Colonial War and the Democratic Peace - Islamic World Peace Forum

Colonial War and the Democratic Peace Author(s): Hilde Ravlo, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Han Dorussen Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Aug., 2003), pp. 520-548 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176207 Accessed: 01/04/2010 07:52 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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ColonialWar and the DemocraticPeace HILDERAVLO Departmentof Political Science VanderbiltUniversity,Nashville

NILS PE'II'ERGLEDITSCH InternationalPeace ResearchInstitute,Oslo (PRIO)

HAN DORUSSEN Departmentof Government Universityof Essex

Proponentsof the democraticpeace havebeen criticizedfor failingto discuss colonial wars.Democratic countrieshave repeatedlyfought such wars, which critics hold to be incompatiblewith democraticpeace theory.Three reasons are suggested to explain why colonial wars do not invalidatethe democraticpeace argument.First, althoughdemocraciesrarely,if ever, fight one another,they participatein war as much as nondemocracies.Thus, mixed political dyads have the greatestpropensityfor war.If nonstateadversaries arecommonlyperceivedto be nondemocratic,democraciesshouldfightcolonial warsmorefrequently.Second,the natureof colonial conflicthas changedovertime.The relationshipbetweendemocracyandcolonial waris examinedin colonial, imperialist,andpostcolonialperiods.Finally,a correctassessmentof the democraticpeace argumentneedsto rely on a multivariatemodel.Witha suitableset of controlvariables,the positive relationshipbetween war and democracydisappears.We also observe that in the post-WorldWarII period,democraciesfightcolonial warsless frequentlythannon-democracies.We surmisethatthis mightbe relatedto changes in the perceptionof non-Europeanpeoples. Keywords: democraticpeace; colonial war; imperialistcolonization; extrasystemicwar; postcolonial period

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE Democraciesrarely,if ever, fight one another(Gleditschand Hegre 1997; Russett 1993). They almostneverexperiencecivil waror seriousinternalviolence (Hegreet al. 2001), and they generally do not engage in genocide or other extremehumanrights AUTHORS'NOTE: The articledrawson Ravlo's (1999) thesis at the NorwegianUniversityof Science and Technology,Trondheim(NTNU). Ravlo's work was supportedby a grantto the InternationalPeace ResearchInstitute(PRIO)and NTNU from the NorwegianMinistryof Defense. Workon this articlewas also supportedby grantsfromthe ResearchCouncilof Norwayandthe WorldBank.We aregratefulto Neal Beck, MatsHammarstrom,JonathonMoses, JohnOneal,RichardTucker,Mariande Vooght,andtwo anonymous refereesfor theircomments.HavardHegrehelped with the data,andNaimaMouhlebassistedin the final editing. The data used in our analyses are available at www.prio.no/cwp/datasets.asp and www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm. JOURNAL OFCONFLICT Vol.47 No.4, August2003520-548 RESOLUTION, DOI:10.1177/0022002703254295 ? 2003SagePublications 520

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violations (Rummel 1995). Indeed, democracyhas been characterizedas a general methodof nonviolentconflict resolution(Rummel 1997). However,most studieshave found thatdemocraciesparticipatein interstatewaras frequentlyas nondemocracies, andpolitically mixed dyads are usually foundto be the most hazardous.Democracies rarelystartnew, armedconflicts, and increasinglyit is being arguedthatdemocracies are more peaceful overall than autocracies(Russettand Starr2000, 94ff.). A numberof challengeshavebeen issued to the idea of a democraticpeace. Realists havearguedthatthe democraticpeace propositionholds only for the cold warera(e.g., Gowa 1999), an argumentthatloses force as the post-cold warperiodkeeps accumulatingmorepeacefuldemocratic-dyadyears.It has also been arguedthatthe processof democratizationis dangerous(MansfieldandSnyder1995), butthe best evidenceindicates that the danger of violence-whether external or internal-lies in political change more generally. The perils of transitionare eventually outweighed by the peaceful impact of a higher level of stable democracy (Wardand Gleditsch 1998; Hegre et al. 2001). Recent surveys (Russettand Oneal 2001; Russettand Starr2000) portraythe democraticpeace argumentas havingbeen strengthenedby the manychallenges and responses. THE CHALLENGE OF COLONIAL WAR One importantchallenge to democraticpeace theorythathas not been extensively studiedconcernsthe role of democraciesin colonial wars. A few studies have examined the democraticpeace in premoder societies (Ember,Ember,and Russett 1992; Robinson2001; RussettandAntholis 1992;Weart1998), buteven in these studies,little attentionis paid to colonial relationships. Reiter and Stam (2002, 151) observe that colonial or imperial wars fought by democraciesprovide "particularlycompelling evidence againstthe normativeexplanation"for the democraticpeace. Democraticnorms of peaceful conflict resolution should apply most stronglytowardobviously weakerstates and societies. Theessentialpartsof thenormsexplanation arguethatdemocracies engageinwarsoutof fearof exploitation states.However,theinitiationof warsof empire by nondemocratic interestsandinfluenceat theexpanseof againstweakerstatesto expanddemocracy's weakersocietiesis inexplicablefromthe liberalnormsperspective.(ReiterandStam 2002, 151) Reiterand Stam (2002) arguethatdemocraticallyelected political elites have found it quiteeasy to obtainconsent fromthe generalpublic for imperialistwars.In such wars againstrelativelyweak and technologically unsophisticatedopponents,the elite and the generalpublic expect an easy victory,andthe targetis portrayedas raciallyor ethnically different. BarkawiandLaffey (2001, 2) arguethat"theclaims for the pacific natureof liberal democracyareeurocentric."Mann(2001, 71) claims thatdemocraticcolonial regimes suppressedthe democraticambitionsarisingin the colonies, attributingthis to a view that"thoseexcludedarenot actuallyseen as eligible to be consideredfree individuals."

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Ethnocidewas practicedon the pre-Columbianpopulationin the UnitedStatesandon the aboriginesin Australia,who were seen as "incapableof acquiringcivilization," "half-breeds,"and "renegades.""Liberalismwas based on the simple exclusion of most collective groups living in the country from the status of the free individual" (p. 73). Mannalso arguesthatthe Europeanscommittedmass murder"againstnative peoples who were usually democraticallyorganized"(p. 72). FourU.S. presidents"reveredas democrats-were also great ethnic cleansers"(Mann2001, 74). George WashingtonlikenednativeAmericansto wolves, "bothbeing beasts of prey,tho' they differ in shape." Jefferson and Jackson also advocated extermination of native Americans,and even TheodoreRoosevelt thoughttheir extermination"was as ultimately beneficial as it was inevitable"(p. 75). Henderson(2002, 82-83), who regardsthe democraticpeace as an illusion, finds that the founding fathers of the democratic peace, such as Immanuel Kant and WoodrowWilson, held racist views and advocated a "Herrenvolkdemocracy."He notes that the battle deaths of the extrasystemicactorsare not includedin the Correlates of War(COW)dataandattributesthis to ideological bias in the recordingof history and compilationof governmentrecords. In a singularlyvitriolic attackon democraticpeace theory,Haas (1995) arguesthat it is precisely democracies that have made colonial conquests and fought wars to preventthe liberationof the colonies. Excluding colonial war from the study of the democraticpeace excludes some of the bloodiest wars fought by democracies(Haas 1995, 7). to dealonlywith"coherent," and"stable" whenthese "mature," democracies, Preferring varying regimes prevent coherence, maturity,and stability abroad,is clearly anattemptto askdarker-skinned ethnocentric, peoplesto go to thebackof thebuswhile seriousresearchis in progress.(Haas1995,14) A relatedcriticism raised by Forsythe(1992), among others, is that democracies have frequentlyintervenedcovertlyagainstelected governments(such as Iranin 1953 or Guatemalain 1954). Some of these governmentscannot be classified as mature democracies,and the battledeathshave generallybeen too few to classify these conflicts as wars. Forsythe neverthelessnotes that one possible interpretation(argued stronglyby Hunt 1987) is thatsuch interventionsinto the affairsof othercountriesare motivatedby "an informalideology of US superiority,racism, and anti-revolution" (p. 393). James and Mitchell (1995, 92), citing covert action by democraciesagainst countriessuch as Iran,Guatemala,and Chile, arguethatrelativelyweak democracies thatseek changesin structuraldependencyarelikely to be vulnerableto outsideefforts towarddestabilization.Hermannand Kegley (1998) have also speculatedaboutsuch motives for interventionsundertakenby democracies,andGaltung(1996) has characterized democracies as arrogant,missionary,and belligerent. Covert action against otherdemocraciesis anotherreasonwhy Reiterand Stam (2002, 150, 159-62) see the normative explanation for the foreign policy behavior of democracies as a "caricature." Even writerssympatheticto the democraticpeace have noted the tendencyof liberaldemocraciesto participatein colonial wars.Doyle (1983b, 322), who views liber-


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alism as a "strikingsuccess" in creatinga zone of peace among liberal states, argues that"liberalismhas been equally strikingas a failurein guidingforeignpolicy outside the liberalworld."This failureis not incidental;the very samecharacteristics"thatpromote peace among liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts between liberal and nonliberalsocieties" (pp. 324-25). Thus, liberal ideological crusadescame to justify liberalimperialism.Gleditschand Hegre (1997, 297) note the tendencyfor democracies to engage in colonial conquest,militaryintervention,andproxywar.Weart(1998, 239) concedes the existence of democraticimperialism.Russett (1993, 34) observes thatmanydemocracieshavefoughtwarsto acquireorhold colonies or to retaincontrol of states formallyindependentbut within the rangeof their spheresof influence. Yet, he views this as more of an anomaly.' There is very little systematic empirical analysis of colonial war. Doyle (1983a, 1983b) undertookone of the first systematic studies of the dyadic democraticpeace, butregardingliberalrelationsto nonliberalstates,he merelynoted (in a footnotecommenting on Rummel 1983) that the extensive history of liberal imperialismhad led him to differ with Rummel on the monadicdemocraticpeace, that is, the question of whether democracies are more peaceful generally. Chan (1984, 642ff.), in a more extended rebuttalto Rummel, analyzed the monadic democraticpeace proposition using COWdata,variouslyincludingand excluding "extrasystemicwars"(i.e., colonial and imperialwars).2He found the monadicproposition"muchmore likely to be contradicted"if the extrasystemicwars were takeninto account.The only systematic multivariatestudywas carriedout by Henderson(2002). Forthe periodbetween 1946 and 1992, he founddemocraticcountriesto be moreinvolvedin interstatewarbut less in extrasystemicwar.He also foundthatWesterncountrieswere morebelligerentand, among these, the democraciesin particular. In this article,we take up these challenges to the democraticpeace, particularlyto the normativeexplanationfor it. Given a lack of datafor the dependentterritories,we areunableto evaluatethe dyadicversionof the democraticpeace argumentin relation to extrasystemicwar. Henderson(2002, 80) notes that some African scholars have documentedthat severalAfrican societies had indigenousrepresentativeinstitutions and therefore,presumably,should have been protectedby the democraticpeace from colonial warfare.However,the existence of such institutionsis a far cry from documentingdemocraticproceduresas in the Polity or FreedomHouse indicators.In our own study, we prefer to stick to the monadic level, but we carefully distinguish between the implicationsof dyadic and monadic analyses. In a sense, this is a more stringenttest of the democraticpeace because most scholarshave found little difference in the interstatewar participationof democracies. Using COW data over the period from 1816 to 1992, we find that,indeed, most of the extrasystemicwars have 1. Some of this criticismappearsto be directedless at democraciesin generalandmoreat the policies andattitudesof majorEuropeanpowers andthe United States-in particular,U.S. behaviorduringthe cold war.This distinctionwould not matterif all these majorpowerswere democraticandwere the only democracies in the world. However,this is not the case. 2. An extrasystemicwaris any warthatincludesan independentstateanda peripheralpoliticalentity. From here on, we use the Correlatesof War(COW)terminology.Extrasystemicwars do not cover covert militaryoperations,andso-called "proxywars"areattributedto the mainbelligerentsinsteadof alleged supportersor instigatorsof the violence.

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been foughtby democracies.Bivariateanalysis shows a positiverelationshipbetween democracyand participationin extrasystemicwar.This finding is significantfor the periodas a whole as well as for two subperiods.The implicationsof these findingsfor the democraticpeace argumentare, however,not straightforward.It may simply be thatnonstateactorswere generallyperceivedas nondemocratic.Moreover,the positive relationshipis not robust. With a reasonableset of control variables,we show democracyto generallyhave a negativerelationshipwith extrasystemicwarparticipation. Democracynot only has a statisticallysignificanteffect butalso reduceswarparticipationsubstantiallyfor most cases.

DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND EXTRASYSTEMIC ACTORS If we could measurethe degree of democracyof an extrasystemicactor,we would expect extrasystemicwar to be negativelycorrelatedwith democracyin the dyad. In other words, democraciesare not supposed to wage war on democraticnonstateor extrasystemicactors. At the same time, nondemocraticextrasystemicactors should fight democraticsystem membersmore frequentlythannondemocraticsystem members.The problemis thatwe haveno way to assess the regimetype of nonsystemmembers. The two majordatabaseson regimetype, Polity III (JaggersandGurr1995) and Polyarchy (Vanhanen2000), contain data almost exclusively for fully independent states.Althoughourtest of the relationshipbetweendemocracyandextrasystemicwar remains at the monadic level, we need not make any assumptionsabout a monadic democraticpeace in general. However,in this case, we have to make an assumption aboutthe regime type of the extrasystemicactors. Let us make the naive and simple (butnot altogetherimplausible)assumptionthat all nonsystem members are nondemocraciesor are perceived as such. Then, if the mainstreampositionin the studyof the democraticpeace governmentwere correct,we would expect nonsystem membersto find themselves more frequentlyat war with democraticsystem membersthanwith nondemocraticsystem members.This follows simply from the observationthatmixed dyads are more proneto war.In otherwords, underthe assumptionthatextrasystemicactorsare nondemocratic,democracyin the system member should be positively correlatedwith extrasystemicwar. The same argumentappliesas long as nondemocraciesarein the majorityamongthe actorsoutside the interstatesystem. Lookingat it fromthe pointof view of system members,we shall call this "theungenerousassumption"abouttheiropponents.Russett(1993, 34) seems to share this assumptionor at least assume that democraticcolonial powers sharedit. He assertsthat,in extrasystemicwars,democraciesfoughtagainstpeople on the assumptionthat they did not have institutionsof self-government.Many indigenous peoples were not consideredcapable of having land rights because they were hunter-gatherers,uncivilized, and too few in number (Reynolds 1996). They were availablenot only for expandingempiresbut also for the benefits of modernmaterial civilization and Westernprinciplesof democracy.Against this background,colonial war is no longer an anomalybut is almost to be expected.


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TABLE 1

DemocraticPeace and ExtrasystemicWar ExtrasystemicActors

Assumption

Frequencyof ExtrasystemicWar

Mostly democratic Proportionallydemocratic Mostly nondemocratic

Generous None Ungenerous

Less for democraticsystem members No correlationwith democracy More for democraticsystem members

If we make the equally naive and simple assumptionthat all extrasystemicactors are democraticor are perceived to be (we call this "the generous assumption"),we shouldexpectdemocraticsystemmembershardlyeverto engage in extrasystemicwar. On the other hand, the extrasystemicactors would still be forming mixed political dyads with nondemocraticsystem members.Thus, therewould still be extrasystemic war,but it would be negativelycorrelatedwith the level of democracyin the system member. If the extrasystemicactorsare divided between democraciesand nondemocracies in the same proportion as system members, then we should expect the rate of extrasystemicwar participationto be the same between democraticand nondemocraticsystem members.Thus, in this intermediatecase, thereshouldbe no correlation between democracy in the system member and participationin extrasystemicwar. Table 1 sets out our threealternativehypothesesrelatingextrasystemicdemocracyto extrasystemicwar. We expect the ungenerousassumptionto be the most realistic,at least for the period beforeWorldWarII. Ourpreferenceis basedonly partiallyon ajudgmentof the actual level of democracyin premodernsocieties. More important,we arguethat,at least in the pre-WorldWarII period,therewas a widespreadandstronglyheld belief thatthese societies were-or even had to be-nondemocratic. To a large extent, these beliefs were self-reinforcing.Because the opposing party was not recognized as a state, it failed to achieve the full range of institutionsthat the democratic system member would recognize as democratic.Regardless,a positive relationshipbetween democracyin the system memberandparticipationin extrasystemicwarshouldnot come as a surprise.

COLONIES AND EMPIRES Colonialism-defined as the conquest and control of land and goods-is not a European invention but an old and pervasive feature of human history. The vast Roman,Mongol, Chinese,andAztec empiressubjugateda largenumberof people and a varietyof ethnic groups (Loomba 1998, 4). However,in the period covered by our study,Europeancountrieswere the most active colonial actors.3 3. The history of colonialism has been documentedextensively. We have relied mainly on Ferro (1997), PalmerandColton (1971), andWoodruff(1989). Forthe purposesof ourstudy,thereareonly minor discrepanciesbetween the works of these scholars.

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This period encompasses the rise and fall of Europeanimperialismor capitalist colonialism. Changes in the dominant colonial activity determine the type of extrasystemicwarwe arelikely to observe.In the earlyyearscoveredby this study(the colonial period), extrasystemicwars were mainly, but not exclusively, wars of conquest. Later,in the imperialperiod,the colonized areawas expanded,and the control was solidified. The thirdperiod(the postcolonialperiod)witnessed a rapiddecolonization.We expect thatthe relationshipbetween democracyand extrasystemicwars is contingenton the historicalperiodbeing studied.To reflect the differentphases in the historyof colonization,we divide the 180-yearperiodcoveredby the COWdatainto three subperiods,which we discuss briefly below. THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1816-1869)

In this period,the acquisitionof far-awaypossessions was based mainlyon private commercialinterests.To have a colony meant,above all, to have a reliablepartnerfor tradeat favorableterms.At the beginningof the 19thcentury,the only reallyprofitable colonies were India and the Indonesianarchipelagofor the British and the Dutch, respectively.The other Europeanpowers had no large profitablecolonies, but the memories of colonial rivalrieswere kept alive. In the precedingcenturies,Portugal, Spain,the Netherlands,andEnglandhad succeededeach otherin exploringthe world for profitabletraderoutes.Colonialismgenerallymeantthe establishmentof trading posts in supportof trademonopolies. Anotherfeatureof the first period was that some settlementcolonies managedto gain independence.The Spanish and Portugueseempires fell apartduringthe 19th century.Spainwas preoccupiedwith Europeanmatters,andtheircolonies took up the fightfor independence.Englandhadbecome anindustrialpowerbuthadlost its American colonies. Consequently,the remainderof the empirebecamemore importantas a tool to secure the access to marketsand raw materials. IMPERIALISM: DIVIDING THE WORLD (1870-1945)

In contrastto the early colonialism, imperialistcolonization became a matterof nationalpolicy.An activecolonial policy seemed a meansto nationalsuccess, a source of new power,anda role on the worldscene (Betts 1968,49). The asymmetricalpower relationshipnot only made imperialismpossible; it also made it tempting. Empire could be acquiredquite cheaply.Most empiresexpandedfrom navalbases or trading posts acquiredduringthe first colonial phase. The requirementsof industrialization andthe need for marketsrivaledthe compulsionfor domination-eventually the latter prevailed. Before too long, nearly all European states joined the competition for new territories.Withina few decades,they had dividedamongthem almostthe entire land surfaceof the earth.By the 1930s, Europeanstates, Europeancolonies, and excolonies covered 85% of the world's land territory.Only parts of Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan,Mongolia,Tibet,China,Siam, andJapannevercame underformalEuropean government(Fieldhouse 1989, 373). After 1870, the statewas moreinvolvedin the colonial enterprise,andthe economic ties were much closer. The imperialexpansionproceededin differentforms in differ-


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ent partsof the world.Betts (1968, 14) arguesthatexpansionby settlementwas fundamentallydifferentfromcolonial expansion.He also distinguishesbetweencontiguous and noncontiguousexpansion.Physical distanceusually implied a distinctdifference between the imperialstateandthe dependentterritorywith respectto governinginstitutions, culture,and society. If the dominatedterritorywas closer to the dominating power,it was morelikely thatgreaterpoliticalandculturalsimilarityexisted. Contiguous expansionusuallyresultedin absorption,whereasnoncontiguousexpansionmost often did not. Russia absorbedSiberiaand the Caucasusdespite culturaldissimilarities. The United States succeeded in absorbingnot just territoriesall the way to the Pacificbutalso AlaskaandHawaii.But therearefew suchexamplesof successfulnoncontiguous expansion. THE POSTCOLONIAL PERIOD: TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (1946-1992)

After WorldWarII, most colonies obtainedindependence.At the same time, the internationalenvironmentchanged from a balance-of-powersystem in Europe to a world dominatedby the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The colonies in the Americashadmanagedto free themselvesfromEuropeandominancemuchearlier.The leadersof most of these newly independentstateswere European settlers.Only in Haiti had the descendantsof African slaves won theirfreedom. As a result,the situationfor the indigenouspopulationgenerallydid not changemuch. Europeansettlersalso won independencein SouthAfrica, but such attemptsfailed in Rhodesia at the end of the 19th centuryand in Algeria in 1958. The liberationmovementsat the end of the colonial era,on the otherhand,hadoriginated in new elites among the colonized. The educationprovidedby Christianmissions helped in the emancipationprocess, whereas Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamic revivals provided focal points for the resistance to Europeandomination. A third source of influence was communistinternationalism,supportedby the Soviet Union and laterby Chinaand Cuba.The nationalstruggleagainstimperialismwas regarded as an essential featureof the internationalproletarianstruggleagainstcapitalism. Decolonization was not only a result of the strugglefor freedom of the colonized peoples. In Europe,many intellectualshad for a long time questionedthe moral and economic wisdom of colonialism (Crawford1993). The post-WorldWarII change in norms had severalearlierorigins. After WorldWarI, the League of Nations defined threelevels of mandate,dependingon how quicklythe colonial peoples were expected to be able to "standby themselves."DuringWorldWarII, the AtlanticChartercalled for self-determination,althoughthe Britishinitiallyclaimedthatit appliedonly to the states under the control of Nazi Germany.The United States, now emerging as the leading world power, opposed traditionalcolonialism and imperialism. A turning point was reachedwhen Indiagained its independencein 1948. Duringthe Suez crisis in 1956, the decline of the FrenchandBritishempiresbecame irreversible,andthe rising power of the United States,the USSR, andthird-worldnationalismbecame all the more evident.

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Colonizationis no longer an importantfeatureof the foreign policy of any state, althoughmany major powers have retainedmost of their contiguous empire. Most non-contiguousempireswere dissolved duringthe firsttwo decades following World War II, creating a large number of independentstates. Numerous small colonies remain,butthey totalonly about0.1% of the world'spopulation,andmost of them are reluctantto face independence.The buildingof empiresalso seems to havecome to an end. In recent years, the trend has been toward secession ratherthan annexation. Between 1989 and 1999, some 20 countriesbecame independentas a resultof secessions or the dissolution of federal states (Gleditschand Ward1999, 405-10).

DETERMINANTS OF COLONIAL WARFARE What were the reasons for expansionand the defense of imperialinterests?Even the staunchest critics of the democratic peace argumentwould hardly claim that democracywas the only causal factor.Rather,theirclaim is thatit was perhapsa contributinganddefinitelynot an inhibitingfactor.This means,however,thatto assess the relativeeffect of democracy,we haveto controlfor at least the mainvariablesthatmay accountfor colonial warfare.Ourambitionis not to constructa fully specified theory of extrasystemicwar but to study the relationshipbetween war and the democratic peace. However,we do need to discuss a broadset of relationshipsto establisha reasonableset of controlvariables.Inparticular,we arelooking for variablesthatcould be responsiblefor a spuriousrelationshipwith our main explanatoryvariable. Majorpower status and conflict involvement. All types of involvementin armed conflict arecostly. A state with a largereconomy is more capableto fight warsin distant places. Often, only the major powers are capable of engaging regularly in extrasystemicwars. Majorpower status,moreover,is not only an indicationof possessing the necessaryabilityto fight a war.Majorpowersmay feel the need to engage or intervene in extrasystemicwars to maintainthe existing internationalorder.An empire secures access to resources,which either enhancethe state's chances of economic expansion or provide resources to fight a costly war against any adversary (Snyder1991, 52). To quoteReiterandStam(2002, 148), "Publicsof greatpowersare morelikely to consentto warundera largerrangeof circumstances,recognizingthata greatpower has more extended securityintereststhandoes a minorpower." Alliances. A common"realist"explanationfor the dyadicdemocraticpeace is that democracies are joined in alliances that represent their common interest. At the monadiclevel, mattersbecome a bit more complicated.One would assumethatstates join alliancesto increasetheirsecurity.In a defensepact,a statecanrely on the allies to come to its assistancein case of an attack.On the otherhand,if an ally is attacked,a defense pact can cause a stateto be involvedin a conflict thatit would not havejoined otherwise. From a balance-of-powerperspective,Walt (1985, 33) argues that states tend to sign alliance agreementswhen they perceivea securitythreat.Thus, the number of alliancesmay reflect a state'sconflict potential(GleditschandHegre 1998, 21).


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However,an allianceis only a deterrentif allies can be reliedon. Failingto flex its muscle in any conflict (includingextrasystemicconflicts) could lessen a country'scredibility as an alliance partner.Reiter and Stam (2002, 149) see alliances as a "literal expression of public consent"to the possibility of going to war. We expect alliance membershipto significantlyenhancethe probabilityof extrasystemicwar. Colonialpossessions. Having a colony is in itself neithera necessary nor a sufficient conditionfor fightingextrasystemicwars.To wage an extrasystemicwar,a state can eitherhave dependentareasor an ambitionto acquiresuch areas.Nevertheless,an alreadyacquiredcolonial possession must be expected to affect the participationin extrasystemicwar.Havingmorecolonies increasesthe numberof possible adversaries or troublespots. Snyder(1991, 3) arguesthata statewith a largenumberof colonies is also more likely to engage in colonial war because such a stateis more likely to fear that the loss of one areamay triggerefforts towardindependencein otherpartsof its empire.4 RESEARCH DESIGN The unit of analysis in this study is the state-year.All independent states are includedfor the periodfrom 1816 to 1992. Using the state-yearas the unit of analysis makes it possible to control for the fact that some states have been membersof the internationalsystem for a longer period and thus have had more opportunityto get involved in wars (Chan 1984, 623). The dataanalyzedin this studyconsist of 11,309 cases. We use the dataon extrasystemicwarin the COWdatabase.The firstpublishededition of the data set (Small and Singer 1982) reports51 extrasystemicwars for the period from 1816 to 1980. The newer edition (Singer and Small 1994) contains 134 wars up to 1992. The expansionof the list is not just due to the inclusion of 12 more years but also results from a relaxation of the coding criteria.For these wars, the thresholdcriterionof 1,000 battledeathsno longerhas to be met in a single year.The battle deathsare still, however,countedonly for the system member,not for the nonmember adversary.According to the COW data, 28 states have participatedin extrasystemicwar. This includes all the greatpowers, with the exception of Japan.6 As noted, we have divided our time period into three subperiodsin an attemptto controlfor importantdifferencesin the internationalenvironment.The colonial period 4. But not all colonial powersfightcolonial wars;Haiti,SouthAfrica,Australia,Japan,New Zealand, Israel, and Denmarkhave had dependentareas withoutwaging war on them accordingto COW criteria. 5. These statesareincludedin AppendixA, which gives the numberof warsfoughtby each stateand whetherthey were imperialor colonial wars. 6. Severalscholarshave arguedthatfrom the late 17thcentury,Japanwas at least as expansionistas the Europeanstates(Ferro1997, 103; Snyder 1991, 151). Japanis not includedin the COWdatauntil 1860, excluding some of the early Japaneseadvances.Otheradvancesresultedin interstatewars with European statesor China.Japaneseexpansionismin the 1930s andearly 1940s is countedas interstatewar(mostly as partof WorldWarII). In a morerecentversionof the COWdata,Japanis representedwith one extrasystemic war(Sarkees2000). Wepreferto use the 1994 editionof the COWdatabecausethe coding rulesof the 2000 datahave not yet been fully documented.

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10

98'0

E

6-

54

0

............................................................................................................................... 1818 1843 1868 1893 1918 1943

1968

Year Figure 1:

Number of Ongoing Extrasystemic Wars per Year (1816-1992)

coversfrom 1816 to 1869, with 125 state-yearsof extrasystemicwar(6.9%of all stateyears in thatsubperiod).The imperialistperiodbetween 1870 and 1945 includes 155 state-yearswith extrasystemicwar (4.3%).Finally,the postcolonialperiodfrom 1946 to 1992 includes 135 state-yearsof extrasystemicwar (2.3%). Figure 1 shows thatin nearly all years, an extrasystemicwar was being fought (with the exception of the WorldWarII period). It also shows thatin many years, more than one extrasystemic war was going on. However, few countries have regularly fought more than one extrasystemicwar in a same year. All warsincludedin the COWdatabaserequirethe participationof at least one system member.System membership,in turn,requiresa degreeof outsiderecognitionof the state. Priorto 1920, system membershipis operationalizedas having diplomatic relationswith BritainandFrance.This inherentlyEurope-centeredview of thingsmay underestimatethe warfareof otherpoliticalentitiesin the earlierperiods.On the other hand,manyrecentextrasystemicwarswere foughtby poorminorpowers(e.g., Ethiopia andSomalia).Using the COWdatamightskew the resultsagainstfindingpeaceful behaviorby democraciesin earlierperiods, whereas the results for the most recent periodcould be influencedby some long warsfoughtby non-Europeanminorpowers. Yet,we havechosento use the datawithoutmakinganychanges.The COW 1994 database is probablythe best one available.Ratherthanperformingad hoc changes,a revision should be guided by a thoroughreconsiderationof the criteria. In our analysis, we use bivariatecorrelationand multivariatenonlinear(Poisson) regression.To assess the substantiveand notjust statisticalrelevanceof our findings, we have also calculatedthe effects of the independentvariables.The effects were calculatedby changinga given independentvariablefrom its minimumto its maximum valuewhile holdingthe otherindependentvariablesat theirmean.To assess the impact of interactionbetweendemocracyandbeing a Europeanstate,we havedeterminedthe effect of the independentvariablescomparingEuropeanwith non-Europeanstates.7 7. The effects were estimated with the help of Clarify (in Stata);see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) and Tomz, Wittenberg,and King (1999).


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Bremer (1992, 320) has arguedstrongly for the need to distinguishbetween the onset and incidence of war.He arguesthatdifferentprocesses govern the startof the warandits continuation.His view is not sharedby Blainey(1988, x), who arguesthat thebeginningof wars,theprolonging of wars,theendingof warsandtheprolonging or of periodsof peaceall sharethesamecausalframework....Thesamefactors shortening arevitalin understanding in understanding eachstagein thesequelof warandpeace. Oneal andRussett(1999, 428) also takethe view that"forseveralreasons,researchers should be concerned with all years in which states are involved in a conflict."This belief is basedon the assumptionthatnationalleadersfrequentlyreevaluatea decision to use force. Maintaininga conflict thusreflectsthe same mix of domesticpolitics, the availability of military and economic resources, and internationalalignments that shapedthe decision to go to war in the first place. ApartfromBremer's(1992) theoreticalargument,studyingthe onset of warrather than the incidence of war can also be defended as a way to reduce the problem of autocorrelation.When only studyingthe first year of a war,the dependencebetween state-yearsof war is eliminated.However,deleting years of continuingwar from the dataonly remediesa partof the problembecause peace also tends to persistfrom one year to another(Raknerudand Hegre 1997; Chan 1997, 73). Reducingthe numberof warevents also makesit moredifficultto obtainstatisticallysignificantresults.Of the 417 state-yearswith incidence of extrasystemicwar in this study, only 140 contain onsets of war.Therefore,we havedecidedto use the incidenceof extrasystemicwaras our dependentvariable. In technicalterms,our studyrequiresan analysisof time-seriescross-sectiondata. Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) argue convincingly for the inclusion of temporal dummy variablesas controls for temporaldependency.8An equivalentalternativeis the inclusion of so-called cubic splines-an approachalso suggested by Beck, Katz, and Tucker.An advantageof using the cubic splines is that they estimate a smooth baselinehazardrate.In otherwords,the probabilityof an extrasystematicconflict for a countryis assumedto decline consistentlyas the numberof yearswithoutsuchconflict increases.Because we have no reasonto assumethatthe hazardof a conflict increases aftera certainnumberof years, it is appropriateto use a smooth baseline hazardrate. The cubic splines were createdusing the BTSCS programin Stata(Tucker1999).

OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES In one of the firstmultivariateanalysesof its kind,Bremer(1992) madeuse of seven predictorsto dyadicinterstatewar:geographicalproximity,powerparity,majorpower status,alliance,regimetype, level of development,anddegreeof militarism.In a study 8. We tested for the existence of temporaldependencein our databy includinga set of 18 temporal dummypeace-yearvariables.A standardlikelihoodratiotest of the hypothesisthatthe setjointly equaled0 had to be rejectedfor the whole period as well as for each of the subperiods.

532


of the monadicdemocraticpeace, GleditschandHegre(1998) used Bremer'sanalysis to derivea set of controlvariablesat the nationlevel. We follow theirdesign here but limit ourselves to three of the variablesdue to the natureof extrasystemicwar.9 The dependentvariable-extrasystemic war. The dependentvariableis the numberof extrasystemicwarsa stateis involvedin duringa given year.Formost statesand years, the variableeither takes the value 0 or 1. However,some states (most notably GreatBritain)areoccasionally involvedin morethanone extrasystemicwar simultaneously.Empirically,the variablefollows very closely a Poisson distribution(with X, 0.049). Less thana quarterof the waryearsinvolvedmorethanone extrasystemicwar for any state, and no state has ever fought more than four wars simultaneously.?1 The measure somewhat blurs the difference between short and long wars. For instance,the Belgian war (1830-1831) lasted only 2 months,butbecauseit went from one year to the next, its three participantsare assigned a total of 6 state-yearsof extrasystemicwar. Independentvariables. The most importantindependentvariableis regime type. Manystudiesof the democraticpeace have used categoricalmeasuresof regimetype. Chan (1997, 71), for instance, arguesthat a dichotomousmeasurebetterreflects the perceived attributesstate leaders give to their counterparts.Some scholars, such as Dixon (1994), use a thirdvalue, "anocracy,"for a polity thatis neitherdemocraticnor autocratic.Hegreet al. (2001) andothersuse the full rangeof the Polity 21-pointscale of democracyminus autocracy. Weuse the democracyandautocracyindexesfromthe Polity IIIddata(McLaughlin et al. 1998) for all independentstates.FollowingJaggersandGurr(1995), we subtract the autocracyscores fromthe democracyscores, so the resultingindex variesbetween -10 (full autocracy)to 10 (full democracy).If democracyis an importantforce for peace, we expect differencesnot only between democraciesand nondemocraciesbut also between states with differentdegrees of democracy. Nonviolent norms and institutionalconstraintshave been suggested as possible explanationsof the democraticpeace. However,it has provendifficultto distinguish betweenthe normativeandconsentrationales.ReiterandStam(2002, 144-63) suggest that democraticinvolvementin extrasystemicwars underminesthe normativeexplanationfor the democraticpeace, whereasit is compatiblewiththe consentexplanation, at least under certain circumstances.We have tried to take both explanationsinto account,but we only assess their relativemeritsindirectly. Maoz andRussett(1993) suggest thatnormscan be judged by the political stability of the polity or, preferably,by the degreeto which it experiencesviolent internalconflict. Data limitationsrequireus to focus on political stabilityto evaluatethe importance of democraticnorms.We have coded a countryas a stabledemocracyif at least 9. The monadicnatureor our study excluded the use of geographicalproximityand power parity. Degree of militarismwas excluded because of data limitations. 10. Ourfindingsarerobustwith respectto the choice of Poisson or logistic regression.We decidedto use all informationcontainedin the dependentvariable.


533

10 years have passed since the polity became democratic.1 States that were democraticwhen theyenteredthe internationalsystemarecoded as nonstablefor the first 10 years.Some stateslose theirstatusas membersof the internationalsystemfor a limited period, an example being Norway duringthe Germanoccupationin WorldWarII. Such countriesare coded as stable democraciesfrom the first year of reentryif they were in thatcategorypriorto the interruption.Both stablenondemocraciesandunstable polities arecoded 0. The variableis thusaninteractionterm,combiningdemocracy and stabilityin one measure.Because the stable democracyvariableis highly correlated with democracy,we have used it only as an alternativeoperationalizationof the democracyvariable. We measureinstitutionalconstraintsby a componentof the Polity index, a 7-point scale rangingfromunlimitedexecutiveauthorityto executivesubordination.Because this variableis highly correlatedwith the democracyindex (GleditschandWard1997), we use it as a substitutefor the democracyvariableratherthan as a supplement. Controlvariables. Ourdiscussionof colonialismabovehas shownthatin the modern era, Europeanstates were originally the main colonizers and later also the main imperialiststates. In the period covered by this study, Europeanrulers felt, almost withoutexception,the urgeto competefor new colonies anddependencies.Forexample, in 1885, Congo becamethe personalpossession of King Leopoldof Belgium. Following his deathin 1908, the Belgians foundthemselvesthe reluctantheirs of an African colony. Therefore,we use Europeanstates as a dummycontrolvariable.The lust for colonies and the empire affected virtuallyall Europeanstates regardlessof size, majorpowerstatus,or othercapabilitymeasures.It did not matterwhetherthese states were majorpowers or alreadyhad colonies; they were all tryingto get a piece of the new territories. Democracy may possibly dampen this imperial spirit; we have includedan interactionterm (Europeandemocracy)to see if this is the case. The Europeanstateswere significantlymoredemocraticthannon-Europeanstates duringthe imperialistand postcolonialperiods. However,non-Europeanstates were on averagemoredemocraticin the colonial subperiod(althoughneithergroupof states could be consideredon averageto be democratic).The findingsfor the earlyperiodare clearly determinedby the level of democracyin the United States. Reiterand Stam (2002, 148-51) relatethe willingness of the generalpublic to consent to war to a broad definition of the national interest, higher levels of external threats,anda likely,quick, andlow-cost victory.They arguethatdemocracyis only an inhibitingfactor if political elites find it difficult to obtain consent. Their argument suggests, first,thatwe need to controlfor these factors.But it also suggests an avenue to assess the relativeimportanceof the normativeandconsentexplanationsof the democraticpeace. After controllingfor the relevantconsent variables,any remainingeffect of democracyshould be attributedto democraticnormsof peaceful resolutionof disputes. 11. The stabledemocracyvariablerequiresa dichotomousdemocracyvariable.For this purpose,we have used the value of +3 as the cutoff on the democracy-autocracyscale.

534


We generallyfollow the measurementsfor consent suggested by Reiter and Stam (2002). Majorpowers have more extended securityintereststhan minorpowers. We use the majorpower variablefrom the COW projectdata set.12 Externalthreatsare measuredby alliancemembership.The COWdatabaseidentifiesthreetypes of formal alliances (Singer and Small 1969), but we include only defense pacts in our analysis. States are coded with the number of alliance membership in the given year. Nonaggression and neutrality pacts are the other types of formal alliances. Nonaggressionpacts usually involve potentialenemies and are largely irrelevantfor extrasystemic wars (Raknerud and Hegre 1997, 394). Neutrality pacts are also unlikelyto affect the probabilityof extrasystemicwarbecause they do not dependon the credibilityof militaryassistance. To measurethe level of anticipatedpower advantage,we use the log of urbanization. The datacome from the COWproject'snationalcapabilitydatabase(Singerand Small 1993). Urbanizationdata are fairly highly correlatedwith other measures of economic developmentand presentthe most complete series for the full time period. Althoughthis measurehas some weaknesses,it allows the measurementof economic activities that take place outside the marketplaceand are not included in the formal economy.In AppendixC, we assess the robustnessof our resultsfor alternativemeasuresof economic development-namely, energyconsumption(fromCOWcapabilities data)and real gross domestic product(GDP) per capita(from Russettand Oneal 2001) for periodsfor which these data are available. The numberof colonies is calculatedon an annualbasis using data in Gleditsch (1988) as a startingpoint and supplementedwith informationfrom variousreference works.The colonies areincludedat the startof the time periodor fromthe time when a colony is established.The yearthe colony is establishedis enteredin the database,and the year the colony obtainedindependenceis coded as the firstyear of independence. This coding scheme does not account for areas that are still dependenton a system member.We made this decision because it is difficult to account for all dependent areas.Thereare areasthat,by formalagreement,form a partof a system member,as Tibet is a partof China. Tibetanswho want independencechallenge this agreement. Thus, one can regardTibetas a Chinese colony with a greatconflict potential.On the otherhand,some annexationshave become an integralpartof system members,such as the southwesternUnited States or Russian Siberia. Thus, some colonies have become inseparableparts of system members, whereas some dependenciesremain conflict areas even though they are based on formal agreementsratherthan violent occupationor annexation.One could of course include as dependenciesthose areas thatarestill contested,butthis wouldraisethe problemof how largethe independence movementmustbe for the situationto be definedas contested.Hawaiihas a movement for independence,as does Brittany.Moreover,we wouldface a selectionproblemif we excludedareasthathavebeen dependenciesin the pastbutarenow regardedas inseparablefroma systemmemberor peacefuldependencies.Because it is virtuallyimpossible to make surethatall relevantdependenciesareincluded,we have chosen to focus 12. In AppendixB, we assess the robustnessof ourresultsby replacingthe majorpowervariablewith dummies for the country-yearsin which specific countrieshad majorpower status.


535

TABLE2

Democracyand the Incidenceof ExtrasystemicWar,1816-1992 (%) Period

Democratic Countries' Share of All Nation-Yearsa

Colonial subperiod Imperialsubperiod Postcolonial subperiod Whole period

Democratic Countries'Share of All Nation-Yearswith Wara Correlation

9.0 32.8 37.7 31.8

24.0 56.4 25.0 36.0

0.06** 0.07*** -0.04*** -0.01

NOTE: Pearson'sr. a. Dichotomous democracymeasureusing +3 as the cutoff on the democracy-autocracyscale. **Significantat the .05 level. ***Significantat the .01 level.

on those dependenciesthathave laterbecome an independentmemberof the international system. Finally,we use a directmeasureof conflict involvementas a single controlvariable for participationin a civil war,an interstatewar,or a militarizedinternationaldispute. Accordingto the COWdata,less than 10%of the state-yearsare affectedby civil war or interstatewar, whereas more than 30% of the state-yearsexperience a dispute. A state-yearscores positively on conflict involvementif the state is involved in one or more conflicts otherthanthe extrasystemicwar.In 34.6%of the state-years,a stateis involvedin otherconflicts. Ourexpectationsfor the conflict involvementvariableare ambiguous.On one hand,conflict involvementdrainsresourcespotentiallyavailable for extrasystemicconflicts. On the other hand, a colonizer distractedby domestic problemsor securityissues presentsa clear opportunityfor liberationmovements.

RESULTS BIVARIATEANALYSIS

Because most of the discussion of democraciesand colonial war reviewed above has been in implicit bivariateterms, we reportbriefly our bivariateanalysis before moving on to the multivariateresults.Table2 tests the "naive"observationthatdemocracies aremorelikely to takepartin extrasystemicwars.Comparedwith theirshareof state-years,we find thatdemocraciesare indeed more involved in extrasystemicwar. This is truefor the firsttwo subperiodsand for the entireperiodsince the Congressof Vienna. As discussed earlier, this observation is compatible with the democratic peace, with the ungenerousassumptionthatmost extrasystemicactorsare nondemocratic.Only in the postcolonialperiodaredemocraciesless involvedin extrasystemic war relativeto their shareof state-years. We also reportbivariatecorrelations.Thereis a positive and significantcorrelation between democracy and extrasystemic war in the colonial and imperial periods. Democracyis, however,negativelycorrelatedwith the incidenceof extrasystemicwar

536


TABLE3

Incidenceof ExtrasystemicWar,MultivariatePoisson Analyses Subperiods Variables

WholePeriod

-2.891*** (.236) Constant -0.153*** (.025) Democracy 1.173*** (.221) European Europeandemocracy 0.118***(.027) 0.625*** (.105) Otherconflicts 0.390*** (.140) Majorpower -0.034 Alliances (.046) Numberof colonies 0.056*** (.007) 0.287*** (.049) Urbanization(log) -0.530*** (.032) Peace-years -0.002*** (.000) Cubic spline la 0.000** (.000) Cubic spline 2a -0.000*** (.000) Cubic spline 3a Log-likelihood ratio (df) 2,275.23 (12) .53 Pseudo-R2 Number 10,131

Colonial (1816-1869)

Imperial (1870-1945)

Postcolonial (1946-1992)

-2.945*** (.657) -0.152** (.073) 0.515 (.769) 0.115 (.086) 0.340* (.185) 1.057*** (.371) -0.010 (.109) 0.100*** (.019) 0.185 (.165) -0.525*** (.089) -0.005*** (.002) -0.003** (.001) 0.001 (.001)

-3.344*** (.393) -0.099** (.041) 1.152*** (.333) 0.111** (.044) 0.540*** (.180) 0.767*** (.251) -0.322*** (.116) 0.003 (.008) 0.360*** (.130) -0.492*** (.061) -0.003*** (.000) 0.002*** (.000) -0.000 (.000)

-2.967*** (.408) -0.207*** (.043) 1.343*** (.377) 0.109** (.048) 1.106*** (.208) 0.469* (.281) -0.261*** (.010) 0.069*** (.017) 0.153* (.087) -1.428*** (.166) -0.015*** (.003) 0.010*** (.002) -0.002* (.001)

508.64 (12) .49 1,524

626.84 (12) .46 3,308

1184.23 .64 5,299

NOTE: Unstandardizedcoefficients from Poisson regression,with standarderrorsin parentheses. a. Coefficients of peace-yearscubic splines segments. *Significantat the .1 level. **Significantat the .05 level. ***Significantat the .01 level.

after 1945. For the period as a whole, there is no significant relationshipbetween democracyandconflict involvement.Thus, we do not find a strongand uniformrelationshipbetween the two variables.However,most findings so far tend to supportthe notion that democraciesare more active in extrasystemicwar than nondemocracies, except in the postcolonialperiod. ANALYSIS MULTIVARIATE Because many of the control variables can be shown to correlate significantly with involvement in extrasystemic wars as well, we should expect that the introduction of controls would alter the picture significantly. Table 3 gives the results of the multivariate Poisson analysis for the involvement in extrasystemic wars.13 13. Poisson is a maximum likelihood regression appropriatewhen the dependent variable is a nonnegative count variable following a Poisson distribution.Heterogeneity or contagion may cause overdispersionof the cases (i.e., morevariationthanwould be expectedfroma simple Poisson process).To accountfor this possibility,negativebinomialmodels were estimatedas well. However,therewas no indication of overdispersion;in each model, it could not be rejectedthata = 0, suggestingthattemporaldependency has sufficientlybeen takencare of.


537

Whenusing multivariateanalysis,the role of democracyappearsin a new light. We generally find a negative (and significant) relationship between democracy and extrasystemicwar.An importantcaveatis thatthe negativeeffect of democracyis partially (and, for the imperialperiod, even completely) offset for Europeanstates, as revealed by the positive sign of the Europeandemocracyinteractionterm. We will assess the impactof the interactionbetweenEuropeanstatesanddemocracymoreprecisely when we considerthe substantiveeffects in Table4. Forthe colonial period,thereis no relationshipbetweenbeing a Europeanstateand being involved in extrasystemicwar. In other periods, there is a significantpositive relationship, indicating that European states were indeed more involved in extrasystemicwar thannon-Europeanstates. Majorpower statusand urbanizationgenerallyincreasethe likelihood of involvementin extrasystemicwars.A broadnationalinterestandanticipatedpoweradvantage may thus indeed generatepublic consent for war, as suggested by Reiter and Stam (2002). Alliances are, however, generally negatively related to extrasystemicwars. This suggests that alliances may not signal public consent for involvement in extrasystemicwars. Table 3 shows that major powers are much more likely to be involved in extrasystemicwar.Consequently,some of the majorpowers (most likely GreatBritain, France,or the United States)mighthave largelydeterminedourfindings.We createddummyvariablesfor the yearsa specific statewas a majorpower(e.g., the United Kingdom dummy scores 1 for all years, whereas the United States dummy scores 1 from 1899) and reranour analyses. The results are given in Appendix B. Our main findings are quiterobust.The democracyvariableis no longer significantin the colonial period but becomes significantin the imperialperiod. The Europeanvariableis also somewhat affected, but this is no surprisewhen country dummies for several European countries are included. France and the United States are always more involved in extrasystemicwar than we would expect from the rest of the model. In summary,we have no reasonto be particularlyconcernedaboutthe influence of specific countries. In AppendixC, we assess the robustnessof ourfindingsfor othermeasurementsof economic developmentthanurbanization.Because of missing data,we can only look at the imperialandpostcolonialsubperiods.In the imperialperiod,we still lose about half of our observations.Not unexpectedly,it becomes more difficultto attainsignificant coefficients.Even so, ourfindingssuggest thatthe findingsfor urbanizationneed to be treatedwith caution. Energy consumptionand real GDP are not significantly related to extrasystemic conflict involvement in most models. In the postcolonial period, real GDP is significantlybut negativelyrelatedto conflict involvement.The findings for the otherindependentvariablesare, however,robust. Turningto the othercontrolvariables,we find thatthe numberof colonies is related to increasedinvolvementin extrasystemicwars. We also find a consistentlypositive and significant relationshipbetween extrasystemicwar and other conflict involvement. The peace-years variable (with the cubic splines) indicate that the hazardof extrasystemicwar involvementis indeed declining when the numberof peace years increases.14

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TABLE4

Effect on the Incidenceof ExtrasystemicWar,MultivariatePoisson Analyses Subperiods Variables (Baseline) Democracy Otherconflicts Majorpower Alliances Numberof Colonies Urbanization

Geographic Area Non-European European Non-European European Non-European European Non-European European Non-European European Non-European European Non-European European

WholePeriod 0.005 0.007 -94.90a -49.31a 86.51 86.80 48.80 47.49 -13.88 -21.25 27.23 96.72 297.94 368.50a

Colonial (1816-1869) 0.012 0.012 -88.07 -44.59 41.61 41.33 _b

188.82 0.15 12.19 111.47 256.73 74.39 113.49

Imperial (1870-1945) 0.004 0.015 -84.28 28.08 70.75 70.64 51.81 118.35 -60.05 -88.81a 6.49 27.06 326.39 270.57

Postcolonial (1946-1992) 0.002 0.005 -97.96a -83.76 49.60 204.44 65.72 60.75 -69.90 -85.57 6.17 1270.08a 99.48 89.25

NOTE: Effect is the percentagechange in expected incidence of extrasystemicwar, based on Poisson regression,whenthe independentvariablechangesfromminimumto maximumvaluedeterminedwhile keeping the otherrelevantvariablesat theirmean.Mean,minimum,andmaximumvalues areconditionalon geographicarea. a. Distinct 95% confidence intervalsof expected value given minimumand maximumvalues. b. No non-Europeanmajorpowers.

Coefficients of nonlinearregression,like Poisson regression,may provide a misleading impressionof the substantiveeffect of the variousindependentvariables.In Table4, we presentthe substantiveeffect of democracyandothercontrolvariablesfor the involvementin extrasystemicwars. The effects are the percentagechange of war involvementif a specific independentvariablechanges from its minimumto maximumvalue.We havecalculatedthe effects for Europeanandnon-Europeanstatesseparately.15The baseline values show that European states were more likely to be involvedin extrasystemicwars.We note also thatthe value of expectedinvolvementis very low.

14. The cubic splines are also an appropriate way to take care of time dependency (or autocorrelation).Brandtet al. (2000) discuss variousapproachesto modelingtime-seriesevent count data. Theirargumentsuggests thatour Poisson model with peace-yearscorrectionmay be less efficient thanthe Poisson exponentiallyweighted moving average(PEWMA)model. Our approachis, however, still quite standardand widely used. Any bias in our model, moreover,goes againstfinding significantcoefficients. 15. The effects arecalculatedby changingthe relevantindependentvariablefromminimumto maximumvalue, whereasthe otherindependentvariablesarekeptattheirmean.Mean,minimum,andmaximum values are conditionalon geographicarea. For Europeanstates, the effect of democracyis calculatedby changing simultaneouslythe values of democracyand Europeandemocracy.


539

Table 4 shows, first of all, that democracy had a substantialnegative effect on involvement in extrasystemic war for both Europeanand non-Europeanstates for nearly all periods. The effect is, however, generally about twice as strong for nonEuropeanas for Europeanstates. There are two importantexceptions. First, in the imperial period (1870-1945), democracy actually increased involvement in extrasystemicwars for Europeanstates. Second, in the postcolonial period (19461992), the negative effect of democracywas about equally strong for Europeanand non-Europeanstates. The restrainingimpactof democracyis largely consistent with the findingsin Henderson(2002) for the periodsince 1946. However,we do not replicate Henderson'sfindingof less restraintamongWesternstatesandWesterndemocracies in particular.In contrast,we find that democracysimilarlyconstrainsEuropean and non-Europeanstates.'6 Using datacoveringthe whole period,Europeanas well as non-Europeandemocracies areclearlydistinctfromnondemocracies.The impactof urbanizationis, however, unmistakablythe largest,whereasthe effect of democracyis comparableto the impact of the othercontrolvariables.In the colonial period,the numberof colonies andmajor power statushave the largestimpact,but the effect of democracyis still sizable (and comparable to urbanizationfor non-Europeanstates). In the imperial period, as alreadynoted,democracyreducesconflict involvementonly for non-Europeanstates. In this period,urbanizationonce morehas the largestimpact,whereasalliance significantlyreducesconflict involvementfor Europeanstates.In the postcolonialperiod,the process of decolonizationnotablyaffected conflict involvementfor Europeanstates. Non-European democracies are significantly distinct from non-European nondemocracies,but the size of the democracy effect is very similar to European states. Robustnessof the democracyvariable. To furtherassess the impactof democracy, we takea second look at the substantiveeffect of democracymeasuredin variousways in Table5. As noted previously,democracyhas a largely negativeeffect in the postWorldWarII subperiodas well as for the periodas a whole. We find some differences using alternativedemocracy measures. Stable democracies did not fight a single extrasystemicwar in the colonial period.In the otherperiods,stable democraciesare not significantlydistinctfrom unstabledemocraciesand nondemocracies.The effect of the stabledemocracyvariableis also smallerthanthatof the democracyscale. The implicationwould seem to be thateither stabilitydoes not accuratelymeasuredemocraticnorms or democraticnormsare not very important.The effects of institutional constraintsaregenerallycomparableto the effects of the democracyvariable.Institutional constraintshave mainly a negative effect on war propensity.An important exception is that during the imperial period (1870-1945) for European states, 16. Thereare some technicaldifferencesbetween our analysesandthose in Henderson(2002). First, we compareEuropeanwith non-Europeanstates,whereasHendersoncomparesWesternwith non-Western civilization. Second, we explicitly compare the effect of democracy for both sets of states, whereas Hendersonanalyses the impactof the democracy-civilizationinteractionin isolation. Finally, we base our conclusions on substantiveeffects as well as statisticalsignificance, whereasHendersonrelies entirely on statisticalsignificance.

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TABLE5

Effect on the Incidenceof ExtrasystemicWarunder VariousDemocracyScales, MultivariatePoisson Analysis Subperiods Variables Democracy

Geographic Area

Non-European European Stable democracy Non-European European Institutionalconstraints Non-European European

WholePeriod

Colonial (1816-1869)


Postcolonial (1946-1992

-94.90a -49.31a -27.592 -27.742 -83.60a -31.44

-88.07 (.012) -84.28 (.004) -44.59 (.012) 28.08 (.015) b 28.68 (.004) b 4.80 (.012) -43.27 (.015) -69.63 (.004) 66.13(.011) -68.75(.011)

-97.96a (.002) -83.76 (.005) -51.25C (.003) -52.75c (.007) -82.25 (.004) -82.84 (.005)

(.005) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.007)

NOTE: The effects were calculatedusing the samecontrolvariablesas in the multivariatePoisson analysis above.The controlvariablesdid not change direction,andthe magnitudeof the coefficients andthe significance levels experiencedonly minor changes. Effect is the percentagechange in expected incidence of extrasystemicwar,based on Poisson regression,when the independentvariablechanges from minimumto maximumvalue determinedwhile keeping the otherrelevantvariablesat theirmean.Mean,minimum,and maximumvalues are conditionalon geographicarea.Baseline value given between brackets. a. Distinct 95% confidence intervalsof expected value given minimumand maximumvalues. b. No stable democracywith extrasystemicwar. c. Interactiontermbetween stabledemocracyandEuropeancountryexcludedbecauseof multicollinearity problem.

democraticinstitutionsseem to have a relativelylargepositiveeffect on extrasystemic war involvement. To inspectfor possible multicollinearity,we ranordinaryleast square(OLS)regressions for each independentvariableon all otherindependentvariables.As expected, the highestR2was foundfor the variablesinvolvingthe interactionterm.Nevertheless, the R2for democracyregressedon the otherindependentvariablesremainedacceptable: .49 for the whole period, .65 for the colonial period, .62 for the imperialperiod, and .41 for the postcolonialperiod.In most models, moreover,therewere no indications suggesting multicollinearityin the data.17

CONCLUSIONS In contrastwith a commonclaim in the literature,being democraticdoes not imply moreinvolvementin colonial war.We generallyfind thatdemocracyhas had an inhibiting effect on extrasystemicwarinvolvement.Claimsto the contraryarebasedon failing to distinguishthe effect of democracyfrom othercausal factors.It is, however,a simplificationof the democraticpeace argumentto hold that democracyis the only pacifying factorand thatits effect has to be equally strongin all historicalperiods.In 17. Whenevertherewas suspicionof multicollinearity(e.g., in the models with the stabledemocracy variable and occasionally when the major power country dummies were used), the variables causing multicollinearitywere omitted.


541

substantiveterms,the pacifyingeffect of democracyhas been modest,particularlyfor Europeanstates.This makesit even morenecessaryto carefullyspecify the causaland temporalfactorsinfluencingthe likelihood of extrasystemicconflict. A more careful specificationalso reducesthe need to rely on a prioriassumptionsaboutthe natureof the nonsystemic actorsinvolved in these conflicts. Because we have found evidence for the existence of a democraticpeace also with regardto extrasystemicwars,it is appropriateto evaluatewhethera normativeor institutional (or consent) interpretationis more relevant.Our main conclusion would be thatit is very difficult, if not almost impossible, to distinguishbetween the two interpretations.But the evidence presentedhere suggests thatthe historyof imperialisticor colonial wars does not imply that a norms-basedinterpretationshould be discarded. Most important,we find that a pacifying effect of democracyremainseven aftercontrolling for factors that influence the ease of attainingpublic consent for the use of force. To recap,democracywas significantin ourmodels thatcontrolledfor capabilities, externalthreatperception,andbroadersecurityinterests.However,we also found thatin these models, institutionalconstraintsseem to be morerelevantthandemocratic stability. We have been unable to account explicitly for the racistjustification of imperial wars. As Reiter and Stam (2002, 152) argue,"Whatmakes imperialwars especially disturbingto the liberalconscience is thatthey demonstratealso thatit is easierto generatepublic consent if the targetis raciallyor ethnicallydifferentfrom the attacker." We have found that the pacifying effect of democracy applies especially to nonEuropeanstates.ForEuropeanstates,democracyemerges as a significantfactoronly in the postcolonialperiodor since WorldWarII.18In the imperialperiod(1870-1945), Europeandemocracieswere actuallymore involved in extrasystemicwars. However,these findings can still be reconciled with a norms-basedexplanation. AfterWorldWarII, the normsregardingcolonial rule changedmarkedly,anddecolonizationbecame one of the centralfeaturesof internationalrelations(Huth 1996, 61). Universalstandardsof humanrightsbecame an integralpartof democraticnormsin this period.As late as the 1930s, the superiorityof "thewhite race"was more or less takenfor grantedin wide circles in the West.In the postcolonialperiod,althoughracism certainlypersisted,stateracismwentinto a steepdecline. The one statethattriedto move against the trendand openly institutionalizeracism, South Africa, became an internationalpariah.The adoptionof the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights in 1948 andthe 1960 Declarationon the Grantingof Independenceto ColonialCountries

18. A contrastingview of the postcolonial periodemphasizes thatWesternand other majorpowers have engaged in neo-imperialistforeign policies, and colonial and imperialistwars have been replacedby covertmilitaryactionand"proxywars."Accordingly,the diminishingimportanceof the Europeanvariable would thus merely reflect a shift from imperialistto such neo-imperialpolicies not covered by our data. Much of this criticismis generallyleveled againstthe United States, obviously not a Europeanstate. Furthermore,we see no obviousreasonsto assumethatdemocraciesaremoreproneto supportcovertactionsor proxywarsthannondemocracies.Duringthe cold war,both the United Statesand Soviet Union used covert action and proxy wars to yield influence. Clearly,the questionwhetherdemocraciesare more or less neoimperialistis ultimately an empiricalone. Withoutsystematicallycollected data about covert action and proxy wars, thereis little we can conclude at this stage.

542


andPeoples testify to this majorchangein the globalnormativestructure.By 1970, the United Nations had labeled colonialism a crime. A basic assumptionfor democracy-and thusfor the democraticpeace-is thatall humanbeings areconsideredequal.This was not the case for the inhabitantsof the colonies. Attemptsat religiousconversionsuggestedthatindigenouspeoples of the colonies were regardedas at least potential equals. As economic goals became more important,the indigenouspopulationswere treatedmoreharshlyandwith less respect (Ferro1997, 32). In extremecases, such as Tasmaniain the 19thcentury,virtuallythe entire indigenous population was exterminated. Significantly, some scientists regardedthe Tasmaniansas a missing link betweenhumansandapes (Diamond 1993, 278-80). The social Darwinismof the late 19th centurybecame a moraljustification for exploitationand inequality.We do not disputethatin this period,elites must have found it easier to generatepublic consent for imperialistwars,but this mainlyreflects the failure to extend democraticnorms to non-Westernpeople. In other words, the norms-andconsent-basedexplanationsof the democraticpeace areindistinguishable. WorldWarII was in some ways a waragainstan extremeversionof the racistmentality.The universalnormsadoptedby the victorsprovideda visible sign thatnormsof fundamentalinequalitywere no longerthoughtof asjust. Crawford(1993, 53) refersto "along-termtrendtowardthe humanizationof the other."Russett(1993, 34-35) refers to the periodof colonial expansionas an era when the ethnocentricviews of the European colonizers automaticallyassumed that the people who were colonized did not have democraticinstitutions.Decolonization occurredwhen colonial governments lost confidence in their normativeright to rule. This change seems to be reflected in our findings. Democracyprovedin the end to be a restrainingforce in extrasystemic warfare.


APPENDIX A

System MembersthatHave FoughtExtrasystemicWars Country GreatBritain France Turkey/OttomanEmpire Russia Spain China Netherlands Austria-Hungary Argentina Germany Italy Portugal Ethiopia Cuba India Iraq Mexico1 United States Philippines1 Peru Egypt Yugoslavia Belgium Somalia Iran Indonesia Morocco Mauritania Total numberof wars

Colonial War 25 13 12 5 7 4 4 3 2 2 1 3

Imperial War

Total

17 12 3 7 1 2 1

42 25 15 12 8 6 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 149

1 1 2 3 2 2 2

1

84

SOURCE: Singer and Small (1994).

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 65

543

544


APPENDIXB

Incidenceof ExtrasystemicWar, MultivariateAnalyses, CountryDummies Subperiods Variables Constant Democracy European Europeandemocracy Otherconflicts Alliances Numberof colonies Urbanization(log) Peace-years Cubic spline la Cubic spline 2a' Cubic spline 3a b Austria-Hungary Chinab Franceb Germanyb Italyb Japanb

Russia/USSRb United Kingdomb United Statesb Log-likelihood ratio (df) Pseudo-R2 Number

WholePeriod -3.321*** (.287) -~0.193***(.031) 1.398*** (.277) 0. 132*** (.034) 0.603*** (.106) -0.013 (.048) 0.025*** (.008) 0.324*** (.053) -0.518*** (.032) -0.001*** (.000) 0.001*** (.000) -0.000*** (.000) -0.193 (.523) -0.035 (.422) 0.779*** (.185) 0.130 (.514) -0.172 (.339)

Colonial (1816-1869) -3.011*** -0.073 0.213 0.059 0.251 0.065 0.082*** 0.405** -0.505'*'* -0.006*** 0.003** -0.001I 0.600

2,308.12 (19) .53 10,131


-5.244*** (.936) -0.294*** (.l01) 2.987*** (.927) 0.260** (.104) 0.516*** (.183) -0.467** (.140) 0.050** (.021) 0.377** (.159) -0.459*** (.061) -0.003*** (.001) 0.002*** (.001) -0.000 (.000) -0.430 (1.027)

-3.046*** (.414) -0.214*** (.043) 0.538 (.492) 0.042 (.059) 0.995*** (.207) -0.140 (.090) 0.077*** (.025) 0.195** (.088) -1.389*** (.164) -0.014*** (.002) 0.0l0*** (.002) -~0.002* (.001)

___

1.288*** (.449) _d d

-c

0.748* 0.434 0.377

1.108** (.555) -0.407 (.843) __C

519.72

(15) .50 1,524

(.391) (.537) (.419)

-0.128 (.429) 1.995***(.672) -C C

_d

_c

d

0.063 (.235) 0.104 (.274) 3.266*** (.739)

(.641) (.082) (.751) (.095) (.186) (.109) (.031) (.206) (.088) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.682)


-0.323 (.490) -0.789 (.803) 5.927***(1.968) 655.38

(18) .48 3,308

_cS d

0.699

(.919) d

1,205.88 (14) .66 5,299

NOTE: Unstandardizedcoefficients from Poisson regression,with standarderrorsin parentheses. a. Coefficientsof peace-yearscubic splines segments. b. Only for those years when countryhad Correlatesof Warmajorpower status. c. No majorpower statusin the subperiod. d. Multicollinearityproblem,variabledeleted. *Significantat the .1 level. **Significantat the .05 level. ***Significantat the .01 level.


545

APPENDIX C

Incidence of ExtrasystemicWar, MultivariatePoisson Analyses, AlternativeModels Model 3

Model 2 imperial (1870-1945)


0.170 (1.751) -0.018 (.046) 0.485 (.359) 0.040 (.048) 0.300 (.240) 0.913*** (.345) -0.372** (.148) 0.015 (.009)

1.039 (1.022) -0.206*** (.055) 2.489*** (.530) 0.156** (.061) 0.848*** (.222) 0.029 (.304) -0.239** (.104) 0.049** (.018)

-0.269 (.236) (log) Energyconsumption per capita (log) Peace years -0.514*** (.078) -0.003*** (.001) Cubic spline Ia 0.002*** (.001) Cubic spline 2a Cubic spline 3a -0.000 (.000) Log-likelihood ratio (dJ) 345.10 (12) Pseudo-R2 .43 Number 1,631

-0.470*** (.139)

Variables Constant Democracy European Europeandemocracy Otherconflicts Majorpower Alliances Numberof colonies Real gross domestic productper capita

1.305*** -0.014*** 0.009*** -0.002

(.159) (.003) (.002) (.001)

1,052.74 (12)

.68 4,410

Imperial (1870-]945)


-1.885*** (.371) -0.O81* (.042) 0.377 (.320) O.099** (.042) 0.523*** (.186) 0.895*** (.266) -0.283** (.116) 0.009 (.008)

-2.742*** (.391) -0.207*** (.043) 1.713*** (.399) 0.131*** (.049) 1.232*** (.202) 0.316 (.289) -0.264*** (.098) 0.055** (.017)

0.062 (.088) -0.499*** (.063) -0.003*** (.001) 0.002*** (.000) -0.000 (.000)

-0.053 (.055) -1.456*** (i6) -0.015*** (.003) 0.010*** (.002) -0.002** (.001)

509.32 (12) .42 2,257

1,186.18 (12) .65 5,174

NOTE: Unstandardizedcoefficients from Poisson regression,with standarderrorsin parentheses. *Significantat the .1 level. **Significantat the .05 level. ***significant at the .01 level. a. Coefficients of peace-yearscubic splines segments.

546


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