Changing direction

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Changing direction: Defensive planning in a post-conflict city Tim Cunningham Published online: 24 Sep 2014.

To cite this article: Tim Cunningham (2014) Changing direction: Defensive planning in a postconflict city, City: analysis of urban trends, culture, theory, policy, action, 18:4-5, 455-462, DOI: 10.1080/13604813.2014.939466 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2014.939466

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CITY, 2014 VOL. 18, NOS. 4 –5, 455– 462, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2014.939466

Changing direction Defensive planning in a post-conflict city

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Tim Cunningham This paper considers a number of recently declassified documents from the 1970s and 1980s to show that the security agencies in Northern Ireland played a key role in shaping the redevelopment of the city of Belfast, which extends some way beyond that which had hitherto been considered to be the case. With the aim of creating a cordon sanitaire around the main areas of conflict, the planning system was successfully harnessed to achieve the key military objective of spatially isolating major areas of the north and west of the city. In this respect, the planning system very successfully achieved the objectives that were set for it by the security agencies. However, the legacy of this approach is that there are now large sections of the city isolated from the economic and social mainstream of post-conflict Belfast. This paper argues that what is now required is a reconfiguration of the planning system within the city, embracing the notion of reflexive regulatory aspects of equality law, which can ensure that the planning system within the city is steered in a different direction from one based on exclusion and segregation, to one that embraces cohesion and integration. Only when this is achieved it is argued, can the objectives of the 1998 peace agreement be realised.

Key words: defensive planning, cordon sanitaire, reflexive regulation, social exclusion, planning system

Introduction

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ast April marked 16 years since the passage of the Belfast peace agreement (The Agreement 1998) in Northern Ireland (NI) that aimed to bring resolution to a conflict spanning several decades and which cost over 3000 lives. The Agreement contained, among many other provisions, a commitment to ‘tackling the problems of a divided society and social cohesion in urban, rural and border areas . . . and rejuvenating major urban centres’ (The Agreement 1998, para. 2). The aim of this paper is to highlight the difficulties associated with achieving this objective given the extent to

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which the urban fabric of the city of Belfast in particular was determined by security considerations. In particular, the paper will argue that several decades of ‘defensive planning’ (Newman 1972), predicated on the notion of separating the two communities, and ghettoising the predominantly Catholic and Nationalist north and west of the city of Belfast, have established patterns and practices which remain in place to this day. Drawing on some recent thinking within the areas of legal and regulatory theory, this paper will conclude by arguing that a reconfiguration of the NI planning system is necessary in order to ‘steer’ the planning system towards objectives more compatible with

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equality and human rights outcomes in order to deliver the kind of integrated and cohesive communities that were promised in 1998.

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The conflict planning debate The extent to which planning within the city of Belfast was controlled or manipulated by the security agencies has been a matter of some debate in recent decades (Brown 1985; Cowan 1982; Doherty and Poole 1997; Hillyard 1983; Pawley 1998; Stollard 1984). Among the claims that have been put forward over the years are that the security forces altered building plans, influenced the final location of the Westlink motorway which runs along the north and western edges of the city centre, and recommended where new social housing developments could, and more importantly, could not be built (Alcorn 1982; Dawson 1984; Hillyard 1983; Neill 2001). Significantly, however, others such as Anson (1984) and Murtagh (2002) have challenged these arguments, stating that there was no evidence of security force involvement in the design and building of new housing estates or the manipulation of territory and community boundaries within the city, and that regeneration initiatives and new housing in Belfast were influenced by community household surveys along with community consultation programmes. It is also important to note that the official line from the government at the time was one of denying that the security forces had any specific role in the planning process in NI (Alcorn 1982). Byrne (2011) concludes that while there are clearly opposing views as to the extent, if any, of the security force involvement in the design and planning of Belfast, it seems ‘highly unlikely’ that at some level the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and the British Army were not involved in discussions on housing redevelopment schemes or road schemes. The problem is that in the absence of any real evidence it is difficult to

fully assess the accuracy of these competing claims. However, examination of some declassified materials sourced from the Public Records Office in Belfast would suggest that the extent to which elements of the security forces were involved in the planning process has been seriously underestimated. It is to these sources that we now turn.

Security planning and official documentation In October 1970, the NI government established a Joint Working Party on Processions to examine existing areas of confrontation and peace lines, and provide recommendations on these issues towards future government policy (CAB/1634/1). The final report of the Working Party is marked ‘secret’ and indicates the thinking at the highest levels of government at the time in NI on how best to spatially manage the conflict. Significantly for the purposes of this debate, the solution to the security problem that was arrived at was one based on manipulation of the built environment in order to ensure the maximum degree of separation between the two communities in NI. This is very explicit in the findings of the report, which states: ‘We would consider it essential to provide in the re-development [of the city] for the maximum natural separation between the opposing areas . . . prudence would point to the wisdom of some sort of physical “cordon sanitaire” . . . the Urban Motorway Project is of considerable significance . . . the effect will be to create a wide (in places as much as 100 yards) cleared belt to the west side of the City Centre.’ (para. 39)

The document also states that the existing plans for the Urban Motorway Project ‘should be urgently examined’ from two security perspectives (para. 40). The first of these was to ensure that the security risks involved during the actual construction of the motorway (e.g. the security risks arising

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from the presence of construction materials and plant in large quantities) were adequately appreciated and minimised (para. 40). The second concern was that there was a need to review the motorway design itself in order to maximise the security impact of the project. What is significant within this document is the level of detail provided with respect to what matters ought to be considered. The document states for example that: ‘Everything possible should be done to avoid using materials which can be ripped up or torn out and used as missiles or for building barricades, e.g. concrete flags . . . It might also be necessary on particular elevated stretches to construct some sort of screen to prevent missiles or explosive devices being thrown up on to or down from the motorway.’ (para. 40)

Looking beyond the Urban Motorway Project, the report found that across NI generally, ‘opportunities to create natural divisions between difficult areas by means of road re-alignment should not be overlooked’ (author’s emphasis). Furthermore, the Working Group considered that the then Ministry of Home Affairs, as the department responsible for security and law and order, should be given an opportunity to consider ‘any plans for substantial development or redevelopment (both for housing and for industry and commerce) at an early stage, consulting the security forces and other departments where necessary’ (para. 41). In relation to housing, the Working Group concluded that plans for housing adjacent to the main line of confrontation between the two communities, where not already approved, should be revised to provide more open space, particularly on either side of the new ‘natural barrier’ and that generally the number of ‘open routes’ between the Falls and the Shankill areas should be substantially reduced. Road re-alignment was also proposed in order to avoid the passage of ‘processionists’ and other persons through or close to ‘hostile’ territory (para. 44). In summary, the report concludes that there may be no alternative to increasing rather than

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discouraging segregation of the two communities through the creation of ‘natural’ barriers (para. 49).

The conflict planning process The subsequent implementation of the framework laid down in the 1972 Report can be traced through the 1980s with an examination of additional records from that period. Of particular interest are the activities of an entity called the Standing Committee on Security Implications of Housing Problems in Belfast (SCH). From the minutes of the meetings of this group, it is clear that the worst concerns that were expressed at the time regarding the role of the security forces in planning in the city were fully justified. A letter from Eddie Simpson, Assistant Secretary, Housing and Urban Affairs, Department of the Environment (DOE) on 6 May 1981, reveals that the SCH contained representation from a range of organisations including the Belfast Development Office (BDO), DOE, NIO, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British Army, with the RUC represented by DCC McAtamney and ACC Chesney and the British Army represented by Brigadier Crowfoot (39th Infantry Brigade). The minutes of a meeting of SCH on Thursday 19 February 1981 indicate that the Draft Belfast Housing Plans were presented to the group and that the plans were ‘fully discussed and comments sought from those present’. In the course of this meeting, Mr John Semple (DOE) explained that the draft District Housing Plan had been in preparation since the previous summer and was being finalised prior to its intended presentation to Belfast City Council on 16 March. He pointed out that the DOE had themselves identified a number of security implications arising from the plan and were now seeking the views of the security authorities on these and any other potential difficulties. At the meeting, Brigadier Crowfoot stated that in his view the redevelopment plans would

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broadly assist the army, particularly through the replacement of flats in Turf Lodge by two-storey houses—the point here being that the lower density two-storey houses would be easier to secure than the higher density flats that presently existed. Summing up the meeting Mr Burns said that there was general agreement that the plan should be made public, however, ‘the immediate priority was for the Police and the Army to examine the proposals in greater depth and alert DOE to any points of security interest which might need further consideration’. In a subsequent letter from ACC Chesney to Eddie Simpson, Assistant Secretary, Housing and Urban Affairs (DOE) on 26 February 1981, ACC Chesney indicated that the Draft Belfast Housing Plan, introduced at the meeting of 19 February 1981 had been subsequently discussed with DCC McAtamney and 39th Infantry Brigade and that his letter contained the combined views of both parties, that is, the police and the army. This letter outlined a range of issues across Belfast that the security forces considered needed to be addressed. For example, in relation to District 2 (i.e. innercity East Belfast) the letter stated that policing problems were envisaged arising as a result of the proposed redevelopment of the Newtownards Road/Seaforde Street/Short Strand Area and it was recommended that a row of shops fronting both roads be erected to provide a ‘screen’. The letter went on to point out that both stretches of road had previously been busy shopping areas prior to the Troubles and the presence of a ‘screen’ of this nature would not only alleviate the policing problems but also provide an amenity for the residents. In District 4 (North Belfast) the letter proposed a number of suggestions to ease the interface problems that might arise as a result of the plan. These included provision of a row of shops on both sides of the interface where this was viable, that the gable ends of houses should be towards the interface and the ‘Provision of aesthetically acceptable sight screens such as walls or advertising hoardings.’

At the next meeting of the SCH on Thursday 1 April 1981, at which DCC McAtamney, ACC Chesney and Brigadier Crowfoot were again present, it was further confirmed that: ‘There was a need to ensure that the machinery for consultation on the security aspects of housing proposals was responsive to developments in security assessments or policy.’

Conflict planning and the Poleglass development The minutes from SCH meetings also provide some interesting insight into the problems that arose for the security forces with respect to the Poleglass housing development that was designed to alleviate the overcrowding and housing need within Catholic West Belfast. The location of the site, however, within the boundaries of the Unionist-controlled Lisburn Borough Council (LBC), created particular difficulties, not least through the fact that the political leadership of LBC tried to undermine the development through various tactics. At a meeting of the SCH on 30 June 1980, a number of problems in the Poleglass housing complex were considered with Mr John Semple reporting on the non-cooperation of LBC in providing services and facilities to the area. The Poleglass development was discussed again at a further meeting of SCH on 19 February 1981, at which it was noted that LBC continued to oppose and obstruct the new housing, both by spreading rumours that tenants owed large rent arrears and by stalling over the granting of pub licences to the area. Significantly, at this meeting DCC McAtamney intervened and stressed that the police attached ‘high importance to the provision of pubs in the area as the demand for such facilities was otherwise likely to be met by clubs with paramilitary associations’. The minutes of the SCH meetings, taken together with the original 1972 document, are also in line with another document sourced by Faligot (1983) who uncovered a

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British Army memo entitled ‘Operation Playground’ which proposed the designing of playgrounds, mainly for the Unity Flats and New Lodge areas as a ‘joint military, RUC and civil project’ with ‘the dual aim of creating an open area for children’s games while at the same time containing the area’. The original document also clearly stated that while the proposals would have military, police and civilian input, the Royal Marine Commando Community Relations Committee would be the main controlling agency.

Planning as conflict management Clearly therefore, looking at the range of original sources that are now available, some general observations can be made about the nature of planning in Belfast in particular over the past four decades. Firstly, there is little doubt that the security forces played a role in determining not just the overall patterns of the city in terms of the route of the Urban Motorway, but also design specifications such as the kind of material that should be used for pavements—that is, not flagstones—and the location of ‘aesthetically pleasing sight screens’ in the form of advertising hoardings, as well as the layout of children’s playgrounds. It is also clear from reading the original sources that there is little doubt as to who had the final say with respect to any planning or design issues and who was in effect ‘steering’ the work of the committee, that is, the security forces. This is evident in the minutes where there are repeated references to the need for security force input as ‘an immediate priority’ along with references to the importance that adhered to this input. Moreover, it is important to note that the individuals from the security agencies represented on the SCH were among the most senior figures in the RUC and British Army at that time in NI. What is also of significance, however, is the fact that on occasion security considerations actually coincided with other interests, including those of the communities who were

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considered ‘at war’ with the British state. This is evident for example in the fact that the British Army, through Brigadier Crowfoot, gave specific approval to the demolition of flats at Turf Lodge, on the grounds that construction of two-storey housing would be more easy to secure from a military point of view. Significantly, however, the campaign to have the Turf Lodge flats demolished has been viewed by community activists and their supporters as one of the most successful campaigns in NI in recent decades on behalf of local communities seeking to bring about an improvement in their housing conditions (Crilly, Gordon, and Rooney 2002). Similarly, the reasons for the concern on the part of the RUC that Poleglass had access to pubs (i.e. to prevent paramilitaries from opening up drinking clubs) differed from those of the residents who wanted somewhere to socialise—but both parties shared the same outcomes. Equally, in a context in which serious levels of violence were perpetrated, it is unsurprising that residents of areas of contention may have wished for the planning and design of their built environment to afford as much protection as possible. Certainly, in this context, it is understandable why some commentators concluded that planning decisions did not involve the security forces but were merely responding to residents’ wishes. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the operation of the SCH is the way in which planning decisions and outcomes were achieved. In the first instance, the DOE themselves assessed plans for security considerations, which were then presented, via the SCH, to the police and army, who then amended these plans in line with their own objectives. However, what is also significant is that recent announcements regarding redevelopments within the city of Belfast indicate that the pattern of defensive planning that was laid down in the early 1970s is still being repeated. The insertion of a community hub and sports fields into the Girdwood site in North Belfast between the predominantly Catholic Antrim Road and predominantly

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Protestant Lower Shankill area is evidence that the ‘infrastructure buffer’ mentality is still alive and well. Similarly, the directing of the new flagship inward investment projects into the ‘safe’ Titanic Quarter is further evidence of how the conflict zones of the north and west of the city continue to be economically and socially segregated from the rest of the city—particularly those parts of the city which are seeking international investment (Morrissey and Gaffikin 2006; O’Dowd and Komarova 2011). Similarly, one of the major infrastructure development projects of the Regional Transportation Strategy 2002 – 2012 (DRD 2002) included a widening of the Belfast Urban Motorway (or Westlink), thereby further entrenching the ‘cordon sanitaire’ around the north and west of the city. In summary therefore, one can conclude that there are a number of problematic consequences of the approach to planning that was adopted in recent decades. Firstly, there is the effect of marginalising, both socially and economically, the north and west of the city as a whole. Secondly, there is the effect of segregating the Catholic and Protestant communities within that part of the city. Thirdly, given that the north and west of the city are overwhelmingly Catholic, there is the effect of ghettoising and concentrating the spatial disadvantage of that community (McCrudden 1999). Fourthly, there is the problem that much of this work was done in secret. Fifthly, there is the fact that a pattern of development was established which has literally been set in stone and indeed, is being replicated in a post-conflict context.

Changing direction—a new approach to planning in NI A question arises therefore as to how this pattern of urban planning based on segregation and exclusion might be reconfigured in a way that promotes equality, integration and social inclusion. In this respect, the work of Hepple (2011), McCrudden (2007),

O’Kelly and Bryan (2007), and others in relation to the application of legal and regulatory theory to these contexts is quite useful and it is to this area that we now turn. Under the terms of Section 75 Northern Ireland Act 1998, which is the legislation which gave effect to The Agreement, public authorities are required to have due regard for the promotion of equality of opportunity and regard for the promotion of good relations with respect to their functions (including planning functions) in NI (Ellis 2001). A fairly detailed framework has been laid down as to how public bodies ought to work to achieve this—specifically through the use of equality impact assessments (Northern Ireland Act 1998). The theoretical basis underpinning these equality impact assessments is, according to McCrudden (2007), one of reflexive regulation, which is based upon the notion that regulatory failure can be attributed to a failure to appreciate the limited role that law can play in bringing about change directly in other social sub-systems because of the limited openness of these other social subsystems to external normative interventions. The aim of reflexive regulation therefore is for the legal system to construct a set of procedural stimuli (i.e. impact assessment requirements) that lead to the targeted sub-system (in this case the planning system) adapting itself. This approach recognises therefore the inner logic of individual social systems and sets law the challenge of seeking to ‘steer’ those systems, thereby re-casting the function of law from direct control to proceduralisation (Black 2000; Scott 2004). Black (2000) considers this approach to be one in which law is used for ‘social gardening’ rather than ‘social engineering’. According to Yeung (2004, 171), this approach ‘ascribes a critical role to deliberative, participatory procedures as a means for securing regulatory objectives’. McCrudden (2007) considers that the benefits that supposedly derive from this ‘third way’ is that it encourages each organisation to engage in its own assessment of the problem, and then to deliberate with others in

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CUNNINGHAM: CHANGING DIRECTION reconsidering whether this is adequate and how far the initial assessment needs to be reconstructed in light of the deliberation. In doing so he argues that this form of regulation supposedly encourages the organisation to ‘own’ the solutions that it devises in addition to encouraging mutual learning within and between organisations and encouraging each organisation to deliberate on the solutions that are best for it, thereby accepting that pluralistic solutions are desirable. The critical point is this, however: reflexive regulation will be more successful in bringing about the regulatory goals than other competing systems of regulation because the solutions are generated primarily internally within the regulated system, rather than imposed in a prescriptive form from another sub-system, for example, the legal system. Considering how the process of defensive planning operated via the work of the SCH, one can see that a reflexive approach was very much in evidence from the 1970s onwards. As the minutes of the SCH meetings show, the DOE came up with plans, which were first assessed by the DOE itself with regard to their impact on segregation and security. These assessments were then presented to the security forces who, in turn, made their own assessments, which produced revisions to the original plans. However, the final planning outcomes were very much ‘owned’ by the DOE, to such an extent, in fact, that for many outside observers the planning system in NI was described as ‘technocratic and colour blind’ (Bollens 1999) or even ‘autistic’ (Ellis 2005) and impervious to outside influence (Murtagh 1998). Clearly, however, far from being ‘autistic’, ‘technocratic’ and ‘impervious to outside influence’, the planning system in NI was very much ‘steered’ in the direction of securing (literally) the maximum degree of segregation possible between contentious areas of the city and ensuring the delivery of ‘defensive planning’. In this respect, from the perspective of achieving its objectives, the planning system actually worked very well. So well in fact that the patterns that were

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established in the early 1970s are continuing to this day as recent major developments with respect to the Girdwood site in North Belfast, the Titanic Quarter and the Urban Motorway would suggest. If this is to change, and the objectives of The Agreement with regard to ending division and creating a cohesive city are to be realised, there are a number of things that need to happen. Firstly, there needs to be due recognition within the planning system of its own role in terms of promoting segregation, and indeed social and economic exclusion and inequality. Secondly, a much more robust emphasis on adherence to the procedures laid down for the implementation of Equality Impact Assessments needs to be pursued. This means in effect that the same kind of approach that adhered to the consideration of security outcomes needs to be established for promoting equality, integration and cohesion. In other words, internal assessments of the extent to which proposals for regeneration or housing redevelopment impact on social and economic exclusion need to be made, followed by deliberation with outside experts and the reformulation of plans on the basis of the input that has been provided. As the work of the SCH shows, it is possible for the planning system in NI to work well with outside agencies and direct planning outcomes to achieve political goals. The trick in the future is to apply the same level of diligence to promoting equality and social inclusion as that which was applied to promoting segregation and separation. Moreover, it is imperative that in future such work is carried out in public rather than in secret. Crucially however, what is also required is for the aim of a cohesive and integrated city to be accorded the same political priority as that which applied to security and segregation during the conflict. Whether the Unionist politicians who are currently sharing power with their Nationalist counterparts are sufficiently willing to embrace a political priority that is designed to bring the predominantly Catholic and Nationalist area of North and West Belfast into the economic and social mainstream of the city remains to be seen.

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However, the main political lesson of the last 30 years in NI is that ending political violence (rather than simply managing political violence) was predicated on the notion of elected representatives in areas like North and West Belfast being brought into the mainstream of the NI body politic and that conflict management based on exclusion and marginalisation produced at best a stalemate. It is clear therefore that the time is ripe for those same lessons to be applied with respect to bringing those communities beyond the ‘cordon sanitaire’ into the economic, social and political mainstream of the city of Belfast. Only when this happens, can the aims and the objectives of the 1998 Agreement be realised.

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Tim Cunningham is a PhD candidate at the Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster. Email: [email protected]