is good or bad (e.g. feeling pleased or angry), bodily feelings concern the ...... of social information processing' In: Wyer, R. S. and Srull, T K. (Eds) Handbook of.
European Journal oJSocial Psychology, Vol. 24,101-1 15 (1994)
Cognitive feelings and metacognitive judgments GERALD L. CLORE University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
and W GERROD PARROTT Georgetown University
Abstract In two studies, subjects read and rated how well they understood a poem. Beforehand, however, they hadparticipated under hypnosis in an exercise designed to inducefeelings of being uncertain about something. For halfof the subjects hypnosis was made salient as a cause for the feelings; for the other half the feelings remained unexplained. The results showed that when left unexplained, the feelings of uncertainty were interpreted by subjects as indications that they did not understand the poem. When attributed to the hypnosis, however, the feelings had no effect on ratings of comprehension. In one experiment, subjects were also studied who were not susceptible to hypnosis, and who, therefore, did not feel uncertain in the first place. The results suggest that just as positive and negative affective feelings serve as information for making evaluative judgments, feelings of certainty and uncertainty serve as informationfor making cognitivejudgments ( I .e. judgments of kno wing).
INTRODUCTION Subjective feelings and objective knowledge are generally seen as antithetical, but people often use their feelings as a guide for judging whether or not they understand something. The type of subjective feeling that most often guides such judgments is the feeling of knowing itself; that IS, the feeling that one knows, understands, or comprehends, or conversely, the feeling of being uncertain, confused, or puzzled. The present research investigates the role of such feelings, which we call ‘cognitive Address for correspondence: Gerald L. Clore, Department of Psychology, Univensty of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign 11.61820,U.S.A. The research was supported by Research Grant BNS-8318077from the National Science Foundation and by Research Training Grant MH-15140from the National Institute of Mental Health. The paper was written while the first author was a Visitor in the Department of Expenmental Psychology, University of Oxford and a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study, University of Illinois. This research benefitted from prior research efforts on the same issue by Christy Scott.
0046-2772/94/010101-1m2.50 0 1994 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Received 26 October 1992 Accepted 12 May 1993
102
G. L. Clore and W. G. Parrot1
feelings’, in judgments of comprehension. We suggest that they are a critical ingredient in decision-making and many other cognitive activities involving reflection. The importance of cognitive feelings may have remained unrecognized precisely because they are such an ever-present and well-integrated part of normal, metacognitive judgments. It is only when these ordinarily reliable feelings lead us astray, or when they occur without appropriate cognitive content (as in the tip of the tongue phenomenon), that we begin to appreciate the work they normally do. Of course, the feeling of certainty is not infallible. Speaking of insight among mathematicians, the French physicist, Henri Poincare (1913, pp. 390-392), discusses such feelings, saying:
I have spoken of the feeling of absolute certitude accompanying the inspiration
often this feeling deceives us without it being any the less vivid . When a sudden illumination seizes upon the mind of the mathematician, it usually happens that it does not deceive him, but [when it does] we almost always notice that this false idea, had it been true, would have gratified our natural feeling for mathematical elegance. Poincare summarizes our case well, suggesting that cognitive feelings often lead us to make accurate metacognitive judgments about our insights, but they are equally compelling when they are false. The plan of the present research was to exploit this property of feelings of confusion and uncertainty as a way of learning more about their informational properties. Words referring to cognrtzve feelings have been distinguished from those referring to affectzve feelings and bodily feefings (Clore, Ortony and Foss, 1987; Ortony, Clore and Foss, 1987). Each kind of feeling is thought of as providing information about a different system. Affective feelings concern how much and in what way something is good or bad (e.g. feeling pleased or angry), bodily feelings concern the state of various bodily systems (e.g. feeling hungry or tired), and cognitive feelings indicate the status of one’s knowledge, understanding, or expectations (e.g. feeling surprised or confused). Some may prefer to restrict the term ‘feeling’ to experiences of visceral reactions. An alternative designation would be simply to refer to the ‘subjective experience’ of confusion or of uncertainty The guiding idea, in any case, is that it mght be useful to try to differentiate beliefs that one must be confused, for example, from subjective experiences of confusion. We might expect that the belief that one is confused would often be based on the experience (feelings) of confusion, and similarly the belief that one is uncertain would often be based on the experience of being unable to decide. The precise nature and locus of such cognitive feelings is far from clear, but the same can be said of affective feelings and even of many bodily feelings. It would be difficult to specify, for example, where feelings of confusion, anger, or tiredness reside or exactly how we know which of these we feel. Little has been done to tie down any of these experiences beyond the pioneering work on emotion by Davitz (1969). The function of all feelings, however, appears to be to provide information in a consciously available, immediate form that summanzes a myriad of complex details about the relevant subsystem (Clore, 1992). This informational function can be seen in the role that such feelings appear to play in everyday decisions. Bodily feelings of fatigue, for example, may play a role in decisions about whether to rest or persevere in an activity, affective feelings of irritation might affect whether to
Cognitrvefeelings
103
complain about something, and cognitive feelings or certainty might affect whether one continues to argue one’s position. It is now well established that emotions and moods can affect judgment and decision-making (for a review, see Clore, Schwarz and Conway, in press). One explanation focuses on the informative function of feelings (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). The idea is that when evaluating something for the first time, one considers the object ofjudgment, notes any affective feelings that it elicits, and uses that information as a basis for judgment. When considering whether to buy something, for example, one may run a quick mental simulation of owning the object, noting any experience of pleasure this operation elicits as an aid to deciding. However, it can be difficult to disentangle how much of one’s experience is due to these considerations and how much is due to irrelevant affective cues. In this way, cues of pre-existing moods and emotions can make one’s judgment more extreme. According to this feelings-asinformation model, however, the effect of mood depends on the implicit attributions of the experiencer. When an irrelevant cause for feelings is made salient, mood should not influence judgments at all. The role of attributions can be seen in Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) weather study. In this study,weather was found to affect people’s moods, which in turn influenced their judgments of life satisfaction. When the weather was made salient, however, ratings of life satisfaction were no different on sunny than on rainy days. Moods frequently have diffuse causes, fast a long time, and involve autonomic arousal, which may decay only slowly As a result, the source of the feelings is often unclear, and they may be especially easy to msattribute. These features, so typical of moods, are not as common for other kinds of feelings. Cognitive feelings of surprise and amazement, for example, although they may involve autonomic arousal, are poor candidates for misattribution because the surprised or amazed reaction usually follows closely the appearance of a surprising or amazing stimulus. Moreover, such cognitive feelings as feeling certain or feeling perplexed may not involve changes in arousal, so that the feelings may disappear after one’s attention has been withdrawn from the material about which one feels certain of perplexed. The hypothesis, then, is that cognitive feelings, such as uncertainty and confusion, play a role in metacognitive judgments, and that the process is similar to the process whereby affective feelings influence affective judgments. If so, any effect of feelings of uncertainty on judgments of understanding should depend on how the feelings are attributed. Existing evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis includes evidence that the experience of being distracted can affect judgments of how interesting a speech seems (Damrad-Frye and Laird, 1989), that the experience of familiarity can affect judgments of the famousness of a name (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown and Jasechko, 1989), and that the experience of ease in recalling instances of assertive behaviour can affect self-ratings of assertiveness (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka and Simons, 1991). These studies not only show that various nonaffective feelings influence judgments but that the effect depends on implicit attributions about the cause of the experience. The present research focuses on feelings of uncertainty and their role in judgments of understanding. The feelings were induced hypnotically in a manner similar to previous research on mood and emotion (e.g. Bower, 1981, Clore, Schwarz and Qrsch, 1983). Hypnotized subjects imagined themselves in a situation that caused them to feel confused or uncertain. Subjects were instructed to retain these feelings
104
G.L. Cloreand W G. Parrott
after emerging from hypnosis and to be unable to remember why they felt this way until told to do so. Following hypnosis, they were given a cue that allowed them to remember everything and thus to make a correct attribution for their feelings of uncertainty Half of the subjects received the cue before they read a poem and half received it afterward. It was predicted that when deciding how well they understood the poem, half of the highly hypnotizable (expenmental) subjects, would have unexplained feelings of uncertainty, and half would have feelings that were explained by the hypnosis. The less hypnotizable (control) subjects would make their judgments in the presence of the suggestion that they should feel uncertain but presumably without actually feeling anything special. If the functions of feelings of uncertainty and confusion are analogous to those of mood and emotion, subjects who feel uncertalnty with no plausible external cause (no-attribution group) should attribute their feelings to a failure to understand the poem and should judge their comprehension lower than do other subjects. Those who have already attributed their feelings to hypnosis (attribution group) should not assume that the feelings of uncertainty are a response to the poem, and therefore their comprehension ratings should be no different than those of the less hypnotizable, control subjects. It should be noted that the demand characteristics inherent in this design function in a direction opposite to that predicted by the hypothesis. Subjects in the attribution group are asked to rate their feelings of confusion before reading the poem, thereby receiving an additional suggestion that they should be feeling uncertain and confused. The hypothesis, however, predicts that these subjects will actually rate their comprehension higher than will subjects not encouraged to consider their state of confusion. In Expenment 1, this procedure was applied to a group of college students who attended a public lecture on hypnosis; they did not know that the demonstration would include an experiment. These students were also given a test of hypnotizability, allowing a comparison of the responses of subjects who were and were not likely to develop feelings of confusion in response to their hypnotic fantasy Experiment 2, which was conducted in the laboratory, used subjects who were prescreened for being highly hypnotizable and employed a number of manipulation and reliability checks absent from Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 1 Method Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two attribution conditions (attribution provided versus no attribution provided). These were each further divided into high or low hypnotizability groups on the basis of the Harvard Group Test of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Shor and Orne, 1962), a test that involves being hypnotized. Dunng hypnosis all subjects participated in a guided fantasy designed to induce feelings of uncertainty and confusion. Subsequently they read and rated their understanding of a short poem. They had been told that they would feel confused again upon wakening. However, consistent with standard instructions for source amnesia (Weizenhoffer and Hilgard, 1962), subjects were told that they would not be able to recall anything about the hypnosis until they read the words, ‘Now you can remember everything’ The difference between the two experimental groups was that the cue
Cognitivefeelings
105
appeared before the experimental task for the attribution group and after the task for the no-attribution group. In addition, a set of rating scales given before the task allowed the attribution group an opportunity to make an explicit attribution for their feelings to the hypnosis. Subjects
Fifty-five students at the University of illinois served as subjects, including 42 males and 13 females divided approximately evenly between conditions. The students had responded to posters and announcements in their dormitones advertising a special lecture and demonstration of hypnotism that would be held in one of the domtories. Subjects received no compensation for their participation. Materials
The guided fantasy depicted a situation in which it would be natural for college students to expenence feelings of uncertainty and confusion. The story involved visiting a computer consultant for help with a class project; the consultant’s advice made the students feel increasingly uncertain and confused. A booklet contained the poem and all response forms. Booklets for the attribution group had two extra pages at the beginning, one page containing the cue words, ‘Now you can remember everything’ and the next page listing three statements: (1) ‘I am feeling a little confused, and this confusion was caused by being hypnotized’; (2) ‘I am feeling a little confused, and this confusion was not caused by being hypnotized’; and (3) ‘I do not feel at all confused now’. Subjects checked the statement corresponding to their belief. These questions made hypnosis salient as the source of the feelings of uncertainty For the no-attribution condition, these pages were not included, although the cue words releasing subjects from amnesia did appear at the end of the experiment. All subjects then read a short poem and answered the question that followed it. The poem was the first eight-line stanza from a simple Rudyard Kipling poem entitled Cities and Thrones and Powers. Following the poem was the question, ‘On the following scale, rate how well you think you could explain the meaning of this poem to another person’. A nine-point scale followed, in which 1 = ‘not at all well’, 5 = ‘moderately well’ and 9 = ‘very well’. The final two pages contained 10 self-scoring items from the Harvard Group Test of Hypnotic Susceptibility Procedure
Following a brief lecture on the history and general nature of hypnosis, the audience participated in the test of hypnotic susceptibility Response booklets (which were sealed) were handed out alternately (attribution condition n = 27); no-attribution condition n = 28). As part of a slightly abbreviated version of the standard hypnotic susceptibility test, a variation of Hilgard’s relaxation induction was used (Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard, 1962). The behavioural test asks hypnotized individuals to do 10 specific tasks, such as being unable to to bend one’s arm, being unable to shake one’s head, feeling compelled to shoo away a fly, being unable to remember anything, and so on. Following these 10 tasks, the students were asked to participate in the
106
G. L. Cloreand W G. Parrott
guided fantasy as if this were an eleventh item on the test. At the end of the fantasy the students, still hypnotized, were given the suggestion that they would retain their feelings of confusion after they emerged from hypnosis, but that they would not remember that they were told to d o so until they read the words, ‘Now you can remember everything’. This amnesic suggestion is a standard part of the Harvard Group Test. Subjects were then brought out of hypnosis and told to open the response booklet in which they indicated which of the hypnotic behavlours they had performed. At the end of the demonstration the students were debriefed and told that they could refuse to donate their data if they so chose. None elected to do so. Results Hypnotic susceptibility
As anticipated in the design, not all students achieved a state of hypnosis. Scores on the 10-item version of the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility spanned the full range from 0 to 10 and averaged 4.54 (S.D. = 2.73). with there being no difference between the attribution (M= 4.52) and no-attribution (M= 4.57) groups, (F(1,53)p < 1.0. The students were divided into two groups based on their Hypnotic Susceptibility scores. Those who scored above the mdpoint of the scale (6 or higher) were considered highfy hypnotizabfe (n = 9 in the attribution condition, n = 10 in the no-attribution condition), while those scoring 5 or less were considered less hypnotizable (n = 18 in both attribution conditions). It was assumed that hypnotic susceptibility would be independent of treatment condition; the similarity of the distribution of hypnotic susceptibility scores in the two groups supports this assumption. Poem comprehension
As can be seen in Figure 1, the expected interaction occurred, so that judgments of ability to explain the poem depended both on hypnotic susceptibility and on the salience of an external explanation for feelings of uncertainty. The highly hypnotizable students in the no-attribution condition rated themselves much less able to explain the poem to another person than did those in the attribution condition. For the less hypnotizable students, there was no such difference, regardless of the salience of the external attribution. As expected, these students (who presumably did not feel uncertain) rated their ability to explain the poem at about the same moderate level as the highly hypnotizable subjects who felt uncertain but had an external explanation for their feelings. These results came from a 2 x 2 analysis of variance, with attribution versus no-attribution as one factor and high versus low hypnotizability level as the other. The unweighted means analysis yielded only one significant effect, the interaction between attribution and hypnotizability level, F(1,51) = 4.22, p < 0.05. This interaction was examined with an analysis of the simple effects of attribution. As suggested by Figure 1, highly hypnotizable subjects differed in their ratings of their ability to explain the poem, F(1,Sl) = 4.71, p 0.25. Nor was there a significant difference in reported uncertainty; the mean for the attribution condition was 3.06 (out of a possible 5.00), and that for the no-attribution condition was 3.33, t(I0) = 0.54, n.s. Ratings ofthe poem
Each subject’s responses to the two questions about the poem were averaged and compared between groups. The results replicated those of the highly hypnotizable subjects in Experiment 1. Subjects in the attribution group reported more confidence in their understanding of the poem (M = 5.08) than did subjects in the no-attribution group (M = 3.00), r(l0) = 2.48, p < 0.05. The two questions about the poem correlated highly with each other, r(10) = 0.69, with the correlation being much higher for no-attribution subjects, r(4) = 0.90, p C 0.05, than for attribution subjects, 44) = 0.35, n.s. These correlations are based on very small n’s, and their values are surely unstable. Their pattern, however, is consistent with the hypothesis. The unexplained feelings of the no-attribution subjects should have provided a common basis for answering both questions and the correlation is large, while the feelings of the attribution subjects should not have seemed relevant to either of them, and their correlation is small. An examination of the self-reports of uncertainty revealed that the troubling tendency in Experiment 1 for some subjects to indicate that they were not feeling uncertain was not present in this expenment. None of the subjects in either condition selected that option. Discussion The results replicate and extend those of Experiment 1. Subjects who experienced feelings of uncertainty but lacked an external attribution for them were less confident that they understood the poem than subjects with similar feelings who attributed them to the hypnosis. Without any other explanation for them, subjects with unexplained feelings (no-attribution condition) interpreted their feelings as feedback that they did not fully understand the poem. The similarity of results between the two experiments, despite numerous changes in materials and procedures, indicates that the obtained effects are reasonably robust.
1 12
G. L. Clore and W G. Parrott
Subjects in the first study were residents of a dormitory who participated out of curiosity about hypnosis. They were run in a large group with a live hypnosis induction and were unaware that they were participating in an experiment. Subjects in the second study were paid volunteers drawn from a class that had taken the Hypnotic Susceptibility Test. They were run individually with a tape-recorded hypnosis induction. Perhaps the most important change between the two studies, however, was in the fantasy used to induce feelings of uncertainty The similarity of results with these two different fantasies allows several conclusions to be drawn. First, it insures that the results were not due to peculiarities of any single induction fantasy Second, it suggests that states of uncertainty and confusion involve similar feelings regardless of their source. The feelings due to an imagined failure to understand the instructions of a computer consultant had the same effects as feelings due to an imagined inability to decide between two equally attractive apartments. Thus, the feelings of uncertainty per se are apparently the same regardless of what one is uncertain about, just as the feeling of sadness is identifiable as sadness regardless of what one is sad about. This does not deny that one’s total complex of feelings might differ if one’s uncertainty, for example, concerned positive rather than negative events or important rather than trivial ones, but the primary differences between those cases would be differences in the affective rather than the cognitive components of the experience. Finally, the similarity of results, despite the fact that the second fantasy was designed to exclude elements that might induce affective feelings (e.g. feelings of frustration or low self-esteem), suggests that, as hypothesized, the results of both were due to cognitive feelings. It also seems unlikely that demand characteristics produced the results. In both experiments subjects received the same instructions and heard the same guided fantasy The primary difference was that subjects in the attribution group received the cue to recall the hypnosis experience before rather than after reading the poem, and they experienced a suggestion from reading the choices on the attribution response scales that hypnosis might produce feelings of uncertainty It is unclear why, apart from the account hypothesized, subjects who did these things would be more rather than less confident that they understood the poem. That is, one might expect suggestion effects, demand characteristics, or cognitive priming to lead to lower ratings of understanding in the conditions where uncertainty was emphasized, but such processes are not apparent in the results.
GENERAL DISCUSSION The present experiments suggest that cognitive feelings of uncertainty affectjudgment by the same processes that appear to operate in the case of affective feelings. The general results also parallel those concerned with the misattribution of other kinds of feelings, including feelings of arousal (Cantor, Bryant and Zillman, 1974),intoxication (McCarty, Diamond and Kaye, 1982), and dissonance (Zanna and Cooper, 1974). As in the case of Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) studies of the misattribution of affective feelings, these results show that the effects of attributing one’s cognitive feelings to an external source occur not because the attributions eliminate or reduce the feelings, but because they render them uninformative for making feeling-based judgments.
Cognitivefeelings
1 13
A rival hypothesis is that unexplained feelings of uncertainty may inhibit actual comprehension of the poem. However, in a third experiment using the same paradigm (Parrott, 1988) SUbjeCtS were asked to rate the ease of deciding between two equally attractive apartments, the unpleasantness of deciding, and how likely they would be just to give up making a choice and stay in their apartment for another year. Unexplained feelings of uncertainty influenced all of these judgments, just as they influenced judgments of poem comprehension in the present study, but of course, the degree to which subjects comprehended the poem was not relevant. Hence, we can conclude that differences in poem comprehension were probably not responsible for the results of the present studies. Another rival hypothesis is that the results were due to activated semantic content rather than feelings (e.g. Forgas and Bower, 1988). After all, it is likely that the guided fantasy used to arouse feelings of uncertainty would also activate concepts about uncertainty Data consistent with the feeling interpretation include the fact that differences among subjects in reports of feelings of uncertainty corresponded closely to differences in their judgments of understanding. In addition, the role of feelings is also suggested by the fact that giving subjects a specific explanation for how they felt is what eliminated the effect of the fantasy on poem understanding. Another kind of evidence is that fact that the inductions used in Experiments 1 and 2 involved quite different semantic content. One concerned the inability to understand a computer consultant, and the other, the difficulty of choosing between two attractive apartments. It seems less likely that these two different semantic contents would both have the same effect than that a common feeling state was responsible. From the standpoint of the informational view (Schwarz and Clore, 1983), however, it is not necessarily cntical whether the active agents were thoughts or feelings. Clore and Parrott (1991) point out thatat another level the primng and informational views are not necessarily in conflict in that they address somewhat different phases of the process. The priming or accessibility explanations offer a model of cognitive processing whereby activation of one set of concepts is likely to activate other related concepts. Presumably moods also mobilize affective cognitive content as well as affective feelings. Indeed, thoughts and feelings are inextricably intertwined in the experience of emotion (see Parrott, 1988). But according to the information view, it is the experiential aspect of emotion that IS the vehicle for mood effects on judgment (Clore and Parrott, 1991). The experience affects judgment if and onIy if it is taken to be informative about one’s reaction to the other object ofjudgment. As it turns out, non-affective priming effects on non-affective judgments are just as dependent upon such attributions as are mood effects (Kubovy, 1977; Lombardi, Higgins and Bargh, 1987; Martin, Seta and Crelia, 1990). In either case, when irrelevant possible causes are made salient, the informativeness of the experience for a particular judgment will be undermined. Thus, if one assumes that it is the experiential aspect of emotion that is used directly as information, and that the experience includes thoughts as well as feelings, then the priming and information hypotheses are not incompatible. Similarly, Forgas (1992) has also recently proposed a framework within which these views can both be accommodated. The results of the current experiments support the hypothesis that cognitive feelings of uncertainty and confusion can be misattributed so that they bias judgments of comprehension. The point of these experiments was not to suggest that such biases are common or constitute a practical problem. Ecological validity was clearly not
114
G. L. Clore and W G. Parrott
the chief strength of the designs employed. Rather extraordinary techniques were employed to enable us to break apart two things that are ordinarily inseparable, namely, the feeling that one understands and the judgment that one understands. We are proposing that some metacognitions, such as the realization that one does or does not comprehend somethmg, IS (at least sometimes) based on experiencing a distinctive set of cognitive feelings. In a similar way, Schwarz a n d Clore (1983) proposed that evaluative judgments depend (at least sometimes) o n positive or negative affective feelings.
REFERENCES Bower, G. H. (1981). ‘Mood and memory’, American Psychologisf, 36: 129-148. Cantor, J. B., Bryant, J. and Zillman, D. (1974). ‘Enhancement of humor appreciation by transferred excitation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30:8 12-82 1. Clore, G. L. (1992). ‘Cognitive phenomenology: Feelings and the construction of judgment’ In: Martin, L. L. and Tesser, A. (Eds) The Consfrucfionof Social Judgments, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, pp. 133-163. Clore, G. L., Ortony, A. and Foss, M. A. (1987). ‘Psychological structure of the affective lexicon’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53: 75 1-766. Clore, G. L. and Parrott, W. G. (1991). ‘Moods and their vicissitudes: The informational properties of affective thoughts and feelings’ In: Forgas, J. (Ed.) Emotion and Social Judgments, Pergamon Press, Oxford, pp. 107-123 Clore, G. L., Schwarz, N. and Conway, M. (in press). ‘Affective causes and consequences of social information processing’ In: Wyer, R. S. and Srull, T K. (Eds) Handbook of Social Cognition, 2nd edn, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Clore, G. L., Schwarz, N. and Kirsch, J. (1983). ‘Generalized mood effects on evaluative judgments’. Paper presented at the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago. Damrad-Frye, R. and Laird, J. D. (1989). ‘The experience of boredom: The role of the selfperception of attention’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57- 315-320. Davitz, J. R. (1969). The Language of Emotion, Academic Press, New York. Forgas, J. P (1992). ‘Affect in social judgments and decisions: A multi-process model’ In: Zanna, M. P (Ed.) Advances UI Expermental Social Psychology, Vol. 25, Academic Press, San Diego, pp. 227-275. Forgas, J. P and Bower, G. H. (1988). ‘Affect in social and personaljudgments’ In: Fiedler, K. and Forgas, J. (Eds) Aflect, Cognition, and Social Behavior, Hogrefe International, Toronto, pp. 183-207 Jacoby, L. L., Kelley, C. M., Brown, J. and Jasechko, J. (1989). ‘Becoming famous overnight: Limts on the ability to avoid unconscious influences of the past’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56: 326-338. Kubovy, M. (1 977). ‘Response availability and the apparent spontaneity of numerical choices’, Journal of Expermental Psychology: Hwnan Perception and Perjbrmance, 3: 359-364. Lombardi, W J., Higgns, E. T and Bargh, J. A. (1987). ‘The role ofconsciousness in priming effects on categormtion: Assimilation versus contrast as a function of awareness of the pnming task’,Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13: 41 1-429. Martin, L. L., Seta, J. J. and Crelia, R. A. (1990). ‘Assimilation and contrast as a function of people’s willingness and ability to expend effort in forrmng an Impression’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59.27-37 McCarty, D., Diamond, W. and Kaye, M. (1982). ‘Alcohol, sexual arousal, and the transfer of excitation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42: 977-988. Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Foss, M. A. (1987). ‘Referential structure of the affective lexicon’, Cognitive Science, 11: 361-384. Parrott, W G. (1988). ‘The role of cognition in emotional experience’ In: Baker, W J., Mos, L. P., Rappard, H. V and Stam, H. J. (Eds) Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology, Springer-Verlag, New York, pp. 327-337
Cognitivefeelings
115
poincare, H. (1913). The Foundalions of Science (G. B. Halsted, trans.), The Science Press, New York. Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H. and Simons, A. (1991). ‘Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61: 195-202. Schwarz, N. and Clore, G . L. (1983). ‘Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being; informative and directive functions of affective states’, Journal of Personality and Social PsyChOtogy, 45: 513-523. Shor, R. E. and Orne, E. C. (1962). ‘Adaptation for group administration with self-scoring of the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Form A’, Studies in Hypnosis Project, Harvard Medical School, Cambridge, Mass. Weuenhoffer, A. M. and Hilgard, E. R. (1962). Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale (form C), Consulting Psychologists Press, Palo Alto. Zanna, M. P and Cooper, J. (1974). ‘Dissonance and the pill: an attribution approach to studying the arousal properties of dissonance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29.703-709.
