Collective Bargaining and the Structure of Wages in New Member States Iga Magda, David Marsden yand Simone Moriconiz August 2008; preliminary and incomplete, do not quote
Abstract In this paper we analyse the relation between collective bargaining and wages in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. By using the national samples from the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) 2002, we analyse the e¤ect of industry level and …rm level agreements on average wages and at di¤erent points of the wage distribution. We …nd that in the Czech and Polish manufacturing sector, sectoral agreements reduce wages at the top of the distribution while …rm level agreement create a wage premium at the bottom of the distribution. In Slovakia, both sectoral and …rm level agreements reduce wages of unskilled workers which may be consistent with unions pursuing employment rather wages maximisation.
1
Introduction
It is widely acknowledged by the literature (both theoretical and empirical) on the e¤ect of unions on wages that a wage premium may result as the outcome of a wage bargaining between employees’and employers’representatives when the former have some power in the bargaining process (Freeman and Medo¤ [23]).1 The way such a mechanism shapes the wage distribution within a country, Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and PhD student at Warsaw School of Economics, E-mail:
[email protected] y
Center for Economic Performance,
London School of Economics and Political Science.
E-mail:
[email protected]. z
SEMeQ, Universita del Piemonte Orientale and Center for Economic Performance, London School of Economics
and Political Science. Email:
[email protected]. 1
There are a number of other indirect channels through which unions may a¤ect wage outcomes thus leading to
a di¤erential with the non union sector. First they may limit downward wage ‡exibility relatively to the uncovered
1
depends on factors such as the position of unionised workers in the wage distribution and the union premium attached to di¤erent types of workers (Bryson [7]). A usual conclusion from the literature on collective bargaining and wages is that, since unions typically pursue standardisation by enforcing a ‘equal pay for equal work’ policy and since unionised workers are concentrated at the lowest end of the wage distribution, unions tend to compress the wage structure (see Blau and Kahn [4], Card et al. [10]). A related topic concerns the analysis of how institutional features of the system of collective bargaining in a country, such as the degree of centralisation and coordination a¤ect the structure of wages. In this respect, the Anglo -Saxon model where bargaining takes place only at the company level is usually compared to the European one, where in a multi-level fashion, sectoral and national bargaining provide the wage ‡oor for further negotiations at the company level while the presence of an uncovered sector is generally negligible (see Freeman and Medo¤ [23], Blanch‡ower and Bryson [5] and Card et al. [10] for the Anglo-Saxon model; Dell’Aringa and Lucifora [12], Hartog et al. [26] and Card and de la Rica [9] for the European model). Much less is known of di¤erent systems where sectoral and …rm level bargaining coexist and their e¤ect may be assessed relatively to the common benchmark provided by the presence of an uncovered sector. In this paper we refer to the alternative ‘model’ of collective bargaining provided by Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland using data from the national samples from the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) 20022 , a matched employer -employee dataset gathering information on salaries and personal, job and …rms characteristics. We focus on these countries since they lie ‘somewhere in between’Anglo-Saxon and Western European countries; Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland in fact present a system of decentralised collective bargaining, with a prevalence of company agreements but with relevant shares of sectoral agreements (especially in Slovakia) and of uncovered …rms. Accordingly, we …rst analyse the e¤ect of industry level and …rm level agreements on average wages. To gain more insight on the e¤ect of collective bargaining at di¤erent points of the wage distribution, we then analyse the e¤ect of collective bargaining on wages in each quintile.3 sector in times of hardship. Second, they limit entry in the covered sector thus increasing labour supply and reducing wages in the uncovered one. Finally they may even exert some threat e¤ects on the non-union sector inducing uncovered …rms to pay higher wages. See Bryson [7] for a review. 2
2004 in case of Poland:
3
A causal interpretation of the relations between unions and wages is di¢ cult due to problems of endogeneity and
2
Our …ndings are as follows; in private …rms, industry level agreements in Czech Republic and Poland reduce wages at the top of the wage distribution while a wage premium is associated with …rm level agreements at the bottom of the distribution. In Slovakia both sectoral and …rm level agreements reduce wages in the …rst two quintiles of the wage distribution in the private sector while a clear negative impact of industry bargaining on wages emerges in the public sector only for women. In Poland, the wage reduction at the top of the distribution associated with industry level agreements is present also in the public sector. Our interpretation of these results relies on di¤erent objectives of unions in these countries; in the Czech Republic and Poland unions may pursue income redistribution towards unskilled workers while in Slovakia they may pursue higher employment of unskilled workers rather than higher wages. Of course caution is needed in stressing these results which may be in‡uenced by self-selection of …rms in bargaining regimes. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the existing literature on the e¤ect of union on wages; in section 3 we describe the main institutional features of systems of collective bargaining in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland; in section 4, we brie‡y describe our dataset, introduce some preliminary statistics, and provide the results of our empirical analysis; in section 5 we interpret the results obtained in the light of the institutional features of the countries analysed. Section 6 concludes.
2
Existing Literature
Up to our knowledge, in the extensive literature on collective bargaining and the structure of wages there are not speci…c contributions on New Member States in the European Union. The literature can indeed be grouped into two big strands. The …rst focuses on Anglo-Saxon countries and started with the 1984 book from Richard Freeman and James Medo¤ [23]. They …nd a wage premium associated with the presence of unions in the US in the 1970s (and to a lesser extent in the 1980s) and show that its magnitude varies depending on workers and markets characteristics. Blanch‡ower and Bryson [5] update their analysis and …nd evidence of a decreasing omitted variable bias. In this paper we control for unobservable characteristics of individuals while we do not control for unobservable …rm characteristics (see Bryson [7] for a review).
3
trend in the union wage premium in the private sector during the 1990s with still a big variation across skill levels, age and sex. Card et al. [10] analyse the impact of unions on the structure of wages in Canada, UK and US using microdata over the period 1970-2000. They …nd that, while unions have an equalizing e¤ect on the dispersion of wages across skill groups for men, they (at least) do not reduce wage inequality for women. The second strand of the literature refers to EU countries. Dell’Aringa and Lucifora [12] study the impact of …rm level contracting on wages using a sample of manufacturing plants in Italy while Hartog et al. [26] focuses on the case of Netherlands. Cardoso and Portugal [11] …nd that …rmspeci…c arrangements in Portugal may help to overcome the equalizing policy pursued by unions and reinforce the impact on wages of worker and …rms attributes. More recently, Plasman et al. [36] study the impact of …rm level agreements on wages in Belgium, Denmark and Spain. They …nd that …rm-level bargaining reduces wage dispersion in Spain while increases it in Denmark and Belgium. Opposite results are obtained by Card and de la Rica [9] who …nd a positive wage premium associated with …rm-level contracting in Spain. They in particular …nd a larger wage premium for higher wage groups suggesting that the adoption of …rm level bargaining is associated with a more ‡exible process of wage determination. Dell’Aringa and Pagani [13] focus on the impact of …rm level bargaining on wage dispersion in Spain, Belgium and Italy. They …nd that in very corporatist countries such as Italy and Belgium …rm level bargaining does not increase wage inequality while their evidence is mixed for Spain. Magda and Szydlowski [33] analyzing data from the Polish Structure of Earnings Survey in 2006 found a positive wage premium associated with supra-…rm agreements and a negative one for …rm-level bargaining. The premiums were higher in the private sector. Kohn and Lembcke [32], …nally, study the wage structure in Germany in three wage settings that are prevalent in the country (industry level, …rm level and employee level contracting) and …nd that collective bargaining leads to higher wage level and reduced wage dispersion.
4
3
Institutional Setting in New Member States: a new ‘model’of collective bargaining?
The New Member States of the European Union present very typical features in terms of both collective bargaining systems and industrial structure. Collective bargaining in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland mixes elements of Anglo-Saxon countries with some typical features of Western European countries.4 Union coverage is low, singlelevel with low centralisation and coordination (Table 1).5 While there is also some role for sectoral agreements in these countries, its relevance should not be overemphasized for a number of reasons (EIRO, 2002a,b); the term sectoral, in these countries may refer to either multi-employer agreements signed by a number of individual employers and the relevant trade unions or to proper sectoral agreements. Multi-employer agreements are widely used by private companies and generally do not allow for extension mechanisms. Accordingly, unless they are signed by employers with a dominant position in the market, such agreements cover only a small segment of the sector. Proper sectoral agreements instead, are generally negotiated by …rms that are (or used to be before the wave of privatisations occurred during the nineties) under the public control and allow for extension mechanisms. Accordingly they cover extensively the sector where they are negotiated. Furthermore, sectoral and multi-employer agreements generally take the form of recommendations not binding in nature and whose actual implementation depends on the mutual recognition by the social partners themselves (EIRO 2002a). For these reasons, only proper sectoral agreements negotiated by traditionally strong social partners are likely to be more e¤ectively enforced. There are several doubts concerning the scope and e¤ective enforcement for enterprise level agreements as well. First of all, since social partners do not have any obligation to conclude such agreements in Czech Republic and Slovakia, negotiations are absolutely voluntary. Secondly, 4
Collective bargaining in EU countries is generally multi-level with predominant sectoral agreements and …rm level
agreements building upon them. Extension mechanisms extend collective agreements in countries such as Spain and Italy to all employees within a …rm covered by the agreement thus rendering bargaining coverage nearly universal (EIRO 2005). In the Anglo-Saxon model instead negotiations take place exclusively at the enterprise level, and a relatively modest share of workers are e¤ectively covered by an agreement (Card et al., 2004). 5
The measures of Coordination Centralisation reported in table 1 refer to the 1-5 OECD Scale provided by OECD
(1994a, 2004).
5
both content and procedures of enterprise level negotiations generally re‡ect an unbalanced power relationship toward the employers that reduces the e¤ective enforcement of measures favourable to employees (EIRO 2002a). In Poland, for example, since 2002 a …rm or a supra- level agreement can be suspended for 3 years, in case of a …nancial hardship of the employer. Within these broad common lines, these three countries present very di¤erent systems of collective bargaining (Table 1). Collective bargaining in the Czech Republic is highly decentralised, union power is very weak, union coverage and coordination are low. The Slovakian model is much closer to the Western European one, with the predominance of sectoral level agreements, higher union coverage and a better coordination of collective bargaining. The di¤erence between Czech Republic and Slovakia is even more striking considering that, up to 1993, the two systems were re-united into the federal Czech and Slovak Trade Union Confederation (CSKOZ) who included the two largest trade unions in the two countries6 . When the CSKOZ was abandoned as a consequence of the break up of Czechoslovakia in 1993, trade unions systems developed independently in each country. In particular, the Slovakian KOZ SR maintained its representative power for almost all sectoral and branch trade unions (particularly in the service sector, health and education) due to its close social partnership with the Slovakian government (Svorenova [38]). Conversely a process of decentralisation started in the Czech Republic. During the nineties, this process led to the reduction of the number of Unions a¢ liated to the CMKOS7 and to the development of so called ‘umbrella groups’enabled to conduct sectoral or multi-employer bargaining. Poland in that respect is closer to the Czech Republic, with low levels of centralisation and coordination. However, the coverage of collective agreements is higher whereas the union density much lower. Wage bargaining takes place mainly at the …rm level, and a great majority of supralevel agreements function in the public sector, while their role in the private sector remains rather marginal. The transition to a market economy during the nineties deeply in‡uenced the industrial structure of Central European Countries. During this period, various waves of privatisations led to a decise reduction of public ownership, a big growth of the service sector and a deep restructuring of 6
These were the Czech and Moravian Trade Union Confederation (CMKOS) and the Confederation of Trade
Unions in the Slovak Republic (KOZ SR). 7
These were 40 in 1990 and decreased to 33 in 2004.
6
several branches of the manufacturing sector.
8
Di¤erences concern also the development of em-
ployers’organisations, with Czech Republic and Poland characterised by pluralism in that respect (European Commission [21]). Privatisations and …rms restructuring may have favoured declining trends of unionisation during the nineties. Unionization in Poland has fallen from above 80 to less than 14 per cent, a level much lower than in most of the Western European States. Here, only the large privatised companies remained unionised while in medium and small ones (up to 250 employees) the trade union representations have practically dissapeared (conversely, trade unions are presents in 50 - 75 per cent of state-owned SMEs). In general, the newly created enterprises in the CEE o¤er little formal institutionalisation of labour relations (such as trade union recognition and signing collective agreements), also many foreign investors are not in favour of such agreements (European Commission [21]).
9
Overall, the processes behind the decline in trade union membership have been similar in all transition countries - decreasing employment in the traditionally unionized sectors (mining, metallurgy etc.), shift to the much less unionized employment in small and medium companies, in the service sector. They were also associated with a declining attractiveness and prestige of trade unions and their marginalization among the less skilled, blue-collar workers (Gardawski [25]). 8
Big di¤erences exist between countries, with Poland and Czech Republic characterised by a relatively faster
transition than Slovakia (Fidrmuc et al. [22], Hughes and Hare [27], Bennett et al. [2]). In the Czech Republic two quick waves of mass (i.e. at a ‘zero’ price) privatisations took place in 1993 and 1994. In Slovakia, conversely, several waves of ‘full price’ privatisations took place during the nineties which have much less e¤ective than mass privatisations at favouring industrial restructuring (Bennett et al. [2]). 9
For example in Poland, very few of green-…eld investments with Polish capital became unionized (approximately
5 per cent), whereas unions are present in one third of new …rms with foreign capital and do not exist in smaller ones (Gardawski [25]). In fact, this outcome was predicted by Freeman, who in his 1992 work suggested that unions in the CEE undergoing transition would become weak and fragmented, concentrated in the public sector, with little or no unionism growing in the private sector.
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4
Empirical Analysis
4.1
Data and descriptive statistics
We use data from The European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) 200210 , a matched employer -employee dataset gathering information on salaries, personal, job and …rms characteristics for the 2002. The Czech and Slovakian samples include respectively 1030982 and 419715 observations for establishments of all sizes11 in the manufacturing, construction, and trade and service sector. The Polish sample includes 609764 observations for establishments with at least 10 employees in agriculture, industry, and service sector (NACE A - O). For convenience, we exclude from the sample establishments with less than 10 individuals and covered by ‘any other type of bargaining’such as agreements of individual professional groups that fall within a wide range of economic activities (Eurostat, 2003). We focus on the manufacturing sector to reduce the ’noise’created by the privatisation which led in these countries to the complete restructuring of many areas of the economic activity mainly in the service sector. After the exclusion of these observations, our sample size reduces to 203725 observations for the Czech Republic, 86735 for Slovakia and 168248 for Poland. We use as our wage measure a monthly wage de…nition which considers gross wages in the reference month including bonuses and excluding overtime work. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for workers in the manufacturing sector by type of collective agreement (industry, …rm level agreement, or no agreement). The comparison of data in the …rst, …fth and ninth column of Table 2 shows that workers in Slovakia and Poland are relatively younger and more educated. Poland has a relatively small share of women, whereas a bigger percentage of Czech workers are white-collar. Slovak workers are most likely to be employed in …rms with more than 250 employees. Big di¤erences exist in the composition of the workforce covered by sectoral agreements or not covered by any agreement (Table 2: columns 3-4, 7-8). In the Czech Republic half of the workers covered by a sectoral agreement are women employed prevalently in …rms with less than 500 employees. Industry level agreements in Slovakia instead cover a majority of men distributed uniformly between …rms of all sizes. Similar …gures hold for uncovered …rms. Finally notice that 10
for Poland we use data from the Structure of Earnings Survey 2004, by Polish Central Statistical O¢ ce.
11
The Czech Data do not include observations for establishments with less than 10 employees.
8
average tenure of workers is rather similar between Czech Republic and Slovakia while it varies quite a lot between occupational groups. Managers and Technicians are characterised by the higher average tenure while service workers are the least tenured. Interestingly enough, relevant di¤erences exist between bargaining sectors. Average tenure is generally more than 10 years in …rms covered by …rm level agreements while it is under 10 years for uncovered …rms. In Poland workers covered by the industry agreements are on average older, better educated and have longer tenures, with a prevalence of men and employees on permanent contracts. They are also more likely to work in large companies belonging to the public sector, on managerial and technical positions. The largest di¤erences concern however not the …rm and industry bargaining but the fact of being or not covered by any sort of agreement. Firms with no bargaining are much smaller, have higher shares of women, younger employees and those on …xed term contracts and have a prevalence of private capital. Table 3 presents means and standard deviations of log monthly wages for men and women in the manufacturing sector in the three countries. Columns (1)-(2), (5)-(6) and (9)-(10) show the unadjusted sample moments in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland while columns (3)-(4), (7)-(8) and (11)-(12) report the moments obtained applying the re-weighting technique by Di Nardo et al. [14] to re-adjust the distribution of the observed characteristics for each bargaining sector back to the overall distribution.12 In the Czech Republic, workers covered by …rm level agreements display higher average wages and less wage variability than workers in …rms covered by sectoral agreements or uncovered. Also in Slovakia …rm level agreements are associated with higher average wages but also with a higher variability than sectoral agreements or no agreements. Firms covered by sectoral agreements present lowest average wages and variability. In Slovakia sectoral agreements are associated with the lowest wages for men while uncovered …rms pay lower wages to women. The application of the re-weighting technique emphasizes that higher wages are associated with …rms covered by …rm level bargaining and reduces the di¤erence between uncovered …rms and …rms covered by industry bargaining. In Poland, workers covered by agreements enjoy higher wages and lower variability than those 12
DiNardo et al. (1996) estimate the relative probability that a worker with given characteristics is employed in
the overall sample and in a given sub-sector and use this probability to re-weight workers that are under or over represented in the subsector. This same procedure is used by Card and de la Rica (2006)
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not covered at all. In case of men, average earnings are higher if they are covered by …rm level agreements, whereas in case of women higher wages are associated with industry level bargaining. The re-weighting technique changes this relation and strengthens the advantage of wages under …rm-level bargaining compared to the industry level. However, contrary to Slovakia and Czech Republic, there remains a substantial gap in earnings of those uncovered by any form of agreement.
4.2
Empirical framework
Our empirical strategy closely follows the one from Card and de la Rica [9]. We assume the following model of earnings for worker i at establishment j: wij = Xi +
ij
+ ai +
ij ;
(1)
where wij is the log hourly wage of individual i, Xi is a set of observed job and workers characteristics,
ij
represents the wage premium of worker i at workplace j, ai is an unobserved skill
component while
ij
is a stochastic error component. We further assume that wage premium of
employee i at workplace j is explained by the following model:
ij
= Xj + f irmj ' + indj + Zj +
(2)
j
where Xj are the average characteristics of all the workers in the workplace, Zj is a set of …rm characteristics (size, type of control, sector etc..) while f irmj and indj are two dummies that indicate that the lowest level where bargaining takes place is the …rm (f irmj ) or the sector (indj ). ij ,
…nally, is an unobserved …rm-level error component. Substituting (2) in (1) we obtain the
following model for individual wages: wij = Xi + Xj + f irmj ' + indj + Zj + ai +
ij
The main focus of our analysis is on the coe¢ cients ' and
+
j;
(3)
for the impact of …rm level agreement
and sectoral agreements respectively on wages. As extensively explained by Card and de la Rica [9], ' and OLS if ai and
j
could be consistently estimated by
were uncorrelated with f irmj and indj . However, since this is not generally the
case due to the omission of unobservables correlated with the bargaining status, our estimates would include the true e¤ect as well the bias factor arising from both workers and …rms heterogeneity. In 10
order to control for workers heterogeneity we follow the methodology proposed by Card and de la Rica [9] and use the information about the personal characteristics of the workers within each …rm to derive the average characteristics of co-workers (i.e. workers in the same …rm and in the same skill group). This methodology relies on the assumption that, due to regularities in the recruiting behaviour of …rms within each broad occupational groups, workers with higher unobserved skills tend to have co-workers with higher average skill levels. Accordingly, by controlling for the average characteristics of coworkers, we can control for unobserved workers characteristics. Notice that a likely correlation between our dummies for collective bargaining and
j
may lead
to an underestimation or overestimation of the true ' and . This selection problem in the New Member States is strongly related to the Transition process. As a matter of fact, this process led to a restructuring of the industrial sector and to the decentralisation of collective bargaining. Old and mostly ine¢ cient …rms who were previously covered by collective agreements were either forced out of the market and replaced by uncovered and more e¢ cient …rms or were restructured and moved to a more decentralised structure of collective bargaining or to an organisational structure without union representation. Accordingly, ‘bad’…rms which did not go through these processes in the New Member States today are probably more likely to be covered by sectoral bargaining. Conversely, the selection of …rms covered by company level bargaining is a priori ambiguous: if the ‘restructuring e¤ect’ prevails over the ‘decentralisation e¤ect’, we may have a selection of bad …rms under decentralised bargaining as well. However, if the latter e¤ect prevails, ‘good …rms’ may be covered by …rm level agreements. The net outcome is unpredictable on a theoretical basis and needs to be veri…ed empirically.
4.3
Estimates for average wages
Table 4 presents the estimates of three di¤erent models for individual wages of men in the manufacturing sector for …rms under private and public control in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland while Table 5 presents the same set of estimates for women. The …rst model simply includes two dummies for …rm level and industry level agreements. The second model adds personal characteristics (age, education, job contract) as well as …rms characteristics (dummies for establishment size
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and occupation). In the third model (columns 3 and 6) we control for unobserved workers ability by adding the average characteristics of the workers employed in the same …rm and occupational group. Notice that all models are estimated by weighted least squares, using the sampling weight for each worker as a weight; standard errors are clustered at the …rm level. Columns 1 to 3 of Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the estimates for the Czech Republic. Industry level agreements have a negative impact on average wages in the public sector while …rm level agreements do not have any impact on average wages. Results from the three sets of estimates in Slovakia (Tables 4,5, columns 4 to 6) evidence a negative impact of sectoral agreements on average wages, particularly for men and women in the private sector (Tables 4a, 5a). When we compare estimates from the three models we notice that, once we account for …rms characteristics (model 2) and characteristics of coworkers, the coe¢ cient of the sectoral agreement dummy becomes more signi…cant and bigger in size. Apparently being covered by a …rm level agreement does not have any impact on wages in the private sector (Tables 4a, 5a) while has a negative impact on wages of women employed in the public sector. In Poland, there is a clear negative impact of sectoral agreements on female earnings in the public sector (Table 5a) while the coe¢ cients for women in the private sector and for men in both sectors are insigni…cant. Overall, results from this …rst set of estimates shows a negative impact of sectoral agreements on average wages while …rm level agreements do not have any clear impact on wages. These results open at least two interpretations; the …rst one stems from a likely selection of bad …rms under collective bargaining. This selection problem may lead to overestimating the real negative impact of industry level agreements on average wages; on the other it can underestimate any wage premium which is associated with …rm level agreements. The second interpretation leaves aside selection issues and considers the fact that unions may represent speci…c workers types (blue collars vs. white collars; skilled vs. unskilled); accordingly the absence of any impact of unions on average wages would hide the fact that such e¤ect is concentrated at speci…c points of the wage distribution.
4.4
Quintiles of the wage distribution
Results in Tables 4 and 5 leave us mostly unsure about the actual impact of collective bargaining on the structure of wages. In this section, we check whether results described in the previous section
12
hide a di¤erent behaviour of unions at di¤erent points of the wage distribution. We divide the wage distribution in quintiles and estimate the three models described above in each quintile for private as well as state owned …rms. Since employees are not randomly assigned in each quintile, results from simple quintile regressions would probably su¤er from a problem of endogeneity. To control for this, we estimate (separately by gender) ordered probit models that predict the probability of a given employee being included in each quintile of the distribution. We then use the predicted probabilities as weights in the quintile regressions (see Card and de la Rica [9]). Table 6 and 7 describe the results from these regressions. In the Czech private sector …rm level agreements produce a wage premium at the bottom of the male wage distribution which ranges between 2.4% to 3%; moreover, at the top of the male wage distribution, sectoral agreements entail wages which are from 11% to 14% lower than the ones in uncovered …rms (Table 6a). Estimates for women and in the public sector present similar coe¢ cients both in sign and size although signi…cance is generally much lower. Results for Slovakia are signi…cantly di¤erent from the Czech ones. In the private sector, …rm and sectoral agreements have a negative impact on wages in the lowest two quintiles of the Slovakian wage distribution for both men and women. In the bottom quintile, male wages in …rms covered by decentralised agreements, are around 2% lower than those in uncovered …rms; male wages in …rms covered by sectoral agreements are more than 10% lower than in uncovered …rms (Table 6a). The negative coe¢ cients for women are even bigger in size than their male counterparts (Table 7a). In the public sector unions seem to be associated with lower wages at the bottom of the wage distribution while a wage premium seems to arise at the top of the distribution (Tables 6b, 7b). These last results however should not be overemphasized since the coe¢ cients are often not signi…cant. In Poland …rm level agreements play a role mainly in the private sector, where earnings of both male and female workers in the top of the distribution are 3 to 10% lower compared to uncovered workers. Male wages are compressed also in the bottom: …rm agreements raise them by 1 to 3%. Sectoral agreements also compress wages in the upper part of the distribution and the result is particularly strong for men in the public sector, since their wages are decreased by 30 to 34%
13
in relation to their uncovered counterparts. The wage penalty for men in the private sector is much smaller, between 6 and 18% whereas the coe¢ cients for women, although also negative, are insigni…cant. Furthermore, sectoral agreements seem to diminish wages of male workers in the bootom quintile in the private sector.
4.5
Interpretation of results and selection issues
We now interpret the results of our econometric analysis in the light of the institutional features of each country. In the Czech Republic industry level agreements reduce wage levels at the top of the distribution while a wage premium is associated with …rm level agreements for workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. The combination of these two forces suggests that unions in Czech Republic may have some preference for income redistribution. In Slovakia, collective agreements (both at the sectoral and the …rm level) have a negative impact on wages at the bottom of the wage distribution. This …nding, puzzling at a …rst sight, may suggest that unions objective in Slovakia is employment rather than wage maximisation for unskilled workers. In Poland, similarly to the Czech Republic, both …rm and industry agreements seem to compress the wage distribution, which would also suggest that the trade unions negotiating these agreements aim at introducing pay schemes which favour lower wage inequalities. Of course caution is needed in stressing some of these results since their complete reliability is hindered by selection issues. In particular, selection of bad …rms in the unionised sector may amplify any negative e¤ect of unions on wages; conversely, the existence of a wage premium of …rm level bargaining at the bottom of the wage distribution seems to be a robust result since selection of less productive …rms in the unionised sector in this case would work in the opposite direction; accordingly our results are likely to underestimate the true e¤ect of …rm level agreement on wages13 . Finally note that the analyses carried upon …rms in the private sector are relatively less vulnerable to selection than estimates for the public sector: being the former relatively less protected from market forces it is likely to show a more e¢ cient production structure. 13
As stated before this result may be driven by self-selection of more productive …rms under …rm level bargaining.
However such a conclusion would be more consistent with a wage premium at the top rather than at the bottom of the wage distribution.
14
5
Conclusions
In this paper we analysed the alternative ‘model’ of collective bargaining provided by Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. We focussed on these three countries since they present a system of (prevalently) single-level collective bargaining, with a majority of company agreements but with relevant shares of sectoral agreements (especially in Slovakia) and of uncovered …rms. We analysed the e¤ect of industry level and …rm level agreements on average wages and at di¤erent points of the wage distribution. We found that in private …rms, industry level agreements both in Poland and Czech Republic reduce wages at the top of the wage distribution while a wage premium is associated with …rm level agreements at the bottom of the distribution. In Slovakia both sectoral and …rm level agreements reduce wages in the …rst two quintiles of the wage distribution in the private sector while no clear pattern emerges in the public sector. In Poland, the wage penalty in the top quintile associated with sectoral agreements is present also in the public sector. We interpret these results by suggesting that unions in these countries may have di¤erent objectives; in the Czech Republic and Poland unions may pursue income redistribution towards unskilled workers while in Slovakia they may pursue higher employment of unskilled workers rather than higher wages. Of course caution is needed in stressing these results which may be in‡uenced by self-selection of …rms in bargaining regimes.
Acknowledgements This work bene…ts of the …nancial support from the project on the Study and Conference on European Labour Market Analysis using Firm-level Panel Data and linked Employer-Employee Data in collaboration with the Employment DG of the European Commission (contract No. VC/2006/0046). We acknowledge Eurostat and the National Statistical O¢ ces of Czech Republic and Slovakia for data access to their national samples of the European Structure of Earnings Survey 2002. To ensure the anonymisation of data for con…dentiality reasons, the research has been conducted using the LISSY System of remote access to the microdata stored at Eurostat in Luxembourg. We acknowledge Tanvi Desai for excellent technical support; we are also particularly grateful to Alex Bryson, Tor Eriksson, Paolo Ghinetti, Francois Rycx, Alessandra Tucci, Hipolito Simon, Till Von Wachter, the participants to the LEED project and the participants and the or-
15
ganisers of the Aarhus School of Business lunch seminar for precious suggestions and discussions. All the remaining errors are our own.
References [1] Basu, S., Estrin, S. and J. Svejnar (2004) ‘Wage Determination under Communism and in Transition: Evidence from Central Europe’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1276; [2] Bennett, J., Estrin, S., Maw J. and G. Urga (2004) ‘Privatisation Methods and Economic Growth in Transition Economies’, Nota di Lavoro 105.2004; [3] Capek A. and W. Sazama (1993) Czech and Slovak Relations, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol 45, No.2, pp 211-235; [4] Blau, F. and L.M Kahn (2002) ‘At Home and Abroad: US labour market performance in international perspective’, New York: Russell Sage; [5] Blanch‡ower, D and A. Bryson (2004) What e¤ect do unions have on wages now and would Freeman and Medo¤ be surprised?, Journal of Labour Research, Vol. 25, no. 3, 383-414; [6] Brada, J., King A.E. and C.Y. Ma (1997) Industrial Economics of the Transition: Determinants of Enterprise E¢ ciency in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 104-127.; [7] Bryson A., The E¤ect of Trade Unions on Wages, Re‡ets et perspectives de la vie économique 2007/2-3, Tome XLVI, p. 33-45.; [8] Card, D., (1996) ‘The e¤ect of unions on the structure of wages: a longitudinal analysis’, Econometrica, 64(4): 957-979; [9] Card D. and S. De la Rica (2006) ‘Firm-level contracting and the structure of wages in Spain’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 59, No.4 (July): 573-592; [10] Card, D. Lemieux, T. and W. C. Riddel (2004) ‘Unions and wage inequality’, Journal of Labour Research, Vol. 25, no. 4, 519-562; 16
[11] Cardoso, A. and P. Portugal (2003) ‘Bargained Wages, wage drift and the design of the wage setting system’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 914, Bonn, IZA; [12] Dell’Aringa, C. and C. Lucifora (1994) ‘Wage dispersion and unionism: do unions protect low pay?’ International Journal of Manpower, 15(2/3): 150-169; [13] Dell’Aringa, C. and L. Pagani (2006) ‘Collective bargaining and wage dispersion in Europe’, British Journal of Industrial Relations 45:1 March 2007 pp. 29-54; [14] DiNardo, J., Fortin, N. and T. Lemieux (1996) ‘Labour Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: a Semi Parametric Approach’, Econometrica, Vol. 64, No. 5 (September), pp. 1001-44; [15] EFILWC (2004a) ‘Social dialogue and con‡ict resolution in the Czech Republic’; [16] EFILWC (2004b) ‘Social dialogue and con‡ict resolution in Slovakia’; [17] EIRO
(2002a)
‘Industrial
Relations
in
the
candidate
countries’,
http://www.eiro.eurofund.ie/2005/03/; [18] EIRO (2002b) ‘Industrial Relations in the EU member states and candidate countries’, http://www.eiro.eurofund.ie/2005/03/; [19] EIRO
(2005)
‘Changes
in
national
collective
bargaining
systems
since
1990’,
http://www.eiro.eurofund.ie/2005/03/; [20] Eurostat (2003) Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) for the year 2002 - Eurostat’s arrangements for implementing the Council Regulation 530/1999 and the Commission Regulation 1916/2000"; [21] European Commission (2002) ‘Industrial Relations in Europe’; [22] Fidrmuc J., Horvath J. and J. Fidrmuc (1999) Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons from the break up of Czechoslovakia, Transition Economics Series, No.10, July; [23] Freeman, R.B. and J.L. Medo¤ (1980) ‘What do unions do?’, New York: Basic Books, 1984;
17
[24] Freeman R., (1992) ‘What direction for labour market institutions in Eastern and Central Europe?’, NBER Working Paper No 4209, Cambridge, NBER; [25] Gardawski J. (2002) ‘ Spadek poziomu uzwiazkowienia w Polsce’, Polskie Centrum Monitorowania Stosunko Przemyslowych, Instytut Spraw Publicznych; [26] Hartog J., Leuven E. and C. Teulings (2002) ‘Wages and the bargaining regime in a corporatist setting: the netherlands’European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 18, pp. 317-31; [27] Hughes, G. and P. Hare (1994) The International Competitiveness of Industries in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 46, No.2, pp.200-221; [28] OECD (1994a) ‘OECD Employment Outlook, 1994’. Paris: OECD; [29] OECD (2004b) ‘OECD Employment Outlook, 2004’. Paris: OECD; [30] Keune M. (2006) Collective Bargaining Systems in Europe: a Schematic Overwiev, ETUIREHIS: Brussels; [31] Koenig (1999) Bringing diverging paths back together, Science, New Series, Vol. 283, No. 5398, January, pp. 25-26; [32] Kohn K. and Lembcke A. (2007) ‘Wage distributions by bargaining regime: linked employeremployee data evidence from Germany’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 813; [33] Magda I. and Szydlowski A., (2008), ‘Wages in micro and macroperspective’, in: Employment in Poland 2007, ed. by M. Bukowski, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; [34] M• unich, D., Svejnar, J. and K. Terrell (1998) ‘WThe worker …rm matching in Transition Economies: (Why) are the Czechs more succesfull than others?’ The William Davidson Institute Working Paper, No. 107; [35] Pavlinek, P. (1995) Regional Development and the Disintegration of Czechoslovakia, Geoforum, Vol. 26 (4) pp. 351-372;
18
[36] Plasman, R., Rusinek, M. and Rycx, F. (2006) ‘Wages and the bargaining regime under multilevel-bargaining: Belgium, Denmark and Spain’, IZA Discussion Paper 1990, Bonn, IZA; [37] Russel, H. and H. Simon (2006) ‘The gender pay gap: New Evidence from International Matched Employer-Employee Data’, (mimeo); [38] Svorenova, M (2000) ‘The development of trade unions in Slovakia during the last decade’, South-East Europe Review S.131-142.
19
Tables
Table 1: Collective Bargaining Institutions in Accession Countries Czech Republic
Slovakia
Poland
Coverage Rate
25% - 30%
50%
41 -50 %
Union Density
30%
40%
single/multi level bargaining
sl
sl/ml
15% sl
centralisation
1
2
1
coordination
1
2
1
12
55
136 multi-employer agreements, 8 "proper' sectoral
na
50%
< 10 %
collective agreements at the sectoral level
number of agreements coverage rate (% of labour force)
meaning of "sectoral"
multi -employer/ suprafirm level (private sector) or proper sectoral (public sector)
effective enforcement
low
multi -employer/ supra-firm level (private sector) or proper sectoral (public sector) low
trade unions
trade unions
collective agreements at the enterprise level organisms entitled to sign agreements Source EIRO, 2002ab, OECD, 2004, Keune 2006
20
multi -employer/ suprafirm level
low trade unions
Table 2: firms characteristics by collective agreement (manufacturing sector) Czech Republic
Slovakia
Poland
all firms
firm level
industry level
no bargaining
all firms
firm level
industry level
no bargaining
all firms
firm level
industry level
no bargaining
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
Age Distribution under 30 30 -44 45- 55 0ver 55
21.7 34.9 31.7 11.7
20.3 34.0 32.8 12.8
24.9 36.3 30.1 8.8
23.6 36.6 29.5 10.3
24.2 40.9 29.1 5.8
19.7 40.8 32.4 7.1
22.4 41.7 30.2 5.7
31.8 40.8 23.8 3.6
24.9 43.2 27.2 4.6
20.2 43.5 31.1 5.1
19.8 41.2 33.9 5.1
31.2 42.8 22.0 4.0
Education Distribution primary secondary university
14.3 75.5 10.2
14.8 74.1 11.1
15.5 76.0 8.6
12.6 78.8 8.6
10.8 77.1 12.1
11.3 77.2 11.5
7.6 77.9 14.4
10.7 76.7 12.7
10.5 77.8 11.6
11.2 77.2 11.6
8.1 78.1 13.8
9.9 78.6 11.5
share of females
39.5
35.7
50.9
43.7
40.8
39.2
36.5
44.4
34.6
32.9
31.5
36.9
share of permanent
84.7
85.8
84.6
81.8
85.2
88.7
73.6
82.3
69.5
76.7
78.4
60.0
establishment size distribution E10_49 E50_249 E250_499 E500_999 E1000
11.2 37.0 13.7 17.5 20.5
2.0 30.5 13.9 23.0 30.6
8.5 54.2 19.3 13.2 4.8
35.9 45.4 10.7 5.7 2.4
11.2 27.3 12.3 15.6 33.5
1.9 25.2 12.8 18.9 41.2
0.0 29.6 29.0 11.8 29.6
28.5 30.2 7.9 11.2 22.2
18.7 35.3 16.5 13.8 15.8
9.1 33.7 18.7 17.5 20.9
15.8 27.5 15.3 9.2 32.2
30.9 37.7 13.7 9.3 8.4
Public control
6.2
8.8
3.2
0.9
5.1
7.3
7.5
1.0
9.6
14.5
38.4
2.0
Occupation Distribution Managers and Technicians Clerical Workers Service Workers Skilled manuals Elementary occupations
25.8 3.5 1.7 63.8 5.2
26.9 3.3 1.4 63.0 5.5
23.1 3.1 0.8 68.2 4.8
24.2 4.2 3.0 63.9 4.7
21.6 3.5 2.2 66.1 6.6
22.4 3.4 2.1 65.6 6.6
22.7 4.2 2.2 66.2 4.7
20.1 3.5 2.5 66.8 7.0
21.8 5.6 2.1 62.8 7.6
23.0 5.7 1.8 62.1 7.5
26.7 7.0 4.1 56.1 6.1
20.2 5.5 2.5 64.1 7.9
Average tenure by occupational group Managers and Technicians 11.1 Clerical Workers 9.3 Service Workers 6.5 Skilled manuals 9.3 Elementary occupations 8.6 Total 9.7
12.8 11.3 8.8 11.3 9.6 11.5
9.2 7.5 6.8 6.8 6.6 7.3
7.4 6.1 3.8 5.8 6.7 6.2
10.1 8.9 6.6 8.4 8.0 8.7
12.9 10.4 9.0 10.8 10.0 11.2
9.5 11.1 4.4 8.7 10.4 8.9
5.2 6.2 4.1 4.6 4.5 4.7
10.3 9.6 5.5 8.7 7.5 9.0
12.7 12.2 7.1 11.0 9.4 11.3
14.7 12.4 4.5 12.7 11.2 12.8
6.6 6.0 4.1 5.7 5.1 5.8
Source: ESES 2002
Table 3: log monthly wages (mean and standard deviation) by type collective agreement (manufacturing sector) Czech Republic
Slovakia
Poland
Standardized Mean log Standard wage deviation Mean log Standard wage deviation
Standardized Mean log Standard wage deviation Mean log Standard wage deviation
Standardized Mean log Standard wage deviation Mean log Standard wage deviation
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
a) Men firm level industry level no bargaining
9.76 9.69 9.74
0.40 0.42 0.48
9.79 9.65 9.66
0.36 0.45 0.44
9.82 9.63 9.85
0.44 0.40 0.43
9.90 9.60 9.83
0.41 0.36 0.42
7.62 7.54 7.45
0.52 0.48 0.56
7.73 7.62 7.36
0.48 0.50 0.55
b) Women firm level industry level no bargaining
9.46 9.32 9.43
0.36 0.34 0.38
9.51 9.29 9.34
0.31 0.32 0.36
9.46 9.41 9.38
0.42 0.42 0.34
9.59 9.41 9.29
0.40 0.32 0.36
7.40 7.45 7.25
0.49 0.49 0.51
7.52 7.50 7.14
0.49 0.48 0.46
Note: standardized mean and standard deviations are obtained using the tecnhique from Di Nardo et al. (1996) Source: ESES 2002
21
Table 4a - Collective Bargaining and the structure of wages in the manufacturing sector (private ownership) - Men Czech Republic [1] firm level agreement
[2]
Slovakia [3]
[4]
-0.035 0.006 0.027 0.029 industry level agreement -0.010 0.004 0.034 0.032 education (secondary) 0.113 ** 0.102 ** (base: primary) 0.011 0.010 education (tertiary) 0.433 ** 0.396 ** (base: primary) 0.018 0.014 age 0.003 ** 0.004 ** 0.000 0.000 fixed-term contract -0.043 * -0.043 * 0.021 0.022 e50_249 0.069 * 0.055 0.031 0.039 e250_499 0.054 0.028 0.035 0.041 e500_999 0.111 ** 0.071 0.038 0.045 e1000 and more 0.183 ** 0.122 * 0.051 0.048 average characteristics of coworkers in the same firm and occupational group education 0.044 ** 0.014 age -0.037 ** 0.009 proportion of under 30 -0.643 ** 0.247 proportion of over 55 0.092 0.194 proportion of female -0.196 ** 0.043 constant 9.678 ** 9.061 ** 10.663 ** 0.021 (0,031) (0,392) 4 occupational dummies R-squared Observations significance: ** 1%; * 5%; + 10%
0.035 0.028 0.034 0.036
0.049 0.083 -0.126 + 0.073
9.701 ** 0.063
Poland
[5]
[6]
-0.043 0.059 -0.200 0.060 0.115 0.026 0.368 0.039 0.005 0.001 -0.063 0.034 0.031 0.057 0.160 0.067 0.164 0.066 0.329 0.087
-0.001 0.042 -0.165 0.050 0.117 0.020 0.354 0.031 0.006 0.001 -0.078 0.038 -0.036 0.065 0.083 0.067 0.088 0.066 0.219 0.086
** ** ** ** +
* ** **
8.966 ** 0.069
0.035 0.029 -0.054 0.015 -0.962 0.359 0.834 0.495 -0.304 0.089 11.382 0.634
[7]
**
0.136 ** -0.02 0.034 -0.082
** ** ** *
**
[8] -0.004 -0.014 -0.037 -0.056 0.088 -0.008 0.454 -0.014 0.007 0 -0.206 -0.01 0.203 -0.017 0.313 -0.023 0.286 -0.026 0.449 -0.029
** ** ** ** ** ** **
** + ** **
7.45 ** -0.013
6.721 ** -0.025
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
0.001 203725
0.353 203725
0.393 197130
0.011 86735
0.293 86735
0.322 84562
0.020 94706
0.410 94706
22
**
**
no
standard errors clustered by firms (brackets)
[9] -0.004 -0.014 -0.032 -0.056 0.047 -0.006 0.362 -0.01 0.007 0 -0.194 -0.01 0.217 -0.017 0.336 -0.022 0.312 -0.026 0.459 -0.028 0.284 -0.034 -0.009 -0.002 -0.284 -0.057 0.095 -0.07 -0.194 -0.025 6.695 -0.131 yes 0.430 94706
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
** ** **
** **
Table 4b - Collective Bargaining and the structure of wages in the manufacturing sector (public ownership) - Men Czech Republic [1] firm level agreement
[2]
Slovakia [3]
0.100 -0.128 0.063 0.111 industry level agreement -0.123 * -0.368 0.049 0.116 education (secondary) 0.107 ** 0.080 (base: primary) 0.017 0.016 education (tertiary) 0.379 ** 0.318 (base: primary) 0.029 0.029 age 0.004 ** 0.005 0.000 0.001 fixed-term contract -0.058 -0.066 0.039 0.025 e50_249 -0.344 ** -0.113 0.040 0.063 e250_499 -0.212 ** 0.051 e500_999 -0.105 0.076 0.071 0.077 e1000 and more -0.019 0.181 0.080 0.076 average characteristics of coworkers in the same firm and occupational group education 0.105 0.049 age -0.037 0.027 proportion of under 30 -0.238 0.900 proportion of over 55 0.360 0.550 proportion of female -0.493 0.158 constant 9.416 ** 9.263 ** 10.829 0.051 0.058 0.286 4 occupational dummies R-squared Observations significance: ** 1%; * 5%; + 10%
0.423 ** 0.069 0.089 0.087
no
yes
yes
0.056 30195
0.417 30195
0.459 29883
[4] 0.037 0.145 0.012 0.100
**
[6]
0.214 0.159
0.213 0.140
-
** ** * +
*
** ** +
** **
* *
** 9.682 ** 0.063
**
no 0.001 5990
standard errors clustered by firms (brackets)
23
[7] 0.169 * -0.08 -0.01 -0.097
0.068 0.046 0.354 0.077 0.006 0.002 0.158 0.087 0.143 0.204 -0.385 0.181 -0.885 0.166 -0.070 0.158
**
Poland
[5]
9.160 ** 0.107
0.049 0.051 0.359 0.076 0.006 0.001 0.127 0.076 0.133 0.168 -0.372 0.191 -0.944 0.177 -0.065 0.148
** **
+ **
-0.095 0.091 -0.099 * 0.055 -1.861 0.362 2.199 0.283 -0.119 0.207 13.803 ** 1.678
7.613 ** -0.076
[8]
[9]
0.102 -0.089 -0.135 -0.111 0.034 -0.017 0.368 -0.034 0.011 -0.001 -0.179 -0.035 0.09 -0.097 0.192 -0.101 0.186 -0.106 0.335 -0.103
0.093 -0.077 -0.142 -0.098 0.018 -0.012 0.338 -0.022 0.011 0 -0.188 -0.031 0.079 -0.084 0.192 -0.089 0.185 -0.096 0.305 -0.094
* ** ** **
+ + **
6.778 ** -0.121
0.12 -0.129 -0.024 -0.008 -0.29 -0.249 1.048 -0.251 -0.208 -0.083 7.666 -0.425
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
0.488 5990
0.516 5903
0.020 16509
0.340 16509
0.370 16509
** ** **
* + **
**
** * **
Table5a - Collective Bargaining and the structure of wages in the manufacturing sector (private ownership) –Women Czech Republic [1] firm level agreement
[2]
Slovakia [3]
[4]
-0.027 -0.011 0.029 0.029 industry level agreement -0.039 -0.020 0.037 0.035 education (secondary) 0.051 ** 0.046 ** (base: primary) 0.009 0.008 education (tertiary) 0.381 ** 0.308 ** (base: primary) 0.015 0.013 age 0.003 ** 0.004 ** 0.000 0.000 fixed-term contract -0.013 -0.036 0.025 0.024 e50_249 0.085 ** 0.099 * 0.032 0.041 e250_499 0.094 * 0.104 * 0.044 0.048 e500_999 0.141 ** 0.117 * 0.040 0.048 e1000 and more 0.248 ** 0.195 ** 0.048 0.052 average characteristics of coworkers in the same firm and occupational group education 0.080 ** 0.011 age -0.015 * 0.006 proportion of under 30 0.124 0.189 proportion of over 55 -0.021 0.164 proportion of female -0.219 ** 0.047 constant 9.356 ** 8.930 ** 9.436 ** 0.023 0.034 0.319
9.339 ** 0.024
4 occupational dummies R-squared Observations significance: ** 1%; * 5%; + 10%
0.073 ** 0.029 -0.034 0.039
0.069 0.053 0.000 0.064
Poland
[5]
[6]
-0.021 0.042 -0.098 0.056 0.106 0.031 0.425 0.034 0.007 0.001 0.031 0.039 0.025 0.057 0.174 0.068 0.134 0.062 0.194 0.064
-0.019 0.044 -0.099 0.055 0.115 0.033 0.404 0.038 0.008 0.001 0.034 0.041 -0.030 0.063 0.109 0.073 0.055 0.069 0.117 0.069
+ ** ** ** **
* * **
8.778 ** 0.083
0.036 0.020 -0.049 0.016 -1.006 0.374 -0.058 0.566 -0.323 0.071 11.113 0.729
[7]
+
0.128 ** -0.021 0.183 + -0.096
** ** **
+
[8] -0.001 -0.016 0.059 -0.076 0.034 -0.008 0.388 -0.014 0.006 0 -0.176 -0.012 0.173 -0.017 0.268 -0.024 0.277 -0.025 0.435 -0.032
** ** ** ** ** ** **
** **
** **
7.243 ** -0.014
6.711 ** -0.026
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
0.014 135095
0.332 135095
0.388 129761
0.007 61400
0.312 61400
0.350 58990
0.020 50479
0.450 50479
24
**
+
no
standard errors clustered by firms (brackets)
[9] -0.008 -0.015 0.053 -0.078 0.009 -0.006 0.292 -0.012 0.006 0 -0.165 -0.011 0.165 -0.017 0.253 -0.022 0.251 -0.024 0.381 -0.031 0.242 -0.029 -0.008 -0.002 -0.212 -0.051 0.123 -0.069 -0.251 -0.021 6.841 -0.12 yes 0.470 50479
** ** ** ** ** ** **
** ** ** + ** **
Table 5b - Collective Bargaining and the structure of wages in the manufacturing sector (public ownership) –Women Czech Republic [1] firm level agreement
[2]
Slovakia [3]
[4]
0.007 0.096 0.110 0.088 industry level agreement -0.162 -0.181 + 0.098 0.099 education (secondary) 0.041 * 0.037 * (base: primary) 0.019 0.016 education (tertiary) 0.390 ** 0.322 ** (base: primary) 0.035 0.035 age 0.002 + 0.003 ** 0.001 0.001 fixed-term contract -0.077 * -0.069 * 0.036 0.030 e50_249 -0.212 * -0.058 0.092 0.078 e250_499 0.003 -0.012 0.129 0.074 e500_999 0.061 0.123 e1000 and more 0.043 0.020 0.140 0.069 average characteristics of coworkers in the same firm and occupational group education 0.118 ** 0.030 age -0.066 ** 0.020 proportion of under 30 -1.161 0.748 proportion of over 55 0.587 0.431 proportion of female -0.413 ** 0.132 constant 9.206 ** 9.217 ** 12.007 ** 0.041 0.111 0.953
9.440 ** 0.134
4 occupational dummies
no
R-squared Observations significance: ** 1%; * 5%; + 10%
0.320 ** 0.073 0.026 0.059
no
yes
yes
0.064 11163
0.390 11163
0.504 10853
0.045 0.152 0.075 0.170
-0.377 0.054 -0.497 0.097 0.085 0.035 0.445 0.067 0.006 0.001 0.198 0.082 0.604 0.068 0.306 0.038
[6] **
standard errors clustered by firms (brackets)
25
-0.562 0.067 -0.684 0.105 0.071 0.032 0.424 0.061 0.006 0.001 0.186 0.080 0.655 0.077 0.335 0.081
** * ** ** * ** **
-
0.002 3603
Poland
[5]
** **
[7]
[8]
[9]
0.088 -0.078 0.003 -0.099
0.022 -0.057 -0.242 -0.098 0.002 -0.026 0.362 -0.047 0.012 -0.001 -0.185 -0.039 -0.011 -0.071 0.023 -0.086 0.147 -0.078 0.253 -0.087
0.019 -0.053 -0.248 -0.091 -0.009 -0.024 0.316 -0.028 0.012 -0.001 -0.171 -0.04 -0.052 -0.081 0.003 -0.091 0.11 -0.084 0.194 -0.092
* ** ** * ** **
0.594 ** 0.048
0.668 ** 0.058
8.824 ** 0.086
-0.026 0.048 0.008 0.045 0.347 0.982 1.235 0.217 0.156 0.223 8.462 ** 1.143
7.492 ** -0.066
*
** ** **
+ **
6.703 ** -0.095
0.198 -0.117 -0.009 -0.008 -0.238 -0.184 0.83 -0.219 -0.23 -0.08 6.979 -0.433
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
0.470 3603
0.475 3469
0.010 6554
0.410 6554
0.450 6554
**
** ** **
*
+
** ** **
Table 6: collective bargaining effect on wages by wage quintile (weighted by the probability of being in each quintile) manufacturing sector, (men) Q1
Q2
Q3 Firm level agreement
Q4
Q5
Q1
Q2
Q3 Q4 Industry level agreement
Q5
a) private ownership Czech Republic Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
0.030 ** 0.011 0.025 * 0.012 0.024 + 0.012
0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003
0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002
0.000 0.005 -0.006 0.004 -0.003 0.005
-0.118 + 0.068 -0.109 0.069 -0.084 0.064
0.019 0.020 0.014 0.019 0.012 0.018
-0.007 0.004 -0.008 + 0.004 -0.006 0.004
0.002 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003
0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.006
-0.021 0.016 -0.034 * 0.017 -0.031 + 0.016
-0.002 0.004 -0.006 0.004 -0.009 * 0.005
-0.002 0.010 -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.004
-0.001 0.014 -0.006 0.013 -0.002 0.007
0.036 0.097 0.014 0.038 -0.021 0.038
0.026 ** -0.002 0.013 ** -0.005
0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003
0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
0.009 ** -0.001 0.003 -0.003
0.012 * -0.005
-0.004 -0.003
-0.002 -0.002
0.003 -0.003
-0.135 + 0.070 -0.116 + 0.066 -0.118 + 0.062
-0.054 0.038 -0.068 + 0.035 -0.074 + 0.039
-0.003 0.004 -0.008 0.005 -0.011 * 0.005
-0.010 0.010 -0.012 0.009 -0.008 0.005
-0.024 * 0.012 -0.021 0.014 -0.016 0.013
0.086 0.100 -0.033 0.060 -0.048 0.058
-0.084 ** -0.009 -0.076 ** -0.019
-0.014 * -0.006 -0.025 * -0.013
-0.002 -0.008 -0.006 -0.012
0.012 * -0.005 0.009 -0.005
0.005 -0.006 0.000 -0.015
-0.177 ** -0.027 -0.115 + -0.060
-0.029 -0.018
-0.025 + -0.013
-0.007 -0.011
0.010 + -0.005
0.000 -0.014
-0.063 -0.043
0.116 + 0.069 0.038 0.062 -0.080 0.076
-0.010 0.013 -0.029 + 0.015 -0.062 ** 0.019
0.012 0.026 0.008 0.025 -0.004 0.026
-0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.014 -0.003 0.017
-0.087 0.109 -0.186 0.152 -0.117 0.130
-0.024 0.039 -
0.042 ** 0.012 -
0.017 0.013 -0.027 + 0.014
0.029 ** 0.000 -
Slovakia Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Poland Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) b) public ownership Czech Republic Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
0.182 ** 0.058 0.101 0.062 0.022 0.075
0.034 * 0.013 0.015 0.014 -0.007 0.015
0.027 0.026 0.011 0.025 0.001 0.025
0.010 ** 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.010
-0.140 0.107 -0.202 0.150 -0.155 0.131
-0.134 * 0.061 -0.016 0.015 -0.021 0.017
0.029 ** 0.007 -0.014 0.009 -0.017 * 0.007
0.002 0.013 -0.018 * 0.007 -0.039 ** 0.013
0.035 ** 0.012 0.010 0.013 -0.002 0.009
0.017 0.022 0.339 * 0.144 0.400 0.262
0.006 -0.016 -0.009 -0.018 -0.009 -0.018
0.010 + -0.005 0.004 -0.009 0.005 -0.010
0.010 ** -0.004 0.010 -0.013 0.010 -0.011
0.022 ** -0.005 0.016 -0.013 0.017 -0.012
-0.246 ** -0.027 -0.151 -0.118 -0.110 -0.099
Slovakia Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
0.025 ** 0.007 0.256 0.148 0.214 0.265
Poland Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
significance: ** 1%; * 5%; + 10% Source: ESES 2002
robust standard errors in brackets (clustered by firm)
26
0.027 -0.028 0.056 -0.037 0.055 -0.035
0.012 + -0.007 -0.009 -0.014 -0.008 -0.014
0.011 * -0.006 0.007 -0.018 0.005 -0.017
0.012 + -0.007 -0.002 -0.016 0.000 -0.014
-0.323 ** -0.034 -0.338 ** -0.119 -0.295 ** -0.104
Table 7: collective bargaining effect on wages by wage quintile (weighted by the probability of being in each quintile) manufacturing sector, (women) Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q1
Firm level agreement
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Industry level agreement
a) private ownership Czech Republic Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
0.022 * 0.011 -0.003 0.014 0.003 0.015
-0.001 0.004 -0.008 + 0.004 -0.008 0.005
0.002 0.030 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003
0.000 0.006 -0.003 0.005 -0.006 0.005
-0.062 0.045 -0.071 0.049 -0.059 0.046
0.012 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.007
0.003 0.012 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.008
0.003 0.061 0.013 0.046 0.000 0.043
-0.024 0.021 -0.036 + 0.020 -0.027 0.020
-0.006 0.006 -0.008 0.006 -0.010 0.007
0.000 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.006
-0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.006 -0.008 0.008
-0.074 0.047 -0.087 0.050 -0.103 * 0.049
-0.107 0.066 -0.113 * 0.056 -0.110 + 0.057
0.008 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.008
0.001 0.009 -0.002 0.010 -0.006 0.009
-0.014 0.009 -0.017 * 0.009 -0.009 0.009
0.035 0.060 0.010 0.048 0.019 0.053
-0.019* * -0.008 -0.040 -0.025 -0.042 -0.026
-0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.015 -0.012 -0.015
0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.011 -0.003 -0.011
0.017 * -0.007 0.016 -0.013 0.017 -0.013
-0.076 + -0.043 -0.087 -0.067 -0.041 -0.059
0.055 * 0.026 -0.070 0.063 -0.094 0.057
-0.036 * 0.017 -0.053 * 0.022 -0.063 * 0.029
-0.014 0.020 -0.044 + 0.020 -0.056 ** 0.014
-0.065 ** 0.012 -0.105 ** 0.017 -0.158 ** 0.013
0.047 0.108 -0.061 0.119 -0.110 0.229
-0.025 0.072 -0.185 ** 0.058
0.063 0.038 0.048 0.039 -0.039 * 0.013
-0.076 ** 0.000 -0.057 ** 0.007
-0.059 ** 0.002 -0.064 + 0.030 -0.035 + 0.015
0.243 ** 0.019 0.278 0.178 0.101 0.088
0.018 -0.059 -0.025 -0.078 -0.053 -0.085
-0.038 ** -0.010 -0.057 ** -0.022 -0.074 ** -0.023
0.030 ** -0.008 0.015 -0.013 0.016 -0.012
-0.009 -0.010 -0.021 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017
-0.077 -0.050 -0.118 -0.076 -0.058 -0.074
Slovakia Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
-0.063 ** 0.021 -0.089 ** 0.021 -0.074 ** 0.021
0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.007
0.009 ** -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006
0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
0.005 ** -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003
-0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
0.163 ** 0.027 0.023 0.060 0.076 0.061
-0.016 0.013 -0.028 + 0.016 -0.030 0.021
0.009 0.016 -0.021 0.024 -0.034 0.016
-0.024 + 0.013 -0.048 ** 0.016 -0.084 ** 0.011
0.093 0.110 0.070 0.122 0.052 0.202
0.005 0.055 -0.168 ** 0.044 -0.022 0.015
0.023 0.037 0.012 0.037 -0.084 ** 0.013
-0.081 ** 0.004 -0.062 ** 0.007 -0.011 ** 0.003
-0.020 0.022 -0.022 0.027 -0.004 0.009
0.085 * 0.035 0.227 0.172 0.028 0.050
-0.009 -0.020 -0.015 -0.025 -0.006 -0.028
-0.002 -0.007 -0.013 -0.014 -0.009 -0.013
0.013 * -0.005 0.010 -0.010 0.010 -0.009
0.024 ** -0.008 0.023 * -0.010 0.030 ** -0.011
0.066 * -0.030 0.078 -0.068 0.081 -0.062
Poland Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
-0.061 ** -0.013 -0.099 ** -0.026 -0.057 * -0.025
b) public ownership Czech Republic Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Slovakia Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Poland Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
significance: ** 1%; * 5%; + 10% Source: ESES 2002
robust standard errors in brackets (clustered by firm)
27
