Changes in Latitude, Changes in Attitude ...

Changesin Latitude, Changes in Attitude: Population Movements and Conservative Shifts in Congress

JANET E. KODRAS Florida State University

JOHN PAUL JONES III University

of Kentucky

Migration from the Northeast and Midwest to the West and South over the past decade has been from politically liberal to conservative areas of the United States. Similarly, migration from central cities to suburbs has been from liberal to conservative areas within states. The Constitution and Supreme Court decisions require redistricting between states (reapportionment) and within states (redistricting) every ten years. This study examines whether reapportionment and redistricting has resulted in a more conservative House of Representatives as the number of representatives from these growing conservative districts has increased. It finds no nationwide evidence to support this proposition; instead, the effects of district reorganization appear to be specific to each district and time.

During the decade of the 197Os, population redistribution in the United States shifted away from the historically Liberal states in the Northeast and North Central regions and toward the traditionally more Conservative regions of the South and West. At the same time, but on a different scale, population movements generated growth in small- and mid-sized cities and in the suburban fringe of metropolitan centers. These areas tend to be more conservative than the central cities that experienced a declining proportion of the U.S. population. Such flows have resulted in a cumulative rearrangement of popu*Direct all correspondence to: Professor Janet E. Kodras, Department sity, Tallahassee, Florida 32306-2050. Telephone 904 644 1865.

The Social Science Journal, Volume 25, Number 4, pages 437.450. Copyright @ 1988 by JAI Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 00357634.

of Geography,

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lations within static congressional boundaries. Because districts of the U.S. House of Representatives are required to be equal in population size, migration creates disproportionate representation that must be redressed each decade through the dual processes of reapportionment, which allocates seats between the states; and redistricting, which redraws congressional boundaries within states.’ Both inter- and intrastate population movements have generated disporportionate representation.2 The population of the Northeast and North Central census regions grew by 0.2% and 4.0%, respectively from 1970 to 1980; whereas in the South and West population grew by 20% and 23.9%. California, Texas, Florida, and Arizona registered especially large increases in population, whereas New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Michigan registered small increases or declines. These trends resulted in a regional reapportionment of congressional representatives after the 1980 census. Much of the growth in urban areas occurred in cities of less than 250,000 persons, while the number of people residing in the large metropolitan areas of over 500,000 persons declined over the decade. Within all urban areas, the proportion of the U.S. population residing in central cities declined from 3 1.5% in 1970 to 29.6% in 1980. The comparable figures for the urban fringe are 26.8% and 3 1.8%.3 Such local variations in population growth resulted in considerable redistricting of congressional boundaries within states. It is well recognized that the growth areas during this period are traditionally more conservative than the areas that witnessed relative population declines. Clark Archer, Daniel Elazar, V.O. Key, and others have documented a higher degree of conservative ideology, voting, and representation in the South and West than in the Northeast and industrial Midwest.4 Research has uncovered significant intra-urban cleavages in central city-suburban voting patterns, as we11.5The central question addressed here is whether the post-1980 reapportionment and redistricting, which tended to favor these conservative and growing areas of the country, reshaped the ideological alignment in the House of Representatives. Specifically, has there been a measurable alteration in congressional voting patterns that is attributable to changes in state seats or district boundaries? To address these issues, this study employs a measure of conservative ideology in representative voting behavior calculated by the Americans for Constitutional Action Research Institute (ACARI). It compares state average ACARI scores for representatives between the 97th Congress (1981-1982) and 98th Congress (1983-1984), which bracket district reorganization resulting from the 1980 Census of Population. Separate analyses are performed to assess the effects of reapportionment and redistricting. For the former, the study examines the voting behavior of representatives in states that lost or gained seats. For the latter, it analyzes whether intrastate redistricting tended to yield more conservative or more liberal constituencies within each state. These results are then correlated with changes in state average ACARI scores to investigate the linkage between redistricting and changes in congressional voting behavior. The impact of reapportionment and redistricting on American politics has been debated vigorously since the 1962 Supreme Court ruling of Baker vs. Can-, which mandated, within reasonable limits, equal population representation. Three alternative perspectives on this issue have emerged in the ensuing years.6 Adherents to the first, referred to as reformers, contended that elimination of malapportionment makes a substantial difference in many states.’ As an example, the reformers argued that district

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reorganization would aid historically underrepresented urban interests in both national and state legislatures. The skeptics countered that apportionment and other political characteristics have little impact relative to ongoing economic and social forces influencing national policy.8 A third group, termed the counterskeptics, challenged the analytical methods of the skeptics, and upon respecification, concluded that reapportionment and redistricting do play an important role, especially if viewed over the long term.9 The 1980 changes were anticipated to be especially significant. Conservatives were optimistic that reapportionment and redistricting would benefit their cause.‘0 Many felt that reapportionment of districts from the liberal Snowbelt to the Sunbelt would assist the conservative agenda. i* Within states, redistricting shifts from cities to suburbs was also foreseen as advantageous to conservatives. 12In addition, a conservative president remained popular, national attitudes seemed to be shifting toward the right, and in 1980, Republicans had gained control of the U.S. Senate for the first time since 1952, while the Democratic majority in the House had diminished.‘3 Another factor was that the Republican National Committee had created a special redistricting division, composed of campaign personnel, attorneys, and computer experts, who gave technical and professional support to state GOP groups involved in the redistricting process.i3 Finally, the Democrats held most of the underpopulated districts and few of the overpopulated districts just prior to reapportionment and redistricting, a situation considered advantageous to conservatives.is Against these formidable odds, the liberal agenda was strengthened by the tendency for the party in the White House to lose congressional seats in the mid-term elections and the fact that Democrats were in a better position to control the redistricting process.16 The Democrats had no national-level redistricting structure as the GOP did, but they had strong political expertise in the states, where key decisions would be made.i7 In addition, the severity of the recession in 1982 was expected to favor the election of liberals. What, then, were the results of reapportionment and redistricting? Did they lend identifiable advantage to either the conservative or the liberal agendas, as meausred by a shift in congressional voting patterns?

INTERSTATE

ANALYSIS

Results of the 1980 Census caused ten states to lose seats in the House of Representatives and eleven states to gain seats. Among the major gaining states were Florida (+4), Texas (+3), and California (+2). States that lost more than one representative included New York (-5); Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois (-2). All told, 17 of the 435 House districts were removed from the Northeast and North Central states and replaced in states in the South and West. Against this pattern of change, consider the distribution of congressional conservatism across states. Figure 2 shows conservatism as calculated by ACARIi8 Every year the institute rates each member of Congress on a scale from 0 (extreme liberal) to 100 (extreme conservative), based on the percentage of votes cast in accordance with the ACARI position. Composite scores for the 97th Congress came from averaging each representative’s ACARI scores for the years 198 1 and 1982. The resulting 434 scores (the Speaker of the House is not rated) for each congress were used to generate state averages. Examples are Massachusetts (with a liberal state average

Figure I.

Number of House of Representative seats gained or lost due to reapportionment.

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Figure 2.

Conservative voting index for 1981-l

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982 House members

ACARI SCORE -100 lo -00 WV

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Figure 3.

ACARI scores by state for 97th Congress versus change in number of House seats between 97th Congress and 98th Congress.

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score of 17.18) and Alabama (with a more conservative state average of 70.93).19 Inspection of Figure 1 and Figure 2 is generally consistent with the premise identified above; that gaining states tend to be more conservative than those that lost representatives due to reapportionment. Figure 3 gives a more precise picture. It directly compares the conservatism scores of the states in the 97th Congress to the number of seats they would gain or lose prior to the 98th. Relatively conservative states (scores 5 l- 100) lie above the horizontal axis, liberal states (scores O-49) below. States gaining seats are to the right of the vertical axis, those losing to the left. Note in the top right quadrant that a number of conservative states, such as Florida, Texas, and interior southwestern states, gain one or more seats. In the bottom right quadrant, Liberal states are also shown to gain seats but their position closer to the origin indicates a lesser gain for liberals. Among losing states, Ohio, Illinois, South Dakota, and Missouri are only slightly on the conservative side (upper-left quadrant) whereas losses among liberal states (such as New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts in the lower-left quadrant) are more substantial. Overall, conservative states tended to gain more and lose fewer seats than did liberal states. While these figures indicate general support for the proposition that states that gained seats were relatively conservative, a conflicting picture emerges when comparing the difference in ACARI scores among the 17 seats lost from the Northeast and North Central states at the end of the 97th Congress and the 17 gained in the South and West at the beginning of the 98th.zo The mean ACARI score of the lost seats is 52.2 1 and that of the gained seats is 55.56, suggesting only a slight movement toward the conservative due to reapportionment. A t-test of difference in means indicates that there is no significant difference in conservatism between the two groups at the 95% probability level.21 This higher level of resolution, then, shows that reapRortionment did not send substantially more conservative representatives to the House in the 1982 election.22

INTRASTATE ANALYSIS Even if a state does not gain or lose House seats through reapportionment, it may need to redraw its districts to reflect population shifts within the state during the previous decade. During the redistricting process prior to the 98th Congress, most states with more than one seat reorganized district boundaries. After redistricting in 1982, the new boundaries of many districts delineated a different set of voters than before. What effect did redistricting have on the Liberal-Conservative composition of the districts? To address this, a measure was used to calculate the change in each district’s ideological position before and after redistricting, denoted POST-PRE.23 It assumes that a district’s presidential vote is a good estimate of its general political stance and that support for Carter in the 1980 presidential election indicates a liberal position.24 PRE is the actual percentage of voters in each congressional district who voted for Carter in the 1980 election. The old boundaries were in effect at that time. POST is the percentage of voters in each district who wouM have voted for Carter in 1980 if the new boundaries had been in effect at the time of the election. These data are available in The Almanac of American Politics.2~ A comparison of PRE and POST indicates the degree of ideological change in the

constituencies due to redistricting. Averaging these values for each state provides

Figure 4.

Differences

in proportion

voting for Carter before and after redistricting

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a summary measure of the impacts of redistricting within a state. States with large positive values of POST-PRE have experienced constituency pressures toward the Liberal because a higher percentage of voters within the new boundaries would have supported the Liberal candidate. Those with large negative values have increased constituency movement toward the Conservative because the collection of voters in the redrawn districts would have yielded lower support for Carter. Note that these changes reflect a redistricting effect only because each individual voted once in the 1980 presidential election. It is the collection of individuals into different district configurations that results in a change in value. State results of these changes in constituency makeup are presented in Figure 4. The majority of states exhibited little change in constituency position as a result of redistricting. In only three states was there a realignment toward a more Liberal constituency pattern (Arizona, Idaho, and New Hampshire). A set of Northeast and Midwest states, as well as California, Oregon, Colorado, and Tennessee, shifted toward the Conservative. This map may be interpreted as the change in ideological pressure on representatives, induced by redistricting at the state level. To what extent are these changes in constituency ideology reflected as changes in representative voting patterns? One would expect that those states which experienced a Conservative realignment would also experience a Conservative shift in House voting record. The same logic applies for Liberal shifts. However, the analysis shows that the Pearson correlation between the change in state average Carter vote and the change in state average House ACARI score is -0.07. This indicates no siginificant relationship between constituency change and representative change at the state level. Thus, while redistricting tended to favor conservative interests, this apparently was not translated into measurable changes in congressional voting behavior.

INTERPRETATION

OF RESULTS

Both the interstate analysis (which examines the effect of reapportionment), and the intrastate analysis (which describes the effect of redistricting), indicate that the Conservative agenda should have been assisted by these changes. Districts moved between states were placed in more Conservative regions than previously and district reorganization within states generally lowered support for liberals. A closer inspection, however, revealed that the gain and loss seats showed very little difference in representative voting patterns and that constituency changes were not related to representative voting changes. This is not to say that representative voting patterns did not change over the period, only that reapportionment and redistricting failed to account for them. What, then, can be offered as an explanation of the pattern of change in state average ACARI scores shown in Figure 5? An examination of the processes generating change in individual states reveals that at least two of the perspectives discussed previously may be operating concurrently. To illustrate, consider first the case of Oregon, a traditionally Progressive state, which underwent a strong shift toward Conservative voting behavior among its representatives over the period. Oregon’s economy began to falter in 1979 with decline in the state’s timber industry. High interest rates during the period depressed new home construction nationwide which in turn lowered the demand for lumber. By 1982 its unemployment

L

IGgure 5.

Change in state average ACARI score between

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97th Congress and 98th Congress.

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rate had reached 11.2%. The reaction of Oregonian voters was to shift away from the traditional emphasis upon quality-of-life issues toward a stronger economy.26 Voters in the timber-dependent Second District ousted the Democratic Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee in favor of a Conservative Republican with a 98th Congress ACARI score of 93. This shift in political stance is attributable to the state’s economic problems and thereby supports the position of the skeptics who argue the supremacy of economic and social factors in political change. On the other hand, consider the situation in California, which tends to support the position of the reformers. The late Democratic Congressman Phillip Burton of San Francisco designed California’s redistricting to favor the election of Democratic candidates. The resulting configuration was so contorted that it has been termed “Burton’s contribution to modem art”2 In the process, the state POST-PRE values actually declined (see Figure 4), as Burton lowered the effective margin of victory for Democrats in many districts. The result was to ensure the election of a greater number of Democrats, albeit at a lower margin of victory. This contributed to the state’s ideological shift from the 97th to 98th Congress (see Figure 5>, and serves to illustrate the impact that reapportionment can have on a state’s representation. Idiosyncratic factors in both Oregon and California add further complexity. The Second District Representative from Oregon was ousted due to shifts in the economy but his frequent absence from the state and his support for an unpopular value-added tax no doubt also weakened his chances for reelection .*8 In California, Burton’s redistricting design was in part influenced by the desire to increase his brother’s chances for election. Ironically, the candidate withdrew from the race just prior to the election.29 Examples such as these demonstrate that the validity of a perspective may depend upon the particular instance being evaluated and that in turn the acceptance of a reformist or skeptic argument may be contingent upon factors that are place or time specific. What then can be concluded regarding the impact of population shifts and the subsequent reapportionment and redistricting upon the ideological balance of the House of Representatives? No overriding evidence is available to support the hypothesis that such movements generated Conservative shifts in Congress. Any such evidence may have been overwhelmed by locally varying economic factors such as those that affected Oregon. On the other hand, unlike changes in the economy and other contingencies, reapportionment and redistricting are persistent forces that remain in effect for at least ten years. It is possible that spatial reorganization in congressional districts may be important at the national level over the long term. The fact remains that new congressional seats were placed in typically more Conservative environments and that redistricting within states also tended to favor Conservatives. This point is consistent with the perspective of the counter-skeptics, who emphasize the long-term impact of reorganization. A question that remains, however, is whether population flows from historically liberal to conservative areas serve to make receiving places more Liberal or have no effect on their traditional conservative nature. The former would occur if entrants were of sufficient number and persistent ideology to elect officials who accord with their beliefs. The latter could occur if migrants assume the ideology of their new location, or if the magnitude of conservative voters in the receiving area outweighs the impact of the arrivals. The answer to this question requires individual-level studies of the changing political behavior of migrants in particular locales.

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NOTES *The authors wish to thank J. Clark Archer and Fred Shelley for their comments and suggestions. 1. Robert Dixon, Jr., “The Court, the People, and the ‘One Man, One Vote,’ ” in Reapportionment in the 197Os, edited by Nelson Polsby (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971): pp. 7-46. Malcolm Jewel1 (editor), 77re Politics of Reapportionment (New York: Atherton Press, 1962). 2. Brian J.L. Berry and Donald C. Dahmann, “Population Redistribution in the United States in the 197Os,” in Population Redistribution and Public Policy, edited by Brian J.L. Berry and Lester Silverman (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1980): pp. 8-49; George Stemlieb, James W. Hughes, and Connie 0. Hughes, Demographic Trends and Economic Reality (New Brunswick: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1982). 3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States, 1984. 4. J. Clark Archer, Tom Murauskas, Fred M. Shelley, E.R. White, and Peter J. Taylor, “Counties, States, Sections, and Parties in the 1984 Presidential Election,” The Professional Geographer 37(1985): 279-287.; Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1949). 5. J. Clark Archer and Fred M. Shelley, American ElectoralMosaics (Washington, DC: Association of American Geographers, 1986); James A. Barnes and John C. Weicher, “Urban Blight: The Democrats’ Eroding Metropolitan Base,” Public Opinion 8( 1985): 49-5 1. 6. David C. Saffel, “Reapportionment and Public Policy: State Legislators’ Perspectives,” in Representation and RedistrictingIssues, edited by Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert B. McKay, and Honard A. Scarrow (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1982). 7. Gordon E. Baker, The Reapportionment Revolution (New York: Random House, 1966); William C. Howard and Loren P. Beth, The Politics of Misrepresentation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962); Jewell, op cit., 1962; William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, The American Legislative Process (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Frank Sorauf, Party and Representation (New York: Atherton, 1962). 8. David Brady and D. Edwards, “One Man, One Vote-So What?” Transaction 4(1967): 4 l-46; Richard Dawson and James A. Robinson, “Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Politics in the American States,” Journal of Politics 25( 1963): 265-289; Thomas R. Dye, Politics,Economics, and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Thomas R. Dye, “State Legislative Politics, ” in Politics and the American States, edited by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston: Little, Brown, 197 1); Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978); Richard Hofferbert, “The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structural and Economic Variables in the American States,” American Political Science Review 60(1966): 73-82; Herbert Jacob, “The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution,” Social Forces (December 1964): 260; Edward R. Tufte, “The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems,” American Political Science Review 67(1973): 550-554. 9. William E. Bicker, “The Effects of Malapportionment in the States: A Mistrial,” in Reapportionment in the 197Os, edited by Nelson Polsky (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); pp. 151-201; Robert Erikson, “The Partisan Impact of Reapportionment,” Midwest Journal of Political Science 57(1971) 57-71; George Frederickson and Yong Hyo Chao, “Sixties Reapportionment: It it Victory or Delusion. 7” National Civic Review 60( 1971):

73-85; Roger A. Hanson and Robert E. Crew, “The Policy Impact of Reapportionment,” Law and Society Review 8(1973): 69-93; Robert B. McKay, “Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court,” Michigan Law Review 67(1968) 223-236; Allan G. Pulsipher

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10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

20.

21. 22.

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and James L. Weatherby, “Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Government Expenditures,” American Poltical Science Review 62(1968): 1207- 12 19; Bruce W. Robeck, “Legislative Partisanship, Constituencies, and Malapportionment: The Case of California,” American Political Science Review 66( 1972): 1246-l 255. Charles Bullock, III, “The Inexact Science of Congressional Redistricting,” PS lS(1982): 43 l-438. Alan I. Abramovitz, “Partisan Redistricting and the 1982 Congressional Elections,” Journal of Politics 45( 1983): 767-770; Congressional Quarterty Almanac, Political Report, 38( 1982), Appendix B; J. David Gopoian and Darrell M. West, “Trading Security for Seats: Strategic Considerations in the Redistricting Process,” Journal of Politics 46( 1984): 1080- 1096. Ronald E. Cohen, “Despite the Map Makers’ Best Efforts, Redistricting Won’t Help Either Party,” National Journal (May 1,1982): 752-756. J. Clark Archer, “Some Geographical Aspects of the American Presidential Election of 1984,” Political Geography Quarterly 4( 1985): 168; Congressional Quarterly Inc., “Redistricting for the 198Os,” Congressional Districtsin the 1980s. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1983) p. vii. Abramovitz, op. cit., p. 768; Cohen, op. cit., p. 753; Gopoian and West, op. tit, p. 1082. Larry M. Schwab, “The Impact of the 1980 Reapportionment in the United States,” Political Geography Quarter& 4( 1985): I4 1- 15 8. Abramovitz, op. cit., p. 768; Archer, op. cit., pp. 168-169; John W. Mashek, “Reagan vs. Democrats: The Lines Harden,” US News and World Report 93( 1982): 19-24. Cohen, op. cit., p. 753. ACARI was established in 1958 by a group of Conservative Senators who sought to have more “constitutional conservatives” elected to Congress. The ACARI scale is one of many indexes calculated by interest groups to measure the political position of members of Congress. (For a comparison of these rating systems see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 2 1, 198 1, pp. 507-5 12.) The ACARI scale is the major index of conservatism, while the most popular liberalism index is conducted by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Each rates an individual representative by the percentage of votes cast in favor of the interest group’s position on an issue. Failure to vote lowers a representative’s score on the ADA scale, but not on the ACARI scale. Data Sources: Congressional Quarterty Weekly Reports, July3,1982,pp. 1616-1617;May7,1983,pp.906-907;Ju1y 14,1984,pp. 1696-1697;and April 20, 1985, pp. 748-749. Three related points are warranted. First, a representative’s conservatism rating is the twoyear average of support for ACARI issues. The average was selected in order to minimize the volatility that might be associated with the use of a single year’s scores based on a small number of issues. Second, state scores for each Congress are the average of these representative ratings. States with large delegations tend to average out one or a few representatives with extreme positions; those with small delegations have a greater potential for mean state scores near the ends of the range. Nevertheless, a delegation, of whatever size, represents a state’s political philosophy through its legislative votes. Finally, the analysis is confined to the 97th Congress and 98th Congress in order to highlight possible conservatism shifts that are due to reapportionment. These 34 districts are identified in Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics, 1982 (Washington, DC: Barone and Company, 1981) and Barone and Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics, 1984 (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1983). The difference-of-means test is conducted to indicate the weakness of the relationship. It does not imply the existence of a sample from which inferences are drawn. Schwab, op. cit.

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23. Amihai Glazer and Marc Robbins, “Congressional Responsiveness to Constituency Change,” American Joumal of Political Science 29( 1985): 259-273; Gopoian and West, op. cit. 24. There is considerable evidence for this position. See Robert Erikson and Gerald Wright, “Policy Representation of Constituency Inters&” Political Behavior 2( 1980): 9 l- 106; John Johannes and John McAdams, “The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is it Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Election,” American Journal of Political Science 25( 198 1): 12-l 3; James Kau, Donald Keenan, and Paul Rubin, “A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 97( 1982): pp. 27 l-293. 25. Barone and Ujifusa, op. cit., 1983. 26. Barone and Ujifusa, op. cit., 1983. 27. Gopoian and West, op. cit. 28. Barone and Ujifusa, op cit., 1983. 29. Ibid.