Changes in Governance: A Background Review - CiteSeerX

Changes in Governance: A Background Review

Prepared for the Salzburg Seminar on the Governance of Health

By:

Michael Kempa Assistant Professor Department of Criminology University of Ottawa [email protected] And Clifford Shearing Professor Regulatory Institutions Network Australian National University [email protected]

And

Scott Burris Professor Beasley School of Law Temple University [email protected]

1 Summary There is widespread agreement that governance is important and that it is changing. But exactly how is it changing, and how are actors at various levels of social organization promoting or adapting to changes in governance? The aim of this paper is to explore what researchers and theorists in a wide range of fields have made of the ferment in governance, and to identify important lessons for people interested in how to improve the governance of health. Specifically, we address two main questions: (1) What are the main current descriptions of where governance is located and how it is exercised? And (2) How have innovators in governance tried to reform or replace institutional forms and constraining devices that no longer perform the functions they once did? Governance and Change in Governance “Governance" may be defined as organized efforts to manage the course of events in a social system. Governance is about how people exercise power to achieve the ends they desire, so disputes about ends are inextricably tied to assessments of governance means. “Good governance” in the abstract is governance that is good at delivering results (i.e., is efficient and effective) and that delivers results that are deemed good (e.g., fair, health-promoting). From a design perspective, a governance system has at least three key components that in this review we treat as “variables” of change and innovation: • • •

Institutions: organizational sites where governing resources are gathered and mobilized (government agencies, corporations, foundations, NGOs, street gangs) Tools of influence: methods or technologies that governors use to project influence (money, military force, claims of legitimate right to rule) Constraints on governors: limitations on the freedom of action of governors that may arise from laws (like a constitution or treaty) or competition from other governors (as in a market) or from culture (social norms)

This typology allows us to see that when commentators write of “changes” in governance, they generally are referring to one or more of several developments: • • •

Shifts in the locus of governing control. Governance is said to be changing when there is an apparent shift of the locus of control from some governors to others. Changes in the technology of influence. Governance can change when governors find new ways to project power towards other governors and individuals in the system. Changes in the nature or effectiveness of constraints on governors. Some writers on governance have observed changes in the nature or potency of constraints on governors.

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Who Governs and How? Describing Contemporary Governance There is wide agreement that these are times of profound governance transformation as a matter of empirical fact. The main theme in the literature is the fragmentation of state sovereignty and the consequent multiplication in the number of agencies and forms of power that are active in the management of social systems. There is fairly wide agreement that it no longer makes sense to conceive of the state as the monopolist of governance. Once it was dogma that our collective world was divided into two fundamentally different spheres: the public sphere -- which was the realm of governance; and, the private sphere -- the realm of the governed. This crucial distinction has eroded. States do not enjoy a monopoly on governance, and themselves are often governed by non-state actors. It now makes more sense to describe our world as polycentric, with multiple agencies and sites of governance who govern through a variety of forms of power and largely in their own interests with far reaching collective impacts. This is as true at the international level (where the proliferation of non-state governing actors has been characterized as a “post-Westphalian” regime) as it is at the local (where, for example, more public order services are provided by private security guards than by public police). In health, we observe the phenomenon in, among other developments, the expanding role of NGOs and foundations in setting health priorities and providing services. Throughout the literature there is discussion of the governing power of transnational corporations. NGOs and foundations, though not generally as wealthy or effective as corporations, are also vital governors at all levels. “Dark networks” like Al Qaida are also seen as agencies of governance. None of this means that states are no longer important governors. Many states retain decisionmaking powers in many spheres. Moreover, states are deliberately “sharing” power as a means of exercising it. Much of this falls under the umbrella of "partnership" approaches to governance, wherein the state attempts to maintain a hand on the tiller "steering" governance processes in the public interest. Even where states are not decisionmakers in governance, they typically remain powerful transmitters and implementers of decisions made by others. The structure of governance today is widely described in network terms. Writers point to phenomena as diverse as information the Internet, public-private partnerships, markets, informal policy networks at the international level, and “whole of government” initiatives as examples of networked governance in action. Though there are distinct differences in how the network metaphor is used, network accounts of governance tend to emphasize the importance of information flow as a means and measure of good governance. Those that have and can use information are at a significant advantage over those who are cut off from information or unable to gather or use it effectively.

3 The fracturing of governance has likewise led to an explosion of interest in better understanding the tools of governance. Force, which the Hobbesian state was designed to constrain, continues of course to be a tool of both state and non-state governance. Money is also a staple. At the same time, thinkers like Michel Foucault have been extremely successful in highlighting how governance may be accomplished through “the regulation of social meaning” (Lessig 1995): culture shapes beliefs both about the means and ends of governance, shaping personal behaviour and political mobilization. Information is proposed hopefully (by writers like Castells) as a tool for constraining and replacing these traditional means of exercising power. New institutions and practices of deliberation, mobilization of local knowledge and capacity, better understanding of the “interfaces” where governing entities come together, and attention to cultural or social enablers like trust or “collective efficacy” are pursued as means of making governance systems fairer and more efficient. Governance is not just changing but is nearly universally acknowledged to be in a state of poor health. The diagnoses of the causes of these problems differ, as therefore do the prescriptions for practical remedies: • • • •

The state is too weak, and needs to be strengthened The state remains too strong, too undemocratic, and therefore needs to be better constrained or stripped of some of its jurisdiction Old models of governance are paralyzed, and need to be replaced New modes of governance are increasingly exploited by the strong at the expense of the weak

Much of the impetus behind the current interest in governance seems to be a sense that the normative goals that once animated a state-centered account of governance – stability, accountability, transparency, efficiency – are no longer being achieved, making it important to consider whether other theoretical descriptions of governance might guide us towards governance practices that do better. Innovation in Governance Efforts to remake governance over the past twenty years can be separated into two "genres" of reform: "reinvention of government" and "reinvention of governance". “Reinventing government” involves efforts to recalibrate state structures to improve their capacity to exercise centralized control of diffuse systems, often somewhat paradoxically by ceding much of the implementation of policy to non-state actors through devices like self-regulation and governance partnerships. “Reinventing governance” differs in that it takes innovation beyond the state and public-private partnerships into efforts to mobilize governors who may act with little or no connection with the state. In the “reinventing government” approach, states and state-backed international institutions devolve the "rowing" of governance -- service provision -to non-state agencies, while retaining a firm grip on the business of "steering" governance processes – i.e., specifying the goals. The characteristic institutional expression of this neo-liberal approach is the “partnership” between state and non-state

4 actors to deliver services previously delivered by the state. Sometimes the broader public may be included in the partnership in an advisory capacity or in public-private oversight bodies that share or even takes from the state the primary authority to oversee the workings of the partnership. This approach to governance is seen throughout the world, including in the Global Fund to Prevent HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria. “Selfregulation” enforced by market forces, and the use of markets as regulatory tools (as in environmental emissions trading schemes) have also been common. The reach and success of reinventing government schemes has been incomplete. These strategies have produced greater efficiency in services and enhanced regulatory compliance in some cases, but they are not panaceas. Political and implementation factors have limited adoption of the approach in many settings. Partnership structures have not proven immune to gaming or capture by those whose behaviour the partnership was intended to constrain. The representativeness of partnerships, with and without formal community representation components, has been questioned, both on the ground that the citizen representatives are not given real control, and that citizens in representative positions are not actually representing or accountable to their communities. Neo-liberal governance strategies have more clearly benefited the wealthy and strong than the poor and weak. “Reinventing governance” involves efforts to imagine new institutional forms and governance processes that overcome the problems that cling to traditional statecentered governance methods. Innovators in this realm tend to start with the view that the state will not be able to overcome the forms of corporate-directed power and other factors that prevent governance from working in the broader collective interest. They seek to identify or invent institutions and practices of governance that do not depend upon the state and that mobilize knowledge, capacity and resources that have not been directed into governance before. In some cases, they are explicitly directed at democratic deficits by seeking to make distributed governance systems work for the poor. The central idea emerging from these experiments in governance is the importance of mobilizing knowledge and capacity that has previously been excluded from or limited in participation in governance. Innovation has been aimed particularly at developing new institutions and new tools of governance that can be placed at the disposal of citizens and other stakeholders. Starting with a general appreciation of the potential for citizen/stakeholder deliberation, innovators seek to facilitate the emergence of effective governance separate from the state. We describe several examples of these innovations: • • •

How fisheries and other “common pool” resources have been effectively managed by innovative use of new rules in both self- and state-regulated environments How a new institution was created in poor townships in South Africa to govern security and support community development How organizations have used standard-setting to promote sustainable or ecofriendly coffee-growing practices.

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The key distinction between reinventing government and reinventing governance seems to be the ceding of true control to non-state actors. New governance institutions and practices cannot flourish unless new governors are given real control over budgets and priorities. An account of Northern Ireland’s attempt at policing reform illustrates the problems of incomplete devolution of state control.

6 One: Defining Governance and Change in Governance Definitions of Governance There is little disagreement that governance is changing, but what "governance" means and what sort of changes are occurring is not always specified. "Governance" has become a popular topic, and so risks becoming a point of false rhetorical convergence, a term that means all things to all people, perhaps as often used to obscure as to enlighten (Bevir and Rhodes 2003: 41). Some contemporary definitions of "governance" are to be found in Box 1.1. We begin by adopting a provisional definition of governance to ground this review. We take governance to mean "the management of the course of events in the social system" (see: Burris, Drahos and Shearing 2005: 30-31).

Much of what is meant by governance has to do with effective and efficient management – i.e., governance that “works.” In the political science literature (especially that associated with the science of “public administration”) well-functioning management and control is referred to as the "governability" of the system (Bovaird 2005; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004: 156-157). A system for governance that is high on "governability" is equipped with appropriate tools and capacities to manage itself (e.g., clear lines of information transfer) and to intervene effectively in various policy domains of interest (e.g., clear and effective legal powers, adequate and well-managed resources, etc.).

Management is not merely about "governability," however. It also implies goals towards which systems are being directed, and so governance as a process is inextricably linked to normative questions of what the governor is seeking to accomplish: Mussolini’s fascist regime famously made the trains ran on time, but the ends of his government were odious. Hence “good governance” is not just governance that works efficiently, but governance that works towards just and socially beneficial ends (ibid.).

Much writing on governance is devoted to questions of its ends, and, conversely, judgements about ends frequently influence assessments of effectiveness in governance

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Box 1.1: Alternate Definitions of "Governance" in the Literature In the broadest sense, the essence of modern purposive governance is captured in Guillaume de la Perrier’s famous statement in Mirroire Politique: "the right disposition of things arranged so as to achieve convenient ends" (quoted in Foucault 1979/1991: 94). The earliest practitioner incarnations of the concept of "governance" applied to the management of "the population" and "the economy" as entities whose internal characteristics and processes were rendered conceptually available by the advent of the statistical sciences. Thus, statistics made it possible for practitioners to think in terms of where the population or economy stood on aggregate measures (i.e.. empirical "norms") and, by extension, where they would like these aggregates to be on the same measures (i.e., known desired "ends"). "Governance" thereby became the "rational" affair of systematic observation, policy design, implementation, measurement, and adjustment towards closing the gap between norms and desired ends. Nevertheless, the precise form of interventions typically advocated, along with nature of outcomes typically pursued, has of course shifted over time. Contemporarily, "good governance" in the field of economic and social development -- epitomized in the language and practices of such international agencies as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization -- is orientated around the twin tracks of enhancing the efficiency of the state administration (i.e., combating corruption and engaging "governmental rightsizing") coupled with so-called "second-generation reforms" to build the critical physical infrastructure and promote the individual skills and collective capacities necessary for the development of health, security, and industry under the banner of "universal human rights" to these collective goods (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2005: 144-145). With respect to the social sciences, governance as an object of study is approached in a variety of ways. Thematically, it can be said that differences in the usage of the term are more a matter of emphasis than substance. Universally, it is acknowledged that governance entails a set of both repressive and constitutive processes oriented towards shaping outcomes that extend beyond the state. Nevertheless, commentators differ on the relative importance they assign to the state versus other agencies, and repressive versus constitutive forms of power, in processes of governance. Commentators representing different academic perspectives also differ in terms of the level at which they focus their analysis in keeping with the "conceptual legacy" of their particular research traditions. Thus, prominent "international relations" scholars have come to see "governance" in terms of "systems of rule, as the purposive activities of any collectivity, that sustain mechanisms designed to ensure its safety, prosperity, coherence, stability, and continuance" that are conceived, implemented, and directed, through "international collectivities" that are not limited to the state or state-sanctioned international institutions but include other entities such as International NonGovernmental Organisations (see: Rosenau 2000: 171). Another usage of the term "governance" is derived from the "network studies" stream of political science. This literature tends to see governance in terms of the tendency of networks of governmental players to derive both formal and informal protocols for interactive and independent conduct through the "messy actualities" of partisan brokerage (see for example: Rhodes 2000) and more "ideological" modes of deliberation (see for example: Ostrom 1999). Similar themes are spoken in various streams of "developmental studies" literature, such as in the domain of "health". Barten et al. (2002: 131-132), for example, argue that "governance expresses the relationship that exists between the state and civil society with respect to problems and policies of national interest". Other authors working within this framework retain much of the flavour of the above definition, while moving beyond the collective envelope of "the nation". Reflecting the prolific work emanating from the "German Overseas Institute", Lars Kohlmorgen (2005: 2-3) observes that governance includes "the interplay of different institutional forms ranging from public to private forms of regulation (with different logics of steering and action) and comprises the interaction of different actors (with different power resources and interests)". Further, given that "there is not only an increase of intergovernmental and international activities, but also a significant [rise in] transnational activities [involving civil society and the private sector], we can speak of global instead of international governance…[which entails] the totality of collective regulations to deal with international and transnational interdependence problems". Also very useful for our purposes is the "socio-legal" or "political sociological" treatment of the concept of "governance" developed in the "governmentality" literature that is founded the path-breaking work of Michel Foucault. Rather than approaching "governance" as a problem to be solved, Foucauldian work understands the concept in terms of a "conceptual category" that shapes the ways in which we subsequently look at and attempt to engage the world.

8 (this is especially the subject matter of normative political theory, see for example such luminaries as Habermas 1998; 1994; 1987; 1984, who explicitly connects the question of norms to institutional design; see also: Benhabib 1990; Frankel 1997; Kymlicka 1995; Van Kersenbergen and Van Waarden 2004: 156-160). Thus, for example, the imposition of “structural adjustment” or other rigorous policies aimed at promoting long-term socioeconomic improvement is seen from dominant reformatory perspectives as the epitome of good governance – willingness to impose short term pain for long term gain – and from others as the archetype of unfair and damaging top-down rule-making by outsiders (see for example: Alexander 1996; Chomsky 2001; Di John 2005; Stiglitz 2002). Canvassing, let alone resolving, these sorts of debates is beyond the scope of this review, but we will put our limited but real normative cards on the table. We proceed from the assumption that for governance to be “good” in terms of population health, it must create the conditions in which it is reasonably possible for the governed population to attain a high level and a fair distribution of health.

Structural “Variables” in Governance Systems A governance system has at least three key components that in this review we will treat as “variables” of change and innovation. In any governance system, we are likely to find: •

Institutions: organizational sites where governing resources are gathered and mobilized (government agencies, corporations, foundations, NGOs, street gangs) (see especially the literature domain of public administration studies: Cameron 2004; Cheema 2005; Collingwood and Logister 4005; Haque 2004; 2004a; Hall and Biersteker 2002; )

•

Tools of influence: methods or technologies that governors use to project influence (money, military force, claims of legitimate right to rule) (on practical tools, see especially the domain of public administration studies: Abrahamsen 2004; Boviard 2005; on broader theoretical issues addressing the nature and machinations of power behind tools and techniques of governance, see various domains of socio-legal studies: “governmentality” work: Burchell 1993;

9 Cruikshank 1999; Foucault 1979/1991; Hindess 1996; Rose 1996; 1999; Rose and Miller 1992; “reflexive sociology”: Bourdieu 1991; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). •

Constraints on governors: limitations on the freedom of action of governors that may arise from laws (like a constitution or treaty) or competition from other governors (as in a market) or from culture (social norms) (see especially the contributions of International Relations scholars of a post-Westphalian ilk on “global governance”: Coicaud 2001; Falk 2004; Held 2000; Hettne 2002; Hewson and Sinclair 1999; Marden 2003; McGrew 2000; Murphy 2000; Ruggie 2003; Zurn 2004); on legal, political and social conditions of possibility that enable and constrain authoritative government action, see the domain of global regulation studies: Braithwaite 2005; Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Multicentric-Faur 2005; C. Scott 2002).

Changes in Governance This typology allows us to see that when commentators write of “changes” in governance, we find that they generally are referring to one or more of several developments.

Shifts in the locus of governing control. Governance is said to be changing when there is an apparent shift of the locus of control from some governors to others. For example, the TRIPS treaty changed the governance of intellectual property rights in part by shifting authority to govern from the World Intellectual Property Organization to the World Trade Organization. Sometimes former governing institutions disappear, like the government of Somalia, but more frequently observed these days is that organizations continue to exist, consume resources and exercise governing influence but in fewer domains or with

10 less effectiveness than in the past. For example, at the international level, the World Bank, operating under the GATT web of treaties, has taken on a powerful governing role not just in international trade but in matters like national standards for environmental or worker health and safety standards (Kohlmorgen 2005). States have less control over certain aspects of domestic policy by virtue of signing on to the World Trade Organisation regime (Chimni 2004). Further state control has been lost to the increasing ability of non-state entities to punch their weight through the threat of flight of capital in a fluid and mobile global information economy (see for example: Drahos and Braithwaite 2002).

Changes in the technology of influence. A second form of change frequently identified in the literature is in the means that governors use to project power towards other governors and individuals in the system. Within state governance, there has been in many (though not all) parts of the world a move towards governing “at-a-distance,” through various forms of standard-setting and self-regulation, and so a departure from more commandand-control based forms (Rose 1996; 1999; Rose and Miller 1992). These programs for governance involve constitutive power mechanisms that literally make political actors up in the image of "responsible" citizenship: independent actors who are capable of reading and navigating the rigours of the market (Burchell 1993). Governance-at-a-distance is also in operation in the sphere of international development: the IMF and World Bank’s "second-generation" reforms orientated towards the development of critical local infrastructure, health and education programs are explicitly about training and fostering

11 capacities for participation in building sustainable local economies throughout the developing world that can be linked with global markets (Abrahamsen 2004).

On the one hand, such programs for governance "at-a-distance" can be thought of as enhancing the capacity of the state to govern a widening sphere of social processes more effectively and efficiently. On the other hand, however, other trends in the form and exercise of authority indicate that state governability and accountability are slipping. In the International Relations literature, scholars like Anne-Marie Slaughter have observed the evolution of control through networks of subsidiary government agencies that directly negotiate agreements (Slaughter 1997). Such processes would diffuse decision-making authority throughout the bureaucracies of state governments, with the effect that Ministerial accountability for governmental policy increasingly stands as a "strange legal fiction" (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004: 156-157).

Further, the creation of trade agreements such as the GATT also opens up to corporate actors the possibility of using information and networking techniques to govern. For example, those who hold intellectual property patents now hire private agencies to search out evidence of piracy in software music and video, and then use the "evidence" gathered to convince the US trade authorities to threaten sanctions within the WTO regime on countries that are not exerting enough influence to stamp out counterfeiting (Drahos and Braithwaite 2004; C. Scott 2002).

12 Changes in the nature or effectiveness of constraints on governors. Finally, some writers on governance have observed changes in governance that are seen in at least part as changes in the nature or potency of constraints on governors. A prime example is in the notion of a “post-Westphalian” form of international governance, which describes the breakdown of the "international" governance régime and its usurpation by a supranational governmental order populated by multilateral "coalitions of the willing", familiar statebacked (i.e., “Treaty”) international institutions, and proliferation of "independent" nonstate entities, such as International Non-Governmental Organizations (e.g., Fidler 2004). This is more than a description. From a normative point of view, it claims a weakening of the primary norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, a norm that to some extent limited the discretion of more powerful states (Chimni 2004; Zurn 2004).

Two “Problems” in Governance for this Review The literature on changing governance tells two basic stories: one is a story of how various governors have “lost” their governing potency by being supplanted by other governors or clinging to modes of influence that are no longer effective; the other is a story of how new players have emerged and found niches and effective tools to assert governing power The issue of constraint is in the background of both kinds of stories: much of the “evolution” of governance systems, and many of the problems of justice, transparency and accountability, can be explained at least in part as reflecting comparative advantage of players in adapting to (e.g., evading) constraints that limit competing governors.

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With a definition of governance, a description of its key elements, and a concise summary of how governance change has been covered in the literature, we can focus the remainder of this review on how innovators and commentators of governance have addresses two core problems:

•

The Description Problem: Most of us are caught in the grip of “civics class” conceptions of governance that prevent us from getting a true picture of governance. In the words of Robert Unger, we tend towards a kind of “institutional festishism” (Unger 1996) in matters of governance, believing that the only institutions that can deliver the goods of good governance are those that have done so in the past. The challenging question in the literature, then, is what is the most accurate, as opposed to the formal, description of where governance is located and how it is exercised?

•

The Innovation Problem: Given a description of “real” governance, how can we reform or replace institutional forms and constraining norms that no longer perform the functions they once did – how, in other words, can we practice innovation in governance?

This review examines how scholars in a variety of fields have tried to answer these two questions. Its aim is to identify the important points of consensus and successful approaches to governance innovation.

14 Two: Who Governs and How? Describing Contemporary Governance Despite differences in conceptual emphasis across the literature, it is widely agreed that we are living in times of profound governance transformation as a matter of empirical fact. The main theme to which all of the transformations in governance that we will describe in this report are ultimately reducible is the fragmentation of state sovereignty and the consequent multiplication in the number of agencies and forms of power that are active in the management of social systems. Once it was dogma that our collective world was divided into two fundamentally different spheres: the public sphere -- which was the realm of governance; and, the private sphere -- the realm of the governed. This crucial distinction has eroded. It no longer represents the way things are (although for many it remains an ideal that sets out the way things ought to be). Much of the impetus behind the current interest in governance seems to be a sense that the normative goals that once animated a state-centered account of governance – stability, accountability, transparency, efficiency – are no longer being achieved, making it important to consider whether other theoretical descriptions of governance might guide us towards governance practices that do better.

There is also fairly wide agreement that the state-centered system of governance has been replaced by some form of distributed governance, in which governance power is spread among a wide range of actors of many different types. Very often the metaphor of the network is used to capture the imagery of diffuse systems of governance involving multiple nodes that interact in a wide variety of ways. The unity of the network metaphor, however, masks a wide diversity in how precisely the concept is being used across a range of literatures. The fracturing of governance has likewise led to an explosion of interest in unpacking the tools of governance: the means, ranging from controlling resource and information flows to influencing culture through setting the abstract terms for debate, through which governing decisions can be influenced and effectuated.

The harmony in the literature in acknowledging profound shifts in the ways in which governance is organised and delivered goes sour on the question of what these agreed

15 changes mean in terms of their origins and practical impacts, and whether they are positive or not. Few seem to think the disappearance of the state would be a good thing. Many who document the weakness or failure of the state tend to look to strengthening the state, or state-based international institutions, as the remedy. Conversely, there is widespread concern that distributed governance systems are being dominated by actors with greater resources to recognize and “game” new governance structures to suit their own (short-term, we would argue) ends. We canvas these points in this section.

The King is Dead

The state has abandoned some of its aspirations to hold a monopoly over the business of governance in key spheres of public policy. The notion that the state ought to stand alone in governing the public sphere in the collective interest – while, conversely, letting the private sphere alone to govern itself within broad limits (e.g., of constitutional or criminal law) – was always more of a set of liberal democratic rhetorical aspirations rather than the institutional reality of collective governance. Nevertheless, this set of rhetorical aspirations reached its institutional apotheosis in the middle decades of the 20th century, and has been in accelerating decline since the advent of the most recent phase of "globalization" associated with the rise of the information economy. In the context of accelerating movement of information and goods (and other forms of capital) and (certain classes) of people in “globalising” times, the primary "envelope" of collectivisation pooling individuals has ceased to be the state: all manner of "non-state spaces" (both real and virtual) have opened up, presenting challenges and opportunities for governance that have been seized by non-state actors who govern largely according to the dictates of their own “private” interests which nevertheless has far-reaching “public” consequences – including governing states themselves.

For many scholars, the public-private distinction has never described reality – it has always been an inspirational rather than an empirical distinction. These spheres have always, it is argued, been hybrids. This is true. However, this observation should not be used to blind us to the fact that there has been fundamental change in the way we practice

16 governance that relates directly to both the empirical and inspirational value of the public-private distinction. Ever since Thomas Hobbes, the state has figured for many thinkers on governance as the one essential decision-maker and coordinator, the one centre of governance that could pacify the war of all against all through the application of repressive sovereign force (see especially: Hindess 1996). This is now longer accepted as true. Indeed, it is now seen as a grossly inaccurate caricature, both of who does governance and how governance is done (Ibid.; Abrahamsen 2004; Castells 2000; Rhodes 1997). Some argue that a continued mono-focus upon the state and obsession with repressive sovereign authority is undermining our ability to govern effectively in a whole variety of domains (Ibid.; Chimni 2004; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004) – including health (Hein et al. 2005; Kohlmorgen 2005; Ollila 2005).

It is not simply that the public and private spheres have become blurred or that there are now hybrid spheres. The distinction is itself no longer valid. Rather than living in a world in which states exercised a monopoly on governance in the public interest, we now live in a polycentric world with multiple agencies and sites of governance who govern through a variety of forms of power and largely in their own interests with far reaching collective impacts. These themes are illustrated in macro- through local- level transformations in governance.

In the International Relations literature, the idea that we have entered a “postWestphalian” era reflects the view that other entities besides states and state-sponsored institutions now have firm places in international governance. For example, International Nongovernmental Organizations, such as Amnesty International, are able to mobilize popular opinion against particular states to constrain and shape their action through the issue of reports and by having access to global information media (Townsend and Townsend 2004). Further, it has been emphasized in this literature that the efficacy of the United Nations and state-sponsored global development agencies has been eroding in the context of the expansion of global corporate and civil power and tendency towards autonomous "multilateral" action on the part of "coalitions of the willing" led by the global superpowers in international affairs – such as in the case of the current military

17 adventure in Iraq (see especially: Anyaoku 2004; Chimni 2004; Ruggie 2003; Zurn 2004).

Additionally, development studies literature reminds us that the power of corporations to govern states -- largely through the weight that accrues to "threat of flight of capital" in a mobile global economy -- has meant that sovereign governments throughout the developing world have often been incapable of pursuing autonomous socio-economic and environmental policy agendas that are unfriendly to the maximization of corporate profits. For example, state government policies throughout Southern Africa have been turned in the direction of conditions favourable for the maintenance of the primary resource extraction economy most beneficial for major transnational corporations (Bongmba 2004; Carmody 2002).

More locally, we have seen the proliferation of forms of "mass private property" and other forms of new "communal space" which are privately owned yet open to various degrees to public access. These spaces include forms of property such as malls and other shopping complexes, golf courses, theme parks and other leisure facilities, and secured corporate and residential complexes and towers. Owners of this property take full advantage of the rights that accrue to property ownership -- and to the inapplicability of constitutional limitations on action that apply only to public authorities -- in Western law to set and enforce behaviour and surveillance standards within the expanses of space that they own (Kempa et al. 2004; von Hirsch and Shearing 2000). This has seen the explosion in the size and role played by the paid private security industry globally over the last three decades (Caldeira 2000; 1996; Kempa et al. 2004; Shearing and Stenning 1983; 1981; Wakefield 2003). These agencies have become the dominant force in the process of "the governance of security" at the local and international levels over this time period, which has seen much of the business of "policing" turn directly in service of the interests of wealthier classes (ibid.). Of great import is the fact that the public police are themselves often mobilized by private security agencies to do their bidding: absent such an invitation, the nature of private property law makes it difficult for the public police to enter and intervene. Thus, in an important sense, the public police are themselves

18 governed by the private security industry and their employers in the expanses of mass private property that dot the contemporary landscape.

As the above examples illustrate, it is not just that the state now shares governance with “private” actors in policy networks that remain state-coordinated. It is now recognized that the state itself is governed by non-state actors -- which makes it possible to speak of the rise of "private government" in contemporary systems of governance (Freeman 2000; Macauley 1995). This highlights the analytic point that useful accounts of, and programs for engagement with, governance must therefore take into consideration the cases in which the state is following orders, in which it may be a transmitter rather than maker of decisions. The fact that a government in a nodal world is democratically elected has on this basis proved to be no guarantee that it will realize broadly based, rather than narrowly partisan agendas (see especially: Bovaird 2005; Di John 2005; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004).

None of the above means, however, that states are no longer important. States are sometimes -- and with varying degrees of success -- endeavouring to act "at-a-distance" to co-ordinate processes of governance. Much of this falls under the umbrella of "partnership" approaches to governance, wherein the state attempts to maintain a hand on the tiller "steering" governance processes in the public interest (see especially: Eggers and O’Leary 1995; Osborne and Gaebler 1993). This has and can be accomplished through a variety of means, which we will focus upon later in this and the next chapter. At this point, suffice it to say that partnership governance can entail the deployment of both repressive and constitutive forms of power, wherein state governments elicit desired forms of behaviour by framing the broadest terms of debate and controlling access to rewards.

Long Live the Extended Royal Family

The point emerges that states exist today as one node among many in an increasingly complex field of governance relationships and practices. In the context of the

19 fragmentation of sovereignty in globalizing times, the "reach" of such non-state actors is not as limited as may have been imagined in the bye-gone era of state-dominated governance: it extends beyond any type of clearly delimited "private" sphere into a wide variety of areas of collectivisation that encompass many individuals and have broad impacts for the social and physical environments. As has been pointed out by Kohlmorgen and his colleagues at the German Overseas Institute, “governance” is a multilevel affair (Hein et al. 2005; Kohlmorgen 2005), and therefore we can expect to see the proliferation in involvement of non-state actors in processes of governance at the local, national, and inter/supra-national levels of collectivisation.

So who else governs? This is an empirical question that has received considerable attention in the literature. In addition to the state, several kinds of institutions have emerged as particularly powerful in managing the flow of events, some of which we have mentioned above: business corporations, private (benevolent) foundations, (International) Non-Governmental Organisations, and criminal or terrorist enterprises are prominent agencies involved in contemporary governance.

The most influential and powerful agencies involved in contemporary governance are without a doubt those representing corporate power: we have seen a veritable resurgence in "private governments" at the local, national, and interest/supranational levels, as we have suggested above (Freeman 2000; Macauley 1995). The mechanisms through which these forms of non-state agencies govern are most clearly spelled out in the global business regulation literature, which provides detailed analysis of the legal and cultural "conditions of possibility" that have enabled corporations to seize the levers of governability away from public authorities. As commentators like John Braithwaite, Peter Drahos, Colin Scott, and David Multicentric-Faur have pointed out, much of this has turned on outdated notions of "private property" contained in contract, patent, and intellectual property law (see: Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; 2000; Scott 2002; Multicentric-Faur 2005; Moran 2002). For example, TRIPS has rendered it possible for pharmaceutical conglomerates to claim patent over remedies derived from plants and

20 other biotic matter that is itself originally sourced from local indigenous knowledge, spawning a boom in the profitable industry of “bioprospecting” (Drahos 2004).

Also exerting a great deal of influence in contemporary governance are NonGovernmental Organizations, which have been noted to be particularly active in the international sphere (Collingwood and Logister 2005; Haque 2004a). Although these bodies are not directly state-sponsored nor "incorporated" in the traditional sense of profit-making institutions, they derive substantial authority to govern states through their capacity to mobilize and shape public opinion through the publication of reports and access to the world's media.

In addition to autonomous activity, both corporate organizations and NGOs have been mobilized to participate in collective governance processes through mainstream "partnership approaches" to governance. Partnership has been the "buzzword" in neoliberal (alternately, "advanced liberal") systems of governance that see the state attempt to govern "at-a-distance" through harnessing the ordering capacity of markets and other autonomous local orders. Within this framework, contributors to "partnership governance" are often explicitly authorized in law or through contract to undertake service provision functions in the public interest (Abrahamsen 2004; Freeman 2000; Haque 2004a). Often, these agencies are subsequently (partially) governed by the state by the establishment of "quasi-independent" oversight bodies (see especially: Rhodes 1997). There are no "sacred cows" of public policy that have been excluded from such devolution of service planning and delivery: as we have mentioned, even in the domain of "the governance of human security", thought in most liberal democratic theory to be the foundational purpose of the state, public authorities have engaged partnership approaches to policing in collaboration with local citizens and the paid private security industry (and have seen corporate authorities take control over their own policing autonomously), with the effect that the preponderance of “policing” that is done today is done by non-state actors under both state and non-state direction (see especially: Kempa et al. 2004; Wakefield 2003).

21 "Dark networks" exert influence on contemporary governance principally through the deployment of force and threat of deployment of force (Raab 2003): these factors contribute to the deepening spread of the "risk mentality" that dominates contemporary life. As scholars such as Ulrich Beck (1993) and David Garland (2003; 2000) have detailed, in the context of uncertain global futures and the apparent failure of science to deliver on the “modernist dream” of a well-administered social and physical environment, individuals have become increasingly fearful of potential and unknown harms. In turn, these fears are often further fanned by politicians for partisan and electoral benefit (Garland 2000). Thus, Al Qaeda governs the West through actual and threatened violence that produces both specific and generalized fear that is associated with xenophobic reactions that further help Al Qaeda’s cause to turn the balance of the planet violently against the West.

What Does Distributed Governance Look Like?

Descriptions of distributed governance have been dominated by the image of the network. The use of the network idea ranges considerably in analytic rigor, from the metaphorical to the mathematical, but the thrust is that governance systems can be best understood as being comprised of many more or less independent governors and providers who are linked in some way that enables them to project influence across social space. Networks can be highly stable, but in the network model there is also an inherent expectation of flux, with institutions being capable of more or less rapidly making new connections and abandoning old ones. We describe here several leading accounts of networked governance at various levels of social organization.

The Network Society There exists a genre of network studies, led by the luminary work of Manuel Castells (2000), which focuses upon the rise of networks as the primary mode of social and institutional organisation in conditions of "advanced information economy" and "late modernity". This perspective approaches the study of networks in terms of how information does, and might yet more optimally, flow between nodes separated by

22 networks of time and space. A critical feature of this work is to ponder the broader social, political, and economic impacts of the spread of different forms of information sharing networks. In this regard, Castells has noted the emergence of a new "fourth world" – a marginalized social class (which in fact comprises the vast majority of the Earth's population) which is relegated to informational "black holes" that are cut off from the information flows that drive the knowledge economy. According to Castells, such black holes have arisen as a consequence of inadequate network design and management.

Related to this work, but more focused in the scale of its analysis, is the "autopoetic" theory developed within the genre of political science. The concept of "autopoiesis" reflects the tendency of institutions and systems to become "self-referential" in terms of the information they take in and consider as the basis of practical action. These authors emphasize that, over time, these tendencies can become quite strong to the point that that entities’ frames of reference for undertaking the business of governance becomes completely disconnected from external feedback (Dunshire 1996; Veld et al. 1991). Seeing only what it wants to see, the institution proceeds on a self-destructive course of action in which each setback is interpreted as validation.

An important point emerging

here is that a critical feature on which to evaluate any system for governance is the capacity to gather and then process information with a minimum of bias arising from the culture or interests of the governing system.

“Whole of Government” and “Whole of Society” Whereas Castells and those he has influenced address the flow of information through networks as their primary focus of analysis, an important group of scholars typified by Roderick Rhodes have adopted the network model within a more policy-oriented framework (see: Rhodes 2005; 1997; 1990). Policy network analyses, in earlier publications, focused upon analysing and categorizing the many forms of "networks" that could exist in terms of what kinds of policy domains they address and the types of nodes that tend to dominate them (i.e. public versus private nodes) (see especially, Rhodes 1990). Thus, there exist multiple forms of policy networks in the contemporary landscape of governance, some that are largely coordinated by public authorities, others

23 that have more minimal forms of state involvement, and still others that are organized counter to state law in service of illegal activities (i.e., "dark networks", see: Raab 2003).

Of late, more emphasis in the literature has been placed upon analyzing the internal political dynamics of policy networks and their impacts in terms of how they distribute "collective benefits", such as security, education, and health services (Ostrom 1999; Rhodes 2005; 2000; 1997; Sorenson and Torfing 2003). As a theme, this huge literature has found policy networks, as they have so far developed, to be mostly exclusive in terms of their membership, whose "voices" (and, by extension what forms of "knowledge") they tend to take seriously, and, consequently, in whose interests policy generated by such networks tends to serve. Thus, contemporary policy networks are for the most part characterized by a lack of legal, political, and fiscal accountability, which contributes to themes of a widening "democratic deficit" between "have" and "have not" segments of the community in neo-liberal times (ibid). This is true across a range of social services, ranging from environment (Elliot 2002; Ostrom 1999) to health (Ollila 2005) to human security (Kempa and Johnston 2005).

More recently, there has been more optimistic network literature identifying some appropriate institutional arrangements to assure effective forms of deliberation that lead to "rational" policy outcomes that are in service of the common interest (see especially: Ostrom 1999; see also: Dryzek 2005; 2000; Surowicki 2004). On the one hand, there is empirical evidence to suggest that there ought to be rules excluding "symbolic" and/or "emotional" communications from the part of deliberation (Habermas 1998; 1996; 1987; 1984); on the other hand, some theorists have mobilized evidence indicating that including more emotional arguments serves an important "cathartic" function increasing the likelihood that policy approaches agreed through deliberation will last in practice for a longer duration on the basis that stakeholders will have a higher emotional stake in such agreements (Mouffe 2000; 1999). What is of clear importance is the role of political brokerage and exchange between nodes (i.e., "partisan politics") in accounting for the emergent character of policy forms around us.

24 Nodal Governance Of late, a global network of scholars to which we are affiliated have been attempting to assemble a synthetic analytic and normative framework for the study of trends in governance and engagement in governance reform that builds upon the strengths of each of the approaches outlined above (Burris, Drahos and Shearing 2005; Burris 2004; Froestad 2005; Kempa and Shearing 2002; Shearing and Wood 2004). The driving principle of this framework is, simply, that "multiple nodes interact in the process of governance -- how they do so in each instance is an empirical question that raises analytic and normative issues around power/knowledge, agency, structure, and shared norms and procedures for justice and fairness".

Picking up on an idea coming from Nietzsche (via Michel Foucault) that "there are as many forms of power as there are relationships, ranging from the repressive to the constitutive", a nodal analysis develops the point that there exist multiple forms of power in play in governance networks, ranging from the repressive to the constitutive. Such an analysis permits a more detailed analysis of the question of how individuals experience the process and impacts of different networked arrangements. To date, research indicates that, despite the dangers in the tendencies towards exclusion in policy networks described above, there are many opportunities to build inclusive networked approaches to governance where such endeavours are built from the "ground up" by stakeholders themselves under broadly defined state-regulatory limits. James C. Scott would understand this as paying attention to métis (i.e., intangible local knowledge and capacities) in ensuring the democratic character of nodal governance arrangements (J.C. Scott 1998).

Post-Westphalian Governance In the International Relations literature, the idea of post-Westphalian governance has been heavily influenced by the architecture of networks. In particular, Annemarie Slaughter (2001) has emphasized the ways in which states and their departments have themselves become fragmented into largely autonomous bureaucracies that are directly linked up with one another and other important non-state players in international policy

25 networks. Thus, the bureaucratic engine of the Ministry of Development in Canada is directly linked with their counterparts in Botswana, and with representatives of international development agencies, nongovernmental organizations and local community leaders, with minimal levels of Ministerial involvement/accountability on either end.

Further, as we have already intimated above, state backed international governance agencies, such as the UN, are under huge pressure shape their behaviour to the preferences of the most powerful nation states, to corporate actors, and sometimes to high profile nongovernmental organizations (Anyaoku 2004; Chimni 2004; Falk 2004; Monbiot 2004; Zurn 2004).

Role-Based and Functional Accounts In contrast to accounts organized explicitly or implicitly around networks, some scholars have tried to refresh the picture of governance by breaking down conventional assumptions about the roles to be played by state versus private governors. Rather than classify institutions in terms of their "location" in the public versus private sphere, some authors have begun to draw functional distinctions between auspices, under whose authority governance is undertaken, and, providers, who undertake the actual business of governance (see: Bayley and Shearing 2001). As we have introduced above, governance can be initiated under either state or non-state impetus, and, subsequently conducted by either state or non-state agencies -- in the contemporary interlinked society, all of these forms of governance will have profound "collective impacts". An important concept that emerges here is that the benefits of networked governance tend to accrue to those individuals who are "members" of the non-state collectives driving and carrying out the business of governance. In contrast to notions of "citizenship" in state collectives, membership in such contractual non-state orders has been thought about in terms of "denizenship" (Shearing and Wood 2004). Denizenship in collectives like gated communities has its privileges: such as access to the security and other forms of social goods that are privately provided with in those orders.

26 In taking such a functionalist view of governing agencies, addressing these difficulties leads to questions about where best to locate and how best to control “public” (i.e., broader collective) resources and an oversight functions so as to insure and equitable distribution of collective goods.

How Do Distributed Governors Govern?

The techniques of governance have received considerable attention in some quite various literatures, ranging from the social theory of Michel Foucault to the extensive technical literature on regulation associated with the “Anglo-Australian” school of regulatory studies. Despite the diversity in these literatures, which deal at varying levels of abstraction with multiple levels of social organization, there is a similarity in the fundamental recognition of the problem of governance as managing complex systems in which governing power is effectively distributed across many more actors than can be managed by centralized command and control techniques.

“The Regulation of Social Meaning” While there are many facets to the work of Michel Foucault, and that of his "neoFoucauldian" interlocutors, most useful in this corpus of work for our purposes is his account of truth and systems of knowledge as themselves being key mechanisms of governance. Foucault was very concerned with identifying the key "conditions of possibility" that enabled particular ways of thinking about and so doing the business of governance, the business of personal and collective health, the business of economy etc (see especially, see especially: Foucault 1979/1991; 1978; 1977/1995; 1969/1997; 1968/1991). Foucault set about examining overarching "rationalities" of governance through reading primary texts across of an array of domains, such as doctors’ manuals, prison wardens’ records and accounts, and policing institutions’ texts. He did so with the view to uncovering commonalities in "ways of thinking" about the world and how best to govern it, which were popular and in operation in many programs for governance at particular juncture in history.

27 Thus, it is possible to speak of different forms of "liberalism" in terms of a set of beliefs, or, "régimes of truth", about how the world works and why and how people act the way they do with in it, that are literally embedded in particular governance practices. For Foucault, these overarching rationalities eventually become widespread enough as to take on a life of their own, literally "covering over" other alternatives for how to think about and do the business of governance. Thus, the rationality of "liberalism" of various stripes can be mobilized by governing actors with the view to attaching legitimacy to their actions and delegitimizing other forms of thinking and acting. A very important technique of governance is thereby "the regulation of social meaning" which is accomplished through setting the broad parameters and rules for debate by invoking dominant ideologies for governance and the symbolic legitimacy that attaches to them. For example, "responsiblised" citizenship in the neo-liberal context is defined in terms of the ability of individuals to competently navigate the rigors of the market in governing their own and their families’ lives: this definition is legitimized in terms of what it means to be a good "liberal" citizen who can be trusted to bear freedom responsibly (see further: Rose 1999; 1996; Rose and Miller 1992). Alternate notions of "good citizenship" are delegitimizing the basis that they do not conform to this "liberal mentality".

Mobilization and Coordination of Diffused Knowledge and Capacity An equally influential account has conceptualized governance in terms of the mobilization and coordination of knowledge and capacity that is diffused throughout the system. An important thinker was Friedrich Hayek, whose analysis of governance was premised on the complexity of social systems and the inability of central planners to comprehend or effectively manage them (Hayek 1988). Hayek’s account rested on the challenge of information flow, which he contended was best managed as a decentralized, polycentric process exemplified by markets. His work has natural affinities with network accounts such as Castells (2000), introduced above, which centers on the fact that hierarchical, bureaucratic modes of organization are inadequate to the task of accommodating massive amounts of information that move through networks. In such a scenario, better resource to "nodes" in the network will be more successful in gaining access to, compiling, and making use of valuable information, to the exclusion of

28 marginalized classes. As we have noted in the work of the policy network theorists (Rhodes 2005; 1997; 1990), the game of partisan politics add the additional layer of competition between "in groups" for dominance in directing and reaping the benefits of governance processes. The effect is that networks gravitate towards being dominated by the most powerful segments of society, who accomplish this largely through taking control of the flow of information in their favour.

Functionalist Accounts: Standards, Oversight, Enforcement The global business regulation literature confirms three generic problems that face governance, which are currently being inadequately met in the reality of governance on the ground. A regulatory system that hopes to govern must do three things: set a standard (whether of behaviour or outcome), it must have a means of monitoring compliance, and it must have means of enforcing compliance upon those who do not obey (Braithwaite 2005; Cashore 2002; Goodin 2003; Moran 2002; C. Scott 2002). In carrying out each of these aspects of regulation, governance can be quite flexible.

With respect to rule-making, government action is one model for setting standards, but there are many others. Market competition between providers can perform a similar function, where consumers literally "vote with their feet" in search of better services where one provider stands as inferior to another on standards. With respect to monitoring compliance, it is possible for the state to do this directly. It is further possible to have semi-independent "watchdog" organizations do this work, and, further, to leave monitoring to the observation of the organization in question itself, or some "professional" association comprised of representatives of a broader collective (i.e. "selfregulation"). With respect to enforcement, again, it is possible for the state to act directly or to engage the services of others to carry out discipline, for leave discipline to the agency in question.

In practice, regulation in the "neo-liberal" order has taken on the character of states acting directly to set standards (sometimes in consultation with community advisory structures), acting "at-a-distance" to conduct monitoring through "semi-independent" watchdog

29 organizations (which are sometimes linked to state structures through "tripartite" arrangements – see: Cameron 2004), and engaging discipline only where corporate or other non-state behaviour has been extreme (in overview, see: Grabosky 1995; Moran 2002; C. Scott 2002). This has been the norm under "partnership" approaches to governance across a range of spheres of service provision, wherein states have sought to maintain a grip on the tiller steering diffuse systems for governance under the privatization impetus associated with the epoch of "reinventing government" – while seeking to mobilise the private entities and market processes to serve the public interest (see especially: Eggers and O’Leary 1995; Osborne and Gaebler 1993).

The impacts of such systems for regulation have been poor, to say the least: the regulation studies literature has confirmed that the most powerful corporate actors have been able to hijack weak systems of accountability in service of their own motivations. Thus, it has become possible to speak of the diffusion of a global system of "regulatory capitalism" that sees governance directed in the interests of the "corporate talker see" that has revolving membership in dominant "power positions" in institutional government and industry (Multicentric-Faur 2005; Toombs and Whyte 2003).

The potentiality of doing things differently in terms of harnessing non-state entities to actually do the business of governance (as opposed to merely service provision) has so far been retained as an interesting theoretical story, though, there have been some interesting experiments on the ground, which we shall discuss in the next chapter.

The “Human Element” A large number of observers reflecting a diversity of perspectives within the social sciences have converged on the important point that there are certain cultural conditions of possibility that are essential to the well functioning of governance. This is a part of a conceptual turn in the social sciences to pay more attention to the human vicissitudes that have so far frustrated efforts to build macro-social scientific predictive "theories" of collective processes that are reliable (see especially: Wedel et al. 2005). This connects with work by Kohlmorgen and colleagues (Hein et al. 2005; Kohlmorgen 2005) coming

30 out of the German Overseas Institute and the general policy network literature (Rhodes 2005; 1997; 1990) that focuses on the forms of partisan politics and negotiation that take place at the “interfaces” where governance nodes come into contact within one another.

Further, within the political sociology and anthropology literatures, there has been a great deal of theory-building founded upon empirical comparative studies on trajectories toward democratic rule. This work centers upon trying to identify core factors relating to the interaction between political economy, institutional structure and human agency that variously contribute to and inhibit the consolidation of effective systems for democratic rule (see for example: Rueschemeyer 1991; Wedel et al. 2005). This work connects with commentators addressing questions of the conditions that underlie both "social capital and "collective efficacy" as collective states of being that are necessary for effective collaboration on meeting the governance challenges of collective interests (see especially: Sampson 2000; Sampson et al 2002; Sampson et al. 1999; Sampson et al. 1997).

Two particularly important aspects of the "human dimension" in terms of understanding how and why individuals engage systems for governance in this spirit of collaborative enterprise are absolutely key: dynamics concerning "trust" and "hope". With respect to the first, it has been pointed out that lack of trust between groups in society themselves (i.e., "horizontal" relationships of trust), and, between social groups and governments (i.e., "vertical" relationships of trust) degrades the form of their engagement in processes of governance (see: Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Gambetta 2002). Where social groups do not trust one another, they will either refuse to engage participatory mechanisms for governance, or, will engage with a view to maximizing their own personal or in groups’ benefit, for fear of lack of reciprocation on the part of competing groups.

Second, it is known that "hope" as both an individual and collective state of being, or cognitive/emotional orientation towards the future, is a vital human element in understanding why governance takes the form that it does. Where human actors have little or no hope that their personal and collective situation will improve, it has been suggested that they will disengage from dominant governance structures and pursue their

31 means through alternate (sometimes "illegitimate") means (in overview, see: V. Braithwaite 2004).

The State of Governance Today

The descriptive analysis of contemporary governance we have presented above is certainly not flattering to say the least. The fragmentation of state sovereignty and multiplication in number of agencies and forms of power active in contemporary governance has seen wealthy groups emerge as the most successful category of people in seizing the levers of governability available in diffuse systems of collective governance. The superior ability of the wealthy to operate in a world of distributed governance has contributed to the creation of a global "super first world" that passes through fortified enclaves of privilege largely unfettered by the responsibilities associated with membership in a widely-inclusive society. The excluded are relegated to an everwidening "fourth world" (Castells 2000) of isolated, marginalized groups that are excluded from global networks of trade, culture, and development. This adds up to an emergent system of "global apartheid", wherein approximately 1 billion people mould the social, political, economic, and biological worlds to their purposes, on the back of more than 5 billion marginalised individuals who are excluded from this vision of "the good life" (see especially: Alexander 1996; on the implications for this system for the distribution of health and human wellbeing, see: Drahos 2004; Ollila 2005). Global governance thus becomes a conflict over values/visions for the future of the planet, leading on into arguments about "the clash of civilizations" (Huntington 2004; 1996) and attendant concerns over escalating socio-political conflict (i.e. "terrorism") between the West and the rest of the planet. This portends to drastic and catastrophic outcomes in terms of long-term planetary security, global health and environmental integrity (Gray 2000; Falk 2004; Monbiot 2004).

Thus, governance is not just in a state of change but is nearly universally acknowledged as being in a state of poor health. What is critical is that the diagnoses of the causes of

32 these problems differ, as therefore do the prescriptions for practical remedies. With respect to diagnoses, it is variously believed that: •

The state is too weak

•

The state remains too strong/or non-democratic

•

Old models of governance are paralyzed

•

New modes of governance are increasingly exploited by the strong at the expense of the weak

To date, ways forward have tended to focus upon reintroducing aspects of centralized authoritative regulation to steer networks of market-driven governance in the broader "collective interest.” In this chapter, we have suggested that once a nodal reality of polycentric steering within governance is recognized the normative question of how to promote democratic governance appears in a different light. The issue becomes, not how to hold states accountable, but how to organize distributed governance in ways that enable the realization of democratic values, such as self-direction, respect for human rights, health and so forth.

Once such a re-conception occurs, the focus shifts from the examination of established mechanisms of democratic governance, such as regular elections, to questions about how nodal governance can be structured so that it promotes public (i.e, “broader collective”) rather than private (i.e., “esoteric” or “narrow partisan”) goods. Old models of governance become paralysed in the face of these nodal developments. In the next section, we turn to examine some more recent examples of innovative approaches to doing the business of governance, which are suggestive of broader principles for engaging and active governance reform in the era of fragmented sovereignty.

33 Three: Innovation in Governance

The widespread sense that governance is in need of change is reflected in the volume of innovation at the local, national, and inter-/supra-national levels in the last two decades. Broadly, these innovations can be separated into two "genres" of reform: those which focus upon the "reinvention of government" versus those that focus upon the "reinvention of governance".

“Reinventing government” involves efforts to recalibrate state structures to improve their capacity to exercise centralized control of diffuse systems, often somewhat paradoxically by ceding much of the implementation of policy to non-state actors through devices like self-regulation and governance partnerships. This approach has been widely deployed in a number of countries, and we will discuss its results. “Reinventing governance” differs in that it takes innovation beyond the state and public-private partnerships into efforts to mobilize governors who may act with little or no connection with the state. We examine some innovative examples of practical developments in this domain with a view to abstracting some general tools and broader rules for practical engagement with "good governance reform" in health.

Remodelling State Direction: Reinventing Government

Much of the innovation in state-centered governance has been concerned with achieving two goals: 1) overcoming the government’s limited reach and 2) mobilizing or constraining non-state governors in the public interest. These efforts have been driven by a sense that the legitimacy and the capabilities of the state have deteriorated (Hindess 1997). This is the essence of the "reinventing government" movement that has grown up in the context of 20 years’ neo-liberal political reform from the West outwards (see especially: Eggers and O’Leary 1995; Osborne and Gaebler 1993). States and statebacked international institutions (such as the UN) have tried to devolve the "rowing" of governance -- service provision -- to non-state agencies, while seeking to retain a firm

34 grip on the business of "steering" governmental processes. In this model, government makes the key collective decisions about ends, but gives considerable discretion (and funding) to other actors to achieve the goals. In service of this approach, neo-liberal government has applied, and global development agencies have promoted, "market principles" of management -- most especially, "subsidiarity", which refers to the belief that decision taking ought to fall to the lowest possible level within an organization -- to both the management of non-state agencies that engage service provision, and, to itself (see especially: Burchell 1993 for an analytic account of neo-liberalism at the national level; see Abrahamsen 2004 for an analytic account of neo-liberalism at the supranational level of development studies). This has been the basis for a massive trimming of bureaucracy under banners like "governmental rightsizing," coupled with the generation of "public-private partnerships" to carry out the service delivery ends of governance.

While neo-liberalism has not been the only discourse for political reform, it has certainly been the most influential over the course of the last 20 years in the Anglo-American democracies: Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia (see especially: Rose 1999; 1996; Rose and Miller 1992). It began largely as a critique to the perceived failures and excesses of welfarist "big government", which, it was posited, had created a dependent and non-entrepreneurial society incapable of managing the rigors of the new global economy. Its program for the "rightsizing" of government and promotion of efficiency and effectiveness through harnessing the power of the market within government and across society has made huge inroads into reforming all manner of social services, ranging from health through housing through human security (i.e. "policing"). Further, this rationality of government informs global development policies advanced by the biggest players in international development: the IMF, World Bank and WTO (see especially Abrahamsen). Before we go on to describe the mechanisms of neo-liberalism, it is important to note that there is a degree of gap between the rhetoric and the reality of the implementation neo-liberalism: as its programs develop "on the ground" they may be resisted by both players within government and members of the governed group, with the effect that its programs may not be the purest expressions of the principles. Thus, in domains of policy that individuals have a particularly high emotional and practical stake,

35 such as health care, the neo-liberal state that regulates services “at-a-distance” may have made more limited progress than the paper trail might suggest (see especially: Moran 2002).

Mechanisms: Public-Private Partnerships Neo-liberal government works primarily through attempting to harness the "responsible" (which is to say, within the limits of law) contribution of non-state actors -- of both the corporate and civil varieties -- to processes of governance. This is a partnership model. Public agencies, in theory, act as the guarantors of the public interest through setting standards (and directly regulating when it is crucial), while private actors carry out the actual business of service provision. Often this is referred to as the “contracting out” of services (Eggers and O’Leary 1993; Osborne and Gaebler 1993).

Given that neo-liberal government is interested in maintaining a hand on the tiller steering governance, partnership approaches have been associated with the promotion of innovative and varied technologies for centralized regulation, which are often exercised in conjunction with one another within broader "tripartite" institutional arrangements. Tripartite structures combine quasi-independent oversight bodies (which have over their histories become increasingly open to citizen engagement) with representatives of the Executive branch of government and upper management level members of a particular service-providing agency to carry out a range of governance activities (see: Ananiadis 2003; Cameron 2004). For example, in Britain, responsibility for setting and monitoring policing policy and expenditure for policing is divided between Chief Constables, the Home Office, and “Police Authorities” that are comprised of local councillors and some lay members of the public. Police Authorities have a legal mandate to carry out a supervisory and auditing function, as well as inject public preferences into mid-term policing priorities.

In many cases, non-state service providers are largely left to regulate themselves through programs of "self-regulation." The concept of self-regulation gets considerable and often highly technical coverage in the literature, and can be advanced by a variety of

36 techniques. Compliance with state standards can be checked by audit, and enforced by markets (as for example when service recipients or customers “vote with their feet" in favour of more ethical and effective companies). "Self-regulation" may be underpinned by state-directed "constitutive" programs for regulation that seek to reconstruct the nonstate actor in such a way that its goals or methods are in alignment with the goals of the state (Abrahamsen 2004; Rose 1999; 1996; Rose and Miller 1992).

So, for example,

pollution trading schemes in the environmental realm align the corporate profit motive with the state’s goal of reducing hazardous emissions from the industry as a whole. Of course, compliance with state standards can also be enforced through the traditional legal devices of threat of criminal and/or civil action against derelict providers along with definitions of good corporate and individual “citizenship” in law that call attention to the social significance of responsible civic engagement (de Vries 2002; Nelken and Feest 2001) . Also crucial is the mechanism of governmental control over public budgets for collective services, which can be withheld on grounds of inappropriate civil engagement.

Successes and Shortcomings The successes and shortcomings of these approaches to the extension of state regulatory authority across networks for governance can be assessed on several dimensions. On the one hand, state supervised audit and oversight functions have characteristically been subverted through the "gaming" activity of corporations (Alexander 2000; Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; 2000; Monbiot 2004). That is, regulated entities learn quickly how to turn the rules of the regulatory scheme to their own advantage. Likewise, quasiindependent oversight bodies have been subject to "agency capture" by the very industries they seek to regulate (generally, see: Ananiadis 2003; Cameron 2004; Hindess 1997; in the sphere of policing, see: Jones and Newburn 1997; Kempa and Johnston 2005; in the sphere of development see: Sagasti et al. 2005; in the sphere of health governance, see: Drahos 2005; Ollila 2005; environmental governance: Ostrom 1999; 1990; Patterson et al. 2003). Thus, non-state "regulatory power" is often capable of taking advantage of holes in state authority, and, in other cases, can simply overpower existing state authority, to subvert the collective benefit of partnership approaches to governance.

37

The achievement of “representativeness” in these public-private bodies has also been incomplete. Sometimes “community representation” is purely nominal. Even when intended to be real, it can be difficult to achieve. The perception and perhaps reality of weakness and corruption on the part of regulatory agencies has undermined their public credibility, rendering "difficult to reach" groups, such as economically marginalised urban-dwelling ethnic minorities, unwilling to engage with them and other state agencies in processes of "partnership" governance (in the domain of policing, for example: Kempa and Johnston 2005; Jones and Newburn 1997; generally, see: Ananiadis 2003; Cameron 2004; Hindess 1997). Too often, as well, "difficult to reach" groups are simply unaware of the role or even existence of these bodies (ibid.). This has raised concerns over the limited "representativeness" of participatory structures for regulation, echoing concerns over exclusivity in networks for service provision outlined in the previous chapter (Centre on the Future of the State 2005; Rhodes 2005; 1997; 1990; Sorenson and Torfing 2003). Thus, in addition to corporate gaming, most efforts to innovate in the form of fostering "partnership approaches" through implementing oversight and accountability measures to governance have fallen flat on the vicissitudes of the "human dimensions" of partisan politics and social relationships. These themes are illustrated through a brief description of participatory governance structures in São Paulo, Brazil in Box 3.1 below. Box 3.1 Participatory Governance in São Paulo, Brazil The Centre for the Future State (2005: 21; 24-25) reports on the proliferation of participatory governance mechanisms in Brazil. Over the course of this nation's transition to democracy, civil organizations were active in negotiating the design of Brazil's impressive democratic constitution of 1988. This document created extensive institutional mechanisms for direct citizen participation in the design of public policy and the regulation of government action. As a result, a proliferation of participatory institutions for setting policy and defining budgets in such domains as public health, security, and other collective services have been created at the Federal, State and Municipal level in that nation. The most successful participatory structures are those that have been assigned the widest mandate to coordinate networks of local associations, advocacy NGOs, and other actors, rather than those tasked with holding a particular public institution to account. Further, those structures that have been most successful in drawing forward participation from "hard to hear" groups are those who have interests that stretch across the geographical space of the city rather than being the limited to a particular locality. Nevertheless, nearly 20 years into their operation, it is observed that there has been some "slippage" where some participatory mechanisms provide a platform for "community leaders" and "neighbourhood associations" and NGOs, rather than independent citizens, to shape the policy agenda. Given that most such collectivities are not "membership based", this raises serious questions as to who they speak for when they participate in policy dialogue (see also: Abrahamsen 2004; Ruggie 2003).

38 Diffusing Authority: Reinventing Governance

We should not be surprised to find that governance reform initiated by the state and stated-backed international institutions will continue to emphasize the state role in centralized regulatory authority: that is consistent, according to many commentators, with a worldview born of 300 years’ immersion in, and experience with, Enlightenment analytic devices (i.e., scientific observation) and standards for public governance and citizen engagement (i.e., rational, centralised management) (on this worldview, see especially: Ashenden and Owen 1999; Benhabib 1986; Foucault 1979/1981; Hindess 1996; Ostrom 1999: 495-497). For some innovators in governance, that traditional worldview is a barrier to effective governance. They believe that state-centred authority and rational management cannot overcome the forms of corporate-directed power and other factors that sometimes threaten the broader collective interest. They therefore tend to start from scratch, looking beyond Western traditional models and asking "where and how else has governmental authority been located and exercised in the broader collective interest?"

New Rules: Advanced Deliberation for Standards Negotiation and Enforcement New governance thinking, like the reinventing government approach, tends to emphasize the importance of institutions that foster collective deliberation to shape public policy and oversee service delivery at various levels of social organization. But where the neoliberal partnership model involves the state as senior partner, efforts to reinvent governance often aim to develop systems that feature little or no control or input from the state. The challenge has been to identify means of decisionmaking that balance efficacy and normative acceptability (see especially: Ostrom 1999; 1990). How can radical participatory mechanisms best be structured to ensure that they work in the common interest, and do not lead to either at tyranny of the majority nor powerful minority?

These concerns are partly reflective of the long-running debate in the social sciences between two major "schools" of deliberative democratic thought. In the domain of Continental theory that draws upon the work of Jürgen Habermas, the "ideal

39 communication situation" is taken to be founded on the exclusion of open emotional contestation within deliberative forums (Habermas 1998; 1996; 1987; 1984), coupled with a degree of "removal" from the legislative/executive political process, especially within the domain of hotly contested governance issues (Dryzek 2005; 2000). Habermas pins his project of the development of "discourse ethics" upon the belief that these situations will be most likely to yield processes that lead participants in deliberation towards "rational outcomes" that are most directly in service of the broader "collective good" rather than merely "political compromises" that entail a "meeting place" somewhere between the extremes of two partisan preferred outcomes. Another stream of deliberative theory that draws most extensively on the work of Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe 2000; 1999) has produced empirical evidence in support of the "cathartic effects" of including emotional and symbolic arguments in processes of deliberation. In our view, it is likely that no one approach for deliberation will ever yield stable empirical findings that hold across all contexts: the value of this scholarly work seems to lie in the provision of suggestive "stories" for how deliberation tends to work in particular socio-political environments to form the basis of leading institutionalisations of programs that would require sufficient flexibility to adjust to be emerging realities of deliberation in each context – what Holland would call “complex adaptive systems” for deliberative regulation (Holland 1995; see also: Ostrom 1999: 497).

The good news for those who would turn a significant portion of standard-setting and enforcement over to local stakeholders is that there exists considerable laboratory and field evidence that individuals who differ significantly in values, knowledge and perceived self-interest can collaborate to effectively govern their collective affairs. Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, for example, have presented much evidence in support of the contention that while “no-one is able to do a complete [rational] analysis before actions are taken, … individuals learn from mistakes and are able to craft tools -- including rules -- to improve the structure of the repetitive situations they face” (Ostrom 1999: 496, 507508; see also: Gibson et al. 1999; Lam 1998; Ostrom 1990; 1996; Schlager 1990; Schlager et al. 1994; Tang 1992). They have shown that people with limited knowledge

40 and real conflicts of interest can, provided with the appropriate governance institutions, tools and constraints, solve complex social problems over time. The innovation challenge, then, is to develop the institutions, tools and constraints that allow this selfdirected governance to flourish. Some of their main ideas are presented in Ostrom and colleagues’ (see: Ostrom 1999; Schlager 1990; Schlager et al. 1994) account of deliberative, multicentered regulation of the fishing industry in Box 3.2 below. (See also Fung 2004). Box 3.3 tells another story of institutional innovation in the cause of security and community development.

Box 3.2 Regulation of the Inshore Fishing Industry For many years, Elinor Ostrom and colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in the United States have collected an immense archive of original case studies concerning the governance of a range of "common pool" resources: irrigation systems, forests, inshore fisheries, and groundwater basins are notable examples. They have been concerned to uncover the types of dilemmas faced by actors in the field as well as the types of rules that users have evolved over time to try to govern and manage the resources effectively in light of these challenges. In-shore fishing represents a classic "common pool" resource, in the sense that fish and other seafoods are a natural resource available to many individuals who, in the absence of trust of competitors to behave with restraint, can potentially eliminate the resource through over-extraction in service of their own short-term interests. Thus, the fundamental problem of such resources is the "tragedy of the commons", wherein there is little collective "buy-in" to sustainable practices on the basis that some unscrupulous individuals will not reciprocate, to the detriment of those who do: this is the essence of the "free rider" problem, that some nonparticipatory groups will reap the benefits of others’ costly restraint or other form of regulatory effort. Hence, if some fishers hold back on their catch and make an effort to harvest only mature, non-spawning marine life, they’re own "good deeds" might be offset by aggressive fishers who fill large nets with as many fish as possible to maximize short-term profits. Ostrom and colleagues have identified four main clusters of rules that can be manipulated as tools to effect appropriation situations in many common pool resources, including inshore fisheries: boundary, authority, pay off, and position rules. In a systematic study of many fishing communities throughout the United States, Schlager (1990; Schlager et al. 1994) coded 33 user groups out of 44 total groups identified as having at least one of these rules in operation regarding the use of the resource. Boundary rules mark and control space with a view to increasing the proportion of participants who are well known in the community, have a long-term stake in that community, and find it costly to have their reputation for trustworthiness harmed in that community. All of the aforementioned 33 self-regulating fisheries groups used some combination of 14 different boundary rules, and none of them relied on a single boundary rule. For example, 30 out of 33 groups limited fishing to those individuals who lived in a nearby community, and 13 groups also required membership in a local organization. This indicates that most inshore fisheries organized by the users themselves restricted fishing to those individuals who are well known to each other, have a relatively long-term time horizon in thinking about the impacts of fishing upon their industry and ecological system, and are connected to one another in multiple ways. Schlager did not find that any particular boundary rule was correlated with higher performance levels, but she did find that the 33 groups who had at least one boundary rule tended to be able to solve common pool problems more effectively than the 11 groups who had not crafted boundary rules, on the basis that this promoted visibility and informal regulatory mechanisms between groups who knew one another.

41 Authority rules are rights and duties (with respect to practices) awarded to individuals that are enforced through payoff rules. For example, a fisher might be assigned to a fixed location (a fishing spot) or to a fixed rotational schedule subject to financial or even criminal sanction for breach of responsibilities. What has been found in fishing communities is that all societies regulated "how" fishing is done in practice: they limited the times fish may be caught, the location where fishing is allowed, the technology permitted, and the stage of the lifecycle during which fish may be taken. It is key that none of the societies reviewed limited the amount of various species that can be caught. Thus, quotas – which are the single most important set of concepts and tools of scientific management in government-led systems for fishing regulation – are absent in locally derived plans for the governance of inshore fishing. As Ostrom (1999: 514-515) points out, "fishers have to know a great deal about the ecology of their inshore region, including spawning areas, nursery areas, the migration routes of different species, and seasonal patterns, just to succeed as fishers. Over time they learn how to maintain these processes through the derivation of governance rules that are based on the biological reality of the survival and propagation of their resource". Position rules pertain to agreed procedures for doing the business of monitoring and enforcing compliance with locally negotiated standards. In this regard, fisheries tend to rely on self-monitoring more than the creation of formal watchdog institutions. For example, most inshore fisheries now use shortwave radios as a routine part of their day-to-day operations, allowing a form of instant monitoring to occur. Given that most fishers will be listening to their shortwave radios, negative publicity about one's breach of rules will be swift and widely spread -- and thereby likely followed by a direct approach to the rule violator to correct the breach. In enforcing violations of agreed rules, shunning and other social norms were more heavily relied upon than more formal sanctions in the fishing communities studied by Shlager. For example, in many communities, a group of fishermen had delegated themselves to speak to the rule breakers. In other instances, a formalised "watchdog" agency may be a more appropriate strategy, particularly when "common goods" are easily extractable, highly mobile, and very valuable, so that a few hours of illicit activity can yield high profits.

Fostering Local Innovation with New Institutions and New Fiscal Tools The preceding section suggests that local actors possess much knowledge and capacity for negotiating effective standards and general procedures for governance. A further problem that we face is that there exist very few institutions for governance (as opposed to government) for bringing together and applying these capacities in a systematic fashion. What do we know about the process of effective institution building? Two important lessons move to the fore. First, that the process is usually most effective when it is led by stakeholders themselves (in overview, see: Centre for the Future State 2005; Sagasti et al. 2005). Second, the process of institution building and operation is usually most effective and inclusive where states or other bodies are able to offer incentives for active participation (Ibid.). This leads onto the point that an effective contribution that states and state-led international development agencies can play in "scaling-up" effective governance institutions is through the provision of resources to support institutionbuilding on the ground.

42

Budgets for public goods are a very tangible set of resources that the state controls, and money is one of the main devices of governance – it is a prime "mover", a major incentive of modern activity -- so using budgets to mobilize governance resources and realign institutions or create institutional competition and even institutional death is very important as a state "lever" over multicentric systems of governance. The power of participatory budgets as key mechanisms for constitutive approaches to regulation has already been widely recognised by states in the context of the neo-liberal "reinvention in government" outlined above. Within these programs, spaces have been opened up for the injection of public preferences into how public monies ought to be spent, coupled with citizen involvement in overseeing the dispensation of public funds.

Promising developments around the world suggest that the devolution of budgets for public goods could go much further with good effect. Rather than merely consulting with citizens on how best public monies ought to be spent, larger portions of collective budgets might be "paid out" to community groups who perform viable "collective services" to subsequently do with what they will in furthering human security, health, and development generally. Within broad constitutional limits, local collectivities might best be left to exercise discretion in expending public resources on the basis that they "own" the payments that they have earned through coordinating and/or providing a collective service. This is a form of “neo-liberalism for the poor.”

Debates and developments in this regard tie in with emerging scholarship that focuses on the important role played by taxation in creating occasions for negotiation between states and their citizens. It is widely theorized that purposive negotiation on how best tax resources ought to be allocated and subsequently spent tends to foster both responsible institutional government and responsible citizenship oriented around achieving collective aims and overcoming collective obstacles rather than dated notions of common ethnic or racial heritage (Centre for the Future State 2005: Chapter 1; Brown 2001; Held 2000). Raising public revenues through taxation is a "pain" felt directly by all citizens, and, therefore, all tax-paying members of society have a direct stake in monitoring the

43 putative collective benefits of the taxes that they pay. As such, placing a "burden" on citizens in the form of direct ownership over tax dollars (or responsibility public resources generally) tends to elicit an active response in the form of their engagement with the policy negotiation and implementation process.

These general processes of local innovation supported through innovative budgeting mechanisms are illustrated in the formation, operation and scaling-up of a local model for the governance of human security that was developed in a small township in South Africa, described in Box 3.3 below. Since its inception in 1998, the model has been rolled out across that country through the support of state and non-state international funders, and, more latterly, partially by municipal levels of the South African Government. The model has since been adapted to the Argentine and Brasilian contexts, and is currently being considered for adaptation elsewhere (notably the Central African and broader Latin American contexts). Box 3.3 The Zwelethemba Model for Peacemaking and Peace-Building. The model for local capacity governance described in this box bears the name of the community in which the initial pilot work took place: Zwelethemba, a community within the Worcester municipality, a country town near Cape Town, South Africa. The name “Zwelethemba”, a Xhosa word, fortuitously means “place of hope”. The model provides a micro-institutional, technological and resource basis for providing governmental services at the local level through the mobilization of local knowledge and capacity. The model approaches governance through the window of dispute resolution. It uses this window to foster the development of institutions of community self-regulation and to support a culture of collective efficacy in places where state government has had difficulty in delivering services over the course of South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to inclusive democracy. Although designed to enhance community security in an immediate sense, the model also develops an institutional framework that can facilitate effective community direction in other domains of governance, such as health promotion, education and housing. The model is built around the right and ability of communities to solve their own problems. It has two components: dispute resolution (i.e., “peacemaking”) and community development through financial grants that are derived from state and non-state sources (i.e., peace-building and local development generally) – that are organized and conducted through Peace Committees made up of five to twenty people. When a dispute arises, members of the Committee sponsor a gathering of people thought to be in a position to contribute to dispute resolution. The gathering’s focus is finding solutions that let people move forward amicably in the future. Participation is voluntary and no coercion, punishment or violence is allowed. A Code of Good Practice, which recognises the governing authority of the South African constitution, along with Steps that ensure consistency and compliance with the Code regulate the process. Audit procedures coordinated by a nongovernmental organization called the "community peace program that is affiliated with the school of Government, University of the Western Cape (and funded by international development grants and partially by the South African state) are used to ensure that embedded regulations operate effectively. While any dispute can give rise to a gathering, the focus is on the small things that, if left unresolved, lead to larger problems.

44

The model is designed to be inexpensive, but not free. Each time a Peace Gathering is held, a payment is made to the Committee by local governments and/or other funders: thirty percent of this goes to the members conducting the gathering to compensate them for their time; sixty percent is paid into a peace building fund used by the Committee as a whole for community development projects, and; a final ten percent goes to an administrative fund for the costs of operating the Committee. Since these funds are earned locally, a great deal of care is taken to ensure that they are spent on the bottom line of community development. Thus, the program provides for greater security, responds to generic issues, enhances selfdirection and promotes human rights. Since its inauguration in 1998, the model has been continuously refined through ongoing experimentation and shown to be robust, sustainable, and easily reproduced. The model has been “rolled out” all over South Africa. To date over 80000 people have participated in over 12000 gatherings in South Africa. In November 2000, the project was initiated in Rosario, Argentina through a partnership with the Universities of Rosario and Toronto with national and local governments of Argentina and Canada. Already, work in Argentina indicates that the model is transferable to at least one other very different socio-political context. In the pilot area of Zwelethemba, CPP members have randomly surveyed the area on several follow-up occasions to determine the perceived efficacy of, and community satisfaction with, the dispute resolution process (On each of these occasions, the number surveyed was between 70 to 100 persons). The CPP has also undertaken an assessment of the contribution being made by the process as a whole toward fostering collective capital and cohesion within the community. In 1997, at the inception of the project, 19.7% of persons surveyed responded that “the way in which disputes are handled” in their communities had “improved” in the last 6 months, while 80.3% indicated that things had “stayed the same or become worse”. By 1999 the proportion reporting an improvement increased to 49%, while the proportion reporting no difference or deterioration was reduced to 35%, with 15% responding that they were “not sure”. In 1998, respondents were asked whether they thought that the public police were being called for similar dispute problems more or less often than in the past six months. The results are indicative of a trend towards the perception that the public police are being called less rather than more often: 46% versus 37.9% respectively. Similarly, 1999 saw the belief that people in the community were capable of handling most local disputes increase to 59% relative to 48.2% in 1998. Finally, community awareness and use of local Peace Committees had clearly increased from 1998 to 1999 – with 3.4% versus 32% mentioning these bodies when asked who had helped them solve a dispute problem in the past 6 months on the two respective occasions. Taken together, these data indicate that perceptions of both the level of safety in the community and the capacity of the community to actively bring about these positive outcomes are on the rise. The increasing use of Peace Committees over this same time period indicates that the project is making a meaningful contribution towards facilitating both of these sets of outcomes. With regard to the objective of fostering community development, a range of projects have been supported through community-block grants earned through gatherings held, including: the building and maintenance of a children’s playground in a shack area far from any other facility; the refurbishment of an old-age home; assistance in furnishing a new day care centre and a feeding scheme for children designed to promote health and so on. The emphasis in these projects has been on using the services that local people are able to provide – thereby creating and increasing the number of baseline local market opportunities that are available to local micro-entrepreneurs. Resources earned in this way can subsequently be used by micro-entrepreneurs to develop further market opportunities into which an expanding number of community members can be drawn.

45 New Mechanisms: Marshalling Information to Regulate Social Meaning We have already described the ways in which neo-liberal government can act "at-adistance" through regulating social meaning by affecting the flow of information through collective networks. Thus, human actors can be made up in the image of responsibilised citizens through state-led efforts to promote these identities through law and various market-oriented incentives. The same set of mechanisms can be mobilized by non-state actors to effect alternate governance agendas. International networks of agencies committed to particular governance causes can deploy the same strategies towards their ends. Thus, responsible planetary stewardship and engagement in governance can be promoted in corporate and consumer circles through the distribution of information about the poor impacts of bad manufacture and consumption practices, coupled with matching incentives to socially progressive manufacture and consumption practices. These processes are illustrated in the successes of the "fair trade" movement that certifies growers and traders of resources who engage environmentally and socially sound production and import practices, often at lower costs to consumers. We examine the illustrative case of the fair trade coffee movement in Box 4.4 below:

46 Box 3.4: The Fair Trade Coffee Movement: The Regulation of Social Meaning Peter Leigh Taylor has described the success of Fair Trade Coffee initiatives in great detail (Taylor 2004). Coffee is one of the five most important commodities in the world market and is principally produced by poor, small-scale farmers in the global South. Since the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989, prices have fallen to their lowest levels in a hundred years. Millions of small farmer families have suffered the loss of their livelihoods as a result. Fair Trade coffee is an inter-organizational network clustered around circulating information about coffee production, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world economy. A point stressed by this network is that surplus profits accrue to roasters and distributing houses in coffee production chains, whom are mostly located in the global North. The network aims explicitly to alter these trade relations along the mainstream coffee commodity chain. It does so through "certifying" coffee brands that make use of equitable coffee production chains. First, their producer operations must be small-scale and family based, be organized politically into democratic associations, and pursue ecological goals. Second, coffee buyers must purchase directly from local organizations with contracts extending beyond one harvest cycle, guaranteeing both an acceptable minimal price and a social premium per pound. Fair Trade is unique among certification schemes worldwide because the buyer, rather than producer, pays the cost of certification and monitoring by the Fair Trade organization. As these costs are passed up the commodity chain, Fair Trade is mostly financed by the consumer’s willingness to pay more for fair coffee. This willingness to pay is supported by the building of direct personal ties between Northern consumers in Southern producers. With special-needs commodity such as fair trade coffee, moral and ideological considerations are added to the value of the product itself. Consumers are conscious of the participation in humanitarian or charitable actions when they buy a certain product over another, and are thereby constituted as responsible global consumers. Although its roots lie in the alternative trade movement, Fair Trade began offering products in large, nonalternative channels in the early 1980s, and in 1997 the labelling scheme was introduced under the Fair Trade Labelling Organization. Today fair trade pursues a "mainstreaming strategy" which aims to achieve rapid growth in market share by encouraging corporations, governments, major retailers and other large economic actors to support fair trade. Mainstreaming has accomplished much on these measures. The strategies most visible recent success has been the enlistment of Starbucks, novel largest US buyer fair trade coffee.

Reinventing Governance versus Reinventing Government: The Devil in Half-Measures

It is clear that there is a great deal of overlap between the two categories of reinventing "governance" versus reinventing "government." Both programs involve the use of similar tools, such as institutional redesign, deliberative negotiation, participatory budgets, and the deployment of information towards the regulation of social meaning. The critical difference between these two genres of reform is the degree to which the

47 rules, institutions and tools for governance are tied to our freed from the state. This is to say that the key difference centers on the issue of the locus of the direction of governance: the state or non-state realm. The evidence indicates that advanced devolution of the direction of governance is the central characteristic of effective governance reform.

As we have developed in the previous chapter, participatory governance structures are not a panacea: research confirms that it is often more powerful collective actors rather than atomised impoverished citizens who are most involved in participatory processes, and utilize their positions to hijack governance in their interests. These issues represent "concerns" rather than "foregone conclusions" as to the strengths and weaknesses of participatory mechanisms, including devolved budgets. Whether or not they enhance public ownership over the policy process across all segments of the community will be an empirical question that must be answered in each particular case.

The balance of evidence is promising, however, on the point that institutionalized negotiation and deliberation constitutes the "core" of effective governance, in the sense that well-structured conversations over issues will lead naturally to a partial "meeting of the minds" as to the most rational and effective ways forward for implementing policy initiatives. In an important sense, therefore, participatory mechanisms, perhaps most notably including the advanced devolved public budgets, might lead to the "repoliticisation" of governance in an era of citizen suspicion and disengagement from state agencies. Such "repoliticisation" ought not to be taken to mean encouraging partisan conflicts over scarce resources, but, rather, re-engagement in the process of debate over the best ways to take forward programs for collective governance in the interests of the broader "common good". The evidence seems to suggest that providing individuals with the space and the resources to engage these debates in large numbers will create the "collective efficacy" (Sampson 2000; Sampson et al. 2002; 1999; 1997) -in terms of breadth of policy imagination and ability to execute on these visions) -- that will be essential to put those with poor intentions who would manipulate governance in their esoteric interests on the sidelines.

48 The evidence indicates that the devil appears to be in half measures, however. What we know from real empirical data outlined above is that efforts to open up systems of statedirected governance to limited forms of citizen participation have accomplished very little in terms of inspiring the trust and hope necessary for synergistic engagement on the part of society at large. What appears to be required is a "leap of faith" wherein states and international reformatory bodies throw their weight behind the support of advanced plans for the reinvention of governance rather than retooling of government.

Clearly, however, providing resources and other support for local populations to simply "muddle through" their own problems and devise their own strategies for governance bears a number of significant threats to our own ideals to develop inclusive and equitable systems for democratic governance. Committed democrats engaging governance reform for the provision of the range of essential collective goods will be most displeased to fund and support local governance schemes that produce violent, repressive and otherwise inequitable programs for rule on race, gender or other "group" fault lines. Nevertheless, many examples of governance approaches that involve advanced devolved partnerships that may fall outside of modern Western sensibilities for tidy and rationalistic management are in operation in many locales around the world -- some of which we have described above -- and appear to be producing significant levels of "collective goods", in the absence of the possibility of any viable conventional alternative. We end this section with a cautionary tale drawn from the fraught issue of policing reform Northern Ireland in Box 3.5, which illustrates what we have called “the devil in half-measures”

49 Box 3.5 Policing Reform in Northern Ireland Policing has always been a highly contentious and symbolically charged issue in Northern Ireland: Irish Republicans/Nationalists and British Unionists/Loyalists have been locked in charged and violent conflict over "their" versus "our" police since the partition of the island of Ireland into North and South in 1920. In the context of an emerging "peace" between warring factions that gathered much pace under the terms of the "Belfast Agreement" signed in May of 1998, the question of policing reform loomed large and was handed over to an Independent Commission (chaired by Chris Patten) to ultimately resolve. Most radical in the Patten Report was what we would call a “post-Enlightenment” program for the “reinvention of governance”, entailing a system of "constitutive regulation" that held at its center a plan to draw "responsiblised" participation in the policing process through turning over to all segments of Northern Ireland's divided society actual control over the public police service and the business of the governance of security more broadly. The central mechanisms to achieve this were twofold. First, the public police were to be rendered "operationally responsible" to a "participatory governance" body named the Policing Board, comprised of a complement of members of the local power-sharing political Assembly and lay members of the public who were representative of the community. The Board would be empowered to work with the Chief Constable and senior officers to devise mid- to long-term policing priorities and strategies for achieving them. Additionally, the Chief would be required to report to the Board on any matter pertaining to the exercise of his duties and policing more broadly after the fact. Second, the same Policing Board was to be charged with ownership over the entire "policing budget", which can be understood as the public funds available for collective local security. Certainly, it would be assumed that the public police would continue to command the great preponderance of the policing budget, and, would have funds awarded to them through the submission of costed policing plans to the Policing Board. Additionally, however, other agencies with the capacity to make a contribution to "collective security" would be able to compete for a portion of the broader policing budget through the submission of tenders. Complementary structures, named "District Policing Partnership Boards" would perform support of functions at the local level. In these ways, Patten intended that the divided communities of Northern Ireland would take responsibility for practical aspects of the collective security issue through the "uniting mechanisms" of substantial legal and financial authority to shape policing. Such a program for the regulation of human security in Northern Ireland can therefore be understood as reflecting a "constitutive" approach to regulation, that seeks to govern not only through repressing negative behaviour, but through eliciting forms of "pro-collective" behaviour (Abrahamsen 2004; Shearing 1993). The tale of the implementation of this program is illustrative of important themes concerning how and why political stakeholders engage innovative "partnership approaches" to governance in the ways that they do. In the enabling legislation that followed along from the Patten Report, the British Government misread Patten’s program for the “reinvention of governance” in the alternate terms of a plan for the reinvention of government”. They did so through including a set of highly "technocratic" legislative clauses that would enable it to retain a hand on the tiller steering policing policy. Our qualitative field research in Northern Ireland revealed that these technocratic clauses were interpreted by all local stakeholders in the policing reform process as efforts on the part of the British Government to inject legal loopholes that would enable future pandering to the interests of whichever political groups served its interests at a future date. It was only when the British Government indicated its intention to remove such contentious "safeguard" clauses that most of the political stakeholders in Northern Ireland agreed to participate in novel policing governance structures (Significantly, the political representatives of the Republican movement continue, at time of writing [Autumn 2005], to refuse to engage the police or these novel policing governance institutions, on the basis that they claim that the British Government’s departure from Patten’s more radical plans for devolved governance have signalled "bad faith" that has resulted in the passing of a critical moment wherein the Republican movement could have been persuaded to support the new policing dispensation.

50

Subsequently, it was only in the "deliberative forum" of the new Policing Board that groups were able to break with the decades-long practice of engaging the policing reform question in nearly wholly symbolic and partisan political terms to begin to turn to policing policy in a practical (some might say "responsible") fashion -- albeit for a short time before the political process again broke down in the territory (on this, see: Kempa and Johnston 2005). Whatever the veracity of any group’s interpretations of the nefarious underlying intentions of the British Government, the essential point was the extent to which each group reported and subsequently mobilized arguments about the existence of these poor intentions – citing as "evidence" the contentious "safeguard" management clauses -- as justifications for refusing to engage the policing reform process. Equally significant was the fact that groups who finally took their positions on the deliberative Policing Board reported doing so on the basis that they perceived sufficient space and opportunity to "take local control" over the policing enterprise, and thereby themselves shape policing futures, with the removal of what were seen as undue "safeguard" clauses built into the enabling legislation by the British Government.

51 Conclusion Contemporary governance has been marked by a move away from a period of statecentered, interventionist, expert government organized under the sign of the welfare liberal political rationality to a decentralized system of networks of policymaking and provision organized under the sign of "neo-liberal" political rationality. This system for governance is characterized by the fragmentation of sovereignty, in the sense that multiple "centers of authority" located within and external to the state are involved in both planning and executing the business of governance. The efficacy of traditional hierarchical systems for governance has diminished, but few alternative systems for steering policy networks in the public interest has developed, with the net effect that governance has been skewed across all "collective good" domains in the interests of the most powerful classes. Researchers have addressed the “description problem” in governance posed by these changes by portraying systems of governance as networks that cut across or even erase the classical public private distinction. They have generally agreed that many kinds of institutions govern; that states have no governance monopoly; that states themselves are governed. They have recognized that the tools of governance are also many. They have emphasized that information can be a potent source of governing power that sometimes can match the power of money and even brute force. Nonetheless, no generally accepted model has emerged to replace the Westphalian, or state-centered, account. The description one chooses of contemporary governance tends to shape the kinds of innovations one proposes. Those who to see the state as still the most potent of

52 governors, or who want to restore its strength, innovation tends to fall into the genre of “reinventing government.” Typically, within the dominant "neo-liberal" story for governance, state authorities attempt to retain a hand on the tiller steering service design and provision, ostensibly in the public interest. Existing institutions are seen as largely the right ones, provided they can adopt some new mechanisms of oversight and cooperation. Existing constraints on state-centered governance (like voting, transparency etc.) are seen as sufficient to prevent abuse of power or corruption. Those who question either the capacity or the will of states to govern effectively for the public good, and who see non-state actors as prime engines of governance, tend to promote more innovation in institutions, tools of governance and norms. They particularly favour institutions that mobilize previously untapped knowledge and capacity, and that give true control to these new institutions. Similarly, they look to governance tools suitable for non-state actors without either great wealth or the capacity to use force: information disseminated across networks is perhaps the primary such tool.

Whatever their starting points, innovators in governance face three different kinds of challenges:

• • •

Challenges of imagination: wherein well-intentioned individuals and groups seek to engage governance reform but do so from conceptual starting points that occlude from view essential features of the contemporary governance landscape. Challenges of intention: wherein groups with poor intentions wilfully hijack contemporary governance arrangements to serve their own personal or in-group interests. Challenges of implementation: wherein good ideas and programs fall on the unpredictable impacts of the human and institutional factors such issues as lack of trust and hope amongst putative participants, and more practical matters such as paucity of resources.

53 The problem of innovation in governance revolves around the distribution of governing power across social space. The idea that governance is now distributed, and that the state has no governance monopoly, carries with it two key implications for those who would "improve" governance. First, governance by the state must overcome limitations imposed by the independent governing power of the regulated and the lacunae in the government’s own capacities of control. Second, governance by other entities must somehow be directed and constrained – by state regulation but also by other means, for, if the state is not supreme and is itself subject to governance by non-state actors then governance coordination and constraint cannot come entirely from the state. The state as the monopolist of governance is historically more a rhetorical device than a reality, and contemporarily nothing better than a maladaptive chimera. In this review, we have traced a series of promising mechanisms and principles for guiding forward action in governance reform. The review has suggested that the most effective strategy for overcoming the challenge of poor intentions on the part of some groups who will endeavor to turn governance in their own interests will be innovative approaches to governance reform that foster the collective efficacy of the vast majority of the Earth's population to establish an alternate vision for inclusive and equitable governance.

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