Common Security and Defence Policy after Lisbon: bureaucratic ...

Common Security and Defence Policy after Lisbon: bureaucratic politics and the marginalisation of foreign policy, or who wants to be a foreign minister? Simon Sweeney University of York

Paper presented at the Political Studies Association Conference Cardiff, 25-27 March 2013

Simon Sweeney Lecturer International Political Economy & Business York Management School University of York PhD candidate Department of Politics and International Studies University of Leeds [email protected] DRAFT PAPER: PEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT FIRST CONTACTING AUTHOR 1

Common Security and Defence Policy after Lisbon: bureaucratic politics and the marginalisation of foreign policy, or who wants to be a foreign minister?

Simon Sweeney (University of York)

Abstract

The Lisbon Treaty attempted a link between the Commission and Council in the delivery of CSDP but an under-resourced European External Action Service is a weak inter-Pillar compromise. Permanent Structured Cooperation and a strengthened European Defence Agency could deliver capability enhancements, but there are few signs so far (Biscop, 2008, 2013; Mattelaer, 2010; Simòn, 2011).

Given that the EU has achieved substantial institutional innovation in this area, and that there is a reasonable degree of input legitimacy given the high degree of member state control, why is it that output legitimacy is so compromised? The paper comments on the frequently observed lack of capability (Witney, 2008; Howorth, 2009, 2010; Menon, 2009) and the lack of strategic direction (Biscop, 2008; Norheim-Martinsen, 20011) but argues that this is explained by bureaucratic politics and the marginalisation of foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War, a process exacerbated by the current financial crisis. Member state executives focus instead almost solely on the economy, trade and commerce. EU, G8, and G20 summits rarely address security and defence, the traditional domains of foreign ministers. CSDP, lacking salience at both executive and popular level, remains a bureaucratic construct below the radar of public engagement. While executives avoid the big questions of security and defence a strategic vacuum persists that diminishes the EU role in international affairs.

The paper uses data from research interviews with 25 policy actors and experts primarily in Brussels, Paris, London, Berlin and Sarajevo between 2009 and 2012.

Keywords: CSDP, foreign policy, security, strategic culture, strategy, actorness, legitimacy, executivisation, governance, bureaucratic politics

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1 Introduction

Foreign policy and defence remained for decades beyond the reach of the European integration process. Early attempts to incorporate a political dimension to the EEC failed in 1954 when a European Defence Community was rejected by the French National Assembly. From that moment the D-word remained beyond use until St Malo in 1998.

Defence, security and foreign affairs crises from Suez through to the Gulf War attracted only limited EEC attention, with even the end of the Cold War being an occasion for single state responses, with the hesitation from both London and Paris to the inevitability of German reunification being a prominent example. The disintegration of Yugoslavia similarly met with a fragmented response in 1991-92 while the EU remained fundamentally ill-equipped to respond to the unfolding Balkan crises throughout the decade. The Yugoslav wars stimulated a new EU approach to security matters, so the St Malo Declaration and subsequently European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) were directly attributable to exogenous pressures and failures on the part of the EU to act coherently, not only in respect of Bosnia and Kosovo, but also over Rwandan genocide in 1992.

St Malo triggered substantive EU policy innovation and ESDP was officially inaugurated in June 1999 at Leuven. In December the Helsinki Headline Goal followed, and despite divisions over Iraq, by 2003 ESDP was fully operational and the first EU missions were launched in Macedonia, Bosnia and DR Congo.

The so-called Solana institutions were the Council Secretariat, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and the Policy and Security Committee (PSC) which became the core decision-making forum in the ESDP process, albeit one widely considered to be ‘on message’ from member state capitals (Interviews 1, 15). Mérand et al (2011) describe the PSC as the reconstitution of state interests at the European level, and central to the emergent policy making bureaucracy in the security and defence fields. ESDP emerged as a manifestation of bureaucratic policy making, beyond multilevel governance, marked by horizontal as well as vertical communication channels, and described as ‘heterarchical’ by Mérand et al (2011). Evidence of Brusselizing (Allen, 1998; Mérand, 2008; Müller-BrandeckBocquet, 2002), albeit through appointments controlled by member states, arguably contributes to concerns about EU democratic deficit and lack of legitimacy. This paper suggests that the organisational frameworks of CSDP are central to its bureaucratic construct; they depend on and are constrained by a multiplicity of networked interactions, 3

and limited by an abundance of external constraints, one of which is the tendency for executives, or policy principals, to focus priorities on other areas, meaning the resources available to CSDP are restricted and even downgraded.

By 2005 Javier Solana, a proactive and innovative High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, began to lose influence and arguably the momentum behind ESDP declined (Interviews 22, 25). In response the Union sought to reinvigorate the initiative through the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, renaming ESDP as Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and launching the European External Action Service (EEAS) headed by Solana’s successor Baroness Ashton. But in spite of new institutional entities every few years designed to progress ESDP/CSDP including the European Defence Agency in 2004, Battlegroups in 2007 and the EEAS in 2010, the momentum receded. Why?

Institutional innovation has been a hallmark of the ESDP/CSDP process, but this paper argues that this reflects the fundamentally bureaucratic nature of the initiative. Applying logic explained by Allison and Zelikow (1999), the bureaucratic politics of CSDP may actually impede the development of EU capability and strategic actorness. ESDP made a promising start; it has launched 27 missions to date; but by the time the EEAS was operational in December 2010, the financial crisis had shifted attention to an existential challenge to the Union. At the same time CSDP suffered from a lack of strategic coherence, perhaps reflecting the downgraded status of foreign policy actors in international affairs. International summits are conducted between heads of government and tend to focus on trade and economic policy, rather than traditional foreign affairs interests like security and defence. The primacy of trade and economics in the construction of the EU is historical and contrasts with the peripheral positioning of foreign and security policy in spite of the grandiose rhetoric and institutional change that has accompanied this policy area since St Malo. The paper consists of four parts. 1) An overview of the major institutional changes around ESDP/CSDP, described in the context of bureaucratic politics; 2) the relationship between institutional innovation and legitimacy in security and defence policy making; 3) weak member state commitment to ESDP/CSDP: a focus on process and institution building has privileged input legitimacy at the expense of output legitimacy; 4) the proposition that the peripheral role of foreign policy representatives in EU forums and other summits suggests evidence of ‘executivisation’ which marginalises CSDP, and contributes to a lack of strategic coherence and an absence of actorness in foreign and security fields.

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The bureaucratic politics of CSDP is therefore posited as a partial explanation for the lack of strategic coherence. The conclusion suggests areas for further research into the concept of executivisation and the proposition that foreign ministers and strategic security and defence policy have a diminished role in international affairs.

2 Institutional changes

Before St Malo in 1998 two processes accounted for EEC/EU foreign and security policy. During the 1980s European Political Cooperation attempted to bring coherence to policy statements from member states, whereby the European Commission could represent the ‘community view’ on major foreign policy developments. EPC worked reasonably well but it never amounted to more than tepid declarations that might be countermanded by individual member states.

The Maastricht negotiations sought to progress EPC but the Pillar architecture of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) affirmed Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as an intergovernmental arena. Indeed common foreign and security policy throughout the 1990s was more aspiration than reality as member states adopted different perspectives on the major challenges of the decade, particularly German reunification and the Yugoslav crisis. CFSP was arguably a response to the divisions manifest in Germany’s early recognition of Slovene and Croatian independence, a decision which while recognising the inevitable, would have looked more assured had it received the backing of the entire European Community. The subsequent crisis over Bosnia Herzegovina likewise drew an initially incoherent EU response.

The President Chirac/Prime Minister Blair St Malo initiative drew support from other member states at the Leuven Council meeting which established ESDP. The Helsinki Headline Goal followed, setting ambitious targets to create an EU rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops deployable within 60 days for up to a year. The appointment of Javier Solana, formerly a NATO chief, as EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and French rapprochement with NATO helped assuage fears that ESDP would be a rival to the transatlantic Alliance.

Since Maastricht and especially since St Malo there has been a considerable degree of institutional innovation in this policy field under the leadership of the first High Representative for the Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Javier Solana (Smith, 2004; 5

Mattelaer, 2010). Within the ambit of the European Council, and strictly under an intergovernmental regime with state rights of veto and opt out applying, ESDP spawned a Council Secretariat, a body of 200-plus officials appointed by member state governments as a kind of ESDP-civil service answerable to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the latter composed of member state Ambassadors typically ‘on message’ from their governments. The PSC exercised overall control of ESDP while the Secretariat embraces a number of specialist units involved in management and implementation, notably the EU Military Committee (EUMC) comprised of member state Military Chiefs. EUMC is the highest military body in the European Council. It is

responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all matters military within the EU. It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework (European Council, 2001).

It also provides military direction to the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and receives from EUMS strategic military options in crisis management. It forwards these with evaluations, military advice, and risk assessment to the PSC. EUMC also supplies financial estimates for crisis management military costs.

Given the focus within ESDP on humanitarian intervention and civilian crisis management (CCM) this structure underwent change following ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the renaming of ESDP as the Common Security and Defence Policy. CSDP is ‘conceived as a crisis management tool’ (Mattelaer, 2010:3).

Solana also oversaw the creation in 2004 of the European Defence Agency (EDA) tasked with securing rationalisation and efficiency gains in equipment procurement and enhanced cooperation between member state militaries. The EDA is not a Council body and while it has remained small, it manages to highlight the wasteful consequences of derogation from the Treaty of Rome in respect of procurement law. States can claim ‘the defence of national security interests’ while protecting local industries in supplying their own militaries, often leading to duplication in research and production as well as problems of interoperability between allied forces, thereby undermining not only ESDP but also NATO.

ESDP achieved some significant successes in a number of missions, both civilian and military, but most remained small scale and relatively straightforward; problems of coherence were evident, especially concerning the speed and efficiency of equipping missions, 6

determining command structures, and launching them in a timely and effective manner (Grevi, Helly, and Keohane, 2009).

These deficiencies spurred further reform, notably the introduction of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) charged with improving coordination between civilian and military aspects of crisis management (Drent and Zandee, 2010). The Lisbon Treaty introduced the European External Action Service (EEAS) comprising EU Delegations in former conflict countries, supported by efforts to better coordinate the Commission role in human rights, democracy and stabilisation initiatives, aid, trade and other economic incentives as well as the overall management of EU engagement with third countries, including responsibility for CSDP missions. The new EU High Representative Baroness Ashton has a double role post-Lisbon, as head of the EEAS and Vice President of the Commission, an arrangement designed to secure better Commission/Council collaboration. The Council maintains a general oversight role over CSDP, still exercised through the PSC. Lisbon therefore attempts better cross pillar coordination. It also introduces Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) which aims to ensure cooperation between member states on an issue-by-issue basis so that states able and willing to contribute to an initiative or mission can do so even if others prefer to remain detached. However Battlegroups, operational since 2007, have not yet been deployed and a conceptual criticism of the BG arrangement is that states may withdraw, which at the very least is likely to undermine mission effectiveness or abort a mission completely. It also undermines the coherence of the entire CSDP concept.

Since February 2010 the PSC is provided with a Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) within the Council Secretariat. The CMPD is at the heart of mission planning and policy implementation, responsible for drafting a crisis management concept (CMC) which covers the political and military aspects of a crisis intervention. The military input comes from the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS) while the civilian expertise is provided by the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability unit (CPCC).

The CIV-MIL cooperation and

comprehensive vision within CMPD is intended to secure coherence in crisis intervention. CMPD also engages with the Commission in terms of the economic and political implications of crisis management, including the Commission role in post-crisis stabilization, economic matters, democracy and rule of law, human rights and institutional development. The CMPD therefore encapsulates the ‘toolbox’ approach of the CSDP, and furthermore ensures the cross-pillar holistic nature of CSDP. The CMC is presented to the PSC for comment and 7

recommendation, before forwarding to the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and the Council of Ministers for approval. The PSC continues to exercise oversight once a mission is undertaken, receiving local reports from Mission Commanders and from EU Delegations.

The CMPD is supported and informed by the EUMC and the EUMS on operational matters. All elements are technically within the ambit of the EEAS which has oversight of 123 EU Delegations worldwide. In Bosnia Herzegovina for example the EUFOR Althea mission is now under the auspices of the EEAS and continues to report to the EU Senior Representative (EUSR) now incorporated in the EU Delegation in Sarajevo. The EEAS brings further advantage in that it links the foreign policy interests of the Council and the PSC with the Commission given the fact that the Union’s High Representative is also the Vice President of the Commission. The Commission, being responsible for Community interests in trade, aid, external relations, and budgetary matters has a further interest in the EEAS through staffing links with EU Delegations and all forms of policy implementation, information gathering, diplomacy and bilateral relations with third parties, including a decisive interest in the Copenhagen Criteria and relations with pre-accession states or potential candidates for pre-accession status.

Among criticism of the institutional arrangements, there are doubts over whether the HR/VP of the Commission can bridge the pillar divide and whether the complex structures and small staff of the EEAS can deliver the coherence required for an effective CSDP (Mauri and Gya, 2009). It may also be argued that the new EEAS is a shoestring exercise in terms of budget and that it was introduced as a compromise between the Council and the Commission, entirely lacking the power to make the required leap forward to EU actorness in international security. A Brussels insider refers to ‘turf wars’ between the Commission and the Council in respect of how the EEAS was established in 2010 (Interview 9) while a Berlin-based expert speaks of rivalry between the CPCC and the CMPD (Interview 22). The complex dynamics of influence and decision making around CSDP reflects typical aspects of the bureaucracy of government organizations, described by Allison and Zelikow as follows: (Government organizations) are called into being by political processes; their goals – like their masters – are often diffuse; (they) are especially burdened by unique constraints; they cannot keep their profits; they have limited control over organization of production; they have limited control over their goals; they have external (as well as internal) goals governing their administrative procedures; and their outputs take a 8

form that often defy easy evaluation of success or failure (Allison and Zelikow, 1999:149. Allison and Zelikow highlight how organizations’ limited resources constrain their ability to fulfil goals set by their masters, and inertia sets in as the transaction costs of change increase. In other words an inevitable characteristic of bureaucracies is the obligation to compromise on what their masters might wish for or define as organizational goals. This seems an apt observation where CSDP is concerned and may help explain an apparently disappointing level of achievement and even strategic incoherence. Organizations do not lack central purpose or goals, but they easily become prey to ‘bureaucratic drift’ (Allison and Zelikow, 1999:152). They adopt rules, norms and routines where satisficing is the rule – stopping with the first alternative that is good enough (…) the menu of choice is severely limited and success is more likely to be defined simply as compliance with relevant rules (Allison and Zelikow, 1999:152).

This matches the observation that ESDP/CSDP represents a policy field where actions are undertaken on the basis of lowest common denominator agreement. (Smith, 2008:10, Rynning, 2011:30) and echoed by several respondents for this research (Interviews, 8, 9, 12, 14, 17, 22). It also matches closely with frustrations voiced unanimously by EUFOR Althea officials in Sarajevo commenting on the relationship between Brussels and the Althea mission (Interviews, 15-22). The prevailing view is that the member states do not have much interest in political process or progress in Sarajevo, and Althea becomes a mere holding operation governed by the principle that if there is no return to violence all must be well – or well enough. Upholding the Dayton Agreement, the core mandate for the mission, is seen as adequate achievement.

The fact that bureaucracies necessarily require compromise should not blind their masters to the need for efficiency gains. Norheim-Martinsen (2011) and Mattelaer (2010) call for better civil-military coordination in CSDP and for greater engagement with CSDP, which remains handicapped by small staffing numbers, around 240 in the Council Secretariat and about 2,000 in the EEAS. The EDA consistently calls for rationalization and efficiency but its recommendations are easily ignored. It fundamentally lacks power being entirely dependent on the member states and the PSC (Interviews 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, 24, 25). One informant described the EDA as continually faced with ‘bureaucratic inertia’ (Interview 2).

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Having looked at the institutional structures of CSDP and located these within the conceptual challenge of bureaucratic politics, this paper now addresses questions of CSDP legitimacy.

3 Legitimacy and CSDP

The claim that the European integration process has been elite-led and lacks legitimacy is central to the notion of democratic deficit. The conceptual framework for legitimacy used in this paper follows Comelli (2010) in using the typology set by Wolfgang Weber (2005) whereby legitimacy has three dimensions: 1) legitimacy as ensured by effective governance (“government for the people” or “output legitimacy”); 2) legitimacy as ensured by participatory procedures (“government by the people” or “input legitimacy”, the latter of which, in turn, may take place at national and/or European level); and 3) compliance with international law (Comelli, 2010:83). Output legitimacy dictates that the results of CSDP should be adequately successful in returning public benefits proportionate to cost. Output legitimacy is difficult to assess but the EU normally reports its missions to have been successful, and in terms of the minimal costs involved, they are (Interview, 18). Missions are typically described as reasonably successful within the terms of their limited remits (Menon, 2009; Grevi, Helly and Keohane, 2009). It is not especially testing of ESDP if the missions undertaken are relatively small and straightforward, avoiding especially challenging situations. The largest ESDP military mission, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1994, was effectively a badge change from NATO to the EU with the aim to uphold the Dayton Accords, making it essentially a holding operation. Critics, and officials working for EUFOR Althea interviewed for this research, argue that EUFOR Althea lacks strategic purpose and reflects a widespread failure not just of the EU but of other international organisations to secure political and social development in a fractured post-conflict state, theoretically en route to EU membership but in reality many years from this being a feasible position (Interviews, 15-21).

On occasions such as Chad in 2008, DR Congo in the same year, or the Darfur Crisis where the EU might have launched a mission but member states refused participation, there is clearly no output. This implies that assessment of the effectiveness of ESDP/CSDP should depend not only on what actual missions have or have not achieved, but what has not been 10

achieved as a consequence of inaction. In probably the major test of EU foreign policy coordination since Iraq, the Arab Spring has not drawn a coherent response. The Libyan crisis highlighted divisions as the eventual Franco-British intervention with US support underlined EU weakness and in particular the different interests among member states, as Germany and Poland refused involvement. While the Iranian nuclear threat has been met by consistent and partially successful EU diplomacy led by France, Britain and Germany, there has been less obvious unity over the on-going crises in Egypt and Syria. France and the UK appear to favour ending an EU arms embargo on Syria, but getting this proposal accepted by 27 EU member states many of whom fear a regional escalation of conflict looks an impossible task (Traynor, 2013). This year France intervened unilaterally in Mali, not waiting for an EU combined effort. Arguably such challenges are beyond the scope of a policy framework that began little more than a decade ago, but if a criterion for success and for legitimacy is output, then the EU scorecard is not especially impressive.

Input legitimacy requires adequate oversight and engagement by parliaments and state authorities, with genuine policy making accountability. This is especially relevant to CSDP as a subset of Common Foreign and Security Policy, since CFSP is designated as intergovernmental and lacks supranational institutions. Member state governments have primacy in the policy making process and actions and policies under CSDP are entirely dependent on the will of states. But substantial innovations in institutional structures within a short time frame means that CSDP is not purely intergovernmental. This according to Comelli (2010) raises important questions of legitimacy. Furthermore, there has been a twofold weakness in CSDP that undermines the credibility of the Union as an actor in international affairs: the rhetoric used to describe the EU contribution to international security is not matched by results, nor is it matched by capability or by actorness. Secondly, the assumption that the EU is a normative power (Manners, 2002) and therefore bathed in the warm glow of legitimacy is not justified: normative power does not equal legitimacy.

Post-Lisbon, in a bid to secure the improved legitimacy of CSDP, the High Representative is tasked with ensuring that CFSP is referred to the European Parliament and that its opinion is taken into account (Comelli, 2010; Quille, 2010). Quille argues that Lisbon delivers the promise of improved legitimacy through national and European Parliamentary oversight, and also through the opportunity for more inclusive and wide ranging debate about the strategic objectives of CSDP. But judging from past experience this is very much the triumph of hope over expectation. Smith (2005) comments on the lack of debate, and the low level of public knowledge of ESDP. An informant interviewed for this research echoed this, arguing that 11

there was almost no debate anywhere even prior to the publication of the European Security Strategy (Interview 3). Another respondent commented that the Report on the Implementation of the ESS in 2008 also produced no debate (Interview 10). Likewise a Berlin-based expert affirmed that in Germany there is studied avoidance of debate on CSDP (Interview 25) echoing a similar view expressed by an SPD member of the Bundestag (Interview 24).

There is no evidence of this foreign and security policy debate taking off, and still less of CSDP becoming the focus of strategic planning about how the EU can achieve its stated goal of becoming a global power or even, according to Simòn (2011) a regional hegemon. Indeed Simòn argues that the stakes are extremely high: a strategic CSDP is essential for the survival of the European Union. If debate is needed to deliver more legitimacy then there is no sign of this, almost four years after Lisbon ratification. Arguably the profile of CSDP has actually diminished given the focus on the financial crisis and the Eurozone.

Furthermore European Parliament opinion on CSDP is hardly power. The only significant EP role is some control over the budget of non-military CSDP missions. But while the EP monitors the CFSP budget for civilian missions, member states may choose to supply additional funding to cover their own personnel costs (Comelli, 2010), so in fact the EP cannot set the ceiling on expenditure even for a civilian mission. Military operations are financed by the Athena mechanism whereby a fund of contributions proportional to gross national income meets core costs, and the contributing member states pay for operational expenditure on the basis of ‘costs lie where they fall’, a mechanism widely criticised as inadequate (Witney, 2008; Biscop, 2008), also by respondents (Interviews 9, 23) although one Secretariat official felt this problem was exaggerated (Interview 6).

Apart from the opportunity for some binary level parliamentary scrutiny, the institutional structure of ESDP/CSDP offers other opportunities for scrutiny and therefore enhanced legitimacy on account of state representation in key committees, such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). CSDP legitimacy is therefore rooted in the intergovernmental nature of CFSP, and the institutional structures to defend the principle of member state oversight and ultimate authority over EU security and defence policy. The institutional structures of CSDP need to be assessed from the perspective of legitimacy, and also from the effectiveness of the CSDP planning process. Legitimacy in an 12

intergovernmental field requires a high level of member state control but member states have tended to avoid hard decisions about capability and strategic purpose. In other words the high level of member state political oversight secures a form of legitimacy, but it may be at the expense of operational effectiveness. Permanent Structured Cooperation may offer a possible way forward, but thus far there is little evidence of positive results.

As Comelli (2010) points out one of the objectives of EU security and defence policy is the promotion of democracy, so it would hardly be conducive to the reputation of the EU or its ability to project positive values if CSDP added to problems of democratic deficit. Accountability and scrutiny by national parliaments ought to be vital elements in security and defence policy making, but the extent to which scrutiny and control over policy is located in national parliaments is open to question, as it varies among member states. In the UK, Italy and Germany it is executives and their appointees which shape security and defence policy making. This has certainly been true where ESDP/CSDP is concerned although rhetoric has exceeded achievement, as for example Prime Minister Tony Blair declared in Warsaw that ‘we need a vastly improved European defence capability so that (we can) undertake actions in our own right (where NATO chooses not to act)’ (Blair, cited in Howorth, 2007:43). The EU uses compliance with international law as a means to legitimise CSDP actions. Mission deployment should conform to international treaties, be backed by UN resolutions, and have clear support from relevant international institutions. This has been true of EU missions under ESDP/CSDP.

Thus far we can summarise four points.

1) Output legitimacy is hampered by the lack of capability and strategic clarity in CSDP. 2) Input legitimacy through parliamentary oversight, whether national or European, is at best limited and public debate, or even debate among governing elites, is barely evident, as the subject is mostly avoided. 3) States are involved in the institutional processes of CSDP, having decisive control over key institutional bodies in Brussels, thus ensuring significant input legitimacy. 4) Member state control is at the expense of strategic clarity; it limits the potential to deliver outcomes that might match the rhetoric espoused at regular intervals since the St Malo Declaration.

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While institutional innovation has been impressive, there remains a fundamental reluctance on the part of states to provide CSDP with either strategic coherence or adequate capability, which in turn hinders its output legitimacy. CSDP has delivered a significant and reasonably coherent institutional community, but not a political community able to make a strategic difference. This was summed up by one respondent as follows:

We have an EEAS, we have institutions and we have missions, but this amounts to a technical kind of strategic community, not a political one (Interview 25).

According to Mattelaer (2010) institutional development has delivered a CSDP that is more accountable than processes undertaken by either NATO or the UN, an assessment which suggests considerable legitimacy for CSDP process. PSC authority and member state involvement, for example in the EUMC, ensures a high level of oversight. Indeed the legitimacy credentials of CSDP compare favourably not only with other international institutions but with other areas of EU policy. Nevertheless, the apparent effectiveness of the institutional machinery is in many ways illusory, a situation which compromises output legitimacy.

The extent of state involvement with CSDP indicates weaknesses that stem from the bureaucratisation of the policy area at the EU level, and from low level of state commitment. CSDP is operational but is not strategic; its marginalisation demonstrates that security and defence policy no longer occupies the high profile it once had in international politics.

3 Weak state commitment to CSDP

Various criticisms of the lack of strategic coherence in CSDP have appeared, notably Howorth (2009), Biscop and Coelmont (2010), Simòn (2011). Simòn is critical of the reactive focus on crisis management and argues for a wider strategic focus that could deliver: the EU’s strategic objectives, namely the exercise of global power and a leadership role in promoting security and prosperity in the broader European neighbourhood (Simòn, 2011:10).

Instead CSDP provides for detailed stage-by-stage and almost paper-by-paper political oversight, ‘a remarkable feature of the CSDP planning process’ (Mattelaer, 2010), but this is 14

accompanied by weak operational capability and an acute lack of strategic direction. States therefore have engaged with CDSP in institution building and by posting personnel to Brussels to represent state interests, but this is effectively a bureaucracy building exercise. Member states control CSDP processes and determine the (limited) resources placed at the disposal of CSDP, but capability deficiencies are maintained by the lack of member state commitment.

Furthermore states continue to hamper the EU effort to substantially contribute to international security, an ambition clearly stated in the European Security Strategy and reiterated in Lisbon.

From St Malo onwards rhetoric has far exceeded capability and

achievement. As argued above, if CSDP does not achieve its stated goals (outputs), legitimacy is compromised.

The Political and Security Committee for example, despite its collegiate nature and its tendency towards an esprit de corps sympathetic to a degree of Europeanization of security and defence policy (Interview 2) remains essentially on message from member state capitals. Various informants questioned about the institutional coherence of CSDP repeatedly affirmed that ‘states call the shots’ and that CSDP is entirely dependent on what is approved by the PSC and made available to Operations Commanders (Interviews 1, 2, 9, 14). Variations on this dominant role of the member states include the view that ESDP was essentially driven by France (Interview 12) or that states have cooled on the whole project (Interviews 3, 25). It remains to be seen whether the new post-Lisbon structures can take CSDP forward (Interview 6) but this is unlikely to be decisive without personalities and leadership, a common complaint among respondents (Interviews 1, 2, 7, 13, 15, 18, 24, 25).

The control element in CSDP is doubly effective in that EUMC and CIVCOM provide detailed technical checks while the PSC provides the political oversight (Mattelaer, 2010). The irony however is that accountability can lead to limiting micro-level interference:

The elaborate procedural model in the CSDP ensures the constant involvement of the political level and fosters accountability and oversight by elected governments. Yet it also creates opportunities for political micromanagement that may be ill informed about the operational context and it leaves less room for prudent planning for hypothetical contingencies (Mattelaer, 2010:9).

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Mattelaer highlights several procedural deficiencies. The Operation Commander is appointed late in the planning process. There being no permanent CSDP Operational HQ, each HQ has to be established from scratch for every mission. This is wasteful and time consuming and detracts from efficient and coordinated implementation (Mattelaer, 2010; Simòn 2011). Naturally the absence of a permanent OHQ is a result of political obstructionism at a state level. The usual ‘neuralgic issue of sovereignty’ (Interview 11) is a barrier to common sense. Finally the Operations Commander, furnished with an Operation Plan, has to petition adequate resources from member states, and if these are not forthcoming, critical delays ensue, or a single state has to make up the deficiencies, as happened with EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2008-09 which ended up looking like a French operation rather than an EU mission. Simòn (2011) argues that failures in the military planning stage led to delays in mission implementation for EUFOR Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina, EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 and EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2008/09. Lessons learned surely point to the need to improve military planning in order to achieve rapid reaction capability. A complication in the planning stage regarding lessons learned is that

military-strategic lessons are often politically sensitive and this complicates any developmental action to resolve these lessons and implement any changes that may be required (Interview 13).

This respondent further expressed the view that while there is a lot of expertise in the planning process there remains a lack of sharing of information and inefficiency in learning from experience; there is a lack of linkage between the various Council Secretariat and Operation Command bodies, so while the PSC is at the centre of a network of expertise, a lack of sharing impedes quality in the planning process. This opinion suggests that the focus on the PSC and the authority vested in that body, and in its communication with its political masters in the member state capitals, risks by-passing important knowledge that could enhance the effectiveness of CSDP, especially if there were better cooperation between the civilian and military aspects, which is clearly meant to happen within CMPD.

A further illustration of poor member state commitment concerns the European Defence Agency (EDA). It aims to enhance operational capacity and efficiency through harmonisation and rationalisation, identification of needs, monitoring states’ capability commitments, and facilitating cooperation in both research and industry. The difficulty is that states are under no obligation to take any notice of EDA suggestions, so it has brought only modest achievements. Capability levels remain grossly deficient despite the EDA urging member 16

states towards better coordination, research and development cooperation, a genuine European defence equipment market, and more transnational partnering in defence-related manufacturing. Defence industry cooperation is referred to as an ‘issue of industry viability, especially with the USA’s technical superiority’ (Moustakis and Violakis, 2008:426). The EDA has no right of initiative and can only respond to state requests from which it produces recommendations.

The EDA has no authority and it is entirely up to the member states whether they accept or ignore EDA advice (Interviews 7, 10). A senior EDA official commented:

The EDA is a small agency, separate from the Council and it can only work with the backing of the member states. We are totally dependent on the states, and we can only respond to state initiatives (Interview 7).

In terms of instruments, the EU does have in its arsenal (if that is not a too ironic word) a range of civilian approaches to the conduct of its external relations. Clearly the EU, as a primarily civilian and soft power, can deploy diplomatic pressures, economic incentives, trade, aid, and other benefits to third parties, many of which are explicitly conditional on ‘good behaviour’. Indeed there is an element of coercion in how the EU deploys soft power. It can use trade policy as a milieu shaping instrument to secure benefits to the EU, as for example in agricultural policy and farm products trading. The European Security Strategy however refers to the ‘toolbox’ approach including the use of force:

we need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention (Solana, 2003:11)

The full range of instruments extends from polite diplomacy and trade agreements to armed intervention in crisis situations, including the need to enforce peace where there is none. But there has been no obvious commitment to go beyond the rhetoric, either of St Malo, which promised ‘autonomous defence’ or the ESS ‘robust intervention’.

The ESS appeared to define the purpose of ESDP soon after the debacle of the EU split over Iraq, but at the same time it lacked strategic content (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). The Council Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy in 2008 was ‘a missed opportunity’ to update it in any meaningful way (Interview 10). It remains an effective elucidation of contemporary security threats, but while it refers to the EU ambition regarding 17

its international obligations to secure a better world, it is absolutely vague on how this can be achieved in practice, or what instruments and level of capability should be made available.

There has long been, and remains a lack of credibility famously highlighted two decades ago by Hill (1993) as a capability-expectations gap, and still unresolved (Toje, 2008). Many have bemoaned the lack of capability (Heisbourg, 2000; Hyde-Price, 2004; Witney, 2008; Menon, 2009) and others the strategic weaknesses of ESDP/CSDP (Biscop, 2009; Biscop et al, 2009; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010; Simòn, 2011; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Biscop and Norheim-Martinsen, 2012) to which this paper returns in its conclusion.

In summarising this section, several key pronouncements have attempted to frame the objectives of ESDP/CSDP. The rhetoric employed at St Malo, in the Helsinki Headline Goal, in the European Security Strategy and again in the Lisbon Treaty has clearly implied that the EU should play a major role in shaping international security and in responding to security threats. That it has achieved neither the means nor the political will to match this aspiration is not a question of legitimacy, it is an issue of leadership and political will on the part of the member states.

The final section of this paper suggests an explanation for this failure.

4 Executivisation: the marginalisation of foreign policy

Section 2 above suggested the bureaucratic nature of political process, underpinned by the complex web of institutions and actors involved, is a partial explanation for why results are invariably less than expectations might indicate. It was argued that in the context of bureaucratic politics, lowest common denominator agreements and therefore low levels of both ambition and outcomes are to be expected. This section adds further to these conclusions, suggesting that there are other reasons too, concerning the profile of traditional foreign policy concerns and the personalities involved that further inhibit the attainment of tangible and substantial benefits from a policy framework like CSDP.

It is evident that the rhetoric surrounding CSDP adds to the sense that achievement has been limited. There is evident frustration in the frequent appeals for CSDP to be more strategic, to focus more on capacity building, and to secure a greater level of actorness in foreign and security policy. 18

What would deliver CSDP salience, substance and actorness? St Malo states that the EU should gain the capability to act autonomously in defence of its interests. This suggests either independence from NATO or that EU states could be independent of the USA from within NATO. In either case it is likely that the EU member states would have to substantially increase their military capacity and willingness to engage in crisis intervention. In times of austerity however, there is little sign of this from any member state, not even from the traditionally heavier defence spenders. In recent years France and Britain, while not averse to forces deployment, have undertaken unilateral or bilateral efforts especially in limited coalitions with US participation, as in Libya. They have not sought to intervene as part of a pan-European or EU-led effort, but, as Menon points out:

If Europeans, including the French and British, aspire to exert real influence over international security affairs, they must do so collectively, or not at all (Menon, 2013).

Austerity ought to push member states towards the cost saving rationality that the EDA advocates. Heisbourg (2000) and Witney (2008) have suggested that capability gains might be achieved even without massive budgetary increases. In 2011 European NATO member states collectively spent almost $234bn defence (NATO, 2012). Efficiencies combined with pooling and sharing (Biscop, 2013) could deliver substantial capability enhancement even with current levels of expenditure. Currently around 80 percent of all defence expenditure on equipment is bought nationally (Valasek, 2011).

The second shift needed is political will: firstly to accept the logic of pooling and sharing, and therefore to confront the neuralgic issue of sovereignty; political will requires leadership and strategic thinking, such as can only emerge from public debate about security issues, security threats, and how to confront them. This debate has not taken place and leadership has not been forthcoming either from heads of government, from minsters for foreign affairs, from the European Commission, nor from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton. Why not?

I suggest that foreign policy representatives in EU forums and strategic questions around defence and security have been marginalised by the need to resolve the financial crisis engulfing the eurozone since 2010. International affairs have been dominated by heads of government and finance ministers in combination with technocrats and officials from the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and representatives from 19

multinational corporations. This reflects the executivisation of politics. In the words of one Berlin-based informant for this paper, asked about the potential for the strategic culture referred to in the European Security Strategy:

This needs a metalevel approach but the problem is that states and traditional state frameworks as well as international organisations like the EU are less relevant now. Business interests and corporations are dominant, energy interests, and NGOs are much more influential (Interview 25).

The same informant refers to the declining role of Foreign Ministers: (They) are no longer so important (…) even the European Council agenda is no longer set by Foreign Ministers, they don’t prepare the Council meetings. What we see is the ‘Presidentialization’ of the Council; it is run by Heads of Government more or less entirely. The focus is only on the heads of government and finance ministers. They listen more to business than to foreign ministers. Hilary Clinton isn’t Henry Kissinger, Guido Westervalle isn’t Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Classical diplomacy is no longer so apparent, but organisations like Transparency International are increasing their role (ibid).

The declining role of foreign ministers contributes to the enduring weakness of EU foreign policy, and the declining significance of foreign policy per se as a political domain, and of foreign policy actors. The policy area becomes a victim of the Executivisation of policy making. On the other hand there is some consistency in this EU marginalisation of foreign policy as the Union has been constructed not on the basis of foreign policy coordination but on the technical coordination of economic interests through the Single European Market, always the driving factor in the integration process. It is true that foreign ministers no longer set the Council agenda but their role was never to explicitly coordinate foreign policy between member states. Nevertheless their role at Council Summits has diminished and now they resemble mere bag carriers for Heads of State and Heads of Government.

The decline of foreign policy even for individual member states stems from the end of the Cold War. Since then priority has shifted from survival to policy coordination aimed at securing economic, trade and business benefits. The ending of the Cold War explains why the attempt to build a Common Foreign and Security Policy and now a Common Security and Defence Policy is never likely to be more than a minor element in the European Union 20

panoply, despite the rhetoric from various pronouncements referred to in this paper. In this context defence interests lose salience, especially as territorial and existential threat is no longer what it was during the Cold War. EU foreign policy, suddenly on the coat tails of the agenda at Maastricht, remains under-developed and under-resourced. In spending terms it manages only about 6 percent of the total EU budget, and member states continue to cut defence spending. Another informant comments: There are no major security threats. Russia isn’t one, and cannot be. Iran isn’t a threat now. Any other kind of threat is non-traditional: illegal immigration, political and Islamic extremism, international crime. There’s no military threat (Interview 2).

This respondent refers without irony to a Simon Jenkins Guardian article suggesting the UK cut military spending completely to solve the budget problem (Jenkins, 2010). Post-Cold War there is no focus on geo-strategy but instead a preoccupation with geo-economy

(which becomes) the subject of Heads of Government summits, EU Summits, G20, G8. These are not for foreign ministers (Interview 25).

According to this logic the EEAS can never achieve impact because security policy is not unequivocally understood as a domain of strategic importance. Instead it is perceived as a technocratic and bureaucratic policy area, mired in the further bureaucratization of the European Union. As such it cannot achieve the strategic relevance demanded by its critics in the Egmont Institute and other foreign policy think tanks. Strategy is no longer the concern of foreign policy actors. Instead economic and geo-political strategy has moved to the G8, the G20, the IMF, the ECB perhaps, the inheritors of the technocratic role of the Committee of Central Bank Governors set up in 1963 to resolve the problem of European exchange rate instability and dollar hegemony (James, 2013). These are the key actors now. Christine Lagarde at the IMF and Mario Draghi at the ECB are more important figures in any European strategic community than Baroness Ashton or any of the 27 member state foreign ministers, or even all combined.

The view of the Berlin-based informant cited above is that the EU is a Treaty-based and legalistic organisation where law counts for more than strategic power. The EU is concerned with governance, able to project normative influence on good governance and multilateralism; it represents values and respect for human rights; it can exert pressure for political reform in Burma, in Cuba and elsewhere, perhaps even on Iran, but as regards 21

strategic culture as understood by Cornish and Edwards (2001) it is deficient, almost irrelevant.

The United States on the other hand has a developed strategic culture supported by strategic power, enabled by the fact that the USA is a state and one that uses the dollar to uphold hegemonic status in the international environment. The EU in contrast is not a state and it has the euro which is weak. So while it is a normative and legalistic power, it does not exercise strategic power and has a poorly developed strategic culture. As James (2013) argues the single currency was supposed to resolve this problem but it has not done so, and nor will it until the ECB is given the tools to act as a central bank within a fiscal and political union. Until that moment the EU is in no position to combine both money and power for strategic ends. A strategic community for the EU is the sine qua non of a strategic culture, and would depend on a strong euro, fiscal union and the ECB being a lender of last resort. Instead of this happening any time soon, individual state interests continue to conduct separate interest-based issue-by-issue non-strategic foreign policies and are increasingly irrelevant. Geo-strategic economic summitry prevails, where governance is determined by leading state executives and the interests of multinational corporations.

The dominance of heads of state and a few others in the G8, the G20, the IMF have the potential to completely marginalise the European Union (Interview 25).

A further impediment to the EU developing a strategic culture is that Germany, in many ways the central player in the future of CSDP, has been acculturated into not having a strategic culture of any kind. German public opinion as well as much of the political class fails to distinguish between military intervention and militarism (Interview 25) and in the view of a prominent Bundestag member, utterly avoids public debate on security and defence (Interview 24). If there was a strategic culture before 1991 it was American-determined and Atlanticist, but since 1991 there has been a vacuum and ‘If Germany doesn’t have (a strategic culture), then Europe cannot have one’ (Interview 25).

The same respondent considers the prospects for the EU achieving a coherent strategic culture - and so substantiating CSDP - to be exceptionally poor. Even the EDA lacks support in Germany because the defence industrial sector is of growing importance to Germany and it is able to achieve valuable global exports in this field as in many others. A law-based rather than power-based EU cannot attract the right people, and people go where the power is, so they are attracted by finance and business, not politics. 22

In Germany we have a business culture not a strategic culture, and in politics as in business it is relations with the BRIC countries that matter. We are more global than European. In trade terms Germany does okay, and there’s an idea around that Germany can be like a big Switzerland (Interview, ibid).

This argument emphasises the pre-eminence of commerce over politics, as Germany edges towards a renewed mercantilism, led by an increasingly confident and globally-oriented business community, where there is a feeling that Germany might do without Europe, not in any short term radical response, but in economic self sufficiency. Germany looks beyond Europe in the way that the United Kingdom Eurosceptics wish that Britain could. The difference is that Germany has the manufacturing and exporting clout to be successful whereas the UK is in terminal decline, overly dependent on a financial services sector rocked to its foundations by the fallout from the financial crisis that the UK and the City in large measure contributed to through excessive deregulation and banking autonomy.

The US meanwhile retains a strong strategic culture and a global role, while Europe is at most regional but potentially merely provincial and local. Brussels as a political community is dismissed as ‘bloodless with respect to power, and power is what counts’ (Interview 25).

The explanation offered above explains why CSDP has not achieved actorness and why it still lacks capability. If the EU has a strategic culture it is no more than embryonic, a view expressed by numerous interviewees for this research (Interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 22, 23). CSDP in this context is a long way from delivering a significant EU contribution to international security.

Conclusion

This paper has suggested that executivisation has marginalised foreign policy actors and limited the prospects for CSDP achieving the substance (Shepherd, 2003) necessary for the EU to become a global security actor. The EU continues to lack of both strategic coherence and actorness in foreign and security policy while in defence it makes only a negligible contribution as NATO provides the guarantee of territorial integrity.

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Consideration of the relationship between CSDP and legitimacy shows that the field demonstrates input legitimacy and accountability given the primary role of member states in the major CSDP institutions, notably the Political and Security Committee and the related bodies in and around the Council Secretariat. This reflects the continuing intergovernmental character of CFSP but also its complex of multilevel and heterarchical frameworks. However a lack of debate and weak leadership undermines input legitimacy and contributes to the lack of strategic purpose around the Union’s security and defence aims. Furthermore the gap between rhetoric and achievement means that CSDP suffers from a credibility deficit.

Leadership and proper public debate about what the EU should be doing in strategic terms would arguably boost the legitimacy of both CSDP and the wider European Union. It is also a prerequisite for strategic clarity, and measures to enhance CSDP capability. A combination of leadership, strategic clarity and capability could deliver actorness and tangible policy outcomes. Instead the first decade of ESDP/CSDP reveals low ambition and low achievement, where missions are small, relatively risk free and based on lowest common denominator agreement among member states. According to an official in the EU Military Staff:

The Council is interest-motivated but lacks real agreement. Yes, agreement inside the Council does exist, but only for low key, low intensity, short term interventions. There is agreement on limited missions, on the lowest common denominator, small, easily defined objectives and short missions (Interview 8)

A consequence of such limited ambition is a low level of achievement which compromises output legitimacy.

Biscop (2008, 2013) argues that the EU must develop a strategic approach to ensure the effectiveness of the structures established by the Lisbon Treaty. Proper application of Permanent Structured Cooperation would help as would giving more sway to the European Defence Agency. But the findings of this paper indicate that calling for a strategic approach and greater actorness on the part of the Union misses the point. We must first understand why CSDP lacks strategic coherence and why the capability gap remains, two decades after Christopher Hill’s seminal paper on this issue (Hill, 1993).

There has been a lack of member state engagement with EU foreign and security policy. This now coincides with an extended period of financial crisis and austerity that further 24

marginalises security and defence debate so CFSP, always a poor relation in EU policy making, is diminished further. This is in spite of the ambitious language of St Malo, Helsinki, the ESS and the Lisbon Treaty. The EU has not become a serious global security actor and remains lightweight in defence. International politics and summitry has typically engaged heads of government and leading institutions with a focus on financial crisis. For the EU this merely extends the dominance of economic discourse over strategic policy making. Arguably geo-strategic thinking has been colonised by commercial and market interests, exacerbating the tendency to look inwards, to be protectionist, to foreground member state interests above those of the community, and even to forge bilateral trade arrangements that potentially undermine the WTO and the admittedly stalled Doha Development Round.

This highlights fundamental weaknesses in the EU integration process, and calls into question the capability of the member states to resolve not only the strategic weakness of CSDP but also the crisis around the eurozone. The unrelenting focus on business and commerce, and perceived market competition from emerging BRIC economies, has pushed the UK deeper into eurosceptic territory and Germany towards a mercantilist interest in exploiting further its regional and global market advantages. There are few good auguries for CSDP in this conclusion and it is notable that this unpromising situation is compounded by the small budget afforded to the EEAS, a mere €7bn in an annual EU budget of over 100 times as much.

The progress of CSDP is disappointing despite the commitment to the EDA and Permanent Structured Cooperation signalled in the Lisbon Treaty. With the focus of attention firmly directed elsewhere there is acute danger that CSDP may perish from neglect.

Further research is needed to test the claim that foreign policy actors and strategic defence and security questions have undergone a downgrading in international summitry. A longitudinal analysis of summit topics and leading participants over three decades before and since the end of the Cold War, or an analysis of media reporting of summitry, could provide evidence to support or challenge suggestions made in this paper.

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Interviews

1 Security and defence policy expert, ISIS, Paris 16/06/2010 2 Expert on EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels 17/06/2010 3 European foreign and security policy expert, Leeds 25/06/2010 4 Security and defence policy expert, Brussels 01/07/2010 5 Former military officer and ESDP expert, Brussels 08/09/2010 6 Expert on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, Brussels 09/09/2010 7 Senior Official in EDA, Brussels 10/09/2010 8 Official in EU Military Staff in Council Secretariat, Brussels 22/09/2010 9 Military official in CMPD, Brussels 24/09/2010 10 Security and defence expert in ECFR, London 30/09/2010 11 EU Foreign policy expert, York 18/11/2010 12 Senior Official in MoD, London 10/03/2011 13 Military representative inside the EEAS, Brussels 23/03/2011 14 Former Member of the Venusberg Group, Munich 25/03/2011 15 Consultant to EUFOR Althea, Sarajevo 16/05/2011 16 Senior Official in OHR, Sarajevo 17/05/2011 17 Chief of Political Dept in OHR, Sarajevo 17/05/2011 18 Senior Official in EUFOR HQ, Sarajevo 18/05/2011 19 Senior Official (2) in EUFOR HQ, Sarajevo 18/05/2011 20 Consultant to project for EU Delegation/European Commission, Sarajevo 19/05/2011 21 Senior Policy Adviser to EUSR/EUFOR, Sarajevo 25/05/2011 22 Defence and security expert, SWP, Berlin 27/09/2011 23 Foreign policy expert, German Council for Foreign Relations (DGAP) Berlin 27/09/2011 24 SPD Member of Bundestag in Grand Coalition 2002-06, Berlin 09/07/2012 25 Defence and security expert, ECFR, Berlin 11/07/2012

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