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Dilemmas of Intra-Commonwealth Representation during the Rhodesian Problem, 1964-65 Carl P. Watts a a Indiana University - Purdue University, Fort Wayne

Online Publication Date: 01 July 2007 To cite this Article: Watts, Carl P. (2007) 'Dilemmas of Intra-Commonwealth Representation during the Rhodesian Problem, 1964-65', Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 45:3, 323 - 344 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/14662040701516904 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662040701516904

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Commonwealth & Comparative Politics Vol. 45, No. 3, 323 – 344, July 2007

Dilemmas of Intra-Commonwealth Representation during the Rhodesian Problem, 1964– 65 CARL P. WATTS Indiana University – Purdue University Fort Wayne

ABSTRACT By the mid-1960s the arrangements for intra-Commonwealth representation between its sovereign member states were well established. The racial tension engendered by the problem of Rhodesian independence threatened the continued existence of the Commonwealth, but the conventions of Commonwealth diplomatic representation made the problem more difficult to manage. This article examines how Rhodesian attitudes towards the Commonwealth and the exclusion of Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference ruled out the possibility of multilateral diplomatic engagement. Opportunities to influence the Rhodesian Government were therefore restricted to bilateral exchanges, but the mechanisms for such diplomatic representation, though technically correct in terms of Commonwealth relations, were limited and inadequate. This historical case study therefore confirms the necessity for sufficient representation between sovereign states and other international actors, but demonstrates that the parties to such a diplomatic relationship can conceive the functions of representation in different terms.

Introduction Paul Sharp contends that ‘international relations scholars should be studying diplomacy more often’, because the proliferation of states and non-state actors has required more and more representation (Sharp, 1999: 33). Yet, he observes, ‘The study of diplomacy remains marginal to and almost disconnected from the rest of the field’ (Sharp, 1999: 34). However, in recent Correspondence Address: Carl. P. Watts, Department of History, Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne, 2101 East Coliseum Boulevard, Fort Wayne, IN 46805-1499, USA. Email: [email protected] 1466-2043 Print/1743-9094 Online/07/030323–22 # 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14662040701516904


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years some scholars have been paying greater attention to diplomacy from an historical as well as a contemporary perspective. It may be argued that although there are notable differences between international relations and diplomatic history, historical studies are nevertheless valuable for illuminating international relations perspectives (Elman & Elman, 1997). Lorna Loyd, for example, has examined the evolution of intraCommonwealth representation since the late nineteenth century, the legacy of which is a residual distinctiveness that distinguishes it marginally from non-Commonwealth diplomacy (Lloyd, 2000; 2001). In one study, Lloyd begins with a significant observation: ‘The essence of diplomacy is communication: it is the means whereby notional entities – sovereign states – communicate through their diplomatic representatives. In so doing, there must be no doubt about a representative’s authority to speak for her or his state’ (Lloyd, 2001: 9). The emphasis on communication between sovereign states has long been an accepted characteristic of diplomacy among practitioners and academics alike, though it has been brought into question by recent changes in the international system, especially since the end of the Cold War.1 A crucial question that arises from the traditional emphasis on state sovereignty is what happens when the health of the international system, or a sub-system such as the Commonwealth, depends upon effective communication with a notional entity that is not sovereign. This article illustrates the point from an historical perspective by examining the problems for Commonwealth diplomacy posed by Rhodesia’s attempts to obtain independence in the 1960s.2 It argues that the opportunity for constructive engagement was limited by the dilemmas associated with Rhodesian representation in the multilateral context of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings, and bilateral relations between Rhodesia and the Old Commonwealth (especially Canada and Australia). In the multilateral context the British Government had to avoid antagonising the Rhodesian Government, lest it provoke a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI); but it also needed to satisfy the demands of the African member states on a delicate racial issue, otherwise Commonwealth unity would be jeopardised. In the bilateral context the Rhodesian Government attempted to obtain what might be termed ‘creeping sovereignty’ by seeking to exchange diplomatic representatives with Ottawa and Canberra. This presented Canada and Australia with an awkward dilemma. Without adequate representation they risked a lack of information about political developments in Rhodesia and, more importantly, a lack of influence over the Rhodesian Government. However, an exchange of accredited representatives would suggest to the African Commonwealth that the Old Commonwealth was colluding with the regime in Salisbury to establish an independent Rhodesia dominated by the white minority.


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These dilemmas of representation served to complicate what was already a highly complex international problem, the multi-faceted nature of which has attracted increasing scholarly attention in recent years.3 This article adds to the historical literature on the Commonwealth dimensions of the Rhodesian problem, but from a theoretical perspective it also demonstrates how relations between sovereign states and other international actors can be inherently complicated as a result of conflicting emphases on the multiple functions of diplomatic representation. The Commonwealth and the Rhodesian Problem: Constraint or Opportunity? The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, wrote in his memoirs that the Commonwealth was one of four ‘constituencies’ whose opinion he had to consider in attempting a settlement of the Rhodesian problem (Wilson, 1971: 180 –181).4 The Commonwealth provided African member states with a forum through which they could attempt to influence British policy; in particular they sought to ensure that Wilson did not abandon his assurance that independence would only be granted on the basis of majority rule. However, the Rhodesian Government consistently resisted any Commonwealth involvement in, or advice about, Rhodesian constitutional politics. Whilst this accorded with the formal constitutional position, it was at odds with the spirit of Commonwealth consultation and cooperation, as the historian J.D.B. (Bruce) Miller (1974: 187) observed: In strict legal terms, the advancement of colonies was Britain’s business and no one else’s; in political terms it was desirable that other Commonwealth members should concur in, and if possible applaud, the progress which Britain was making. If they could be associated in some way in that progress – as India and Pakistan had been in preparing for the independence of the Sudan, and Australia, India, and Pakistan in that of Malaya – this was all to the good. The Rhodesian Government’s unwillingness to countenance Commonwealth involvement in its affairs was motivated by hostile attitudes towards the African Commonwealth. In February 1964, the Rhodesian Front Leader and Prime Minister, Winston Field, spoke disparagingly of the Commonwealth African states, which were characterised by ‘varying degrees of one-party dictatorship; some just flirting with communism, some obviously in love with communism, if not already married to it’.5 Field suggested that these states wanted to interfere in Rhodesian affairs to divert attention from their own poor administration and corruption.6 The following month Field made it


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clear to the British Government that for the Rhodesian Government the issue was ‘not the impact on the Commonwealth which the grant of independence is likely to have but the preservation of our Constitution, which is essential to our freedom, against the efforts of international and Commonwealth forces to circumvent, and even suppress it’.7 Field went on to suggest that the 1961 Constitution was ‘the very basis for the orderly political advancement of Africans’ and for that reason Rhodesia’s enemies regarded the Constitution as an obstacle. Field also observed: ‘There is no doubt that African Nationalism in this country is directed and financed by Communist countries.’8 Ian Smith, who replaced Field as Prime Minister in April 1964,9 expressed similar views about the Commonwealth. When the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec DouglasHome, advised Smith that ‘the British Government, either alone or in conjunction with other Commonwealth Governments, will be glad to help in any way they can to bring about a generally acceptable solution’, Smith replied: ‘I must repeat, what my predecessor has already stated, that the issue of independence for Southern Rhodesia is a matter solely between the Southern Rhodesia Government and the British Government and that it is not the concern of any other Government in the Commonwealth or elsewhere.’10 All this suggests that the Commonwealth dimensions of the Rhodesian problem were a complicating factor for the British Government, and indeed Wilson found it extremely difficult to balance the conflicting demands of African Commonwealth leaders and the Rhodesian Government. However, Wilson also believed that the Old Commonwealth could play a modest role in the management of the Rhodesian problem. Although the British Government consistently reaffirmed its sole responsibility for bringing Rhodesia to independence, it nevertheless looked to its Old Commonwealth partners to help maintain reasonable relations with the Rhodesian Government and the wider Commonwealth. Wilson followed the precedent established by his Conservative predecessors of consulting with the Prime Ministers of the Old Commonwealth. Wilson ensured that they were kept informed of developments in the negotiations between Britain and Rhodesia, urged them to dissuade Ian Smith from a UDI, and looked to them for help in assuaging Afro-Asian criticism of British policy (see Watts 2006b). It was not only the British Government that entertained hopes and expectations that the Old Commonwealth could ward off a UDI. European moderates in Rhodesia approached the British Government and the Old Commonwealth to suggest that greater Commonwealth cooperation was needed in helping to find a solution to the Rhodesian problem.11 Some American officials also thought that the Old Commonwealth had a role to play and suggested that Rhodesia was most open to the influence of Australia and New Zealand.12 Similarly, some African governments and African nationalists in Rhodesia regarded Australia as the member of the Commonwealth that was potentially most influential.13 These widespread



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hopes for some form of Old Commonwealth involvement in the Rhodesian problem were not entirely misplaced. To be sure, Ian Smith repeatedly insisted that the Commonwealth had no standing in the matter of Rhodesia’s claim to independence, and stressed that its African members were infected with communism and were therefore enemies of Rhodesia.14 However, in July 1964 he also confided to one Canadian diplomat that the views of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were ‘the only ones that count’.15 There was, therefore, some scope for constructive engagement between the Old Commonwealth and Rhodesia. Yet this was never fully exploited because Rhodesia was excluded from Commonwealth multilateral diplomacy and the Old Commonwealth lacked adequate bilateral representation with Salisbury. Commonwealth Multilateral Diplomacy and the Rhodesian Problem During the 1920s the British Dominions – Canada, South Africa, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand – were members of the League of Nations and its functional organisations, so they were involved in multilateral diplomacy even before they obtained sovereign independence through the 1931 Statute of Westminster (Lloyd, 2001: 10). This demonstrates the legal principle that a notional entity can acquire international personality even though it is not an independent state (Nkala, 1985: 58 – 59). This principle obviously applied to Rhodesia, to which the United Kingdom delegated a large measure of international personality. It is notable that when Rhodesia became a British colony in 1923 it was subject to the administrative authority of the Dominions Office rather than the Colonial Office, which reflected the considerable degree of self-government that Rhodesia enjoyed (Wood, 2005: 9). From 1932 Rhodesian representatives attended Commonwealth meetings and they could therefore communicate directly with other members of the Commonwealth. The British Government enhanced the authority of the Central African Federation to conduct relations with Commonwealth countries and foreign states – subject to the safeguard of British responsibilities and interests – and this authority devolved upon the Rhodesian Government when the Federation was dissolved (Nkala, 1985: 59 –61). Thus, Rhodesian ministers felt justified in claiming that Rhodesia was a member of the Commonwealth even though it did not possess sovereign independence.16 The Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, recalled in his memoirs that in June 1963 he had a long conversation about this in London with Jack Howman, the Rhodesian Minister of Internal Affairs, Local Government, and African Education. Menzies pointed out that it was a mistake to believe that Rhodesia was a member of the Commonwealth. Rhodesian representatives


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had never attended Commonwealth meetings as a matter of right and Rhodesia could not become a member of the Commonwealth without the approval of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting, which was unlikely so long as the Rhodesian franchise did not include the whole African population. Menzies observed that Howman was ‘genuinely surprised’ by this assessment, and Howman apparently suggested that the only recourse for Rhodesia’s critics was to move for Rhodesia’s expulsion from the Commonwealth, which he thought was unlikely despite the South African precedent (Menzies, 1967: 216 – 217). Accordingly, Menzies wrote to Field in an attempt to clear up this misapprehension, citing the original basis upon which a Rhodesian representative had been invited to attend the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa in 1932 ‘as an observer, with liberty by permission of the Conference, to speak at its full meetings and with a right to participate in the work of its Committees’.17 Yet despite Menzies’ verbal and written advice, the Rhodesian Government still continued to profess that it was already a member of the Commonwealth. In September 1963 Howman told Canadian officials and ministers ‘Southern Rhodesia is and always has been a member of the Commonwealth’ and ‘there could be no question of Southern Rhodesia applying for Commonwealth membership but, rather, a question of whether its membership would be denied it’.18 Howman suggested that ‘if other members of the Commonwealth made difficulties then it was time for the old members of the Commonwealth to stand up and support Southern Rhodesia’s right to full membership’.19 In 1964 the debate about Rhodesia’s status became a highly controversial matter, which caused anxiety for Britain and the Old Commonwealth in the context of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting. In April 1964, Douglas-Home announced that the Prime Ministers’ Meeting would be held in London in July. Shortly thereafter he was asked in the House of Commons whether the Rhodesian Prime Minister would be invited to the meeting. Douglas-Home replied that only Prime Ministers of fully independent Commonwealth countries had a right to attend, and any invitation to the Prime Minister of a country that was not independent could only be extended after consultation with other Commonwealth countries. Accordingly, Douglas-Home had asked Smith if he wished the Commonwealth to be so consulted. Smith had replied that he did not because he believed he was entitled to attend as of right, but he had been asked to reconsider his position.20 The Ghanaian High Commissioner had already stated that his government was ‘astounded’ by the suggestion that Smith might attend, and warned that it would not participate in the meeting if that were the case.21 The Indian Government had also indicated its opposition to Smith’s attendance.22 Smith, however, did ask to be invited and the British Government therefore initiated consultation on this issue with the Old Commonwealth



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representatives in London and directly with their Prime Ministers. Sir Saville Garner, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Commonwealth Relations Office, emphasised to the High Commissioners of Australia, New Zealand and Canada that an invitation to Rhodesia to attend the Prime Ministers’ Meeting would be conditional upon the prior endorsement by all Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and that there was no precedent by which the Rhodesian Prime Minister should be invited automatically. They were told that the British Government was anxious to obtain the views of the Old Commonwealth before requesting the formal advice of the other Commonwealth Prime Ministers.23 Douglas-Home wrote to Lester Pearson, Robert Menzies and Keith Holyoake, acknowledging that there were advantages and disadvantages associated with Rhodesian attendance at the meeting. On the one hand, if the Rhodesian problem was going to be discussed it would be fair if Smith was present, and if an invitation was not extended it could lead to resentment in Rhodesia. On the other hand, there were procedural implications associated with Smith’s attendance, because colonies that were already scheduled for independence (such as Northern Rhodesia) or enjoyed self-government (such as Malta, British Guiana and Barbados) might ask to attend. More significantly, there was likely to be strong opposition to Smith’s attendance: Ghana and India had already objected, and it was likely that other newly independent members of the Commonwealth would do the same. Newer members of the Commonwealth who did not object would probably have the intention of putting Smith ‘in the dock’. Douglas-Home feared that in such circumstances the Rhodesian question ‘would be so highlighted by the press that it would overshadow all else’, which would give a distorted picture of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting. He therefore concluded that it would be in the best interests of Rhodesia and the Commonwealth if Smith did not attend, but invited comments from Pearson, Menzies and Holyoake.24 Australian officials were concerned that if Menzies ‘places his weight on one side or the other at the present juncture, it might sharpen the controversy’ and therefore advised that ‘the Prime Minister should not positively take sides on the substantive issue but should point to the need to continue the search for a compromise’.25 Menzies was apparently already thinking along these lines.26 He suggested to the British Prime Minister that Smith should make himself available for informal discussions in London outside the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, which he thought ‘would be not only fair but also of considerable value’.27 The major concern of the New Zealand Government was that ‘the invitation question should not be allowed to divide Commonwealth members nor provide any of them with an excuse for flamboyant gestures of disapproval’. It thought that Smith’s attendance would not confer ‘any advantages which outweigh the risks of a serious dispute’ and sought to avoid making any public statement on the issue because it would ‘merely


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serve to bring Smith’s attendance even more within the realm of public controversy and give credence to the existence of a crisis within the Commonwealth’.28 Bruce Miller (1974: 192 n.5) believed that Canada was ‘strongly opposed’ to Rhodesian attendance, but it appears that opinion in Ottawa was actually divided. Some officials were in favour of inviting Smith on the basis that failure to do so could be interpreted as a signal that the Commonwealth had no role to play in the Rhodesian question.29 Yet it was clear to Douglas-Home that there was insufficient support among the Old Commonwealth for Smith to attend the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, and by the end of May Pakistan and Kenya had also made their opposition clear.30 In June the British Prime Minister told the House of Commons that the consensus of Commonwealth opinion was that because of the size of the Commonwealth, only representatives of fully sovereign states should attend the Prime Ministers’ Meeting.31 Douglas-Home thus attempted to avoid antagonising Smith by justifying the outcome of the issue in strictly procedural terms. Smith, however, felt that Rhodesia had been excluded because ‘the Commonwealth has outgrown itself and there is no longer room for us among the motley of small countries which have recently acceded to independence and been admitted to the Commonwealth without regard to their adherence to the ideals and concepts on which it was founded’.32 Douglas-Home had managed to defuse a potentially explosive problem that could have wrecked the Prime Ministers’ Meeting before it even began. It also prevented a direct clash between Smith and the African Commonwealth Prime Ministers similar to the confrontation that had led to the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961 (Miller, 1974: 192). However, Rhodesia’s exclusion from the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, and the Rhodesian Government’s obstinate refusal to admit that there was a genuine Commonwealth interest in the future of Rhodesia, ruled out a constructive multilateral approach to the problem of independence. This placed increased emphasis on bilateral communication between Rhodesia and the Commonwealth, but these channels of representation were institutionally inadequate because Commonwealth conventions dictated their extent, and attempts to change them were fraught with political problems. Commonwealth Bilateral Diplomacy and the Rhodesian Problem The Rhodesian High Commission in London and the British High Commission in Salisbury served as the main channels of communication between the British and Rhodesian Governments and there was no equivalent level of bilateral representation between Rhodesia and any other Commonwealth state. This did not mean that there was a complete absence of diplomatic links between Rhodesia and other members of the Commonwealth. For



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example, the Canadian High Commission in London liaised with the Rhodesian High Commission, Rhodesian representatives who were attached to the British Embassy in Washington made periodic visits to Ottawa, Canadian diplomats occasionally visited Rhodesia, and there was also a Canadian Trade Commission in Salisbury. Similar arrangements pertained to Australia, though it did not place the same degree of emphasis on diplomatic links with Rhodesia that Canada did. New Zealand had no form of representation in Salisbury at all and did not attempt to cultivate a regular diplomatic relationship with Rhodesia (which reflected the fact that New Zealand’s material interests in Africa were so limited that it did not justify the costs of representation), though it did receive information from the Rhodesian Government, which it sought to verify through other channels.33 All of this had different significance for the parties to the Rhodesian problem. The Rhodesian Government argued that because Canada, Australia, and New Zealand lacked sufficient diplomatic representation in Salisbury, they did not have an accurate picture of local conditions and therefore could not formulate a valid opinion about Rhodesian claims to independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution. The Canadian, Australian and New Zealand diplomatic establishments sometimes felt that they lacked firsthand information, but the main concern, in Ottawa especially, was that without sufficient representation in Salisbury they were unable to exert influence on a regular basis. Britain and the Old Commonwealth were also conscious of the fact that the limited diplomatic links between Rhodesia and the Old Commonwealth could be interpreted by Salisbury as a lack of genuine concern with the Rhodesian problem. Yet the Old Commonwealth was, of course, faced with an obvious dilemma. If they had augmented the status of their representation in Salisbury it might have facilitated better relations with the Rhodesian Government, but at the same time it would have poisoned relations with the African members of the Commonwealth, who would have undoubtedly condemned the Old Commonwealth for colluding with the European minority in Rhodesia. The dilemma of representation is therefore an excellent illustration of the difficulties associated with the management of the Rhodesian problem. Canadian Diplomatic Representation The ineffectual nature of Canadian representation in Salisbury acquired a farcical quality that did not sit well with the seriousness of the Rhodesian problem. In July 1964 the British High Commissioner in Salisbury commented on the incongruity between Canadian interest in a satisfactory outcome to the Rhodesian problem and the lack of effective Canadian representation in Salisbury:


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Until earlier this year their only representative was a Trade Commissioner [Lester Glass] of the most useless kind of near-pensioner it is possible to imagine. So far as I can ascertain he does no work to speak of, and certainly takes no part in local life whatsoever. He is a semi-invalid, and his wife apparently a total invalid – at least she has never appeared in public and I have never met her. I have seen him once this year (Canada Day), and twice last – the first at the Armistice Day ceremony, when he forgot his wreath, and the second when the diplomats took formal leave of Sir Roy Welensky, when he was a quarter of an hour late!34 To be sure, the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) was aware of the nature of this problem, which had been under review since the impending dissolution of the Central African Federation. Lester Glass was due to be replaced by a younger official, Ian Smyth, who was scheduled to arrive in Salisbury by January 1964 in readiness to take over as Trade Commissioner by the summer. Officials also recommended that a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) should be attached to the Canadian Trade Commission in Salisbury for a number of reasons. First, it was important for Canada to establish a way of obtaining objective and reliable views on the Rhodesian problem. This would ensure that Canada was properly informed in the event that it was called upon to attend a Commonwealth conference on the Rhodesian question, or to make statements at the United Nations, where the issue had intensified since the independence of Kenya and Zanzibar. Second, it would be a useful means by which to establish regular contact with African nationalists. Third, because external aid to Rhodesia was likely to increase, it would be helpful to have a FSO in Salisbury to administer the programme. Finally, as Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were both scheduled to attain independence in 1964, it would be useful to accredit Canadian representatives in Salisbury to the newly independent states.35 The Canadian Government treated this recommendation with caution because it coincided with a request from the Rhodesian Government to exchange accredited diplomatic representatives.36 This was obviously an attempt by the Rhodesian Government to subvert the constitutional convention that the British Government had ultimate responsibility for the conduct of Rhodesian external affairs, but the Canadian DEA did not dismiss the idea out of hand. In a meeting on 4 March 1964 it was suggested that there might be some advantage in securing the appointment of a Rhodesian High Commissioner in Ottawa, since this would allow the Canadian Government to exercise some influence on the Rhodesian Government to refrain from a UDI. However, it was also recognised that it would have serious drawbacks in terms of Canada’s relations with African members of the Commonwealth,



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‘since they would undoubtedly look on it as an Old Commonwealth gesture of support for the present white government in Salisbury’. The Canadian Government therefore declined the Rhodesian invitation to exchange diplomatic representatives on the basis that: ‘It is Canadian practice to use the title of High Commissioner only for representatives of independent members of the Commonwealth and that we do not think that the present circumstances would justify our making an exception in the case of Southern Rhodesia.’37 A similar desire to avoid gestures of encouragement to the Rhodesian Government was probably behind the Canadian Government’s decision not to attach a FSO to its Trade Commission in Salisbury. Instead, Ian Smyth took on the task of political reporting, and according to the British High Commissioner Smyth quickly ‘got into local confidence and the local picture extremely well’.38 Unfortunately, Smyth’s reports demonstrated that the Canadian Government could not place much trust in the Rhodesian Government, which may be illustrated by an incident that he reported in June 1965. Smyth advised his superiors that he had been called in to see M.B. Benoy, the Permanent Secretary of the Rhodesian Ministry of External Affairs, to answer questions about a recent visit to Salisbury by N.H.F. Berlis, the Canadian High Commissioner in Tanzania.39 Benoy, who referred to a letter from the British South Africa Police (the Rhodesian police force), wanted to know why the High Commissioner had not presented himself officially to the Rhodesian Government, and why he had visited two well-known African nationalists. Smyth explained that the visit was unofficial and personal but Benoy ‘virtually demanded to be told what had been discussed at the meetings and suggested that perhaps Mr Berlis had been acting as a “courier”’.40 Smyth gave a ‘short and sharp’ reply to the effect that he was not prepared to tolerate such a line of questioning and Benoy withdrew the accusation. Smyth reported that Benoy was in fact a close personal friend and had later told Smyth that ‘he had been “put up” to the interview by certain Ministers’.41 Smyth commented that the episode showed that either Berlis or more likely the African nationalists had been under police surveillance, and referred to a previous report in which he had advised that ‘our mail is still opened, our telephone tapped and, periodically, I am followed by various Rhodesian security personnel’.42 Smyth’s letter not only confirms that by mid-1965 Rhodesia had become a police state, but also demonstrates that the Rhodesian Government treated Canadian diplomats with contempt. This was at variance with the Rhodesian objective of establishing an enhanced diplomatic relationship with the Old Commonwealth. It appears even more incomprehensible given that Rhodesia was by this time in receipt of technical assistance from Canada, which the Rhodesian Government considered a valuable expression of Canadian interest in Rhodesia’s affairs.43

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Australian Diplomatic Representation Australian diplomatic representation in Salisbury was even more limited than that of the Canadian Government. Australia had maintained a Trade Commission in Salisbury since December 1954, but in 1963 the Department of Trade decided to reassign its Trade Commissioner to another post. Administration of Australian trade interests was left in the hands of a locally recruited Englishman who was designated as a Marketing Officer.44 In September 1963 Field wrote to Menzies enquiring whether Australia might open a diplomatic mission in Salisbury in order that Australia could be better informed on the Rhodesian problem (but it was also, no doubt, an attempt to inch towards de facto recognition). The Australian Government made no reply but official opinion suggested that sufficient information could be obtained from the Australian Ambassador in South Africa, Australian High Commissions in Africa, and material circulated by the British and Rhodesian Governments.45 A senior External Affairs official who visited Salisbury advised Canberra that Field had again raised the question of Australian representation. In reviewing the situation the official recognised the same dilemma that faced the Canadian Government: on the one hand, it would probably be politically disadvantageous in terms of African opinion; but on the other hand it would be useful to have better representation in Salisbury to handle technical assistance and immigration matters. He concluded: ‘For these purposes, the maintenance of the Trade Commission, if properly staffed from Australia, would provide a suitable answer.’46 The Minister for External Affairs therefore requested the Department of Trade to appoint a suitably qualified officer to Salisbury.47 However, the Department of Trade did not feel that it could accommodate the request because Australian trade with Rhodesia was stagnant and its staffing resources for overseas posts were inadequate, so it shunted responsibility back to External Affairs.48 Against this background of bureaucratic unwillingness to accept responsibility, the Rhodesian Government once again asked if it would be possible to send a diplomatic representative to Salisbury. The Australian Ambassador to South Africa opined that this would probably not accomplish a great deal, ‘although it might make the Southern Rhodesia authorities feel rather less isolated inside the old Commonwealth’.49 Yet this was precisely the point, and the Department of External Affairs ought to have apprehended the value of maintaining one of its officers in Salisbury not only for the purpose of gathering information, but also to signal a clear interest in the Rhodesian problem and to establish a clear line of communication with Salisbury. However, External Affairs advised its Embassy in South Africa that it had decided to maintain the status quo, partly due to the impending Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting and partly because ‘Mr Smith’s emergence as Prime Minister has made the situation a little different’.50



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Notable consequences flowed from the Australian decision not to augment the status of their diplomatic representation in Salisbury. First, their Marketing Officer, Mr J.K. Brodie, was not trained to understand the political environment in Rhodesia and did not appreciate that his apparently innocuous actions could be invested with political spin. In October 1964 Brodie attended an indaba of African chiefs, through which the Rhodesian Government intended to demonstrate that a majority of the Rhodesian population supported its claim to independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution (Wood, 2005: 246; Young, 1967: 171). However, in Britain the outgoing Conservative and incoming Labour administrations had both made it clear to Ian Smith that they did not regard this as an acceptable test of Rhodesian opinion as a whole and therefore no British observer would attend.51 Thus, by attending the indaba Brodie found that he had unwittingly endorsed the Rhodesian Government’s plans even though he had attended ‘with no thoughts of political implications’ and was ‘dismayed to see the political slant the local Press ha[d] attached to the whole affair’.52 It is likely that a properly trained diplomat would not have made such a mistake and this would have avoided a situation in which it appeared that there was a divergence between British and Australian policy towards Rhodesia. A second consequence of inadequate Australian diplomatic representation in Rhodesia was that the Department of External Affairs relied to a great extent on political reports from its Ambassador to South Africa, Mr J.C.G. Kevin. The Ambassador was very sympathetic to the Europeans in Rhodesia, hostile to Canadian diplomatic initiatives for greater Commonwealth involvement in the Rhodesian problem, and keen to put some distance between British and Australian policy towards the Rhodesian Government.53 It would be going too far to suggest that this shaped Australian policy on the issue of Rhodesian independence, but it certainly reinforced certain attitudes and tendencies that were evident in Canberra.54 It may therefore be suggested that a competent first-hand Australian view from Salisbury could have been a valuable counterweight to some of the prejudiced input that emanated from the Australian Embassy in Pretoria. Diplomatic Representation and the Rhodesian Problem: Theoretical Perspectives Diplomatic representation has four major functions: achievement of statehood; contact and communication; promotion, explanation and defence of national interests; and acquisition of information (Barston, 1988: 18– 19). From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the Rhodesian Government aimed at the first and third functions in its exchanges with Canada and Australia, whereas the Canadians and Australians were concerned with the second and fourth functions. Richard Langhorne (2005: 333) has commented


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that ‘Recognition of a state by other states is the holy grail of legitimacy’. The significance of international recognition has been debated extensively by advocates of two theories: the constitutive, which maintains that a notional entity claiming statehood does not exist as a state in international law until it has been recognised; and the declaratory, which contends that recognition has no effect on statehood because it is a matter of fact rather than law (Nkala, 1985: 53). Ian Smith and his colleagues no doubt drew some comfort from the declaratory school of thought after their UDI, but it is evident that in the two years preceding it they sought to satisfy the constitutive requirements of statehood by attempting to exchange accredited diplomatic representatives with other states they considered useful and/or sympathetic to the cause of Rhodesian independence.55 The Rhodesian Government clearly hoped that after a UDI it would be possible to maintain normal and cordial relations with the Old Commonwealth. In October 1965 Ian Smith asked for a deferred judgement to see how the Rhodesian Government discharged its responsibilities towards the Rhodesian people, but the Old Commonwealth made it clear that it would not be possible to maintain anything like normal diplomatic relations.56 Rhodesian attempts to obtain de facto recognition by exchanging accredited representatives, and Old Commonwealth anxiety about such attempts, demonstrates the sensitive nature of this function of diplomatic representation. The Rhodesian Government also pursued vigorously the promotion, explanation and defence of its national interests.57 Its trade relationship with the Old Commonwealth was not a matter of great concern because the volume of commerce was low. Shortly after the dissolution of the Central African Federation, Australian officials reported that in 1961– 62 Australian imports from the Federation amounted to just under £2 million and Australian exports were worth a little more than £3 million.58 In 1963 –64 New Zealand exports to the Central African Federation were worth only £169,792 and imports from the Federation amounted to just £293,330.59 Trade between Canada and Rhodesia was worth rather more – around $3 million annually – but Canadian officials recognised that this was still a very limited proportion of Rhodesian trade.60 Rhodesia’s economic interests were therefore not central to its relationship with the Old Commonwealth, but the Rhodesian Government was keen to demonstrate that in terms of international security its own interests coincided with those of the Old Commonwealth: namely, to prevent the spread of communism in Africa by preserving white rule in Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. Many politicians and officials in Australia and New Zealand were sympathetic to these arguments, but in Canada there was a greater belief in the value of multiracialism, especially as a guiding principle of the modern Commonwealth (see Watts, 2006b).



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The major focus of Canadian and Australian diplomatic representation contrasted markedly with Rhodesian diplomatic objectives. Canada and Australia sought to maintain contact and communication with Salisbury in order to maintain friendly relations with, and exert influence upon, the Rhodesian Government. Communication has always been regarded as an essential aspect of diplomacy (Jo¨nsson & Hall, 2003). One theorist has used this striking image to convey its significance: ‘Communication is to diplomacy as blood is to the human body. Whenever communication ceases, the body of international politics, the process of diplomacy, is dead, and the result is violent conflict or atrophy’ (Tran, 1987: 8). Communication between the Old Commonwealth and Rhodesia did not cease, even after UDI, but it is the contention of this article that the channels of communication between Salisbury, Ottawa and Canberra (not to mention Wellington) could have been much more effective. In this regard it is worthwhile to consider a point made by Christer Jo¨nsson and Martin Hall (2003: 202): ‘The significance attached to the selection of envoys appears to be a perennial aspect of diplomatic communication.’ The formal titles, seniority and size of a diplomatic mission are a form of non-verbal signalling that indicates the importance a government attaches to its relations with another actor in the international system. It has been suggested that in the Commonwealth the office of High Commissioner ‘can open diplomatic doors, facilitate good relations and oil the diplomatic wheels – something that is especially appreciated by the smaller, weaker members of the Commonwealth’ (Lloyd, 2000: 71). Political difficulties notwithstanding, one can only speculate that if the Old Commonwealth had exchanged High Commissioners with Rhodesia it might have facilitated a more productive diplomatic relationship between them. As it was, the absence of New Zealand diplomatic representation in Salisbury, and the junior standing of the Canadian and Australian trade representatives, possibly sent the wrong signal to the Rhodesian Government about the seriousness with which the Old Commonwealth regarded developments in Rhodesia. In addition to maintaining contact and communication with the Rhodesian Government, Canada and Australia sought to acquire reliable information about local conditions in Rhodesia. The information-gathering function of diplomatic representation is recognised in the 1961 Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations and academic commentators have emphasised consistently the significance of diplomats as the ‘eyes and ears’ of their governments (cf. Bull, 1977: 181; Berridge, 1995: 41; Jo¨nsson & Hall, 2003: 197 –198). Yet, as Sir Harold Nicolson (1964: 143) observed, critics of diplomacy have often claimed that the development of modern communications has rendered the resident diplomat defunct. Nicolson rejected the gibe that ‘the diplomatist today has been reduced to the status of a clerk at the end of the telephone line’. He contended that the ‘man on the spot’ is still essential


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‘to study local conditions; to assess the areas of local susceptibility; to cultivate the acquaintance of local politicians, and thus to be in a position to advise his own minister how far he can go and how far he can trust those with whom he is negotiating’ (Nicolson, 1964: 144). The case of Old Commonwealth representation in Rhodesia during the 1960s is highly relevant to this debate. The Rhodesian Government largely controlled the media and was trying to project an image abroad that was obviously at variance with the political reports despatched by the Canadian Trade Commissioner. This at the very least suggests that in states whose political system is relatively closed it is a good idea for interested foreign governments to have ‘eyes and ears’ in situ rather than depending upon media sources for information. Conclusions Rhodesia became legally independent in 1980 as the state of Zimbabwe, thereby bringing an end to 15 years of international ostracism. Reflecting on the period since Rhodesia’s UDI, the retired British diplomat Lord Saint Brides of Hasguard (formerly Sir Morris James) contended that: ‘Before the disappearance of Portugal’s colonial empire, and South Africa’s consequent change in policy, not even the tongues of angels could have talked Ian Smith into accepting fair and impartial terms’ (Saint Brides, 1980: 184). This was a fair comment, but from the Commonwealth perspective it is also true that the channels for diplomatic dialogue could have been more effective. The exclusion of Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings was entirely defensible on constitutional and procedural grounds, and had the political advantage of preventing a disastrous confrontation between Rhodesia and the African Commonwealth. However, it also meant that there was no possibility of constructive multilateral engagement with the Rhodesian Government and suggested that Commonwealth influence could only be exerted through bilateral representation. Ottawa and Canberra were attuned to the emphasis on recognition that the Rhodesian Government was attempting to place on its diplomatic representation, which presented the Canadians and Australians with a delicate situation. Ottawa was not prepared to exchange accredited representatives with Salisbury, nor even to augment the staffing of its Trade Commission, because this could easily be construed as showing approval of Rhodesian policies. Only if the Rhodesian Government implemented progressive policies would Canada be disposed to review its policy.61 The Australian Government, which was aware of Canadian policy on representation, was also cognisant of the political disadvantages that would follow any decision to augment its representation in Salisbury. However, Australian policy appears to have been guided less by concern for African opinion than consideration of staffing costs in the



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Departments of External Affairs and Trade. The cautious approach adopted by Canada and Australia on the problem of representation was understandable, but it did not maximise their opportunities to exert influence in Salisbury and possibly signalled a lack of interest in the Rhodesian problem. The Commonwealth diplomatic conventions that dictated the nature and extent of communication between sovereign states and non-sovereign actors therefore exacerbated the management of the Rhodesian problem. The availability of official records in Ottawa, Canberra and Wellington means that there is certainly scope for further research on the patterns and quality of Old Commonwealth diplomatic representation in Africa since the 1960s, especially southern Africa during its lengthy transition to majority rule.62 The modest purpose of this article has been to demonstrate the utility of a single historical case study in order to understand the necessity for adequate channels of diplomatic representation between sovereign states and other actors involved in international problems.63 This is a matter of relevance for diplomacy today, as Richard Langhorne (2005: 333) has commented, ‘diplomacy is a necessary and natural part of the international order’ but governments are no longer sure that ‘the essentially inter-state structure which history imposed upon the practice of diplomacy quite fits the contemporary, globalizing world’. The new international actors also face ‘a crisis of representation because it is unclear who is to represent them, what sort of representation is meaningful, and how their role is to be made credible’ (Langhorne, 2005: 333). Today, rather like Rhodesia and the Commonwealth in the 1960s, ‘The methods which secure reciprocal recognition and allow actors to exert influence – the mechanism of representation itself – has become hazy as the ascendant actors fit uneasily with conventional notions of representation’ (Langhorne, 2005: 339). This calls into question the traditional frameworks of diplomatic exchange but nevertheless affirms the need for effective channels of diplomatic representation, however they may be constructed. Acknowledgements I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on an earlier draft of this article. In particular they encouraged me to focus more clearly on the theoretical aspects of diplomacy, and the contemporary relevance of historical case studies. Notes 1. Sir Ernest Satow’s standard reference work for diplomats begins with the definition: ‘Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes to their relations with vassal


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2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10.

states; or, more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means’ (Satow, [1917] 1979: 3). Sir Harold Nicolson (1964: vii) defined diplomacy similarly as ‘the art of negotiating agreements between Sovereign States’. From an academic perspective Alan James (1980: 936) has written that diplomacy involves ‘the conduct of relations between sovereign states through the medium of accredited representatives’ and Paul Sharp (1997: 609–610) observes that such representatives derive their authority ‘from the claim that they represent sovereign states in their relations with one another’. R. P. Barston (1988: 1) goes a little further with his definition: ‘Diplomacy is concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors.’ This reference to ‘other actors’ is of course highly significant. Richard Langhorne (2005: 339) has recently concluded that among other developments the proliferation of non-state actors suggests ‘The finely honed traditional machinery of inter-state diplomacy is coming to seem increasingly like an antiquated machine of almost baroque refinement.’ After Northern Rhodesia became independent as the state of Zambia in October 1964, Southern Rhodesia was usually referred to simply as Rhodesia. This article refers to Rhodesia throughout, except where Southern Rhodesia appears in quotations. Two conferences marked the fortieth anniversary of UDI: in September 2005, the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, Cambridge, hosted ‘UDI Forty Years On: Liberation, Confrontation and Co-operation’, the programme for which is available at http://www.udi40.org; and in January 2006, as part of its Southern Africa Initiative, the Cold War Studies Centre at the LSE held a similar conference, details of which can be accessed at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC/events/rhodesia_jan_06.htm. The increasing number of journal articles about the Rhodesian problem has also demonstrated significant academic interest during the last few years. On the vexed question of whether Britain should, or could, have used force to solve the Rhodesian problem see Watts (2005), Murphy (2006), and Coggins (2006). For the impact of the Rhodesian problem on Anglo-American relations see Butler (2000), and Watts (2006a). The regional context of Rhodesia’s UDI is considered in Onslow (2005). For the Commonwealth dimensions see McWilliam (2003), which provides an overview of the impact of Rhodesian and Zimbabwean affairs on Britain’s relationship with the Empire-Commonwealth; Alexander (2006), which contains a brief discussion of the Rhodesian independence issue as one of several conditioning factors in the Labour Government’s Commonwealth policy; Watts (2006b), which examines attitudes in the Old Commonwealth towards Rhodesia and the reception given to Canadian initiatives for a diplomatic settlement; and Watts (2007), which considers the reasons why the Commonwealth did not disintegrate as a result of the Rhodesian problem. See also Wood (2005), an extremely detailed chronological account that conflates Anglo-Rhodesian and international perspectives, which makes the text tricky to navigate for non-specialists. The other three ‘constituencies’ were Rhodesia, Britain, and the United Nations. Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 26 February 1964 (quoted in Miller, 1974: 190). Ibid. Field to Sandys, 3 March 1964, para. 2, Cmnd. 2807, Southern Rhodesia: Documents relating to the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments November 1963– November 1965 (London: HMSO, 1965), 13. Ibid. The Rhodesian Front perceived Field as too moderate and deferential to the British. For the process by which Smith replaced Field see Wood (2005: Ch. 1). Douglas-Home to Smith, 20 May 1964, final para.; Smith to Douglas-Home, 24 June 1964, para. 8, Cmnd. 2807, 16 and 19.



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11. Garfield Todd and Hardwicke Holderness to Keith Holyoake, 9 June 1964, enclosing a copy of a letter from Todd and Holderness to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 15 May 1964, ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, Archives New Zealand/Te Rua Mahara o te Ka¯wanatanga, Head Office, Wellington (hereafter ANZ). 12. Australian Embassy, Washington, to Department of External Affairs (hereafter DEA), Canberra, Savingram 1284, 30 October 1964, A1838, 190/10/1, Part 3a, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, [hereafter NAA]. 13. E. V. Vines, British High Commission (hereafter BHC), Dar Es Salaam, to D. F. B. Le Breton, UN and General Africa Department, Commonwealth Relations Office (hereafter CRO), London, 3 February 1964, DO 183/324, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (hereafter TNA). Vines reported a visit by an Australian official, Ralph Harry, to several African states including Tanganyika. Le Breton replied: ‘It is interesting to note how both Kambona [Tanganyikan Foreign Minister] and Sithole [Leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union] regard the Australians as the best channel for exerting influence on Field and his Government and also on ourselves.’ Le Breton, CRO, to P. A. Carter, BHC, Dar Es Salaam, 25 February 1964, DO 183/324, TNA. 14. See Smith to Wilson, 28 June 1965, para. 3; ‘Record of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, 8 October 1965’; and ‘Record of a Meeting held at Milton Buildings, Salisbury, 29 October 1965’; Cmnd 2807, 62, 81–82, 114 –115. Smith continued to condemn African dictatorship and corruption in his memoirs, e.g. Smith (2001: 64–66). 15. Ralph Collins, Canadian Ambassador to South Africa, to DEA, Ottawa, Cable No. 85, 3 July 1964, RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, National Archives of Canada, Ottawa (hereafter NAC). 16. For a brief summary of conflicting academic opinions about the status of Rhodesia in international law see Nkala (1985: 62). 17. Secretary of State for the Dominions to Sir Cecil Rodwell, Governor of Southern Rhodesia, 3 December 1931 (cited in Menzies, 1967: 217). 18. ‘Meeting with Mr J. H. Howman, Minister of Internal Affairs for Southern Rhodesia’, (on 12 September 1963), Memo by R. G. Hatheway, African and Middle Eastern Division (hereafter AMED), DEA, Ottawa, 19 September 1963, para. 4, RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, NAC. 19. ‘Visit to Ottawa by Mr J. H. Howman, Minister of Internal Affairs, Local Government and African Education of Southern Rhodesia, Sept. 12–13 1963’, Memo by D. B. Hicks, AMED, DEA, Ottawa, 21 October 1963, para. 2, RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, NAC. 20. House of Commons Debates, 30 April 1964, cols. 583–584 (cited in Miller, 1974: 191–192). 21. The Times, 25 April 1964 (cited in Miller, 1974: 192); and Ghana Today, 6 May 1964 (cited in Aluko, 1972: 312). 22. Guardian, 28 April 1964 (cited in Miller, 1974: 192). 23. Sir Eric Harrison, Australian High Commissioner, London, to Menzies, Canberra, Cable No. 2863, 6 May 1964, A1838, 190/11/1, Part 1, NAA. 24. Douglas-Home to Menzies, 5 May 1964, A1838, 190/11/1, Part 1, NAA. 25. Memo by M. R. Booker, First Assistant Secretary, Division IV, DEA, Canberra, 6 May 1964, A1838, 190/11/1, Part 1, NAA. 26. Foreign Minister’s hand-written minute on Booker’s Memo. 27. Menzies to Douglas-Home, 7 May 1964, A1838, 190/11/1, Part 1, NAA. 28. DEA, Wellington, to New Zealand High Commission (hereafter NZHC), London, Cable No. 1074, 5 May 1964, ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 9, ANZ. 29. J. S. Reid, NZHC, Ottawa, to DEA, Wellington, 15 June 1964, ABHS 950, W4627, 245/ 8/3, Part 9, ANZ. 30. Daily Telegraph, 26 May 1964 (cited in Miller, 1974: 192).


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31. House of Commons Debates, 3 June 1964, cols. 239–240 (cited in Miller, 1974: 192). 32. The Times, 8 June 1964 (quoted in Miller, 1974: 192; and Young, 1967: 139). 33. For example, in November 1964 the Rhodesian High Commissioner in London wrote to his New Zealand counterpart: ‘In view of the manner in which the machinery of government in Rhodesia has been widely misrepresented, I am enclosing a booklet which sketches in outline some important background considerations that are all too often overlooked.’ Evan Campbell to Sir Thomas Macdonald, 11 November 1964, ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 10, ANZ. Macdonald forwarded the booklet, ‘Southern Rhodesia: Advance to Maturity’, to his Prime Minister and suggested that he could check the information against the first-hand impressions of the party of New Zealand MPs who had attended the recent indaba of African Chiefs in Rhodesia. Macdonald to Holyoake, 13 November 1964. 34. J. B. Johnston, BHC, Salisbury, to Sir Saville Garner, CRO, 24 July 1964, DO 183/317, TNA. 35. ‘Attachment of Foreign Service Officer to Trade Commissioner’s Office, Salisbury’, Memo by R. G. Hatheway, AMED, DEA, to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 24 December 1963, RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, NAC. 36. The Rhodesian Government proposed that its Minister attached to the British Embassy in Washington, Oliver Bennett, be formally accredited to Ottawa and that the Canadian Ambassador to South Africa be accredited to Salisbury. Canadian Embassy, Washington, to DEA, Ottawa, Cable No. 390, 30 January 1964, RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, NAC. 37. DEA, Ottawa, to Canadian Embassy, Washington, Cable No. ME 95, 11 March 1964, RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, NAC. 38. Johnston, BHC, Salisbury, to Garner, CRO, 24 July 1964, DO 183/317, TNA. 39. Ian R. Smyth, Acting Canadian Trade Commissioner, Salisbury, to T. L. Carter, AMED, DEA, Ottawa, 16 June 1965, RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.2, NAC. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. For details of this initiative see Watts (2006b). 44. ‘Australian Trade Commissioner, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia’, Memo by R. L. Harry, First Assistant Secretary, Division IV, DEA, Canberra, 17 January 1964, para. 1, A1838, 190/10/6, Part 1, NAA. 45. Ibid., para. 2. 46. Ibid., para. 3. 47. Sir Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs, to J. McEwen, Minister for Trade and Industry, 6 February 1964, A1838, 190/10/6, Part 1, NAA. 48. N. H. D. Henty, Acting Minister for Trade and Industry, to Barwick, 16 March 1964, NAA: A1838, 190/10/6, Part 1, NAA. 49. J. C. G. Kevin, Australian Ambassador to South Africa, to DEA, Canberra, 12 June 1964, A1838, 190/10/6, Part 1, NAA. 50. Charles Lee, DEA, Canberra, to Australian Embassy, Pretoria, 3 July 1964, A1838, 190/ 10/6, Part 1, NAA. 51. Johnston, BHC, Salisbury to Smith, 15 Oct. 1964; and Bottomley to Smith, 19 October 1964, Cmnd. 2807, 41 –42. 52. J. K. Brodie, Marketing Officer, Salisbury to W. Mayne-Wilson, Australian Embassy, Pretoria, [n.d. but October 1964], A1838, 190/10/1, Part 4, NAA. 53. See ‘Southern Rhodesia’, Memo by J. C. G. Kevin, 25 February 1965; Kevin, Pretoria, to DEA, Canberra, Cable No. 170, 15 October 1965; and Kevin, Pretoria, to DEA, Canberra, Savingram 65/65, 17 December 1965; A1838, 190/10/1, Parts 4, 5, and 7, NAA.



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54. See Watts (2006b) for details of political, official, and public attitudes in Australia towards Rhodesia. 55. Such efforts were not confined to the Old Commonwealth. In September 1965 the Rhodesian Government sparked a major diplomatic row with Britain by sending a Rhodesian ‘accredited diplomatic representative’ to Lisbon (see Wood, 2005: Ch. 21). 56. Smith to Pearson, 9 October 1965, DO 183/674, TNA; Smith to Menzies, 9 October 1965, A1838, 190/10/1, Part 5, NAA; Smith to Holyoake, 9 October 1965, ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 13, ANZ; Pearson to Smith, 12 October 1965, DO 183/ 674, TNA; Press Statement by Keith Holyoake, Australian High Commission, Wellington, to DEA, Canberra, Cable No. 495, 11 October 1965, A1838, 370/1/26, NAA. 57. For the concept of the national interest see Reynolds (1994: Ch. 3). 58. ‘Australian Trade Commissioner, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia’, Memo by R. L. Harry, First Assistant Secretary, Division IV, DEA, Canberra, 17 January 1964, A1838, 190/10/ 6, Part 1, NAA. 59. Department of Trade Memorandum, 27 January 1964, ABHS 950, W4627, 245/8/3, Part 11, ANZ. 60. ‘Southern Rhodesia – Possible UDI – Canadian Interests’, Memorandum by Tom Carter, AMED, DEA, for Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 28 October 1964, RG 25, Vol. 10071, 20-1-2-SR, Part 1.1, NAC. 61. L. G. Sellars, Acting Australian High Commissioner, Ottawa, to DEA, Canberra, 26 June 1964, A1838, 190/10/6, Part 1, NAA. 62. For a study that explicitly addresses the quality of Canadian diplomatic representation in Africa see Stigger (1971). 63. It is therefore a theory-confirming case study. For a brief discussion of the value of different types of case studies see Lijphart (1971: 691– 693).

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