i s , 1994; Roche and T u r n e r , 1994). To avoid any r e s u l t i n g spurious r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e i n i t i a l regressions on i n d i v i d u a l i s m were f i r s t r u n by e x c l u d i n g the o w n e r s h i p d u m m y variables. Despite t h i s approach, location i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l sectors d i d not achieve significance i n any of these equations. Impact of relative Labour Costs A number of commentators have suggested t h a t relative labour costs as a percentage of t o t a l production or service costs can exert a significant i m p a c t on enterprise level i n d u s t r i a l relations ( M a r c h i n g t o n , 1990; M i t c h e l l , 1994). I n particular, i t is suggested t h a t more t r a d i t i o n a l adversarial and collective i n d u s t r i a l relations styles w i l l be adopted i n higher labour costs companies w h i l e a more benign, consensual and i n d i v i d u a l i s t orientation w i l l be adopted i n companies w i t h low r e l a t i v e labour costs (Foulkes, 1980; T h u r l e y a n d Wood, 1983; M a r c h i n g t o n and Parker, 1990; M i t c h e l l , 1994). Our analysis found t h a t relative labour costs d i d not significantly i m p a c t on v a r i a t i o n s i n i n d u s t r i a l relations. This f i n d i n g m a y reflect the fact t h a t most, i f not a l l , greenfield companies need to exert considerable control over labour costs. W h i l e t h i s f i n d i n g is somewhat out of l i n e w i t h some of the established l i t e r a t u r e on p a t t e r n s of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s m a n a g e m e n t (Foulkes, 1980, M a r c h i n g t o n , 1990; M a r c h i n g t o n and Parker, 1990) i t finds support i n a recent analysis of payment practices i n I r i s h m u l t i n a t i o n a l companies (Roche and Geary, 1994). Roche and Geary noted t h a t a significant t r e n d d u r i n g the 1970s and early 1980s was for foreign owned companies to concede "above the n o r m " pay increases. However, the authors note t h e abandonment of this approach since the mid-1980s w i t h most such companies s e t t l i n g w i t h i n the n o r m . B y and large, foreign owned companies i n I r e l a n d are more capital intensive a n d have lower r e l a t i v e labour costs t h a n t h e i r indigenous counterparts (Foley, 1990). E x t r a p o l a t i n g the logic of Roche and Geary's analysis i t appears t h a t foreign owned companies could absorb "above t h e n o r m " pay increases i n previous years due to a c o m b i n a t i o n of less intense competitive pressures a n d lower relative labour costs. However, i n the face of significantly increased competitive pressures, labour costs have now become a focus of management control i n foreign owned companies to a degree only previously experienced i n h i g h labour cost companies, p r i m a r i l y of indigenous ownership. Impact of Product Market Performance The nature of a firm's product m a r k e t performance and its product m a r k e t position relative to competitors is identified i n the contemporary l i t e r a t u r e as an i m p o r t a n t factor i m p a c t i n g on i n d u s t r i a l relations ( M a r c h i n g t o n , 1990;

M a r c h i n g t o n a n d P a r k e r , 1990; T h u r l e y and Wood, 1983; K o c h a n et al., 1986). I n essence i t is suggested t h a t companies who are performing w e l l i n t h e i r respective p r o d u c t m a r k e t s are l i k e l y to adopt more b e n i g n a n d sophisticated i n d u s t r i a l relations practices, largely as a result of t h e i r strong financial position. I n contrast, firms who are experiencing difficulties i n t h e i r product m a r k e t s are l i k e l y to adopt more t r a d i t i o n a l , adversarial i n d u s t r i a l relations styles (Kochan et al., 1986; M a r c h i n g t o n a n d Parker, 1990). This study used a n u m b e r of indicators of product m a r k e t performance as follows: (i) l o c a t i o n of major m a r k e t s ; ( i i ) financial performance relative to sectoral n o r m and (iii) product m a r k e t position. This l a t t e r variable was based on the Boston C o n s u l t i n g Group's portfolio "matrix" (see Hedley, 1977). O u r f i n d i n g s suggest t h a t t h e extent of a n i n d i v i d u a l i s t management o r i e n t a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l relations is positively associated w i t h the extent to w h i c h companies sell t h e i r products or services on a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l basis. Product m a r k e t performance also impacts positively on levels of employee autonomy and employee involvement. The study findings on the relationship between product m a r k e t performance and i n d u s t r i a l relations indicate t h a t m a r k e t performance a n d m a r k e t l o c a t i o n positively i m p a c t on levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . I t appears t h a t h i g h p e r f o r m i n g companies w i t h a s t r o n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l focus are most l i k e l y to adopt i n d u s t r i a l relations styles characterised by h i g h levels of individualism.

V I CONCLUSIONS A N D DISCUSSION The evidence presented i n t h i s paper points to a severe erosion i n levels of trade u n i o n recognition and density i n newly established firms. The second c r i t i c a l characteristic of emergent patterns of i n d u s t r i a l relations i n I r i s h greenfield companies is a greater emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l i s m . The most significant i n d i c a t o r s o f h i g h e r levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m were performancebased pay systems t i e d to i n d i v i d u a l employee appraisals and greater direct communications w i t h employees. Roche (1990) has argued t h a t , traditionally, i n d u s t r i a l relations practice i n I r e l a n d has been based on a willingness to accept collective b a r g a i n i n g i n p u r s u i t o f i n d u s t r i a l peace. I t now appears t h a t more competitive product m a r k e t s , h i g h u n e m p l o y m e n t and a decline i n " t r a d i t i o n a l " m a n u f a c t u r i n g is u n d e r m i n i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n a l power-base of unions and fostering more aggressive a n t i - u n i o n styles. I t also appears t h a t , i n m a n y greenfield sites, managements are seeking to adopt patterns of i n d u s t r i a l relations manage­ m e n t w h i c h contrast w i t h those i n the "brownfield" sector by excluding trade unions and developing a greater i n d i v i d u a l i s t orientation. C o u n t r y of ownership emerges as the most critical explanatory variable

i m p a c t i n g upon variations i n i n d u s t r i a l relations. The impact of ownership was most significant i n e x p l a i n i n g v a r i a t i o n s i n levels of collectivism a n d i n d i v i d u a l i s m . European ownership was the most significant independent variable positively associated w i t h collectivism, w h i l e U S ownership was the most significant variable negatively i m p a c t i n g u p o n levels of trade u n i o n recognition and density. The impact of US ownership was most pronounced i n i m p a c t i n g on levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m : U S ownership was t h e single most significant factor positively impacting on levels of i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l relations. T u r n i n g to the broader i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s our research, i t is useful to consider the i m p o r t of our findings for i n d u s t r i a l relations practice. First, our evidence points to a considerable take-up i n i n d i v i d u a l i s t H R M practices among greenfield companies. W h i l e t h i s is greatest i n U S owned companies, the evidence also points to extensive use of such H R M practices among m a n y other greenfield firms. The m a i n areas of focus are performance related pay, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d m a n a g i n g h u m a n resource flows (i.e. r e c r u i t m e n t , socialisation a n d t r a i n i n g ) . However, the take-up of H R M practices designed to facilitate i n d i v i d u a l worker involvement and autonomy was quite low. A second and related theme points to the emergence of i n d u s t r i a l relations styles w h i c h diverge from the t r a d i t i o n a l p l u r a l i s t model. However, the emer­ gent i n d u s t r i a l relations styles could be classified as "soft" H R M i n only a m i n o r i t y of cases. Indeed, the more common p a t t e r n approximated to w h a t has been t e r m e d "hard" H R M . The "soft" H R M style is commonly associated w i t h " h i g h c o m m i t m e n t " w o r k systems. I t is characterised by a resource perspective of employees, i n c o r p o r a t i n g the view t h a t there is an o r g a n ­ isational pay-off i n performance terms from the u t i l i s a t i o n of a combination of "sophisticated" H R policies designed to develop employee c o m m i t m e n t , and promote t h e m u t u a l i t y of management a n d employee interests. I n orgaisations p u r s u i n g t h i s style one w o u l d expect to see sophisticated r e c r u i t m e n t and socialisation systems, extensive t r a i n i n g and development, h i g h levels of employee involvement and autonomy and an above average pay and benefits system. T h i s approach commonly relies on a union substitution premise, whereby firms, w h i l e not c l a i m i n g to be overtly "anti-union", t a k e careful steps to e l i m i n a t e employee needs for collective r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by, for example, extensive line management t r a i n i n g i n i n d u s t r i a l relations, p r o m p t h a n d l i n g of employee grievances, good terms and conditions of employment, a n d a facilitative supervisory style. I n our study only seven.of the fifty-three companies adopted a l l the h a l l m a r k s of "soft H R M " . A l l b u t one of these companies were US-owned and a l l were m a n u f a c t u r i n g companies operating from strong m a r k e t positions. I n contrast, the "hard" H R M style places the p r i m a r y emphasis on m i n i m i s i n g the t r a n s a c t i o n costs of labour. T h i s is

commonly achieved t h r o u g h extensive use of outsourcing and, p a r t i c u l a r l y , t h r o u g h t h e use o f subcontracted l a b o u r a n d other forms of a t y p i c a l employment. T h i s approach is also associated w i t h intensified w o r k systems, characterised by increased w o r k flow/pace. W h i l e u n i o n avoidance is equally significant u n d e r t h i s style, i t is achieved more by u n i o n suppression t h a n u n i o n s u b s t i t u t i o n . O u r findings indicate t h a t t h i s style was common among U S - o w n e d i n f o r m a t i o n / d a t a processing services a n d electronics assembly companies operating i n a sub-contracting mode to major manufacturers. A f i n a l alternative i n d u s t r i a l relations style is the so called "dualist" approach, characterised by a n acceptance of the l e g i t i m a c y of collective employee representation b u t supplemented by a strong i n d i v i d u a l i s t emphasis. T h i s style involves the use o f selected H R M techniques, such as sophisticated selection, extensive direct communications w i t h employees and performancer e l a t e d pay systems, alongside established collective b a r g a i n i n g procedures. O u r research found t h a t t h i s style was extremely rare and, i n its "pure form" ( h i g h levels of collectivism and individualism), was confined to only one of the fifty three greenfield companies studied. A final theme emerging from our study is the l i n k between i n d i v i d u a l i s t H R M practices a n d t r a d e u n i o n recognition. W h i l e our analysis d i d not demonstrate a definitive causal relationship, the weight of evidence indicates t h a t the adoption of i n d i v i d u a l i s t H R M approaches has negatively impacted on u n i o n p e n e t r a t i o n i n greenfield companies. W h i l e t h e use o f H R M practices to f a c i l i t a t e u n i o n avoidance was p r e d o m i n a n t l y confined to U S companies, there was some evidence of s i m i l a r approaches among indigenous a n d Japanese owned firms. I t appears t h a t w h i l e the i n i t i a l adoption o f i n d i v i d u a l i s t i n d u s t r i a l relations polices was almost exclusively a U S com­ pany phenomenon, such polices are increasingly pervading other companies and industries. I n conclusion, i t is useful to reflect on the d i m i n u t i o n of u n i o n penetration among greenfield companies. W h i l e i t appears t h a t H R M practices at the enterprise level are serving to m i t i g a t e u n i o n penetration, i t is necessary to look at developments i n the broader business e n v i r o n m e n t to more f u l l y e x p l a i n these developments. O f p a r t i c u l a r significance is the socio-economic climate. The greenfield study is based on new firms established i n the period 1987-1992. T h e I r i s h macro-economic climate of the late 1980s a n d early 1990s presented quite a contrast to earlier decades. Intensified i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i o n combined w i t h h i g h levels of u n e m p l o y m e n t characterised the I r i s h economy for m u c h of t h e period. I n d i g e n o u s a n d foreign-owned companies were forced to adapt t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l relations practices i n the face of increased price competition, p a r t i c u l a r l y from the emerging "Pacific r i m " economies ( H a s t i n g s , 1994). Greenfield companies were a r g u a b l y better

placed to adopt management-led i n d u s t r i a l relations i n i t i a t i v e s designed to simultaneously improve product/service q u a l i t y , cost control and flexibility. For m a n y of these new companies, and p a r t i c u l a r l y those of U S origin, trade u n i o n avoidance c o n s t i t u t e d an i m p o r t a n t element of t h e i r c o m p e t i t i v e positioning. F r o m the broader public policy perspective, Governments were preoccupied w i t h job creation. Consequently, issues such as t r a d e u n i o n recognition and adherence to other characteristics of w h a t was t r a d i t i o n a l l y seen as con­ s t i t u t i v e of good i n d u s t r i a l relations, decreased i n r e l a t i v e importance. I t should be noted t h a t the role of the i n d u s t r i a l promotions agencies vested w i t h responsibility for wooing foreign investment incorporates a significant i n d u s t r i a l relations dimension. There is l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h e i n d u s t r i a l promotions agencies have changed t h e i r position on trade u n i o n recognition over the years (see McGovern, 1989). I n the 1960s and 1970s these agencies promoted u n i o n recognition among new i n w a r d i n v e s t i n g f i r m s , specifically by recommending pre-production u n i o n recognition agreements and a r r a n g ­ i n g introductions to trade u n i o n officials. However, since the 1980s, i t is clear t h a t these development agencies have w i t h d r a w n from this pro-union stance a n d adopted a more n e u t r a l position. T h i s change was accentuated by increased c o m p e t i t i o n for mobile foreign i n v e s t m e n t . I n the face of such c o m p e t i t i o n , the I r i s h development agencies were forced to lessen t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l collectivist o r i e n t a t i o n and, r a t h e r , emphasise t h e scope for foreign companies to adopt i n d u s t r i a l relations polices "best suited" to t h e i r particular business needs (such as the desire to go non-union). I t also seems t h a t m a n y of the. sectors targeted by the i n d u s t r i a l p r o ­ motions agencies are quite i n i m i c a l towards t r a d e unions, specifically elec­ tronics, software development and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y t r a d e d services. M a n y of these are also characterised by h i g h levels of m a r k e t v o l a t i l i t y . As a result, such organisations place a p r e m i u m on t h e i r ability to adjust t h e i r operations and employment q u i c k l y i n l i n e w i t h m a r k e t changes. The perception t h a t u n i o n recognition w o u l d impinge on such f l e x i b i l i t y is an i m p o r t a n t factor encouraging such f i r m s to go non-union. Another factor w h i c h m a y also help e x p l a i n the lower level of u n i o n penetration i n greenfield companies is the increasing a v a i l a b i l i t y of role models of companies w h i c h have established a n d sustained a non-union approach. A f i n a l factor c o n t r i b u t i n g to the change i n u n i o n p e n e t r a t i o n is the changed s k i l l and education profile of the I r i s h workforce. The period since t h e 1970s has witnessed a huge increase i n e d u c a t i o n levels w i t h a pronounced g r o w t h i n t h i r d - l e v e l education. The absorption of increased graduate numbers i n t o w h i t e collar and technical positions, i n p a r t i c u l a r , c o n t r i b u t e d to a workforce profile w h i c h appear less sympathetic to t r a d e

u n i o n membership. T h i s development is captured i n the following quote from a senior manager, w i t h experience i n t w o different U S greenfield companies: W h i l e there was undoubtedly a n overall corporate a n t i - u n i o n bias ... one of t h e most i n t e r e s t i n g developments w h i c h I found was t h a t I r i s h employees, p a r t i c u l a r l y graduate software engineers, quickly embraced t h e i n d i v i d u a l performance e v a l u a t i o n approach of t h e i r peer group colleagues i n the parent company. M a n y of t h e m , who were recognised and r e w a r d e d financially by the company as " i n d i v i d u a l contributors", preferred to represent themselves r a t h e r t h a n get t i e d u p i n a u n i o n i m p o s e d g r a d i n g system w i t h t h e accompanying i n c r e m e n t a l wage scales based on years of service, not only for salary increases, b u t also for promotion. (CEO: U S "high tech" m a n u f a c t u r i n g company). The c o m b i n a t i o n o f these factors m e a n t t h a t by the mid-1980s the I r i s h socio-political climate h a d become a l o t less favourable for trade unions. E v e n t h o u g h unions enjoyed considerable political support and became increasingly i n t e g r a l to c o r p o r a t i s t - s t y l e c e n t r a l i s e d agreements, t h e exigencies o f increased m a r k e t competition at enterprise level, h i g h unemployment and a c h a n g i n g socio-economic workforce profile m e a n t t h a t unions increasingly faced employer opposition, more recalcitrant employees and a d i m i n u t i o n i n t r a d i t i o n a l public policy support for u n i o n organisation. For U S companies i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h i s created an e n v i r o n m e n t where non-union policies could be established a n d sustained. T h u s , w h i l e u n i t a r i s t values m a y have always been present, the combination of social, economic and political developments i n I r e l a n d since the 1980s have created a context i n w h i c h these values could be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o practice i n companies establishing at greenfield sites to an extent not possible i n previous decades. BIBLIOGRAPHY B A S S E T T , P., 1987. Strike Free: New Industrial Relations in Britain, London: Macmillan. B A C O N , N . , and J . S T O R E Y , 1993 "Individualization of the Employment Relation­ ship and the Implications for Trade Unions", Employee Relations, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 5-17. B E A U M O N T , P.B., 1985. "New Plant Work Practices", Personnel Review, Vol. 14, No. 5, pp. 15-19. B E A U M O N T , P.B., 1986. "Management Opposition to Union Organisation: Research­ ing the Indicators", Employee Relations, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 31-38. B E A U M O N T , P.B., 1987. The Decline of Trade Union Organisation, London: CroomHelm. B E A U M O N T , P.B., 1991. "Trade Unions and HRM", Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 300-308.

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APPENDIX 1 Variables used to construct composite measures of

Individualism

V a r i a b l e 1: Sophistication of the Employment and Socialisation system: This v a r i a b l e measures t h e degree of sophistication a n d r e l a t i v e emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l i s m i n t h e m a n a g e m e n t of h u m a n resource "flows" i n t o a n d t h r o u g h t h e organisation. T h i s was the most complex variable to construct a n d was developed on the basis of four key indicators (sophistication of selection, induction/socialisation, employee development techniques and line m a n a g e m e n t capacity to f a c i l i t a t e employee development). These four indicators were, i n t u r n , based on the aggregation of i n f o r m a t i o n gathered from b o t h t h e survey a n d q u a l i t a t i v e i n t e r v i e w phases of t h i s study. The construction of these variables is summarised briefly as follows: (i)

(ii)

(iii)

Sophistication of selection techniques: This indicator measures the sophistication of techniques used to select new employees. I t was based on t h e incidence of specified selection techniques, such as i n t e r v i e w s , a p t i t u d e tests, etc., and scored on a scale of 1-3 ( l o w h i g h ) i n accordance w i t h the reported u t i l i s a t i o n of these selection techniques. Sophistication of induction / socialisation of new employees: T h i s i n d i c a t o r measures t h e l e v e l of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of i n d u c t i o n / socialisation of new employees and was, i n t u r n , constructed on the basis of t h r e e indicators as follows: (a) d u r a t i o n of programme; scored 0 (less t h a n one day) and 1 (one to five days); (b) Chief executive i n v o l v e m e n t i n i n d u c t i o n ; scored 0 (not i n t e g r a l l y involved) and 1 (integrally involved); (c) nature/content of i n d u c t i o n p r o g r a m m e ; scored 0 (None/basic programme) and 1 (Extensive, comprehensive programme). Responses on each of these indicators were t h e n aggregated i n t o an overall i n d u c t i o n variable and scaled on a range of 1-3 ( l o w - h i g h ) as follows: 1 (no/very basic i n d u c t i o n p r o g r a m m e , n o / l i t t l e top m a n a g e m e n t i n v o l v e m e n t ) ; 2 (basic i n d u c t i o n programme, some top management i n v o l v e m e n t ) a n d 3 (comprehensive i n d u c t i o n programme, significant top management involvement). Techniques used to facilitate employee development: This indicator measures the use of three specific techniques to facilitate i n d i v i d u a l employee development among non-managerial employees, namely f o r m a l performance appraisals, succession p l a n n i n g and financial support for further education. These were scored on a range of 1-3 as

(iv)

follows: 1 (no/extremely l i m i t e d use); 2 (use of at least t w o of the three techniques) and 3 ( a l l three techniques used to f a c i l i t a t e i n d i v i d u a l employee development), Line management capacity for employee development: T h i s indicator measures the emphasis on developing the t r a i n i n g and development capacity of l i n e management. I t was constructed from data on the extent to w h i c h line managers received formal training/development i n (a) conducting performance appraisals; (b) management-employee c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ; (c) t o t a l q u a l i t y m a n a g e m e n t or e q u i v a l e n t ; (d) i n d i v i d u a l s t a f f development a n d (e) h a n d l i n g employee grievances. T h i s variable was scored on a scale of 1-3 as follows: 1 (low capacity: line management t r a i n e d i n one or none of the above areas); 2 (medium capacity: line management t r a i n e d i n t w o or three of these areas); 3 (high capacity; line management t r a i n e d i n four or all areas).

A n o v e r a l l e m p l o y m e n t a n d s o c i a l i s a t i o n system v a r i a b l e was t h e n constructed by aggregating t h e scores on each of t h e four c o n s t i t u e n t indicators above. T h i s overall variable was also scored on a 1-3 ( l o w - h i g h ) scale as follows: 1 (very basic selection process; n o / l i t t l e sophistication i n induction/socialisation; low line-management capacity to undertake employee development; l i t t l e / n o u t i l i s a t i o n of management techniques to facilitate employee development); 2 (medium level of sophistication i n selection; basic s o p h i s t i c a t i o n i n d u c t i o n / s o c i a l i s a t i o n p r o g r a m m e b u t v e r y l i m i t e d top management involvement; m e d i u m line-management capacity i n employee development; some u t i l i s a t i o n of management techniques to u n d e r t a k e employee development) and 3 (comprehensive selection process; comprehen­ sive induction/socialisation programme w i t h considerable top management involvement; h i g h line-management capacity i n employee development; h i g h level of u t i l i s a t i o n of m a n a g e m e n t techniques to u n d e r t a k e employee development). V a r i a b l e 2: Communications: T h i s v a r i a b l e measures t h e incidence o f employee b r i e f i n g on issues of corporate significance a n d t h e levels of sophistication i n the techniques used by management to facilitate manage­ ment-employee communications and the relative emphasis on developing an essentially i n d i v i d u a l i s t focus i n such communications. I t was constructed on the basis of t w o key indicators as follows: (i) incidence and n a t u r e of formal b r i e f i n g of n o n - m a n a g e r i a l employees on (a) business s t r a t e g y a n d (b) f i n a n c i a l performance. These t w o indicators were aggregated i n t o one overall communications variable scaled on a range of 1-3 ( l o w - h i g h ) as

follows: 1 (no formal briefing); 2 (formal briefing on business strategy only) and 3 (formal briefing on business strategy and financial performance). V a r i a b l e 3: Employee Involvement: T h i s variable measures the extent to w h i c h management utilises explicit techniques to facilitate employee involve­ m e n t i n decision-making (e.g., consultative/briefing groups, q u a l i t y groups/ circles, etc.). I t was constructed on the basis of the extent of u t i l i s a t i o n of a prescribed group of employee involvement techniques and scored on a 1-3 range as follows: l ( n o / l i t t l e use of techniques to facilitate employee involve­ m e n t ) , 2 (some use of techniques to facilitate employee involvement) and 3 (extensive use of techniques to facilitate employee involvement). Variable 4: Employee Autonomy: This variable measures the extent to w h i c h m a n a g e m e n t s seek to f a c i l i t a t e / p r o m o t e employee a u t o n o m y . I t was constructed on t h e basis of the following indicators of employee autonomy: (i) level of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of non-managerial employees for q u a l i t y / q u a l i t y control scored as 0 (none/little) and 1 (largely or totally responsible); (ii) level of employee responsibility for w o r k allocation scored as 0 (none/little) and 1 (largely or t o t a l l y responsible); ( i i i ) extent to w h i c h j o b design reflects m a n a g e r i a l attempts/desire to m a x i m i s e the use of i n d i v i d u a l employees' skills a n d a b i l i t i e s scored as 0 (no attempt/desire to maximise i n d i v i d u a l employees' s k i l l s / a b i l i t i e s ) a n d 1 (some/considerable attempt/desire to m a x i m i s e i n d i v i d u a l employees' s k i l l s / a b i l i t i e s ) ; ( i v ) T h e d o m i n a n t supervisory style adopted i n t h e company scored as follows: 0 (largely autocratic style) a n d 1 (democratic style/considerable scope for employee a u t o n o m y ) . These four i n d i c a t o r s were t h e n aggregated i n t o a n o v e r a l l measure of employee autonomy and scored on a range of 1-3 ( l o w - h i g h ) as follows: 1 ( l i t t l e / n o employee responsibility for q u a l i t y or w o r k allocation, autocratic supervisory style and no management attempt/desire to maximise employees' skills/abilities t h r o u g h job design), 2 (Some b u t l i m i t e d employee r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for q u a l i t y or w o r k a l l o c a t i o n , autocratic/semi-autocratic supervisory style a n d l i t t l e / n o management desire to maximise employees' s k i l l s / a b i l i t i e s t h r o u g h j o b design) a n d 3 ( h i g h levels of employee responsibility for q u a l i t y or w o r k allocation, democratic supervisory style and s t r o n g m a n a g e m e n t a t t e m p t / d e s i r e to m a x i m i s e i n d i v i d u a l employees' skills/abilities t h r o u g h job design). Variable 5: Performance-Related Pay: This variable measures the incidence of performance-related pay systems and the u t i l i s a t i o n of formal performance appraisals to a i d performance-related pay decisions among manual/operative grades. I t was constructed on the basis of t w o key indicators: (i) use of performance-related pay among manual/operative grades a n d ( i i ) use of

formal appraisals of i n d i v i d u a l employee performance to make performancerelated pay decisions. These indicators were aggregated to produce an overall performance-related pay indicator and scored on a scale of 1-3 as follows: 1 (no i n d i v i d u a l PRP), 2 (PRP b u t no use of i n d i v i d u a l appraisals to a i d PRP decisions) and 3 (individual appraisals used to aid PRP decisions).

APPENDIX 2 Variables used to construct composite measures of Collectivism Variable 1: Trade Union Presence: This variable measures the n a t u r e of trade u n i o n p e n e t r a t i o n i n the companies studied. I t is essentially a composite variable based on the aggregation of data on (i) the extent of t r a d e u n i o n recognition a n d ( i i ) the level of u n i o n membership (density) among n o n managerial employees. Results on these t w o indicators were aggregated a n d scored on a 1-3 scale from low to h i g h trade u n i o n presence as follows: 1 (low: no t r a d e u n i o n r e c o g n i t i o n ; no/low level of t r a d e u n i o n m e m b e r s h i p ) ; 2 ( m e d i u m : trade u n i o n recognition b u t trade u n i o n density less t h a n 50 per cent) and 3 (high: trade u n i o n recognition and trade u n i o n density greater t h a n 50 per cent) (see Table 5.1). Variable 2: Membership and Patterns of Utilisation of Employer Associations: T h i s v a r i a b l e measures t h e level a n d n a t u r e of e m p l o y e r association m e m b e r s h i p among greenfield site companies. I t is a composite v a r i a b l e based on the incidence of employer association membership among the study population and the pattern of u t i l i s a t i o n of employer association services. The l a t t e r indicator was constructed on the basis of patterns of u t i l i s a t i o n of three specific e m p l o y e r association services, n a m e l y ( i ) d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t / assistance i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s negotiations; ( i i ) advice on i n d u s t r i a l relations issues; (iii) advice on general personnel/HR issues. Results on these two indicators were aggregated and scaled 1-3 ( l o w - h i g h ) as follows: 1 (low: not i n membership of employer association); 2 ( m e d i u m : . i n membership b u t employer association only used i n advisory capacity) a n d 3 (high: i n m e m ­ bership and employer association directly involved i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s negotiations). Variable 3: Patterns of trade union organisation: This variable measures the p a t t e r n o f trade u n i o n organisation i n greenfield companies. A g a i n t h i s is a composite constructed on the basis of the following indicators of trade u n i o n organisation: (a) numbers and types of trade unions recognised scored as 1 (no u n i o n recognition), 2 (one [general] u n i o n recognised) and 3 (more t h a n

one u n i o n recognised i n c l u d i n g a general u n i o n and a craft or w h i t e collar u n i o n ) ; (b) incidence a n d n a t u r e of (post-entry) closed shop arrangement scored as follows: 1 (not applicable); 2 (union recognition b u t no closed shop) a n d 3 (closed shop agreement(s) w i t h one or more unions; (c) impact of trade union(s) o n w o r k p l a c e i n d u s t r i a l relations scored as 1 (not applicable/no i m p a c t ) ; 2 ( l i t t l e / m i n o r i m p a c t ) and 3 (considerable/major impact). These three indicators were t h e n aggregated into an overall measure of patterns of t r a d e u n i o n organisation and scored on a range of 1-3 as follows: 1 (no/poor trade u n i o n organisation as indicated by absence of closed shop agreement(s), a n d l i t t l e / n o t r a d e u n i o n i m p a c t on w o r k p l a c e i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s ) ; 2 ( m e d i u m level of trade u n i o n organisation as indicated by the recognition of one general trade u n i o n b u t t h a t u n i o n only h a v i n g , at most, a m i n o r impact on workplace i n d u s t r i a l relations) and 3 (high level of trade u n i o n organ­ isation as indicated by the recognition of a number of trade unions, i n c l u d i n g other t h a n general unions, t h e use of closed shop agreements and unions h a v i n g a considerable or major impact on workplace i n d u s t r i a l relations. V a r i a b l e 4: Role of trade unions and other employee representative bodies in management-employee communications: T h i s variable assesses the t r e n d i n patterns of u t i l i s a t i o n of trade unions and employee representative bodies as a conduit for management-employee communications. I t was constructed on the basis of i n f o r m a t i o n on trends i n the u t i l i s a t i o n of trade unions/employee representative bodies scaled 1-3 (low-high) as follows: 1 (low: no u t i l i s a t i o n of t r a d e unions/employee representative bodies as conduit for managementemployee communications); 2 ( m e d i u m : decreasing/stable t r e n d i n use of trade unions/other employee representative bodies) and 3 (high: increasing t r e n d i n use of t r a d e unions/other employee representative bodies i n communications).