Collaborative Planning - SAGE Journals

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communicative planning (Forester 1989; Healey 1992; Innes 1996), the ... Planning (Taylor 1998), and collaborative planning (Healey 1997; Innes and Booher.
Collaborative Planning Margerum

Collaborative Planning Building Consensus and Building a Distinct Model for Practice

Richard D. Margerum

n 1966, Godschalk and Mills (1966, 88) advocated a collaborative approach to planning and asserted that “meaningful and effective planning must be based on a twoway communication flow between the public and the planning agency.” Similarly, Arnstein (1969) argued for a more substantive role for the public in planning decision making. While some of the terminology and descriptions have changed, the basic message of “planning as a collaborative process” has remained a core principle of the planning discipline. Over the past several decades, there has been increasing emphasis on the communicative and interactive nature of planning practice (Forester 1989, 1999b; Friedmann 1973; Healey 1992; Innes 1996). Terms such as transactive planning (Friedmann 1973), communicative planning (Forester 1989; Healey 1992; Innes 1996), the Discourse Model of Planning (Taylor 1998), and collaborative planning (Healey 1997; Innes and Booher 1999) all emphasize an interactive approach. Furthermore, there is a rich body of literature from related disciplines such as public policy and environmental management that offers valuable contributions to collaborative approaches (Gray 1989; Moote, McClaran, and Chickering 1997; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Despite this long history and recent emphasis, the empirical research presented in this article demonstrates that the practice of collaborative planning confronts a range of significant obstacles that needs to be addressed in a model for practice. Furthermore, the research findings suggest that the heavy reliance on alternative dispute resolution principles does not always suit collaborative planning settings. There is clearly a significant overlap between the fields, but collaborative planning needs to develop a more robust model to guide practice. This article focuses on the common obstacles faced by stakeholder groups during the direction-setting phase, which is the process of building consensus for action.1 These obstacles were identified through research of twenty stakeholder groups in the United States and Australia. The practical responses used by participants to overcome these obstacles are documented and compared to the literature to help clarify a model that more accurately describes collaborative planning.

I

Abstract Collaborative planning is an interactive process of consensus building and implementation using stakeholder and public involvement. Based on research of twenty case studies in the United States and Australia, the author explores some of the most common obstacles that have confronted stakeholder groups in their effort to build consensus, including contextual, compositional, operational, organizational, ideological, and power and capacity. The case studies reveal a range of responses for overcoming these obstacles and highlight some important distinctions between models of collaborative planning and conflict resolution. The researcher also identifies key questions for stakeholders to use in designing and assessing consensus-building processes.

Richard D. Margerum is an assistant professor in the Department of Planning, Public Policy and Management at the University of Oregon. He was previously on the faculty of the Queensland University of Technology in Australia. He is the author of several articles on collaborative and integrated approaches to environmental planning.

Journal of Planning Education and Research 21:237-253 © 2002 Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning

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䉴 Collaborative Planning Collaborative planning involves interaction in the form of a partnership throughout consensus building, plan development, and implementation (Lowry, Adler, and Milner 1997). For example, Innes et al. (1994, vii) describe it in terms of “long-term, face to face group processes . . . [in which] groups were called together to prepare legislation, policies, plans, regulatory principles, and implementation strategies.” Thus, collaborative decision making requires a process of shared decision making—usually through a group of stakeholders prepared to share information and build consensus (Fulton 1989). The participants in the process typically involve people with a particular interest or stake in the outcome. These stakeholders may include representatives of government, interest groups, and major sectors of the community. In addition to stakeholders, the public is also involved because of their interests—although these interests may be less well defined (Born and Sonzogni 1995). The process of collaborative planning can be broadly classified into three phases (Gray 1989, 57). First, there is a problemsetting phase, in which stakeholders become involved and a convener is established. Second, there is the direction-setting phase, in which the stakeholder group interacts in an effort to reach consensus. Finally, stakeholders work to implement through individual and joint actions. This article focuses on the obstacles to reaching consensus during the problemsetting and direction-setting stages, which I refer to generally as the consensus-building process.

䉴 Collaborative Planning Case Studies In the United States, collaborative planning has been used in growth management planning, environmental planning, and neighborhood planning (Innes et al. 1994; Julian 1994; Moote, McClaran, and Chickering 1997; Selin and Chavez 1995). All of the U.S. case studies examined in the research involved collaborative approaches to addressing environmental management on a regional scale. Most of the case studies were based in the state of Wisconsin, where the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has helped address a range of issues in conjunction with federal agencies, local government, interest groups, and the community. For example, twenty-six stakeholders representing a range of government and nongovernment interests participated in a collaborative effort to plan for the lower Wisconsin River Valley. The stakeholder group, which was coordinated by the Wisconsin DNR, confronted highly contentious arguments about land and recreation management in an area of the state where some local

Margerum

governments have no planning or zoning codes. After eighteen months of consensus building and hundreds of meetings and public forums, the group endorsed a recreation management plan and created a Riverway Board that administers regional land use performance standards. In Australia, collaborative approaches to planning have emerged from rural land and water management approaches. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the states of New South Wales and Queensland initiated catchment management efforts called Total Catchment Management and Integrated Catchment Management, respectively. In both states, a state agency selects a steering group who advertises for committee members and nominates a cross section of stakeholders, which typically includes state agencies, local government, interest groups, and concerned citizens. The committees can access funds for operational expenses, but funding levels did not always keep up with program expenses and some committees had part-time coordinators. One example of a stakeholder committee is the Johnstone River Catchment Committee, which is located in tropical North Queensland (near the city of Innisfail). The Johnstone Committee was appointed in 1991 soon after major areas of rainforest in the region had been nominated for World Heritage protection. Despite antagonism in the community about the World Heritage designation, the committee produced one of the first catchment strategies in the state. The stakeholders have helped develop best practice guidelines for each of the major agricultural industries in the region, sponsored a stream bank restoration program, and worked with local government to develop a new land use plan. These types of success stories are what make collaborative planning an exciting model for practice. However, these successes tend to mask the difficulty of the process and overshadow the cases that have not produced results. Before discussing findings from the case studies, it is also important to briefly compare the contexts for environmental planning in Australia and the United States. Australia operates under a parliamentary system, which grants almost all power to the majority party (whose members almost never cross party lines). Therefore, changes in government can produce significant policy changes (Holland 1996). Also, differences in constitutional process and language and judicial interpretations have produced a much stronger federal role in the United States than in Australia (Holland 1996). The practical implication of this is that Australian federal agencies are usually not involved in most day-to-day environmental decision making, and most of their influence comes through funding incentives. Finally, while Australia is approximately the same size as the lower forty-eight states of the United States, its population of 18.8 million is less than 7 percent of the U.S. population. As a

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Literature Review

U.S. Case Studies

U.S.Research

Preliminary Conclusions

Literature Review Australian Case Studies Australian Research

Revised Hypotheses

Stakeholder Survey Final Conclusions

Figure 1. Research methodology.

result, there are considerably fewer resources at both the federal and state level to support resource management efforts. Despite these differences, the research also revealed many commonalities. The case studies in both countries involved a similar range of stakeholders who encountered similar problems in communicating, resolving conflict, and building consensus. Furthermore, in all of the case studies, the policies and legislation supporting collaborative approaches emphasized coordination across different jurisdictions and partnerships with the community.

䉴 Method The findings reported here are from a series of research projects that focused on a single unit of analysis (stakeholder groups) using multiple case studies, which Yin (1994, 39) refers to as a “Type 3” case study design. This comparative approach makes the conclusions more relevant by allowing an analytical generalization of the findings that are replicated across the case studies (Yin 1994, 46). The cases consist of two clusters, one in the United States and the other in Australia, which were studied in three stages in 1993, 1995, and 1997-98 (see Figure 1). Almost all of the cases involved an extensive process of consensus building leading to an ongoing role for integrated management. Thus, some of these findings may be distinct from collaboration focused on single conflicts or oneoff projects. In a study carried out in 1993, I examined environmental planning case studies in the United States that used a collaborative planning approach (see Table 1). The research focused on cases that had produced outcomes that could be evaluated. For each case study, the research involved interviews with eight to fifteen participants covering issues about case history,

organizational support, coordination, conflict resolution, public involvement, and outputs and outcomes. The semistructured interviews were tape recorded and transcribed into a database for analysis, and each interviewee was asked to complete a written evaluation of communication, coordination, and conflict resolution processes. The published findings of this study identified conclusions and hypotheses about collaborative approaches to environmental management (Margerum 1995). In 1995, the opportunity arose to extend the comparison and test and amplify the previous findings through a yearlong investigation of collaborative-based environmental planning efforts in Australia. This study focused on eleven catchment management stakeholder groups in New South Wales and Queensland (see Table 1). The case studies were chosen largely at random, and the groups had much more mixed results than the U.S. cases. The research involved interviews with coordinators and stakeholders (three to eight participants per case study), reviews of committees’ written records, and observation of committee meetings. Using a checklist of issues identified in the U.S. research, the semistructured interviews explored committee formation, committee operation, roles, constraints, commitment, and achievements. The interviews, which lasted between forty-five and ninety minutes, were recorded in research notebooks, and summary notes were prepared at the end of each interview.2 To test the external validity of the case study findings, a survey was mailed to all participants on twenty-eight of the fortynine catchment committees in New South Wales and Queensland3 (see Table 2). The participating committees included a broad cross section of urban and rural committees as well as coastal and inland groups. The respondents generally reflected the range of interests of most committees, but the response rate of individuals representing government organizations was lower than would be expected. The survey focused on the issues of committee operation, committee support, evaluation of committee efforts, and assessment of participant commitment. The survey also asked open-ended questions about inhibitors and supporting factors. These answers were classified by content and broken down by committee to check for consistency within committees (see Figures 2, 3, and 4). Also, the case study notes and survey data (qualitative and quantitative) for every committee were summarized in a table for analysis.4 In 1997 and 1998, I conducted several new and follow-up case study investigations in the United States and Australia using the same research method and interview protocol. In 1997, I also identified twenty-eight respondents from the 1995 Australian survey who were highly critical of their consensusbuilding process and interviewed twelve of them over the

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Table 1. Case study data at time of analysis. Location

Strategy Complete

Black Earth Creek

Wisconsin

Yes

10

Starkweather Creek

Wisconsin

Yes

8

Lower Wisconsin River

Wisconsin

Upper Wisconsin River

Case Study

Size of Number of Approximate Committee Committees Start Datea b

Notes on Management

Date of Study

1

1985

Managing trout stream with strong stakeholder leadership

1993

b

1

1990

Rehabilitation of small stream by state and local government

1993

Yes

26

1

1986

Managing recreation and development visual impacts

1993, 1997

Wisconsin

Yes

16b

6

1987

Comprehensive response to dam relicensing issues in the region

1993

Milwaukee Riverc

Wisconsin

Yes

8-12

12

1985

Multiwatershed planning for highly altered watershed

1993

Lake Winnebago

Wisconsin

Draft

25

3

1986

Rehabilitation effort for lake with high recreation use

1993, 1997

Upper Mississippi River

Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota

Several

NA

NA

Several

Long-term, multistate efforts for managing impacts of navigation

1993

Lake Tahoe

California and Nevada

Yes

14

1

NA

Long-term, multistate efforts for managing impacts of development

1993

San Francisco Estuary

California

Yes

49b

9

1986

Negotiations over water quality guidelines and management plan

1997

North West

New South Wales

Yes

21

5

1989

Management plan for rich cropping and grazing region

1995

Clarence River

New South Wales

No

18

4

1989

Managing catchment with grazing, fishing, and cropping economies

1995

Georges River

New South Wales

No

21

1

1989

Managing semiurbanized catchment in metropolitan Sydney

1995, 1997

Hacking River

New South Wales

No

18

6

1989

Managing semiurbanized catchment in metropolitan Sydney

1995

Illawarra

New South Wales

Yes

24

5

1989

Managing semiurbanized catchment south of Sydney

1995, 1998

Lockyer Valley

Queensland

Yes

17

4

1990

Managing rich farming country on the edge of metropolitan Brisbane

1995, 1997

Condamine River

Queensland

No

14

1

1994

Managing grazing land in dryland border region

1995

Mary River

Queensland

Draft

21

9

1990

Managing catchment with dairy, gravel, and forestry industries

1995, 1997

Pioneer River

Queensland

Draft

13

3

1993

Managing catchment in rich sugar cane– 1995 producing region

Johnstone River

Queensland

Yes

19

3

1990

Managing catchment with rainforest and sugar cane

1995

Trinity Inlet

Queensland

Yes

5

4

1987

Managing urban inlet with high development and use impacts

1995, 1998

b

b

Note: All information is based on data at the time research was conducted. a. Start dates are estimated for some cases. b. Estimated size: composition or structure varied. c. Project included five parallel subcatchment plans; group size reflects average.

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Table 2. Survey data. 1995 Population

Survey

Responses

New South Wales New South Wales committees New South Wales committees with three or more respondents New South Wales committee members

35 — 690a

20 — 413

20 19 167 (40%)

Queensland Queensland committees Queensland committees with three or more respondents Queensland committee members

14 — 243a

8 — 139

8 7 48 (34%)

Total Total committees Total members Government representatives Nongovernment representatives

49 933a NA NA

28 552 45%b 55%b

28 215 (39%) 31% 69%

a. These are estimates derived by multiplying the mean number of members on surveyed committees in each state by the total number of committees in the state. b. These are estimates extrapolated from mailing lists in which organization affiliation was indicated.

The Committee has made progress because of...

Our committee has been inhibited by...

Member Commitment

Limited resources

Coordinator

Parochialism

Group Consensus Operational problems

Group Communication

State agency commitment

Strategy/Plan

Member ability

Agency Support

Lack of strategy

Leader Commitment

Contextual problems

Sub-group work

Comm. newness

Group Enthusiasm Mutual Respect

Leadership problems

Resources

Local gov. commitment

Committee Credibility Commitment (generally)

Public Partic. Efforts

Group legitimacy

Commit. of Individuals 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Number of responses

Figure 2. Inhibitors to progress identified by Australian stakeholders. Note: Comm. = committee; gov. = government.

Strategic Approach Projects Group as Advocate Council Support 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Number of Responses

phone.5 The purpose of these interviews was to explore the obstacles they identified in their written responses and assess how the obstacles and committee operation had changed over time. As with much qualitative analysis, the complexity of the phenomenon being studied necessitated an iterative approach to the research analysis (Wolcott 1990). This process involved analysis and reanalysis of the case study data, as well as comparison and interpretation using the literature. Table 3 summarizes the major obstacles identified in the research and

Figure 3. Contributors to success identified by Australian stakeholders. Note: Partic. = participation; Commit. = commitment.

the types of data used to analyze these obstacles. The Australian case study research revealed convergence with several findings from the U.S. cases. Some of the findings were compatible with the literature, but other findings revealed differences—particularly differences between collaborative planning and conflict resolution. Other findings from the Australian research revealed new issues or dilemmas that I did

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not identify previously, which led me to reexamine data from the U.S. cases. As with all case study research, the difficulty of data analysis is compounded by the number of variables and the unique issues raised in each case. In presenting the findings from this iterative review and synthesis, I have focused on the findings that are replicated across several cases rather than those that appeared to be unique to just one or two cases.

䉴 Overcoming Obstacles to Consensus Building

Margerum

Shading Represents Percent of Respondents Citing Inhibitor (Only categories with 2 or more responses are shaded)

Committees

Agency Council General Paroch- Member Operacommit commit. commit. ialism ability tion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Strategic

Leader- Resourship ces

n=5 n=7 n=9 n=11 n=11 n=7 n=9 n=10 n=10 n=10 n=8 n=6 n=9 n=9 n=9 n=14 n=6 n=7 n=6 n=5 n=11 n=6 n=5 n=7 n=6 n=4

The research revealed a range of obstacles to consensus building and some effective responses to these Key obstacles. The obstacles are summaDescription of inhibitors rized in Table 4, along with the releCommit = commitment of agencies, councils (local government), and the committee generally Parochialism = parochial views among committee members vant literature that I compared against Member ability = ability and skills among committee members the research findings. This analysis Operation = effectiveness of committee’s operation Strategic = effective strategy or strategic direction and comparison reveals some useful Leadership = leadership within the committee strategies for overcoming obstacles Resource = funding for committee and its operation and highlights some of the characterisExamples of shading tics that make collaborative planning 25% 50% 75% 100% settings distinct from conflict resoluFigure 4. Inhibitors to progress cited by Australian committees. tion settings. Participants in the United States and Australia approached collaborative planning in similar ways and conconservative and liberal governments have rejected nominees fronted similar problems. Therefore, this article does not conwith opposing political views, including nominees put forward centrate on a comparison and contrast between the two by local government councils. The anger among stakeholders countries but analyzes the common obstacles and responses from both ends of the political spectrum was palpable, with sevacross all of the case studies. eral respondents stating that the selection process involved

Selection and Composition The case studies revealed the importance of the stakeholder selection process and composition, which confirmed well-established principles in the literature on clear process, inclusion, and flexibility (Gray 1989; Innes et al. 1994; Carlson 1999). Several New South Wales cases illustrated the problems created by defective processes. The New South Wales catchment management policies emphasized the importance of committee membership that is representative of the range of community interests. However, ministers under both the

“rorting” (Australian slang for fraudulent activity). At least two members on three different New South Wales committees cited this political interference, and the resultant impact on their credibility, as one of their most significant obstacles. Some authors suggest that while inclusiveness is important, large groups will reduce workability (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987; Gray 1989, 68). However, participants emphasized that inclusiveness was a much more important variable than size because of the public nature of the issues. For example, the lower Wisconsin River case involved controversial issues such as land use regulation and recreation management. The open membership rules produced a twenty-sixmember committee, but participants emphasized that it was

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Table 3. Data sources. Obstacle

Data Source

Type of Question

Selection and Case study documents, composition interviews, survey (self-identified obstacles)

Interview: Is the committee representative of the range of interests? Interview: Was the committee selection process appropriate? Interview: Who do you represent on the committee? Survey: Our committee has been inhibited by . . .

Context

Case study documents, interviews, survey (self-identified obstacles), survey (self-identified support)

Interview: Did past history affect the group’s ability to act? Survey: Our committee has been inhibited by . . . Survey: Our committee has made progress because . . .

Operation

Interviews, observation of meetings (Australia), survey (direct questions), survey (self-identified obstacles)

Interview: How well does your committee function? Interview: How does the committee make decisions? Survey: “The committee has adequate resources.” (scale: agree to disagree) Survey: “The committee has been an effective forum for resolving differences.” (scale: agree to disagree)

Organizations

Interviews, observation of meetings (Australia), survey (direct questions), survey (self-identified obstacles)

Interview: How well has your agency supported your participation in this project? Interview: Has your organization provided clear guidance? Survey: “Rank each organization’s level of commitment to the committee.” (scale: very high to very low) Survey: In a few words, describe your role on the committee . . .

Ideology

Interviews, observation of meetings (Australia), survey (direct questions), survey (self-identified obstacles)

Interview: What were some of the conflicts that arose on the committee? How were they resolved? Interview: What has constrained the ability of the committee to operate effectively? Survey: Our committee has been inhibited by . . . Survey: Our committee has made progress because . . .

Power and capacity

Interviews, observation of meetings (Australia), survey (direct questions), survey (self-identified obstacles)

Interview: Has the committee been a useful forum for you? Interview: Does the committee respect different points of view? Survey: “The committee influences the actions of state agencies.” (scale: agree to disagree) Survey: “The committee has developed commonly accepted goals and objectives.” (scale: agree to disagree)

important to allow everyone the opportunity to become involved. Similarly, the San Francisco Estuary case involved forty-nine participants representing a wide range of interests. The Queensland and New South Wales committees had between seventeen and twenty-five members, although their appointment to the committees was more formal. Many committees also had subcommittees addressing such issues as user interests and technical issues (see Table 1). The roles of these subcommittees varied widely. While some acted merely as information exchange forums, others took on major research and management tasks. Besides analyzing information and developing recommendations for the full committee to consider, the subcommittees were also used to expand participation in the collaboration process. The findings also highlighted an issue about the definition of the term stakeholder. In the planning literature, the concept of stakeholder tends to be defined in terms of dispute resolution. Thus, there is a focus on people representing

organizations and interest groups or those with the power to block action (Innes et al. 1994; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). However, five of the U.S. case studies and all of the Australian case studies involved participants who were representative of a certain sector of society but did not belong to any organization or interest group. They were invited to provide substantive citizen input into the decision-making process, as a compliment to other public participation processes. For example, several farmers were asked to participate on the lower Wisconsin Riverway committee, but they did not represent any formal or informal farming organization in the region. Smith, Nell, and Prystupa (1997) argue that interest representation through lobbying, public involvement, and dispute resolution have traditionally been viewed as very different approaches, but the lines between them are blurring. The case study findings suggest that this is particularly true for collaborative planning, which often involves interest groups, lay public, and other stakeholders involved in lobbying, negotiation, policy

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Table 4. Obstacles to consensus building. Obstacle

Authors

Explanation of Obstacle from the Literature

Selection and composition Selection Innes et al. (1994); Susskind and Clear process of selection; flexible process of stakeholder selection Cruikshank (1987); Carlson (1999) Composition Innes et al. (1994); Gray (1989); Need for inclusiveness; need to limit size Lowry, Adler, and Milner (1997) Context Societal-level dynamics Technical complexity Historical barriers Operation Resources

Consensus process

Gray (1989); Whetten and Bozeman (1984) Gray (1989) Gray (1989); Walther (1987); Whetten and Bozeman (1984) Innes et al. (1994); Susskind and Cruikshank (1987); Amy (1987); Carlson (1999) Susskind and Ozawa (1984); Pasquero (1991); Innes et al. (1994); McKearnan and Fairman (1999)

Organizations and interests Political and Gray (1989); Susskind and organizational Cruikshank (1987); Selin and cultures Chavez (1995) Organizational Gray (1989); McCarthy disincentives and Shorett (1984) Ideology Ideological barriers Differing perceptions of problem

Sense of individualism; decisions more difficult if they involve reallocation Technical complexity makes discussion difficult; some parties may not have access to research Bitter historical interaction creates problems; previous ineffective interaction makes it more difficult Need for adequate resources; need for adequately trained facilitator

Most members need to agree; need to recognize interdependency of interests; importance of consensus processes

Elected officials often view consensus as giving up power; short-term views of political system; organizations may not support collaboration; budget cycles may discourage open timelines and discussions Negotiation dilutes mission of advocacy organizations; litigation is a more visible form of intervention; participation drains time and resources; consensus must also be achieved within organizations

Gray (1989); Whetten and Bozeman Constitutional law not well suited to consensus; basic ideological differences (1984); Forester (1999a) Gray (1989) Legitimate differences not acknowledged by all parties; different solution preferences may emerge; perceptions of risk vary

Power and capacity Operational Gray (1989); Amy (1987) capacity Power disparities Gray (1989); Bingham (1986); Amy (1987); Whetten and Bozeman (1984); Susskind and Cruikshank (1987)

Power of managing process; power of understanding process and strategies Power in not collaborating; power in other forums; power of unilateral action; substantial power differentials exist; consensus takes time and therefore resources

creation, and implementation. Therefore, collaborative planning forums will usually be more diverse, more broad based, and more long term than conflict resolution forums.

Context Authors such as Gray (1989) identify a range of context issues that are described as potential obstacles to consensus, including societal-level dynamics, technical complexity, and

history (see Table 5). Although contextual issues were noted in the case studies, they did not stand out as major factors (see Figures 2 and 3). In fact, I found that every case involved societal complexity, technical complexity, and historical barriers. It is seldom mentioned that many of these problems are approached through collaborative forums because they are complex and because more simplistic approaches have not been effective (Born and Sonzogni 1995). This implies that context complexity may often be a condition of collaborative planning.

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Table 5. Findings from Australian written survey (in percentages). Question Our committee has adequate resources. Our committee has been an effective forum for exchanging information. Our committee has been an effective forum for resolving conflict. Our committee functions effectively. My organization has provided me with sufficient guidance on my role on the committee. The committee has done a sufficient job consulting with the public.

n

Strongly Agree

Agree

Not Sure

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

192 194 191 192

2 26 6 9

20 63 35 62

22 5 40 17

42 5 15 9

11 0 1 1

104 192

11 3

48 24

15 32

22 35

2 4

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to non-responses.

Although stakeholders offered a range of views on how to respond to societal issues and technical complexity, the most consistent recommendation was for a strategic and pragmatic approach. In almost every case, participants developed a strategic plan that merged a broad-based view with an action plan. Many of the Australian respondents listed a clear and strategic direction as one of the important contributors to success (see Figures 2 and 3). Groups that had been through more than one plan iteration, such as the Milwaukee River and North West committees, noted that a strategic approach also meant focusing on actions that the group itself had the capacity to solve. These stakeholder groups are unique forums, and their ability to integrate goals and actions is their greatest strength. Therefore, participants needed to look first at their own capacity to leverage action before looking to other solutions (Elmore 1982; Margerum and Hooper 2001). In many conflict resolution settings, there is an alternative forum that participants can access, but in the collaborative planning settings, there was often no other forum for addressing the integrated set of issues. Stakeholders emphasized that plans had to be pragmatic because the complexity of the setting required some concrete actions to build the confidence of the group, generate momentum, and help them determine their role. For example, in the Illawarra region (New South Wales), the committee produced a series of guidance documents on urban stormwater management and site planning that was soon adopted by several local governments as part of their development assessment policies. Similarly, when the issue of an abandoned mill dam arose during the planning process for the Milwaukee River, the private and public stakeholders involved in planning all cooperated to facilitate the removal of the dam, restore the creek, and create a wetland park. For participants, the project

not only produced a visible outcome, it also demonstrated how the collaborative roles they had been discussing in the planning process could work in practice. The literature also emphasizes the historical relationships between participants as a potential inhibitor to interaction (Walther 1987; Whetten and Bozeman 1984). However, I found that this was not as important as some authors suggest. In almost every case study, there was some history of interaction among participants. For example, in the lower Wisconsin River (United States) and Johnstone River (Australia), the collaborative planning effort was preceded by highly public and intense conflicts. While both cases began under a tense atmosphere, many parties welcomed a more collaborative and open process. In case study interviews, many participants viewed the consensus-based efforts as a new opportunity, distinct from past conflicts and management approaches, and a new forum for dealing more constructively with differences.

Operation: Resources Finding resources to support a consensus process is often cited as a critical step (Carlson 1999), but the long-term nature of collaborative planning appears to create unique resource difficulties. A lack of resources was one of the most commonly cited constraints in both the U.S. and Australian case studies. It was the most commonly cited inhibitor among Australian survey respondents, and more than 50 percent of the respondents (n = 157) believed the committee did not have adequate resources (see Table 5 and Figures 2 and 4). Although most stakeholders believed their committee still functioned effectively (see Figure 2), they raised three common concerns related to resources.

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First, participants were concerned that their collaboration efforts would be in vain because there would not be adequate funds for implementation. They expressed doubts about the ability of government stakeholders to commit to the strategies and actions they were developing. In particular, they were concerned about funding ongoing integrated management activities like technical advisory committees, joint databases, and information and education programs. For example, a joint database project developed for the Trinity Inlet brought together data from agencies that had never shared data before, but the joint funding was constantly being scrutinized by the organizations funding the project. Second, Australian participants were concerned about inadequate funding for public involvement during the consensus process. For example, 39 percent of survey respondents believed their committee had done an insufficient job of consulting the public (n = 192) (see Table 5). As discussed below, public consultation was found to be particularly important for U.S. and Australian stakeholders who did not represent formal organizations. The third resource issue was a lack of funding for coordinators, which revealed another distinction from conflict resolution processes. Conflict resolution settings typically involve a trained, independent facilitator or coordinator, who manages group process for a limited period of time. In all but one of the case studies, coordinators carried out both process and content functions during planning and implementation. Participants described their coordinator with phrases such as “the glue that holds the committee together.” They were not simply there to facilitate a process, they were like program managers— an integral part of the institutional history and institutional structure created for consensus building and implementation. Stakeholder committees used a range of strategies to address the issue of resources, but they often faced a catch-22. The interjurisdictional nature of the problems made it difficult to find funding, but when one organization provided funding, there were concerns about bias and control. For example, the coordinators who managed the lower Wisconsin River project were employees of the DNR, which made some participants wary of their role. To avoid this issue, most New South Wales and Queensland catchment committees receive a basic level of operational funding that supports a coordinator and committee operation.6 Alternatively, state government, local government, and a port authority in the Trinity Inlet (North Queensland) all allocated funds at the beginning of each financial year to a management program, which were reallocated for operation and special projects. In summary, the length of the consensus process and ongoing role of the stakeholder group necessitate a long-term commitment to funding.

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Therefore, a one-time allocation of funding that is sometimes described as an approach to convening an alternative dispute resolution process (Carlson 1999) would not be adequate for the types of collaborative planning case studies that I researched.

Operation: Consensus Process It is widely asserted that an effective consensus process requires clear decision rules and constructive conflict management (Susskind and Ozawa 1984; McKearnan and Fairman 1999). Case study participants also emphasized the importance of effective process, but the research revealed that often they struggled to operate effectively by consensus. Interviewees noted that many participants were not familiar with consensus, some participants said it was “too time consuming,” and some elected officials wanted to “put things to a vote.” In the Australian written survey, the third most commonly cited inhibitor related to problems with stakeholder group operation, in particular, consensus decision making and conflict management (see Figure 2). In seven of the nine stakeholder group meetings that I observed, the group had significant difficulty operating by consensus. Similarly, participants in two of the Wisconsin cases complained that their processes for making decisions were never clear. It appeared to them that consensus had been reached and the issue resolved, but then it would resurface again the following meeting. Many committees also encountered problems with resolving conflict. Only about 41 percent of Australian survey respondents believed that their group resolved conflicts effectively (n = 191) (see Table 5). In particular, when observing Australian stakeholder meetings, I noted that groups had problems confronting conflict when it existed. For example, several participants at one catchment committee meeting in Queensland made conflicting statements about a land use strategy, but no one openly acknowledged the conflict or attempted to address the differences. As a result, the discussion circled around the issues and the meeting ended without a clear recognition of the conflict, let alone a resolution. A detailed analysis of forty-four conflicts in the U.S. cases revealed that conflicts that occurred during the consensusbuilding phase were more difficult to resolve than those that occurred during implementation. During consensus building, the conflicts tended to be evenly divided between conflicts involving technical disagreements, interest concerns, and value differences, while those that occurred during implementation included a much higher percentage of technical disagreements.7 This implies that the consensus-building process

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will encounter a higher number of the most difficult types of conflicts, those involving distribution of benefits and costs (interest) and those involving different values. There is a wide range of well-documented techniques to help groups develop effective skills; however, the cases revealed three practical problems. First, some of the paid coordinators involved in the projects did not have the process skills necessary to facilitate the group. At least fifteen of the twenty case study coordinators had their primary training in natural science or engineering, and many of them cited group process skills among their greatest needs. For example, a 1994 survey of coordinators in New South Wales indicated that they wanted more training in process skills such as facilitation, mediation, and communication.8 This tends to reflect the demands by environmental management stakeholder groups for coordinators who have both substantive knowledge and process skills. Second, under the Queensland and New South Wales catchment management structure, the group is led by a citizen member to emphasize its community-based role. In several cases, interviewees raised concerns about the ability of these people to help the committee operate effectively. In the Australian survey, leadership issues were cited as both an obstacle and a reason for progress (see Figures 2 and 3). Therefore, it is important for committee chairs to have facilitation skills or have access to training to develop those skills. As Innes and Booher (1999, 11) indicate, collaborative planning requires a process that is facilitated rather than just chaired. Third, because these groups are ongoing, the membership of most committees changed—often before they reached consensus or produced a plan. Therefore, training for committee members needs to be viewed as a continuous process, which may also be necessary to ensure participants maintain a consensus-based approach. These findings suggest that while the importance of training is emphasized in the literature, in practice it is often not being adequately addressed. It is a significant change from many other decision-making processes, and participants may have to work hard to operate under a consensus-based process. Furthermore, training and support require funding, which is another common shortcoming discussed below.

Organizations and Interests Stakeholder groups confronted several organizational obstacles related to participation. First, government organizations were often criticized for not being adequately committed to collaborative planning efforts (see Figures 2 and 4). The literature cites several reasons for this obstacle, including short-

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term political culture, organizational cultures that do not support collaboration, and institutional disincentives to collaborate (Gray 1989; Selin and Chavez 1995; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). The research did not reveal any clear underlying causes, but the obstacles were manifested in lack of commitment, unclear roles, and inadequate guidance for government representatives. When Australian stakeholders were surveyed about the commitment of some of these government organizations, certain organizations consistently scored better than others. However, there was wide variability in these evaluations—often correlating by region and varying by individual committee. For example, the participants’ evaluations of commitment for one New South Wales agency varied significantly across the state: on one committee, five of the six respondents rated their commitment as “low,” and on another committee, three of the four respondents rated the same organization as “high.”9 Similarly, while the commitment of one bureau within the Wisconsin DNR was praised for their contributions to one committee, the same bureau was criticized for not contributing to another committee. These findings suggest that although organization administrators may support or resist collaboration, there is often considerable discretion at the regional, middle management, and even staff levels. The two most common representation problems were a lack of guidance by the organization for their representative and a lack of understanding by the representative of his or her role in the stakeholder group. When Australian government representatives were asked whether their organization had provided “sufficient guidance” about their role on the committee, only about 60 percent agreed (n = 104) (see Table 5). Similarly, only 50 percent of Wisconsin DNR staff felt their guidance was adequate, while 15 percent believed it was inadequate and 35 percent were not sure (n = 34). Furthermore, many government stakeholders in the United States and Australia referred to their role in terms of “providing expertise,” “advice,” and “technical assistance,” rather than participating in an interactive exchange of information. In the Australian survey, all agency representatives were asked to describe their role. The content of each response was analyzed, and 69 percent of the respondents described their role in terms of a oneway flow of information, while only 31 percent described it in terms of a two-way flow (Margerum 1999). Stakeholder groups generally responded to these obstacles with strategies focusing on the individual rather than on the organization. In some cases, groups sought out people who were personally dedicated. These individuals acted as champions within their organization for the issues being addressed in the stakeholder forum. Groups also relied on facilitation

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strategies to improve team operation and build consensus. However, these approaches did not always generate commitment, so some groups initiated reporting procedures that essentially forced a two-way flow of information. For example, the North West Catchment Committee (New South Wales) literally demanded that agency representatives present a written progress report at each meeting, 10 and the committee reviewed and updated its action plan at each meeting. The second problem common to both government organizations and interest groups is the difficulty of reaching consensus within the organization as well as within the stakeholder forum. Gray (1989) refers to this as the “two-table problem,” and Innes et al. (1994, 17) point out that government agencies themselves often act as consensus groups, which must often resolve policy interpretations internally. As the president of one conservation organization pointed out, she could not commit to major decisions until she consulted her organization, which meant the stakeholder group had to allow adequate time for their decision processes. The consensus-building phases in almost all the case studies took a minimum of eighteen months and some cases more than three years— which was generally much more time than most people anticipated. A final organizational obstacle related to participants who were not representing any organization or interest group. Sixteen of the twenty case studies included concerned individuals who were involved because they were typical of the types of interests in the community (home owner, farmer, boater, etc.). In two of the U.S. case studies, community representatives stated that public participation was essential to ensuring that their views were compatible with the broader community. An environmental representative in one of the U.S. cases explained, “We generally listened to have some idea whether what we were saying jived with the public comments; then we went back to the committee afterwards.” Therefore, consensus building among stakeholders must be intertwined with more broadly based efforts to achieve consensus in the community, which is often not incorporated into conflict resolution models.

Ideology In the U.S. case studies, stakeholders emphasized that it was important for committees to build mutual understanding, develop familiarity with each other, and identify common goals. However, two of the U.S. stakeholder groups confronted some fundamental differences, and Australian participants commonly cited obstacles related to “parochial” views of

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participants in the collaboration process (see Figures 2 and 4). This was a difficult issue to investigate because participants were often reluctant to talk about these differences and because they lumped a variety of issues under a basic term such as parochialism. Using the research data and the literature, I explore three different interpretations of parochialism— which I believe is better described as “ideology.” One perspective about ideology is that it relates to resistance to work collaboratively. Researchers point to factors such as an emphasis on efficiency (time) rather than creativity (problem solving) and individualism that views negotiating as a weakness (Gray 1989). Many agencies and local governments were criticized for their lack of commitment, and both U.S. and Australian agency participants indicated that time was a significant constraint on their participation. However, there was no clear evidence to support or refute the origins of these barriers, and this needs to be explored in greater detail by future research. A second perspective about ideologies revealed in the interviews was that they are caused by a single-issue focus among some participants. For example, participants on four different committees noted that when they set their priorities, some people lost interest because their specific concern was not a high priority. Similarly, some government representatives in both Australia and the United States expressed narrow, programmatic views of management problems and said they only attended meetings when “their issues” were listed. Addressing this obstacle required stakeholders to engage in a learning process about the system they were addressing and how different problems were interrelated. As other studies have shown, participants cited the importance of watershed tours, site visits, creative interaction, and social activities for building trust within the group and developing a common understanding of the systems in question (Gray 1989; Innes and Booher 1999). As one Australian stakeholder wrote, I have been quite surprised to find areas of common concern (i.e., pesticide and herbicide pollution, water conservation, etc.). However, the time taken to do this runs into years and these areas of commonality tend to be discovered on a personal level, and not over the committee table.

I suggest that a third perspective on ideology relates to underlying value differences. In interviews and written responses, the parochial views that participants cited appeared to be differences in personal values toward the natural environment or private property, rather than a limited or narrow view. For example, an Australian environmental representative complained about the conservatism of the traditional farmers and gravel extractors, and a New South Wales farmer wrote that his group was inhibited by extreme “green” views.

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Some authors suggest that when there are basic ideological or value differences, collaborative forums may need to give way to political or legal forums (Amy 1987; Whetten and Bozeman 1984). However, collaborative efforts addressing environmental management are almost certain to involve value differences. When confronted with ideological differences, participants appeared to rely on identifying common goals and then working backwards to determine the range of means for achieving those goals, which is an approach also emphasized by Bryson (1988) and Bührs (1991). At the first meeting of the Johnstone River case, one farmer leaned over to the environmental representative and said, “I don’t like greenies.” However, within a few months, the committee agreed to address several common concerns, and although the two protagonists did not agree on all aspects, they worked closely on several initiatives. The most striking illustration of this occurred in the lower Wisconsin River case, which involved farmers, environmentalists, foresters, recreation interests, and staff from the DNR. Previous failed planning efforts had revolved around proposals to create a park and a federal waterway, but a new effort began with an open agenda. After months of deliberation, the breakthrough came when the participants began to realize that they all had the same goal. They all wanted to maintain the existing qualities of the valley, but they disagreed on how those qualities should be protected. Some farmers argued that private land ethics had maintained these qualities for generations, while others argued that government regulation was required to ensure that a few landowners did not spoil it in the future.11 The lower Wisconsin case study also illustrates an underlying ethical issue that appeared in several other cases and that other authors raise about environmental dispute resolution (Amy 1987). In the lower Wisconsin River case, a land rights organization presented a fairly radical and nonnegotiable position that called for no government involvement in land use planning or management. The group could be dismissed as self-interested, but the same criticism was directed to Australian environmental representatives who called for government intervention into tree clearing. How should a stakeholder group respond to a strongly held minority viewpoint, and at what point does deliberation become unreasonable pressure? The option for individual interests is to seek out alternative forums, which is what the land rights group did in the lower Wisconsin River case.12 An option for stakeholder groups is to develop strategies and tools to fully explore these value differences (Forester 1999a). For example, participants in the Lake Winnebago project were able to agree about a number of management actions despite different values about recreation and resource management. Another option for stakeholder groups is to focus on areas of agreement. For example, two

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committees in New South Wales have chosen to focus on education campaigns and information-sharing networks, largely because they have not been able to reach consensus on other issues. A final option is to use complete consensus as a decision rule, which protects minority views. This is discussed in more detail in the next section.

Power and Capacity Power was an important issue in the case studies, including the power of managing the process, the power of knowledge and information, the power of not collaborating, and the power of autonomous decision making. One category of power relates to the capacity to influence process through the control of agendas, information, and persuasiveness (Amy 1987; Gray 1989). For example, stakeholders involved in several of the Wisconsin cases were concerned about the overinfluence of the DNR because of its wide range of powers, expertise, and resources. Similarly, a community representative on a New South Wales committee expressed concern about the power of government departments and industry organizations to influence the process: At first glance, it would appear that citizen members have better than equal representation on the committee; but in practice this is often not the case because their attendance is not always certain and they are not paid, but mainly because representatives of government departments have much greater access to office assistance, photocopying, printing, and research. Hence, they can drive agendas with superior presentation, leapfrogging and squeezing out some citizen-initiated items.

The second category of power is the ability to mobilize, influence, and organize action or resistance through stakeholder constituencies (Amy 1987; Bingham 1986; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). This form of power is substantially more complex to address. Concerns about this form of power were most commonly expressed by minority interests, such as environmental representatives. For example, an Australian community representative noted, The committee has allowed a cross section of power brokers in the district to meet with the few environmentally concerned groups and provide some reasonable working conditions, but it is my clear impression that the cane growers and executive are there to make sure their plans are not significantly compromised.

The literature offers a range of views about how to respond to these power differentials during consensus building. Selin and Chavez (1995) suggest that consensus building is inhibited when significant power differences exist among the par-

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ties. While Gray (1989) agrees that major inequities will deter collaboration, she suggests that parties involved in consensus building will not be equal in power. Three types of strategies from the literature are considered in turn and compared to the case study research.

Stakeholder Cost-Benefit Analysis Several authors emphasize that consensus building is one of several options that stakeholders must weigh before entering into the process. Innes et al. (1994, 20) suggest that stakeholders must evaluate these power differentials in a kind of cost-benefit analysis, before they enter into the process. Similarly, Fisher and Ury (1981) argue that stakeholders must assess the range of actions available to them, including the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. The case studies suggested two difficulties with this approach to stakeholder assessment under collaborative planning. First, this kind of assessment may be problematic for some participants. For example, one person listed on an Australian committee as a representative of bushwalkers did not maintain regular communication with his own group: “I really should meet with the bushwalking club prior to catchment committee meetings, but I haven’t been able to find the time to get together with them” (26 April 1995, notebook 3). While skilled representatives would communicate regularly with their group and be able to evaluate the process, many participants do not have the skills, experience, or time. Second, because many of these efforts begin with reasonably open agendas, it is very difficult for stakeholders to carry out a cost-benefit analysis. Amy (1987) warns about the potential for environmental mediation to “seduce” inexperienced participants, and collaboration could be even more susceptible to this abuse. Therefore, some of these participants will depend heavily on the actions of the coordinators and chairs, which are discussed below.

Power Sharing A number of authors argue that consensus building requires a kind of power sharing that will produce a stalemate. Gray (1989, 119) suggests that stakeholder groups are successful when they have “mutually authorized each other to reach a decision.” Similarly, McCarthy and Shorett (1984, 13) suggest that “power parity is reached when each interest group is unable to impose its proposed solution on the other affected parties.” The parties must in some way become dependent on each other. In Amy’s (1987) review of environmental

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mediation, he suggests that participants may have to be forced into power stalemates to resolve their differences. The critical issue for the practice of collaborative planning is how interdependence and power stalemates are created. One way of promoting power sharing is through complete consensus on decision making. It is argued in the literature that consensus is important for effective process and to ensure that a substantial minority is not ignored, but many authors suggest that complete consensus is not required (Innes et al. 1994; Susskind and Ozawa 1984). The common concern is that a unanimity rule may result in the group being “held hostage to their most demanding and inflexible member” (McKearnan and Fairman 1999, 366). About 48 percent of Australian participants said they operated by general consensus, 50 percent said they operated by complete consensus, and 2 percent said they operated by voting (n = 189). Similarly, an analysis of forty-four different conflicts in the U.S. cases revealed that participants used a range of voting and consensus processes. However, the few case study committees that did adhere to complete consensus clearly fostered a greater balance of power. For example, participants in the upper Wisconsin River project operated by complete consensus to decide on dam relicensing issues, and unresolved issues were left to be decided by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Both government and nongovernment participants commented that the unanimity rule lent considerable strength to individual viewpoints, and the potential clout of complete consensus in front of federal regulators encouraged participants to work together. The Johnstone River (Queensland) committee also operated by consensus from the beginning and developed several projects that are used as models across the state, but they also reached a stalemate on a wetland modification proposal. For almost one year, the committee debated the issue at committee meetings and special forums until they agreed to disagree.13 Although a majority of the committee was composed of farming interests who supported the proposal, the committee respected the opposition of environmental representatives and did not produce a position on the proposal. The conflict resolution literature would probably describe this as a failed project and suggest that the “overwhelming support” for the proposal should override the minority view (McKearnan and Fairman 1999, 366). However, viewed as a long-term, multidimensional forum for collaborative decision making, the group has been very successful. The chief weakness of the unanimity rule is that some groups have found so few areas of agreement, they have been limited to education and informationsharing roles. The chief strength is that complete unanimity requires participants to give equal merit to all options. The case studies also suggested that power sharing may require a deliberate effort on the part of powerful organiza-

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tions. Government agencies in particular may need to be encouraged to give up some of their autonomy in exchange for increased respect and support. For example, in three Wisconsin case studies, participants were particularly impressed with the way the DNR used stakeholder and public input to shape the plan. A participant in the Lake Winnebago plan noted, When I first moved here people just hated the DNR. . . . People felt they were power hungry. [In the Lake Winnebago Plan] it felt like DNR was part of it, but they did not dominate. I have not heard near the anti-DNR sentiment as when I first got here. It seems to be a more cooperative atmosphere.

Clearly, this kind of regional power sharing approach must be balanced against broader goals and legislative mandates.

Coordinators and Chairs The literature notes that coordinators and committee chairs play an important role in ensuring a balanced and ethical approach (Sullivan 1984; Susskind and Ozawa 1984). The case study and survey research revealed that coordinators and chairs are very influential in collaborative planning, and this influence appears to be greater than indicated in the literature. Most of the U.S. stakeholder groups were led by an agency coordinator who ran the meetings and administered the group. In four of those cases, participants specifically cited their role as one of the most important factors to helping achieve a balanced deliberation. In the Australian survey, leadership and coordinator issues were commonly listed as both inhibitors and contributors to success (see Figures 2 and 3). U.S. and Australian interviewees emphasized that coordinators and chairs not only managed the meetings and guided the planning process, they had fundamental influences on how well the group operated. Two comments from Australian survey respondents illustrate these subtle and not-so-subtle influences and confirm the need for training of these important leaders: [Our committee is inhibited by:] the chairman is also a real estate agent who has allowed his personal bias to influence his actions, like speaking on behalf of the committee without prior consultation. [Our committee is inhibited by:] the chairman: does not support community consultation; protects interests of his industry (cane and dairy); pushes funding for farmers only; lack of knowledge of environmental impacts; strong dislike for environmentalists and land care groups; instigator of disharmony and disruption of discussion.

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Clearly, these coordinators and chairs wield considerable influence that far exceeds the leadership roles in most alternative dispute resolution models. Because this approach is so prevalent, future research needs to explore these roles and influences in greater detail.

䉴 Concluding Remarks The findings from this research reinforce suggestions over the past several years that effective communication, collaboration, and interaction are important prerequisites to effective planning practice (Forester 1989; Friedmann 1973; Innes 1996). However, collaborative planning needs to continue to refine and elaborate on a model of planning practice to ensure appropriate responses. Several new contributions are offered here, but several areas require additional study. The research revealed several important distinctions between collaborative planning and conflict resolution. First, the goal in defining the stakeholder group is not just to involve direct interests like a negotiation exercise but also to involve the array of indirect interests like in a public participation exercise. Second, the more open agenda of a collaborative planning effort allows a wider range of potential outcomes but also makes it difficult for potential stakeholders to assess whether they want to participate. Third, the longer time frame of most collaborative planning efforts requires an ongoing commitment of resources to both facilitate and participate in the process. Finally, because the stakeholder groups themselves often become part of the institutional arrangements, coordinators become a much more integral part of the process than the independent facilitators and mediators who are typically used in conflict resolution cases. In the introduction to their handbook on consensus building, Susskind, McKearnan, and Carpenter (1999, xix) distinguish between ad hoc forums and permanent groups. However, many of the case studies appeared to fit into a third model—permanent forums. Clearly, collaboration and conflict resolution still share many commonalities, but these subtle differences suggest that a collaborative model of planning is distinct. The research also revealed a range of responses that may assist stakeholder groups in overcoming the obstacles to consensus building. Although these obstacles and responses are clearly not universal, they were prevalent in a range of case studies, which suggests that they are likely to be common in collaborative planning. I believe these obstacles and responses lead to several key questions for stakeholders involved in a collaborative planning process:

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• To what extent does this stakeholder group involve not only

• • • • • • •

those people with direct interest in the issues but also represent the array of indirect interests that exists in the community? Are the stakeholders committed to learn about their environment and the different perspectives on that environment? Are the stakeholders willing to search for common goals and able to agree to an array of strategies that will address those goals? Is there a long-term commitment of resources to maintain the stakeholder group and facilitate participation with the broader community? To what extent are the stakeholders willing to only move forward when complete consensus is reached? To what extent are the people representing government and nongovernment organizations willing to work to gain the commitment of their organization? Do the coordinators and chairs have the inclination and ability to fairly facilitate the committee using consensusbased decision making? To what extent are powerful stakeholders willing to give up power to gain collaborative outcomes?

While there are many other questions that stakeholders need to consider in collaborative planning, I believe that these questions help reveal some of the core issues that can be used in assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of process. For individual stakeholders, these questions provide an ongoing reference for assessing their personal roles and the value of the stakeholder forum. For stakeholder groups, the questions provide the basis for an explicit evaluation of their consensusbuilding efforts. Author’s Note: This research was funded by grants from the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and the Australian-American Fulbright Commission. Support was also provided by the Centre for Water Policy Research, University of New England, Australia. The author would also like to thank Dr. John Minnery and all of the editors and reviewers for their constructive comments.

䉴 Notes 1. Margerum (1999) discusses the difficulties of implementing collaborative plans once consensus is reached. 2. The interviews were not tape recorded because interviewees offered more candid responses when they were not being recorded. All interviewees were promised anonymity. 3. Every committee in Queensland and New South Wales was contacted to participate in the survey, but some committees did not respond. 4. This document is not included due to space limitations. 5. An attempt was made to contact all twenty-eight respondents, but the other sixteen could not be contacted or did not want to be interviewed.

6. These funds have traditionally been allocated by a state agency, but funding levels have not always kept up with demand for coordinators. More recently, the federal government began providing additional funding through the Natural Heritage Trust. Committees such as the Mary River and Illawarra also receive some local government funding for operational expenses. 7. This distinction of conflict types is based on Lord (1979): conflicts during planning phase: 28 percent technical, 36 percent interest, and 36 percent value; conflicts during implementation: 58 percent technical, 21 percent interest, and 21 percent value. 8. This was an unpublished survey of catchment coordinators carried out by the New South Wales Department of Land and Water Conservation. 9. The overall distribution of responses for the New South Wales agency was as follows: 11 percent rated it as very low, 14 percent as low, 27 percent as moderate, 33 percent as high, and 14 percent as very high (n = 70). 10. At the two-day meeting attended by the author, the chairman admonished several agency representatives for not submitting reports. He told them to dictate a report to their secretaries over the phone that afternoon and have it faxed back in time for the committee to consider the next morning. 11. The final proposal involved a joint local-state Riverway Board that administers visual and habitat performance standards. 12. Although they generated considerable interest among state and local elected officials, the exhaustive stakeholder and public consultation efforts used in the lower Wisconsin process created strong support for the final proposal. When local and state elected officials called for hearings, a range of farmers, local landowners, recreationists, and environmentalists spoke in favor of the proposal, which was adopted with minor changes. 13. The meeting minutes showed that the committee argued about the issue at almost every meeting for almost one year. The committee initiated discussions and data-collection efforts, but it could not reach consensus on a position.

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