Competing loyalties

Competing loyalties: Journalism culture in the Ethiopian state media

Terje S. Skjerdal Doctoral thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. Department of Media and Communication Faculty of Humanities University of Oslo Advisor: Prof. Helge Rønning Co-advisor: Prof. Bahru Zewde June 2012

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Abstract

Using Ethiopia as its case, this dissertation discusses a classic problem in journalism sociology, specifically the dilemma of media practitioners who face multiple commitments. One stream of research within this area has focused on the conflict that arises when journalists find their professional commitment to be challenged by a commitment to a non-professional community such as the nation. An accepted theory maintains that journalists in such situations will protect a sense of professionalism by shifting between loyalties, where media practitioners for a limited period exchange their ‘ordinary’ professional loyalty for loyalty to the nation. According to the theory, the professional mindset is eventually restored through a process of ‘paradigm repair’. This approach may be described as a model of ‘shifting loyalties’. The current research project considers the theory through the case of Ethiopia, a transitional society characterized by strong state/government dominance in the media sector. The study applies a combination of personal interviews, newsroom observation and content analysis, with main emphasis on qualitative interviews with 67 journalists from three stateowned media institutions. The researched institutions comprise of a television station (Ethiopian Television), a daily newspaper (The Ethiopian Herald), and a news agency (Ethiopian News Agency), all of which in various ways are affected by government control. The research finds journalism culture in the Ethiopian state media to be circumscribed by a combination of aspiring professionalism, vague control and personal opportunism. Through a culture of self-censorship and discourses of fear in the newsroom, journalists produce and reproduce a subservient reporting style. At the same time, reporters rescue a sense of professionalism by exploiting the journalistic adiophoron, trusting a critical public, and adhering to national interest. On the normative level, the journalists are found to express

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dual loyalty to the profession and the nation, while a potential loyalty to the government is observed as broken. The research concludes that the recognized approach of ‘shifting loyalties’ does not convincingly describe the situation for journalists in the Ethiopian state media. The interviewed journalists do not portray an environment where they normally stay professional and occasionally swop to national loyalty, but rather describe how both loyalties are present at the same time, persistently and forcefully. Thus, the research submits that within the Ethiopian context, professional and national loyalties can hardly be treated separately as if the journalists subscribe to one identity the one day and another the next. In place of a model of shifting loyalties, the research therefore proposes a model of ‘competing loyalties’.

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Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................... iii Contents........................................................................................................................................................... v List of figures .................................................................................................................................................... x Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................................... xii Currency......................................................................................................................................................... xv A note on Ethiopian names ............................................................................................................................xvi Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................................xvii How the dissertation is organized .................................................................................................................. xx

Chapter 1: A puzzling encounter in Addis Ababa .............................................................................................. 1 1.1. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2002 .......................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2: Ethiopian society and media ........................................................................................................... 3 2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 3 2.2. Social and political context .......................................................................................................................... 5 2.2.1. Demographics and economy ................................................................................................................ 5 2.2.2. Political governance ............................................................................................................................. 7 2.3. An historical review of the Ethiopian media ................................................................................................ 9 2.3.1. Media during the Empire (–1974) ........................................................................................................ 9 2.3.2. Media during the Derg regime (1974–91) .......................................................................................... 14 2.3.3. Media during EPRDF (1991–present) ................................................................................................. 17 2.3.3.1. 1991–1992: Liberalization .......................................................................................................... 17

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2.3.3.2. 2.3.3.3. 2.3.3.4. 2.3.3.5. 2.3.3.6. 2.3.3.7.

1992–1996: Proliferation of private publications ...................................................................... 18 1996–1999: Government crackdowns ....................................................................................... 21 1999–2005: Consolidation and renewed diversity .................................................................... 22 2005–2007: Post-election setback ............................................................................................. 24 2007–2010: Revitalization .......................................................................................................... 25 2010–2012: Renewed coercion .................................................................................................. 27

2.4. Interchanges between coercion and liberalization .................................................................................... 31 2.5. Summary .................................................................................................................................................... 32

Chapter 3: A profile of journalists and media channels .................................................................................. 35 3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 35 3.2. Polarization ................................................................................................................................................ 35 3.3. Journalists .................................................................................................................................................. 37 3.3.1. Demographics ..................................................................................................................................... 37 3.3.2. Gender ................................................................................................................................................ 38 3.3.3. Salary .................................................................................................................................................. 38 3.3.4. Journalism education ......................................................................................................................... 39 3.3.5. Journalist associations ........................................................................................................................ 41 3.4. Media channels .......................................................................................................................................... 43 3.4.1. Television ............................................................................................................................................ 43 3.4.2. Radio ................................................................................................................................................... 44 3.4.3. Newspapers ........................................................................................................................................ 45 3.4.4. News agencies .................................................................................................................................... 47 3.4.5. The Internet ........................................................................................................................................ 48 3.5. Summary .................................................................................................................................................... 49

Chapter 4: Theoretical framework ................................................................................................................. 51 4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 51 4.2. Two competing paradigms of journalism culture ...................................................................................... 53 4.2.1. The professionalization paradigm ...................................................................................................... 55 4.2.2. The interpretive community paradigm .............................................................................................. 57 4.3. The journalistic community and loyalty conflicts ....................................................................................... 61 4.3.1. ‘Social control in the newsroom’ ........................................................................................................ 63 4.3.2. ‘Journalists as members of contradicting communities’ .................................................................... 66 4.4. Journalism culture in transitional societies ................................................................................................ 67 4.4.1. The identity issue in African journalism ............................................................................................. 68 4.4.2. Research on Ethiopian journalism culture ......................................................................................... 71 4.5. Problem statement .................................................................................................................................... 73 4.6. Summary .................................................................................................................................................... 74

Chapter 5: Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 75 5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 75 5.2. Arriving at a method .................................................................................................................................. 76 5.2.1. Qualitative interviews ........................................................................................................................ 77

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5.2.2. Newsroom observation ...................................................................................................................... 81 5.2.3. Content analysis ................................................................................................................................. 82 5.3. Three methodological concerns ................................................................................................................. 83 5.3.1. The cultural leap ................................................................................................................................. 83 5.3.2. Interview confidence .......................................................................................................................... 88 5.3.3. Dealing with political polarization ...................................................................................................... 92 5.4. Transcription and coding ........................................................................................................................... 95 5.5. Terminology ............................................................................................................................................... 95 5.5.1. ‘State media’ vs. ‘government media’ and ‘public media’ ................................................................. 95 5.5.2. ‘Private media’ vs. ‘independent media’ ............................................................................................ 96 5.5.3. ‘Journalists’, ‘reporters’ and ‘editors’................................................................................................. 96 5.5.4. ‘Profession’ vs. ‘occupation’ ............................................................................................................... 97 5.5.5. ‘Loyalty’ vs. ‘commitment’ ................................................................................................................. 97 5.6. Summary .................................................................................................................................................... 97

Chapter 6: The three media institutions under scrutiny ................................................................................. 99 6.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 99 6.2. Why these three media institutions? ......................................................................................................... 99 6.3. Ethiopian News Agency............................................................................................................................ 101 6.4. Ethiopian Television ................................................................................................................................. 105 6.5. The Ethiopian Herald ............................................................................................................................... 108 6.6. Restructuring of the state media ............................................................................................................. 111 6.7. Who owns the Ethiopian state media? .................................................................................................... 112 6.8. Summary .................................................................................................................................................. 114

Chapter 7: Quantitative content analysis of ENA and The Ethiopian Herald ................................................. 115 7.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 115 7.2. Analysis of news content produced by ENA ............................................................................................. 116 7.2.1. Previous studies and current methodology ..................................................................................... 116 7.2.2. Findings ............................................................................................................................................ 117 7.3. Analysis of content in The Ethiopian Herald ............................................................................................ 122 7.3.1. Previous studies and current methodology ..................................................................................... 122 7.3.2. Findings ............................................................................................................................................ 124 7.3.2.1. Visual appearance ..................................................................................................................... 124 7.3.2.2. Sources ...................................................................................................................................... 126 7.3.2.3. Genres ....................................................................................................................................... 130 7.3.2.4. Topics ........................................................................................................................................ 133 7.3.2.5. Origin of articles ........................................................................................................................ 135 7.3.2.6. Geographical origin ................................................................................................................... 136 7.3.3. The Ethiopian Herald’s overhaul in December 2011 ........................................................................ 137 7.4. Summary .................................................................................................................................................. 138

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Chapter 8: Qualitative content analysis of an ETV documentary .................................................................. 141 8.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 141 8.2. Methodology: Framing analysis ............................................................................................................... 143 8.3. Overview of programme sections and genres ......................................................................................... 146 8.4. Programmes 1–3: Responsible government frame .................................................................................. 148 8.5. Programmes 4–6: Irresponsible press frame ........................................................................................... 152 8.5.1. Rhetorical questions ......................................................................................................................... 152 8.5.2. Massive use of evidentia .................................................................................................................. 157 8.5.3. Foregrounding of expert voices........................................................................................................ 158 8.5.4. Equating past with present .............................................................................................................. 161 8.5.5. Incognito positioning of the government and the state media........................................................ 163 8.6. Programmes 7–10: Public responses ....................................................................................................... 165 8.7. Programmes 11–14: Debating the documentary..................................................................................... 167 8.8. The making of the documentary .............................................................................................................. 171 8.9. Is it propaganda? ..................................................................................................................................... 176 8.10. Summary ................................................................................................................................................ 180

Chapter 9: Journalism culture ...................................................................................................................... 183 9.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 183 9.2. Journalist profiles ..................................................................................................................................... 183 9.2.1. Increasingly educated ....................................................................................................................... 183 9.2.2. Diverse professional background ..................................................................................................... 184 9.2.3. A young and fairly inexperienced work force ................................................................................... 185 9.2.4. Salary levels ...................................................................................................................................... 187 9.2.5. Moonlighting .................................................................................................................................... 189 9.2.6. Brown envelopes .............................................................................................................................. 190 9.3. The work environment ............................................................................................................................. 192 9.3.1. Social satisfaction, professional dissatisfaction ................................................................................ 192 9.3.2. ‘UNMEEs’ and ‘al-Shabaabs’ in the newsroom ................................................................................ 194 9.3.3. Rumours about party membership .................................................................................................. 195 9.3.4. Political appointments ...................................................................................................................... 196 9.3.5. Ethnicity ............................................................................................................................................ 198 9.3.6. Tensions with management ............................................................................................................. 200 9.3.7. Fellowship with private media journalists ........................................................................................ 201 9.3.8. Dual attitude to professional associations ....................................................................................... 203 9.3.9. Defections......................................................................................................................................... 206 9.3.10. Facing a suspicious public ............................................................................................................... 208 9.4. Professional values .................................................................................................................................. 209 9.4.1. Autonomy ......................................................................................................................................... 209 9.4.2. Objectivity ........................................................................................................................................ 210 9.4.3. Serving the people ............................................................................................................................ 211 9.4.4. Development journalism .................................................................................................................. 212 9.4.5. Watchdog journalism ....................................................................................................................... 213 9.5. Work routines .......................................................................................................................................... 214 9.5.1. The working day ............................................................................................................................... 214 9.5.2. Pursuing own ideas........................................................................................................................... 215 9.5.3. Doing protocol news ........................................................................................................................ 215

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9.5.4. Staying on the safe side of the editorial policy................................................................................. 217 9.6. Dealing with sensitive issues .................................................................................................................... 219 9.6.1. Self-censorship ................................................................................................................................. 219 9.6.2. Interference ...................................................................................................................................... 221 9.6.3. Sanctions and rumours of sanctions ................................................................................................ 223 9.7. Professional integrity ............................................................................................................................... 224 9.7.1. Personal dilemmas ........................................................................................................................... 224 9.7.2. Rescuing professional identity ......................................................................................................... 225 9.8. Summary .................................................................................................................................................. 227

Chapter 10: Towards a model of competing loyalties ................................................................................... 229 10.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 229 10.2. The two paradigms on journalism culture revisited ............................................................................... 230 10.2.1. Ethiopian journalism seen through the interpretive community lens ........................................... 230 10.2.2. A return to the professionalization paradigm ................................................................................ 232 10.3. Three strategies for maintaining professionalism ................................................................................. 234 10.3.1. Exploiting the journalistic adiaphoron ........................................................................................... 235 10.3.2. Trusting the critical public .............................................................................................................. 236 10.3.3. Adhering to national interest ......................................................................................................... 237 10.4. Three loyalties – two sustained and one broken ................................................................................... 238 10.4.1. Professional loyalty ........................................................................................................................ 239 10.4.2. National loyalty .............................................................................................................................. 240 10.4.3. Government loyalty ........................................................................................................................ 240 10.5. A model of competing loyalties ............................................................................................................. 242 10.6. Recommendations ................................................................................................................................. 244 10.6.1. The journalists ................................................................................................................................ 244 10.6.2. The authorities ............................................................................................................................... 245 10.6.3. The private media ........................................................................................................................... 245 10.6.4. The donor community .................................................................................................................... 246 10.6.5. The research community ................................................................................................................ 246 10.7. Summary and conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 247

Chapter 11: Epilogue .................................................................................................................................... 249 11.1. Kristiansand, Norway, May 2012 ........................................................................................................... 249

Appendix 1: Informants, main interviews..................................................................................................... 251 Appendix 2: Informants, support interviews ................................................................................................ 254 Appendix 3: Interview guide for main interviews (semi-structured)............................................................. 256 References ................................................................................................................................................... 258 Index ............................................................................................................................................................ 289

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List of figures

Figure 2.1: Front pages of The Reporter, English version, 26 April 2008 and 19 May 2012 ................................. 29 Figure 3.1: Front page of Awramba Times, 17 Sept 2011 ..................................................................................... 36 Figure 4.1: Tensions between the professionalization paradigm and the interpretive community paradigm .... 54 Figure 6.1: Exterior of Ethiopian News Agency, Piazza ....................................................................................... 104 Figure 6.2: Ethical values poster in ENA’s main hall area ................................................................................... 104 Figure 6.3: Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency, exterior .............................................................................. 105 Figure 6.4: Lex Plaza, location of The Ethiopian Herald ...................................................................................... 109 Figure 6.5: Ethiopian Press Agency, located at Arat Kilo across Berhanena Selam Printing Press ..................... 110 Figure 7.1: Overview of content analyses in chapters 7 and 8 ........................................................................... 116 Figure 7.2: The 50 most frequent words used in ENA headlines Mar 2011–Feb 2012....................................... 118 Figure 7.3: Word cloud generated from ENA headlines Mar 2011–Feb 2012 .................................................... 120 Figure 7.4: The 50 most frequent words used in articles in a constructed ENA week Mar 2011–Feb 2012 ...... 121 Figure 7.5: Front pages of The Ethiopian Herald before and after refurbishing Dec 2011 ................................. 125 Figure 7.6: Example of conference photograph in The Ethiopian Herald ........................................................... 125 Figure 7.7: Photograph types in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald .............................. 126 Figure 7.8: Sources in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald .............................................. 127 Figure 7.9: Genres in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald ............................................... 130 Figure 7.10: Topics covered in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald ................................. 133

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Figure 7.11: Front page of The Ethiopian Herald with new slogan on bottom, 29 April 2011 ........................... 134 Figure 7.12: Origin of articles in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald .............................. 136 Figure 7.13: Geographical origin of articles in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald ......... 136 Figure 7.14: Front page of The Ethiopian Herald, 14 Dec 2011 (refurbished) .................................................... 137 Figure 8.1: An integrated process model of framing .......................................................................................... 145 Figure 8.2: ETV documentary series on free press with follow-up programmes: Overview .............................. 147 Figure 8.3: Persons interviewed, programmes 1–3 ............................................................................................ 148 Figure 8.4: Screenshot, EBA director Desta Tesfaw in office .............................................................................. 149 Figure 8.5: Screenshot, people welcoming TPLF forces, May 1991 .................................................................... 153 Figure 8.6: Examples of rhetorical questions and answers in documentary section 2 (programmes 4–6) ........ 155 Figure 8.7: Persons interviewed, programme 4–6 .............................................................................................. 159 Figure 8.8: Screenshot, front page of research journal ...................................................................................... 160 Figure 8.9: Screenshot, coverage of food shortage in private newspaper ......................................................... 162 Figure 8.10: Screenshot, panellists in ETV studio ............................................................................................... 168 Figure 8.11: Screenshot, 1994 protests against private magazines at Meskel Square ....................................... 178 Figure 9.1: Length of journalistic experience of informants ............................................................................... 186 Figure 9.2: Average and median years of journalistic experience of informants ............................................... 186 Figure 9.3: Monthly salary brackets of informants before tax ........................................................................... 188 Figure 9.4: Monthly salary levels of informants before tax ................................................................................ 188 Figure 9.5: Anti-corruption poster in the ENA newsroom .................................................................................. 191 Figure 9.6: Front page of The Reporter, Amharic version, 4 May 2011 .............................................................. 206

All photographs in the dissertation by author

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Acronyms

AAU

Addis Ababa University

AFP

Agence France-Presse

AM

amplitude modulation

AP

Associated Press

AU

African Union

BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

BPR

business process reengineering

CEJA

Climate and Environmental Journalists’ Association

CNN

Cable News Network

CPJ

Committee to Protect Journalists

CSO

civil society organization

CUD

Coalition for Unity and Democracy

DPA

Deutsche Presse-Agentur

DW

Deutsche Welle

EBA

Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority

EC

Ethiopian Calendar

EDP

Ethiopian Democratic Party

EEJA

Ethiopian Environment Journalists’ Association

EFFORT

Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray

EFJA

Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association

EJA

Ethiopian Journalist Association

EMMTI

Ethiopian Mass Media Training Institute

EMWA

Ethiopian Media Women’s Association

ENA

Ethiopian News Agency xii

ENJU

Ethiopian National Journalists’ Union

EPA

Ethiopian Press Agency

EPRDF

Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front

ERIS

Electoral Reform International Services

Eri-TV

Eritrean Television

ERTA

Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency

ESJA

Ethiopian Sports Journalists’ Association

ESAT

Ethiopian Satellite Television

ETB

Ethiopian birr

ETC

Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation

ETV

Ethiopian Television

EU

European Union

EVMPA

Ethiopian Volunteer Media Professionals Against AIDS

FCAE

Foreign Correspondents’ Association of Ethiopia

FJC

Faculty of Journalism and Communication, AAU

FES

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

FM

frequency modulation

GCIS

Government Communication and Information System

GDP

gross domestic product

GM

general manager

GTP

Growth and Transformation Plan

HDI

Human Development Index

HRW

Human Rights Watch

ICASA

International Conference on AIDS and STIs in Africa

ICG

International Crisis Group

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IREX

International Research & Exchanges Board

IRNA

Islam Republic News Agency

ISS

Institute for Security Studies

LDC

leased developed countries

MA

Master of Arts

MoI

Ministry of Information

MP

Member of Parliament

NEPAD

New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NGO

non-governmental organization

NJAFGM Network of Journalists Against Female Genital Mutilation NMNE

Nile Media Network Ethiopia Chapter

NPAE

National Photojournalist Association Ethiopia

OAU

Organization of African Unity xiii

OGCA

Office for Government Communication Affairs

OLF

Oromo Liberation Front

OTV

Oromo Television (Oromiya Television)

PANA

Pan-African News Agency

PLWHA

people living with HIV/AIDS

PM

Prime Minister

PMC

Population Media Center

RSF

Reporters sans frontières/Reporters Without Borders

RVOG

Radio Voice of the Gospel

SABC

South African Broadcasting Corporation

SAPA

South African Press Association

SJA

Science Journalists’ Association

SMS

short message service

TGE

Transitional Government of Ethiopia

TPLF

Tigray People’s Liberation Front

UEDF

United Ethiopian Democratic Forces

UN

United Nations

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMEE

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

US(A)

United States (of America)

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

USD

United States dollar

VOA

Voice of America

WFP

World Food Programme

WJS

Worlds of Journalism Study

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Currency

June 2012: ETB 100 = USD 5.60 June 2010: ETB 100 = USD 7.20* * Before the devaluation of the Ethiopian birr in September 2010

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A note on Ethiopian names

The dissertation follows Ethiopian naming tradition by using first name as the primary reference, although the second name (the person’s father’s name) is habitually added for clarification. The work makes no use of designations such as ‘ato’ and ‘weyzero’, even if this is customary when referring to prominent persons in Ethiopia. This should not be read as a sign of impoliteness, but rather as a principle of treating all persons on an equal basis.

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Acknowledgements

There are many people to thank. First and foremost, I thank my advisor, Prof. Helge Rønning, for excellent support and constructive discussion throughout the project period. Helge is a combination of sound experience and great compassion. At Addis Ababa University, our students just called him ‘the ocean’ (ውቅያኖስ) – not because of his physical size, but because of his wide knowledge. I am grateful for having been under his wings during this project. I also thank Prof. Bahru Zewde for having agreed to be my co-advisor after I forced him to do so. His knowledge of the Ethiopian society, past and present, is unprecedented. In addition to my advisors, many more skilled persons have been involved in giving input to selected parts of the dissertation, crucial to bringing the final product to its present shape. The persons include professors Sigurd Allern, Georgina Born, Raymond Boyle, Stig Hjarvard, Beate Josephi, Ullamaija Kivikuru, Philip Schlesinger, Tore Slaatta, Brian Winston and Barbie Zelizer. I thank you all for having taken the time to respond to drafts and assist in various ways. There would be no dissertation of this kind without informants. I am tremendously impressed by all journalists and stakeholders in the Ethiopian media environment who have offered their time and energy to share experiences despite heavy workloads. Some have gone at great lengths to assist this shameless Norwegian researcher, epitomized by Communication Minister Bereket Simon who set aside a full hour for me in his office less than two weeks before the 2010 elections. I have truly enjoyed each and every of the total 94 interviews, and my thanks go in particular to journalists who have not been afraid to speak their mind despite constraints of different kinds. I also thank local informants who have not been included in the official list of interviewees but who have still provided invaluable input for the project. For various reasons I could not mention your names here, but please accept my greatest appreciation. In xvii

addition, I thank former colleagues at the Faculty of Journalism and Communication, Addis Ababa University, where I had different commitments from 2004 to 2008. The dean, Dr. Gebremedhin Simon, is especially thanked, and so are the assistant deans Abdi Ali, Getachew Dinku, Tenaw Terefe and Zenebe Beyene. I am also in a special way indebted to former and present students in the MA programme in journalism who have done nothing less than to pave the way for Ethiopian media research through many a ground-breaking MA thesis. As anyone can see in the reference list for this dissertation, I have drawn extensively on these thesis projects in my own research. It is a delight to notice that several of the MA graduates have pursued further media and journalism research, insofar as former students are now placed in PhD programmes on four continents with projects focusing on Ethiopian media and communication. The scholarship in Ethiopian media research is truly growing. My lack of proficiency in local languages has meant great dependence on assistants, being responsible for translating around a hundred pages of policy documents and many hours of television broadcasts, plus more. In this regard I would have been helpless without the assistance of, in particular, Ephrem Taddesse, Jemal Mohammed, Nebiat Gebissa, Senait Hargos, Tigist Gebru, Woldegiorgis Ghebrehiwot and Zewge Abate. ለሚቀጥለው የመመረቂያ ፅሑፌ ኣማርኛ ለመማር ቃል እገባለሁ! I am indebted to several libraries which have been instrumental in retrieving information otherwise hard to find, especially in the area of Ethiopian media history (chapter 2). For this I thank librarians at the Faculty of Journalism and Communication, AAU; Forum for Social Studies; Mekane Yesus Seminary; and Population Media Center (all in Addis Ababa); plus librarians at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden. I thank personnel at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Addis Ababa for moral support to my project and for genuine interest in Ethiopian journalism and media development. For financial support toward field trips I am especially indebted to Family & Media (‘Familie & Medier’, Norway) and the Nordic Africa Institute (Sweden). Thank you both for your generosity and for showing confidence in the project! Besides field trips to Ethiopia, the research project has brought me to conferences in no less than ten countries. For much needed support toward these conferences I should acknowledge the Nordic Africa Days organizing committee; the Nordic Research Network in Journalism Studies; and internal funds at the Department of Media and Communication, University of Oslo. For the PhD research opportunity itself, I will be forever grateful to the Competence Development Fund of Southern Norway (‘Sørlandets kompetansefond’), which has graciously covered the entire PhD grant through my home institution Gimlekollen School of Journalism and Communication, Kristiansand, Norway. Without your unconditional financial support this PhD project would not have become a reality. At Gimlekollen I thank all colleagues and superiors who have been utterly supportive to the project. I could not have had a better work environment. For scholarly discussions and xviii

responses, I thank in particular Kenneth Andresen and Henrik Kjellingland. A special note of thanks goes to Chris Wales for proof-reading without complaining about the length of the dissertation. Special thanks also go to Dr. Rev. Øyvind Aadland, who introduced me to Ethiopia in a most empathetic manner in the first place, and to Dr. Rev. Hans Aage Gravaas, who has made me see at least the surface of the many layers in Ethiopian culture. Finally, I thank my family who has indeed never protested to this project. The main burden has fallen on my wife, Kathrine, who has, without the slightest degree of complaint, taken care of practically all issues on the domestic arena lately. This is not a small duty, given that our family has grown to five during the PhD project period. At the same time, Skule (now 5), Knut (now 4) and Tallak (1) have reminded me that there is a meaningful life after a PhD. Skule, I promise that we will now go and pick blueberries. I am also very grateful to my mother-in-law, Inger Margrethe, and my father-in-law, Terje, who always support us. In the extended sense, I thank my parents Magnhild and Steinulf, who live far away, but who taught me that hard work is essentially a good thing. Thank you all once again. Somehow, each of you have contributed to making the dissertation exactly in the form it now stands.

Kristiansand, Norway, June 2012

Terje S. Skjerdal

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How the dissertation is organized

Chapter 1 recounts the personal story that provoked the research in the first place. It ends with an informal formulation of the problem statement. Chapters 2 and 3 provide an introduction to Ethiopian society and the local media situation. This section is fairly extensive, mainly due to the realization that many readers will be unfamiliar with the general context of the research. Chapter 4 discusses the theoretical framework of the research, both from a general paradigmatic and a specific theoretical perspective. A discussion of relevant global as well as local contributions is included. The chapter ends by formulating the problem statement of the research. Chapter 5 presents the chosen methodology. The main focus of this chapter is on qualitative in-depth interviews, which form the chief method of the research. Attention is also paid to particular issues pertaining to the fieldwork, such as the challenge of crossing cultural boundaries as a researcher. Subordinate methods, notably content analysis (chapters 7 and 8), are presented in respective chapters rather than in the general methodology chapter. Chapter 6 introduces the three researched media organizations and explains the reasons for why these media organizations were selected. Chapters 7 and 8 present the character of the three media organizations by means of consecutive content analyses. Chapter 7 comprises a quantitative content analysis of articles distributed by ENA and The Ethiopian Herald. Chapter 8 resumes the content analysis with a qualitative in-depth study of a contentious documentary series produced by Ethiopian Television. While chapter 7 is intended to provide a representative analysis of news content in ENA and The Ethiopian Herald, chapter 8 focuses on a particular documentary production so as to demonstrate the inclination of the broadcaster when treating a controversial, political xx

issue. In addition to presenting a content analysis, chapter 8 includes an opening analysis of journalism culture by going behind the documentary production by means of interviews with producers and journalists. Chapter 9 comprises the focal point of the research by considering journalism culture in the three researched organizations through interviews with 67 journalists and other actors. A particular focus in the discussion is the different commitments journalists face to the profession, to the nation, and to the government. Chapter 10 revisits the theoretical framework (outlined in chapter 4) in light of the research findings. The chapter concludes by proposing a model of competing loyalties as an alternative to the acknowledged model of shifting loyalties. Chapter 11 provides a brief personal reflection by means of an epilogue to the study. Regardless of the general flow in the dissertation, effort has been made to compose each chapter in such a way that they can be read independently. Thus, those interested in the empirical findings and an account of Ethiopian journalism culture may skip the introductory chapters and go directly to chapters 7, 8 and 9. To gain an understanding of the theoretical approach to the research, and a discussion of the concept of competing loyalties, the reader is referred to chapters 4 and 10. For an overview of Ethiopian media history and a slightly new way to consider developments in the contemporary media situation in the country, one may read chapters 2 and 3, which, due to the perceived lack of coherent literature in the area, is an attempt to draft an account of the Ethiopian media in light of the changing political context.

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Chapter 1 A puzzling encounter in Addis Ababa

1.1. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2002 This research project was provoked by a trip I made to Ethiopia almost ten years ago. In October 2002, I was given the opportunity to travel to Ethiopia as part of an assignment which aimed to draft a curriculum for a planned graduate programme in journalism at Addis Ababa University. While on the mission, I wanted to get some acquaintance with the local media, so I invited myself to a few selected institutions. One of the institutions I visited was Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), a government-run agency which has been in charge of distributing official news to the local media since the early 1940s. I must admit that I had serious preconceptions as I entered ENA’s building on upper Piazza. What type of journalistic mindset could you expect in a news agency which was rumoured to have been in the pockets of the government for six decades? It turned out that my preconceptions needed fine-tuning. Certainly, I could observe the expected reporting style focusing on official strategies and government achievements. However, I could also observe journalists in the news agency who did not at all appear to be ignorant information workers serving the official power. They were happy to answer any questions I posed and expressed, as far as I could discern, a sound journalistic mindset. I especially remember an encounter with the editor-in-chief of one of ENA’s departments. His office had the typical layout of a chief’s office, with a large desk between himself and visitors. It was clear that he was in charge. As we began talking, I could immediately recognize the journalistic ‘spirit’. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what this is, but being a former journalist myself, I know when I meet someone of my kind. It is perhaps an attitude of telling

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things as they are; stay away from jargon; not take anything as a given. The editor had all these attitudes. He expressed clear journalistic aspirations. Then, the puzzle. As we had chatted for a while, he suddenly bent over the desk towards me, so as to tell me a secret: «We’re a government mouthpiece, you know!» He whispered – loudly, as if to say that everybody knows it, but we’re not supposed to talk about it. I found this utterly bewildering. Clearly there was a conflict here. On the one hand, the editor had a sharp conception of what it means to be a professional journalist. On the other hand, it seemed that he had somehow submitted to standards which are contrary to his professional mindset. How could he reconcile this conflict? Why would he not work for the private media instead, where he could realize his professional potential? Ultimately, how could he rescue a sense of professionalism while serving a state media institution? That puzzle is essentially what this dissertation is all about.

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Chapter 2 Ethiopian society and media

2.1. Introduction Contemporary Ethiopia faces an apparent paradox: a situation of extraordinary economic growth despite, according to critics, an increasingly authoritarian political atmosphere. Towards a yearly GDP growth of 7–11% since 2007 and a projected growth of 6–8% in the years to come1, Ethiopia is likely to become a middle-income nation in less than three decades2. This is remarkable, given that Ethiopia around year 2000 frequently figured as one of the world’s three poorest countries on a range of social and economic indicators. However, economic prosperity coincides with mounting concern for the political situation in the country. Analysts claim that the exercise of political power in Ethiopia is becoming increasingly authoritarian (Abbink, 2011; Hagmann and Abbink, 2011; Asnake, 2011; cf. Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009a, 2009b; Lefort, 2010), demonstrated by the latest national elections in 2010 which gave the ruling coalition 91% of the seats in Parliament. In this regard, the media policy of the incumbent, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), is commonly portrayed as an exemplar of Ethiopia’s alleged authoritarian turn. Repercussions against journalists and tightly controlled state media channels are widely used as evidence of restrictions of public liberties. Evidently, the current political leadership regards the media as an integrated part of its governance strategy,

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‘World Economic Outlook’, International Monetary Fond (IMF), September 2011. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/country/eth/. Cf. ‘Ethiopia forecast’, Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2012. Available at: http://country.eiu.com/Ethiopia 2 ‘The least developed countries (LDC) report 2011’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), September 2011. Available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2011_en.pdf. There are today 48 countries in the LDC category worldwide, of which 33 belong to Africa.

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similar to the approach of preceding regimes. At the same time, a comprehensive analysis of the Ethiopian media situation must be open to divergent readings, including the possibility that media policy does not necessarily concur with the development in governance at all points. This alternative perspective is indeed at hand in the current treatment of Ethiopian media governance. This introductory chapter includes a substantial historical background section, which might be considered unusual for a dissertation focusing primarily on a contemporary issue. There are three reasons for this, equally important. Firstly, the possible international readership of dissertation is unlikely to be familiar with local society and history. As is repeatedly emphasized by scholars in Ethiopian studies, the country cannot readily be equated with other African societies, not least because of its exclusive lack of colonial history and its exceptionally long-standing national configuration. Secondly, a comprehensive media history of Ethiopia is yet to be written. This implies that there is no ‘canon’ which constitutes a common reference point for the development of the nation’s media. Instead, we are left with fragmented treatments and drafts of history, quite often actually emerging as contradictory accounts of the local media. I have therefore opted for a new consultation of sources for the history section of this dissertation; this with a view to present an renewed historical account of the Ethiopian media, focusing particularly on the changing political context. Thirdly, I aim to challenge popular accounts of the contemporary Ethiopian media situation. Developments in the media domain over the past decade have been used by critics external to the media and communication field to corroborate political analyses as part of the ‘mounting authoritarianism’ argument, while the situation is indeed multifaceted. In the eagerness to streamline developments within media governance with overall political developments, nuances and precision tend to get lost, even in otherwise respected research contributions. To exemplify with some of the many inaccuracies that abound, it is claimed that there are no independent radio stations in Ethiopia (Hagmann and Abbink, 2011, p. 592), while there are in fact five; it is claimed that the new media law of 2008 represents a narrowing of the media field in comparison with the 1992 press law (Bach, 2011, p. 646), while no thorough reading could arrive at such a conclusion; it is claimed that there are no undergraduate university programmes in journalism in Ethiopia (Kent and Taylor, 2011, p. 5), while in actuality there are 21; and, to name a most extreme example derived from an early issue of the acclaimed magazine Global Journalist, it has been claimed that at least 16 journalists have been killed in Ethiopia during EPRDF rule (Kefale, 2001), while comprehensive statistics by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) hold that only one journalist has died on a work-related assignment in the country over the past 20 years3. It is tempting to suggest that such distortions pass into the literature because they appear liable in light of a general argument of political repression. What I am presenting in this chapter is therefore an alternative to accounts which uncritically mesh developments in media governance with 3

http://cpj.org/killed/africa/ethiopia/ (statistics updated until June 2012)

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overall political developments. Instead of assuming that recent Ethiopian media governance entails steady deterioration towards increased control with the press, I will argue that the developments over time testify to a continuous condition of periodic interchanges between coercion and liberalization. Thus, while the situation for the press since 2005 is commonly portrayed as one of mounting repression, there have also in this period been notable achievements in terms of liberalization of media regulation, diversification in the airwaves, and professionalization of the state media. A chief purpose of the present chapter is therefore to modify popular portrayals of Ethiopian media governance. The chapter has three parts. The first part (2.2) provides an introduction to recent social and political history of Ethiopia. The second part (2.3) drafts the local media history, with main emphasis on the two decades of EPRDF rule (1991–2012). On this basis, the third part (2.4) describes the already mentioned theory of interchanges between coercion and liberalization as a new way to approach Ethiopian media governance, besides introducing the concept of ‘selective liberalization’. 2.2. Social and political context 2.2.1. Demographics and economy Ethiopia is a significant regional power on the Horn of Africa with growing impact on the continent as a whole. In 2005, Ethiopia surpassed Egypt to become Africa’s second largest nation population-wise, after Nigeria. The World Bank’s 2010 figures estimate a population of approximately 83 million4. In 2011, Ethiopia became the third largest economy in SubSaharan Africa. The African Futures Project, commissioned by the South African-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS), places Ethiopia in the ‘A4 group’ together with Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa, suggesting that these four countries will have the greatest impact in determining the continent’s economic and political destiny in the decades to come5. Ethiopia also scores well on a range of social development indicators. On UNDP’s Human Development Index, Ethiopia is the country with the fourth highest growth worldwide since 20006. The country has shown significant improvements in education, life expectancy and overall living standards, to name a few areas. Rapid economic growth, however, has aggravated high inflation rates since 2008, affecting food prices in particular. Nevertheless, by mid-2012, the high inflation shows signs of decline due to measures taken by the government and the national bank, much to the satisfaction of the International Monetary

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http://data.worldbank.org ‘African futures 2050: the next forty years’, report, Institute for Security Studies, January 2011. Available at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono175.pdf 6 ‘Human Development Report 2011: sustainability and equity: a better future for all’, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), November 2011. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Complete.pdf 5

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Fund (IMF)7. Despite some critical voices questioning the validity of Ethiopia’s economic progress (often emanating from oppositional diaspora environments; e.g. Berhanu, 2010), independent reports confirm that growth is steady and exceptional by global standards. Economic success has granted Ethiopia a favourable standing with the international donor community. The nation is described as a ‘donor darling’ (Hagmann and Abbink, 2011, p. 588), alluding to the way in which Ethiopia’s development successes supposedly make the international community look past the downsides, such as EPRDF’s scepticism towards liberal democracy and political pluralism. Accordingly, in the Ethiopian case, donor engagement is found to have little impact on local policies (Borchgrevink, 2008). In the view of Dereje Feyissa (2011), the relationship between Ethiopia and international donors ought to be described as ‘aid negotiation’ rather than as a genuine partnership. International support is sustained on a large scale. The annual donor contribution is estimated at more than USD 3 billion, representing at least a third of Ethiopia’s national budget (Dereje, 2011, p. 788). International interests vis-à-vis Ethiopia must also be read towards the nation’s role as a regional stabilizer on the Horn of Africa. Flanked by war-ridden Sudan/South Sudan, totalitarian Eritrea and volatile Somalia, Ethiopia is ascribed a collateral role between local and international interests, not least in relation to the imminent threat of terrorism in the region. Moreover, Ethiopia has achieved an increasingly influential position in global priorities such as north/south climate negotiations, and continues to serve as the geographical headquarter of the African Union (AU) in addition to hosting important branch offices of the UN and other international organizations. On the domestic arena, Ethiopia is challenged by troubles related to energy demand, among other pressing issues. A 2011-initiated mega-dam project on the Blue Nile River close to the border of Sudan is trumpeted as one of the greatest investments in modern Ethiopia both financially and culturally, as indicated by its official name, the ‘Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’ (formerly known as the Millennium Dam). When completed, the dam will comprise the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa, besides being one of the ten largest in the world. The local state media have publicized the project as a joint effort between the Ethiopian people and investors, and every public servant, including workers in the state media, has contributed one month’s salary towards its capital investment8. Sudan and Egypt, on the other hand, are concerned about consequences for the downstream of the Nile. Another on-going major dam project in Ethiopia, the Gilgel Gibe III Dam of the Omo River in the south of the country, is disputed because of its potential environmental and social impact. In both cases, the Ethiopian government is criticized for lack of transparency around the projects, with government-commissioned reports allegedly arriving at preordained conclusions. Accordingly, the state media function as patrons of the mega-dam ventures, producing 7

‘Statement by an IMF Staff Mission on the 2012 Article IV Consultation with Ethiopia’, press release no. 12/224, IMF, 14 June 2012. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr12224.htm 8 E.g. ‘Employees of Ethiopian Press Agency donated one month salary for construction of Grand Dam’, ENA, 15 April 2011. Available at: http://www.ena.gov.et/EnglishNews/2012/Jan/15Jan12/138381.htm

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enthusiastic reports about the construction and admitting critical voices only on a very modest scale (cf. 7.3.2.4). 2.2.2. Political governance Since 1930, a stretch of more than 80 years, Ethiopia has only had three heads of state. Emperor Haile Selassie (r. 1930–74) went into history as the last regent of the Ethiopian Empire, claiming direct descent from King Solomon of ancient Israel (900 BC). During Haile Selassie’s reign, Ethiopia gained international momentum and pan-African recognition, culminating with the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU; renamed African Union in 2002) in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963. Ethiopia was an obvious candidate for the OAU headquarters, not least because of its symbolic power as a non-colonized society. Internally, Haile Selassie brought capitalist economic reforms to Ethiopia while centralizing the government structure. In line with imperial tradition, the public administration was modelled after the hierarchical system of the Amhara, spurring Amharic ethnic dominance in for example language policy. Nevertheless, Haile Selassie’s reforms had socially unsolicited side effects, besides colliding with the ideology of the radical student movement of the 1960s. Eventually, the empire collapsed in 1974, and after an interregnum of contestations between socialist groups, Mengistu Haile Mariam (r. 1977–91) seized power on behalf of the Derg (‘committee’) in 1977. Mengistu promised national unity, land reform and a socialist revolution, but the biproduct, so to speak, was terrorism and dictatorship. The Red Terror campaign of the late 1970s left thousands of ‘counter-revolutionaries’ dead; perhaps as many as 200,000 persons or more (Girmachew, 2006, p. 66). The radical political leadership which followed nationalized all rural land and eradicated private ownership. Toward the end of the 1980s, however, Mengistu faced increased pressure from clandestine counter-revolutionary groups and even lost support from his former allies in Eastern Europe. The Derg regime was finally toppled by the cleverly organized EPRDF alliance in Addis Ababa in May 1991. EPRDF, comprising a coalition of four political groups led by the ethnically-based Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), advocated a democratic agenda and instituted the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) which governed the country from 1991 to 1993. A new constitution came into force in 1995, amalgamating human rights principles with directions for a political governance model designed on the principles of a multi-ethnic state. In contrast to the two previous regimes, which promoted different types of centralized governing structures, EPRDF launched a de-centralized model based on ethnic federalism. The country is now officially a federation comprising nine self-administered regional states based on linguistic ethnicity, in addition to two self-administered city states (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). The federation is defined according to a map which officially

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recognizes 75 ethnic groups9 (‘nations, nationalities and peoples’), but their size is highly uneven, and so is access to infrastructure and resources. The four largest groups are the Oromo (35% of the population10), the Amhara (27%), the Somali (6%) and the Tigray (6%); while the smallest sub-groups of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples region have less than 1,000 members. This caters for an asymmetrical relationship between the regions, and Tigray interests, which, although representing only 6% of the population, are commonly thought to be favoured by the central government. The Prime Minister himself, Meles Zenawi, is Tigray. The ethnic-based federalist system, sometimes dubbed an Ethiopian ‘experiment’ (Abbink, 2011), has been subject to much analysis by political and social scientists. Though principally aiming to raise ethnic self-determination (Yonatan, 2010), EPRDF governance in practice has been criticized for fuelling ethnic conflict and bolstering a centralized government along the lines of a Marxist-Leninist model (Aalen, 2002, 2006; Abbink, 2011; ICG, 2009). There is no agreed terminology which encapsulates the current governance system of Ethiopia apart from nominal descriptions such as ‘ethnic federalism’. In political analysis, the government has been described as everything from democratic (Henze, 1998) to authoritarian (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009a). Analysts emphasizing democratic features of Ethiopia point to conditions of regularly held elections where citizens have a constitutional right to organize political parties and compete for power. At the same time it is clear that the official Ethiopian understanding of democracy diverges from a liberal democracy model. As pronounced by Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, «we do not follow the liberal democratic principles which the Western countries are pushing us to follow»11. Ethiopia has instead pursued a revolutionary democracy model, which entails a sometimes bewildering combination of centralized directives and a direct ‘coalition with the people’. As expounded by Sarah Vaughan (2011), the exercise of revolutionary democracy in Ethiopia constitutes a multifaceted strategy towards state-building in which the Front (i.e. EPRDF, dominated by TPLF) emerges as the constant reference point of power. The ambiguity of the Ethiopian governance model is captured in the Amharic term abyotawi demokrasi, which, according to Jean-Nicolas Bach (2011), represents a system which is actually «neither revolutionary, nor democratic» (p. 641). The ambiguity in Ethiopian governance is detectable in for example the regime’s recent embracing of developmental capitalism (lematawi habt) despite the regime’s official rhetoric against economic liberalism. Alongside the move towards democratic-centralist developmentalism since 2005, critics note authoritarian tendencies in EPRDF’s governance practice. Elections in particular are used to substantiate this argument. While the 2005 federal election campaign for the first 9

Although the commonly acknowledged number of ethnic groups in Ethiopia is 82 Figures derived from US Department of State statistics. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.htm 11 ‘Ethiopia’s PM restructures government’, Peter Heinlein, 5 October 2010. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Ethiopias-PM-Restructures-Government-104350299.html 10

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time signalled a competitive multiparty environment (EPRDF only won a 60% share of the seats in Parliament), the aftermath soon proved that the ruling coalition was not prepared to accept pluralist politics. A period of tight political control followed, with mass mobilization for party membership. The reinforcement of the ruling party at all levels was underscored by the 2008 local elections, which saw the withdrawal of the most prominent opposition parties and a sweeping win to EPRDF and its affiliated parties. The 2008 vote was thus dubbed ‘a return of electoral authoritarianism’ (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009a), only to be further accentuated by the 2010 federal elections, where EPRDF got 91.4% of the seats in Parliament (99.6% if counting EPRDF-affiliated parties). Although there were some reports of irregularities at the polling stations, the main criticism of the 2010 elections, in the view of international observers from EU’s election mission, was that they did not provide for «a level playing field for all contested parties»12. Among the most critical scholars in this regard is human rights professor Kjetil Tronvoll (2011), who argues that the 2010 elections represent the definitive return to one-partyism in Ethiopia. At the same time, Tronvoll (2009) appropriately emphasizes that elections alone do not constitute sufficient ground for a comprehensive analysis of Ethiopian political governance. The «non-electoral context» must be taken into account, demanding a multi-layered analysis which contemplates international relations, cultural authority and ideological reorientation, such as the EPRDF government’s rejection of the Ethiopian nationalist discourse, among other factors (Tronvoll, 2009). A compound analysis is precisely the approach of the following historical review of Ethiopia’s mass media, which considers the nation’s media history in light of social and political developments. This is not to assume that developments in media governance constitute a straightforward reflection of social and political conditions. On the contrary, the review, specifically the part dealing with the current regime, will problematize what might be described as reductionist interpretations of media policy. 2.3. An historical review of the Ethiopian media 2.3.1. Media during the Empire (–1974) The first Ethiopian newspaper came to birth around year 1900. The exact year and name of the earliest newspaper is, however, uncertain. Principally, three publications could qualify as the first press product: (a) The weekly Le Semaine d’Ethiopie (‘Ethiopian weekly’), was distributed in Harar in 1905, but it may have appeared in the same city as early as 1884, 1888, 1890 or 1896, possibly under the name Le Semeur d’Ethiopie (‘the Ethiopian sower’) (Aadland and Røe, 2000, p. 216; Mekuria, 2007, p. 27; Shimelis, 2000, p. 6; Shinn and Ofcansky, 2004, p. 273). It was produced by Franciscan missionaries and consisted mainly of health information,

12

European Union Election Observation Mission report on Ethiopian elections 2010, final report, November 2010, p. 1. Available at: http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/final-report-eueom-ethiopia08112010_en.pdf

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notably campaigns against leprosy. The main language of the publication was French, occasionally Amharic (Janas, 1991, p. 12). (b) The other candidate is the Amharic 4-page weekly Aemero (‘intelligence’) which appeared in the relatively newfound capital Addis Ababa around 1901 (alternatively 1895, 1900 or 1902; Shimelis, 2000, p. 7; Shinn and Ofcansky, 2004, p. 273; Talbot, 1955, p. 319). It was marked by a degree of government control, underlined by the fact that the name was chosen by the Emperor himself, Menelik II (Janas, 1991, p. 16). The first volumes of Aemero had a circulation of only 24 handwritten copies, but the circulation rose to about 200 when it began to be duplicated on a new printing machine in Addis Ababa in 1905 or 1906. (c) Thirdly, there are reports that blatta13 Gebre Egziabher wrote satirical poems on sheets that were duplicated around 50 times and circulated in the Emperor’s courtyard every Sunday before year 1900 in a format that resembled a newspaper, although its title remains unknown (Pankhurst, 1962, p. 260; Irma, 1994, p. 501). Whichever of these three publications should be regarded as Ethiopia’s first newspaper, each of them emphasizes features which have characterized Ethiopian journalism to various degrees ever since, namely international influence (Le Semaine d’Ethiopie), government allegiance (Aemero), and political criticism (Gebre Egziabher’s weekly). A landmark for Ethiopian journalism is the establishment in 1921 of the printing press in Addis Ababa that later came to be known as Berhanena Selam (‘light and peace’). Although various types of printing equipment had been introduced to Ethiopia/Eritrea earlier (Massawa 1863, Keren 1879, Addis Ababa 1893, Asmara 1895, Harar 1905), the overall technical quality was poor and the presses did not have the capacity to print newspapers in large circulations (Garretson, 1978, p. 286; Janas, 1991, p. 11). With imported modern machinery from Germany, Berhanena Selam Printing Press was first aimed at producing religious books, but soon expanded to the newspaper sector. On 1 January 1925, the printing press, which was fittingly placed at the Emperor’s compound Genete Leul during its first few years of existence (today Addis Ababa University main campus at Siddist Kilo), launched the first issue of Berhanena Selam, an Amharic weekly conceived by ras (prince) Tafari Mekonnen himself (Berhanena Selam, 2011). The newspaper was a semi-official periodical and emphasized internal affairs, in contrast to Aemero which concentrated on foreign news (Garretson, 1978, p. 287). Berhanena Selam truly signalled the imminent Emperor’s cognizant attitude towards media communication. Ras Tafari (later Haile Selassie) was closely involved with the newspaper, and even assisted with proof-reading when there was shortage of personnel (Mekuria, 2007, p. 28) – thus challenging Ryszard Kapuściński’s (1983) claim that «his venerable Majesty was no reader» (p. 7)14. While remaining loyal to the throne, Berhanena Selam purportedly also served as a promoter for progressive ideas among young intellectuals in the 1920s and 30s (Shimelis, 2000, p. 8). A fair number of smaller publications were also available 13

Blatta (ብላታ) is an honorary title designating scholarship (akin to ‘laurate’). Could also refer to a person in the imperial court in charge of maintaining palace protocol. 14 For a critical assessment of Kapuściński’s (1983) portrayal of Haile Selassie as literary uninformed and other misrepresentations in The Emperor, see Marcus, 1990 and Zebrowska, 2008.

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at the time, including selected titles in European languages such as English, French, Greek and Italian. This condition notwithstanding, Ethiopia was not generally known as a newspaper-reading society. A Central European newspaper in 1929 thus described Ethiopia as «ein Land ohne Zeitungen» (‘a country without newspapers’15). Still, a lasting tradition of Ethiopian journalism was formed during this period. Blatta Welde Giyorgis Wolde Yohannes was assigned as main editor of Berhanena Selam in the 1930s and subsequently became known as ‘the father of Ethiopian journalism’ (Molvær, 1997, p. 29; Shimelis, 2000, p. 9). Illustrative of the close bonds between the government and the media, the Emperor later entrusted Welde Giyorgis to become the long-serving chief for the Ministry of the Pen 1941– 58. It was an era when loyalty to the Emperor paid off. Radio broadcasting came to Ethiopia in 1935, just before the Italian occupation 1936– 41. The new medium was only allowed a year of operation before Mussolini’s forces took over the governing structures and prohibited practically all local media. Radio transmitters were destroyed by Ethiopians just in time to prevent the Italian governors from using the local media for propaganda purposes. However, the Italian forces redeveloped a broadcasting structure and spread Fascist propaganda using radio programmes in addition to print material which was produced on a few surviving printing presses. An underground press consequently arose. It distributed illegal newspapers that were printed abroad on an irregular basis (Janas, 1991). The return of the Ethiopian government in 1941 heralded a new era in the nation’s media history. In May 1941, the local administration enthusiastically launched Addis Zemen (fittingly meaning ‘new era’), an Amharic publication which has remained the most important state-owned newspaper in the nation ever since. Its loyalty to the nation and the incumbent has always been indisputable. One of the first issues proclaimed that the newspaper «was established with the permission of His Imperial Majesty to explain to the people about what they should do for their country, for their King and for His government» (Addis Zemen 7 June 1941, quoted in Shimelis, 2000, p. 12). The radio network was resurrected along similar patriotic lines. In contrast to the previous radio venture, which was established primarily by means of foreign expertise, Addis Ababa Voice of Ethiopia began broadcasting in 1942 with local personnel and could boast of being the only Sub-Saharan radio not established by colonial authorities (Janas, 1991, p. 47). Other notable achievements in the media sector were the establishments of The Ethiopian Herald, an English-language weekly for the international community in Ethiopia (daily since 1958), and Ethiopian News Agency (ENA). Both were founded by the government in 1943. The new era for the Ethiopian media was simultaneously a new era for censorship, more systematic and detailed than before. After liberation in 1941, a censorship board was established under the Press and Information Office in the Ministry of the Pen. The board had seven members and was responsible for pre-censoring all news for radio and newspapers. 15

Deutsche Zeitung, 29 December 1929, p. 7 (Celje, Slovenia)

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There were detailed guidelines to go by. For instance, any event which could damage the reputation of the empire, such as famine, drought, unemployment and inflation, would not be covered. Newspapers were required to publish the Emperor’s photograph on their front page, and any title or office attached to the Emperor must have capital first letter. Pictures of government members were forbidden. Books and imported media material were scrutinized by the censors as well (Janas, 1991, p. 68; Wondwosen, 2009, p. 89). The succeeding 1959 criminal code corroborated the censorship practices by prohibiting any material which was deemed «calumnious, false and insulting the Emperor, his family or the constitutional authorities, foreign states or the heads of them» (quoted in Janas, 1991, p. 69). However, provisions for censorship were in place already before the Italian invasion. Pre-publication censorship was formally introduced with the first constitution of the nation in 1935, following the Minister of the Pen’s decree in November 1933 that all printed material was to be censored by his office (Bahru, 2002, p. 193). Moreover, government interference in the press was an issue even much earlier. Peter P. Garretson (1978, p. 287) reports how the former Emperor’s administration used a pamphlet, Le docteur nouvellement venu, to clear Empress Taitu of rumours that she poisoned her husband Menelik II in 1910. It was only during Haile Selassie, however, that censorship procedures became formalized across the board. Expatriates were not exempt. The American educator William H. Seed, for one, was very angered after having tried to publish a weekly in Addis Ababa for a year against the government’s will. He subsequently wrote a booklet with the telling title Ethiopia’s iron curtain in an argument to condemn the lack of press freedom in the country (Seed, 1955). Lifting censorship was one of the demands of the student demonstrations around 1960 (Balsvik, 1985). The government did indeed ease restrictions for the media in the early 1960s, exemplified by the publishing of polemic letters to the editor in Addis Zemen and The Ethiopian Herald, but the vibrancy was short-lived. Tight censorship returned (Barkocy, 1963; cf. Kehoe, 1964), and once again, independent voices were only permitted in the public domain by the grace of the Emperor. One important exception for independent broadcasting (indeed the only one) was granted for Radio Voice of the Gospel (RVOG), an Ethiopianbased radio network which has gone into broadcasting history as one of the most successful pan-African media initiatives ever. On air in 1963, RVOG produced religious and current affairs programmes in numerous African languages and transmitted its content throughout the continent and to the Middle East and Asia (Lundgren, 1983; Tamrat, 2008). RVOG had comprehensive coverage of international news, but, as pertinently pointed out by Dessalegn Rahmato and Meheret Ayenew (2004, p. 55), when reporting on domestic issues, the station showed great care. The Emperor was a regular listener of RVOG and called the senior advisor of the station on several occasions to tell him how pleased he was with the programmes (Teferra, 2008, p. 40). The first television signals in Ethiopia were distributed on a closed circuit in Africa Hall in Addis Ababa in May 1963 on the important occasion of the first meeting of the 12

Organization of African Unity. Ethiopian Television (ETV) began permanent broadcasting on 2 November 1964, coinciding with the 33th coronation of Haile Selassie. Hence, Ethiopia was among the first nations in Africa to establish a television service (Gabriel, 1962). By 1968, as many as 10,000 television sets were in operation in Addis Ababa. The programme schedule had a combination of news, live drama, story-reading for children, dancing and cultural documentaries. In line with the profile of ETV at the time, the first televised Amharic drama productions represented the manner and wealth of the higher class (Wondimagegn, 2008). The two hours of evening programming in the beginning years were equally divided between Amharic and English, attesting to the ethnic and urban bias of ETV (Baalu, 1968; MoI, 1969, p. 141). On the whole, media governance during the Ethiopian Empire served to manifest imperial immunity and Amharic supremacy. The feudal mindset affected both media structures and media content. Likewise, a decisive ethnic inclination was reflected in the language policy of the permitted media outlets. With the spread of mass media in the first half of the 20th century, Amharic became the indisputable language of official Ethiopia. It has been suggested that the prominence of Amharic in the media, schools and state administration was an act of considered assimilation of the population into Abyssinian culture by the ruling class (Haile Selassie and Völker, 2000). The state media became an important part of the strategy, especially during the reign of Haile Selassie (1930–74). Amharic remained the only local language on television during the days of the Empire. The situation was slightly different for radio, where programme segments of selected other local languages were allowed towards the end of the regime. At the beginning of the 1970s, Radio Ethiopia thus broadcast in Afar, Somali, Tigre and Tigrinya in addition to English, French and Swahili. However, Amharic still occupied half of the airtime (Janas, 1991, p. 49; Smith, 2008, p. 219; cf. MoI, 1969, p. 140). Particularly worthy of note is the condition that Oromo was banned from the state media (Fellman, 1992; Mekuria, 1997). Paradoxically, according to the pro-Oromo website www.gadaa.com, Oromo was first heard on radio in Ethiopia when Italian fascist forces used it on the airwaves during the occupation16. The language became an independent media vernacular when it was employed by Radio Mogadishu, Somalia in broadcasts aimed at the Oromo population in Ethiopia starting in 1962. The programme in question, which bore the name Raadiyoo Afaan Qottu, attracted a large audience base in Ethiopia much to the distress of Haile Selassie. Greg Gow (2004, p. 310) claims that the fury of the Emperor led him to pay for the assassination of the programme founder Ayub Abubakar in Mogadishu in 1965. This only provoked more cohesion among the Oromo, however, and the Emperor finally gave in and allowed Oromo programming on the regionally based Harar Radio in 1972 – only to find that the audiences preferred the freer tone of Radio Mogadishu after having initially applauded the new language policy of the Emperor’s own Harar Radio 16

‘Events in Oromo history during the reign of Haile Selassie I’. Available at: http://www.gadaa.com/haileselassie.html

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(Gow, 2004). The language situation in the print media was much the same. Amharic dominated the print products together with more or less sporadic selection of foreign languages like English, French, Italian and Arabic17. The European languages, which elsewhere in Africa became a pertinent reminder of colonial legacy, were never really a threat to Ethiopianness in the eyes of the imperial government. Thus, the demise of the Ethiopian Empire left the media environment with a number of unresolved issues. Despite serious journalistic reporting and significant growth in audience figures, especially in the domain of radio broadcasting, the media had been misused by the rulers for the promotion of their own interests and the subjugation of others. A new media policy was needed. Unfortunately, the upcoming regime would only make the situation worse. 2.3.2. Media during the Derg regime (1974–91) The years of the Derg regime have unequivocally been portrayed as a dark chapter in the history of Ethiopian media and journalism. The regime turned all media outlets into propaganda channels and effectively forbade any opening for professional independence. The newsroom environment was marked by fear and anxiety. In the words of contemporary media analyst Frank Barton, founding editor of African Times, the Derg’s media became «the worst piece of Marxist mouthpiece on the Continent» (Barton, 1979, p. 256). Paradoxically, however, it was a momentary period of vibrancy in the media that entertained the revolutionary ideas in the first place. The state-owned print media, whose imperial loyalty grew weary as Haile Selassie’s downfall was approaching, suddenly began to publish opinionated pieces where journalists complained about lack of press freedom and where young intellectuals discussed previously censored issues like land tenure policy and principles of governance. For the first time in many years, journalists could freely report from the Parliament, expose social ills such as famine, and so forth. New publications appeared, if only a few. The relief period in 1974 and 1975 thus became known as «the golden days of Ethiopian journalism» (Ellene et al., 2003, p. 30; Shimelis, 2000, p. 13). Criticism of the Empire was also part of the picture. A weekly magazine bluntly accused Haile Selassie of being «an expensive and unnecessary luxury», a statement inconceivable in the media prior to 1974 (quoted in Patman, 1990, p. 154). Similarly, ETV in a very provocative presentation juxtaposed footage of drought victims from Wollo with pictures of the Emperor in his fine attire (Lee, 1993, p. 172). Censorship had disappeared indeed. The open media climate would not last for long, however. It soon became clear that the golden days of reporting had a looming subtext. Most vigorous of the revolutionary groups, the Derg (Amharic for ‘committee’) began to utilize the state media as part of its

17

The Arabic-language al-Alem, a forerunner to the current state-owned weekly with the same name, came as a one-page supplement to the government newspaper Sendek Alemachin (‘our flag’) from 1941 to 1974 (Janas, 1991, p. 25).

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political strategy. In its final campaign against the outgoing administration, the military committee made Addis Zemen publish long lists of names of officials who were urged to surrender (Andargachew, 1993, p. 67). Communist ideas were suddenly embraced by the media. Thus, allied newspapers in the Soviet Union willingly quoted The Ethiopian Herald when it declared: Ethiopia can learn a great deal from the socialist countries, making use of, in particular, the great experience and knowledge of these countries in the building of a new society in the social and economic spheres, in the sphere of industrialisation and agriculture. (The Ethiopian Herald 1975; quoted in Patman, 1990, p. 171) Overnight, the Ethiopian official media were reclothed in socialist attire (cf. Brush, 1988). Soon thereafter, in March 1976, the Derg reintroduced censorship, far more severe than during the Empire. The media were ‘nationalized’ and put directly under the new Ministry of Information and National Guidance. Of 17 publishers that existed in 1974, only one (a church publisher) was left untouched by the media restructuring of the Derg (Janas, 1991, p. 15). In 1975, correspondents belonging to Western news agencies were deported. From now on they could only visit Ethiopia on special occasions, but always under strict guidance of the militia. Communist-loyal agencies were allowed to stay, however. The Cuban news agency Prensa Latina accordingly opened a correspondent office in Addis Ababa in 1978 (Janas, 1991, p. 66). A lot of restrictions were introduced in the newsrooms as well. Ordinary journalists could not read international news publications like Time, Newsweek and International Herald Tribune, for example. Such exposure was only allowed for a few selected senior managers (Melaku, 2008). Accordingly, the Ethiopian population became only selectively informed about world events, to the extent that even important news about Ethiopia published in the international media scarcely came to the knowledge of the local population18. Linguistically, Amharic dominated both in print and broadcasting during the Derg regime. Other local languages faded, in particular Tigrinya, as the central authorities sought to prevent separatist tendencies in the regions (Janas, 1991, p. 38). An Oromo weekly, Bariisaa (‘morning star’), commenced in 1976 on the initiative of the cultural committee of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), but the publication was nationalized by the Derg the year after. Initially written with Latin script, Bariisaa was forced to use Amharic fidels as conventional Latin Oromo script was forbidden by the regime (Gow, 2004, p. 208; Kebede, 2003, p. 479). The publication reverted to Latin script after the 1991 liberation. It still remains a government-run weekly; indeed comprising the only Oromo newspaper on national level today (2012).

18

In The day of the martyrs, Gedion Wolde Amanuel (2010) has compiled examples of such suppressed media reports.

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Deviant journalists were persecuted during the Derg regime like everybody else who posed a threat to the junta. The story of Baalu Girma is particularly renowned. An experienced writer and journalist, Baalu opposed the regime and wrote critically against the totalitarian governing system. Although the extent of his critique is debated, his last book, Oromay (1983), could be read as a rebuke of the Derg administration. Colonel Mengistu was probably aware of the book in advance, but still became infuriated when it was published. Without any reason given, Oromay was banned and immediately removed from the bookshops (Molvær, 1997, p. 347). Seven months later, on his way to his previous workplace the Ministry of Information and National Guidance on Thursday, 14 February 1984, Baalu disappeared19. Exactly what happened has never been settled. The junta asked the public to engage in a search for Baalu, but it has been dubbed a fake search. Veteran journalist Melaku Tegegne (2008), for one, claims that Baalu was assassinated by security agents, perhaps in a kebele prison (cf. Molvær, 1997, p. 351).20 The only advancement in the Ethiopian media during the Derg, according to Amanuel Gebru (2007, p. 32), was the introduction of colour television in 1984. However, symptomatically, the regime linked the advances in broadcasting technology to the 10th anniversary of the revolution on 12 September 1984, conveniently coinciding with the magnificent inauguration of the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia. Concurrently, foreign journalists who had come to Ethiopia to report on what soon became the world’s most famous famine were prohibited from travelling outside of Addis Ababa exactly because reports on starvation could divert the attention from the festivities in the capital (Franks, 2006, p. 298; Giorgis, 1989, p. 158). Foreign correspondents also faced other problems with the regime during the reporting of the 1984 famine, such as visa denials (Philo, 1993, p. 106). Evidently, the regime could hardly find any reason weighty enough to sidestep its repressive media policy. The ideology of the Derg regime led it to make alliances with socialist governments and movements elsewhere around the globe, in politics as well as in media-related issues. Radio Ethiopia therefore lent transmission equipment to Voice of Zimbabwe to realize daily broadcasts from Addis Ababa until Zimbabwe was liberalized in 1980, and later offered the same service to the South African liberation movement and its programme ANC Radio Freedom (Gedamu, 1986, p. 181). By the same token, Ethiopia was treated favourably by the Soviet press (Eribo, 1993; Quist-Adade, 2000, 2005). The relationship with the Soviet Union changed, however, after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Mengistu could not tolerate Gorbachev’s liberalization policy. He forbade the local media to make any reference to glasnost and perestroika (Andargachew, 1993, p. 358). For Mengistu, nonetheless, the need to stabilize his own nation was long overdue. Ethiopia became increasingly isolated from the rest of the political world; Mengistu suffered from a confidence crisis with his own Central Committee; and ‘counter-revolutionary’ freedom movements within Ethiopia posed a 19 20

http://www.baalugirmafoundation.org/bio.html Baalu’s wife, Almaz Abera, speaks in the documentary analysed in chapter 8 (figure 8.3 refers).

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greater threat than ever before. Mengistu finally fled the country on 21 May 1991, while the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) announced victory in Addis Ababa the following week – illustratively using the same radio transmitters that the Derg had earlier used for their massive propaganda machinery. 2.3.3. Media during EPRDF (1991–present) The media situation during EPRDF is significantly different from that of the two previous regimes, especially with regard to formal media policy and openings for independent journalism. However, there are also signs of lasting constraints, particularly on the informal level. Hence, what I will argue in the following section is that there is not a single conception that could adequately describe the developments in the Ethiopia media environment since the arrival of the current government in 1991. Instead, I will demonstrate that the media situation is best seen as an interchange between coercion and liberalization (and correspondingly between irresponsible journalism and professionalism; uniformity and diversity). In so doing, I will divide the period 1991–2012 into different phases, each of which is characterized by a major trend. The period begins with liberalization (1991–92) and proliferation of new media outlets (1992–96); turning into a phase of government clampdowns (1996–2000); followed by consolidation and renewed diversity (2000–05); then abruptly changing direction due to post-election setbacks (2005–07); succeeded by an interlude of revitalization (2007–10); before once again being affected by a wave of coercion (2010–12). Obviously, the phases are not exclusively characterized by either coercion or liberalization but contain subtleties that sometimes appear to be incongruous. Nonetheless, the general development for each phase, I will argue, points in the direction of either coercion or liberalization. This reading of recent Ethiopian media history will in turn form the basis for the concept ‘selective liberalization’ (2.4). 2.3.3.1. 1991–1992: Liberalization Echoing the protests of the previous 1974 revolution, one of the demands of the public with the fall of the Derg was freedom of speech. Thus, EPRDF was quick to promise media freedom when it came to power. Building on the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Transitional Period Charter of 22 July 1991 puts particular emphasis on «the freedom of conscience, expression, association and peaceful assembly» (article 1a)21. Several succeeding law reforms were made with specific relevance for the media. One of the very first bills to be issued by the new government was a proclamation defining the functions of the state media22. The proclamation assigns an important role to the state media, demanding unbiased news and exposure of government shortcomings, although the con-

21

‘Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia’ (Negarit Gazeta, 22 July 1991) Proclamation No. 6/1991, ‘A Proclamation to Provide for the Determination of the Application of State Owned Mass Media’ (Negarit Gazeta, 3 October 1991) 22

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cerned institutions are also requested to promote the Transitional Period Charter and the government’s achievements. The proclamation arranged the state media institutions under the Ministry of Information23. Much more attention yet has been given to the 1992 press law24. It marked a significant step forward in Ethiopian media policy at the time. Despite vital shortcomings which will be addressed later, the press law guaranteed a number of rights associated with a free media society. Two principles were deemed particularly important: the abolishment of prepublication censorship (article 3(2)), and the right for any Ethiopian citizen to open a media outlet (article 5(1)). The two severest restrictions for media activity in the previous regimes were thus formally scrapped. Other principles included for instance the right of foreign correspondents to freely gather news in Ethiopia; the right of access to information; the right of reply; and the duty of government officials to cooperate with the press. All of these values marked, in principle, a sharp break with media governance during the Derg regime. In the view of law professor Andargachew Tiruneh (cited in Skjerdal and Hallelujah, 2009, p. 48), the 1992 press law was among the most liberal bills passed by the transitional government in that it did not envisage a government agency specifically assigned to regulate or inspect the media sector. Critical researchers have suggested that the relatively liberal press law was partly motivated by Meles Zenawi’s desire to boost his own image as one of Africa’s ‘new leaders’ with the intention of generating domestic and international support for the new government (Price et al., 2010, p. 224). On a more principal level than the press law, the national Constitution of 1995 contains important rights for the press and free speech under article 29. Freedom of expression without interference is guaranteed; prohibition of «any form of censorship» is affirmed; access to information is promised; and the independent media are granted legal protection. A few limitations are nonetheless maintained, involving proscription of content which could damage minors, harm the reputation of individuals, or provoke armed conflict (article 29(6)). This was, however, not the first constitution of Ethiopia which guaranteed freedom of expression. Altogether the 1955 Constitution, the aborted 1974 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution contained clauses which granted citizens freedom of speech, but, as demonstrated earlier, to no avail. 2.3.3.2. 1992–1996: Proliferation of private publications The green light for private media outlets spurred an explosion of new titles. In the period October 1992 to July 1997, no less than 265 newspapers and 120 magazines were licensed by the Ministry of Information (Aadland and Røe, 2000, p. 218). Far fewer actually made it to the street, but there were still numerous titles to choose between. By January 1996, a report 23

With the new government arrangement in 1995, the Ministry of Information became the Ministry of Information and Culture, before reverting to a designated Ministry of Information in 2001. 24 Proclamation No. 34/1992, ‘A Proclamation to provide for the Freedom of the Press’ (Negarit Gazeta, 21 October 1992)

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estimated that 35 of the licensed titles were in active production (KPMG, 1996). If expanding the period by another five years, until 2001, statistics show that 543 newspapers and 182 magazines were licensed during the first ten years of publication freedom in Ethiopia (Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004, p. 57). Indeed, some publications did not even have the patience to wait for the press law. Five magazines went to the printers in the succeeding months from December 1991, and the first newspaper, Eyeta, appeared on 18 May 1992, almost half a year ahead of the impending press law (Shimelis, 2000, p. 20). Even after the press law was passed, some newspapers did not bother to apply for a licence and were published without formal permission. The real boom of newspapers, however, came in 1994, when a total of 128 publications were registered (Shimelis, 2002, p. 191; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003, p. 72). The flourishing of print publications is a well-documented phenomenon in nations which enter a free media situation after long oppression. Societies as diverse as Somaliland (Höhne, 2008), Mongolia (Nielsen, 2009) and the Baltic states (Harro-Loit, 2005) all experienced an explosion in the media market after liberalization in the early 1990s. However, juvenile free media markets also tend to be volatile. Hence, most of the newfound publications in Ethiopia were short-lived. Some barely made it to the vendors before folding, while others stayed for a couple of years or more. Circulation numbers were equally unstable. The first newspaper, Eyeta, pertinently illustrates the situation. Published by Paulos Publishing House, the tabloid soon printed 50,000 copies, which would be a high circulation figure at any point in time in Ethiopian media history since the press markets opened in 1991. On the event of critical news, circulation figures could rise to 70,000. However, challenged by its sensationalist profile, Eyeta faced several charges of defamation and shrank to a circulation of 5,000 copies until it vanished in October 1993 (Ellene et al., 2003, p. 32; Shimelis, 2000, p. 20). Many of the private newspapers were politically motivated. Shimelis Bonsa (2002, p. 199) claims that Ethiopia’s independent press came to life as a ‘rebel’. By and large, the press was highly hostile of the new EPRDF government. The government’s politics of ethnic federalism were portrayed as a grave concern, and so was the official strategy towards Eritrea. Dessalegn and Meheret (2004, p. 61) estimate that of the 65 newspapers published in 2004, less than five per cent were positive towards the government. This is comparable with the situation in the early/mid 1990s. Many newsrooms were staffed with persons who earlier held key positions in the Derg’s media edifice. The popular weekly Tobiya (1992–2005) is but one example. Launched as a magazine in April 1992, the publication began with 15 reporters and editors, many of whom were central media officers of the previous regime (Price et al., 2010, p. 226). Founding editor Mulugeta Lule, for example, was former head of the official Press Department and served as editor for the Derg’s party publication Serto Ader. Another of Tobiya’s founding members, Goshu Mogus, had been in charge of the censorship office. A third well-known press personality who also worked for Tobiya is Kifle Mulat, whose past career included prominent positions in the government organ Addis Zemen.

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Residing in Houston, Texas, he is today (in 2012) president of the Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association in Exile. In retrospect, Shimelis (2002, p. 185) notes that there were two generations of journalists entering the Ethiopian private press in the 1990s. The first generation consisted of press veterans with journalistic experience from the Derg years, some even with experience back in the days of the imperial media of Haile Selassie. The second generation, appearing a couple of years later, consisted of inexperienced and aspiring young media personalities. The latter group did not necessarily have an outspoken political purpose, but could be driven by profit-generating motives as well. Within both constituents, however, there were ample examples of unprofessional and unethical journalism. Newspapers printed stories without the slightest attempt to check facts. Unsubstantiated claims of the government preparing military campaigns and secretly receiving massive support from international partners were published without mention of any source. One newspaper claimed that the Derg was planning a counterattack against EPRDF as late as 1994. Defamatory assaults on named persons were commonplace. Slanderous reports reached such heights that an oppositional newspaper claimed that EPRDF was secretly behind the rumours for the purpose of discrediting the private press (Hansen, 2006, p. 115). Most private newspapers, according to Tim Allen and Nicole Stremlau (2005), contained stories which made the crudeness of the British tabloid press «seem mild» (p. 9). In summarizing the professional standards of the early independent press, Shimelis (2002) notes a «rampancy of misquoting, misinterpreting, and plagiarism, the focus on trivial issues, poor layout, subjectivity, sensationalism, fixation on most sordid and volatile issues, obscenity and outright lies» (p. 198). Again, these experiences are not unique to Ethiopian journalism. Transitional media elsewhere attest to similar flaws. In South Africa’s postapartheid media, for instance, editor-in-chief Moegsien Williams of The Star noted a glaring lack of professionalism: The journalists’ newfound freedom led many to «mistakenly assume that there were no limits on what they could and could not write» (quoted in Siegfried, 2004). Irresponsible journalism notwithstanding, there were also other developments in the early post-Derg media environment that ought to be noted. One is the rise of the current affairs-oriented Islamic press (Shimelis, 2002, p. 184). Another is the establishment of two prominent pro-government media businesses with roots in the clandestine media and resistance movement during the Derg. Radio Fana, established November 1994, was known as Voice of the Tigray Revolution during the Derg period and used to broadcast from an antiaircraft protected cave in the Semien Mountains, more than 3500 meters above sea level. It could now come out of hiding and was established as an open media agency in the capital together with an affiliated news agency, Walta25 Information Center, which opened the month after. Both Radio Fana and Walta remain property of the MegaNet Corporation,

25

Named after a revolutionary hero who fought against the Derg

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which in turn is indirectly linked to EPRDF economy26 (Shinn and Ofcansky, 2004, p. 274; Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011, p. 58). The history of Radio Fana pertinently illustrates the politically-inclined pragmatism of Ethiopian media governance. The radio station has been allowed to operate freely, while no other private radio station was granted a licence until 2007. Different reasons have been given for this from the official side, including a loophole in the 1992 press law which granted existing media outlets at the time a right to continue operation (clause 7(3)), but the explanations boil down to a testimony of discriminatory treatment of pro-government media houses vis-à-vis others. In reality, Radio Fana existed «outside of a publicly known and consistent regulatory framework» (Wanyeki, 2000, p. 8). When the radio market was eventually opened for private broadcasters in 2007, Radio Fana became the first station to receive a commercial licence. However, that Radio Fana is owned by an EPRDF-affiliated corporation was not problematized in the licensing process, even though the 2007 broadcasting proclamation prohibits politically-affiliated organizations to possess a broadcasting licence (clause 23(3)). Thus, the policy line towards Radio Fana and Walta has been favourable ever since their inception in 1994, owing to their pro-government stance. 2.3.3.3. 1996–1999: Government crackdowns The energetic media environment was soon harshly confronted by the government. Journalists were intimidated and detained in large numbers. For several years in the 1990s, Ethiopia was the country in Africa with the highest frequency of imprisonments of journalists (CPJ, 1996). It became clear that the 1992 press law had serious flaws. Some of the problems included vague definitions of defamation and incitement to ethnic conflict which opened for legal persecution on loose grounds. In addition, a major deficiency of the press law was that it stipulated that criminal and civil damages be laid down in the penal code of 1957 and the civil code of 1959 – both of which belonged to an era when press freedom was very limited. Equally important, however, were the restraining interpretations of the law by the public prosecutor and the judges. With little experience in principles of press freedom along with pressure from the government, the courts chose to interpret the law restrictively (Gedion T., 2010). The reactions sometimes also clearly contravened laws and regulations. For example, journalists were detained for months without being charged, which is in conflict with article 17(2) of the 1995 Constitution. Crackdowns were even more severe in the regions. Vehicles which transported newspapers could get their entire load confiscated at checkpoints. Persons who were seen reading private newspapers risked being harassed

26

Ownership structures in Ethiopia are seldom transparent, largely due to the intertwining between the ruling party and business interests (Berhanu, 2011; Vaughan and Gebremichael, 2011). According to the general manager of Radio Fana, the media venture is now a share company owned primarily by the Tirit (EFFORT), Tiret and Tumsa endowments, plus the Wondo group (‘Radio Fana to launch TV’, Capital, 11 January 2011). However, the four companies correspond with the four political parties of EPRDF, so the linkages to the ruling coalition are still clearly evident.

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because they were believed to be supporters of the opposition (Ellene et al., 2003, p. 34). Thus, political polarization had manifested itself in the media governance. This phase also saw the first wave of Ethiopian journalists leaving the country. Many first left for Kenya and later ended up in Europe, North America or Australia. By mid-2001, 43 Ethiopian journalists were in exile, according to the Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association’s (EFJA’s) own records (Kefale, 2001). Many of them became pivotal in forming the opposition movement abroad through the use of new media channels. Back in Ethiopia, the number of publications decreased. This cannot solely be attributed to government clampdowns, however. The economy of most newspapers was poor, and the market was not strong enough to sustain a high number of outlets. With substantial increase in printing costs (90% from 1993 to 1997), and difficulties in attracting advertisers (especially for sensationalist newspapers), a number of outlets were forced to close (Shimelis, 2000). It did not make the situation any better when the Mass Media License Registration and Control Department in the Ministry of Information and Culture suddenly introduced a yearly licence renewal fee of ETB 10,000 in 1999, which was unbearable for small businesses (Ellene et al., 2003, p. 34). Additionally, the authorities exerted restrictions on newspaper distribution outside of the capital. Government pressure combined with market constraints therefore led to the termination of vulnerable titles. The newspaper market became somewhat more stable, but it was also clear that the government would readily suppress any media activity it did not like. 2.3.3.4. 1999–2005: Consolidation and renewed diversity The media climate suddenly eased with the Ethio-Eritrean war 1998–2000. The government began to display a softer attitude towards the private press, and for the first time, the public information office served all parts of the media, not just the state media (Skjerdal and Hallelujah, 2009, p. 54). Different explanations have been offered for the accommodative turn during the Ethio-Eritrean war. Many private newspapers did indeed share the government’s Eritrea strategy when the war broke out (Aadland and Fackler, 2001) despite the preceding years’ massive fostering of the ‘puppet theme’ in the private press, i.e. a theme which held that the Ethiopian government was an instrument for Eritrean interests (Hansen, 2006). Certainly, the government could need the private press’ support in the conflict (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003, p. 72), and the two parties joined hands for the sake of protecting national interest (Blen, 2006). The legal advisor of the critical weekly Tobiya, however, was of the opinion that the decline in crackdowns on the media was simply a result of the government being preoccupied with the war (Nessman, 1999). The overall journalistic quality improved in this era, both in the private and state media. The private press showed tendencies to serious investigative reporting by exposing corruption and public failures based on evidence, not just hearsay. Sensationalism became a lesser problem. Notably, the state media also showed improvement. It began to report on the 22

opposition, which was unthinkable a few years earlier. The state-owned radio station FM Addis 97.1, which at its establishment in June 2000 became the first FM station in the country, opened its programme schedules for civil society organizations. Numerous human rights groups seized the opportunity and rented airtime (Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004, p. 60). Some of the most stable newspapers in Ethiopia were established around year 2000. Among these are the popular Amharic Addis Admas (December 1999) and the two Englishlanguage financial newspapers Capital (December 1998) and Fortune (May 2000). In addition, The Reporter, which has both an Amharic (1995) and English (1996) edition, must be mentioned. The Reporter was started by Amare Aregawi, who, still being the owner of the newspaper, for many years has been the most famous personality in the private news industry in Ethiopia. With a past as TPLF fighter and general manager of ETV 1991–95, plus a year as general manager for Ethiopian News Agency, Amare began The Reporter as an EPRDFfriendly newspaper to balance the strongly oppositional press at the time. However, the outlet turned highly critical to the government in 1997 over a disagreement on policy towards Eritrea (Hansen, 2006, p. 45). Since then, The Reporter has played an ambivalent role as critical supporter of government policy. At times, the newspaper has scorned the government, not least because of the authorities’ unfavourable attitude towards the press; though in general, The Reporter has covered ruling policy in critical-supportive manner. The Reporter has therefore managed to stay away from reactions from the authorities for the most part, even though the newspaper organization and its owner have been subject to violent attacks from parties other than the central government27. However, that The Reporter has survived for more than 15 years in a volatile private media market cannot solely be explained on the basis of its overall positive attitude towards the ruling party. Equally important is the newspaper’s journalistic profile which has attracted a solid readership and advertising base. The same goes for the three other private titles mentioned above (Ward, 2011, p. 17). Hence, forced by consolidation in the media market, the period around 2000 was one that gave a foundation for stable press products. As noted by Dessalegn and Meheret (2004, p. 60), however, it is a paradox that improvement in journalistic quality coincided with government pressure. A new vibrancy in the newspaper market surfaced as the 2005 elections were approaching. The number of publications available on the street doubled from 2003 to 2005 (Yacob et al., 2007, p. 51). Confident that a political alternative was possible, the opposition-aligned press reached new heights. Some titles multiplied their circulation figures many times. Ethop, for example, went from its regular 5000 copies to 130,000 copies28 in the weeks before the election day 15 May 2005 (Wondwosen, 2009, p. 96). Circulation figures for the state press, however, stayed the same as before. Moreover, the opposition was allowed to participate in live televised debates on the state broadcaster. 54% of the airtime on national radio and 27

E.g. ‘Editor in hospital after brutal assault’, The Reporter, 1 November 2008. Available at: http://en.ethiopianreporter.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=178&Itemid=1 28 The figure is confirmed by the newspaper’s manager Sisay Agena (personal interview, 14 May 2010). However, the circulation figures given by the Ministry of Information are 97,500 (Stremlau, 2011, p. 724).

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television was set aside for the opposition (although far from all the airtime was used). Large, peaceful election rallies were held. There was an unprecedented openness in public speech. It has been suggested that the government allowed this because EPRDF was confident it would win a great majority in the vote anyway (Stremlau and Price, 2009, p. 20). Others, advocating a more critical view, have called the vibrant period prior to the 2005 elections an orchestrated ‘liberalization intermezzo’ (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009a, p. 112). Clearly, the government was monitoring the situation closely, and, as it turned out, anxiously. The first signs of a new serious wave of crackdowns on the private press came only days after 15 May 2005. 2.3.3.5. 2005–2007: Post-election setback The tensions between the incumbent and the opposition after the polling day on 15 May 2005 soon materialized in mounting polarization between the different segments of the press. The private press speculated in a possible victory to the opposition. Some private newspapers claimed to have access to reports which showed that the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) had defeated EPRDF in the count for parliamentary seats. Moderate private newspapers too, like The Reporter, began to question that the elections had been fair. The state press on its part forwarded statements by public officials who claimed that the ruling coalition had won Parliament even though the counting of votes was still in process. Furthermore, the official media channels began to attach negative adjectives to CUD. From the day violent clashes began in Addis Ababa on 8 June 2005, it became common for the state media to open any news report with the phrase, ‘The street violence that was instigated by the CUD …’ (ENA journalist quoted in Price et al., 2010, p. 230). It was clear that the state media held the opposition responsible for any looming protest. In June 2005, the authorities closed the national SMS service as a means to avoid improvised public gatherings. For a long time, they blamed the obstruction on technical difficulties at the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation (ETC). The SMS ban, which lasted until September 2007 when it was re-opened as a ‘gift’ to the Ethiopian people in connection with the millennium celebrations, remains the longest obstruction of the SMS service in Africa29. Thus, the aftermath of the 2005 elections gradually demonstrated the underlying political parallelism that characterizes Ethiopian media operations. The attacks on the private press culminated in November 2005 when security forces used violence against the opposition and killed more than 100 persons in Addis Ababa30. No media personnel were killed, but the crackdown led to long-term detention of 14 journalists

29

‘SMS message ban in Mozambique raises difficulties operators and government will have to deal with’, Balancing Act, newsletter no. 522, 17 September 2010. Available at: http://www.balancingactafrica.com/news/en/issue-no-522 30 The total number of demonstrators killed in the clashes between security forces and the opposition in June and November 2005 amounts to more than 180, plus six policemen who were also killed.

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and media owners together with 62 opposition members and supporters of CUD31. The journalists, together with CUD activists, were charged by the public prosecutor primarily for outrages against the Constitution, impairment of the defence forces, and attempt to commit genocide. The subsequent court process finally acquitted seven of the journalists of all charges, while the remaining seven were convicted for the specific charge pertaining to outrage against the Constitution. Additionally, nine Ethiopian journalists in exile were tried in absence, but acquitted. However, all convicted journalists were released on presidential pardon in July 2007 shortly after the announcement of the verdict. The entire process led, however, to a serious setback for the critical private press. A number of publications were forced to close as a result of the detentions of their managers and editors, including critical outlets such as Addis Zena, Ethop, Menelik, Meyisaw, Meznagna, Netsanet, Satenaw and Seife Nebelbal (Skjerdal and Hallelujah, 2009). Of the total 85 newspapers that were in circulation in June 2005, only 51 were still being published in February 2006 (Kibnesh, 2006, p. 15). Although many of the closures must also be explained by the condition of poor journalistic quality and absence of professional ethics (Wondwosen, 2009, p. 100), government pressure was severe and practically ruled out opposition-minded journalism of the kind seen during the 2005 elections. Foreign-based media were targeted as well. Five Ethiopian journalists working for Voice of America and Deutsche Welle had their accreditation revoked; at least one foreign journalist was expelled for «tarnishing the image of the nation»32; while others experienced difficulties getting work permits as foreign reporters in the country (Wondwosen, 2009, p. 98). The overall press freedom situation pushed Ethiopia down on international indexes. In their reports for 2006, Freedom House ranked Ethiopia as number 170 of 195 countries, while Reporters Without Borders rated it as 150 out of 169. The private newspapers that continued publication, however, were generally characterized by professional standards in terms of maintaining balance in reporting and avoiding extremism. Paradoxically, akin to Dessalegn and Meheret’s (2004, p. 60) observation of the situation a few years earlier, the tendency to responsible reporting came after a new wave of government pressure. 2.3.3.6. 2007–2010: Revitalization The release of the aforementioned journalists in July 2007 signalled a return to a softer relationship between the press and the government. Improvements took place both in legislation and in the media market. Most importantly from a regulatory perspective, the 1992 press law, which represented an achievement at the time but later became a tool for 31

‘Justice under fire: trials of opposition leaders, journalists and human rights defenders in Ethiopia’, report, Amnesty International, 29 July 2011. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR25/002/2011/en 32 ‘AP correspondent asked to leave Ethiopia in 24 hours’, Xinhua, 22 January 2006. Available at: http://english.people.com.cn/200601/22/eng20060122_237290.html

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suppression, was replaced by a new media law in 200833. The new law proclaimed significant improvements in at least four areas. First, pre-trial detention of journalists became prohibited. Second, licensing of newspapers was abolished. The law now only demands new publications to submit a registration form to the Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (EBA), and the registration is acknowledged by default if no response is received within 30 days. No fee is involved. Third, the new media law explicitly proclaims the right of journalists to form professional associations. Reads article 5.2, «Journalists have a right to organize themselves into professional associations of their choice». Although this might appear like a redundant clause, it is an important assurance in Ethiopia where associations for professional journalists have been subject to habitual harassment. Fourth, the 2008 media law contains an extensive section on access to information, at that time making Ethiopia the second African country, after South Africa, to pass an access to information proclamation34. Despite delays in the implementation of this part of the law, procedures are underway and public officers are being trained in large numbers with the view to make the government administration more open to the media and the public. Some restrictive provisions nevertheless survived into the new media law, of which the opening for criminal defamation and harsh punishments for false accusations have received the most attention (Ross, 2010). The compensation for such damage amounts to up to ETB 100,000 (USD 5,500)35, up from ETB 50,000 in the 1992 proclamation36. Also, the authorities can lawfully confiscate a press product in advance of circulation if it is believed to represent a serious threat to national security (article 42). On the other hand, a proposal in the first draft of the law to introduce a statutory press council, attracting wide criticism because of fears that the council would be government-dominated (Alemayehu, 2003; Article 19, 2004; Barker and Mendel, 2003; Berger, 2007; Theodros, 2005), was abandoned in the final law. Overall, it is thus clear that the 2008 media law represents significant improvements from the 1992 press law, despite occasional claims of the contrary. To this end, it is telling that in a critical review of Ethiopian media legislation, Gedion Timothewos (2010) draws all examples of legal mistreatment of journalists from the repealed 1992 law rather than from

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Proclamation no. 590/2008, ‘A Proclamation to Provide for Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information’ (Negarit Gazeta, 4 December 2008) 34 ‘Access to information’, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). Available at: http://fesmedia.org/access-toinformation. FES also refers to Uganda in its report, but that nation’s Access to Information Act, which was passed by the Ugandan Parliament in 2005, was only ratified on 10 March 2011 when signed by the Minister of Information. In addition, Zimbabwe passed access to information legislation in 2002, but the act is considered idle for the purpose of information retrieval (Chiumbu and Moyo, 2009; Chuma, 2010). 35 The law bulletin has in fact a printing error in the English translation, where it says ETB 1,000,000. The correct amount according to the authoritative Amharic text is ETB 100,000 (article 43(7)). (Confirmed in personal conversation with law drafter Shimelis Kemal, 6 May 2009.) 36 Interestingly enough, due to inflation, there is actually no increase in the fine levels if compared with foreign currency. ETB 100,000 in 2012 currency equals USD 5,500, which is slightly less than the worth of ETB 50,000 in 2007, the year before the new media law was introduced. Researchers’ claim that the new press law meant that «the punishment for defamation was also increased» (Aalen, 2011, p. 194) therefore needs refinement.

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the existing 2008 law37. Similarly, a recent Amnesty International report on ‘intensified crackdown on free speech in Ethiopia’ finds ample examples of the criminal code and antiterrorism legislation being used against journalists, but makes no mention of the media law38. Improvements occurred in broadcasting regulation as well. The broadcasting proclamation of 199939, which commentators deemed unconstitutional because of limitations in freedom of speech (Meron, 2006; Netsanet, 2007), was replaced by a new proclamation in 200740. The new proclamation opens up for broadcasting licences in three categories: public, commercial and community broadcasting. As a result, the first two licences for private radio stations were awarded for Sheger FM and Zami FM, alongside formal registration of the progovernment station Radio Fana which had operated semi-officially since November 1994. Even though the licensing process was criticized for not being fully transparent (IREX, 2009, p. 125), the licences meant that for the first time, the Ethiopian public had an alternative to state radio on the local radio network. In the case of Sheger FM in particular, this involves a political reporting approach which challenges the servile style of the state media (Engdawork, 2011; IREX, 2010, p. 134). The period around 2007 showed diversification in the print media market as well. Several critical weeklies were established, including Awramba Times, Fiteh and, most notably, Addis Neger. The educated public embraced particularly the critical commentary style of Addis Neger, established October 2007. Fearlessly, the newspaper challenged both the government and the opposition. Its circulation figures soon rose to more than 25,000 copies, thus becoming one of the two most popular newspapers in the country together with Addis Admas. The government, however, suspecting that Addis Neger began publication with secret financial support from the US embassy (Bereket, 2011, p. 249), was critical to the success of the newspaper. Another wave of coercion was underway. 2.3.3.7. 2010–2012: Renewed coercion The past two years have been marked by renewed coercion in the Ethiopian media market. The coercion actually began in the autumn of 2009, when Addis Neger faced threats in progovernment media channels. In October and November 2009, the state-owned daily Addis Zemen published several unsigned letters claiming that certain unnamed publications walked a tightrope vis-à-vis the recently passed anti-terrorism proclamation41. The editors of Addis Neger interpreted the letters as a warning that they were about to be legally persecuted for engaging in terrorist activities, and left the country after publishing the final issue of the 37

The same applies to a more recent contribution (Zenebe, 2011), where all cases used as evidence of legal persecutions of journalists are drawn from the regime during the repealed 1992 law. 38 ‘Dismantling dissent: intensified crackdown on free speech in Ethiopia’, report, Amnesty International, 16 December 2011. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR25/011/2011/en 39 Broadcasting Proclamation no. 178/1999 40 Broadcasting Service Proclamation no. 533/2007 41 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation no. 652/2009, promulgated August 2009

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newspaper on Saturday 28 November 200942 (Mesfin, 2010). Simultaneously, ETV prepared the airing of the second section of a documentary that looked critically at the work of Addis Neger and other press products (the documentary is thoroughly analysed in chapter 8). As the May 2010 elections were approaching, the media faced increased pressure. For the first time, the authorities went public about their jamming tactics of foreign news content. At a press conference in Addis Ababa on 18 March 2010, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi declared that the government had for some time been trying out radio jamming equipment with the intention to obstruct Voice of America’s (VOA) Amharic broadcasts if deemed necessary. Meles accused the station of engaging in ‘destabilizing propaganda’ and compared it with the notorious Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda43. EPRDF’s criticism of VOA’s Amharic section was not at all new, but this was the first time the government openly admitted deliberate obstruction. Only two weeks earlier, State Minister Shimelis Kemal of the Office for Government Communication Affairs (OGCA) called accusations that VOA broadcasts were jammed ‘a baseless allegation’44, representing a typical official response to such claims. The subsequent turnaround by the Prime Minister thus seriously called into question the quality and integrity of government communications in Ethiopia. In the months that followed, both VOA and Deutsche Welle experienced obstruction of their Amharic radio broadcasts to Ethiopia, in addition to the Amsterdam/Washington DC-based diaspora-run Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT), which transmits its signals through Arabsat. A number of politically-aligned diaspora websites were also blocked, a phenomenon initially reported in May 2006. The infrequent blocking of diaspora websites purportedly makes Ethiopia the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa known to use Internet filtering technology, according to the global Internet watchdog OpenNet Initiative. The filtering is found to be conflict/politically motivated rather than social (Deibert et al., 2008; cf. updates on www.opennet.net). Several researchers and commentators claim that the technology used in the blocking is imported by the Ethiopian government from China (Gagliardone et al., 2010, p. 15), which is supported by the fact that EPRDF in June 2012 invited the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party to learn about the experiences of China regarding «mass media capacity building, mass media institution management and Internet management»45. The latest wave of crackdowns on Ethiopian media activity began in June 2011, when the authorities began to apply the anti-terrorism proclamation against journalists and opposition members. Three local journalists have thus far (June 2012) been convicted under the 42

‘Addis Neger ceases publication’, press release, 4 December 2009. Available at: http://abbaymedia.com/News/?p=3084 43 ‘Ethiopia admits jamming VOA radio broadcasts in Amharic’, BBC News, 19 March 2010. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8575749.stm 44 ‘VOA Amharic broadcasts jammed in Ethiopia’, Peter Heinlein, 4 March 2010. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/VOA-Amharic-Broadcasts-Jammed-in-Ethiopia-86339587.html 45 ‘Workshop conducted’, EPRDF press release, 3 June 2012. Available at: http://www.eprdf.org.et/web/guest/news/-/asset_publisher/c0F7/content/3-june-2012-26-2004

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Figure 2.1: Front pages of The Reporter, English version, 26 April 2008 and 19 May 2012 The press freedom situation in Ethiopia is getting worse, according to the private weekly The Reporter. This is illustrated by the characteristic hangman logo in the heading of the newspaper ('Rescue Press freedom from the hangman!!'), where the stool has been moved from stable position (26 April 2008, upper copy) to tilted position (19 May 2012, lower copy).

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new law46, in addition to another six Ethiopian bloggers and journalists living in exile in Europe and North America who have been convicted or charged in absentia47. Additionally, the court proceedings against two Swedish freelance journalists illegally entering the Ogaden territory in July 2011 received much attention from the international community48. Notably, all these cases involve anti-terrorism legislation rather than designated media legislation. Another sign of tighter conditions for independent reporting in Ethiopia is the increase in journalists fleeing the country. Recent cases involve renowned journalist and leader of the Ethiopian Environmental Journalists’ Association, Argaw Ashine, who left Ethiopia in September 2011 after being exposed in a WikiLeaks cable, and Dawit Kebede, editor of the critical private weekly Awramba Times, who defected to the US in November 2011. According to Committee to Protect Journalists, with 49 exiled journalists over the five-year period from 2007–12, Ethiopia has the third highest defection rate of journalists in the world, after Somalia and Iran49. One should nevertheless be aware that the reasons for defections are often composite, and that several names on lists of journalists in exile do not have a known reputation as journalists back in Ethiopia (Skjerdal, 2010a). By 2012, most rights organizations claim to see a steady worsening of the conditions for free press operations in Ethiopia (cf. figure 2.1). Freedom House notes an «alarming trend in Ethiopia»50 and downgraded the nation to category ‘not free’ in its 2011 Freedom in the World Report. Amnesty International, Article 19 and Human Rights Watch in a joint statement declare that «Ethiopia’s once vibrant civil society has been severely decimated due to various legal and other impediments to its work imposed by the government»51. Committee to Protect Journalists asserts that the Ethiopian government lately has taken «an authoritarian approach to the press […] much like that of Beijing» (Keita, 2012, p. 53). The diaspora environment concurs. The Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association in Exile claims that Ethiopia is «one of the leading repressive regimes in the world»52, corroborating political science professor Alemayehu W. Mariam at California State University who concludes that «the destruction of press freedom in Ethiopia is now complete»53. On balance, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) notes that there is still space for freedom of expression in the country, 46

Eskinder Nega (blogger), Reeyot Alemu (Fiteh) and Woubshet Taye (Awramba Times) Abebe Belew (Addis Dimts), Abebe Gellaw (Addis Voice), Abiye Teklemariam (Addis Neger Online), Elias Kifle (Ethiopian Review), Fasil Yenealem (ESAT) and Mesfin Negash (Addis Neger Online) 48 Johan Persson and Martin Schibbye 49 ‘463 journalists forced into exile since 2007’, CPJ, 20 June 2012. Available at: http://cpj.org/exile/ 50 ‘Freedom House condemns the conviction of Swedish journalists in Ethiopia’, Freedom House, 20 December 2011. Available at: http://freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-house-condemns-conviction-swedish-journalistsethiopia 51 ‘Ethiopia: Future of last remaining human rights monitoring NGO in the balance’, press statement, 1 February 2012. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/01/ethiopia-future-last-remaining-human-rightsmonitoring-ngo-balance 52 ‘EFJA calls for concerted global efforts to stop abuses’, press release, Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association in Exile, 25 January 2012. Available at: http://www.ifex.org/ethiopia/2012/01/25/stop_abuses/ 53 ‘Awramba Times: More powerful than ten thousand bayonets’, commentary, Alemayehu G. Mariam, 5 December 2011. Available at: http://www.ethiomedia.com/broad/3300.html 47

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reporting that a number of the private newspapers are «routinely critical of government policies and at times provocative»54. RSF accordingly ranks Ethiopia in the middle section of African countries in its Press Freedom Index 2011–12. On a world scale, RSF places Ethiopia in 127th position of a total 179 countries with regard to press freedom55, thus challenging the more pessimistic portrayals of various other rights groups. 2.4. Interchanges between coercion and liberalization In contrast to the accounts of several rights organizations quoted above, I will argue that the developments in the Ethiopian media situation over time ought not to be described as a steady route towards deterioration, but rather as a continuous interchange between coercion and liberalization. Reviewing the developments since the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, one notes both achievements and setbacks. A period of liberalization and proliferation in the private media market (1991–96) was followed by government crackdowns (1996–99) and renewed diversity (1999–2005), before once again reverting to shifting phases between setbacks (2005–07), revitalization (2007–10) and renewed coercion (2010–12). Thus, the longterm development in Ethiopian media governance is not unidirectional. It is not a one-way trajectory towards increased suppression, as some rights groups argue, nor is the nation’s media policy «on par with the best in the world», as Prime Minister Meles Zenawi declared in an interview with Newsweek56. In order to further make sense of apparent ambivalences in Ethiopian media governance, the analysis may benefit from a distinction between formal and informal policy. That is, formal developments in local media governance, especially in the period following 2007, do indeed denote significant steps forward towards increased liberalization. Suppressive clauses have been scrapped in the legislation; licences are no longer required for print publications; journalists are allowed to form professional associations – and the associations prosper like never before (3.3.5). Additionally, the media are given formal access to public information; government press conferences are arranged on a regular basis; five private radio stations have obtained licences and are operational (3.4.2); the state media are restructuring with the view to become public media institutions (6.6); journalism education is blossoming (3.3.4); and the media have begun to take up the task of self-governance by organizing a committee for the establishment of an independent media council (9.3.8). At the same time, however, the informal side of Ethiopian media governance and decrees outside of formal media legislation remain a concern, perhaps increasingly so. Legislation adjacent to media regulation, particularly the anti-terrorism law, has a controlling effect on media activity. A 54

‘Two journalists sentenced to 14 years on terrorism charges’, Reporters Without Borders, 24 January 2012. Available at: http://en.rsf.org/ethiopia-journalists-are-not-terrorists-24-01-2012,41759.html 55 ‘Press Freedom Index 2011–12’, Reporters Without Borders, report, 25 January 2012. Available at: http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html 56 ‘Stuck in Somalia’, Jason McLure, Newsweek, 10 April 2008. Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/2008/04/10/stuck-in-somalia.html

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much criticized civil society organization (CSO) law57, barring rights organizations to receive more than 10% of their funding from abroad, also serves as a control mechanism for media rights in the country58. Furthermore, the official news agency ENA has been drawn closer to the government, perhaps with the purpose of central control with the flow of information (see discussion in subchapter 6.3). Websites and radio stations operated by the Ethiopian diaspora are readily blocked by the authorities. In-depth interviews with local journalists show that there is an immanent fear in the newsroom for reactions from the government, resulting in self-censorship and avoidance of critical reporting (Skjerdal, 2008, 2010b; cf. 9.6.1). In theoretical terms, the paradoxes in Ethiopian media governance may be explained as a case of selective liberalization (cf. Skjerdal, 2012). Liberalization is evident in formal regulation, where it is easily observed by outsiders, and in areas where the risk of losing control with the flow of information for the government is less. Like Zambian broadcasting reform, which has been characterized as a process of reluctant liberalization (Moyo, 2010), Ethiopian media reform secures the dominance of the state media while opening up for limited competition in the private media market. Importantly, however, the trend towards liberalization is challenged by a strong undercurrent of unofficial policy which may represent a return to vague coercion against the media industry. There are several indicators of such informal pressure in the Ethiopian media, though more difficult to verify than developments in official media policy. For example, strategic appointments both in state media institutions and in regulatory bodies such as the Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (EBA) are mainly of political nature (cf. 9.3.4). Broadcasting licences are similarly believed to be awarded to groups close to the government; at any rate not to companies in direct opposition to ruling interests (Amare, 2009). Online media channels, though less subject to formal control than their counterparts in the Middle East and Asia, are subject to casual regulation (Skjerdal and Endalkachew, 2012). Print publications which are critical of the ruling power experience informal threats, as in the case of Addis Neger. As a strategy of survival, journalists and media companies choose the safe route and only moderately portion out their critical reporting. Formal media regulation is gradually improved from the authorities’ side, but informal suppression prevails, partly owing to the media’s own self-imposed mechanisms. 2.5. Summary Ethiopia’s media history testifies to persistently tight government control. Each of the three regimes during the past century has used the nation’s media as an integral part of their political project, thereby warranting a coercive media strategy. To this end, the political leadership has regarded independent media outlets as largely contrary to aims of national

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Charities and Societies Proclamation no. 621/2009 ‘Stifling human rights work: the impact of civil society legislation in Ethiopia’, report, Amnesty International, March 2012. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_22411.pdf 58

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cohesion and social development, besides labelling them as disobedient oppositional voices in the public sphere. Nonetheless, the arrival of the EPRDF in 1991 marked a shift in media policy and practice. Private newspapers were allowed for the first time, and censorship was lifted. However, many of the newfound publications were beyond any journalistic standard, and the government turned out not to be genuinely prepared to accept critical reporting and what it regarded as political aggravation in the public domain. A series of crackdowns followed, accompanied by delays in media legislation reform. Around 2000, the private media market had largely parted in two groups: one clearly opposition-affiliated and the other consisting of less politicized or moderately pro-government publications. While the first group continued to face harassment, notably in the aftermath of the 2005 elections; the latter group laid the foundation for stable publishing and a sustainable in-house economy. Contrary to popular portrayal, the latter group does engage in critical reporting, though not in large amounts, and always with fine-tuned sensitivity as to how far it can go without facing repercussions. This is indeed in line with an Ethiopian understanding of press freedom, where freedom of expression both judicially and culturally is defined as a democratic right rather than a human right (1995 Constitution, article 29; cf. Gedion, 2010, p. 208). In effect, press freedom is not regarded as an inherent right, but as a privilege earned. On the analytic level, this chapter has argued against a one-sided interpretation of media governance during EPRDF. I have sought to demonstrate that the two decades of EPRDF rule emerge as shifting periods between coercion and liberalization. Even in the post2005 era, which is often described by analysts as a decisive turn to increased political oppression in Ethiopia, media governance has shifted between a period of post-election setbacks, to a period of revitalization, and back to a current condition of renewed coercion. On the whole, the last few years have demonstrated achievements in terms of legislative reforms; general media professionalization; prospering journalism education programmes; increased access to government information; rise of professional associations with appending narrowing of the gap between private and state media societies; as well as signs of diversification in the media landscape with the introduction of private radio channels. Recently, however, coercion against the critical press has become highly prevalent, not least with the use of anti-terrorism rhetoric against journalistic activity. Hence, the new media law of 2008 is frequently mentioned in the same breath as the anti-terrorism law (2009) and the CSO law (2009) as evidence of the authoritarian turn in Ethiopian governance (e.g. Abbink, 2011, p. 598; Bach, 2011, p. 646; Merera, 2011, p. 673; Tronvoll, 2011, p. 132), but, as this chapter has argued, such meshing of media policy with other policy is not grounded in a sound analysis of Ethiopian media legislation. Although there are potentially restrictive clauses in the new media law, the critical attention should lie more on the pragmatic use of adjacent legislation and the politicization of the court system (Assefa, 2011), which demonstrate that journalists are persecuted by legislation external to the media domain (notably the anti-terrorism

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proclamation and the criminal code) rather than by the media law itself59. Equally important, however, is the need for critical focus on informal mechanisms in Ethiopian media governance. Journalists in both the private media industry and the state media sense a strong undercurrent of unofficial policy delimiting their professional space. The situation calls for an application of qualitative in-depth research that goes beyond analyses of legislative reforms alone.

59

Cf. ‘Dismantling dissent: intensified crackdown on free speech in Ethiopia’, report, Amnesty International, 16 December 2011. Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR25/011/2011/en

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Chapter 3 A profile of journalists and media channels

3.1. Introduction With Ethiopian media history fresh in mind (chapter 2), this chapter presents an overview of the current media situation. The attention is both on a journalist profile (3.3) and a profile of media channels (3.4). A purpose in this regard is to acquaint readers with locally produced studies and reports in the area, so as to encourage use of this literature in internationally linked research. The chapter begins, however, with a discussion of the ‘polarization’ concept, which is often applied when describing the immediate topography of the Ethiopian media landscape. 3.2. Polarization The current Ethiopian media situation, as for the past 20 years, is commonly described as a polarized state of affairs between the state media and private media outlets (Aadland and Fackler, 2001; Price et al., 2008). Nicole Stremlau (2011) attributes polarization in the press to EPRDF’s revolutionary democracy ideology, which leaves little room for a dynamic opposition. Øyvind Aadland and Knut Røe (2000, p. 214) on their part explain the tendency to polarization as an absence of a tradition of dialogue in the local society, where disagreement customarily ends in enmity and division. Concomitantly, editor Mesfin Negash of the defunct newspaper Addis Neger claims that anybody engaging in critical political reporting in Ethiopia will be considered an enemy of the government and an activist. Mesfin comments: I don’t think it is a matter of choice for journalists to be taken as activists in Ethiopia where they play, by design or convenience, the role of teaching, monitoring, exposing and defending those basic elements of democracy. (Mesfin, 2010, p. 67) 35

However, as pointed out by Shimelis Bonsa (2002, p. 199), the recognition of polarization in the Ethiopian media is not to suggest that the private media are harmonized in their position vis-à-vis the government. There are different factions in the private media, and their media strategies also differ. At the one end there are publications with an aggressive oppositional

political

agenda.

Most of these folded with the post-election crackdown on the press in 2005 and included newspapers such as Ethop, Menelik and Seife Nebelbal, but current publications like Fiteh and the recently closed Awramba Times could also be said to belong to this group though with a more moderate reporting style (figure 3.1)60. Impatient for political change, several of these newspapers hinted in the months following the 2005 elections that armed struggle may be the only way to get Ethiopia on

Figure 3.1: Front page of Awramba Times, 17 Sept 2011 The facsimile shows Awramba Times writing critically about the anti-terrorism proclamation on 17 September 2011. The newspaper folded two months later, after its editor-in-chief Dawit Kebede defected to the US.

the right track. Then there are the moderately critical outlets which engage in criticism of the government while sometimes also supporting official policy. The Reporter, Fortune and Addis Admas would be examples of such publications, in addition to the popular radio station Sheger FM. Importantly, these outlets have typically been on the scene for a long time (except Sheger FM), and their potential to exercise critical reporting is a result of longstanding confidence-building both with the public and the authorities. Lastly, there are media companies which openly support government policy. Walta Information Center and Radio Fana are the foremost examples, having benefited from special treatment from the government since their inception in the early 1990s (cf. 2.3.3.2). There are also certain print 60

Following the footsteps of Addis Neger, the Amharic weekly Awramba Times (folded November 2011) was resurrected as a diaspora online publication in May 2012 with a mixed Amharic/English profile (www.awrambatimes.com).

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publications, such as EthioChannel and the previous Eftin, which are closely linked to EPRDF interests. The portrayal of the Ethiopian media landscape as sharply polarized between private and state media therefore requires some modification. Discriminatory treatment between the private and state media is a recurring challenge for independent journalists in Ethiopia. Despite the new media law of 2008, which prescribes equal treatment between private and state media in terms of access to public information, private journalists do not expect to be treated by public officials the same way as their colleagues in the state media. Illustratively, a comparative study of retrieval of information in a state radio and a private radio in Addis Ababa found that journalists from the private radio station (Sheger FM) were often denied public information simply on the grounds that they do not work for the ‘government’ media (Engdawork, 2011). On balance, journalists from the state radio (FM Addis 97.1) found it difficult to retrieve information too, alluding to a lack of tradition in the public administration to share information besides an underlying fear felt by public officials that they would transgress their authority by giving out the information. This points to the importance of considering the role of tradition and informal processes when assessing phenomena such as favouritism and discrimination in Ethiopian media culture. By the same token, the private media were for a long time customarily excluded from official press conferences and briefings. Following the softening of the press/government relations after the Ethio-Eritrean war 1998–2000, however (cf. 2.3.3.4), the Minister of Information announced that the government would begin inviting private journalists to the Prime Minister’s press conferences, though, interestingly enough, only based on the merit of the individual reporter (Ellene et al., 2003, p. 35). Discriminatory treatment in the Ethiopian media environment is therefore not only a matter of polarization between private and state media, but goes down to the individual reporter level as well. 3.3. Journalists 3.3.1. Demographics Polarization in the Ethiopian media is additionally identified in journalist demographics, portrayed as a long-standing dichotomy between state media and private media journalists. Overall, the professional population is dominated by journalists working for the state media. The hitherto most comprehensive survey of the local media industry, conducted by Electoral Reform International Services (ERIS) in 2010–11, reveals that there are approximately 1550 journalists serving Ethiopia’s news media, of whom 1100 (71%) work for the state media (Ward, 2011). Journalists in news agencies and magazines are not counted in this estimate.61 61

The figures come close to my own previous estimate of 1600–1700 Ethiopian journalists in total, of whom 1300 work for the state media (Skjerdal, 2008). In contrast to ERIS’ survey, my estimate includes journalists working for news agencies. Similarly, a detailed count by media researcher Birhanu Olana found 1391 journalists in the Ethiopian media in 2010, excluding Radio Fana, Walta, Ethiopian News Agency and Dimtsi Woyane (personal communication, 24 March 2012). All these three independent studies end up at around

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A high number of state media journalists are employed in the broadcasting sector (totalling approximately 1000 reporters and editors), with as many as 650 journalists serving regional broadcasting agencies. This is largely a result of a restructuring process in the Ethiopian state media which began in 2008, entailing that regional ‘mass media agencies’ are assigned a greater role than before in producing and disseminating local programmes in different languages. Thus, the resources of the centralized Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency (ERTA) are now to some degree dispersed into the regional agencies. Remaining at ERTA’s head quarters in Addis Ababa is a constituency of some 350 journalists who work for the national radio and television channels (for more details about the restructuring of ERTA, subchapter 6.4 refers). In the print media sector, on the other hand, the balance is reversed with approximately 90 journalists working for state-owned newspapers and 180 for private titles (Ward, 2011).62 3.3.2. Gender Gender-wise, Ethiopian newsrooms attest to great imbalances, reflecting the general professional situation in the country (Alem, 2008). In the phrasing of African Media Barometer, women in the Ethiopian media are confined to «’window-dressing’ positions» (FES, 2010, p. 53). Editors admit that they assign female journalists to soft stories because they believe this topic area suits them better, and there are several reports of female journalists earning less than male journalists with the same standing (Nolawi, 2008; Rahel, 2010; Seble, 2006). Researching gender imbalances in 13 media houses, Mengistu Dargie (2007, p. 43) found an overall proportion of female journalists of 14%, which is in fact a slight decline from an earlier survey which found 17% female journalists (Agaredech, 2003). The ratio is virtually the same in the privately owned and state-owned media. Universities have made efforts to rectify the gender balance among journalism students, but there are still few female students in the degree programmes. During its first ten years of existence, the largest journalism training institution in the country, Ethiopian Mass Media Training Institute (EMMTI), graduated 639 students with diplomas in journalism, of whom 20% were women (PMC, 2006, p. 55). 3.3.3. Salary Salary is generally better in the private media than in the state media, although there are significant variations among the outlets (FES, 2010, p. 57; IREX, 2009, p. 127; IREX, 2010, p.

1600–1700 journalists in total in the Ethiopian news media (magazines excluded), which must then be regarded as a reliable estimate. 62 All figures in this section are set right against a discrepancy in Ward’s (2011) media mapping report. The report misleadingly lists the number of journalists working for state newspapers as 273, whereas that figure actually includes other employees as well. The correct number of journalists working for the four state-owned newspapers is approximately 90.

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134). A rough monthly estimate for a senior reporter position in 2012 is ETB 2000 (USD 110) in the state media and ETB 2500 in the private media, with broadcasting offering somewhat better pay than the print media. Though many journalists complain about the salary, it is still higher than many other professions which require higher education, for example the teaching profession. Reporters in both private and state media are found to engage in ‘moonlighting’ (9.2.5), and some accept so-called ‘brown envelopes’ as a supplement to their regular income, defined as underhand payment from sources to journalists (Berhanu, 2009; Berhanu and Skjerdal, 2009, 2011; Birhanu, 2010). The practice attests to the multifaceted character of journalistic work in Ethiopia (cf. 9.2.6). 3.3.4. Journalism education A growing share of the Ethiopian journalist population is formally educated in the profession. This is due to the upsurge in journalism programmes in the country since 2003. By 2012, there are journalism courses at 21 universities nationwide, seven of which offer a full BA degree in journalism63. The rise in journalism programmes is largely an upshot of the postgraduate programme in journalism which opened at Addis Ababa University in 2004, providing regional universities with qualified instructors. However, many regional universities are barred by lack of proper media training equipment, resulting in an disproportionate share of theoretical vs. practical courses, or skills being taught theoretically (Woldegiorgis, 2010). Besides, lack of job opportunities pose a challenge for candidates educated in regional universities, as the media companies, particularly in the private sector, are still mostly confined to the capital city. International input has marked Ethiopian journalism training ever since Frank Hammer founded ‘The Radio School’ in Addis Ababa in the 1930s (Janas, 1991, p. 47). One of the well-known media personalities who came to Ethiopia to teach reporting in 1963 at the time of the arrival of television was Mal Goode, known in the US as the ‘dean of black journalism’ (Hachten, 1968; Peabody, 1995). In the early 1970s, a journalism programme was erected at Addis Ababa University, only to be shut with the Marxist revolution in 1974 (Brook, 2000, p. 33; Janas, 1991, p. 66). During the Derg regime, media personnel were sent to allied nations such as USSR and East Germany for training, although a problem with the training, according to former head of ETV Amare Aregawi, was that candidates returned with transcripts revealing they spent «two years learning Russian; three years studying MarxismLeninism; two years visiting Uzbekistan; nothing about journalism» (Amare, 2009, p. 27). Although journalism training reverted to a Western orientation after the downfall of the Derg, the fieldwork for the present research reveals that today’s practicing state media journalists boast professional diplomas from an array of non-Western contexts, including China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania. It would therefore be 63

Partly based on information provided by Endalkachew Hailemikael, Journalism and Media Studies Unit, Department of English Language and Literature, Arba Minch University, 7 November 2011.

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misleading to say that Ethiopian journalism is solely informed by Western trainers and ideology. From the media institutions’ point of view, using training programmes in nonWestern countries is additionally preferred because the risk of defection is much less. A number of Ethiopian media institutions which have sent staff members to Europe or the US for training have painfully experienced that the chosen candidates never returned. Illustratively, an account of journalists sent abroad for training in the early 2000s reveals that of all ETV programme producers who got the chance to go, only one returned (Ellene et al., 2003, p. 39). Local journalism programmes are occasionally accused of favouring employees from the state media in their student intakes. In particular, the first permanent journalism training school in the country, Ethiopian Mass Media Training Institute (EMMTI), established in 1996 under the Ministry of Information, was regarded as an ally of the official media institutions. In earlier years, 80% of the students entered the programme on recommendation from the government (Røe and Aadland, 1999, p. 14). The remaining 20% competitive admissions were open for all, but this enrolment too was dominated by candidates from the state media. The intake regulation changed, however, when EMMTI was overtaken by Addis Ababa University’s Faculty of Journalism and Communication (FJC) in 2006. The student body of approximately 400 students in the undergraduate division now mainly comprises of high school graduates who enter the journalism programme in a two-step process where the Ministry of Education is involved in gross quota dispersion and the university subsequently decides individual placements. Rumours nonetheless claim that the recruitment of students is politicized. Upset with the situation, an instructor in FJC’s undergraduate division complains that «90% of our students are EPRDF members» (personal communication, date concealed). Although the statement should not be taken literally, it aptly demonstrates the perception of recruitment to journalism education in Ethiopia as being politicized. Moreover, the graduate programme at Addis Ababa University, indeed the only MA degree in journalism on the Horn of Africa, has been blamed for being drawn closer to government interests after foreign funding ceased in 2009 (IREX, 2010, p. 132; Kent and Taylor, 2011, p. 5; Mesfin, 2010, p. 71)64. Nevertheless, the claim that Ethiopian journalism education is politicized needs much refining. For example, there is heated discussion over professional issues among personnel in the concerned departments, and ideological positions are seen to cut across the teaching staff rather than constituting an official Ethiopian ‘way of doing journalism’ (Skjerdal, 2011d). Illustratively, when the dean of FJC in an interview in Addis Zemen claimed that the case against the aforementioned Swedish journalists caught in Ogaden in July 2011 had nothing to do with freedom of expression (cf. 2.3.3.7), he was promptly opposed by colleagues from the journalism programme at Arba Minch University who dubbed the dean’s 64

The reader should be informed that I served as external academic coordinator in AAU’s MA programme in journalism from 2004 to 2006, and as thesis coordinator from 2006 to 2008. There is no space here to discuss firsthand experiences with Ethiopian journalism education, except referring to contributions published elsewhere (Skjerdal, 2009b; 2011d).

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viewpoint «extreme»65. Be that as it may, Ethiopian journalism education, like journalism programmes elsewhere in Eastern Africa, is challenged by a legacy where the training has been part and parcel of the government’s overall media strategy (Skjerdal and Ngugi, 2007). 3.3.5. Journalist associations Ethiopia has witnessed a tremendous increase in the number of professional associations for journalists over the past few years. The recent growth has come in the area of special interest associations in particular, which includes Ethiopian Environment Journalists’ Association (EEJA, est. 2006), PEN Ethiopia (est. 2008) and Ethiopian Media Women’s Association (EMWA, est. 1997), in addition to less publicly known associations such as Climate and Environmental Journalists’ Association (CEJA, est. 2008), Coalition of Media Against Malaria in Ethiopia (est. 2006), Network of Journalists Against Female Genital Mutilation (NJAFGM, est. 2008), Ethiopian Volunteer Media Professionals Against AIDS (EVMPA, est. 2002), Nile Media Network Ethiopia Chapter (NMNE, est. 2006), Science Journalists’ Association (SJA, est. 2010), National Photojournalist Association Ethiopia (NPAE, est. 2008), Ethiopian Sports Journalists’ Association (ESJA) and Foreign Correspondents’ Association of Ethiopia (FCAE). There is also an association for young journalists and concrete plans to establish an interest group for Muslim journalists. Not all associations are yet registered in accordance with the civil society organization (CSO) law of 2009, thus the year of establishment indicated above refers to the initial formation of the association. Importantly, these associations appear to concentrate mainly on less controversial issues and therefore operate fairly freely on the public arena. However, a few of the associations claim to be impeded by the CSO law, which restricts organizations focusing on democracy and human rights issues to receiving no more than 10% of its income from foreign funding. As a result, associations traditionally relying on foreign funding, such as EMWA, have downsized its staff, while others are searching for creative means to circumvent the restrictions of the new legislation. All the above-mentioned associations draw members from both the private and the state media, emphasizing increased cross-socialization in the local journalist environment based on professional interest rather than media ownership type (9.2.8). This signals a significant change in journalistic identity since 2003, when a study concluded that the only association in the country attracting membership from both private and state media journalists was EMWA (Ellene et al., 2003, p. 46). The traditional professional associations (unions), on the other hand, are characterized by continuous disparity between private and state media journalists. The oldest group, Ethiopian Journalist Association (EJA), was established in 1968 as an assembly for official reporters and still appears to be an in-house association for state media journalists, although

65

‘Addis Ababa University’s School of Journalism against journalists?’, Endalkachew Hailemikael, blog entry, 21 February 2012. Available at: http://endalk.wordpress.com/2012/02/21/addis-ababa-universitys-school-ofjournalism-against-journalists

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its current president Meseret Atalay a few years ago projected it would soon have more than 100 members from the private media (personal interview, 3 December 2008). EJA claims to have a total membership record of more than 500 journalists, which appears to be a very generous estimate. Of the 67 state media journalists interviewed in this research, only eight informed that they were members of EJA, and they mainly belong to ETV and describe themselves as passive members. EJA’s professional activities have stayed at a modest scale for many years. The counterpart to EJA, Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association (EFJA), was formed in 1993, soon after private publications were allowed. However, the association was haunted by the government since inception and only received official NGO recognition in 2000. By that time, the association had become an important critic of official media policy with backing from international rights organizations. In November 2003, EFJA was suspended by the government on grounds that it had failed to renew its registration (Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004, p. 66). However, the leadership of EFJA defeated the government in two consecutive court levels, but by the time of the announcement of the final verdict, several of the association’s key personalities, including founding president Kifle Mulat, had defected from the country. In addition, the association faced internal turmoil over misuse of funds which resulted in Wondwosen Mekonnen heading up the association despite lacking support from the former leadership due to his alleged pro-government posture (personal interview with Sisay Agena, former executive board member, 14 May 2010). At present, EFJA is inactive as an association for private journalists in homeland Ethiopia, but the old leadership maintains an active profile in the diaspora under the name ‘Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association in Exile’. In the vacuum between EJA and EFJA, a new association surfaced in 2003, attempting to reach out to both private and state media journalists. The founding members of the new association Ethiopian National Journalists’ Union (ENJU) initially applied for membership in EFJA, only to be met with suspicion since they worked for the state media and were hence denied a membership card. However, the suspicion went both ways. Current president of ENJU, Anteneh Abraham, portrays the then leadership of EFJA as ‘former Dergs’ and as being preoccupied with attacking the ruling party rather than focusing on professional journalism issues (personal interview, 4 May 2011). This resulted in a group of young journalists forming ENJU, and the association today stands out as the most viable of the three general journalist associations. Its membership register purportedly contains names of more than 600 practicing journalists (Anteneh Abraham, personal interview, 4 May 2011), although the present research only found two ENJU members among its 67 main informants. It is possible, however, that some informants have failed to inform about an affiliation, and that ENJU keeps a loose membership file. It is for example commonplace in Ethiopia to sign participants of training sessions up as nominal members of the arranging organization.

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3.4. Media channels 3.4.1. Television Television broadcasting is still not open for private actors in Ethiopia. The only channels available on local networks are the government-run ETV1 (national) and ETV2 (an urban channel managed by the Addis Ababa City Administration). In addition, regional mass media companies have started to produce local programmes focusing on their respective regions, though still partly depending on ETV’s network for transmission. The reason for not yet awarding private television licences, according to EBA director Desta Tesfaw, is that the country is awaiting digital terrestrial broadcasting and it would not be viable to give out licences before the new transmission technology is in place (personal interview, 6 August 2009). In media circles, however, it is a commonly held belief that an equally important reason for not allowing private television is that the government is not yet prepared for competition in this area, paralleling the severe delays in issuing the first private radio licences66. When digital television eventually comes, it is planned to cater for eight channels; half commercial and half state-owned, or ‘public’, which is the proper term according to the 2007 broadcasting law. The affluent media group Radio Fana, having changed its company name to Fana Broadcasting Corporate in 2011, has ambitions to become the first private television broadcaster in the country by 2013 and has already submitted an application for licence. The penetration of ETV is uncertain. Officially, the station covers 42% of the geographical area of the country67, although external reports claim up to 60% coverage (FES, 2010, p. 27). The station aims to reach 86% coverage when the digital terrestrial network is established within a few years’ time. More interesting yet are audience surveys, which expose who actually watches television. According to a representative survey among 4,000 households, 39% responded that they have access to television in some way, and 40% said they watched television ‘yesterday’ (Ward and Selam, 2011). Certainly, many do not have access to television at home, but in cafeterias, public places or at a friend’s house. The most watched channel is naturally the easily available ETV, although an increasing number of viewers also have access to satellite channels, particularly within the urban population. The two most watched foreign satellite channels are BBC World and Al Jazeera. Interestingly, 17% of the respondents list the government-critical diaspora channel Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) as one of their favourite stations (Ward and Selam, 2011, p. 31), despite the fact that the channel has been habitually jammed on Arabsat since mid-2010, a few months after its opening (cf. 2.3.3.7). This demonstrates that local Ethiopian audiences are aware of ESAT despite attempts at jamming, and some may have access to the programmes through various mirroring websites.

66

‘Time for private TV stations!’, editorial, The Reporter, 22 January 2011 Five-months report to the House of Representatives, ERTA, 3 January 2012. Cf. http://www.ena.gov.et/EnglishNews/2012/Jan/03Jan12/157726.htm 67

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3.4.2. Radio For decades, radio has been regarded the most important mass medium in Ethiopia (e.g. MoI, 1969, p. 140). The claim still makes sense, at least when it comes to audience figures and reach. The state-owned Ethiopian Radio (also known as Radio Ethiopia, especially in earlier years) claims to cover 67% of the geographic area of the country, mostly by means of medium wave (AM). A nationwide survey found that 60% of the population had listened to radio ‘yesterday’, and a majority regards radio as the most reliable and important source of information (Ward and Selam, 2011, p. 13). However, there are regions in Ethiopia where radio is much less listened to, such as the rural area of Gambella, where the survey found that only 8% of the respondents listened to radio on a daily basis. This is a testimony of the extraordinary dispersion of settlement in Ethiopia, where 82% of the population live in rural areas68. For at least half of the national population of 83 million, radio is by all practical means the only mass medium available. Since the fall of state monopoly in broadcasting in 2007, five private radio stations have received licences – four based in Addis Ababa (Sheger FM, Zami FM, Radio Fana and Afro FM) and one in Mekelle (Dimtsi Woyane Tigray). A few of the new stations are quite popular with the audience and appear to have met a demand in the media market. Figures for Addis Ababa show that Sheger FM and Radio Fana are the most popular stations with 57% of the public listing them as their favourite stations, followed by the urban state-run channel FM Addis 97.1 (51%) and Ethiopian Radio (28%). Zami Radio (14%) and Afro FM (5%) are less popular, although the latter is in a category of its own as the only radio station broadcasting in English (Ward and Selam, 2011, p. 25; respondents were allowed to list several stations as their favourite). The content of the radios belong to three genres, broadly speaking: news/current affairs, music/entertainment and health/education. Only Sheger FM could be said to engage in critical reporting, although the station’s news-gathering methods are less organized than those of its state-run competitor FM Addis 97.1 (Engdawork, 2011). A private station, Sheger FM is impeded by government offices not willing to cooperate in the sharing of information, but its news presentation style is more direct and less formal than its competitors, hence making the news programmes popular with young listeners (Wondwossen, 2010). This illustrates a trend towards increased diversity in the Ethiopian radio market since 2007, although private radio stations are still far less hard-hitting in political reporting than some of the past private newspapers were. As a supplement to national Ethiopian Radio, the government maintains a decentralized radio structure through regional media agencies. Each of the eight regional mass media agencies runs at least one local FM station, typically broadcasting from five to eleven hours daily. Lastly, community radio stations are on the rise. There are currently eight community radios in the country, depending mainly on volunteer work force. 68

The World Bank 2010 statistics. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator

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Additionally, it is important to take into account the role of foreign shortwave broadcasts aimed at Ethiopia, especially Deutsche Welle (DW; began Amharic broadcasts in 1965) and Voice of America (VOA; began Amharic broadcasts in 1982, also producing programmes in Oromo and Tigrinya). 5% of the listening public inform that they listened to each of these stations ‘yesterday’ (Ward and Selam, 2011, p. 25), implying that DW and VOA every day reach out to roughly 2–3 million Ethiopian citizens. The potential political impact of the programmes has led the authorities to engage in habitual jamming of the broadcasts (cf. 2.3.3.7), in contrast to other foreign shortwave broadcasts in Ethiopian languages, such as Radio Cairo and Radio Vatican, which are left untouched. The profile of VOA’s Amharic service has turned into an issue at high diplomatic level between Ethiopia and the US, insofar as the American embassy in November 2005 ordered an independent investigation of the station’s reporting69. Today, Amharic shortwave broadcasts by VOA and DW are irregularly blocked in Ethiopia, although their news reports are readily available for local audiences through various alternative websites. 3.4.3. Newspapers Newspapers represent the only area in the Ethiopian media landscape where private actors dominate the market. Of today’s 31 publishing newspaper titles, 27 are privately owned. Most titles are published weekly (or twice-weekly), except two state-owned dailies (Addis Zemen and The Ethiopian Herald) and one private daily (Daily Monitor). Circulation figures are limited, and so is the geographical distribution. The two most popular newspapers, Addis Admas and the Amharic version of The Reporter (both private), print 22,000–25,000 copies. The remaining titles print less than 13,000 copies, with some as little as 1,000 copies or less (Ward, 2011). The total circulation for Ethiopian newspapers is a mere 150,000 copies for a population of 83 million. In this perspective, the impact of newspapers in the Ethiopian society would seem miniscule. It would be a mistake, however, to write off the influence of print publications based on circulation figures alone. For one, each printed copy is likely to be read by many persons. A common way to consume newspapers in Ethiopia is to ‘rent a read’ on the street corner for 25 or 50 cents (less than 3 US cents), meaning that one copy could be read by 30–40 persons70. Thus, a recent survey concludes that 6% of the population read newspapers at least once a week, accounting for a sizeable total readership (Ward and Selam, 2011, p. 33). Secondly, many of the readers are well educated and belong to the urban, decision-making segment of the population. Even in the remote regions, the few copies of newspapers that do appear are believed to play a significant role for the ‘small-town intelligentsia’ 69

‘VOA’s Amharic service condemned by GOE – need for proof’, diplomatic cable, 15 November 2005. Exposed by WikiLeaks 30 August 2011. Available at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/11/05ADDISABABA3852.html 70 ‘Ethiopia’s newspaper landlords’, Mohamed Selman, Mail & Guardian Online, 14 February 2011. Available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-14-ethiopias-paper-landlords. Cf. ‘Renting a read from ‘newspaper landlords’’, Robyn Curnow, CNN, 19 April 2011. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/04/19/newspaper.rental.ethiopia/index.html

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(Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003, p. 73). The print media therefore constitute a crucial arena for exchange of ideas and information despite limitations in production and distribution. As many as 21 of the total 31 newspapers are published in local languages (the remaining nine in English, plus one in Arabic), making Ethiopia one of only three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with a substantial local language tradition in the print media, besides Somalia and Tanzania (Salawu, 2009). As such, Ethiopian newspapers play a key role in reinforcing a local literary tradition in the area of news and contemporary issues. The Amharic language is vastly dominant in the newspaper market, accounting for 20 titles. The remaining two newspapers, apart from the English ones, use Arabic (al-Alem) and Oromo (Bariisaa). That only one newspaper is printed in Oromo, representing the tongue of 35% of the population, is noteworthy. This reflects the uneven language situation in the media of earlier regimes, although today Oromo is not banned from the media as it was during the reign of Haile Selassie (cf. 2.3.1). Oromo is fairly commonly used in radio and television, but is only to very little extent present in the print media. Privately-owned and state-owned newspapers are organized in vastly different ways. The four state-owned newspapers (Addis Zemen in Amharic, The Ethiopian Herald in English, Bariisaa in Oromo and al-Alem in Arabic) are under the wings of the centralized publisher Ethiopian Press Agency (EPA), while the private newspapers belong to independent publishing houses. EPA prescribes local and centralized editorial meetings twice a day for its four titles according to a clearly defined editorial policy document, while the private publications are usually far less orderly in its organizing of the working day and the newsroom. A few of the private newspapers are well staffed with around 20 journalists or more, such as The Reporter and Addis Admas, although most companies employ only 5–8 full-time journalists. As noted earlier (2.3.3.4), several of the private newspapers established around 2000 have emerged as stable and profitable businesses, while others are financially weak. As many as 37% of the newspapers report financial loss (Ward, 2011, p. 16). Financial viability is much less of an issue for the state-owned newspapers, as they are secured by public funds. A considerable portion of the official newspapers’ revenue comes from public tender advertisements, which rarely appear in private newspapers. Numerous studies point to major differences in the content of private vs. state-owned newspapers. The reporting style of state newspapers is described as servile, uncritical and development-oriented, up against private newspapers’ tendency to be conflict-oriented, profit-driven and critical to the party in power (Eden, 2011; Eshetu, 2011; Hailemarkos, 2006; Markos, 2006; Mesfin A., 2006; Mesfin B., 2006; Misrak, 2009; Nebiyu, 2009; Semere, 2010; Senait, 2010; Sileshi, 2010; Simret, 2006; Ward, 2010; Yetnayet, 2010). The differences transpire for example in the use of sources. While state-owned newspapers consistently and accurately attribute sources, private newspapers are inclined to use large amounts of anonymous sources in their news articles (Asgedom, 2006; Eden, 2009; Tizita, 2008). Both cases are in fact an unhealthy sign. For the private media, the massive use of anonymous sources is a sign of 46

sloppy reporting and dispatch of unconfirmed reports, although concealment of sources is of course necessary in isolated cases. For the state media, the careful attribution of sources is in reality a blanket promotion of government officials at the expense of critical voices, although sound sourcing is of course usually a mark of reliable reporting. This is but one example of the way media content reflects not just the bias of the media outlets but also the reporting style that journalists are inclined to adopt as they join a media organization, thus underlining the need for background content analysis (chapters 7 and 8). 3.4.4. News agencies There are two locally-run news agencies in Ethiopia, one official and one private71. Both agencies, however, ought to be regarded as government-affiliated. Opened in 1942 under the Ministry of the Pen, the official Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) boasts being one of African’s oldest news agencies. In 2007, ENA again came under direct command of the Ministry of Information (later Office for Government Communication Affairs) after a few years under a semi-independent board. The other news agency, Walta Information Center, was established in 1994 by the EPRDF-affiliated MegaNet Corporation. It has since become a serious competitor to ENA. Already by 2000, it was claimed that Walta had surpassed ENA as a provider of news and information to the official media (Brook, 2000, p. 19), although in terms of number of news dispatches, ENA must have been larger. Today, Walta is reputed as a fresh and competitive wire service while ENA is struggling to divest itself of an image as old-fashioned and dull. ENA is superior, however, in terms of its nation-wide ‘correspondent’ network with no less than 39 branch offices across the country. That said, the competition between the two news agencies does not reach further than the fact that they communicate on a daily basis to discuss assignments so they do not waste resources by covering the same event. This is possible because the two agencies share a common news ideology besides serving largely the same subscribers. ENA and Walta play a pivotal role in deciding the domestic news agenda in Ethiopia, especially with regard to the state media. An earlier report estimated that 90% of Ethiopian Radio’s news items came from ENA and Walta (Stanbridge and Ljunggren, 2003, p. 86). Although the recent restructuring of the state media implies that more stories are now selfproduced by ERTA and individual media outlets, a considerable portion of the news is still derived directly from the news wire services. As for the private media outlets, very few have formal agreements with ENA and Walta despite low subscription costs. However, it is commonplace for the local media to pull stories from local and international news agencies without permission, and Walta has given a blanket blessing for all media outlets to use its online material. The private media are nevertheless sceptical when it comes to using the local news agencies, in contrast to international services. A study of the only private daily in the 71

An attempt to erect a third news agency in the mid-1990s failed because of lack of market appeal. Tam Asmar, a small-scale private agency, was operational from 1994 to 1997 (Tenaw, 2006, p. 11).

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country, Daily Monitor, found that 87% of its news was derived from international news channels, mainly BBC and Reuters, while only 3% came from ENA and Walta (Semere, 2010, p. 48). Both ENA and Walta sustain expanding audio-visual production units besides their print journalism departments. They also cater for the two most active news websites locally, with continuous news updates72. 3.4.5. The Internet The Internet plays an increasingly important role in the Ethiopian mediascape. Despite slow connectivity and delays in the linking up to the East African high-speed submarine cable EASSy, Ethiopians use the Internet more and more for exchanges of news and messages. According to frequently quoted user statistics, 622,000 Ethiopians (0.7% of the population) are regular Internet users, making Ethiopia, together with Liberia, the least connected country in Africa73. However, there is reason to assume that the penetration is higher. This is indicated by the number of Ethiopian personal profiles on Facebook, which reached 599,000 in June 201274, and the total number of Internet users is clearly much higher. Furthermore, the most reliable audience survey conducted in Ethiopia thus far found that 6% of the respondents accessed the Internet ‘yesterday’ and another 6% ‘last week’ (Ward and Selam, 2011, p. 14). In contrast to Western countries, where Internet use is assumed to pose a threat to newspaper reading, in Ethiopia, active exposure to online media appears to be correlated with high newspaper consumption (cf. Sophia, 2006). However, the Internet is not yet a prioritized area for Ethiopian media houses. All larger media organizations maintain a news site on the web, but the content is mostly replicated from respective print editions or radio/television programmes (the technical feasibility of the sites has indeed only marginally improved over the past few years; compared with Kibnesh, 2006). The situation is reversed for the diaspora, which uses the Internet extensively in its media communication (Metasebia, 2012; Skjerdal, 2011c). Corroborating Yunusa Ya’u’s (2008) claim that more online content about Africa is produced overseas than within the continent itself, there are many more Ethiopian news sites operated by the diaspora living abroad than from within the homeland itself. The diaspora sites are highly uneven as regards journalistic quality. On the one end of the scale there are aggressive political sites such as Ethiopianreview.com which maintain a trivial relationship with acknowledged journalistic standards like rejection of libellous speech (cf. Skjerdal, 2009a, 2010a). Illustratively, in July 2011, Ethiopian Review’s exiled editor Elias Kifle was sentenced by a British high court to pay GBP 175,000 in libel damages to the Ethiopian businessman Mohammed Al-Amoudi after the web channel accused the man of murdering his daughter’s lover in Iraq, among

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www.ena.gov.et and www.waltainfo.com www.internetworldstats.com, latest update 31 December 2011 74 www.socialbakers.com 73

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other things75. On the other end of the scale there are sites which rely on first-hand accounts and champion a differentiation between fact and opinion. Many diaspora website editors are indeed caught in the dilemma between journalism and activism. They identify with a professional journalistic community while simultaneously reporting strongly critically on the Ethiopian government, thereby ending up being portrayed as diaspora activists (Lyons, 2006, 2007). However, in the view of Mesfin Negash, editor of Addis Neger Online, the limited space for critical reporting within homeland Ethiopia forces diaspora journalists into a frame where journalism and activism inevitably amalgamate: We [the diaspora editors] belong to a new brand of journalism where formal reporting and activism go together. I try to stick to the old school of journalism – I do fair, balanced, objective and impartial reporting. But at the same time, I subscribe to human rights. We’re pro-democracy, we’re activists. We fight against repression, we fight against poverty by fighting corruption. It’s not as if we remain neutral. We’re doing a blend of journalism and activism. (Mesfin Negash, editor of Addis Neger Online, personal interview, 27 August 2010) Yet, as I argue elsewhere (Skjerdal, 2011c), even though the hybrid journalism style thriving in online diaspora environments challenges objectivity norms and journalistic integrity on the operational level, it nonetheless upholds ideals like impartiality and ethical coherence on the normative level. A way to make sense of this discrepancy between ideal and practice in diaspora media-making is to explain it towards the unfortunate conditions for journalistic practice back home. Along this line of thought, the tightly controlled media environment in Ethiopia provokes an uncompromising reporting style in the diaspora, where journalists escape media repression in the homeland. In turn, media makers in the diaspora face a potential dilemma of conflicting loyalties – being committed to professional journalism and political activism simultaneously. Principally, the situation is analogous to the dilemma experienced by journalists in the state media back home in Ethiopia, caught between conflicting commitments to the profession and the regime. 3.5. Summary The Ethiopian media landscape may be described as a polarized state of affairs between private and state media, although nuances within the different media outlets must also be acknowledged. The private media dominate the print publication sector, while the state media dominate broadcasting. Television remains a monopoly of the state, as does telecommunications through Ethio Telecom (formerly Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation). The radio waves are open to private actors, and five private licences have been awarded since 2007, which according to the 2007 broadcasting law are defined as ‘commercial’ 75

‘Ethiopian billionaire wins libel action in UK’, BBC News, 29 July 2011. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14345007

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broadcasters. Critical reporting, however, is not much of a phenomenon in the radio sector, apart from some tendencies in the Addis Ababa-based private station Sheger FM. In the regions, there are an additional eight community radio stations and nine stations run by the publicly-owned mass media agencies. The print media, on the other hand, traditionally constitute a space for critical journalism in Ethiopia, although there is less criticism today than during the 2005 elections and earlier. There are currently 31 operational newspapers in Ethiopia, of which 27 are privately-owned. Most newspapers come out on a weekly basis and are primarily distributed in the capital city Addis Ababa. Lastly, there are two competing news agencies; one private and one government-run. In terms of journalists, there are approximately 1250 full-time employees in the state media and 300 in the private media. Socially speaking, the gap between private and state media journalists appears to be less than it used to be. Many of the new interest associations for journalists attract members from both constituencies. A growing number of journalists have formal education in the profession. The gender imbalance is still highly perceptible in all parts of the media, with female journalists constituting only 14–17% of the work force.

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Chapter 4 Theoretical framework

4.1. Introduction The way that we speak about journalism culture traditionally tends to circumscribe journalists as relating primarily to one community, that is, a professional journalistic community. Thus, theorizing about journalism culture chiefly focuses on issues of how journalistic activity relates to a conceptualization of the profession. Within this paradigm, some of the key issues which have dominated research are the question of whether journalism constitutes a profession, an occupation, a craft, or something else (Aldridge and Evetts, 2003; Singer, 2003; Soloski, 1989; Tumber and Prentoulis, 2005; Tunstall, 1971; Weaver, 2005); and the study of how journalistic values differ across geographical and cultural boundaries (De Beer, 2009; Donsbach and Klett, 1993; Donsbach and Patterson, 2004; Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Herbert, 2001; Löffelholz and Weaver, 2008; Shoemaker and Cohen, 2006; Trappel, Nieminen and Nord, 2011; Weaver and Willnat, 2012). However, journalists are not just members of a professional community. They also belong to a social community, a cultural community, a political community, and so forth. This realization has led scholars of late to suggest alternative ways of treating journalism culture. It has been proposed, for example, that journalists should first and foremost be viewed as members of an interpretive community, emanating from communal interpretations of events and practices rather than through the acknowledgement of agreed professional values (Zelizer, 1993b). Simultaneously, it has been argued that multiculturalism and new media practices do not quite fit in with established journalistic boundaries (Deuze, 2005, 2008). These and similar developments within contemporary media models call for an approach to journalism culture which departs from the traditional professionalization paradigm. 51

A perspective still largely absent in this discussion is research on journalism culture in the context of transitional societies. Such societies – purportedly in a transitional phase ‘towards’ some sort of democracy – are typically characterized by volatile media structures and strong government involvement in communication policy and media operations. For reasons other than in Western societies, interpretations of journalism culture in transitional societies are potentially drawn towards both a traditional professionalization paradigm and an interpretive community paradigm. On the one hand, the significance of professionalization is pertinently emphasized in these contexts, exemplified by the importance of enhancing the professional media environment as one of the chief instruments for democratic development. On the other hand, opting for an alternative definition of the media environment as an interpretive community makes sense given the perpetual lack of a defined professional framework in transitional media societies, as well as the less stringent boundaries between the media and other societal domains. Purportedly, there are thus contradictory interpretations of journalism culture in transitional societies. The classic interpretation, situated in a professionalization paradigm, is challenged by an alternative approach seeing the journalistic community as less formally defined, for example in the model of an interpretive community. Towards this backdrop, the purpose of the present research is to study journalism culture through the case of one particular transitional media society – Ethiopia. For several reasons, Ethiopia provides for a compelling case study of a transitional media environment. The country shares common characteristics of media societies in transition, such as a weak commercial media market and correspondingly strong state control, while at the same time providing for an unusual case because of the nation’s extraordinary economic growth and rise as a political power in East Africa. This implies that journalists in Ethiopia, like in many other transitional societies, are caught in the dilemma of dual allegiance to the profession and to the nation, in addition to further complications caused by compulsion from ethnic groups, political parties, and more. This complexity in the work situation caters for a different perspective on journalism culture than that of an established Western media society. This research explores one particular entry point to study journalism culture, specifically conflicts of loyalties. This choice of research focus stems from the realization that any journalist and media organization in any society, unescapably and continuously, pledge loyalty to various parties, be it to the profession, the nation, the media owner, the self, or various other parties; which in turn has implications for the understanding of journalism culture in that society. The loyalty here referred to is principally informal in nature, and for exactly that reason, all the more important for the fundamental character of journalistic practice. Various expressions of loyalty may stretch from voluntary to compulsive; individual to collective; and so forth, but over time, the loyalties that emerge reflect the dominant character of journalistic belonging in a particular media context. Of special interest in this regard is the point at which different types of loyalties collide, for example when commit52

ment to the nation is seen to be at odds with professional ethics. In such incidents of loyalty conflicts, a dominant loyalty will typically subjugate others, or standards will emerge which serve to ‘regulate’ the conflict. The way loyalty conflicts are negotiated within a journalistic community is therefore a reflection of fundamental attributes of that particular media society, which includes conceptualizations of how the society relates to journalistic professionalism. The aim of this chapter is to formulate the theoretical foundation of the research. The chapter is organized as follows: Firstly, it outlines two competing approaches to journalism culture (4.2). The argument is that the research literature on journalism culture may be read as a contestation between a conventional professionalization paradigm and a more recent interpretive community paradigm, although the latter may not qualify as a paradigm in the original Kuhnian sense of the term (Kuhn, 1962). Having described the broader approaches to journalism culture, I will enter the specific theoretical field which concerns loyalty conflicts in journalistic work (4.3). Two theories are particularly paid attention to, each corresponding to a broader paradigm. The first, ‘social control in the newsroom’, is drawn from the classic professionalization paradigm, while the second, ‘journalists as members of contradicting communities’, pertains to the interpretive community paradigm. In the third part of the chapter, I contextualize the theoretical traditions with reference to research carried out in specific transitional societies (4.4). This part begins by drawing on global research experiences, before focusing in on Africa and arriving at Ethiopia. A summary of relevant research on Ethiopian journalism culture is provided. On the basis of general research on journalism culture in transitional societies as well as specific contributions regarding reporting practices in the Ethiopian state media, the chapter concludes by formulating a problem statement for the research (4.5). 4.2. Two competing paradigms of journalism culture Journalism culture emerges as one of the key underlying themes of journalism sociology research. This for obvious reasons, as journalism culture concerns the fundamental identity of the journalistic community, as it were. Thus, sociological inquiry into journalism from the early beginnings of media research circumscribed media workers as a defined community or society, using analogies such as ‘gatekeepers’ (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; McNelly, 1959; White, 1950) and, later, ‘news manufacturers’ (Cohen and Young, 1973; Fishman, 1980; Schlesinger, 1978; Tuchman, 1978b). Importantly, even if these studies spurred contestation between a selection and a construction approach (Hjarvard, 2012; Zelizer, 2004), they all more or less presupposed that journalism culture transpired in light of a professional conceptualization. Traditional journalism sociology research may therefore be identified as adhering to a dominant paradigm which owes its existence to professionalization discourses. Lately, however, the dominant paradigm has been challenged by an alternative model which holds that journalism culture is constituted primarily from social processes within a commu53

nity rather than through commitments/contestations to professional norms. The alternative model is in reality a collection of various conceptual frameworks, but I will suggest that the model known as the interpretive community framework incorporates a broad range of these approaches. Common to these models is less emphasis on the professional codex as a determinant of journalism culture and correspondingly more emphasis on informal exchanges within the community, as well as a weakening of the boundaries between the professional media environment and other constituents of the public domain. Figure 4.1: Tensions between the professionalization paradigm and the interpretive community paradigm Professionalization paradigm

Interpretive community paradigm

Discourse emphasized

Professional codes

Narratives

Object of analysis

Newsroom

Community

View of journalism culture

Homogeneous

Heterogeneous

View of journalistic expression

Authoritative

Participatory

View of the media

Autonomy

Integration

Figure 4.1 illustrates some of the predominant tensions between the professionalization paradigm, which remains the dominant paradigm in scholarly work concerning journalism culture, and the interpretive community paradigm. The terms in the columns are not to be seen as defined categories, but are markers which portray the inclination of each paradigm on continuous scales. Firstly, there is a standing difference in the discourse emphasized when detecting journalism culture in each of the paradigms. The professionalization paradigm emphasizes professional codes and ethical norms, while the interpretive paradigm is more interested in social narratives that exist within the journalistic community. Secondly, the two research approaches differ in their object of analysis in accordance with their parent paradigm. Research positioned in the professionalization paradigm tends to define the ‘newsroom’ as their prime object of analysis, while interpretive community research sees the ‘community’ as the proper approach for analysing journalistic societies. Thirdly, this leads to a difference in the view of journalism culture when considering social and geographical boundaries. While the professionalization paradigm is likely to concentrate on standards which start off with the assumption that journalism culture is potentially homogeneous and may therefore be measured against various constituents, the interpretive community paradigm presupposes that journalism culture is better termed in the plural form (‘journalism cultures’), and that it constitutes a heterogeneous entity highly dependent on its social circumstance. Interpretive community research therefore tends to be less interested in comparative journalism studies than does professionalization research.

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Fourthly, the two paradigms differ in their view of journalistic expressions. A professionalization approach emphasizes that responsible media organizations adhere to formal codes and conduct, thus demarcating the journalistic community as authoritative with regard to proper media standards. An interpretive community approach on the other hand, situated in a non-exclusivist view of the journalistic profession, regards media-making as a potentially joint public effort where the wider society ought to participate on a par with the professional community. Fifthly and accordingly, the two paradigms differ in their view of the media as public institutions. The professionalization paradigm begins with the premise that modern media institutions are autonomous, while the interpretive community paradigm is more inclined to seeing media institutions as integrated with other public endeavours. Moving from the professionalization paradigm to the interpretive community paradigm may therefore also be seen as a shift from an institutional reading of the media to a communal reading. 4.2.1. The professionalization paradigm Research within the professionalization paradigm has grappled with two broader issues in particular: first, the problem of identifying journalistic professionalism; and second, comparative issues in the global journalism context. The first problem eventually involves the defining of journalistic professionalism, which is not an easy task given the many deficiencies of journalistic activity if compared with the classic disciplines of law, theology and medicine. For example, there is no agreed scope of knowledge that constitutes journalism proper; authorities rarely operate with formal certification for journalists; organizational membership is generally poorly esteemed; journalistic methods are pragmatically oriented and constantly changing; et cetera (Høyer and Lauk, 2003; Josephi, 2009; Tumber and Prentoulis, 2005; Weaver, 2005). However, very few, if any, have claimed that journalism qualifies as a profession in the strict sense, and, as pointed out by one of the pioneers in the field, Jeremy Tunstall (1973, p. 89), neither would law nor medicine if judged against a strict set of criteria. Dismissing the professionalization approach as a misnomer on the basis of a supposedly proper definition of ‘profession’ is therefore not the issue here. Scholars have vacillated between profession, occupation, trade and craft as the main identifier of journalistic activity, but conceptualizations of the ‘professional’ have always remained a benchmark in the discussion. Thus, the emphasis in the research has evolved from survey studies which seek to identify traits of professional journalists (Johnstone et al., 1976; McLeod and Hawley, 1964; Windahl and Rosengren, 1976), via discussions of professional values, notably the objectivity norm, and their function as markers and guardians of the occupation (Golding and Elliot, 1979; Hackett, 1984; Schudson, 2001; Tuchman, 1972), to contemporary contributions which interrogate how changes in media technology impact on professional culture (Bardoel, 1996; Wiik, 2009; Witschge and Nygren, 2009). David Weaver and Martin Löffelholz (2008) note that recent years have seen a return to systematic research on journalism practitioners after a 55

long period of due weight on studies of media messages, audiences, uses and effects. Thus, the focus on professionalism is by no means passé in journalism research. The second broad research theme within the professionalization paradigm has concentrated on occupational similarities and differences across cultures. Studies within this area are inclined to hypothesize a correlation between consistent standards in the global news environment and a high degree of professionalism. A case in point is one of the first broad comparative studies conducted in the late 1980s with data from journalism students in 22 countries, which proposed that a sign of true professionalization within the journalistic environment would be common normative ideals across national and cultural boundaries (Splichal and Sparks, 1994). The researchers did indeed find indicators of shared professional norms throughout the researched countries, although their conclusion has later been contested by research undertakings which instead have laid emphasis on the nuances between the journalistic societies under scrutiny. This is the case not least with David Weaver’s (1998) landmark Global Journalist survey, which found significant differences in journalistic values even among assumingly comparable Western media societies76. Illustratively, 74% of the surveyed German journalists agreed that reporting objectively is an ‘extremely’ or ‘very’ important part of their work, compared with only 30% of British journalists (survey data collected by Henningham and Delano, 1998; and Weischenberg et al., 1998). Another major comparative research undertaking within the area that deserves mention is the on-going Worlds of Journalism Study. The first phase of the study which was conducted in 2007–09 and comprised 18 countries found that journalism cultures across the world are both homogenizing and heterogenizing, depending on the subject in focus. With regard to role perceptions, for example, journalists across the globe were found to cherish ideals of detachment and critical reporting, while at the same time separating on the topic of interventionism. Overall, journalists from Western societies were found to reject the idea that journalism has a mandate to promote social change (an interventionist ideal), in contrast to journalists from transitional societies who believe that journalists have a lasting obligation to stay socially committed. Besides its dual focus on homogenization and heterogenization in global journalism, the Worlds of Journalism Study (WJS) is representational of recent developments in journalism research in its use of the concept journalism culture to describe journalistic communities (cf. Brüggemann, 2011; Hanusch, 2009). The concept is more open-ended than traditional terminology applied in occupational and professional theory, and perhaps it needs to be, as the concerned study is prepared to include alternative reporting practices such as development journalism, peace journalism and public journalism (Hanitzsch, 2007). The journalism culture concept infers that journalism is a meaning-based discipline, as ‘culture’ may be seen 76

A revised version of the Global Journalist survey will be published in 2012, after the completion of this dissertation (Weaver and Willnat, 2012). Unfortunately, the African continent is still not represented among the 33 nations covered in the survey.

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as a system of meanings. At the same time, however, the professionalization concept is not left behind. In WJS’ initial research design, the ‘ideology of professionalism’ (Hanitzsch, 2007, p. 372) is utilized to describe a particular journalism culture associated with Western liberal democracies, emphasizing values such as objectivity, neutrality, fairness and impartiality in reporting. In the later research results, however, the professionalization concept appears to have gained some more universal application in the sense that the phrase is not exclusively tied to a Western news culture, and journalists could potentially subscribe to «different professional values in different countries» (Hanitzsch et al., 2011, p. 276; cf. Hanitzsch, 2011). Nevertheless, in one of its conclusions, the study suggests that certain journalistic values have reached such agreement on a cross-national scale that it makes sense to speak of a ‘universal professional identity’ (p. 287). In a wider perspective, then, one observes that research within the professionalization paradigm has been through different phases with different emphases. Early studies focused on role perceptions and profiles of journalists in the national environment, notably in the US. Research on the national journalistic environment has not at all diminished – it is indeed flourishing like never before, all across the world, and with the aid of various methodologies – but such studies are today accompanied by comparative efforts across nations and continents as well. This has led to a new opportunity to discuss fundamental issues of journalism culture, such as whether the identity of a media worker is primarily tied to the profession or to the local environment. As noted by Levi Obijiofor and Folker Hanusch (2011, p. 51), the rise in studies from the global South has spawned an interest in the option that cultural differences may account for some of the disparities in professional role perceptions between journalists across nations. Specific case studies support this hypothesis. A survey of political journalists in four European countries, for example, found that professional role perceptions vary more across countries than within countries (Van Dalen et al., 2012). This, in conjunction with growing acceptance of the ‘journalism culture’ conception, is arguably an indication of increasing interest in an alternative perspective on journalistic identity. 4.2.2. The interpretive community paradigm The interpretive community paradigm, as used in this context, combines various approaches to journalism culture which encounter the classic – and still dominant – professionalization paradigm. The paradigm begins with the interpretive community theory (Zelizer, 1993b), but emerges as a broader paradigm when seen together with a cluster of related theories that approach journalism culture more widely than through professionalization issues alone. As explained earlier (4.2), the approaches brought together under this label converge in their emphasis on narratives, community, heterogeneity, participation and integration as identifiers in the analysis. However, the various theories in the cluster are driven by different motivations and may not wholly subscribe to each of the five markers. The most pertinent example is Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of the journalistic field, which springs forth from general sociology 57

theory but is not primarily motivated by an aim to dissect journalism culture as such. I have still opted to include the theory in this section because of its emphasis on unwritten norms (doxa) within the journalistic field, offering an alternative way to understand journalism culture than that of the professionalization paradigm. In this respect, there is an obvious familiarity between Bourdieu’s field theory and the interpretive community model. In general, both field theory and other approaches within the interpretive community paradigm seek to explain tacit arrangements which appear to regulate journalism culture beyond palpable professional rules and norms. Originally, the interpretive community concept grew out of literary studies but soon became popular across the scholarly disciplines. The term itself was coined by Stanley Fish (1980) as a way to explain how the meaning in a literary text does not rest with the text itself, but rather with the reading community, i.e. the interpretive community. The concept was readily applicable in for example sociology and anthropology to describe how meaning and mutual readings emerged within a group. Similarly, in media reception studies the concept gained momentum as an analytic framework which rejected the notion of the passive consumer and gave the audience authority over the mediated text (Lindlof, 1988). Consequently, the theory has been criticized for being overoptimistic on behalf of audience ‘resistance’ (Carragee, 1990) and for misleadingly inferring an empty text before it is filled with meaning by the audience (Jensen, 2012, p. 183). In relation to journalism culture, however, the interpretive community model is used not in the context of audience reception, but to describe how the journalistic society constructs and maintains a preferred discourse of the profession through mutual interpretations of events crucial for journalistic work. The theory of journalists as interpretive communities owes existence particularly to Barbie Zelizer’s (1992a, 1992b, 1993b) studies of journalistic authority in the US American media. Studying major events in the nation’s history, Zelizer found that narratives about these events in the newsroom served to produce and reproduce journalistic authority. Some stories, like Watergate, became the source of positive narratives about journalistic authority, while others, like the fallacious coverage of McCarthyism, had the adverse function, though still reinforcing an account of ‘good journalism’. The importance of this approach lies in the assertion that informal discourse in the newsroom (narratives) plays a prime role in shaping journalism culture. Critiquing the traditional professionalization approach, Zelizer notes that storytelling practices and informal networking have largely been ignored in research on journalistic authority. Indeed, according to Zelizer (1993b, p. 221), professional metaphors serve as a method to «conceal the constructed nature» of journalistic work. In the eyes of the quoted researcher, then, various traditional demarcations, such as professional associations, are only of limited relevance for a practitioner’s occupation like journalism. Seeing journalists as an interpretive community has become an increasingly common approach in journalism research. The concept provides for an alternative to the professional58

ization paradigm to illuminate reporting practices which deviate from the classic neutralistobjectivist norm, for example in the case of nationalistic coverage within the terrorism/antiterrorism theme (Borden, 2005; Nossek and Berkowitz, 2006; Parameswaran, 2006). The framework has proven to be fruitful when conceptualizing self-images of reporting communities that are more or less peripheral to hard-hitting news journalism, such as the arts journalism environment, which, purportedly, has a «complicated relationship to the strategic ritual of objectivity» (Harries and Wahl-Jørgensen, 2007). Moreover, the interpretive community concept has been applied in the study of j-blogs (journalism blogs) which operate in a semi-professional domain outside of established media houses (Chu, 2012; Lin, G., 2010). Further out on the fringes of traditional journalistic activity, citizen journalists have been identified as an ‘informal interpretive community’, though case studies conclude that they have not attained «full membership in [the] interpretive journalistic community» (Robinson and DeShano, 2011, p. 980). The interpretive community paradigm is relevant not only for the analysis of semiprofessional and alternative journalistic practices, however. The paradigm is increasingly applied to journalism cultures in established news organizations as well, both in Western and non-Western societies. In transitional contexts, the interpretive community paradigm opens up for a new conceptualization of multidimensional journalism culture – as illustrated by case studies of China (Pan, 2000; Pan and Chan, 2003), the Arab countries (Mellor, 2008, 2009), Romania (Larssen, 2010) and Venezuela (Manzella and Yacher, 2010), to name but a few examples. Drawing on South African experiences, Anthea Garman (2005) suggests that the interpretive community paradigm ought to replace the professionalization paradigm as a framework for teaching journalism in a media context in change. The interpretive community model has also created a foundation for further theorizing of journalism culture and journalistic processes. For example, the model has become a close ally of ‘paradigm repair’ theory, which holds that there are tacit mechanisms within journalism culture that serve to safeguard the paradigm of objectivity when threatened by deviant media agents (Berkowitz, 2000; Cecil, 2002; Zandberg and Neiger, 2005). Similarly, the interpretive community is crucial in the emerging field of memory studies when theorizing about the role of journalists and media institutions as manufacturers of collective public memory (Carlson, 2007; Kitch, 2008; Zandberg, 2010; Zelizer, 2008b). The interpretive community paradigm resonates with key aspects of Bourdieu’s field theory. Although field theory will not be applied in the analysis of the current research findings, the theory is mentioned here since it is increasingly used in studies of journalism culture and because it has a familiarity with the interpretive community model. Bourdieu’s (1993, 2005) field concept circumscribes journalism as an semi-autonomous field subordinate to the broader field of cultural production. Within their field, journalists possess certain cultural capitals which are unique to their profession: competence, experience, skills, and so forth. The relative value of the journalistic field is thus dependent on the value of these non59

fiscal capitals, which also have a bearing on the power relation between the journalistic field and other social fields, including the field of power. Unfortunately, according to Bourdieu (2005), the journalistic field has lost power to other social fields, notably the economic field, due to the dominance of fiscal capital in the market-oriented society. However, in order to conceptualize a field like journalism, it is essential to look to its doxa and habitus as well (Bourdieu, 1998). Doxa are the unspoken, taken for granted rules that exist within society, and within each field. These are in many ways the defining boundaries of the journalistic field, because anyone who wants to be a member, must internalize the rules. News values, for example, represent various types of doxa and can be described as the ‘journalistic gut feeling’, in the words of Ida Schultz (2007). The sum of the socially adopted rules within a field represents the community’s habitus, which is understood in field analysis as bridging social agency and structure. Bourdieu’s field theory and the interpretive community model are rarely used in conjunction, but their kinship is evident in at least three areas when it comes to issues of journalism culture. Firstly, both approaches put emphasis on informal discourses when describing the journalistic community/field. Field theory focuses on self-evident presuppositions of social groups, theorized through doxa and habitus, while the interpretive community model relatedly focuses on social narratives. Secondly, the two approaches converge in their relatively flexible approach to the journalistic society as either field or community rather than a professional dominion. Thirdly, both approaches are open to a heterogeneous understanding of journalism culture, at least to some extent. Field theory postulates that each field is relational to other social fields in the particular society, and they are subject to change. Likewise, the interpretive community model holds that each particular journalistic community is a product of that community’s articulation of occupational values in the societal context. Thus, both approaches demand an inductive method of study; that is, an understanding of a particular journalism culture must emanate from empirical field studies rather than through a predetermined formula. Along these lines, Noha Mellor (2008), in a rare combination of the two approaches, proposes that Arab journalism should be regarded both as a social field and as a product of an interpretive community. Social field theory, Mellor contends, would provide a perspective on the cultural capital which Arab journalists actually possess in their role as cultural intermediaries (Bourdieu, 1984), while the interpretive community model would shed light on how the journalists perceive their professional identity. This is not to suggest, however, that the two approaches are not without differences or potential shortcomings. Their differences are aptly manifest in their raison d’être. Field theory begins as a theory which explains power relations between the grand social domains. In this respect, the journalistic field is interdependent with other fields and is increasingly, according to Bourdieu, becoming subordinate to other, more dominant fields. The interpretive community model, on the other hand, lends more authority to the journalistic community itself when it comes to defining its own identity. Indeed, this is precisely the reason 60

for Michael Schudson and Chris Anderson’s (2009) critical view of the interpretive community model. In their view, the cultural authority that the model bestows on the journalistic society is «important, but incomplete» (Schudson and Anderson, 2009, p. 97). There is additionally a need for a theory which explains how the journalistic community operates in response to other social agents. Bourdieu’s theory offers such a perspective, but has other limitations. Chris Atton (2002), for one, is highly critical of field theory’s potential to include radical and alternative media practices. He maintains that the theory is «too undifferentiated, too monolithic» (Atton, 2002, p. 30) to capture the multidimensionality of the many media expressions that prosper in contemporary media culture. Risto Kunelius and Laura Ruusunoksa (2008), on their part, argue that field theory is inclined to portray the journalistic field as overly autonomous from broader systems of meaning (cf. Schudson, 2005). They therefore propose ‘professional imagination’ (cf. Taylor, 2004) as an additional perspective. This imagination has a double function: It leaves journalists and media leaders with a false perception of the impeccability of traditional media work; but even more importantly, it materializes as a ‘sacred belief’ that actually stands out as a great motivating force for the journalistic community (Kunelius and Ruusunoksa, 2008, p. 676). Although a rather pessimistic view of journalistic self-knowledge, the professional imagination concept echoes the interpretive community model in its emphasis on social discourse as a key to journalism culture. In summary, scholars of late have been eager to define theoretical approaches to journalism culture which challenge the professionalization paradigm. The approaches diverge in their purpose and disciplinary heritage, but they converge in their search for a more holistic model for journalism culture, taking into consideration the multiplicity of journalistic experiences in contemporary society. Some of the approaches are more hostile to the professionalization paradigm than others. Among the most radical positions is that of John Hartley (2008), who argues for journalism as a ‘human right’, implying that everyone may demand ownership to the journalistic discipline without being hampered by professional demarcations. Consequently, Hartley (2008, p. 46) argues that «there can be no theory of journalism based on its professional production» (italics in original). This treatment of journalism from a cultural studies perspective is also representational of the multi-disciplinary turn in journalism and media research (cf. Zelizer 1993a, 2004, 2008a). Certainly, there has been a cultural turn in journalism sociology lately, although professionalization discourses still dominate reports, manuals and major research undertakings. 4.3. The journalistic community and loyalty conflicts Having argued for two major paradigms in contemporary scholarship concerning journalism culture, I will proceed to the subordinate level, focusing on specific theory. The purpose at this juncture is to isolate an area which crystallizes key differences between major approaches to journalism culture, while at the same time circumscribing a research topic which is assumed to carry particular relevance for the context of journalism in a transitional society 61

like Ethiopia. To this end I have chosen to concentrate on loyalty conflicts, a subject frequently encountered in journalistic practice, occasionally also addressed by media researchers. Loyalty conflicts are inherent to journalistic practice. News organizations and journalists all across the globe face, from time to time, and sometimes continuously, the dilemma of discord over loyalty. This comes as a result of the inescapable condition that journalists encounter commitments of contradictory nature in their work. On the most basic level, there exists a commitment to the media institution and its owner. This commitment, however, may sometimes run into conflict with another commitment, that of the profession. The prime example would be that of the profit-seeking media institution permanently in tension with serious journalistic work which demands time and resources. There are, nonetheless, several other potential commitments involved in addition to these two. One would be specific interests of the individual journalist, as in the example of a personal dedication to saving the natural environment. To a large extent, such a genuine interest in a specialized subject area would be considered beneficial for a reporting community, as it generates knowledge and source networks. However, it may also come into conflict with the professional commitment if the journalist, in her passion for the natural environment, becomes less concerned with treating other subject areas on an ethically coherent basis, or begins to make shortcuts in order to get the message of the ailing environment through. Another vital commitment is the relationship with sources, which could instigate a variety of tensions with other work obligations. Then there are commitments to the audience, to the self, and more. At one point, a commitment materializes as a loyalty. Loyalty, as defined in this research, is a lasting commitment which is tolerable to discomfort. The definition is inspired by Josiah Royce’s ‘Philosophy of loyalty’, which particularly emphasizes the unselfish attitude of loyalty. According to Royce (1908), a person’s loyalty is «larger than the private self»; «external to his purely individual will» (p. 51). For the present study, it is important to highlight the durable character of loyalty, because that is where it becomes a potentially significant influence in journalistic work. A felt commitment to offer an occasional passenger a ride with an institutional vehicle is not to be considered a loyalty in this sense (unless the service becomes systematic and influential). Also, a loyalty bond is potentially unrewarding. Thus, the person or group expressing the loyalty must expect to sustain bonds with the beneficiary even though it means some degree of discomfort, albeit in the long run the loyalty is of course often believed to repay in one way or the other. It is the supposition of this particular research that loyalty conflicts provide an entry point to apprehend journalism culture in the Ethiopian state media. This outlook begins with the deduction that journalists working in the Ethiopian state media are expected to display a high degree of ownership commitment, as indicated by various studies (Amanuel, 2006; Birhanu, 2006, 2009; Daniel, 2009; Dejene, 2010; Engdawork, 2011; EPA, 2008; Getachew, 2006; Haile-Gebriel, 2006; Hailemarkos, 2006; Skjerdal, 2008, 2010b, 2011b; Solomon H., 2006; Ward, 2010). The commitment to the owner (which may be described as the state, the 62

government, the ruling party, or the media institution) is potentially in conflict with the commitment to the profession. While a typical Western media environment has established codes and norms which serve to regulate this conflict, the media in a transitional society like Ethiopia are exposed to a variety of influences in the ‘regulation’, both on formal and informal level. With this in mind, it becomes intriguing to examine the articulations of occupational identities among the journalists as potentially conflicting commitments, and, eventually, a conflict of loyalties. Throughout media research history, there have been various endeavours to theorize loyalty conflicts within journalism. Two of these have been chosen for closer treatment in the present study, each with roots in one of the broader research paradigms presented earlier. The first theory to be recaptured, ‘social control in the newsroom’ (Breed, 1952, 1955), is regarded as one of the seminal works of early journalism sociology. Situated in a 1950s functionalist tradition, Breed’s theory assumes a classic professionalization discourse. Secondly, a much more recent approach, ‘journalists as members of contradicting communities’ (Zandberg and Neiger, 2005), offers a perspective on the dilemma facing media practitioners who operate in national crisis situations. The latter theory borrows its terminology and premise from the interpretive community paradigm. Both theories, nevertheless, emanate from the realization that journalists and journalistic communities encounter competing loyalties in their work situation, and that professional and occupational conventions offer no definite solution to this experience of conflict. 4.3.1. ‘Social control in the newsroom’ A classic theory of loyalty conflicts for journalists, Warren Breed’s (1952, 1955) concept of social control in the newsroom seeks to explain how a media owner’s ideological policy pervades a media organization even though many of its journalists personally disagree with the policy. Not only that; the proprietor’s policy also frequently comes into conflict with professional standards. On the basis of interviews with approximately 120 ‘newsmen’ (reporters, editors and media managers) from 32 American newspapers, Breed concluded that six factors in particular lead to policy allegiance and conformity in the newsroom. Firstly, institutional authority and the risk of sanctions compel journalists to adhere to the newspaper’s policy, even though actual cases of such sanctions are rare. Secondly, esteem for veteran journalists and superiors has much the same effect. Thirdly, reporters comply with policy in order to secure a future career. Fourthly, professional associations do not really engage in discussions over media organizations’ policies but are preoccupied with other issues such as salary increments. Fifthly, journalists generally like their work. They get to go to interesting events and experience the newsroom as a «friendly, first-namish place» (Breed, 1955, p. 330– 331) with short distance to executives. This serves to reduce disagreements over policy. Sixthly, journalists are so preoccupied with news production and making good stories that the professional activity becomes a cherished value in itself and totally overshadows the felt 63

need to oppose policy. All in all, according to Breed, these factors serve to conform the attitudes of the journalists with the result that the media organization’s policy is reinforced and reproduced both within the newsroom and in the stories that the journalists produce. Breed encapsulates the subtly on-going processes as mechanisms of ‘social control’ in the newsroom. Breed acknowledges, however, that there are instances in which individual journalists are able to deviate from the conformity of the newsroom and thereby challenge the owner’s policy. This is possible because the nature of the journalistic work leaves reporters with a considerable degree of autonomy. Reporters can decide whom to interview and whom to ignore, for example. Chances of deviation are found to be greater for senior reporters and within stories emerging from self-generated ideas. There could even be cases of smart reporters who plant stories through colleagues or competing media outlets, thus bypassing policy (Breed, 1955, p. 333). There are in other words opportunities for nonconformity in the newsroom. Breed concludes, however, that these opportunities are practised only in exceptional cases and that the general rule is that media workers reinforce the publisher’s policy rather than confront it. In terms of ideological heritage, ‘social control in the newsroom’ builds on sociological functionalist terminology, particularly rooted in Robert K. Merton’s (1949) broader structural functionalist framework. In Merton’s conception, social structure is maintained through various types of culturally desired goals. Within this system, social members attain intrinsic and extrinsic gratification through abiding by social rules and achieving personal goals. However, the social structure also calls for adaptations that may contradict individual aspirations. This is at the core of Merton’s (1938) ‘strain theory’. Conformity is described as the mildest form of adaptation, holding that social members accept the goals of society even though it means postponing individual aspirations. Deviant behaviour, on the other hand, takes place when individuals reject both society’s cultural goals and the legitimate means for achieving them. The social equilibrium is thus challenged. In adopting the structural functionalist framework to newsroom sociology, Breed (1952, 1955) focuses mainly on journalists’ tendency to conformity, but also on the potential for deviant behaviour. The possibility for deviant behaviour, which is not to be understood as a type of rebellion in the newsroom but rather as a refusal of allowing the publisher’s policy uncritically dominate the media production, rests to a large extent with the professional culture. However, in Breed’s analysis, the role of the professional codes is far too weak to have a notable impact on policy decisions. Breed (1955) concludes that the ultimate power over policy lies with the publisher, though intriguingly enough, the ownership dominance would not be possible without the assistance of the journalists themselves. The role of the professional culture in maintaining policy becomes the main reason for placing the theory of social control in the newsroom within the professionalization paradigm as described in this study. Although Breed’s research approach can be considered 64

to be wide open for a more inclusive interpretation of journalism culture, he powerfully refers to the professional environment as the nexus for maintaining social control. Breed finds, however, that learning professional norms is not primarily a matter of reading a journalism primer or studying the editorial code, but should rather be seen as a process of socialization into the professional culture of the news organization. The theory of social control in the newsroom has subsequently attracted wide attention within media research for its conceptualization of the socialization processes which supposedly take place within the professional journalistic community. This, rather than the equally important aspect of the theory which deals with the loyalty conflict that journalists face vis-à-vis their owners, indeed represents the main application of social control in the newsroom in subsequent research. To exemplify, the theory has been used as part of an argument to demonstrate how journalists in Hong Kong adopt self-censorship much the same way as Breed portrays the subtle approval of editorial norms in the newsroom (Lee and Chan, 2009); to explain how international correspondents in the Middle East conform to organizational policies (Ibrahim, 2003); and to describe how journalists fortify a professional culture in order to resist the threat of new media technology (Ruggiero, 2004). Geographically speaking, the theory has been applied not only in Western media societies, but in cultures as diverse as Nigeria (Utomi, 1981); Kenya (Ogongo-Ogongo’a and White, 2008); Nepal (Ramaprasad, 2005); and Singapore (Ramaprasad and Ong, 1990), to name but a few examples. The seemingly plain assumptions of the social control in the newsroom concept has also led to dismissal of the theory on false grounds. It has been claimed, for example, that Breed declared that editors «asserted a fairly straightforward control over reporters» (DarlingWolf, 1997, p. 80). Quite the contrary, Breed (1952, 1955) describes how the proprietor’s authority over the newsroom is all but straightforward. Instead, Breed depicts a highly refined form of control which is indeed perpetuated by the journalists themselves. The popularity of social control in the newsroom theory could also be attributed to the fact that it remains one of the few frameworks which theorize the conflict between journalists and owners in media organizations, as pointed out by Stephen D. Reese and Jane Ballinger (2001, p. 652). The tensions between journalists and superiors were never really high on the agenda in early journalism sociology, and Breed’s study remained largely unchallenged during the time. Moreover, as journalism sociology research progressed in the decades that followed, the main focus shifted to news production processes and the media organizations’ ideological role in society (Epstein, 1973; Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1979; Schlesinger, 1978; Tuchman, 1978b; cf. Zelizer’s so-called ‘mid-period of sociological inquiry into journalism’; Zelizer, 2004). Internal conflicts within the newsroom remained less emphasized areas in the research, with the result that Breed’s social control theory stayed largely uncontested within its core focus area. Social control in the newsroom theory, nevertheless, has a limited perspective on the types of loyalty conflicts that journalists experience. The theory confines its attention to the 65

tensions arising along the journalist vs. media owner axis, which quite correctly was the interest area of Breed as he sought to find out how ownership policy was internalized among journalists. However, as argued above (4.3), this axis represents only one of several potent loyalty dimensions for journalists. The loyalty to a national community and its impact on journalistic practice, for example, is not a perspective in Breed’s original contribution; nor are other types of conflicts of interests which could eventually materialize as ‘divided loyalties’ (Foreman, 2010, p. 137). A few more recent contributions, however, bring the discussion of loyalty conflicts a step further by introducing multiple dimensions to analysing the pressures that journalists face in their work. One notable contribution along this line is a theory based on a case study of journalists in Israel/Palestine who find themselves caught between the two different communities of the nation and the profession (Zandberg and Neiger, 2005). 4.3.2. ‘Journalists as members of contradicting communities’ While Warren Breed in 1955 indirectly queried ‘How do journalists deal with ownership loyalty?’, Eyal Zandberg and Motti Neiger (2005) 50 years later posed the related question, ‘How do journalists deal with national loyalty?’. Realizing that journalists belong to two communities simultaneously, a professional and a national-cultural one, Zandberg and Neiger set out to assess the negotiation of the two loyalties under special circumstances. The contribution looks at the coverage of the Al-Aksa intifada in the Israeli media in late September/early October 2000. The researchers found that the journalists, all of whom were JewishIsraelis, made a sudden shift in their loyalty when violent riots broke out among Arab citizens of Israel following the outbreak of the second intifada in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in late September 2000. The protests led to immediate confusion and uncertainty among the Jewish-Israeli population, apparently threatening the very existence of the Israeli state. The newsrooms were no exception, and the journalists markedly shifted from a standard professional loyalty emphasizing factuality and objectivity, to a national loyalty emphasizing patriotism and favouritism. After some five days of patriotic reporting, however, the journalists shifted back to a professional mode and began to report in a more objective manner. Zandberg and Neiger (2005, p. 138) explain this as a case of ‘paradigm repair’ (cf. Berkowitz, 2000), whereby the journalists restore what they consider as the genuine and responsible form of journalism. Michael Schudson (2002) suggests a similar type of restoration of professional journalism ideals among American journalists occurring two and a half weeks after the September 11 attacks. The paradigm repair procedure thus rationalizes factual and objective reporting as the proper journalistic style, while patriotic journalism stands out as exceptional. In explaining how journalists manage to cope with the grave contradiction of paying allegiance to both the nation and the profession, Zandberg and Neiger suggest that the two loyalties are actually not coexistent. The journalists circumvent identity crisis because «they are never in a

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situation of being loyal to the two communities at the same time» (Zandberg and Neiger, 2005, p. 138). As indicated by its title, the theory of journalists as members of contradicting communities adheres to the interpretive community paradigm. Central to Zandberg and Neiger’s comprehension of the journalistic community is seeing the professional identity as fluid and unstable. This entails, for example, that journalists can move between different loyalties such as nation and profession without, in the view of Zandberg and Neiger, encountering an identity crisis. This also implies that the researchers find traditional descriptions of the profession inapt. They prefer a wider take on journalism culture. Rather than perceiving reality from a «distant, professional view», journalists cannot escape that they are «always members of their cultural and national communities» as well (Zandberg and Neiger, 2005, p. 139). In a later study, the researchers detect a similar type of dual loyalty in journalistic criticism, where journalists are found to vacillate between loyalty to the profession and loyalty to the establishment (Neiger et al., 2010). The theory of journalists as members of contradicting communities demonstrates how journalistic professionalism might be challenged in a crisis situation, thus connecting to the growing body of post-9/11 literature focusing on changing journalistic ideals and practices in an age of risks and threats (e.g. Cottle, 2006; Freedman and Thussu, 2012; Kivikuru and Nord, 2009; Nohrstedt, 2010; Zelizer and Allan, 2002). At the same time, the theory represents a broadening of the research field because it emanates from a study conducted in a society located on the periphery of the Western media sphere. In line with the opening argument of this chapter, the theory could thus shed new light on journalistic identity by bringing in perspectives different from those which informed theories of the professionalization and interpretive community paradigms in the first place. As a means of demonstrating the relevance of these theories for the Ethiopian context, I will therefore continue by drawing attention to selected perspectives on journalism culture in transitional societies. 4.4. Journalism culture in transitional societies As already indicated, the leading research literature both within the professionalization paradigm and the interpretive community paradigm emanates from a Western context. Indeed, it is not uncommon for the literature to treat Western approaches to journalistic professionalism as if they assume universal application. There has been growing attention, however, on the question of journalism culture in non-Western societies, particularly in relation to social and political transformation (Curran and Park, 2000; Josephi, 2005, 2008; Wasserman, 2009). Researchers point to conditions in transitional societies that becloud the liberal-democratic premises of a free media environment. In Kosovo, for example, past experiences of war, threats, economic hardship and suffering call for an application of risk theory in the analysis of journalism culture (Andresen, 2009; Paterson et al., 2012). In China, contemporary appropriations of Confucian philosophy arguably have an impact on journalistic values that 67

materialize in a literati reporting style which serves as an alternative to both Western professionalism and party journalism (Lee, 2005; Lin, F., 2010; Zhao, 2012). In various African and Asian societies, the entrenched phenomenon of brown envelopes, i.e. small monetary incentives offered to reporters for coverage, has an impact on media practice (Ristow, 2010; Skjerdal, 2010c). These are but some of the ways in which local conditions have a bearing on journalistic work, and, perhaps, more profoundly on journalism culture as well. Transitional contexts accordingly provide additional perspectives on loyalty conflicts. The typical conflict arises from the double duty paid to the profession and to the government or ruling party. Loyalty to authorities has often led to submissive journalistic forms, such as ‘lapdog journalism’ in Latin America (Alves, 2005; Rockwell, 2009) and ‘Afghanistanism’ in the Arab media (i.e. reporting critically on foreign issues while ignoring domestic problems; Figenschou, 2010; Pintak and Ginges, 2009). ‘Development journalism’, especially pursued in African and Asian media environments, has similarly prompted journalists’ loyalty to national development (Musa and Domatob, 2007; Skjerdal, 2011b). Nevertheless, a number of research undertakings conducted within transitional contexts emphasize that journalists find ways to maintain a professional loyalty as well. In the late Soviet Union, media practitioners balanced their commitment to the state with various silent opposition forms which served as ‘survival’ mechanisms for the profession. Epp Lauk demonstrates this phenomenon by means of resistant Estonian journalists who parted into three groups: cynical conformists who ridiculed the official ideology within the limits of acceptable criticism; culturally responsible journalists who exercised dissent in the media ‘between the lines’; and a large group of journalists who preferred to avoid problematic areas by adhering to apolitical topics and staying personally detached from controversy in the media content (Lauk, 1996, 2005; Lauk and Kreegipuu, 2010). In order to withstand the ensuing role ambiguity, journalists are found to develop various pragmatic strategies, one of which is self-censorship (Lee and Chan, 2009; Simons and Strovsky, 2006). These enigmas pertaining to journalism culture in transitional societies may all be seen as responses to the dilemma of loyalty conflicts. A key contribution from African media scholarship in this regard is the question of primary allegiance for media workers, often approached as an issue of personal identity. The discussion typically concerns whether an African journalist’s main belonging is to the profession or to Africanity. Before turning to a review of specific research on journalism culture in the Ethiopian context, I will therefore contextualize the research area by encapsulating the identity discussion in African journalism. 4.4.1. The identity issue in African journalism The question of identity in African journalism has vast philosophical and ideological implications. It concerns the question of the ultimate commitment for a journalist: Should it be to the profession or to the culture? The two conflicting positions in the debate may be 68

illustrated by two prominent actors who each within their arena has played a key role in the African media debate. The first position is advocated by Christine Qunta, former deputy chairperson of the board of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). In her view, African journalists cannot and should not escape the fact that they are Africans. Qunta maintains that «African journalists are Africans before they are journalists»77. To her, much of today’s African media practice is in actuality unsolicited reproductions of a colonial mindset. Qunta makes a call for a distinct African journalism philosophy which involves patriotic commitment to a pan-African agenda. This position stands in immense contrast to that of Joe Kadhi, former editor-in-chief of Kenya’s critical newspaper The Daily Nation. According to Kadhi (quoted in Skjerdal, 2011d, p. 44), «there is no such thing as African journalism». For Kadhi, advocating a unique African journalism philosophy is wrong because it infers the loss of an independent press. Instead, Kadhi argues strongly for upholding the fourth estate as a universal press standard (Kadhi, 1999; Kadhi and Rutten, 2001). In-between these two positions, there are scholars who acknowledge general journalistic values while maintaining an African mentality. Francis B. Nyamnjoh (2005) advocates this position when regretting the lack of professionalism in much of the contemporary African media while simultaneously upholding Africanness as an important quality of local media work. Importantly, however, the type of Africanness Nyamnjoh (2005) speaks of is a «negotiated idea of Africanness» (p. 92), recognizing that being African is «not a static or frozen state of existence, but a dynamic identity» (p. 91). Nyamnjoh here shares the criticism raised against cultural essentialist approaches by other key African media scholars (Banda, 2009b; Fourie, 2008a, 2008b, 2011; Strelitz, 2004, 2005; Tomaselli, 2009, 2011; Wasserman, 2011). However, as I argue elsewhere (Skjerdal, 2013b), there are ample cases of journalistic styles specifically emanating from African media practice which are less fixed to a particular culture, such as various frameworks belonging to the journalism for social change paradigm, including liberation journalism (Nyamnjoh, 2011), emancipatory journalism (Banda, 2009a), and radical journalism (Pinnock, 2007). In addition, proposed African journalism models should not be taken as either culturally essentialist or relativist. They are usually situated on a spectrum between the two extremes, and sometimes even fluctuate between a universal and an exclusivist position. Francis Kasoma’s (1996) Afriethics, for example, though chiefly describing African communal values in essentialist terms, makes a sincere call for professionalization in African media practice. This includes acceptance of media competition and a professional view of «what is right and what is wrong» in journalistic work (Kasoma, 1996, p. 110) – both of which are well-known demands of classic journalism paradigms aspiring to universal application. Empirical quantitative research on African journalism cultures tends to conclude that classic role conceptions associated with a liberal Western journalism discourse, including 77

Christine Qunta in opening address, Highway Africa conference 2005, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa, 12 September 2005

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adherence to objectivity, impartiality and fairness, are highly esteemed in the newsrooms. Among the most quoted studies are a nationwide survey of 101 Ugandan journalists which concludes that the reporters embrace Western journalistic values along the lines of information, entertainment, analysis and interpretation (Mwesige, 2004); and a survey of 139 Tanzanian journalists which similarly found that the respondents rate journalistic functions of accuracy, analysis, investigation and entertainment highly (Ramaprasad, 2001). However, while mainly emphasizing independent reporting, the latter study also brings some support to the idea that the media should portray the country positively and promote development. In this regard, Tanzanian journalists, both those working for the state-owned media and those working for the private media, believe that the state media are better equipped to promote development and help unifying the country than the private media. The researcher explains this as remnants of ujamaa journalism which ceased from official media policy in the late 1980s (Ramaprasad, 2003). Another significant study which points to considerable correlation between Western and non-Western journalists in terms of emphasizing detachment, non-involvement, providing political information and monitoring the government as essential journalistic functions is the Worlds of Journalism Study, which included Uganda as one of the 18 researched countries in its first phase of research (Hanitzsch et al., 2011). However, on a more detailed level, the study also points to differences between role perceptions among Western journalists (represented by Germany, Austria, Switzerland, USA and Australia) and their Ugandan counterparts. Of all 18 populations in the study, the Ugandan journalist constituency is least likely to subscribe to a ‘detached watchdog’ discourse, and correspondingly most likely to support an ‘opportunist facilitator’ role, which entails the endorsement of media/government collaboration in economic development and political transformation processes (Hanitzsch, 2011). Overall, quantitative survey studies of role perceptions within African journalism cultures emphasize independence, objectivity and critical analysis as important journalistic ideals, while also tracing some support for the role of journalists as facilitators of social and economic development. Qualitative studies of African journalism cultures are generally more focused on the peculiarities and complexities of local media practice than are quantitative studies. Thus, Jennifer Hasty’s (2001, 2005, 2006) anthropological inquiry of Ghanaian news culture aptly differentiates between state-owned and private media newsrooms in relation to professional mindsets. Where state journalists draw on development discourses, private media journalists adopt international models associated with democracy and human rights. In both constituencies, however, the researcher notices what could be described as professional contradictions. On the one hand, the journalists are informed by a seemingly universal discourse of liberalism. On the other hand, they operate within «locally determined […] standards of discourse and sociality» which affect daily work routines; relationships with sources; news criteria; and narrative techniques alike (Hasty, 2005, p. 5). The researcher describes the professional negotiations taking place in the journalistic production as a ‘contradictory dialectic’ 70

which involves constant redefinition and reproduction of modernity and locality (Hasty, 2005, p. 158). In a similar analysis, Hayes Mawindi Mabweazara (2011) demonstrates how Zimbabwean journalists are caught between universally acknowledged professional norms and local restraints such as quest for economic survival, political manipulation, and polarization between editorial policies and ownership demands. Mabweazara (2011) concludes that apparently universally accepted standards are not sufficient for the analysis of African media cultures, arguing that «generic Anglo-American ideals of journalism tend to blind researchers» (p. 114). Nevertheless, qualitative research also points to genuine adaptation of a neutralistobjectivist media paradigm within African journalism not necessarily arriving at an indispensable conflict with local premises. For example, a study of professional roles and cultural identities of Sub-Saharan journalists reporting on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) found, for the most part, that the journalists prioritize a commitment to the liberal-professional paradigm above a commitment to Africanity in their work (Kanyegirire, 2007). This despite the journalists’ earnest dedication to both identities. Even though the appearance of a hybrid journalistic identity would seem imminent (Kanyegirire, 2006), the journalists adopt strategies to handle potential conflicts between being an African and behaving as a professional (Kanyegirire, 2011). What all these research undertakings pertinently demonstrate, regardless of their final conclusion, is the extent to which the question of conflicting commitments becomes highly relevant in light of the multifaceted nature of African media practice. The studies thus indirectly underscore the need for further studies along the line of the present project. 4.4.2. Research on Ethiopian journalism culture Before bringing this review of relevant research and theory to a close and arriving at a problem statement, it is necessary to recapitulate vital research conducted in the local Ethiopian context. Although studies focusing specifically on professional identity in Ethiopian journalism remain few in number, there are particularly two studies that should be taken into consideration, both of which emanate from research projects for MA degrees at Addis Ababa University. The first is Birhanu Olana’s (2006, 2009) study of the professional orientation of 92 journalists in Ethiopian media houses of different ownership. The research concludes that the journalists are generally professionally oriented in their work, implying that they chose the occupation willingly in the first place and continue to cherish the professional aspects of their work more than the material aspects. At the same time, however, the survey part of the study detects low professional pride among the journalists vis-àvis the local society. A total of 66% of the surveyed journalists claim that the reputation of journalism in Ethiopia is ‘bad’ or ‘not particularly good’ (Birhanu, 2006, p. 88). Even so, only 22% of the respondents want to leave the profession. Moreover, Ethiopian journalists display high esteem for journalism education, indeed significantly higher than similar surveys 71

conducted in Western media societies. A number of the respondents even favoured the idea of formal accreditation of journalists (not practised in Ethiopia), which, according to the appending qualitative interviews, is often justified by a desire to reduce abuses of press freedom (Birhanu, 2006, p. 123). The indication is, in other words, that Ethiopian journalists are generally professionally motivated while at the same time pointing to various types of distress in their work situation. Moreover, collaborating the previously quoted studies from Ghana (Hasty, 2005) and Tanzania (Ramaprasad, 2001), Birhanu identifies differences in the professional attitudes between journalists working for the state media and journalists working for the private media. State media journalists are more favourable to the developmental role of the media, while private media journalists give more value to the adversary role (Birhanu, 2006, 2009). The other significant study of Ethiopian journalism culture to be highlighted here is Amanuel Gebru’s (2006) inquiry of job satisfaction among 134 journalists working in three state media institutions (Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency, Ethiopian Press Agency and Ethiopian News Agency). The study exposed significant levels of dissatisfaction among the employees, with 90% of the research population described as ‘dissatisfied’, 2% as ‘very dissatisfied’, and only 8% as ‘satisfied’. The results concur with those of a later comparative study between a state-owned and a privately owned radio station in Addis Ababa, which found that journalists in the state radio station were notably less satisfied with their work situation than their private counterparts (Sisay, 2011). Amanuel’s (2006) research points to a series of reasons for the low satisfaction levels. These include poor operating conditions (89% very/dissatisfied), low salary levels (88%), missing promotion prospects (87%), lack of training opportunities (85%) and neglect of contingent rewards (83%), the latter of which includes lack of recognition of work efforts. The respondents were relatively better satisfied with supervision and, especially, their relationship with co-workers. Despite the overall dissatisfaction, however, only a small portion of the journalists – 22% – said they had a desire to leave the profession, equalling the findings of the previously referred survey (Birhanu, 2006). In its qualitative analysis, the study of work satisfaction in the state media concludes that journalists connect poor operating conditions with lack of professional freedom and enduring moral discontent. A radio journalist epitomizes this opinion by proclaiming, «I am forced to do what I do not believe in» (Amanuel, 2006, p. 48). Concern with lack of professional freedom in Ethiopian state media organizations is a recurring topic in the local research literature. In particular, the influence of political interference is highlighted as a problem. Studies suggest that the close relationship between state media institutions and the government implies interference by government officials (Solomon H., 2006; Yetnayet, 2010); uncritical treatment of official information (Biniyam, 2006); discriminatory handling of the state media versus the private media when it comes to access to public information (Engdawork, 2011; Getahun, 2006); nepotism in regional state media organizations (Wudneh, 2008); unclear accountability lines (Daniel, 2009); biased election 72

reporting (Haile-Gebriel, 2006; Hailemarkos, 2006; Markos, 2006; Mesfin B., 2006; Simret, 2006; Ward, 2005; Ward 2010; Yosef, 2006); negligence of investigative reporting (Tizita, 2008); silencing of critical voices (FES, 2010; McGill et al., 2007; Solomon A., 2006); suppression of controversial issues (Mesfin A., 2006; Semere, 2010); downplaying of civil society, especially its political side (Setotaw, 2008; Yikunnoamlak, 2008); favouring of public officials and government sources in news coverage (Abebe, 2007; Eden, 2011; Getachew, 2006; Samuel, 2006); self-censorship in the newsroom (Nebiyu, 2009; Skjerdal, 2008, 2010b); as well as censoring of controversial music in state radio (Gezahegn, 2009; cf. Endalkachew, 2011). The political inclination of the state media accordingly has become a common explanation for negative audience attitudes (Abel, 2009; Sahilu, 2008; Zewge, 2007). On this basis, the state media edifice emerges as a domain where professional dilemmas for journalists are highly imminent. 4.5. Problem statement Acknowledging the generally intricate nature of journalistic practice in transitional societies, and realizing the particular constraints of the Ethiopian media situation, the present research project aims to examine how journalists in the Ethiopian state media negotiate the conflict of working as professional journalists while serving an official media institution. As demonstrated above, this condition implies an utterly engrained conflict. The journalist has a moral obligation to the profession, which involves critical reporting on those in power – while simultaneously being obliged to pledge loyalty to the authorities on which they report. A testimony of the presence of the dual duty is found in the editorial policies of Ethiopian state media institutions, which, while stressing various professional ideals, prescribe that the state media have a special obligation to «strengthen the relationship between the government and the public» (ETV editorial policy, 2004, clause 3.2.2; cf. ENA editorial policy, 2003 and EPA editorial policy, 2003). The main aim of the research is thus to analyse how journalists respond to these apparently conflicting commitments. Importantly, referring to professional identity in this regard does not necessarily imply a strict definition of professionalism (cf. 5.5.4). It is vital for the research to maintain an open approach to journalistic professionalism, inviting practitioners themselves to describe professional ideals and standards. By the same token, it is important to ask the journalists of their own view in terms of how they understand the commitment to the state/government as employees of a state media organization. This commitment, as well as impending loyalty conflicts, may of course appear different for different journalists. Thus, in its methodology, the research relies heavily on in-depth conversations with journalists. A total of 67 journalists were interviewed for the study, representing three state media organizations. 31 informants come from Ethiopian Television (ETV), which for several reasons constitutes the most prestigious Ethiopian media institution; 17 come from The Ethiopian Herald, which is the state-owned English-language daily newspaper; and 19 are 73

drawn from Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), the government-controlled wire service. The reasons for choosing these three institutions are outlined in chapter 6, following a discussion of methodology in chapter 5. 4.6. Summary The chapter has argued for a twofold reading of the research literature concerning journalism culture, whereby the professionalization paradigm represents the traditional approach and the interpretive community paradigm represents the more recent, alternative method. While the professionalization paradigm focuses on professional codes; takes the newsroom as the prime object of analysis; tends to favour a homogeneous view of journalism culture; sees journalistic expression as authoritative; and regards the media as autonomous social institutions, the interpretive community paradigm focuses on journalistic narratives; takes the community as the prime object of analysis; tends to favour a heterogeneous view of journalism culture; sees journalistic expression as participatory; and regards the media as integrated with other communication forms. Each of two paradigms might be exemplified with a principal theory from the research: While the theory of ‘social control in the newsroom’ is settled in a professionalization tradition, the theory of ‘journalists as members of contradicting communities’ springs out of the interpretive community paradigm. As an entry point to study journalism culture, the dissertation proposes an assessment of loyalty conflicts. Briefly put, the crucial question in this regard is how journalists handle the situation of two (or more) conflicting commitments. On this basis, the problem statement of the research is defined as examining how practitioners in the Ethiopian state media negotiate the conflict of working as professional journalists while serving an official media institution.

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Chapter 5 Methodology

5.1. Introduction In keeping with the problem statement presented in chapter 4, the project has opted for a research approach primarily based on qualitative in-depth interviews with journalists, supplemented by content analysis and some use of observation in the newsrooms. An important purpose of this chapter is therefore to explain the project’s research design by describing the three chosen methods and their relevance for investigating journalism culture (5.2). Next, the chapter aims to discuss particular methodological concerns that arise from the project (5.3). Among many relevant issues that could have been discussed, three have been regarded as particularly important: Firstly, the ‘cultural leap’ that I face as a Norwegian researcher in Ethiopia; secondly, the challenge of creating confidence in the interview situation; and thirdly, how to deal with political polarization in the research. Finally, after explaining the techniques used for transcription and coding of research data (5.4), the chapter discusses terminology and selected key concepts (5.5). In this chapter specifically, I have opted for a somewhat more personal style than in the rest of the dissertation. There are combined reasons for this. First, the fieldwork, which represents a substantial part of the research undertaking, is highly marked by personal choices and experiences. Thus, using the singular personal pronoun ‘I’ in this context underscores the profound subjectivity of these experiences. By contrast, the alternative in classic research writing, where the researcher is customarily referred to in third person, easily creates an impression of double detachment where not only the researcher, but also the writer, is attempted written out of the research undertaking so as to raise the sense of objectivity in the work. A more realistic impression, I argue, is one in which the researcher 75

acknowledges personal influences and limitations, especially in projects like this where research results largely depend on interpretations of the researcher in the fieldwork situation. At the same time, I wish to maintain that the recognition of research subjectivity ought not to become an excuse for research subjectivity. That is, recognizing that research subjectivity is unavoidable does not imply that bias is arbitrary or ethically acceptable in all cases. To the contrary, I would maintain that the researcher should as a standard rule strive for impartiality and fairness in research approach as well as in presentation of research results. This is not to diminish the realization of subjectivity in the research process, but to encourage an open and transparent research attitude which avoids locking the reader in with the researcher’s preferences and predispositions. I would argue that such a posture is particularly important in a research undertaking which navigates in a highly contested and polarized political terrain like the contemporary Ethiopian media society (cf. 5.3.3). 5.2. Arriving at a method As described in chapter 3, empirical research on journalism culture takes both quantitative and qualitative routes. Two methods appear to dominate the research literature: survey studies, which are used both in single country studies and in comparative studies between countries (e.g. international research endeavours such as the Worlds of Journalism Study; Hanitzsch et al., 2011); and qualitative interviews combined with observation of professional practices, which are somewhat less represented in the research literature yet tend to be the preferred approach in close studies of local media culture (e.g. in-depth studies of Ghanaian and Zimbabwean journalism practice; Hasty, 2005; Mabweazara, 2011). Additionally, content analysis of various kinds is sometimes used to complement both quantitative and qualitative studies. The approach of the present research is primarily qualitative. The main emphasis of the project is placed upon the journalists’ own accounts of professional practices and dilemmas. Thus, the qualitative, face-to-face research interview emerges as the core method. The method coincides with the approach taken in Breed’s (1952, 1955) seminal study of social control in the newsroom, which constitutes one of the two key theories to be interrogated in the present research. Additionally, newsroom observation and content analysis were employed as complementary methods in order to contextualize the respondents’ portrayal of journalism culture in light of newsroom practices and actual media content. To this end, the other key theory to be interrogated in the research, Zandberg and Neiger’s (2005) contradicting communities theory, primarily rests on qualitative content analysis. Thus, combining qualitative interviews with content analysis and newsroom observation in the present research will prepare the ground for comparisons with previous research contributions. Despite using three different methods in the study, the research design might not qualify as triangulation in the strict sense of the term. The three methods are not employed with equal weight, insofar as qualitative interviews stand out as the main method with 76

newsroom observation and content analysis mainly serving as supplementary instruments to contextualize and bring further insight to the information emanating from the interviews. The actual field research took place over a four-year period between November 2007 and December 2011, plus additional media material collected for content analysis in the first few months of 2012. Because I reside in Norway, I depended on field trips to Ethiopia which usually lasted around two weeks; four at the most. A total of 11 such field trips were undertaken, as it was important to follow the developments in the media environment during the entire timespan of the study. This emerged as a fruitful strategy. In contrast to some other countries in the South, Ethiopia is hard to follow at a distance as the news coming out of the country is fairly limited. Additionally, Ethiopian diaspora websites have a tendency to be detached from day-to-day events in the homeland (Skjerdal, 2011c). It has therefore been important for the project to invest in consecutive field trips, enabling continuous updates on the media situation. The on-going restructuring of the state media, in particular, has resulted in incessant changes that have been important for the project to follow (6.6). 5.2.1. Qualitative interviews Much effort in the fieldwork has been devoted to qualitative interviews. In the end, 67 journalists were interviewed for the study between November 2007 and December 2011. All interviews took place in Addis Ababa, where the three media organizations under scrutiny are situated. There is some degree of correspondence between the number of journalists interviewed from each media organization and the size of the organization. Thus, of the 67 main informants, 31 came from Ethiopian Television (ETV), 19 came from Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), and 17 came from The Ethiopian Herald. This means that the study covers approximately 15% of the journalistic work force in ENA and ETV (i.e. counting only the television wing of ERTA). By contrast, in The Ethiopian Herald, which only has around 20 fulltime journalists, I have interviewed most of the reporters and editors in the organization although due to staff turnover the potential sampling pool over a four-year period is higher. The reasons for choosing exactly these three media institutions for the study are laid out in the next chapter (6.2). The informants were semi-purposively sampled from the professional work force in each media institution. For a start, I asked someone I already knew from the media environment in Addis Ababa to suggest names of reporters and editors who might be willing to see me for an interview. When eventually interviewing these persons, I asked for suggestions of more names, who proposed yet other names; thus starting off with a snowball or chainreferral sampling method. In addition, I met journalists by chance in the media houses and at various conventions whom I asked upfront if would be willing to do an interview. Step by step, I built up a fairly long list of potential informants, most of whom agreed to be interviewed at some point. At this first stage of the research process, the sampling was rather inclusive in the sense that I would interview nearly anyone provided they were occupied 77

with full-time journalistic work in one of the three media organizations. In the second phase, however, I began to be more specific about the type of informants I searched for in order to include groups which were not yet covered. Specifically, I felt a need to include more journalists who specialized in key topic areas, particularly political reporting. I also wanted to interview veteran journalists who could shed light on longitudinal perspectives in the media organizations, although I found very few with more than 15 years of experience (figure 9.1). Similarly, it was important to include journalists from all levels in the organization (from junior reporter to senior editor), even if that dispersion actually came quite naturally as the interviews progressed. In this regard, one may ask why it was important to include a variety of informants. After all, one of the premises of the qualitative research interview is that it is not meant to be representational of the population at large but rather seeks to study meaning pertaining to the individual interview subject by means of «obtaining descriptions of the life world of the interviewee» (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 3). However, for the present study, I would argue that a certain representativeness is in fact important. The study aims to give insight into dilemmas that journalists in the state media typically face, and if the identified dilemmas only applied to one or two persons, the interviews would be of little relevance as a source to understand the overall tendency in the journalistic environment. Additionally, I would argue that even if one could, from a scholarly point of view, justify an unrepresentative inclination, it runs the risk that the reader will still assume the sampling to be representative. By effect, a quote from an informant is likely to be taken as a typical representation of the research population even if it only represents an extreme end of the group. I have therefore found it viable for this research to interview a fairly wide group in each media organization in order to get an idea of the extent to which the expressed meanings are characteristic of ordinary journalists in the institution. This is also one of the reasons why the number of informants from each institution is fairly large. Thus, every research interview does not have to be representative of the overall journalist population, but taken as a whole, the presentation of interview material seeks some degree of representativeness. That said, the final sampling does not entirely fit the demographics of the journalism population at all levels. In particular, the different languages are unevenly represented in the sampling. English is especially overrepresented, counting for 53% of the research population. This comes as a result of The Ethiopian Herald being one of the researched media institutions, where all journalists write in the English language. Secondly, Amharic counts for 30% of the informants, representing the main language in the national media. Oromo and Tigrinya are less represented in the research population (9% in total), although each of the two languages has a certain share in the nation’s media content, especially in broadcasting. However, during the research, ETV embarked on a restructuring process which meant that the Oromo and Tigrinya departments were relocated to regional media agencies (cf. 6.4). The proportion of respondents working in these languages is therefore relatively small in the study, al78

though I made an effort to include some journalists with background in other language departments than Amharic and English so as to consider possible perceptions of ethnic division in the newsroom. At the same time, it is important not to overstress language as an identifier of ethnic belonging. A number of journalists report in different languages (at least 8% of the respondents in the study produce or edit content in more than one language; cf. 9.2.5), and there are journalists who previously worked in another tongue than they do today, especially among those working in the English language. Furthermore, the low proportion of female respondents in the study (15%) may appear unfitting in terms of gender balance. However, the quota actually coincides with the general situation in the Ethiopian media, which is found to accommodate only 14–17% female journalists (Agaredech, 2003; Mengistu, 2007)78. Attempts to include more female journalists in the research were unsuccessful, perhaps because some of the women I asked did not want to be seen in close conversation with a white male. However, since the research does not have a specific focus on gender issues, I consider the gender proportion to be adequate. The interviews varied in length and focus. On average, I would estimate each interview to have lasted around one hour, although some were barely half an hour, and a few reached between two and three hours. This came as a result of the focus in each interview. In the first phase of the research, I took a fairly broad approach to the interviews and tried to cover more or less the entire interview guide in each session (appendix 3). However, as informants started to tell me more or less the same accounts over and over again, I felt that the information was reaching a point of saturation and I became more restrictive with the use of time in each interview. At the same time, this phase of the fieldwork also proved to be most valuable as I could be much more focused in each interview. Instead of covering the whole interview guide, I began to search for areas where the informant had particularly interesting things to share. Once identified, this area would be the subject for an in-depth conversation where we could focus more vigorously on details and complexities. I also realized that if I tried to cover too much in an interview, the informant became less focused. In general, I would say that the interview session could not last for much more than an hour before the informant started to tire out. On several occasions, I suggested that we would meet again some days later to continue the conversation. This would also give time for the interviewee to think over the topics we talked about and perhaps consult colleagues on specific topics. During the four-year fieldwork period, there were in fact many informants whom I met several times. Typically, I would meet the informant again by accident in the newsroom and we had an informal talk where he/she could introduce me to colleagues but also fill in with important details. Because we already knew each other, the atmosphere would be relaxed and friendly. In some cases, the informant came to be a special source for 78

A third study concluding with 28% women in the Ethiopian state media does not apply in this context as the figures appear to incorporate additional staff members than just journalists (Kiage and Macakiage, 2009, p. 9).

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my project and we continued to communicate throughout the entire research period also through e-mail. A few potential informants were apparently not interested in meeting me for an interview. I have noted eight persons whom I repeatedly tried to arrange an interview with, but who pulled out in the last minute or did not show up. There could be a variety of reasons why persons fail to show up for an interview (especially when there is no compensation involved), but in these cases, I became suspicious that they actually did not want to give an interview at all. Instead of giving me a ‘no’ upfront, they agreed to meet but failed to keep the appointment, or presented weak excuses for postponing the interview. Several of them claimed that they were outside of the city every time I called them on the mobile phone, like one ENA journalist who suspiciously declined an appointment by saying, «Sorry, I am not here in Addis». It therefore became an aim for me to try see them nonetheless, primarily because I wanted to know the reason for their reluctance to share their story. Unfortunately, I was not successful in seeing any of these eight journalists, so I cannot know for sure the reason for their denial. However, on the basis of a few other informants who reluctantly agreed to be interviewed, I suspect that several of them were afraid that the information could be misused and that they feared negative repercussions of some kind, most likely from the work place. This coincides with the ‘discourses of fear’ that I observe among journalists in the state media (cf. 9.6.3). At the same time, it must be clearly underlined that these responses were exceptional. In by far the most cases, journalists were willing to see me and appeared to speak freely in the interviews. Of the final 67 informants, there were 11 (16%) whom I already knew or were acquainted with from the master programme in journalism at Addis Ababa University (AAU), where I previously served as instructor and coordinator. Although it is necessary to reflect on potential lack of detachment when interviewing people the researcher is already acquainted with, my contention is that this did not emerge as a disqualifying condition in the present study. The research would have come to a critical stage if I used my position as a researcher to speak an acquaintance’s personal or political agenda, but, as I think will stand out from the interview analysis (chapter 9), the research design is not such that it invites to one-sided advocacy of personal interests or viewpoints. To the contrary, I found the use of former MA students to be advantageous because I could draw on already built confidence which warranted full focus in the interview situation on core issues (cf. 5.3.2). This way, the informants whom I already knew from AAU became some of the most beneficial sources in the project. At the same time, I adhere towards conservativeness when it comes to involving close acquaintances in research, if only for the reason that readers may question the validity of the research data. Thus, there are students from the MA programme whom I have maintained a personal relationship with in the years after graduation and whom I regard as too close to be used as informants in the project. I may not be able to define exactly when the relationship becomes too close, but as a rule of thumb, if it involves other types of socia80

lization than the ‘professionally’ motivated, for example going out for a meal, it rules out formal involvement as interview informants. The paradox, nonetheless, is that I may still consolidate these acquaintances at an informal level on various issues. That is to say, during the research period, I have maintained regular contact with a few local sources whom I have used as discussants so as to test the validity of my own reasoning and interpretations. These discussions have been especially important since I am a foreigner to Ethiopian society and culture (cf. 5.3.1). However, to be clear, the judgements presented in the dissertation are my own and rest on my integrity as an independent researcher. Furthermore on issues of research independence, it is open for anyone to see that several of the informants (appendices 1 and 2) are ‘friends’ with me on Facebook. To this, I respond that I keep a liberal policy when it comes to accepting friend requests on Facebook, regardless of whether I have met the person once or numerous times. The match between informants and friends on Facebook should therefore not be taken as evidence of favouritism in the research. Facebook has, on the contrary, proved to be a viable channel for communicating with informants post-interview for clarification and further discussion. In addition to the main research interviews, the study includes interviews with 27 actors in the Ethiopian media environment, involving editors and journalists from the private media, government representatives, and others (appendix 2). These interviews usually had the same length as the main interviews (about an hour), but were generally more focused on specific issues related to the informant’s relevant expertise for the project. The support interviews, as I call them, are vital to establish the local media context, and to grasp the government’s media strategy. Moreover, I have had informal talks with a number of other persons with experiences from Ethiopian media practice, both within the country and in diaspora milieus abroad. These are not listed in the dissertation, but have been important sources for various aspects of the research. Issues pertaining to interview confidence, setting and personal confidentiality are discussed in the relevant subsection (5.3.2). 5.2.2. Newsroom observation Newsroom observation has been used to some extent in the project, although less than initially planned. In the original project scheme, I identified observation of news production processes to be a main approach in conjunction with qualitative interviews. However, as the research progressed, it became gradually clear that the interviews were far more beneficial for the purpose of the study than newsroom observation. The main reason for this is that in the interviews, the journalists openly shared opinions and perceptions, while in observation of news production, it often became guesswork to find out what the journalists’ perceptions were. This, of course, is a realization of the overall aim of the research project. The ultimate focus is the professional dilemmas that journalists potentially experience in the state media. These dilemmas eventually appeared to be less perceptible through newsroom observation 81

than in interviews with journalists. Outside of the newsroom, where most of the interviews took place, journalists felt free to speak their mind. Inside of the workplace, journalists were welcoming and friendly, but they sometimes appeared to put constraints on themselves due to the presence of colleagues and bosses. There were also two other impediments to the initial scheme of systematic use of newsroom observation in the project. Firstly, the secretive environment in the news organizations. In The Ethiopian Herald, this was actually less of a problem, since I could go in and out of offices as I wished; participate in editorial meetings, even. In ENA, it was partly a challenge, but in ETV, secrecy certainly represented a hindrance for the researcher. On the whole, the ETV newsroom is situated in a protective environment where tight security and surveillance cameras are indicative of the general atmosphere (these features are more closely discussed in subchapter 6.4). I realized that even though observation in this setting could be useful for achieving a general impression of news-making procedures, it was not sufficient for revealing the rationale of the journalists. Secondly, the language posed a challenge. With no proficiency in Amharic (or any other local language, for that matter), I had to rely on translators in the newsroom, which would work well for short visits but could become a practical problem in lengthy and systematic observation. Rigorous ethnographic observation appeared not to be the most viable route for this particular project. Thus, it soon became clear that I should reduce the role of observation as one of the main methods in the study. Even so, I emphasize that I found the use of observation useful – if not crucial – for grasping routines and limitations in the daily operations of the three media institutions. Rather than embarking on an exhaustive ethnographic approach, I opted for informal and casual observation in the organizations while conversing with journalists. I asked specific questions about their duties which in turn generated background knowledge for the in-depth interviews. Hence, notes from the observations are integrated in the qualitative analysis (notably chapter 9) rather than comprising an analysis on its own. 5.2.3. Content analysis The project makes use of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. In order to view the media content from multiple perspectives, different analytic approaches were chosen for the three institutions. For ENA dispatches, I chose a quantitative approach using a computergenerated word count based on a full year’s news production (7.2). For content in The Ethiopian Herald, I similarly applied quantitative analysis for the most part, although the treatment goes somewhat more in depth as it combines analysis of visual appearance, sources, genres and news topics with a note on the newspaper’s refurbishing in December 2011 (7.3). For ETV, I have chosen to make an in-depth analysis of a controversial documentary series which was broadcast in 2009–10 (chapter 8). The focus thus shifts from representative media content (ENA and The Ethiopian Herald) to a documentary production which may not be representative of the general media content, but still displays what a state media outlet (ETV) 82

is capable of doing in political rhetoric if ‘necessary’. The chosen methodological approach for the documentary series is framing analysis, involving also the production processes that preceded the airing of the programmes. As such, the examination of the documentary bridges the content analysis with experiences of journalists, pointing to the main emphasis of the dissertation (chapter 9). While some authors contend that by definition, «content analysis is quantitative» (Wimmer and Dominick, 2011, p. 157, italics in original), it should be clear from the outline above that I take a less strict approach to content analysis, treating it merely as analysis of media content. Originally, content analysis was designed as a quantitative instrument, not least in the tradition of Bernard Berelson’s (1952) classic companion on content analysis where he defines the method as «a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication» (p. 18). Over the years, however, various qualitative approaches have become popular in the study of media texts, and Klaus Krippendorff (2004) in his seminal handbook on content analysis treats qualitative approaches side by side with quantitative (cf. Krippendorff and Bock, 2009). That is also the stance taken in this research, where qualitative framing analysis is viewed as a sub-discipline of content analysis. The application of framing analysis in the current study, however, could not escape a criticism of the method in the way it is commonly portrayed and applied in the research literature. What surfaced as a deficiency does not pertain to the method itself, but rather to the way in which framing analysis – probably unintentionally – is shaped as a method assuming a predominantly liberal media environment. Thus, the traditional premises of the method makes it less suitable for a transitional media context like Ethiopia. In short, the Ethiopian state media setting does not prescribe that frames can be ‘chosen’ by individual journalists in the same way as in a Western context (cf. De Vreese, 2005; Scheufele, 1999). This critique of methodology is addressed in the relevant section (chapter 8), together with a more thorough introduction to framing theory used in the analysis. Thus, because of the space devoted to methodological discussion, chapter 8 emerges as relatively lengthy. 5.3. Three methodological concerns Of the many methodological issues which could have been discussed, I have chosen to concentrate on three in this chapter which I find particularly crucial to the overall project: the cultural ‘leap’, interview confidence, and how to deal with political polarization in the research. 5.3.1. The cultural leap Economically speaking, travelling from Norway to Ethiopia is one of the greatest leaps one can take. But, it is also a great leap culturally speaking. This is indicated by Geert Hofstede’s (1980) renowned (but also debated) cultural dimensions when applied in a comparison bet83

ween the two countries. For example, Norway scores low on the power distance dimension, meaning that its citizens cherish decentralized power, whereas Ethiopia scores high, meaning that hierarchical order is accepted. Moreover, Norway is an individualistic society, while Ethiopia is considered collectivistic. Even more striking is the contrast on the masculinity/femininity dimension, where Norway is found to be extremely feminine (consensusoriented, avoid showing status), while Ethiopia is strongly masculine (managers are decisive and assertive, conflicts are resolved by fighting them out)79. As a researcher travelling from Norway to Ethiopia, I therefore face two very different societies, one of which I am a member myself. Principally, this is not a unique research experience. Much qualitative research in the social sciences entails precisely the entering into a group or society which is foreign to the researcher’s own frame of reference. However, the cultural leap in this case is immense in several respects: Both material conditions, governing structures and social codes differ significantly between the two societies, to name only a few areas. The realization of this gap has prompted me to continuously reflect on the limitations in the field research as well as in the subsequent analysis. Although the research is not ethnographic as such (it rather belongs to sociological inquiry), I find it useful to draw on experiences from anthropological methodology. In particular, the distinction between emic (the insider’s) and etic (the outsider’s) perspectives emerges as a fruitful way to explore the study’s cultural conundrum. Without entering into a debate about possible epistemological differences between emic and etic preferences (Headland et al., 1990), I would contend that both perspectives are present in the research and that they are not mutually exclusive. I rather treat the two conditions as comprising a continuum between an insider’s and an outsider’s perspective. Likewise, my role as a researcher is not necessarily to argue for either emic or etic descriptions, but to be informed by both, and perhaps change footing at various stages in the research. In the interviews, it has been vital for me to try to describe and make sense of the informants’ ‘life-world’, a term frequently used in ethnographic research (Fetterman, 2010). At that stage, I aim to let descriptions grow out of the informants’ own accounts, so as to avoid coercion into a framework foreign to local conditions. At the same time, the nature of the research demands that the local accounts be related to journalism discourses elsewhere. The issue of universal validity of research data is thus inevitably encountered. The dilemma may be encapsulated in a question relevant to the study: How can I be sure that when an informant refers to ‘journalistic objectivity’, he/she means the same as when I talk about ‘journalistic objectivity’? The unending discussion in the academic environment on the question of universal validity of research data is evidence in itself that there is no straightforward solution to this issue. However, as Sonia Livingstone (2003, p. 483) notes, even though there are researchers who maintain that any comparison between cultures is useless because it ends up being reductionist, it is necessary for research to claim comparison across groups and categories as 79

Exact scores available at http://www.geert-hofstede.com/countries.html

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this is indeed a most basic premise of scholarship when drawing distinctions at any level, be it within an institution, a medium, a nation, or across cultures. The same thinking would apply to the present research. Even if the project is not comparative in its field orientation, it draws on theories from societal contexts very different from Ethiopia, notably Israel/Palestine and USA (cf. chapter 3). It does so in a qualitative tradition, purportedly making comparisons even more challenging. However, in accordance with Livingstone’s (2003, p. 494) argument, I do not see the ‘ethnographic turn’ in media studies, emphasizing contextualized interpretation and insider accounts, as disqualifying for cross-national comparisons. On the contrary, I argue that qualitative studies of local journalism cultures could fruitfully complement multi-national quantitative studies. Not least, qualitative studies of journalism culture have important contributions to make with regard to the consideration of which terms and frameworks may be applied in global survey studies. A crucial question in relation to the cultural leap is whether it is at all possible to attain an emic perspective when communicating in a foreign language. In language learning circles, it is often claimed that language and culture are inseparable, even to the degree that «language and culture cannot exist without each other» (Jiang, 2000, p. 328). It would hence seem very hard to comprehend or even portray a culture without knowing the local language. This would arise as a major problem in the current research project, where all interviews were conducted in a language foreign to both the researcher and the informants, namely English. Certainly, Semitic languages such as Amharic and Tigrinya, or Cushitic languages such as Oromo, or any other local language that the informants may have had as their mother tongue, are all very far from English. How, then, would it be possible to express local meanings genuinely in a conversation with a foreign researcher who does not master any of the local languages? Without diminishing the role of language in cultural expression, I would point to some aspects of the research which still make it seem worthwhile despite the use of English in the interviews and my inability in local languages. Firstly, the informants are generally well versed in English. All of them have diplomas or degrees from a local university, where English is the language of instruction. Indeed, currently English is the main language of instruction from grade seven in the Ethiopian school system. In addition, as mentioned above, 53% of the informants in the study also use English in their daily media production. There were however a few informants who opened the interview by making excuses for poor English competence, but in no case did I experience this as a problem when we started talking. There were of course occasions when informants searched for the right expression, but we usually reached an understanding after brief clarification. In a few cases, it actually emerged as a revealing exercise to communicate in a foreign language when informants resorted to a candid expression in a situation where I suspect they would have employed a euphemism were they able to use their mother tongue. Secondly, the purpose of the research is neither a linguistic analysis nor a close study of concepts and terminology. Indeed, within a professional arena like media production, 85

many terms in Amharic do not have local origin but are derived from foreign languages. This is illustrated by the Amharic word for ‘newspaper’, gazeta, which is derived from Italian, and the word for ‘journalism’, gazetegnet80, which is a further Amharic appropriation of the term81. It appears that communicating about media production in a foreign language after all proves to be less cumbersome than communicating about traditional cultural practices, where the entire vocabulary depends so much on thorough knowledge of the cultural mindset itself. In this regard, the fieldwork has benefited from my own past in journalistic practice. Even though the organizing of the media organizations and some of the news production procedures are different from what I am used to, there are also many similarities. For example, constraints in news production are known to any journalist in the world, material as well as immaterial. Moreover, thinking realistically about news production, regardless of the geographical setting, seems to come easier for writers with experience from journalistic work, if we are to make a general judgement based on the available research literature. What emerges from this line of thought is a two-dimensional approach to culture which entails a distinction between a social and, in this case, a professional dimension. While the social dimension is principally geographically defined, the professional dimension cuts across terrestrial markers and emerges from occupational thinking and practices. This serves to illustrate that emics and etics are not static positions. While one can be an outsider in one area, one might be an insider in another. Thus, while I remain an outsider to Ethiopian society as such, I would regard myself an insider in the journalistic environment. Somnath Batabyal (2007), a former journalist who conducts research in Indian newsrooms, dubs this change of footing «a constant oscillation between the insider and the outsider» (p. 7). Coming close to ‘culture’ is therefore not only about knowing the verbal language, but also about possessing other types of knowledge – in this case knowing the ‘vernacular’ of journalistic conventions. Thirdly, moving on to the epistemological level, I do not fully concur with the view that culture is only accessible through the local language. If that was the case, it would have dire consequences for members of society who are deaf or who suffer from other communication deficiencies, and hence could only be regarded as halfway members of the concerned culture at best. My contention is rather that verbal language is only one of many means through which ‘culture’ is reflected and defined, and that local societies can (and should) be assessed through a multi-layered approach. These arguments notwithstanding, I cannot escape the fact that proficiency in local languages would have been an advantage for the research project – as would better knowledge of local tradition, history, society and human interaction. That said, the research process has implied a gradual development towards ‘thicker’ descriptions (Geertz, 1973) of the local 80

Same as in Tigrinya Early studies by Abraham Demoz (1963) and M L Bender (1972) found more than 600 foreign loanwords in Amharic newspapers, many of which concerned media and communication. 81

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society. I dare say that I am closer to an emic understanding today than when I started the project almost five years ago, and certainly closer than at the time of my first encounter with Ethiopia ten years ago. What remains unanswered, nonetheless, is the question about universal validity of notions and concepts. Even if one could perceive that the researcher approaches a degree of emic comprehension, how can these conceptions be communicated truthfully to the wider research community in etic terminology? The conundrum could pertinently be illustrated by the Amharic word mengist, a key term which points to the omnipotence of government power in Ethiopia. At the most basic level, mengist simply designates ‘the government’ or ‘power’, but the concept may also include the ruling party, local authorities and the entire state administration (Cohen, 1995, p. 180; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003, p. 41). René Lefort (2007) documents the pervasiveness of the concept when interviewing rural peasants in North Shoa who ultimately assert that «God and the mengist are the same» (p. 258). Thus, the mengist is simply not up for discussion for these respondents, according to Lefort. It took me a while to understand the degree to which the conceptualization of the mengist has a bearing on the perceived outlook of the media as well. While I was always careful to distinguish between ‘state media’ and ‘government media’ when speaking with informants, the distinction did not seem to carry much significance for them. Halfway into the field research, I realized that ‘state media’ and ‘government media’ virtually went by the same term in Amharic – yemengist media (or yemengist megenagna bizuhan). There is also a term which more strictly points to ‘state media’, yehizb media, but it is practically not in use. It is clear that the conflation of ‘state media’ and ‘government media’ is more than a linguistic simplification. It points to the general perception that the media channels in question legitimately ‘belong’ to the ruling power. The concept is not entirely transferable to etic terminology, however. The English term ‘state media’ is deficient because it does not wholly reflect the intensity of government inclination. On the other hand, the term ‘government media’ is not fully adequate either, as it conveys an impression that the government sits in the editor’s chair, while the exercise of control is far more sophisticated than that (cf. 9.6.2). What this discussion eventually suggests, is that research terms (etic references) must be in continuous negotiation with the local account (emic references). It would not be sufficient to leave the descriptions purely emic, as some level of standardization is needed for the purpose of comparison across societies. At the same time, a rigorous etic terminology risks losing the peculiars of the local meaning. While realizing that the emic/etic tension will never cease to exist (unless one conflates local and global culture altogether), there are practical measures which can be taken to enable constructive interaction between the insider/ outsider perspective. In the current project, I have found three strategies particularly worthwhile. The first simply involves spending much time in the field. Instead of confining the fieldwork to one time period in the research, I have chosen to make a series of visits and recurring revisits so as to continuously shift between the insider/outsider perspective. 87

Secondly, the research includes more informants than normal for a qualitative study. An important reason for this is that I as an outsider felt a need to consult a larger research base in order to achieve sufficient verification that informants’ accounts are characteristic of the journalist population, besides avoiding misinterpretation and misrepresentation from my own side. Thirdly, I have purposefully engaged local readers to respond to draft chapters and sections of the dissertation. This has given me at least some confidence that the emic descriptions employed in the dissertation are not completely off the mark. 5.3.2. Interview confidence It has been crucial for the project to ensure that the informants feel free to speak their mind. This involves, first of all, establishing confidence in the interview situation. From the informant’s perspective, confidence implies assurance that the information shared in the interview will not be misused in any way. A combination of factors must be present for achieving interview confidence, including a safe interview setting, assurance of confidentiality, and personal trust in the researcher. Choosing physical surroundings which felt safe for the informants was a highly prioritized issue. I soon determined that the newsroom was not the optimum setting for the research interview, as informants may put constraints on themselves if colleagues were around – or they may not want to be seen with a researcher at all. This was confirmed by informants who expressed relief once I proposed that the interview could take place outside of the media institution. We usually agreed to meet at a hotel or cafeteria where we could sit comfortably at a table over a cup of coffee or tea. The principle of conducting the interview outside of the media institution was particularly important in relation to ETV, which is situated in a protected environment (cf. 6.4). The only two interviews I conducted inside of the ETV/ERTA building were with persons on higher management level, both of whom invited me to their office. At ENA and The Ethiopian Herald, however, where the news environment is more open than in ETV, several of the journalists suggested that we might as well meet at the media institution. Thus, seven of the interviews for ENA were conducted inside of the institution, as well as 12 of the interviews for The Ethiopian Herald. It was nonetheless important to find a space in the building where we could talk discretely. Once we had finished the informal (but important) meeting and greeting procedures and were ready to embark on the interview itself, it was imperative for me to establish a framework for the conversation and give assurances of confidentiality. While it was necessary to recapitulate some principles at this point, it was important to avoid creating an overly formalized atmosphere. Thus, I gave a short introduction to the purpose of the research and briefly explained – in practical terms – the principles of informed consent. I explained that I intended to keep a full record of all informants as an appendix to the dissertation so that readers could see who I had interviewed (appendix 1), but assured that the informant would be contacted again if I wanted to attribute him/her by name within the text itself. It was 88

highly important to make this premise clear so as to avoid any uncertainty about confidentiality. In many cases informants replied that this was no problem at all; they explained that they were not afraid to express their opinion and I could quote them as I wished. However, I also experienced that interviewed journalists found the information to be more harmful when it actually came out in print. At a research conference during the study, I delivered a paper where I quoted one of the informants – not by name, but by position and rank in the news organization. The paper eventually ended up on the conference’s website, with the result that the informant wrote to me a few months later and asked if it was possible to remove details about his work position in connection with the quotation. He did not want to take the risk that he could be identified; this despite the fact that the informant had assured me in the interview session that I was free to quote him as much as I wanted to, by name, even. This taught me that even though informants gave consent to attribution during the interview, I still had to consider the possibility that they could change their mind and come to the conclusion that the quotations were harmful when actually appearing in printed form. The informed consent was not signed in writing, as is obligatory in some research settings. This was a deliberate choice of mine as I suspected bringing in a written contractlike document could have barred the free flow in the conversation. From previous work in Ethiopia, I have experienced a strong reluctance to sign any document unless the person is absolutely certain that it does not entail any hidden obligations. It was therefore not an option for me to consider asking for a signed consent insofar as the national research regulations do not require it. The consent was instead given orally. One may ask why I opted to include a full record with all informants’ names and details in the dissertation (appendix 1). Granted, in many research endeavours of this kind it is customary to conceal the identity of informants altogether and use pseudonyms instead. However, identifying the informants is important for this particular project as it gives the reader an opportunity to see what kind of persons I have consulted. Thus, the list hopefully serves to remove any possible belief that the sampling is inclined towards a particular segment in the media organizations. Interview dates are included as well so as to concretize the fieldwork. However, in the dissertation text, dates are removed from the quotations in order to make it unviable to track information and opinions to individual persons. For the same purpose, position and rank are only loosely identified in the text. Despite these assurances of confidentiality, there were nonetheless three informants who refused to have their name on the list. I found it inappropriate to ask for the motivation for this, rather I was thankful that they still decided to carry on with the interview. During the interviews, I took precise notes, in addition to – in most cases – recording the dialogue. I used a mobile cell phone for the recording in order to cause as little disturbance as possible to the conversation. When asking for permission to record the interview, I explained that the recording was for my own purpose only and that it would be used when 89

transcribing the dialogue if uncertainty arose about what exactly was uttered. While most informants had no objection to the recording, a few refused. Again, I found it inappropriate to ask for the reason, although I assume it had to do with general uneasiness with the feeling of going on record about sensitive issues. In most cases, I did not sense that the use of a recording device affected the interview negatively. However, on one occasion, the informant seemed somewhat reserved during the interview session. Immediately after switching off the recorder on the cell phone, he provided information that he apparently would not have given on record. This incident underscored the importance of the ‘after-talk’, by which I mean the informal chatting when the interview is formally over. This was the time when I would switch off the recorder, put my pen aside and lean back in the chair instead of staring down at the notebook, thereby conveying an impression that the Q-and-A session was over and that we could converse on an equal footing. At this time I occasionally posted some reflections from my own side and could observe the response. I used this opportunity actively to ascertain whether the informant had actually shared all he/she wanted to say in the interview, besides reassuring that I had understood the interviewee’s viewpoints correctly. The design of the interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide (appendix 3). I opened by asking standard questions about work position, journalistic experience, educational background and so forth. I then usually made a bridge from their own background to asking normative questions about the journalist’s role and professional values. An important issue in this regard which I tried to ask everybody is how they would describe ‘good journalism’. That gave me an opportunity to learn what the informants considered to be ideal-type journalism styles, regardless of constraints in the particular media organization. I often followed up by urging them to describe a journalistic story they had done which they were really satisfied with, and why. So far, we had only dealt with unthreatening issues, though still highly appropriate for the understanding of journalistic paradigms within the local media environment. From this point on, the interview could take different routes, depending on the natural flow in the conversation. However, it was important for me to consider four areas along the way: constraints in the media institution; collegial cohesion; work routines; and future perspectives. As explained earlier (5.2.1), as the fieldwork progressed, I was less concerned about covering every issue in every interview, but I made sure that each informant would speak in depth on at least one of the issues. In line with principles of the qualitative ‘life world interview’ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009), it was important to convey an open-minded attitude in the interview situation. Only then could I genuinely expect the informants to speak their mind in return. Some of the best moments I had in the field research were when informants willingly expounded on ideas which I found hard to comprehend, and still they made no effort to rationalize the ideas with my (a Westerner) preconceived ideas. Such was the case when a journalist maintained that 90

he was an objective reporter but still found it reasonable to favour the government in coverage. Even if I felt at unease with this line of thought, our personal differences were not an issue in the interview, and we could instead seek a richer understanding by expounding on the informant’s meaning from his own perspective. Generally, however, the informants’ line of reasoning did not occur to me to be especially puzzling, and I rather had to ask myself if they explained things in a certain way so as to make the foreign researcher happy. I was particularly cautious that informants would scorn Ethiopian media policy because they sensed that this was expected in front of a Western researcher. In order to minimize this fallacy, in addition to attempting to build trust in the interview situation, I chose a strategy where I avoided asking deductive questions of the kind which appears to be open-ended but in reality prompts a certain type of answer from the respondent (‘What do you think of Ethiopian media policy?’). Instead, I approached the interview topics inductively and began each section by asking about the informants’ own experience, from where they could expound and give their view on the general situation if the string went in that direction. By the same token, I avoided introducing a sensitive issue with questions of the sort, ‘Have you ever experienced government interference in your media institution?’. I would rather approach the topic inductively, for example by suggesting, ‘Tell me about constraints in your media organization’ – as constraints obviously abound in any work place. This invited the informant to speak freely about different types of constraints, and, as became evident, it was not always political interference which came first, but lack of resources, low salary, and so forth. Then there were questions I would practically never consider asking. ‘Are you member of a political party?’ would be one example. Even if the information could have been interesting to know, the question itself risks being counter-productive. Firstly, if the answer was ‘no’, which was the most likely response, I would not be able to check the validity anyway and the information would not be very useful. Secondly, posing such a question could be perceived by the informant as an expression of distrust. He/she might start to speculate, ‘Now he thinks I’m a ruling party member’, and the rest of the interview would be a performance to cast off any rumour of party membership. That said, many informants still seized the opportunity at an appropriate moment in the interview to tell me that they were not ruling party members, but then it came from their own accord and not as a result of a direct question from me (I obviously still had to be open to the possibility that the information given was strategic rather than factual). Another topic I avoided asking direct questions about was ethnicity. This was due to the presumed sensitivity of the issue (cf. Aalen, 2011, p. 18). In hindsight, however, I believe I could have been more forward on this topic. In the latter stages of the fieldwork, I asked more direct questions about ethnicity, and the informants seemed to be comfortable with it. At the same time, this was an issue which could be approached in general rather than just personal terms, for example by asking, ‘Do journalists in your organization consider ethnic 91

contestation to be an issue in the newsroom?’ This way, I invited informants to consider the issue from the side-lines, although their personal perspective would be present as well. 5.3.3. Dealing with political polarization Under the current regime, Ethiopian politics has been marked by polarization between the ruling party and opposition parties. This polarization especially came to the fore in the 2005 elections, when CUD and UEDF arose to become serious competitors to EPRDF. In the ensuing years, contestation has faded in electoral politics, but polarization persists, especially if taking the engagement of the digital diaspora in Europe and North America into account. Much opposition-minded political formation today takes place in the extended public sphere where the diaspora plays a pivotal role (Hafkin, 2006; Lyons and Mandaville, 2010). The state of political polarization is not necessarily easy to deal with for researchers. While I would argue that a certain degree of independence and detachment is the preferred position for an analyst, there are those who contend that such a position is only a wild imagination for anyone who is involved in Ethiopian current affairs at some level. Diaspora editor Mesfin Negash (2010), for one, asserts that «the very concept of ‘independent enterprise’ is alien in the political sphere of Ethiopia» (p. 70). This could have two meanings, either that it is impossible to stay neutral in front of Ethiopian politics, or, a more likely interpretation, that people will always seek to identify you and your enterprise with a political position. The latter does, at least to some extent, correspond with my own experience. Even though I prefer to think that being a foreigner is an asset for being perceived as neutral, I have also experienced speculations about my own possible political leanings – in different directions. On the one hand, I sensed in some of the interviews with top officials that there was a suspicion that I came as an ‘undercover’ representative for rights organizations when asking critical questions about Ethiopian media policy. In one interview, I experienced that the official had done his homework by checking my record. On his desk, I spotted print-outs of various articles I had written. On the other hand, there were also those who seemed to conclude that I was a regime supporter simply because I focused on the state media in the research. The most astonishing moment came when a journalist in the diaspora failed to show up for an appointment we had made. Only several months later did I get an explanation, upon receiving a surprising letter of apology from the person. It explained that the journalist had been afraid to see me for rumours that I was a ‘woyane agent’ (agent for the ruling party). What this incident shows, in addition to demonstrating the extent of political labelling in Ethiopian diaspora circles, is the degree to which people are prone to see a danger of political surveillance wherever they go. That political and ethnic contestation extends into the research community is also a lesson I have learnt. A telling incident occurred when I asked a researcher to send me some of his work. That he was happy to do, but only on the condition that I «won’t share the information with some crook Abyssinians who don’t like to see my kind of perspective» (citation 92

from e-mail communication). The person clearly had poor past experiences which entailed a sentiment of neglect of his own ethnic group in Ethiopian politics. On my part, however, this condition was more than I could accept as a researcher. Unless articles and research results can be made public, the basic premise of transparency in scholarly debate becomes flawed. If I were to receive any material from a researcher, we must agree on a different set of conditions, or I would be forced to leave the material untouched. Some scholars in Ethiopian studies warn against possible dire consequences that participation in research interviews could mean for politically-minded citizens. Political scientist Lovise Aalen (2002) describes the worst case scenario: «If the informant expresses the ‘wrong’ political opinions, s/he can end up as a victim of torture and imprisonment, and in the most extreme cases disappearances and deaths» (p. 32). My own experience from the present research is far less dramatic. Persons have – for the most part – been more than willing to meet me for an interview (cf. 5.2.1), and they were generally very outspoken. In particular, some of the informants who are listed in the support interviews (appendix 2) expressed opinions which are strongly hostile to the current political leadership, in addition to a number of the informants from the state media (appendix 1) who uttered sincere criticism of politicization of the media. The position of the informants could account for some of the differences experienced between the present research and the political science research referred to above. Coming from the media sector, many of the support interviews in this study are given by informants who are used to public exposure and who might have developed a sense of triviality towards possible repercussions. To this end, an editor in a private publication explains that appearing in court is a «daily business» for him and that the worst thing about it is really that it takes up too much of his time. An editor of another publication expounds that «court cases come from every direction» and takes this as «a sign that we are doing our job». Close to ten (if not more) of the informants have been to prison for media activities, including the State Minister of Government Communications Affairs himself, Shimelis Kemal, who was detained for more than three months in 1998 on charges of harming national interest when serving as editor-in-chief of the private publication Nishan (Abou, 1999, p. 84). Discussing experiences of the court system and imprisonments did not surface as a no-go area in the interviews82. As far as my responsibility as a researcher in this area goes, I have concluded that the persons best equipped to know the limits for which information is safe to share and not, would be the informants themselves. They are in possession of my contact details and are free to get in touch should they want to withdraw or alter any information given in the interviews. So far, I have received no such requests. That said, the main focus of the research is not considered to be sensitive, although some of the contextual information might be. I would, as far as my judgement goes, doubt that anyone risks any serious personal reaction because of the information published in this dissertation. 82

One of the informants, Sisay Agena, expounds on his long-term experiences at Addis Ababa’s Kaliti prison in the recent book Yekalitiw Mengist (Sisay, 2012).

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On a few occasions, I received requests from informants to assist them on various personal issues. There were two types of requests: assistance in relation to further education, and assistance to flee the country. Being aware that such requests could come up, I had made a principle in advance which entailed that I would not engage in any business which could be perceived as exchange of research information for personal gain – for the obvious reason that such trading could negatively affect information given in the research interviews. Thus, when asked about assistance to pursue further education and training, I responded that I could share names and addresses of relevant institutions and programmes, but I was not prepared to get involved with personal recommendations or suchlike. In the end, there were fewer such requests than I had anticipated; I would estimate around five. To the other category of requests, assistance to flee the country, I only had one encounter of this among the main informants. This category was a much more serious type of request, as it could mean that persons found themselves to be in a situation of despair, and hence were prone to use the interview situation wholly for a specific purpose. Without going into detail about the particular case, the request for assistance only came long after the interview was conducted. I responded that I was willing to link the person with an organization which works with such issues, but I would not contribute actively in his/her case. Obviously, later knowing that the person fled the country (which he/she eventually did), I saw the information given in the interview in a slightly different light. In addition to this incident, I have had several requests from Ethiopian journalists in the diaspora asking for assistance in relation to their applications for visa and asylum, as well as a few similar requests from persons locally who are not among the main informants. In accordance with the above, I have responded that I am willing to share factual information, but I will not get involved in any agitation for their case. Finally, there is a need to reflect on my own possible role in commenting publicly on local politics and other sensitive issues related to Ethiopia. On this theme, I have chosen a restrictive line. This is both because I do not necessarily feel qualified to speak on every issue related to Ethiopia, and because at this stage in my career, it could jeopardize my confidence as a researcher if I came to be associated with particular political interests. I have nevertheless agreed to be interviewed by the local Ethiopian media as well as by Norwegian and Swedish media outlets on issues related to Ethiopia, but only when I regarded the topic as relevant to my area of expertise and hence could speak as a researcher. Even so, as noted above, I have observed political labelling in Ethiopia diaspora circles, and, as discussed in chapter 8, excerpts from one of my research articles were used in a documentary on ETV as part of a political argument (8.5.3). Despite a feeling of immediate distress in these situations, I have come to the conclusion that I should not spend much time responding to such uncontrollable cases of misrepresentation. I will rather use my efforts to produce reliable research, and over time this strategy will hopefully benefit the wider public as well.

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5.4. Transcription and coding As previously mentioned, I took careful notes during each interview and normally also made a recording. At a later stage, I transcribed each interview using computer software with the view to systematize research data and to make information retrieval easier. In the literary transcription, I did not make a note of every pause and ‘uhm’, as is sometimes done when writing out qualitative interviews. Extra-textual information of that kind was likely to draw the attention away from the research theme in this particular project. In fact, I also took the liberty to alter single words and the syntax when transcribing the interviews if it was obvious that the informant had departed from common grammar. For example, in Ethiopian English it is not unusual to use negative verbal constructions in cases where regular English uses adverbial phrases, as in ‘Almost all of them didn’t pass’, which could be rephrased as ‘Hardly anyone passed’. In such cases, I found it appropriate to change the wording so as to avoid confusion while ensuring that the meaning stayed the same. For the most part, it was sufficient to use the written notes for transcription. I consulted the recording only if further clarification or details were needed. After transcribing the interviews, the information was organized in an uncomplicated coding sheet distinguished by descriptive codes, also called topic codes (Saldaña, 2009, p. 70). Each code represents a list of references pointing to single quotes from the interviews. In total, 192 such codes were identified. The codes are essentially of two sub-types: detailed codes (e.g. ‘Addis Ababa Mass Media Agency’, ‘Bereket Simon’ and ‘Copenhagen climate summit’) and thematic codes (e.g. ‘development journalism’, ‘editorial policy’ and ‘fear’). The latter type includes many more single references than the first. While some writers in coding analysis propose embarking on a ‘second cycle’ of coding where the codes are reconfigured into broader categories (e.g. Saldaña, 2009), I did not find this convenient for the study. Instead, I opted to keep the two types of quotes in the same coding sheet (after several rounds of refinement, obviously) because this turned out to be more efficient for retrieving the desired information. In the end, having finished the transcription and coding 67 main interviews and 27 support interviews, I am left with a large collection of research material which I hope to make use of in future writings as well (and I have already used some in published articles). This dissertation can only include a selection of the total material collected in the fieldwork. 5.5. Terminology 5.5.1. ‘State media’ vs. ‘government media’ and ‘public media’ I have chosen to consistently refer to ‘state media’ instead of ‘government media’ in the dissertation. This despite the fact that, as explained earlier (5.3.1), the defined Amharic term for ‘state media’, yehizb media, is hardly ever used in daily conversation. This choice is made largely because ‘state media’ (or ‘state-owned media’) is the common term used in the global 95

(etic) research literature, even if the media outlets in many cases could clearly be described as government-loyal. It is also because I do not wish to induce an interpretation in the basic terminology which could be perceived as predetermined vis-à-vis the research results. That said, the dissertation will demonstrate that there would also be fair reason to argue for the use of ‘government media’. The choice of which of the two concepts to use depends on its intention as well. ‘State media’ points to the formal organizing of the media, while ‘government media’ emphasizes their political leaning. There exists also a third term, ‘public media’, which is now the correct designation according to the broadcasting law of 2007 and the general policy of the government. In 2010, the year after the physical merger between Ethiopian Radio and Ethiopian Television, the authorities introduced ‘public media’ as the proper term to be used by the organizations themselves. However, the concept has not yet gained popularity with the public, who still talk about ‘government media’. Moreover, within global media theory, it would be problematic to use ‘public media’ in relation to the Ethiopian state media because the concept points to media outlooks within the public service media tradition, which does not fully correspond with the local situation. This is indeed also indicated by the government’s decision to abandon the idea of converting Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency into a BBClike ‘Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation’ (cf. 6.6). On these grounds, I decided to stick to ‘state media’ instead of either ‘government media’ or ‘public media’. 5.5.2. ‘Private media’ vs. ‘independent media’ Although the private media industry is not the main focus area of this research, it is referred to throughout the dissertation. For the most part, ‘private media’ is the preferred term above ‘independent media’. This is primarily because ‘independent media’ could convey a false impression that the concerned media outlets are independent from political interests, which is rarely the case. Using ‘private media’ also comes out as a suitable parallel to ‘state media’, insofar as the focus is on ownership type rather than political leaning. There are still instances where I use the term ‘independent media’ (or ‘independent journalists’); this could be for linguistic purposes, or in contexts where it is necessary to emphasize that the referred media outlets are independent from government interests, though not necessarily from ideology altogether. 5.5.3. ‘Journalists’, ‘reporters’ and ‘editors’ In this dissertation, the term ‘journalist’ shall be understood as a person whose main occupational duty is the production of content for mass media outlets. In accordance with the use of the term in Ethiopia, ‘journalist’ encompasses both reporters and editors. The Ethiopian state media organizations have an intricate ranking system going all the way from junior/cub reporter and up to senior editor and beyond. Most editors are assigned to do exactly what the term says; they edit media content, besides making other types of editorial decisions. 96

Among the informants in this study, both reporters and editors are included, with a slight predominance on editors. Some persons with other positions are also interviewed, like department heads in ETV. 5.5.4. ‘Profession’ vs. ‘occupation’ As elucidated in the theory chapter, there is an age-old discussion in media research of whether journalism constitutes a profession, an occupation, or something else (4.2.1). While appreciating this discussion, the dissertation has opted to refer to journalists as ‘professionals’ without any lengthy scholarly analysis. This is primarily because this is a term journalists use about themselves (‘professional journalist’, ‘media professional’), and secondarily because there are indeed reasons to argue that journalism has characteristics of a profession, as discussed in chapter 4. However, the dissertation occasionally also refers to journalism as an ‘occupation’, though mainly for the sake of linguistic variation, and sometimes with the view to emphasize the occupational aspects of the work. 5.5.5. ‘Loyalty’ vs. ‘commitment’ The ‘loyalty’ concept stands at the core of the theoretical discussion of the dissertation. In the way it is framed in this work, it should be understood as ‘a lasting commitment which is tolerable to discomfort’ (cf. 4.3). In other words, ‘loyalty’ exceeds common usages of ‘commitment’ in that it represents a more profound obligation for the person involved, including a personal will to commitment. While journalists have a commitment to produce a story every day or treat an interviewee with respect, the loyalty aspect points to enduring allegiances which do not change from day to day. Relevant loyalties in journalistic work are for example loyalty to the owner, to the nation, and to the profession. The loyalty concept is more thoroughly discussed in subchapter 4.3. 5.6. Summary The chapter has addressed the choice of a three-tiered methodological approach, consisting of qualitative interviews, newsroom observation and content analysis. Representing the main approach in the study, qualitative interviews were conducted with 67 main informants in a four-year period from November 2007 to December 2011. The informants were semi-purposively selected from the three researched media institutions, Ethiopian Television, The Ethiopian Herald and Ethiopian News Agency. Newsroom observation came to be less dominant and less systematic in the study than initially planned, but still represents an important means for assessing work routines and the atmosphere of the newsroom. Lastly, content analysis is used in various forms to examine journalistic content in the concerned media outlets (chapters 7 and 8). Three important methodological concerns have been discussed. Firstly, the challenge arising from the ‘cultural leap’. Assistance is here sought from ethnographic methodology, 97

where the differentiation between the emic (the insider’s perspective) and the etic (the outsider’s perspective) is frequently discussed. While contending that the emic/etic gap cannot (and should not) be entirely resolved, I suggest that a fruitful approach for the present study is to maintain both perspectives in the analysis. Secondly, creating confidence in the interview situation is seen as crucial to the quality of the research data. In this regard, I emphasize a safe interview setting, assurance of confidentiality and trust in the interviewer as important preconditions. I also demonstrate that a reflection over the sequence of interview topics and types of questions is crucial to building personal trust and hence increasing the value of interview data. Thirdly, a consideration of the politically polarized context is essential to any social science researcher conducting fieldwork in contemporary Ethiopia. On this issue, I have argued for a moderate approach which entails sharp distinctions between a researcher/analyst role and an activist/advocacy role.

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Chapter 6 The three media institutions under scrutiny

6.1. Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the three researched media institutions: Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), Ethiopian Television (ETV) and The Ethiopian Herald. While the historical context of the institutions was presented in chapter 2, this chapter focuses primarily on organizational aspects of the three institutions, including their governance models and recently implemented restructuring processes. Content and style of the media channels, however, are dealt with in chapters 7 and 8. This chapter will begin by giving reasons as to why exactly these three media institutions were selected as research sites in the project. 6.2. Why these three media institutions? ETV, The Ethiopian Herald and ENA were chosen based on their suitability for illuminating the problem statement of the research from multiple angles. As described earlier (4.5), the research aims to assess how journalists handle the conflict of operating as professional media workers while serving the state media, thus warranting a research focus on key official media institutions. To this end, ETV, The Ethiopian Herald and ENA represent both salience and diversity in the media landscape. ETV retains a critical position as the nation’s only television channel and houses a large journalist constituency. As a result of the merger with Ethiopian Radio in 2009, ETV is no longer a distinct organization, although the station still

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retains an institutional identity in the public mindset83. For many journalists, ETV remains the most prestigious media institution to work for in terms of public exposure – despite many shortcomings. In ETV, one finds many of the most experienced journalists in the country. Secondly, ENA on its part becomes a natural choice because of its size and role. Besides Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency (ERTA) and the regional mass media agencies, ENA is the media organization which employs the highest number of journalists in the country. With 39 branch offices nationwide, ENA has approximately 120 full-time journalists on its payroll. An additionally important reason for including ENA in the research is that the agency traditionally has been a prime source for news for the various state media outlets, and it has a special position as a conveyor of official news in Ethiopia. The move by the authorities to put ENA under direct government control in 2007 made its role even more compelling with regard to the research aims. Thirdly, The Ethiopian Herald is important for the research because it represents a different media type and earns a somewhat freer position in the state media structure than ETV and ENA. The newspaper has a much more limited audience than ETV, to some extent explaining its relatively more relaxed position vis-à-vis the authorities. The Ethiopian Herald is also the only state media outlet partly aimed at the international community, although many, if not most, of its readers are Ethiopian citizens. As an alternative to The Ethiopian Herald, the project could have investigated Addis Zemen, the Amharic sister publication with slightly higher circulation figures than Herald. However, the use of English in The Ethiopian Herald makes it more easily accessible for the researcher. Also, Herald’s special obligation of imagebuilding for the international community provides an entry point for considering how the aim of national promotion affects reporting practices. In sum, the three media institutions represent diversity both in government relations and media type. What is missing from the selection is an institution focusing specifically on radio production. The inclusion of a radio station in the research would seem appropriate given that it constitutes the medium with the widest reach in the country (cf. 3.4.2). However, the focus in the research remains on journalism culture rather than on audience profile, and in the choice between radio and television, ETV was deemed more important for the project due to its relatively higher esteem among journalists, indicated by better salary levels and the fact that many journalists advance from radio to television rather than vice versa (at least 23% of the ETV informants had earlier worked for radio). That said, with the merger between ETV and Ethiopian Radio in 2009, all ERTA reporters are now supposed to cover both radio and television journalism. As a result, the research could possibly be informed by perspectives from radio reporting as well. In actuality, however, reporters who previously 83

Legally, state radio and television became one organizational entity already in 1995 (ERTA Proclamation no. 114/1995), but the merger had minimal practical effect until the physical unification of the radio and television unit in 2009. Thus, ‘merger’ in this research points to the physical and organizational relocation in 2009.

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served ETV are still largely preoccupied with the television medium, thus the emphasis in the research remains on the television part of ERTA. In the text, ‘ETV’ designates both the television channel ETV as well as the imagined media institution ETV which is now incorporated in the new ERTA organization. Importantly, the research does not aim at a comparative study between the three media institutions. On the other hand, capturing the essence of state media operations in Ethiopia requires that different newsroom types be included. By triangulating the nation’s sole television station, a traditional print publication and a centrally controlled news agency, the research purports to gain sufficient ground for referring to Ethiopian ‘state media journalism’ in general terms as well as in institutional-specific terms. 6.3. Ethiopian News Agency Founded in 1942, ENA boasts being one of the continent’s oldest news agencies (cf. Eapen, 1972). South Africa’s independent news agency SAPA, however, came to birth a few years earlier, in 1938. Nevertheless, ENA (until 1963 known as ‘Agence Direcsione’) was practically inoperative between 1947 and 1954, thus this year’s 70th anniversary (in 2012) marks 70 years of existence rather than 70 years of operation (cf. Topuz, 1962, p. 50). What has remained steady during ENA’s entire period of existence, however, is a profound intimacy with the ruling power. Initially under guidance of the Ministry of the Pen, ENA has had different arrangements vis-à-vis the higher authorities, but its loyalty to ruling interests remains indisputable. ENA has nevertheless been drawn closer to the government in later years. Between 1997 and 2007, the news agency enjoyed somewhat greater autonomy as it was governed by a semi-independent board accountable to the House of Representatives84, though still closely aligned with government interests. In August 2007, the situation changed when the agency came under direct control by the Ministry of Information85. The reorganizing stirred negative reactions from the political opposition and journalists alike. «I saw a lot of mess. […] ENA used to be relatively free. Now it lost its independence,» says a centrally placed person in the state media administration (personal communication, date concealed). Journalists complained about growing political interference. The work environment suffered. Some of the reporters decided to quit, and the defection continued in subsequent years. As a result, the various divisions of ENA are currently characterized by many new and inexperienced reporters. Senior journalists complain about ailing work satisfaction. The closeness to the government became even more evident when the Ministry of Information was dissolved in October 2008 and later replaced by the Office for Government Communication Affairs (OGCA). A key duty of OGCA is to operate ENA, and journalists in the news agency today sometimes 84

Cf. Ethiopian News Agency Proclamation no. 115/1995 and Ethiopian News Agency Establishment (Amendment) Proclamation no. 74/1997 85 Cf. Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation no. 546/2007

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describe themselves as government communication officers, although they simultaneously express adherence to a journalistic community. Traditionally, ENA has had a defining role as a home for official journalism philosophy in Ethiopia. Illustratively, one of the few journalism books in Amharic is written by two ENA veterans, Haddush Kassu and the late Simeneh Mekonnen, and published by the agency (Haddush and Simeneh, 2004). In relation to its 60th anniversary in 2002, ENA launched the scholarly journal Ethiopian Journalism Review in Amharic. Initially announced as a quarterly publication, the publishing of Ethiopian Journalism Review has been irregular, although it remains the only periodical devoted to professional journalism issues in the country. ENA’s wire service subscribers consist mainly of state media outlets. State radio and television are major users of ENA material, as are the official print publication outlets under the umbrella of Ethiopian Press Agency (EPA). Government-loyal private media outlets, such as Radio Fana, also draw on ENA dispatches. Most private publications, however, do not subscribe to ENA and only occasionally publish stories from the official news agency, in which case they will copy material from the agency’s website without paying for it. The competition with the private news agency Walta Information Center is highly perceptible in ENA, as noted in subchapter 3.4.4. Walta appears to have gained an upper hand lately as regards professional reputation. Several journalists in ENA express that they would prefer to work at Walta if they had the chance because it pays better than ENA and has newer production equipment and facilities than the state agency. In terms of political inclination, however, the journalists regard ENA and EPRDF-associated Walta as much the same, although a few claim to see some more journalistic independence at Walta. One of the informants, who served as public relations officer for the electoral board during the 2005 elections, recalls an incident during the elections where he was interviewed by both news agencies, but in the end, only Walta published the interview. The reason behind ENA’s decision not to distribute the interview, he claims, was that the general manager found the information too controversial for the government. On the other hand, there are also state media journalists who prefer news dispatches from ENA because its articles allegedly carry less outspoken bias than those of Walta. One ETV editor imparts, «If I have to choose between Walta and ENA, I will choose ENA because it seems more neutral» (personal communication, date concealed). The reason for this may be the strong protocol news profile of ENA, where the focus on conferences and reports makes news bulletins appear factually correct and trustworthy (cf. discussion of news content in chapter 7). ENA has exchange agreements with two of the three major international agencies: Reuters and AFP (the third one being AP). It also cooperates with various national news agencies, whose geographical location attests to the Asian and Middle Eastern rather than African orientation of Ethiopian news communication. The agencies include Xinhua (China), Antara (Indonesia), IRNA (Iran), Anadolu (Turkey), Saba (Yemen), as well as DPA (Ger102

many) and PANA (Pan-African News Agency). The vast majority of international news stories forwarded by ENA to the local media, however, originate from the large international news agencies. On a yearly basis, ENA distributes approximately 25,000 news items from Reuters and 20,000 items from AFP, followed by 5,000 stories by Xinhua and far less for the other agencies. These items are distributed without any further editing, unless the story concerns Ethiopia, in which case ENA will most likely compose its own story and only use the international news agency’s account as a resource. (A closer discussion of editing practices in ENA and the other institutions is offered in chapter 9.) In terms of self-generated domestic news, ENA produces approximately 8,000 articles a year, seven days a week. Of these, some 3,000 articles emanate from the foreign languages team, which hitherto only uses English, while the remainder is written in Amharic. However, the English content tends to be translations of original Amharic articles (alternatively, the story may in some cases first be written in English and then translated to Amharic), thus the amount of unique news stories produced by ENA is notably less than the total 8,000 articles. ENA also accommodates an audio-visual production unit which produces news programmes and documentaries for radio and television. In actuality, in the current situation, the audio-visual production is mainly meant for promotion of government activities on ETV and Ethiopian Radio, although some programmes are channelled into ENA’s website as well (www.ena.gov.et). ENA has, nevertheless, ambitious plans to open a television news channel for the entire region with programmes in four languages: Amharic, Arabic, English and French. ENA’s website is the most frequently updated local news site besides Walta’s equivalent, www.waltainfo.com. Previously situated at the media production site at Abune Petros which currently belongs to the undergraduate division of Addis Ababa University’s Faculty of Journalism and Communication, ENA in 1996 moved to its present location on Belay Zeleke Avenue (upper Piazza). The site overlooks the city and is relatively close to key governance buildings, although not in proximity to any other media institution. The physical appearance of ENA’s headquarter first and foremost communicates datedness (figure 6.1). This researcher has not found the security at the gate especially strict, although The New York Times recently concluded that the building is «guarded by heavily armed police forces and has windows that have not been cleaned for a long time»86. At the entrance gate, one usually has to show an ID card but may sometimes gain entrance without. Inside of the building, one is free to walk around without a visitor’s card or a personal guide. Management and administrative offices are located on two floors on each side of long corridors. The interior and furniture look tattered, though not in a worse condition than in an average public office building. 86

‘For an Ethiopia in transition, guarded hope for freer journalism’, Benno Muchler, The New York Times, 21 May 2012, p. B3. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/business/media/at-the-ethiopian-newsagency-hope-for-freer-journalism.html

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Office desks are marked by many years of use. The main newsroom is situated upstairs in a spacious area on the southern wing of the building. Divided in two parallel areas, the journalists are placed at individual desks in rows where they can easily communicate with each other. Many desks have a computer, not of the latest kind, but still with appropriate software and an Internet connection, even if slow. Next to the entrance to

Figure 6.1: Exterior of Ethiopian News Agency, Piazza

the newsroom, there is a whiteboard

highlighting

important

events of the day. Posters here and

there

inform

journalists

about practical matters or remind them about important policy issues such as editorial imperatives (figure 6.2). In addition to its headquarters in Addis Ababa, ENA sustains a network of 15 regional main branches and 24 subbranches with at least one jour- Figure 6.2: Ethical values poster in ENA’s main hall area nalist. The headquarters receive news reports from the regions on a daily basis and distribute them further after fact-check and editing. In total, ENA employs approximately 120 full-time journalists and an equally large constituency of support staff. Some of the journalists are assigned as beat reporters who cover specific areas: one is placed at Bole International Airport; one at the Parliament; one at the Federal High Court; in addition to a beat reporter assigned to permanently follow the Prime Minister. The general manager of ENA since late 2011 has been Tadesse Zinaye, former director of the Ethiopian Mass Media Training Institute (now undergraduate division of Addis Ababa University’s Faculty of Journalism and Communication).

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6.4. Ethiopian Television ETV is situated in an impressive building in downtown Addis Ababa (figure 6.3). The building, which has 12 floors, used to incorporate

the

Ministry

of

Information on levels 7, 8 and 9 until the dismantling of the ministry in 2008. The unit which partly replaced the ministry, OGCA, did not move in with ETV but started its life at upper Bole Road, next to Meskel Square. When ETV and Ethiopian Figure 6.3: Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency, exterior Radio subsequently merged in 2009, the radio staff moved in from the outskirts of the city. The combined ERTA organization today occupies the entire 12-storey building on the lower part of the historically famous Churchill Road. With bright new neon signs on the roof and a large digital clock on the front installed in 2011, the ERTA headquarters is a landmark on the Addis Ababa skyline (figure 6.3). Circumscribed by a tall fence, the ERTA premises are heavily guarded. In order to enter, one needs an appointment with an official staff member, and a thorough security scan is mandatory. Electronic devices such as laptops and cameras must be left outside. It is not allowed to take any photographs inside the building. A visitor’s card is required, and an assigned person is expected to meet the visitor in the reception area on the first floor. According to informants, security became tighter after the military intervention by Ethiopian troops in Somalia in July 2006. Because ETV is regarded an important institution in the national communication scheme, the authorities may demand tightening of the station’s security when external pressure is determined to be imminent. There are multiple reasons for the security measures, however. In July 2010, diaspora media reported that ERTA had begun to install security cameras at its production facilities. This fuelled speculations that the authorities were introducing political surveillance in the newsroom87. Local ETV journalists, however, took a much more relaxed attitude to the cameras and asserted that they were installed to prevent theft of electronic equipment. But the surveillance devices are not effective, according to informants. «If I want to steal a camera, I can still do so. The security in ETV is not as such strong, especially outdoors. They are not doing their work seriously,» one reporter claims (personal communication, date concealed). 87

‘Security cameras installed at ETV offices’, Addis Neger Online, 6 July 2010. Available at: http://addisnegeronline.com/2010/07/security-cameras-installed-at-etv-offices/

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The ERTA building itself is less functional for broadcasting production. The main studio on the ground level serves its purpose adequately, but the rest of the building resembles an administrative unit rather than a production house. Each floor contains offices on both sides of tall corridors in which spaces have been attempted to be converted into production facilities. The vertical structure of the building is not inviting for television production, and small groups of staff members are continuously seen waiting for one of the two lifts in the centre of the building. At the same time, however, the layout of the building is somewhat indicative of the hierarchical structure of the organization. The management is located at the middle to higher levels of the building, and the secretarial anterooms attached to the chief offices are adequate in an organization where persons often have to wait for the boss’ signature or view on various issues. Shortage of resources and old-fashioned equipment represent recurring issues of complaint for ETV staff. There is for example a scarcity of cars and cameras for outdoor reporting, forcing production staff to resort to secondary solutions such as using archive material instead of shooting new footage when reporting news. In terms of technical equipment, reporters claim that ETV has always lagged behind. The oldest of the analogue recording video cassette formats, U-matic, was in use by ETV until the late 1990s when cassettes became obsolete from the market. The station then decided to switch to the analogue Betacam format, which had already been on the market internationally for almost two decades. Soon after, however, the original Betacam format was on its way out due to the introduction of digital formats. Today, analogue Betacam equipment can still be seen in use in ETV editing suites side by side with newly introduced digital equipment. «It is difficult to do good journalism with the old equipment in ETV,» claims one editor whose experience has only involved analogue recording and editing (personal communication, date concealed). Some of the weakness in the production stems from the condition that ETV still maintains distinct roles for technical and journalistic personnel, while new digital technology is built on the premise that the journalist increasingly engages in recording and editing besides the traditional role of reporting. The already mentioned merger between ETV and Ethiopian Radio was supposed to stimulate more effective and audience-friendly reporting practices, but, according to the journalists, the results so far are meagre. The principle of co-reporting for radio and television has allegedly led to negligence of the radio medium. Common practice in ERTA is to dub radio items directly from video-edited packages without adjusting the content to the radio format. One of the informants explains: Radio has been ignored after the merger. Everybody focuses on television. The quality of Ethiopian Radio diminishes. The management also has to be blamed for this. They might think television is more effective when it comes to announcing a message for the people. (ETV editor, personal communication, date concealed) 106

With the merger in 2009, ERTA introduced an organizational chart where journalistic work is shared between three programme sections: news and current affairs, education, and entertainment. The news and current affairs section (whose orientation matches the main interest area of this research project) is organized around a news centre which functions as a hub for the daily news production. Over the years, the management of the news centre has grappled with bureaucratic and inefficient decision making lines, partly due to a 1997 proclamation which divided the staff in two administrations: one consisting of journalists and technicians who are employed by ERTA’s politically elected board, and another consisting of support staff who belong to the civil service88. The bureaucratic structure meant, among other things, inadequate follow-up training for the journalists (Almaz, 2009). One of the aims of the 2009 restructuring was therefore to streamline the organization for journalistic efficiency and professionalism. An important step in the process was the establishment of an in-house training centre in 2009. Another major step in the on-going re-organizing process of ERTA is the relocation of different language sections to regional mass media agencies. According to the scheme, production of television programmes in major local languages will no longer be the responsibility of the central ERTA organization, but will take place in regional agencies closer to the geographical ‘home’ of each language. So far, the former Oromo department in ETV has closed and its production has been relocated to Oromia Mass Media Agency in Adama (the administrative capital of Oromia Regional State, also known as Nazret), while the activities of the former Tigrinya department has been transferred to Tigray Mass Media Agency in Mekelle (the administrative capital of Tigray Regional State). The Oromo language already has its own television station, Oromo Television (OTV), which broadcasts on a distinct transmission network. It also produces programmes in Amharic and English. The Tigrinya language, on the other hand, does not yet possess a distinct television station and relies on the centralized ETV network for transmission. All in all, ETV today broadcasts in five local languages (Amharic, Oromo, Tigrinya, Somali and Afar) and three foreign ones (English, French and Arabic). Amharic occupies most of the airtime (60% of the scheduled airtime on the main channel). In addition to its national channel, ETV accommodates an urban channel, ETV2 (also called Addis Television), mainly used by the Addis Ababa City Administration. Programmes on ETV consist of a mixture of genres. According to a survey of content of ETV’s main channel, the programming comprises 29% news, debate and documentary; 41% education; 22% drama and entertainment; and 8% other genres (Ward, 2011, p. 49). The channel is on air 24 hours a day, and reruns are common. A vast amount of the content is locally produced, in contrast to various other African television stations where imported programmes make up much of the schedule. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that a study of cultural influence in 19 Sub-Saharan African countries indicated that Ethiopians are more sceptical to Western 88

ERTA Establishment (Amendment) Proclamation no. 73/1997

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culture than any of the other researched Sub-Saharan publics. For example, only 33% of the Ethiopian respondents said that they ‘like Western movies, music and television’ (Smith and Lugo, 2010). ETV programming confirms – and possibly reinforces – this tendency by carrying much local content. Audience satisfaction with ETV is nevertheless mixed. On national surveys, ETV scores better than any other television channel, foreign stations included, when respondents are queried about their favourite channel (Ward and Selam, 2011, p. 31). This must however be seen in light of the wide national reach of state television as well as the advantage of broadcasting in local languages. A few years ago, there were concerns among media professionals that the programme quality of ETV was in general decay and that it pushed people to subscribe to satellite television (Gebremedhin, 2006, p. 20). A popular joke in this regard is the one about an ETV host who introduces the evening programme by saying: ‘Welcome to ETV to all those of you who can’t afford a satellite dish.’ Recently, however, reports point to improvements in technical quality and content variation on ETV. African Media Barometer notes «remarkable improvements on ERTA stations since the middle of 2010 in regard to presentation and packaging as well as coverage of a wider variety of issues» (FES, 2010). This is partly attributed to the recent move by ETV to outsource part of its production to the growing sector of private production companies in Addis Ababa. With approximately 350 full-time journalists in its ranks, ERTA is the largest employer of journalists in Ethiopia. According to information prior to the merger, the support personnel (technicians and administrative staff) entail twice as many persons as the journalists, thus the total manpower of ERTA exceeds 1,000 persons (Desta, 2007, p. 63). The organization is led by a general manager appointed directly by the Prime Minister. General manager since November 2008 has been Zeray Asgedom, a veteran EPRDF affiliate with membership in TPLF’s Central Committee. Leadership positions in ERTA as well as in the other state media institutions are politically inclined, a condition not denied by Minister of Government Communication Affairs Bereket Simon (personal interview, 10 May 2010; cf. 9.2.4). ERTA is formally accountable to the House of Representatives (the Parliament) through an elected board. The board, however, is led by Bereket Simon in a personal capacity. It is thus clear that the government is actively present in all influential organs making decisions on behalf of the official broadcasting agency. 6.5. The Ethiopian Herald In contrast to ENA and especially ETV, the physical appearance of The Ethiopian Herald’s office building gives a far more open impression. Since 2006, when Herald moved out of the previous location in ETV’s headquarters, the newspaper has resided on the 6th floor of Lex Plaza Building on Haile Gebreselassie Road (close to Axum Hotel), a modern commercial building housing a variety of shops and offices (figure 6.4). There is no tight security, except occasional checks by guards at ground level. The newsroom premises are easily accessible 108

for visitors, as is the editor-inchief’s office. The main newsroom is situated in a large room with individually placed desks. Like ENA and ETV, however, The Ethiopian Herald has no modern style newsdesk where reporters and editors are situated in a vibrant central arrangement. Instead, much of the communication takes place across offices

between

individual

reporters and editors. Much time Figure 6.4: Lex Plaza, location of The Ethiopian Herald is actually spent on copy-editing, which entails the checking and double-checking of facts, spelling and grammar in articles. Thus, the news environment is in many ways built around the premise of slow pace news (cf. content analysis of The Ethiopian Herald in subchapter 7.3). Every reporter has easy access to the Internet on his/her computer. This was not the case a few years ago, when The Ethiopian Herald had neither an Internet connection nor a fax machine (Stanbridge and Ljunggren, 2003, p. 93). When one of the informants for the current study came to the newspaper house as a young reporter in 2001, it ruined his preconceptions about a prominent state media institution: I expected a well-equipped newsroom with state of the art technical equipment. After all, Herald was supposed to convey an image of Ethiopia. But when I joined, the newsroom didn’t have computers – in fact only one. The lady who used the computer would type based on written notes [by the journalists]. (The Ethiopian Herald reporter, personal communication, date concealed) The resource situation has changed in recent years, and access to computer facilities and Internet is one of the positive things informants emphasize about The Ethiopian Herald as a work place. The three other state newspapers, Addis Zemen (Amharic), Bariisaa (Oromo) and alAlem (Arabic), are all situated in the same building as The Ethiopian Herald, but there is no routine collaboration between the publications except occasional exchange of news stories and sharing of transport resources and photographers. However, the editors of the publications meet every afternoon with the press department head of Ethiopian Press Agency (EPA) to discuss daily priorities and other issues (9.5.1). The general manager of EPA may also be present, especially if important issues are at hand.

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EPA is the umbrella organization for the four state-owned newspapers, including the bimonthly Zemen Magazine (figure 6.5). EPA has formal political connections to the Parliament similar to those of ERTA in that the House of Representatives elects the board of EPA and oversees the organization. However, the elected chairperson of the board is still a person belonging to the central government admi-

Figure 6.5: Ethiopian Press Agency, located at Arat Kilo across nistration, Shimelis Kemal, State Berhanena Selam Printing Press Minister of Government Communication Affairs. Furthermore, the general manager of EPA is appointed directly by the executive through the Prime Minister. It is the responsibility of the general manager together with the press department head of EPA to hire editors-in-chief and deputy editors-in-chief of the various publications, while the editor-in-chief of each publication hires all other journalists in the respective institutions. EPA is today headed by Sebsibe Kebede, who took over from Kefyalew Azeze in 2008. The changing roles of Kefyalew pertinently illustrates the integration between press and politics in official Ethiopia. A veteran journalist, Kefyalew served as EPA’s general manager for approximately ten years until he turned to political administration and became Deputy Mayor and Communication Affairs Bureau Head of the Addis Ababa City Administration in April 200889. However, he has continued to advise the EPA management on an informal basis after he left for political administration (personal interview, 17 November 2009). Kefyalew has had major impact on the management philosophy of the official media institutions in Ethiopia, although his name is not always specifically mentioned. He has written a lengthy book on the topic of media management (Kefyalew, 2008), and is one of the minds behind the development journalism policy of the state media (9.4.4). Thus, although the print publications within the EPA organization (notably The Ethiopian Herald) enjoy a somewhat freer position vis-à-vis the government than ERTA and ENA, the management of EPA is evidently well trusted in the central government. Current editor-in-chief of The Ethiopian Herald is Dejene Tesemma, an experienced reporter and former university lecturer in literature who, despite heading an official media institution, has a good reputation both in the state media and in the private media. Dejene also serves on the board of PEN Ethiopia, a locally registered organization devoted to championing for the freedom of speech for writers. The Ethiopian Herald’s editor-in-chief directs 89

From November 2011, International and Domestic Relations Senior Advisor to the Mayor.

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approximately 20 full-time journalists and another 5-6 part-time journalists in his organization. The Ethiopian Herald is published every day except Monday. Its approximately 9,000 copies are distributed mainly to public offices, libraries and international embassies in Addis Ababa, as well as to key institutions in the regions. All the larger hotels have copies of The Ethiopian Herald alongside private newspapers. It is harder to get hold of a copy of the newspaper on the street, however. Vendors mostly entertain private titles in their stacks. Lately, however, The Ethiopian Herald has become available at various news corners around the capital city, notably at the busy Arat Kilo intersection, not far from the Parliament building. 6.6. Restructuring of the state media The already mentioned restructuring processes of the different state media institutions emanate from a central programme aimed at improving the entire Ethiopian civil service. The programme, known as business process reengineering (BPR), is based on a model for radical corporate organizational reform which emerged in American business circles in the 1990s (key texts are Champy, 1995, and Johansson et al., 1993). BPR aims to sharpen organizational efficiency and refine customer service. It was first introduced for Ethiopian civil service institutions in 2004, and the challenges entailed in implementing a market-oriented business restructuring model for public institutions have been documented in several studies (e.g. Getachew and Brocke, 2011; Tesfaye and Atkilt, 2011). The state media, which began preparations for the restructuring in 2006, experienced that BPR was not readily fit for a sector not focusing solely on service delivery. Nonetheless, a planning committee consisting of members from all state media organizations as well as key officials from the Ministry of Information (MoI) was set up, chaired by the Minister himself, Bereket Simon. The committee set five ambitious goals for the restructuring process: more transparency in the media institutions; better public service; improved content in the media outlets; reduction of bureaucratic chains; and, above all, securing the rule of law in the organizations (information provided by Daniel Bekele, member of planning committee, personal communication, 29 November 2008). Seen from a media analysis perspective, the BPR process induced very different outcomes for the three researched media institutions. While ERTA and EPA were granted more journalistic independence, ENA was drawn closer to the government as a result of the agency being put under direct administration by MoI and later OGCA (cf. 6.3). Purportedly, the new structure of ENA/OGCA is modelled after South Africa’s Government Communication and Information System (GCIS), a presidential office which «proactively communicates with the public about government policies, plans, programmes and achievements»90. A significant difference between the South African and the Ethiopian media and communication setting, nonetheless, is that GCIS does not operate a news agency, in addition to the 90

http://www.gcis.gov.za/aboutus

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fact that South Africa caters for a lively media market where the private media function as a realistic corrective to government communication strategies. With the takeover of ENA by OGCA, key news information in Ethiopia has been centralized in a society where the private media are secondary to the state media in terms of national reach and resources. On the other hand, for the state-owned broadcasting and print media organizations, the BPR process implies relatively greater independence and increased professionalization. At one point in the process, it was recommended that ERTA be converted to a broadcasting corporation along the lines of a traditional Western public service media institution (the name ‘Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation’/’EBC’ was in fact already on the lips of key officials). In the end, however, it was decided to keep the traditional ‘agency’ identity by maintaining ‘ERTA’ as the proper name, with the important amendment that the state media institutions were no longer to be referred to as ‘state media’, but as ‘public media’ or ‘public service media’. Thus, one notes a shift in focal point from the owner (the state) to the recipient (the public). This is in line with the philosophy of the three foreign organizations that were visited and benchmarked by ERTA in the process: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and All India Radio – all of which are well reputed public broadcasters on three different continents. In daily reporting practice, the restructuring is supposed to induce greater focus on journalism ethics, less involvement by public officials in news decisions, and reduced bureaucracy in the newsroom. More specifically, a participant in the restructuring negotiations notes that «there were consensus in the BPR committee that we should get rid of the self-censorship culture», which is a common trait of state media organizations (Nebiyu, 2009; Skjerdal, 2010b). However, the informant adds that it is too soon to conclude whether there will be genuine change when it comes to these matters (personal communication, date concealed). 6.7. Who owns the Ethiopian state media? It is not altogether clear who owns the Ethiopian state broadcasting and print media institutions. Both the public, the Parliament and the government are potential shareholders. The public share has been re-emphasized lately by formally designating the outlets as ‘public’ media channels, reflecting the 2007 broadcasting proclamation where ‘public broadcasting’ is one of the three official broadcasting service categories91. Public ownership is in keeping with classic European public service broadcasting (PSB) ideals, prescribing that the population rather than the state retains a sense of control over the media channels through payment of licence fees (Scannel, 1990). The economy of ERTA, however, attests to only a moderate level of public ownership. The agency is struggling to convince viewers to pay the obligatory licence fee which in 2011 was raised from 50 to 60 birr per television set (USD 3). Licence fee revenues for the fiscal year 2010–11 added up to a mere 27 million birr, 91

Broadcasting Service Proclamation no. 533/2007, clause 16(1)

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representing less than 10% of ERTA’s total budget of approximately 300 million birr (USD 17 million)92. Government funding and sponsorship are far more pervasive for the state broadcaster than either licence fees and advertising, and have always been (cf. Solomon H., 2006, p. 34). Officially, ERTA no longer receives direct funding from the government, although the agency gains indirect government funding through ‘sponsorship’ of specific broadcasting programmes and rental of airtime by various public offices. Private businesses and NGOs also sponsor programmes and rent airtime on ETV, which actually marks a new era insofar as non-government productions are now welcomed on national television. Secondly, besides the sense of public ownership, the Parliament could be regarded as a stakeholder in ERTA and EPA through its influence in the elected boards of directors. The Parliament oversees the media activities by means of reviewing regular reports from the agencies, and defines the general frames for the media organizations through proclamations and law reforms. Specifically, ERTA and EPA are accountable to the Parliament through the House of Representatives’ Information and Culture Affairs Standing Committee. The power of the Parliament in the organizing of the state media is balanced by the third stakeholder – the executive – which exerts influence over ERTA and EPA by appointing key managers in each organization, besides allocating funds through the abovementioned sponsorships. Public sponsoring is especially important for the broadcaster, more so than for the official print publications, which generate most of its income from advertising and copy sales (Ward, 2011, p. 17). However, as disclosed above, key persons from the central government administration are also represented in the board management of the concerned media organizations. The Minister of Government Communication Affairs, Bereket Simon, chairs the ERTA board (besides heading ENA in his capacity as minister), while his deputy, Shimelis Kemal, chairs EPA’s board. According to the ministers themselves, the chairperson functions are indiscriminate in the sense that they are personally elected by House of Representatives in their capacity as members of Parliament (MPs) rather than claiming board membership ex officio93. In principle, any MP could have been elected to chair the boards (Shimelis Kemal, personal communication, 6 May 2009). However, from a critical point of view, it must be remarked that electing two MPs who simultaneously happen to be the two foremost communication executives in the government administration could put into question the relative autonomy of the media institutions. On balance, the ministers emphasize that the boards also contain representatives from opposition parties, civil society organizations and the academic community (Bereket Simon, personal communication, 10 May 2010). Even so,

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Media reports that ERTA had collected 127 million birr from licence fees in the 2010–11 fiscal year are demeed false by the agency’s education and training centre (personal communication, 26 April 2012). See for example ‘ERTA popularizing GTP, expanding coverage: Bereket’, ENA, 3 January 2012. Available at: http://www.ena.gov.et/EnglishNews/2012/Jan/03Jan12/157726.htm 93 This is possible because in the Ethiopian parliamentary system, an MP remains member of the Parliament with full rights even though he/she is chosen by the Prime Minister to become member of the Council of Ministers.

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government affiliation of the chairpersons sends a strong signal of political inclination of the state media’s boards of directors. Thus, it follows from the analysis that the official promotion of the state media as public institutions is impeded by de facto government control over structures and institutional self-rule. For ENA, the presence of government authority and ownership is open and legitimate given that it is organized under OGCA. For ERTA and ENA, on the other hand, the government shares ownership with Parliament and the public, but it is government representatives who are left with the upper hand as they are in charge of key appointments, financial allowances and the drafting of editorial policies in the organizations. 6.8. Summary Besides representing different media types, the three media institutions under scrutiny are different in their relative autonomy and relationship with the government. In its 70 th year of existence, ENA is under direct government control as it continues to provide the nation’s media with official news and information. ETV, by contrast, has a relatively freer role vis-àvis the government in its formal structure, and it depends less on ENA material than it did before the restructuring programme. However, ETV’s management profile and the institutional appearance testify to continuing kinship with ruling interests. The Ethiopian Herald is most autonomous of the three researched institutions, though still organized under a centralized agency which arranges daily editorial meetings with its four official print publications, which includes supervision of content and journalistic profile. The recently implemented BPR programme has resulted in different routes for the three media institutions. ENA has reinforced its role as the government’s (rather than just the country’s) official news wire service, but has become less important as a source of news and information for the various state media outlets. By contrast, the restructuring programme has requested less political intervention in the official media outlets, in this study represented by ETV (ERTA) and The Ethiopian Herald (EPA). Less bureaucratic chains, greater economic selfreliance and improved journalism ethics are also important aims of the BPR scheme. The next two chapters will indicate how the restructuring might have impacted on media content produced by ENA, The Ethiopian Herald and ETV respectively.

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Chapter 7 Quantitative content analysis of ENA and The Ethiopian Herald

7.1. Introduction As a backdrop to the analysis of journalism culture in the Ethiopian state media, the current and following chapter provide an assessment of content in the three researched media organizations. This is achieved through a dual approach: The current chapter utilizes a quantitative approach, whereas chapter 8 takes on a qualitative, in-depth approach (figure 7.1). In sum, the two analyses aim to generate a complementary, though not necessarily exhaustive, consideration of media content in the three media institutions under scrutiny in the dissertation. This chapter begins with a word count analysis of news articles dispatched by ENA. The source of the analysis is 12 months of journalistic stories delivered by the news agency, all of which are derived from the archives at ENA’s website (www.ena.gov.et). The second part of the chapter consists of an analysis of content in The Ethiopian Herald, somewhat more detailed than the analysis of ENA material. The consideration of content from Herald contains a constructed news month drawn from April to December 2011 with particular focus on sources, genres and topics covered by the newspaper. The analyses ultimately aim to shed light on the impact of editorial policies and journalistic decision-making in the selected state media outlets.

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Figure 7.1: Overview of content analyses in chapters 7 and 8 Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Outlets

ENA, The Ethiopian Herald

ETV

Main approach

Quantitative

Qualitative

Method

Word count, source/genre analysis

Framing analysis, rhetorical analysis

Time period covered

March 2011–February 2012

August 2009–January 2010

Content type

Articles

TV documentary

Language

English

Amharic

7.2. Analysis of news content produced by ENA 7.2.1. Previous studies and current methodology There are numerous studies of content in Ethiopian broadcasting and print media channels, but very few of them concentrate on material produced by ENA; this despite the condition that ENA is the parent source of a vast amount of stories appearing on state radio and television as well as in official newspapers. With the reorganizing of ENA directly under the Office for Government Communications Affairs (OGCA), one could expect the government to exert even tighter control than before with the type of information disseminated by the news agency. A closer analysis of material produced by ENA is therefore called for, supplementing a small body of previous research of the agency’s news production. Among previous studies on ENA’s journalistic production worth mentioning is one contribution which focuses on the news agency’s coverage of the aftermath of the 2005 elections. The contribution (Abebe, 2007), comprising a comparative study between ENA and Reuters, demonstrates how coverage in Ethiopia’s official news agency differs significantly from the coverage of one of the world’s leading agencies . While Reuters in the hectic post-election weeks focused on visible imageries such as killings and mass arrests, ENA was preoccupied with portraying the electoral process as democratic and responsible, besides portraying the government’s actions against the protesters as just. The disparity between the two news agencies is detectable for example in the salience of news topics. In 36% of its election stories, ENA had a main focus on local democracy, compared with Reuters’ 13% (Abebe, 2007, p. 64). In only 14% of its stories, ENA covered post-election violence and clashes, while Reuters had this as a main focus in 47% of its stories. It turned out that the two news agencies presented substantially different accounts of the events surrounding the 2005 elections, each, in the view of Abebe (2007), according to their national and international interests. While ENA reflected the government’s agenda, Reuters was driven by journalistic ideologies and market interests (p. 109).

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The aftermath of the 2005 elections nevertheless remains an extraordinary news event. The focus in the present analysis – though only providing a limited selection – is on journalistic material produced by ENA in a situation of relative peace and stability. The interest is placed upon capturing the profile of the news agency’s average reporting style. This is achieved through a quantitative analysis of words and phrases over a 12-month period, covering March 2011 to February 2012. Two records have been compiled. The first is based on an analysis of headlines (figures 7.2 and 7.3), recognizing that these indicate what the editors consider to be the most important aspect of the news story. All headlines in the 366-day period were gathered, except eight days in July 2011 which were missing from the search database (www.ena.gov.et). The chosen period covers more than 2500 headlines, averaging 7.1 news stories a day. The words in the headlines were then counted and categorized using word frequency software. The purpose is to map out the focus of typical ENA news files. The next step in the analysis (figure 7.4) takes into consideration the full text of the articles, not just the headline. In order to make the analysis manageable, an arbitrarily constructed news week was made covering the period March 2011 to February 2012. All weekdays were included (Monday to Sunday). This resulted in 50 news articles, which were combined and plotted into a word frequency software programme. The purpose once again is to give pointers to the thematic profile of ENA stories, though this time with the inclusion of the full article text. As to the limitations of the analysis, only English headlines and articles are included. ENA produces each day more items in Amharic than in English, as Amharic constitutes the main demand of the subscribers of the news agency. These items are missing from the analysis. However, the predisposition entailed in Amharic vs. English news items may not be that different, as news items in English are customarily a direct translation of original Amharic articles. It is also clear that articles produced by ENA, regardless of language, do not usually have an international focus but deal with domestic issues. On this basis, it is assumed that news dispatches by ENA in the English language are a reflection of the general editing practice in the agency. As the study is mostly interesting in detecting in-house editing practices of ENA, the analysis only includes items produced by the news agency itself. ENA also transmits a high amount of articles emanating from international news agencies to the local media (cf. 6.3), but these are not included in the analysis. 7.2.2. Findings A word frequency count of selected ENA articles reveals a striking pattern in the agency’s journalistic inclination. The overall impression is that the coverage is development-oriented and devoid of a critical tone. Five observations emanate from the word count: firstly, a remarkable fixation on numbers and amounts. More than 20% of the articles in the 12-month period (specifically 561 of 2547 articles) contain the word ‘million’ or ‘billion’ in the headline 117

(figure 7.2), usually accompanied with a specific digit (not counted by the word frequency software), and a currency. To illustrate, a typical headline reads: «NGOs undertaking 630 mln. birr development activities in Sidama» (9 February 2012). In masculine manner, the figures emphasize the magnitude of an event or project through the use of (seemingly) objective terms.

Figure 7.2: The 50 most frequent words used in ENA headlines Mar 2011–Feb 2012 Freq.

Word

Freq.

Word

490

million

69

dam

436

birr

67

university

403

Ethiopia

67

town

244

project

64

ambassador

185

development

63

nation

152

construction

63

House (of Representatives)

141

zone

63

activity

125

Ministry

62

investment

124

worth

61

committee

107

Africa

60

USD

97

water

60

facility

97

revenue

59

support

96

undertake

58

say

92

President

57

government

89

service

56

sale

89

AU (African Union)

55

woreda

88

state

53

need

88

farmer

52

new

87

health

51

PM (Prime Minister)

86

secure

50

agreement

80

sign

49

people

73

underway

49

collect

71

Meles (Zenawi)

49

China

71

construct

47

public

71

billion

47

Girma (Woldegiorgis)

Note: Common words (e.g. prepositions and conjunctions) are omitted. Numbers are also omitted. Each word includes sub-categories (e.g. ‘Ethiopia’ also counts ‘Ethio’, ‘Ethiopian’, ‘Ethiopians’ and ‘Ethiopia’s’). The analysis includes all 366 days in the time period, except dates 1–7 and 27 July 2011, which were missing from the database.

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Secondly, it is clear that many of the news items are development-oriented, in line with the development journalism policy of the Ethiopian state media (9.4.4). Words like ‘project’, ‘construction’, ‘water’ etc. all emphasize this inclination, in addition to, obviously, the monetary signifiers. Thirdly, governing structures are emphasized, evident from words like ‘zone‘, ‘Ministry’, ‘President’, ‘Meles’ and ‘woreda’ (the second lowest administrative level in the country). This indicates that important events in the eyes of ENA are those which emanate from the government and official society. By contrast, the word ‘NGO’ appears in a few headlines concerning development, although only on 226th place on the list in terms of relative importance. Even worse, the word ‘private’ appears a further twelve places down the list. Thus, it is evident that ENA favours the official society and the formal governing structures in its coverage over and above private and independent initiatives. Fourthly, the coverage is internationally oriented. The African Union and Africa as a whole are frequently referred to, as are the words ‘ambassador’ and ‘international’. The foreign nations most often appearing in the headlines are, in descending order, China, Sudan, Somalia, the US, Egypt, Japan, Libya and India – each mentioned at least 20 times over the 12-month period. This is indeed a telling account of the Ethiopian regional and international orientation, including references to Libya, which scores highly due to a large constituency of Ethiopian citizens in the country during the Arab Spring upheaval in 2011. That China is the foreign country most often emphasized in ENA reports is illustrative of the Asian turn in Ethiopian development partnership (cf. Dereje, 2011). A typical headline in this regard is: «China backs Ethiopia’s anti-malaria effort: ambassador» (27 March 2011). Interestingly, a European country appears only on 9th place on this list of relative country importance (Germany). Eritrea, the standing rival on the northern border of Ethiopia, is mentioned even fewer times. The few references to Eritrea (11 in the entire 12-month period) depict the country as dictatorial as opposed to the portrayal of Ethiopia as an accountable ally of the world community in the unresolved conflict situation. Fifthly, the headlines of ENA appear static and fixed rather than active and dynamic. Very few of the stories, if any, represent breaking events. Instead, they give the impression of carefully orchestrated news which could have been produced at an office desk rather than by a journalist who actively searches for sources and collects information. Analysing related news styles in Nigeria, Ralph Akinfeleye (1982) coins the term ‘protocol journalism’94, pointing to reporting practices which simply focus on copying speeches and press conferences without critically engaging with the news material. In similar vein, many ENA headlines could very well have been duplicated from the front pages of speeches and reports rather than being a result of journalistic creativity and professional judgement.

94

According to the author, the term was first used in a 1979 publication which preceded the more known book which came out in 1982 (Ralph Akinfeleye, personal communication, 15 June 2012).

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Figure 7.3: Word cloud generated from ENA headlines Mar 2011–Feb 2012

Note: Common words (e.g. prepositions and conjunctions) are omitted. Numbers are also omitted. Each word includes sub-categories (e.g. ‘Ethiopia’ also counts ‘Ethio’, ‘Ethiopian’, ‘Ethiopians’ and ‘Ethiopia’s’). The analysis includes all 366 days in the time period, except dates 1–7 and 27 July 2011, which were missing from the database.

Equally interesting, nonetheless, is potentially ignored news information. Domestic political conflict, in particular, is forcefully suppressed in ENA news coverage. To this end, it is revealing that in the chosen 12-month period, covering more than 2,500 stories, the political opposition is not mentioned once in the headlines. Neither is it acknowledged in the full article texts in the constructed news week (figure 7.4). EPRDF, on the other hand, is referred to 16 times in the headlines, which is not much considering that it is the only political party

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Figure 7.4: The 50 most frequent words used in articles in a constructed ENA week Mar 2011–Feb 2012 Freq.

Word

Freq.

Word

74

Ethiopia

16

south

53

Africa

16

people

48

country

16

laboratory

46

development

16

effort

45

state

16

agreement

40

million

15

water

39

zone

15

university

31

project

15

Sudan

31

construction

15

new

29

birr

15

authority

27

government

14

cost

26

ENA

14

AU (African Union)

23

Minister

13

world

22

activity

13

Somalia

21

office

13

national

20

town

13

international

20

service

13

peace

20

public

13

school

20

meeting

12

security

20

construct

12

plan

19

ambassador

12

commission

18

President

12

Addis Ababa

18

health

11

well

17

support

11

growth

17

road

11

hospital

Note: The table is derived from 50 articles appearing in a 7-day constructed news week from March 2011 to February 2012. Common words (e.g. prepositions and conjunctions) are omitted. Numbers are also omitted. Each word includes sub-categories (e.g. ‘Ethiopia’ also counts ‘Ethiopian’, ‘Ethiopians’, ‘Ethio’ and ‘Ethiopia’s’).

in the country with de facto influence. Party politics and political debate are in other words forcefully neglected by Ethiopia’s official news agency. On a similar note, ENA’s news coverage suffers from a lack of language associated with critical reporting. For example, words like ‘criticize’, ‘deny’ and ‘reject’, which are very common in global news language, are not used once in the researched ENA headlines, nor in the full article texts (apart from a few occurrences of ‘critical’ where the meaning is not 121

negative, as in ‘play a critical role’). There are however several stories concerning corruption, but in all these cases, the focus is on the prevention of such activities rather than investigation of specific cases of corruption. The government administration thus once again stands out as accountable and a guarantor of safe progress in the country. These findings complement the concluding remarks made by a veteran journalist of ENA, Teshome Negatu, in a treatise concerning development stories produced by ENA. Teshome (2007) finds that the news agency’s stories are marked by a failure to use multiple sources; incapacity to do in-depth and follow-up reporting; using press releases as they are; inaptness to cover the complexity of an issue; and using figures abundantly without interpreting them. The challenges emanating from content analyses of ENA material are thus twofold: first, insufficiency to comply with various professional journalistic standards; and second, a disconcerting highlighting of official interests at the expense of private and informal efforts. 7.3. Analysis of content in The Ethiopian Herald 7.3.1. Previous studies and current methodology In contrast to the situation for ENA, many studies have been undertaken to indicate the journalistic profile of The Ethiopian Herald. Previous content analyses of The Ethiopian Herald have particularly focused on two themes: the newspaper’s development profile, and its political bias during elections. The emphasis on development is indisputable, and is an intrinsic part of the newspaper’s editorial policy, just as it is for the three other state-owned newspapers. Hence, in a comparative study between Daily Monitor and The Ethiopian Herald, Semere Ameha (2010) concludes that while the private publication focuses mainly on politics, sport and conflict, The Ethiopian Herald is preoccupied with economy and development. In the study, 43% of Herald’s stories were found to be concerned with economic activities, compared with Monitor’s scanty 12% (Semere, 2010, p. 36). By contrast, Herald was much less likely to write about negative issues. The state-owned newspaper touched conflict and disaster in only 8 of 223 stories (4%), compared with 17% coverage of such issues in Daily Monitor. However, a note of caution needs to be attached to this part of Semere’s (2010) study, as it only surveyed selected newspaper issues within a two-month period. In a more focused study, concentrating on the 2002–03 drought and famine in the southern lowland, The Ethiopian Herald was found rather to give wide coverage of the crisis situation, indeed substantially more than any of the private newspapers treated in the study (Bethelhem, 2006). The state-owned newspaper at the time introduced a regular column called ‘The drought in focus’ on its front page and sent reporters out to report on the crisis, in contrast to some of the private newspapers which relied on dispatches by foreign news agencies. For The Ethiopian Herald, this represents a totally different approach from that of the renowned 1984–85 famine, when the state-owned newspaper gave hardly any coverage to the crisis and 122

made it a policy not to use the word ‘famine’ in its columns (Article 19, 1990). Unsurprisingly, however, the sources quoted by the state newspaper in the 2002–03 drought and famine were mainly government officials (67%), deviating greatly from private newspapers which preferred to forward the views of NGO workers, donors and people affected – partly due to the dependence on foreign news agencies (Bethelhem, 2006, p. 39). The Ethiopian Herald’s development profile is additionally evident in its emphasis on health. To this end, a study of the newspaper’s 2003 volume found that as much as 83% of its editions contained at least one article related to HIV/AIDS (Sale, 2004). Similarly, a more recent study found that the newspaper devoted many times more space to HIV/AIDS and TB (tuberculosis) related stories than the popular critical weekly Addis Neger in 2008 (Mekuria, 2009). Interestingly, the main actors in the HIV/AIDS-related articles in The Ethiopian Herald were not government representatives, but people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs). In terms of election reporting, studies show that while The Ethiopian Herald favours the ruling party in its overall coverage, it contains little direct agitation in the articles. Thus, EU’s report of the 2010 elections concluded that while 77% of the election space in The Ethiopian Herald was devoted to EPRDF, the reporting propagated a neutral tone95. Likewise, in the contested 2005 elections, the newspaper reported favourably on both the ruling party and the contending parties up to the election day (Hailemarkos, 2006), but turned critical to the opposition in the aftermath (Haile-Gebriel, 2006). It would seem that the state newspaper can afford to report in fair manner under normal circumstances, but becomes protective of ruling interests when the central power is under threat. The safeguarding of official interests is detectable in the composition of each article. That is, even if the headline appears to be neutral, bias surfaces in the underlying verbal structure. Thus, Haile-Gebriel Endeshaw (2006) found that more than 90% of the post-election articles in The Ethiopian Herald mentioned the ruling party before opposition parties in the journalistic story, thereby defining the ruling party as the common reference point and the opposition as deviant. The same study revealed that 12 of 15 Herald journalists in the post-election context regarded their own reporting as not fair to the different parties (Haile-Gebriel, 2006, p. 48). The present content analysis of The Ethiopian Herald, however, focuses on a much less turbulent period than the aftermath of the 2005 elections. The chosen sampling period is 2011, where random issues from six months (April, May, August, September, October and December) were compiled so as to form a constructed news month (comprising 4 weeks/24 issues)96. All weekdays were included in the collection, except Monday, when The Ethiopian Herald is not published. The intention is to create a representative selection of newspaper issues in a period when there were no extraordinary events dominating the news agenda. Since the analysis focuses on news, current affairs and other content which has socio-political 95

European Union Election Observation Mission report on Ethiopian elections 2010, final report, November 2010, p. 21. Available at: http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/final-report-eueom-ethiopia08112010_en.pdf 96 To be precise, the issues were collected at times when I did fieldwork in Addis Ababa.

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importance, the weekly sports column on Sunday and leisure/entertainment (which makes up a very little portion of the overall content) are excluded from the scrutiny. Also excluded is material produced by foreign news channels, notably the business and markets column, unless it is directly related to Ethiopia. Neither are the reference column on the front page, advertisements and other non-journalistic material part of the analysis. The main interest in the analysis, in other words, lies on news and current affairs produced by local journalists, either belonging to the newsroom staff of The Ethiopian Herald or to one of the local news providers ENA and Walta. 7.3.2. Findings 7.3.2.1. Visual appearance From its outset in 1943 until December 2011, The Ethiopian Herald was printed in the broadsheet format, mainly in black and white. However, on Tuesday 13 December 2011, a new era began when the newspaper, together with its sister publication Addis Zemen, appeared with full colour print on its front and back pages (figure 7.5). The two state-owned newspapers simultaneously changed their size to the Berliner format (midway between tabloid and broadsheet). The resizing represents a change not only in physical appearance but also in content, as will be noted later (7.3.3). The traditional look of The Ethiopian Herald, nevertheless, signals formality and seriousness. The newspaper heading (i.e. the logo on top) is printed in a static, serif font type, contrasting a tabloid style which frequently applies grotesque font types (also known as sans serif) and effects such as shadows and images in its logo (exemplified by the local weeklies Capital and Fortune). The heading of The Ethiopian Herald thus marks a kinship with serious-minded broadsheets such as International Herald Tribune (US) and The Daily Telegraph (UK). The size of The Ethiopian Herald is usually 8, 10 or 12 pages, with advertisements occupying between two and four pages. The advertisements mostly consist of public tender announcements, accounting for most of the income for the newspaper (Ward, 2011, p. 17). Public announcements are one of the main reasons for reading The Ethiopian Herald, according to consumers. There are also occasional advertisements for private companies and international organizations in the newspaper. Photographs are used throughout the newspaper. As for the text columns, the photographs communicate a fixation on official society rather than an interest in average citizens and unexpected events. Corroborating a previous study which concluded that powerful persons are overwhelmingly dominant in the visuals in the front pages of The Ethiopian Herald (Samuel, 2006), the constructed news month in this study finds that a considerable amount of the photographs (28%) portrays officials and experts who are quoted in the article (figure 7.7). Less than 5% of the photographs depict average citizens. However, half of the photo-

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Figure 7.5: Front pages of The Ethiopian Herald before and after refurbishing Dec 2011

Figure 7.6: Example of conference photograph in The Ethiopian Herald

graphs of citizens actually appear in one single article in the constructed news month, so visual portrayals of people on the ground are even less in an average newspaper issue, in fact close to non-existent.

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Furthermore, The Ethiopian Herald entertains a distinct genre of images which may best be dubbed as the ‘conference photograph’, showing an audience sitting in a conference hall dressed in formal attire (figure 7.6). Captions of such photos may for example simply say, ‘Some of the workshop participants’97, thus pointing to the felt importance of the formal event and its turnout rather than the actual contents of the conference that took place. The largest amount of pictures in the constructed news month falls within the field photo category (figure 7.7), comprising for example of a photograph of a power transmission line in a story concerning energy or a picture of a coffee plant in a story about coffee bean export. However, these photographs are usually drawn from the newspaper’s archives and are rarely shot on location for the particular story. There are no examples of photographs of sudden events, such as an accident, in the scrutinized material.

Figure 7.7: Photograph types in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald

7.3.2.2. Sources A closer look at the sources used in the individual articles reveals a strong focus on official voices. Officials and politicians comprise 52% of the total sources (figure 7.8). Public officials alone account for more than a third (38%) of the persons quoted, directly or indirectly. The typical public official appearing in the newspaper is a head or a spokesperson of an office, of which there are very many in the Ethiopian bureaucracy. Additionally, government ministers and state ministers are an obvious source in the articles, even if the person simply introduces a conference without expressing anything of news importance. Accordingly, the composition of an article often follows the chronological order of a meeting, workshop or confe97

‘Workshop discusses Addis revised land grading system’, Million Fikru, The Ethiopian Herald, 28 April 2011, p.

2

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rence: First, a higher official, sometimes a minister, expresses the importance of the particular workshop theme. Then, another public representative (who could also be an expert or a foreign representative) adds information or expresses a view which validates what the higher official said in the first place. Lastly, a potential third or fourth person with apparently lower rank, for example a regional chief, expresses his gratitude with what is going on, sometimes playing a receiver role. It is very unlikely that the quoted persons appear incongruent in their statements in any way. The use of sources in the news articles thus creates an impression of orchestrated consent where there is no room for aberrant voices or discussion. The Prime Minister, nevertheless, appears to be quoted less often, representing only 7 of close to 500 sources in the selected time period (figure 7.8). This would appear surprising

Figure 7.8: Sources in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald

Note: The category ‘other’ includes conference convenors, religious leaders and celebrities.

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at first glance, and is a long way from the policy of The Ethiopian Herald in earlier times when the newspaper was required to picture and quote the emperor on the first page of every issue (cf. 2.3.1). It is also surprising given that ENA, which is a main provider of news to Herald, accommodates an assigned beat reporter whose only duty is to follow the Prime Minister. News of the Prime Minister’s whereabouts and activities would therefore be easy for The Ethiopian Herald to obtain. However, the relatively less foregrounding of the Premier is consistent with the development journalism policy of the state media. With the present emphasis on development and progress, The Ethiopian Herald directs its lens to seminars and reports concerning such issues. The Prime Minister’s engagement in other areas, for example conflict and terrorism, is not a prioritized theme for Herald. Thus, in the scrutinized newspaper issues, Meles Zenawi is never quoted on controversial issues, but rather on three soft issues: international relations, development and an international HIV/AIDS congress in Addis Ababa. Party politics is indeed also a less prioritized area for The Ethiopian Herald. This is evident from the remarkably low use of politicians as sources. Parliamentarians make up only 12 persons of the nearly 500 sources quoted in the researched period (figure 7.8). Opposition politicians (not in Parliament) are quoted only four times. Even more surprisingly, politicians representing the ruling party are not quoted at all in the entire period under scrutiny. (Government politicians obviously appear frequently in the articles, but they are not portrayed as representatives of the ruling party.) Moreover, the ruling coalition EPRDF is not mentioned once in the selected four weeks of The Ethiopian Herald. This finding appears puzzling in light of the common portrayal of Herald as a party organ for EPRDF. Jean-Nicolas Bach (2011), for one, notes that The Ethiopian Herald since 1991 was «in charge of spreading EPRDF’s ideas» (p. 649). If used to described today’s situation, this perception needs some refining. Although it is correct that The Ethiopian Herald propagates EPRDF policies, the party itself is largely non-existent in journalistic coverage, except, obviously, during election times. This coincides with the foregoing analysis of ENA material which found that EPRDF was mentioned merely 16 times in an entire year of the agency’s news headlines (cf. 7.2.2). One way to elucidate this conundrum is to explain it in relation to the one-party atmosphere of the current regime. With a single party occupying more than 90% of the seats in Parliament and controlling nearly all seats in the local councils, the concentration of political power is so pervasive that it leaves little room for genuine political competition on a day-to-day basis. The Ethiopian Herald does not regard it as part of its duty to stimulate political contestation, resulting in a neglect of party politics. In addition, the reorientation towards development journalism in the state media makes the newspaper downplay political coverage. Foreign representatives are frequently sourced in The Ethiopian Herald, making up 25% of the overall source base. This category actually covers a range of titles, including diplomats, delegates, politicians and representatives of international organizations. The count, however, excludes stories dispatched by international agencies unless specifically 128

relating to Ethiopia, thus the figure refers mainly to foreigners present in Addis Ababa. The prominence of foreigners testifies both to the profile of The Ethiopian Herald as oriented towards the local international community and the status of Addis Ababa as a seat for international organizations. The focus on international sources also coincides with the newspaper’s fixation on conferences, where foreign representatives are often present, especially in the role as speakers. The study of the constructed news month in 2011 further reveals massive male dominance. Only 9% of the quoted persons are women. Looking more closely at the instances where women are quoted, these tend to be reduced to less prominent roles and a health or family orientation, or to cases where the gender perspective itself is an issue. For example, the momentous ICASA 2011 conference in Addis Ababa in December 2011 (the largest conference on HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases in Africa ever) prompted wide coverage by The Ethiopian Herald with ample acknowledgement of important local and international representatives, but women were primarily cited in a less visible article which dealt with experiences of using the female condom98. The negligence of women in The Ethiopian Herald is hardly a result of a deliberate strategy on behalf of the newspaper to suppress female voices, as the editorial policy demands gender sensitivity. Nevertheless, the coverage appears to be reflective of a general tendency in the Ethiopian media of marginalization and stereotyping of women (Gubae, 2009; Kenaw, 2006; Nardos, 2006). A contributing factor to the gender imbalance in the columns of The Ethiopian Herald may be the uneven gender proportion in the newsroom, where there were only two female journalists at the most at any point in time during the fieldwork period 2007–11 – out of a total journalist population of approximately 20. In this regard, a study of news content in one private and one state-owned newspaper in Ethiopia suggests that there is a direct correlation between the proportion of women in the newsroom and sensitivity to gender issues (Seble, 2006). In contrast to Addis Zemen and some radio stations (Haile-Giorgis, 2008; Mulu, 2009), The Ethiopian Herald does not presently have a column specifically addressing gender issues. The Ethiopian Herald clearly avoids using quotes from anonymous persons. Only four instances of unnamed sources are detected in the studied time period, all of whom are foreigners whose identity is rather unimportant for the news story. Open source attribution differentiates The Ethiopian Herald from private publications, where anonymous sourcing is the order of the day (Tizita, 2008). As such, it testifies to the detailed and facts-oriented reporting style of the Ethiopian state media outlets (cf. 3.4.3). At the same time it illustrates the lack of controversial information conveyed by these outlets. The persons quoted are not afraid to be named because the information they share will not affect them negatively anyway. Accordingly, correct attribution of titles and names becomes an important component of the newspaper’s portrayal of officialdom. In some cases, it emerges as a demanding exercise for reporters to get the credentials straight. Illustratively, one article quotes an officer 98

‘Condomize campaign discusses female condoms’, The Ethiopian Herald, 9 December 2011, p. 2

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whose proper title is ‘Federal Police Central Intelligence and Crime Intelligence Directorate Director Deputy Commissioner Demelash Gebremichael’99; another refers to ‘Agriculture Cooperatives Development International Volunteer Overseas Cooperative Association Ethiopia Representative Jhon Bick Rieley’100. Thus, source attribution becomes an integral part of the state media’s affirmation of public authority.

Figure 7.9: Genres in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald

7.3.2.3. Genres The majority of items appearing in The Ethiopian Herald in the studied period – 70% - may be classified as protocol news (figure 7.9). As noted earlier (7.2.2), this is a journalistic genre where the focus lies on reproducing official information rather than encouraging a critical posture to the material by pursuing independent journalistic ideals (Akinfeleye, 1982). Articles within this genre are organized according to a standard formula where the source takes the lead and the journalist assumes an accommodating role. The emphasis remains with the source and its presentation rather than with the issue itself. Thus, even though a large amount of stories focus on health issues, very few concentrate on activities in hospitals, health clinics and so forth. Instead, the newspaper writes about conferences and reports where improvements in health operations are said to be very important, but the focus stays on formalities and officials. Thus, the conference happening turns into a news event in itself,

99

‘Police say have solid evidence on suspected terrorists’, The Ethiopian Herald, 6 September 2011, p. 1 ‘Union builds commercial feed manufacturing’, The Ethiopian Herald, 6 September 2011, p. 2

100

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as illustrated by this excerpt from the reporting of a climate meeting where the attention remains on who attended the event: «The meeting was attended by former Prime Minister of Korea and CGGI Board Chairman Han Seung-soo; the UAE Special Envoy for Energy and Climate Change and Chief Executive Officer of Masdar, Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber; Minister Trevor Manuel in the Presidency for the National Planning Commission of South Africa as well as by various other influential leaders who specialise in green growth and climate change.» (‘Africa can increase food yield despite climate change challenges’, Aregu Balleh, The Ethiopian Herald, 8 December 2011, p. 5) Officials and dignitaries are accordingly taken as witnesses of what is happening on the ground rather than the users themselves. Thus, typically, an article about a health training scheme reports that, «The Ministry of Health said accelerated health officers’ training programme implemented during the previous six years was successful»101. The quote is accompanied by three other local and international officials who likewise affirm that the training was ‘fruitful’, ‘successful’ etc. Nobody who actually attended the training is asked about their opinion, however. Another important category in the proposed genre breakdown chart (figure 7.9) is the analytic article. This is a genre worthy of note, and it actually comprises far more than 11% of the newspaper content if we were to measure space instead of number of articles. This is because the analytic article is lengthier than the protocol news item; usually half a page or more. It goes in depth on a relevant social topic, for instance child mortality, environmental degradation, the humanitarian crisis on the Horn of Africa, or even technology. The analysis appears to be written on basis of reports and experts consulted. Direct quotes from persons are occasionally included, though usually the article is written descriptively and authoritatively without use of citations. The writer is normally a senior journalist, alternatively an external contributor with expert knowledge. The analytic articles differ from the protocol articles in their generic disposition: While protocol articles are essentially promotional and emphasize the efforts of the government, analytic articles are educative and direct the attention to the subject matter itself. The analytic article is less promoted, however, appearing somewhere in the second half of the newspaper. The feature article, here defined as a fairly long story where the journalist has actively gone out to report on a subject with openness for different perspectives, appears once in every two newspaper issues on average. It is especially featured in the newspaper’s weekend edition. This is usually the only place where average people are given an opportunity to express themselves. The topics treated in the feature articles are nevertheless soft and of uncontroversial character. It appears that the recent refurbishing of the newspaper entails that features will achieve higher status in the future (cf. 7.3.3). 101

‘Ministry says health officers’ training successful’, The Ethiopian Herald, 6 September 2011, p. 2

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Page 3 of every issue is devoted to editorials and commentaries. The editorial (usually one, sometimes two), is written by the editor-in-chief, although everybody expects him to propagate the government’s view rather than his own. The topic is usually picked from the day’s news agenda. The standard tone of The Ethiopian Herald’s editorial is positive rather than critical, celebrating progress, development and commitment to the nation. The adjacent commentary or opinion article on the same page occasionally appears more critical in tone. Whenever criticism is expressed, however, it is inclined to be aimed at groups which are against official policy. This creates an asymmetrical ground for discussion, because oppositional viewpoints are hardly ever printed in Herald. To illustrate, on 5 May 2011, a commentator scorns people who spread ‘cynical views’ about the planned Grand Renaissance Dam. However, in the studied period, the newspaper did not publish any letter (or journalistic article, for that matter) critical to the dam project, thus the concerned commentator attacks someone who is essentially non-existent in the public discussion as far as The Ethiopian Herald is concerned. As such, The Ethiopian Herald stands out not as an arena for public debate, but as a pulpit for public lecturing where the speakers principally share the same view. This condition notwithstanding, there are occasions where criticism against the governing power sifts through in Herald’s columns, though in polite manner. The editor-inchief himself, Dejene Tesemma, has used the opportunity on a few occasions to disagree with government policy and action. One example is a lengthy commentary piece on 4 October 2011, where the editor points to the bleak chances for expressing nonconformist views in contemporary Ethiopia. Writes Dejene, «In absence of vibrant competitive views, challengers, who can tell their opponents to clean their stains, there would be no sincere progress. Political maturity and profound civility blossom in a situation where mutual rivalry and sincere competition is alive. […] Only through genuine criticism and constructive comments one would be able to see one’s appropriate place. In a situation, where everyone tunes to the same pattern of thinking, in a situation where differences are not appreciated, vibrancy and vitality of ideas would be reduced to a moonshine.» (‘Challengers are mirrors’, Dejene Tesemma (editorin-chief), The Ethiopian Herald, 4 October 2011, p 3) Even though the government is not explicitly named in the article, anybody familiar with Ethiopian contemporary discourse will read the commentary as an analogy to the ails of current public dialogue in the country. While the commentary is likely to be perceived as a provocation, the editor-in-chief is safe to express the view as he has gained confidence after having stayed loyal to the owner for many years. The article is thus signed by full name. On other occasions, the signature may be a pen name (pseudonym), should the author want to avoid personal confrontations of any kind. For the most part, however, the opinions expressed on the op-ed pages of The Ethiopian Herald are supportive of government policy and offer few surprises as regards their political posture. 132

Figure 7.10: Topics covered in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald

7.3.2.4. Topics Most stories published in The Ethiopian Herald (63%) could be classified as developmentspecific (figure 7.10). Even those which are not in this category are customarily related to development in one way or the other. Thus, one could safely say that The Ethiopian Herald is inspired by development journalism in its content orientation. This also implies, however, that topic areas which are not motivated by a development discourse are routinely neglected. Most strikingly, sudden events do not have a place in the newspaper. Accidents rarely, if ever, get any coverage in Herald. The closest example in the sampling period is a severe car 133

accident on 27 September 2011 which caused the death of nine members of the Tigray Police Orchestra on their way to Sudan for a music performance. However, the accident itself is not covered by the newspaper, only a letter of condolences sent by the Sudanese ambassador to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi a week after, primarily emphasizing brotherhood ties between Sudan and Ethiopia102. This serves to exemplify the sense of control that pervades the state media’s news style. One is prompted to query whether such items should be classified as news at all. Rather than being characterized by novelty and unexpectedness – qualities usually associated with news – the stories are marked by controlled disclosure. If insisting on the news genre, the reports in The Ethiopian Herald might better be described as tamed news. In the sampled material, stories relating to energy were found to make up a substantial amount (7%). This is largely due to the focus on the Grand Renaissance Dam, whose foundation stone was laid in April 2011. The project has triggered reactions from the downstream countries Sudan and Egypt (cf. 2.2.1), but in The Ethiopian Herald, the coverage presents the less problematic sides. Indeed, the Grand Renaissance Dam is presented by the newspaper as a unifying effort by the Ethiopian people. In this case, The Ethiopian Herald goes further than what journalistic objectivity standards would normally permit; it engages in direct promotion as well. On 29 April 2011, the newspaper introduced a new permanent slogan at the bottom of its front page: «The Grand Renaissance Dam – a Gateway to Prosperity», thus removing any doubt as to the stance of the newspaper on the issue (figure 7.11). It therefore comes as no surprise that any article related to the dam construction – as well as another 12 stories in the constructed news month concerning the Nile basin conundrum – function as sheer acclaim of the project. Even the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) is mentioned in an article where it expresses support to the Renaissance Dam103, constituting a rare acknowledgement of the organization by The Ethiopian Herald insofar as ONLF was officially de- Figure 7.11: Front page of The Ethiopian Herald with new slogan on signated a terrorist group bottom, 29 April 2011 102 103

‘Ambassador expresses condolence over artists’ death’, The Ethiopian Herald, 4 October 2011, p 1 ‘ONLF highlights significance of Renaissance Dam to conquer poverty’, The Ethiopian Herald, 29 April 2011, p

2

134

by the Parliament in June 2011. Thus, in issues of particular national importance, Herald may take a step away from its otherwise detached presentation form and function as an active promoter of official policy. On the other hand, the sampled material shows less evidence of national promotion aimed directly at the international community. There are seven articles concerning tourism and travel, which are not much considering that one of the aims of The Ethiopian Herald is to promote the country as a travel destination as part of its national image-building strategy. Potentially negative issues are less covered by The Ethiopian Herald. Illustratively, of the 18 stories that focus on governance, only one deals with corruption (and it concerns criticism of international corruption indexes rather than a specific case of corruption). Likewise, terrorism, defence and conflict resolution comprise only 2% of the articles, even though the area represents a top priority for the government. Finally, as pointed out with regard to the previous analysis of sources (7.3.2.2), party politics are practically non-existent in the columns of The Ethiopian Herald. Of the approximately 400 articles scrutinized in this study, only one deals with the Parliament, and it does not mention any political party. Thus, when another study concludes that at least 15% of the content in The Ethiopian Herald concern politics (Ward, 2011, p. 60), it must stem from a category other than party politics, or be a result of the data gathering being conducted in the same year as the national elections in 2010. The combined analysis of sources, topics and images in the present study shows that political parties and their representatives are not at all part of The Ethiopian Herald’s news agenda. 7.3.2.5. Origin of articles An overview of news sources (figure 7.12) reveals the important position of ENA for Herald’s content, accounting for 51% of the journalistic stories (commentaries not counted). However, the proportion of ENA news items appears to have decreased lately, as a 2008 survey found that as many as 86% of the articles in The Ethiopian Herald were signed by either ENA or Walta (Tizita, 2008, p. 107). ENA and Walta combined account for 65% of the stories in the current study. Nevertheless, the dominance of the news agencies is less than the figures seem to indicate, as many of the agencies’ items are short news bulletins in contrast to lengthier articles produced by the newspaper’s own journalists. All ENA articles could be defined within the protocol news genre (cf. 7.3.2.3). ENA’s competitor Walta is gaining ground in The Ethiopian Herald’s columns, though still well behind the official news agency. Like ENA, Walta stands out as a disseminator of protocol news. Although the current study does not involve in-depth textual analysis, Walta’s articles appear to carry the same journalistic inclination as ENA’s, with strong focus on conferences and development issues.

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Figure 7.12: Origin of articles in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald

Figure 7.13: Geographical origin of articles in a constructed 2011 news month in The Ethiopian Herald

Note: The ‘other’ category includes Ambo, Andola, Assela, Assosa, Dessie, Dilla, Gambella, Gimbi, Harar, Hossana, Humera, Jijiga, Maichew, Mettu, Mizan, Nekemte and Wolkoite.

7.3.2.6. Geographical origin As expected, most articles (74%) report from Addis Ababa (figure 7.13), as this is the city where practically all decisions of national importance are made in Ethiopia and the only city with a sizeable population. To this end, it is rather surprising that as many as 26% of the articles where the geographical origin is known come from places outside of Addis Ababa. 136

This is largely thanks to the extensive regional network of ENA. The Herald’s own journalists do sometimes travel outside of Addis Ababa, but most articles from the regions still emanate from ENA. 7.3.3. The Ethiopian Herald’s overhaul in December 2011 As noted earlier, the visual appearance of The Ethiopian Herald changed in December 2011 with introduction of full colour print and reduction of size. Moreover, the newspaper simultaneously refurbished its journalistic profile. The changes are noteworthy vis-à-vis the style traditionally associated with the government’s print publications. Four modifications stand out besides the upgrading in visual appearance: Firstly, there appears to be less use of news agency material and more use of own journalistic production.

The

front

pages are now primarily devoted to the newspaper’s own stories rather than bulletin news from ENA. Secondly, feature stories attain more prominence than before. They are now placed on the front page, with the story continuing inside (cf. figure 7.5). Accompanying large, lively photographs give the impression that the journalist has actually been out in the field for information

collection.

Ordinary people are acknowledged and given a voice in the stories. Most

notably,

nevertheless, is the acknowledgement

of

the Figure 7.14: Front page of The Ethiopian Herald, 14 Dec 2011 political opposition. This (refurbished) 137

is demonstrated by the main story on 13 December 2011, which consists of a dispute over development policy between a state minister and an opposition party official (figure 7.14). President of the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), Mushe Semu, is quoted as saying, «Ethiopia is a country where many are still suffering from famine»104 – a provocative statement of the kind not often previously seen in print in the state media. Fourthly, the op-ed page shows signs of more vibrancy than before. A letter from a reader attacking an official institution is published. The writer scorns staff at Addis Ababa University and calls the institution ‘reckless’ and ‘undemocratic’105. The tone of the letter is far from the reserved articulation which normally characterizes expression in The Ethiopian Herald. It must be underlined, however, that the refurbishing of The Ethiopian Herald occurred in the very last week of the sampling period. Thus, only two issues of the remodelled newspaper were included in the analysis. It remains to be seen whether the new editing style of Herald will persist in the long run, but the first few modernized issues marks an intentional change towards contemporary layout, less protocol news, as well as a possible beginning of recognition of oppositional voices. 7.4. Summary Using a mainly quantitative content analysis approach, the chapter has sought an inquiry of journalistic content in two of the three media organizations under scrutiny in the research project – ENA and The Ethiopian Herald. The analysis reveals a strong development focus in the two organizations’ news coverage where achievements are objectified through facts and figures so as to induce an unbiased reporting style. The sense of objective news presentation is central to the idea of protocol news, where the intention is to copy reports and conferences rather than critically engaging with the information. In certain cases, however, the state media bypass the objective reporting vocabulary and openly favour government policy. This is outstandingly exemplified with the journalistic treatment of the Grand Renaissance Dam, whose commencement prompted The Ethiopian Herald to campaign for the project both through optimistic news reports, flattering commentaries, praising pictorials, as well as the introduction of a new permanent slogan at the bottom of the newspaper’s front page, proclaiming ‘The Grand Renaissance Dam – a Gateway to Prosperity’ (figure 7.14). The extended engagement by the state media for the Grand Renaissance Dam culminated on Press Freedom Day 3 May 2011, when State Minister of Government Communication Affairs Shimelis Kemal, who is also chairman of the board of EPA, in a joint conference co-organized by the private and the state media extended an official note of thanks to all media outlets that had contributed to the promotion of the Grand Renaissance Dam project (cf. figure 9.6). The Ethiopian Herald could safely accept the gratitude. 104 105

‘Growth, development in focus’, Mekonnen Teshome, The Ethiopian Herald, 13 December 2011, p. 1 ‘Change@AAU: Really?’ Dejene Sojato, The Ethiopian Herald, 13 December 2011, p. 3

138

Furthermore, the analysis questions common portrayals of The Ethiopian Herald as a political party organ for EPRDF. Conducted in a non-electoral time period, the study finds that the ruling party is rarely mentioned in news articles produced by ENA and never in The Ethiopian Herald during the news month constructed for the study. Relatedly, the political opposition was not referred to at all in ENA headlines over the year studied and only in a few cases by The Ethiopian Herald. Parliamentary processes and debate are given hardly any attention. The study suggests that the negligence of party politics could partly be explained by means of the nearly monopolized situation in Ethiopian governance and politics, where political decision-making has been removed from the elected bodies and instead been relocated to the government ministries. This being the case, the study nevertheless detects a notable change in the editing style of The Ethiopian Herald in the last week of inquiry. As of 13 December 2011, the newspaper, known as a mouthpiece for ruling interests, refurbished its graphic profile, opened up for coverage of political disputes, and emphasized feature stories more than before. Only time will tell whether the change in form and content is indicative of a more profound change in journalistic mentality in The Ethiopian Herald.

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Chapter 8 Qualitative content analysis of an ETV documentary

8.1. Introduction During the period August 2009 to January 2010, ETV broadcast a documentary series which instigated heated debate in media circles and beyond. An in-house production of ETV, the documentary aimed to evaluate the performance of the private press in Ethiopia since its inception in the early 1990s and until the present day. The documentary concludes with a strong verdict against the independent press, claiming the press has been irresponsible, unethical and heavily biased in favour of the political opposition. The documentary’s judgement is based on massive amounts of evidence and expert commentaries, presented in six different programmes totalling more than two hours of airtime. After the broadcasting of the six programmes, which took place in two segments in August and December 2009, a new series of programmes followed where the general public and commentators were invited to respond to issues raised in the documentary. Another eight programmes were thus produced and broadcast on ETV. The documentary series on the private press represented the largest undertaking in its genre at the time when it was produced (personal communication with Teshale Bekele, executive producer, 6 September 2011). As soon as it was broadcast, accusations surfaced in the local media and through international rights organizations claiming that the documentary was part of a larger smear campaign orchestrated by the government with the intention of seriously harming the private media.106 This had a particular reason, as the broadcasting of

106

E.g.: a) ‘Editors of Addis Neger flee the country’, Kaleyesus Bekele, 5 December 2009. Available at: http://en.ethiopianreporter.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1985&Itemid=26

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the documentary coincided with repeated assaults on the private press published in the state-owned daily Addis Zemen, eventually leading to the termination of the privately-owned critical weekly Addis Neger on 28 November 2009. In addition, the documentary was broadcast just a few months prior to the upcoming national elections in May 2010, which made the production seem like a strategic move by the government in order to prevent new confrontations with the media akin to the clampdown on the private press after the 2005 elections (cf. 2.3.3.5)107. The documentary series has been chosen for in-depth analysis in this section of the dissertation for three main reasons. Firstly, because of its contentious topic, highly relevant to the focus area of the dissertation. Comprising an account of the history of the independent press in Ethiopia, the documentary visualizes the tensions between the authorities and the media in several interesting ways; not to mention that the producing agency itself, ETV, has a role in the documentary in that it has some sort of relation to both the independent media industry and the governing powers. This opens up for a meta-perspective in the analysis, i.e. a perspective which looks at the case of a media institution reporting on other media institutions. Secondly, a number of the persons who appear in the documentary or were involved in the production coincide with those who offered to serve as informants in the current PhD project. There is a match of no less than 12 persons between the documentary and the research informants, which testifies to an overlap in the subject matter. Thirdly, without prior knowledge, I was used as an expert source in the documentary. In programme 4, one of my co-edited journal articles is used as evidence of the misbehaviour of the past private press. This subsequently gives me an opportunity to assess the way in which research material that was supposed to be balanced and non-aligned is used as part of an argument in a documentary produced by ETV. Although the main purpose of the analysis is to provide insight into programme content on ETV, it also serves to get an appreciation of production processes of ETV/ERTA. The research approach is qualitative, thus offering a different perspective on official media content than the analysis in chapter 7, which employed a largely quantitative approach. Importantly, the analysis of the concerned documentary series may not be representational

b) ‘Weekly forced to stop publishing, its journalists flee abroad’, Reporters Without Borders, 4 December 2009. Available at: http://en.rsf.org/ethiopia-weekly-forced-to-stop-publishing-04-12-2009,35258.html c) ‘Half-yearly caselist’, International PEN, Writers in Prison Committee, 31 December 2009. Available at: http://www.internationalpen.org.uk/files/dmfile/CaselistJul09.pdf 107 a) ‘‘Mesfin Negash: ‘We shouldn’t give the dictators what they want, which is our silence at home and abroad’, Joe Edgar, 28 November 2011. Available at: http://www.sampsoniaway.org/blog/2011/11/28/mesfinnegash-“we-shouldnt-give-the-dictators-what-they-want-which-is-our-silence-at-home-and-abroad-”/ b) ‘Ethiopian newspaper shuts down, editors flee’, Peter Heinlein, 6 December 2009. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Ethiopian-Newspaper-Shuts-Down-Editors-Flee---78646927.html c) ‘Independent newspaper Addis Neger closes and its editors flee Ethiopia, fearing perspecution’, statement, International Press Institute, Naomi Hunt, 7 December 2009. Available at: http://www.freemedia.at/pressroom/public-statements/press-releases/singleview/article/independent-newspaper-addis-neger-closes-and-itseditors-flee-ethiopia-fearing-persecution.html

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of general programme content on ETV. To the contrary, the documentary is chosen partly because of its unusually contentious topic, offering a perspective on ETV’s treatment of an issue where the government is an evident stakeholder. Accordingly, the analysis will consider to what extent and in which ways ETV promotes an official line as part of the documentary’s agenda. The sensitivity of the subject illuminates, for example, the journalists’ claim that higher officials intervened in the production process (cf. 8.8). However, one cannot deduct from this analysis a general conclusion that higher officials habitually intervene in the production of ETV programmes. Nor can one conclude that programme content on ETV normally advances a strong political argument. Nevertheless, the analysis of the documentary series demonstrates the prevailing potential of ETV to engage in controversial issues and advance arguments with clear political ramifications. It follows from the approach outlined above that the analysis of the ETV documentary seeks to narrow the gap between examinations of media content and examinations of media production. The first part of the analysis therefore consists of a close reading of the documentary programmes, with emphasis on the major frames and rhetoric that emerge from the programme presentation (8.4–8.7). However, because of the research project’s intention to comprehend the mechanisms that come prior to the dissemination of media content, the analysis moves into a second part which discusses the processes and conditions that informed the production (8.8). This part relies mostly on interviews with actors involved, both journalists and other players. In terms of methodology, the analysis draws mainly on approaches associated with framing theory, in addition to some application of rhetorical analysis. Though often concentrating on media content alone, framing theory has the potential to bridge content analysis with analyses of production processes by incorporating the frame-building perspective. This chapter therefore begins with an explanation of why framing analysis is regarded as a relevant method in the study (8.2), followed by an overview of the episodes and genres of the documentary series (8.3). The question of genre and appending rhetoric is revisited towards the end of the chapter, where I discuss whether the ETV documentary could be said to constitute propaganda (8.9). 8.2. Methodology: Framing analysis The present analysis of the ETV documentary series draws mainly on methods used in conjunction with media framing theory. The research interest in media frames grew out the 1970s’ focus on the ‘construction’ of mediated reality. Both Gaye Tuchman (1978b) and Todd Gitlin (1980) drew on Erving Goffman’s (1974) original frame concept when analysing coverage of major events and issues in US American newspapers and television programmes. However, a systematic approach to framing theory as a methodology in media studies emerged only in the 1990s; followed by the 2000s, which saw a proliferation of case studies on media frames and media framing (Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011, figure 1 p. 102). In his seminal 1993 143

article, Robert M. Entman suggests an explanation of framing which remains one the most, if not the most, acknowledged definition in contemporary framing research literature. In his view, framing is a process which implies, first and foremost, selection and salience. The verb ‘to frame’ is thus defined as: «to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicative text» (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Media framing accordingly points to the way in which issues are selected and accentuated in and by the media. This selection and accentuation process has potentially tremendous ramifications beyond the media sphere as it involves problem definition, cause explanation, moral judgement, and the power to suggest remedies (Entman, 1993). Herein lies the crux of media framing theory, presuming that the dominant media frames have an ensuing effect on audience interpretation, social behaviour, policy-making, and so forth. Media framing theory in other words assumes a profound relationship between media production, media content and media effects. Along these lines, Entman (1993) and Dietram A. Scheufele (1999, 2000) suggest that framing takes place at different stages in the communication process, identifiable by media frames, which are construed from the text and tell us what the issue is all about, and audience frames, which evolve at the receiving end and could be described as «mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information» (Entman, 1993, p. 53). Media framing theory has nevertheless struggled to operationalize its emphasis on an interlinked relationship between the different stages of the communication process in actual research practice. To the contrary, specific studies tend to be preoccupied with isolated stages in the communication process. To illustrate, media frames have been studied thoroughly in broadcasting (e.g. Avraham and First, 2010; Gavriely-Nuri and Balas, 2010) and print media formats (e.g. Brewer and Macafee, 2007; Peng, 2008), although, as pointed out by Jesper Strömbäck and Peter van Aelst (2010), rarely in conjunction. On another level, analyses of audience frames have sought to determine effects on public opinion through experimental research methods (e.g. Brewer et al., 2003; Richardson, 2005) and on the basis of authentic media content (e.g. Birkland and Lawrence, 2009), but still mostly in isolation from the other stages in the communication process. The problem with many of the focused studies, argues Scheufele (1999, p. 117) with exemplar reference to Iyengar (1991), is that they have tended to assume a direct link between media frames and audience impact without providing any explanation for the link. They remain frame studies rather than framing studies, as it were. Equally surprising is the lack of empirical studies at the other end of the communication model. That is, studies of media frames, of which there are many, are rarely substantiated with research on how the framing transpires in the newsroom in the first place. Framing models do indeed theorize these processes through the notion of frame-building (figure 8.1), but the phenomenon is less often subject to empirical analysis (De Vreese, 2003; Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011). As a modest response to this vacuum, the present study will bring in the production processes as a perspective supplementing the analysis of media frames. The study will however not enter into an analysis of audience frames or perform any 144

type of reception analysis. The research is thus confined to the production processes and the ensuing media content, while frame-setting and framing effects will not be part of the analysis, neither in this chapter nor in other parts of the dissertation.

Figure 8.1: An integrated process model of framing Frame-building Framing in the newsroom

Frame-setting Media frames

Framing effects Audience frames

Note: The figure is a slightly abridged version of De Vreese’s (2005, p. 52) integrated process model of framing.

The first level of the analysis (8.4–8.7), which consists of identification of media frames, relies mostly on qualitative content analysis with some application of rhetorical analysis. The aim of this part is to identify the dominant frames of the different sections of the documentary series. To detect media frames, the analysis will make use of recognized methods described in the research literature, though going beyond approaches that focus primarily on linguistic analysis. In a classic recipe for frame analysis, Entman (1993) maintains that the researcher must look for items that are «manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgements» (p. 52). Entman points especially to the importance of considering salience of the different items in the media report, a consideration often ignored in textual content analysis (Entman, 1993, p. 57). Propagating a more quantitative approach to frame analysis, Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman (2007) emphasize that systematic coding of words and phrases should be part of any comprehensive analysis of media frames. To them, the testing of intercoder reliability is an essential feature of systematic framing research. The present study, however, will rely to a greater degree on a qualitative approach, not least because a detailed analysis of words and expressions is only moderately likely to identify the most salient frames in the ETV documentary series. Some of the perspectives I am interested in investigating beyond the significance of words and expressions, are: narrative structures (which techniques does the documentarian make use of to develop the story?); speaking privileges (who is allowed to speak?); argumentative style (what type of evidence is used and in which way?); categorization (how are different segments and eras of the private press compared and contrasted?); and self-positioning (how does ETV position itself in the documentary?). All these perspectives point to the dominant frames in the documentary and will therefore form an important part of the analysis in addition to linguistic perspectives. References will also be made to rhetorical theory where relevant for the discussion of argumentation and narrative structure. 145

The second level of the analysis (8.8) will take a step back in the communication process by considering the production phase. This is, in other words, the level which informs the manufacture of specific media frames. In this part I will draw on Scheufele’s (1999) framebuilding concept, which describes how the media organization and its journalists generate and shape media frames. Inspired by agenda-building theory (Cobb and Elder, 1972), research on frame-building involves studies of «organizational or structural factors of the media system» as well as «individual characteristics of journalists» and considerations of how these conditions have an impact on the emergent media content (Scheufele, 1999, p. 115). The present analysis of the ETV documentary will consider each of these perspectives, mainly on the basis of interviews with journalists and other actors who were directly or indirectly involved in the production. However, as will be argued in the appending discussion (8.8), the two perspectives on media system and individual reporter characteristics respectively do not at all appear to carry equal weight in the impact on media frames in the ETV documentary. On the contrary, organizational and structural factors pertaining to the media situation are found to be vastly dominant vis-à-vis characteristics of individual journalists as influences in the frame-building process. This finding, I will argue, indicates that established frame-building theory has a conceptual inclination which makes it more compatible with liberal media environments than with the conditions of a controlled media society such as Ethiopia. 8.3. Overview of programme sections and genres The 14 programmes in the ETV documentary series consist of four sections which belong to three broader sets of television genres. The first two sections (programmes 1–3 and 4–6) comprise of the documentary itself, alternating between historic footage, contemporary scenes, expert interviews, voice-over, and documentary evidence such as photographs and quotes from newspapers. The mixture of different types of media material and the combination of narrative voices and interviews/recordings ascribe the first six programmes to known formats of contemporary television documentaries (Kilborn and Izod, 1997). The documentary is characterized by classic realism conventions and could not at all be associated with popular mixed-genre or hybrid genre formats which purposely challenge traditional differentiations between facts and fiction (Hill, 2007). The third section (programmes 7–10) consists of audience responses, both in the form of street interviews and recitation of viewer letters. This section represents a genre not often seen on leading global television channels. Its style is related to the letters to the editor section in printed newspapers or chat rooms on online news channels. The broad idea is that the public is invited to respond freely to issues raised in the programmes. The fourth and last section (programmes 11–14) consists of a prolonged discussion of the documentary in four studio debates with invited guests from a spectrum of stakeholders from the Ethiopian media environment. The debate is led by two hosts from ETV, and the conversation tone is calm and issue-oriented. 146

All 14 programmes are part of the analysis in the present study. However, programmes 4–6 will receive the broadest treatment as these programmes were regarded as the most controversial and thereby attracted more debate in alternative media channels than the other programmes. Broadcast on ETV1, the documentary series was produced and narrated in Amharic, like most programmes on the channel. The series was translated into English for the purpose of this analysis108.

Figure 8.2: ETV documentary series on free press with follow-up programmes: Overview Prog

Title

Duration

Aired *

1

The history of the free press in Ethiopia, part 1

15:50

19 Aug 2009

2

The history of the free press in Ethiopia, part 2

20:21

20 Aug 2009

3

The history of the free press in Ethiopia, part 3

19:25

20 Aug 2009

4

ETV political documentary: The birth and growth of the free press in Ethiopia, part 1

28:33

11 Dec 2009

5

ETV political documentary: The birth and growth of the free press in Ethiopia, part 2

29:31

13 Dec 2009

6

ETV political documentary: The birth and growth of the free press in Ethiopia, part 3

20:18

15 Dec 2009

7

Public responses to ‘The birth and growth of the free press in Ethiopia’, part 1 (interviews with the public)

12:40

30 Dec 2009

8

Public responses to ‘The birth and growth of the free press in Ethiopia’, part 2 (interviews with the public)

4:21

30 Dec 2009

9

Public responses to ‘The birth and growth of the free press in Ethiopia’, part 3 (interviews with the public)

5:29

30 Dec 2009

10

Public responses to ‘The birth and the growth of the free press in Ethiopia’, part 4 (interviews with the public)

14:35

30 Dec 2009

11

The impact of the ETV documentary ‘The birth and growth of the free press in Ethiopia’, part 1 (studio discussion)

37:21

31 Dec 2009

12

The impact of the ETV documentary ‘The birth and growth of the free press in Ethiopia’, part 1 (studio discussion)

37:12

2 Jan 2010

13

The impact of the ETV documentary ‘The birth and growth of the free press in Ethiopia’, part 1 (studio discussion)

28:51

2 Jan 2010

14

The impact of the ETV documentary ‘The birth and growth of the free press in Ethiopia’, part 1 (studio discussion)

36:39

2 Jan 2010

Note (*): I have not been able to establish the exact broadcasting date of each programme. The date in the column to the far right is the date on which the programmes were uploaded at www.ethiotube.net, which is usually one or a few days after the original broadcast on ETV. Each programme had many reruns on ETV in the relevant time period.

108

My sincere gratitude goes to Amanuel Gebru, Nebiat Gebissa, Senait Hargos and especially Zewge Abate for translating the 14 programmes from Amharic to English.

147

8.4. Programmes 1–3: Responsible government frame Although it did generate reactions, the first section (programmes 1–3) caused less public controversy than the section broadcast almost four months later (programmes 4–6). This may partly be explained by the somewhat more inclusive approach in this section than in the next, illustrated by the relative magnitude of private press journalists who are interviewed. In their statements, the journalists focus predominantly on the contemporary media rather than conditions in the past. Overall, rather than constituting a comprehensive historical documentary, the first three programmes serve to build a case for contemporary Ethiopian media policy as a telling contrast to the terrible conditions of the past. This argument emerges both in the narrative structure of the documentary, the selection of footage, the choice of quotes, and the range of informants. The first programme opens with a rather long sound bite by EBA’s director Desta Tesfaw which serves to define the focal point of the upcoming investigation. «What makes

Figure 8.3: Persons interviewed, programmes 1–3 Name

Position

Speaking time, min:sec

Officials: Desta Tesfaw

Director, Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (EBA)

9:55 (12 clips)

Adamu Haile

Head of Commercial Dep, Berhanena Selam Printing Press

0:45 (1 clip)

Abera Beyera

Human relations development officer, Central Printing Press

0:42 (1 clip)

Researchers/experts: Hallelujah Lule

Journalist/researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

7:45 (13 clips)

Solomon Endale

Legal expert

1:32 (2 clips)

Kahsay Gebreigziabher

Veteran journalist, various publications

3:36 (9 clips)

Mesfin Negash

Editor, Addis Neger

2:59 (5 clips)

Tamrat Gebregiorgis

Editor, Fortune

2:24 (4 clips)

Tamrat Negera

Editor, Addis Neger

2:21 (2 clips)

Elizabeth Equbay

Journalist, Addis Admas

1:26 (4 clips)

Tamrat Haile

Managing editor, Kumneger Magazine

1:18 (1 clip)

Almaz Abera

Journalist/novelist; wife of Baalu Girma, missing journalist (cf. 4.2.2)

0:53 (1 clip)

Unnamed female journalist

Addis Neger

0:10 (1 clip)

Independent journalists:

148

these outlets independent,» says Desta, «is that they report freely. They function as free media» (programme 1, 00:10). The task of the documentarian is hence defined as researching this claim and interrogating whether today’s private press operate in a free media environment and to what extent they responsibly acknowledge the duties that come with this privilege. To answer the question, the documentary consults a range of representatives from the private press. Indeed, the high number of interviewed persons from the private media in the first three programmes is significant. A total of eight independent109 journalists are interviewed, making it the largest constituency in the documentary. The remaining informants on screen in the first three programmes are: one representative of the regulator (Desta Tesfaw, EBA); two from state-owned printing houses; one researcher; and one legal expert (figure 8.3). As regards the selection of independent journalists, they represent a variety of publications, including the two most popular outlets at the time – Addis Admas and Addis Neger. It is significant to note that three of the interviewed journalists belong to Addis Neger, which went into a phase of intimidation at the time when the documentary was aired. The interviewed journalists can therefore not be said to belong to a handpicked group of government-friendly puppets in the private media. Overall, the independent journalists testify that they are free to report and write whatever they want. «Personally, I have not experienced any intimidation,» imparts one journalist in the programme immediately after Desta’s proclamation that the private media in Ethiopia are free (programme 1, 00:45). «I just write what I think is right. I’ve never used a pen name110», says another journalist (programme 1, 02:50), followed by two additional testimonies of the presence of press freedom in Ethiopia. Interestingly, the first four and a half minutes of the documentary consist solely of quotes from independent

journalists

(plus EBA’s director). Only at almost five minutes into the programme does the voice of the narrator arrive. The

documentary

thus

appears at first sight to be anything but propagandistic; it is the interviewed subjects who carry the narration and they do not come out as government cadres.

Figure 8.4: Screenshot, EBA director Desta Tesfaw in office

109

‘Independent journalist’ here means a journalist working for another media outlet than those belonging to the state. 110 Pseudonym

149

There is a visual difference, however, in the way that the EBA director and the other informants are presented in the documentary. Desta Tesfaw is filmed in his office, sitting behind a desk with a highly visible ETV microphone placed on the table as if in a press briefing arrangement (figure 8.4). The image communicates an official atmosphere, which in combination with Desta’s formal dress and moderate voice underlines the authority of the speaker. This stands in contrast to the other speakers, who are occasionally interviewed in their office, occasionally outside, but never situated behind a desk with a fixed microphone. One should be cautious not to assume that the visual representation of the speakers is deliberatively intended by the documentary team (it could have a very practical explanation), but for the audience, the difference is potentially significant regardless of the intention. The EBA director is portrayed as an official representative, but more than that, he is presented as the objective voice who explains and rationalizes rather than interprets and opines. He thereby assumes a footing equivalent to that of the production team, which is one that promotes factuality and detachment. The sense of association with the broadcaster does indeed recur in the studio debate following the documentary series, in which Desta, together with Shimelis Kemal of OGCA, are put in a position which makes them partially answerable for the documentary (cf. 8.8). Before turning to historical footage, the documentary pays a visit to the printing press. As part of the implicit backdrop of the documentary, many viewers would be aware of allegations in the not so distant past claiming that higher officials in the state administration have given orders to the printing houses to refuse the printing of oppositional newspapers, as of latest in the turmoil after the 2005 elections (IREX, 2009, p. 132). However, the human relations development officer of Central Printing Press assures that the allegations are false: «We print whatever comes to us, and do not take orders on what to publish and not. The government doesn’t tell us to publish this and not this, even though we are a government institution» (programme 1, 05:00). Notably, the narrator does not inform the viewer about the allegations of printing bans but lets the representative of the publisher refute the claims without introduction. This way, the documentary effectively leaves behind allegations against the government, while at the same time managing to make a positive statement regarding the independence of the media industry for those who are in doubt. The narration is in other words characterized by a pro-active rather than a defensive approach. The historical review that follows (programme 1, 07:20–14:40) addresses the conditions for the media during the Ethiopian empire (until 1974) and during the military Derg regime (1974–91), both of which were considered miserable eras for press freedom. Accompanied with historical photographs and footage, the documentary is particularly critical to the conditions during the Derg and gives evidence of censorship, disappearance of journalists, and the fact that state-controlled media outlets – the only media allowed by the Derg – were obliged to mention Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam’s name frequently. A telling contrast is created in the second programme, which contains footage of the resistance movement 150

marching into Addis Ababa in 1991, freeing the country from the military regime and using radio to announce the takeover of the present government (programme 2, 01:30). The documentary thus reads media history directly into political history, drawing a contrast between the oppressive past and the democratic present. Moving on into the present era, the documentary presents prevailing conflicts between the private press and the authorities in what might be defined as a legal subframe. The point of departure is the press law that was introduced by the new government in 1992 to prohibit censorship and open up for private media outlets. Soon to be contested, the law did not create a fertile relationship between the government and the press. This is largely explained in the documentary by means of flaws with the private press. One the interviewed journalists in the programme explicates this argument in length by admitting that the «private press didn’t comply with international standards»; that it was «mostly hostile to government»; besides «imposing a political agenda» and «having ethical flaws» (programme 2, 10:00). Moreover, to explain why a number of private newspapers folded after the 2005 elections, the journalist suggests that «most of them had legal problems» (programme 2, 15:15). What is most significant here is that these explanations do not come from the narrator or from a government official, but from one of the sources in the private press – thus likely to increase audience confidence. The third programme throws a small but noteworthy disturbance into the seemingly consistent pro-government argumentation by giving room for some critical remarks to the official media agenda. One of the interviewed editors imparts that if his newspaper writes critically about a government agency, the agency will get hostile to the newspaper; and that when government offices call for press conferences, they always invite the same media people and exclude others. This criticism is however balanced with quotes from journalists in other newspapers who commend the government for introducing weekly press briefings where the private media are invited. Also bringing nuance to this last part of the first section of the documentary series is EBA’s director, who admits that the public administration is not providing as much information as it should to the public and the media. He points out that Ethiopia is a young democracy, thus implying that there will necessarily be some imperfections both on the side of the media and the government. The first part of the documentary (programmes 1–3) ends with the director urging the media to play a constructive role in the democratization process. Overall, the argument here is that programmes 1–3 are presented in an issue-specific responsible government frame. Despite promising a historical documentary of the private press, ETV in reality shifts the focus to the government. It becomes the argument of the documentary that the current private press enjoys large freedoms, and that this is thanks to the role of EPRDF. The responsible government frame is supported by at least two subframes: the legal subframe, indicating the government’s readiness to pass liberal media policies, and the development subframe, explaining why there are still some imperfections in the Ethi151

opian media–government relationship. From a rhetorical perspective, the dominant frame and the supportive subframes are a result of deliberate choices pertaining to the selection of speakers and the narrative structure. Most notably, the perception of liberal media governance appears to be expressed through representatives of the private media themselves rather than by public officials. This is achieved through the private media’s dominant position as informants in the series, as well as through an exposed self-critical attitude in which the press admits its own shortcomings of the past. By contrast, the next section abandons the use of assorted informants from the independent media and instead relies on voices close to the official institutions. This results in an aggressive turn in the documentary series, as elaborated below. 8.5. Programmes 4–6: Irresponsible press frame The documentary series shifts tone and focus in the second section (programmes 4 to 6), which was broadcast three to four months after the first section. Instead of focusing positively on the government as a facilitator of press freedom, the main attention is now on the private press, which is presented as an irresponsible recipient of the given freedoms. The tone is argumentative and aggressive. Although the second section on the surface appears to be the product of impartial journalistic investigation, it clearly defines an adversary, which is the private press. In so doing, the producers apply various rhetorical techniques. Five of these will be analysed in the following section. They are: rhetorical questions; massive use of evidentia; foregrounding of expert voices; equation of past with present; and incognito positioning of the government and the state media. 8.5.1. Rhetorical questions In narrative terms, the second section of the documentary adopts an inductive approach. That is, the section opens with a research question that becomes the entry point for the imminent investigation of the next three programmes. The producers could alternatively have chosen a deductive narrative approach, by which they would announce the main argument in the opening part with the remainder of the documentary consisting of evidence in support of the already disclosed conclusion. Instead, by choosing an inductive structure, the documentarians arguably create an impression of being more open for alternative answers to the initial research question. However, as will be demonstrated below, the research question, as well as a series of subordinate questions, is in actuality rhetorical questions where the primary function is to build a case towards a predetermined conclusion in disfavour of the private press. Before the main research question is posted, however, the documentary begins by presenting an historic exposé. The very first picture in the first programme of this section (programme 4) thus consists of documentary footage of crowds of people who cheerfully welcome TPLF forces during the culmination of the liberation from the Derg regime in 1991 152

(figure 8.5). The sentiment is unmistakably one of emancipation and relief. The focus then shifts to the Parliament hall, where delegates from a wide variety of political parties as well as representatives from the international community are seen listening to the

new

national

leader,

Meles Zenawi, assuring that EPRDF does not intend to take all power for itself but wants to involve everybody Figure 8.5: Screenshot, people welcoming TPLF forces, May 1991 in the rebuilding of the country (programme 4, 00:30). The narrator goes on to underline for the viewer that the subsequently agreed charter111 included the right of all people to speak as well as a guarantee of the abolishment of censorship. In the next shot, the narration swops to today’s events by letting Tamrat Negera, editor of the private weekly Addis Neger, retrospectively reflect on the 1991 situation. Tamrat affirms that two fundamental changes were secured with the coming of the new government in 1991, namely the right of the independent press to operate, and the right of the opposition to be organized (programme 4, 02:10). Notably, this is the only place in the second section of the documentary series where a representative of the private press is allowed to speak (that is, apart from EFJA’s Wondwosen Mekonnen, who is currently not active in press activities and who many consider to be aligned with the government). The quotation of Tamrat Negera serves to give an independent voice to the assertion that EPRDF’s arrival in 1991 meant liberation of official media policy. Tamrat’s statement is reiterated by Wondwosen Mekonnen, who adds that the new media policy «cleared the darkness» of the past (programme 4, 02:30), and Shimelis Bejiga of Addis Ababa University’s Faculty of Journalism and Communication, who recalls how the independent press mushroomed after 1991 with a range of newspapers popping up in interest areas spanning from religion, sports and sexuality to children’s interests. «That was a big breakthrough in the country’s history,» Shimelis emphasizes (programme 4, 04:15). Towards this historic backdrop, the main research question of the documentary is stated by the narrator approximately five minutes into programme 4: This was an unprecedented point in the history of Ethiopia. Now, how did the journalists use that opportunity? Did they make use the dawn of the new era 111

The 1991 Transitional Charter of Ethiopia

153

to benefit the people of the country? What did they contribute to Ethiopia’s peace and development? (Narrator, programme 4, 05:15) The threefold research question heralds a critical investigation of the private press’ performance during the advent of Ethiopian democracy and defines the overarching focus of the present section (programmes 4 to 6). While the narrative approach is inductive and the research question remains predominantly open-ended (in linguistic terms, that is), it is already clear to the viewer that the only possible outcome of the investigation is that the private press is to be found guilty. Indeed, common documentary conventions necessitate a critical response to such questions; if not, the justification for the documentary would be annulled and it would not be aired. Disguised as an open-ended question, the research question posed in the introduction of the first programme (programme 4) therefore surfaces as a rhetorical one instead. Rhetorical questions similar to the one in the opening are repeated throughout the three programmes and serve as a driving force in the narration as well as a reminder of the critical focus of the documentary, as illustrated by figure 8.6. The questions occasionally also appear as title cards (text on dark background) distinguishing different segments of the documentary, exemplified by the heading in front of programme 5: «The private press: balanced or extremist?» (Programme 5, 00:00). While the introductory question had an open-ended tint in the first place, the succeeding questions are restrained and accustomed to the critical line that is drawn towards the private press as the programme unfolds. This technique generates an adversarial framing of the private press and leaves the viewer with few alternatives beyond either seeing the press as a friend or an enemy. What surfaces is a dichotomy which forces the viewer to take an either/or position to the questions posed. For example, by asking if the press told the truth or fabricated stories (programme 5, 08:00), the documentary leaves no room for a middle position which holds that the press usually reported the facts while occasionally falling prey to false information. Successfully conveying this dichotomy, it is sufficient for the documentarian to provide a handful of examples of fabricated stories in order to conclude that the entire private press should be labelled as irresponsible media channels. In rhetorical theory, the technique of leaving the public with forceful either/or choices is described as an eristic type of dialogue. The eristic argument, according to Douglas Walton (2007), belongs to one of the ten characteristics of propaganda. The eristic aspect «postulates a dichotomy for the audience: ‘We are the good guys. If you are not for us, you must be against us’» (Walton, 2007, p. 112). Essential to this set of rhetoric is the treatment of all adversary forces as if they are one. This is achieved in the ETV documentary by referring to the private press as one entity and subsequently ignoring the nuances between the many outlets that have been on the scene. Thus, the initial research question in combination with supplementary rhetorical subquestions collectively defines the private newspapers as an adversary.

154

Figure 8.6: Examples of rhetorical questions and answers in documentary section 2 (programmes 4–6) Rhetorical question (explicit)

Rhetorical answer (implicit)

«What was the role of the press during these incidents [terrorist attacks in

They applauded terrorism.

the 1990s]? Did they condemn the acts? Or did they applaud terrorism?» (Programme 4, 10:10) «The Constitution sought to establish democracy on the basis of equality

No.

between people. […] Now, the question is: The press that came into being, did it recognize this beauty and diversity?» (Programme 4, 18:50) «Democracy aims to bring about peace and tolerance among people. The

No.

private press is expected to contribute to this cause. In this regard, have they fulfilled their responsibilities?» (Programme 5, 06:15) «Was the private press focused on the truth or was it fabricating stories?»

It fabricated stories.

(Programme 5, 08:00) «What was the role that the private press played in building multiparty

Distractive.

democracy? Was it distractive or constructive?» (Programme 5, 17:40) «How about the background of Deutsche Welle and Voice of America

They stirred disruption.

which reported the 2005 elections tirelessly from beginning to end? What was their contribution to peace and democracy?» (Programme 5, 19:00)

In answering the research questions, the documentary makes use of a combination of presentation of evidence and interpretation of the same evidence. The evidence consists of extensive footage of printed newspaper material (cf. 8.5.2), while the interpretation is mainly left with a few experts who explicate the chosen newspaper quotations in historical and political perspective (cf. 8.5.3). Besides the presentation of evidence and historical footage, shifts between the narrator’s voice and the interviews with experts play a role in establishing and reinforcing a distinction between the apparently objective role of the programme producers (represented by the narrator) and the interpretative role of the specialists. At the same time, the narrator (of whom there are actually two throughout the three programmes; one male and one female) vacillates between being an objective rapporteur of events and facts and assuming a critical commentator’s role. When presenting newspaper excerpts and introducing historical footage, the narrator appears prosaic and impartial. In these cases, and when posing the research questions, the narrator adopts a distancing self by speaking on behalf of the public, thus conveying an impression of a neutralist stance (Clayman, 1988, 2007). However, the impression of neutralism fades as the narrator interprets the footage and 155

draws conclusions at various transitional points in the documentary. For example, in summarizing research evidence presented in programme 4, the narrator concludes that the private press acted irresponsibly: Following the overthrow of the Derg, freedom of expression was granted and censorship was lifted. It paved the way for the distribution of a lot of press products. But seen from the point of peace and tranquillity […], they played distractive roles. They preached terrorism and ethnic division. (Narrator, programme 4, 26:41) In this case, although it is indeed a common view that parts of the early private press were sensationalist and unreliable (Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004, p. 59; Lidetu, 2006, p. 132ff; Shimelis, 2002; Skjerdal and Hallelujah, 2009; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003, p. 72; Wondwosen, 2009, p. 101), the narrator takes a small but significant step away from simply describing the events to interpreting them. This shift of the narrator’s position is perhaps somewhat surprising given that the massive evidence presented earlier in the programme almost speaks for itself, in addition to the unmistakably critical attitude conveyed by the interviewed expert commentators. The narrator’s supplementary conclusion could appear as a pleonasm in this company, although it does serve to corroborate the consistent argument against the private press. Stronger yet is the narrator’s defining summary as she draws the next programme to a close (programme 5). At the end of the episode, which has dwelt on numerous newspaper articles and exposed the political backgrounds of various actors in the past private press, the narrator makes a summary of the programme in the form of a compelling judgement: In this programme, we have seen that most private media outlets were at odds with professional ethics. Instead, they executed baseless reporting and held onto extreme bias. They served as mouthpieces for the opposition. Most owners and editors were also active players during the Derg reign. They worked towards realizing their dream of restoring the dictatorial regime. Accordingly, they left facts and realities behind in the 2005 elections and strived to dismantle constitutional order through negative and distractive reporting. (Narrator, programme 5, 27:22) The narrator has thus shifted his/her footing during the course of the documentary. While the opening position was one of seemingly unbiased curiosity, the narrator now stands in the midst of the dispute and draws conclusions as well as pronounces verdicts. The questions posed at the beginning of programme 4 and later in the section have thus served as a driving force in the narration, while simultaneously urging the narrator to changing his/her position from being a passive observer to becoming an active participant in the debate. The conclusion is inevitably a substantive disapproval of the private press.

156

8.5.2. Massive use of evidentia The most outstanding feature of the second section of the documentary series (programmes 4 to 6) is arguably the massive use of evidentia. The section uses no less than 98 direct quotations from the private press to prove its case (37 quotations in programme 4; 33 in programme 5; and 28 in programme 6). The quotations are displayed as authentic clippings of newspaper front pages and inside pages, recited by an accompanying voice-over. Most quotations are derived from the emerging private press post-1991, but there are also ample examples of press headlines from the contested 2005 elections. They all serve to give evidence for claims of extremism and falsehood in the concerned newspapers. In fact, introducing the section by simply showing the titles and logos of past newspapers, as is done in programme 4 (05:47– 06:05), gives the Amharic-proficient viewer an idea of the radical position of the private publications when they was established in the early 1990s. Illustratively, some of the displayed titles are Nebrek (‘thunder’), Moged (‘storm’), Seife Nebelbal (‘fire-spitting sword’) and Gamora (‘erupting lava’). Their stance in the political debate was accordingly hostile to the new EPRDF government and habitually supportive of the preceding Derg administration. This is underscored by a series of headlines that the documentary refers to, containing slogan-like captions such as «Mengistu is our father» (Nebrek), «One country, one leader – that is Mengistu» (Andebet) and «17 years of Derg administration better than EPRDF» (Seife Nebelbal). What is somewhat confusing to the viewer, however, is the documentary’s lack of distinction between the newspapers’ use of quotes versus statements of facts. Many of the examples that the documentary refers to, such as those cited above, are direct quotations from persons (marked with quotation marks in the newspapers) or excerpts from letters to the editor rather than news reports of facts and events. The documentary, however, makes little distinction between news and views when describing the contents of the private press, thus giving the impression that every quotation is a representation of the newspaper’s own position. This way, the documentary effectively disregards the newspapers’ right and duty to quote persons who may contradict the newspaper’s own view. That said, many Ethiopian newspapers have indeed been infamous for being «collections of opinions» rather than reliable sources of information (Shimelis, 2002, p. 200), and their source arrangement has been immensely one-sided in favour of oppositional groups (Skjerdal and Hallelujah, 2009). Nevertheless, the documentary’s equation between quoted opinions and the newspaper’s own opinion ignores a distinction that is essential to journalistic presentation, indeed maintained by the concerned newspapers through their use of quotation marks. That the quotation marks get lost in the documentary narration serves to corroborate the fact that the aim of the production is first and foremost to build an irrefutable argument against the private press. Besides references to extremist opinions, the documentary presents an array of newspaper headlines which were evidently the result of pure speculation and outright falsehood. 157

The examples range from rumours of war and famine to premature announcements of the opposition’s alleged victory in the 2005 elections. An early headline in Ageri, for example, reads: «Meles’ Satanic administration has come to an end» (1994), while Tarik similarly spreads the rumour that: «One government brigade has been destroyed» (1998). The ethnic bias is also clearly present in the headlines exposed by the documentary. Tarik, for example, claims that: «The Amhara people is suffering from famine» (1997), while Seife Nebelbal, known as the most militant Oromo-affiliated newspaper, equally falsely claims that: «Oromiffa is banned in Addis Ababa prison» (1997). The documentary goes on to demonstrate how speculations escalated again in the private press during the 2005 elections. Election results were prematurely presented, typically in favour of the opposition (illustratively, Finch falsely reported ‘confirmed’ results that the opposition coalition CUD had won 240 seats in the Parliament against EPRDF’s 162; programme 5, 12:10). As the final results did not give the opposition the announced victory, the press supposedly began to nurture ideas of aggressive overthrow. Some of the examples that the documentary provides are drawn from Ethop, which reported that: «Armed struggle would be possible», and Abal, which wrote in an editorial that: «If power is not possible through free elections, it will be through civil disobedience». What the documentary fails to present, however, is the context for all the speculation and agitation that took place in the private newspapers. The election results were delayed and marked by a lack of transparency (Carter Center, 2009; EU Election Observation Mission Ethiopia, 2005; Stremlau and Price, 2009; Wondwosen, 2009, p. 95), which partly explain the speculations in the private press. In addition, the state media had also begun publishing premature statements by government officials who announced a victory to the incumbent even though counting was still underway (cf. 2.3.3.5). Though biased, the reports in the private press provided a certain balance up against the announcements in the official media. Notably, this situation and other background knowledge are not part of the context mentioned by the documentary. 8.5.3. Foregrounding of expert voices A major contrast between the first (programmes 1–3) and the second section (programmes 4– 6) of the documentary series is the shifting balance between the interviewed speakers. While section 1 included excerpts from eight independent journalists, only one journalist from the private press is allowed to speak in section 2 (editor Tamrat Negera of Addis Neger), and his quote is very brief (figure 8.7). The emphasis is instead on expert voices. In fact, there are only three persons who occupy nearly all the speaking time in the second section, in addition to lengthy citations of an academic article which would also fall under the definition of an expert voice. This illustrates a shift in focus from the first to the second section of the documentary. While the first section emphasized the ‘responsible government’ frame, cleverly expressed through journalists in the independent media, the second section emphasizes the

158

Figure 8.7: Persons interviewed, programme 4–6 Name

Position

Speaking time, min:sec

Shimelis Bejiga

Lecturer, Faculty of Journalism and Communication (FJC), Addis Ababa University

8:27 (11 clips)

Wondwosen Mekonnen

President, Ethiopian Free Press Journalist Association (EFJA)

4:31 (9 clips)

Mekuria Mekasha

Lecturer, Faculty of Journalism and Communication (FJC), Addis Ababa University

3:03 (5 clips)

Abebe Aynete

Editor, Zemen Magazine (state-owned)

1:49 (2 clips)

Mekasha Abera

Legal expert

1:18 (1 clip)

Radaei Baraki

Legal expert

0:32 (1 clip)

Hallelujah Lule

Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

0:29 (1 clip)

Tamrat Negera

Editor-in-chief, Addis Neger (private)

0:26 (1 clip)

‘irresponsible press’ frame, expressed by experts who critically review the history and standards of the private press. The three emphasized experts are all very critical of the performance of the private press, especially its early years. The person quoted most often, lecturer Shimelis Bejiga at the Faculty of Journalism and Communication, Addis Ababa University, emphasizes that the newly established newspapers in the 1990s were extremist and conveyed «very dangerous messages, creating hatred and conflicts between peoples and nationalities» (programme 4, 21:30). Mekuria Mekasha, also a journalism lecturer and researcher at Addis Ababa University, for his part highlights that unprofessionalism in the media led journalists to confuse their reporter’s role with political advocacy. Lastly, Wondwosen Mekonnen, president of the dormant Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association (EFJA), admits that the private press in the formative years could not at all be called independent as it was politicized and «full of hatred and emotions» (programme 5, 02:30). Notably, despite representing an independent journalist association, Wondwosen is considered government-friendly in journalist circles (3.3.5). The three specialists thus validate the overall message of the documentary by offering critical analyses of the early private press, further reinforced by the diagnostic detachment that they assume through keeping the interpreted events at an historical distance. In addition to the expert voices, lengthy citations of an academic article occupy a central role as an ‘independent’ source of the criticism of the private press as presented in programmes 4–6 of the documentary. The quoted article, «Uneven performances by the private press in Ethiopia: An analysis of 18 years of press freedom» (Skjerdal and Hallelujah, 2009), is written by myself as main author, thus offering me an unusual (though necessarily subjective) position to comment on its treatment in the documentary. The chosen excerpts from the article are, as one would expect, those which most seamlessly fit in with the overall argument of the documentary. There are four direct citations from the concerned article in 159

programme 4, all of which testify to the shortcomings of the private press. However, studying the citations more closely (programme 4, 22:50– 26:41), one finds that three of the four excerpts are actually quotations of informants in the study rather than reflections of the researchers. If the aim was simply to quote the informants, it is tempting to suggest that it would make better television if the three Figure 8.8: Screenshot, front page of research journal sources (whose names are disclosed in the article and mentioned at various points in the documentary) were interviewed in front of the camera instead of being cited by a narrator who reads passages from an academic article in English followed by tedious word-by-word translation in Amharic. On the other hand, citing the article while showing pictures of the physical journal in which it was published gives a special prominence to the uttered statements (figure 8.8). Furthermore, linking the quotations to the work of two media researchers, one of whom represents the international research community (myself), gives validation and status to the material presented. As for my own credentials in this regard, the narrator presents me as ‘professor’ in the documentary, while the proper title at the time was much lower in ranking, namely ‘assistant professor’ (as stated in the journal). Intentional or not, the false upgrading of my academic status serves to give additional prominence to the material quoted from the article. If I were to make a personal judgement from my position as the main author of the quoted research article, I would find the documentary’s use of citations to be correct in the details but erroneous in the larger perspective. On the one hand, the documentary is correct in conveying the impression that our article is critical to parts of the private press and thereby denounces past performances. In the article we claim that the press has been overtly politicized, sensationalist, unprofessional and driven by bad advocacy journalism (Skjerdal and Hallelujah, 2009). However, the article also draws attention to the fact that the private press has been diverse, and it goes on to argue that its imperfections must partly be explained as a result of the government’s hostile attitude towards independent voices on the public arena in Ethiopia. This is indeed a key perspective in the research article (cf. the concluding section; Skjerdal and Hallelujah, 2009, pp. 55–57), but it is absent in the documentary’s presentation of it. The documentary is thus selective in the passages it chooses to quote from

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the article, as it is selective in the collection of experts it decided to consult in the research process for the programme series. 8.5.4. Equating past with present While the titles of the first two documentary sections herald a main focus on past events (‘The history of the free press in Ethiopia’ and ‘The birth and the growth of the free press in Ethiopia’), the documentary in fact brings the argument into the present day. This impression emerges both from the examples used in the programme as well as in the interchange between linguistic past and present tense by narrators and interviewees. As the second section evolves, the clippings of newspaper pages are more up-to-date and become interlinked with contemporary issues. To this end, there is a shift in programme 5 when the previous focus on the turbulences in the early democratic press of the 1990s (programme 4) is left for a while. The programme makes a jump in history to 2005 and discusses media performances during the contested federal elections that year. Though the examples displayed in this regard are less outrageous than those of the 1990s, the programme demonstrates how the private press during the 2005 elections fabricated election results and conveyed voices which encouraged regime change through violent means. The programme then makes a shift back again in history and reveals how a number of named actors in the private press, as well as Amharic-speaking reporters in Deutsche Welle and Voice of America, filled important functions in the Derg administration (programme 5, 17:40). Thus, by creating links between the past and the present, the documentary strongly insinuates that transgressions by the private press are not just a matter of history; the perception is rather that the Ethiopian public is in constant danger of being haunted by the past and can expect the private media to revert to harmful methods again at any time. In the last episode of the second section (programme 6), the documentary again pays a visit to past events before offering a forceful analysis of today’s media situation. This is achieved through setting up a contrast between the coverage of Ethiopia in the local versus the international media. The programme departs from the earlier programmes in its use of footage and excerpts from international media channels (Reuters Africa Journal and The Economist). It is demonstrated how the foreign media apparently produce one report after another focusing on Ethiopia’s astonishing economic growth, while the local press makes no mention of the progress. Local Amharic newspapers instead publish stories like «Ethiopia’s business movement in darkness» (Goggle), «Ethiopia is in desperate need» (The Reporter) and «Ethiopia is drowning» (Addis Neger) (programme 6, 17:30). The crisis headlines, rolling on the screen, culminate in a 20-second clip of a newscast derived from Eri-TV (Eritrean state television) in which the news reader declares that: «It is a joke that Ethiopian authorities have registered economic growth», and that: «It is easier to believe that the economic growth in the country has gone downwards by 11% than upwards» (programme 6, 18:15). Ethiopian viewers will find these claims ludicrous, as Eri-TV is considered by the public to be a propa161

ganda channel for the Eritrean government and a conduit for hostility towards Ethiopia112. Thus, by juxtaposing Ethiopian newspapers with Eritrean state television, the documentary strongly insinuates that the journalistic quality in the local newspapers is beyond any ethical standard. The message is that these media outlets have closed their eyes for the world out there and are only interested in serving political propaganda – today as they were in 1991. To further demonstrate the distortion of the Ethiopian situation by the contemporary private press, the

documentary

shows

how the Amharic weekly Mesenazeria used the famous photograph of a starving toddler and a vulture, shot by Kevin Carter in Sudan in 1993, to illustrate food shortage in today’s Ethiopia (figure 8.9). Commentator Shimelis Bejiga goes on to analyse the photograph and Figure 8.9: Screenshot, coverage of food shortage in private says it misleads the audi- newspaper ence as it is used out of context (programme 6, 05:30). Somewhat paradoxically, however, Shimelis committed the same ‘sin’ of confusing different contexts and eras when he previously commented on the outrageous behaviour of the private press in the early 1990s. In condemning the dreadful standards of past newspapers, he concluded: «They focus more on the emotional than the professional» (Shimelis Bejiga, programme 4, 12:00; italics mine). The use of present tense – both here and elsewhere in the documentary – appears to be more than a slip of the tongue. It conveys the impression that the commentator believes the misbehaviour of the private press is not just an issue of the past, but remains a problem today. Having shown additional examples of front pages with photographs of starving children, the narrator assumes a commentator position and goes on to make a moral statement: «Instead of supporting the population which has struggled with hunger crisis for so many years, the newspapers use these pictures which are just demotivating» (programme 6, 06:30). The subtext is in other words that the private press is expected to support social development, much like the guidelines prescribed for the state media in the development journalism policy document (EPA, 2008). The lasting focus on crisis and catastrophe in the newspapers 112

Cf. ‘Shabia’, the name of official Eritrean government radio which is used in Ethiopia as a derogatory term to denote dreadful media quality

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is seen as contrary to this duty. What the documentary fails to acknowledge, however, is the media context which these media outlets operate in. The dominant media channels – the state media – are overwhelmingly oriented towards success stories and accordingly lack critical perspectives. The private media seek to fill the void by habitually putting critical stories on the public agenda, such as the food crisis. Seen in isolation, the critical stories in the private media may not be representational of the overall situation in Ethiopia, but they serve to create a certain balance to the one-sided coverage in the state media. However, the documentary has no focus on the role or track record of the state media. This brings us to the last point to be discussed in relation to the rhetorical strategy of programmes 4–6. 8.5.5. Incognito positioning of the government and the state media It is striking that programmes 1–6 of the documentary, comprising more than two hours of airtime, make no reference to the state media. This despite the fact that the major media channels in Ethiopia have been state-owned throughout the entire period covered (1991– 2009), and that the private media channels commonly have been viewed as an antithesis to the state media. Indeed, the behaviour of the private media may – and probably should – be explained towards the position and leaning of the state media. For example, as indicated in the section above, the critical stories concerning food shortage and famine in private newspapers could be viewed as a corrective to the ignoring of these issues in the official media. On a similar note, the role of the government is largely absent from the documentary. For instance, when referring to the transgressions by the private press during the 2005 elections, such as the reporting of false election results (cf. 8.5.2), the documentary does not bring up the troubles from the authorities’ side. Neither does the documentary make any mentioning of the authorities’ harsh reactions towards the press later in the same year. The clean-up ended in 14 editors and media owners being detained, some for almost two years, until they were finally released on pardon (2.3.3.5). These incidents are left out as if they are beyond the scope of the documentary. Yet another example is the omission of any reference to the government’s clampdown on the private press in the 1990s, when Ethiopia became known as Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest jail for journalists (CPJ, 1999). Overall, the documentary treats the role of the authorities and the state media as unimportant in relation to understanding the behaviour of the private press. By its negligence of the official media, the documentary implicitly portrays the state media as the ‘norm’, while the private media assume a deviant position which justifies critical investigation. Many media scholars have emphasized the importance of analysing not only what is present in media content, but also what is not present, i.e. actively or passively excluded. The concept of ‘symbolic annihilation’ has been applied in this regard to demonstrate the absence of female identities in the media (Gerbner and Gross, 1976; Tuchman, 1978a), with recent adoptions in framing theory through the term ‘annihilating framing’ which denotes the exclusion of a topic or an event from media discourse (Gavriely-Nuri and Balas, 2010). Simi163

larly, the term ‘structured absences’ has been used to point to systematic omissions in film and television content over time, as illustrated by the intentional exclusion of recorded documentary footage to maintain a mythic and romantic perception of the Kalahari Bushman (Homiak and Tomaselli, 1999) and the absence of blacks in South African television during apartheid (Krabill, 2010). However, this analysis shows that absence may not only be used as a mechanism to exclude certain groups or ideas from media representation, but also with the view to define an apparently objective position. In this regard, the un-represented (the state media) becomes the implied objective standard in light of the negative representation of the deviant (the private media). Lack of media representation is therefore not always an indication of disapproval (as in symbolic annihilation and structured absences), but has the exact opposite function if the un-represented is assumed to be the objective standard which defines the flaws of the represented. In the ETV documentary, the state media, and to a large extent the state and the government themselves, are assumed to constitute an objective reference point for the ‘deviant’ private press, demonstrated by their lack of representation and critical treatment. What further complicates the incognito position of the government and the state media in the documentary is that the production itself is planned and orchestrated by a state media institution. This way, the ETV producers encompass the power to define the portrayal of their own institution in the documentary. The final product shows that they decided to keep the state media out of the investigative scene and opted to concentrate fully on the private media. At first, this would seem to make sense as it makes way for a focused documentary; besides, it reduces the chances of the producers being accused of violating their professional integrity by reporting on and possibly favouring their own institution. However, the patent negligence of the state media in the documentary does not mean that they are not part of the context. As argued above, the role and performance of the private press can hardly be isolated from the general media environment. The private outlets operate in a media context where the state media are dominant, and where rules and regulations are determined and executed by an ally of the state media edifice, i.e. government offices. This context is effectively downplayed by the documentary. This approach to media coverage could be regarded as an institutional instance of ‘distancing self’, which is a strategy journalists use to accomplish neutralism in controversial issues (Clayman, 1988). However, in order for neutrality to be accomplished in the case of the ETV documentary, the viewer must agree that the lack of representation of the state media implies that they occupy an uninvolved position in the Ethiopian media landscape. The upcoming sections of the documentary strongly suggest that parts of the public do not agree with this premise. Thus, in the next four programmes, several interviewed viewers, though not the majority, express that it is unreasonable of ETV to make a documentary on the media situation without taking its own role into account.

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8.6. Programmes 7–10: Public responses The third section of the documentary series consists of four shorter programmes where representatives of the public respond to the documentary proper. The responses consist of both short interviews in public areas (programmes 7 and 10) and letters to the television station read aloud by presenters (programmes 8 and 9). A number of cities and places throughout the country are represented, both in the response letters as well as in the street interviews. The format of these four programmes is one not often seen on television, at least if judged towards standard formats on global networks. The recited response letters resemble letters to the editor in conventional newspapers, where readers are given a chance to respond not only to issues raised in the columns but also to the professional performance of the newspaper. It is thus interesting to note that most respondents appearing in programmes 7–10 put themselves in the role of an evaluator whereby they assume a right to comment on the journalistic quality of ETV’s work. For example, one viewer writes: «The programme on the private press is very nice. […] It is very educational» (response letter to ETV, programme 9, 00:25). This and similar statements indicate audiences who assume an analytical position vis-à-vis ETV and who do not take for granted that all media content is by default valuable and truthful. Similarly, the standard question posed by the ETV reporter to persons on the street is one which invites the public to critically assess the station’s performance: «What do you think of the ETV documentary on the free press?» Thus, the two hours of critical investigation of the private press (programmes 1–6) are not presented as the final word on the issue; it is rather implied that the documentary’s approach to the private media is open for discussion. The viewers who are quoted and interviewed in the four response programmes, however, do not represent a wide range of views but are mostly supportive of the documentary. Of 19 persons interviewed on the street, 18 come out in favour of the documentary, whereas only one is critical. Among the 26 quoted audience letters, 17 give positive acclaim to the documentary, eight take a critical stand, while one expresses a balanced position. Illustrative of the supporters, one viewer writes: I followed the programme. I think the public has now understood the reality. We have seen that the private media are more of opposition party organs than an independent press. The programme was therefore good. Keep up the good work. (Letter from viewer Birtukan Tekeste, Oromia region; programme 9, 02:40) The viewer characteristically comments both on the issue proper and on the journalistic quality of the documentary. She condemns the record of the private press and compliments on the work of the documentary team; in addition, she concludes with a word of encouragement to ETV which could be read both as an inspiration to continue making good documentaries in the future and keeping up the ‘fight’ against the opposition. Overall, the 35 (of a total 45) viewer comments which are supportive of the documentary are also negative of the 165

private press’ performance record. These comments resonate with the government’s attitude towards the independent press as relentlessly pronounced since its inception in the early 1990s. There are, nonetheless, nine respondents who express a critical attitude towards the documentary, and who have still not been excluded from the programme. These viewers are concerned that the private press did not get a fair treatment in the six programmes (e.g. «ETV should not be judgemental by generalizing the free press»; viewer comment in programme 8, 00:50), and, to a lesser extent, that ETV is not in an adequate position to produce a documentary about a competitor. The most critical judgement is posed by a viewer who writes from Addis Ababa: First of all, your airtime was never enough to present the 15 year history of the private press. Secondly, you journalists from the Ethiopian Television do not have the knowledge, efficiency and moral ground to criticize Addis Admas, Reporter and particularly Addis Neger. After all you are always deafening us on our own tax money with your useless programming on making Ethiopia a middle income country. The people who know the worth of private newspapers, buy them; and those who don’t want to buy them, just don’t buy them. Do not tire yourselves in vain. (Response letter from Ermias Mamo, Addis Ababa, programme 9, 03:45) The critical question, however, is to what extent the aired audience views are representational of the opinions of wider public. Several of my informants are doubtful of this and presume that the recited letters are mainly those which support the documentary, whereas critical letters have been largely dismissed113. They assume the same to be the case with the interviews conducted on the street. Corroborating this, a former journalist with ERTA responds with laughter when asked about the documentary’s enquête interviews. She claims that it is common practice for journalists in the state media to be selective when asking the public about their views. Only respondents who endorse the official view will come on air, though a few critical voices will be included in order to avoid the guise of propaganda, according to the journalist. For me, the public responses [in the ETV documentary series] are all fabricated. I’ve been doing the same thing. We put together a collection of persons who support the government, then we add two or three critical persons so people will believe the right thing. (ERTA journalist, personal communication) The documentary’s executive producer, Teshale Bekele, has a different version. He admits that the interviewed respondents may be disproportionally positive to the documentary (18 113

The programme presenter in the ETV documentary does indeed inform the viewers that the quoted letters are only a selection of all the letters that have come to the station after the airing of the documentary (programme 8, 04:00; programme 9, 05:10).

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positive, 1 negative), but according to him, this came as a result of difficulties to get people to speak rather than a deliberate staging by ETV. The producer informs that ETV did indeed talk to several persons who expressed negative views towards the documentary on the telephone, but when asked to speak on air, they declined. Teshale offers an interesting explanation for this refusal: Besides ‘being afraid of being on air’, people may think that something negative could happen to them if they criticize ETV in public, and they may fear that the station will edit their statements (personal communication, 6 September 2011). Coming from a leading person in ETV114, this explanation reveals a remarkable assumption of negative audience attitudes towards ETV. As will be shown later in the dissertation, the impression of lacking audience confidence is common to journalists in ETV (9.3.10). They often have a hard time convincing persons to be interviewed by the station, purportedly because interviewees suspect their quotes will be misused or because they do not want to be associated with the government-loyal media. As for the documentary series, critical viewers refused to be interviewed probably because of fear of negative repercussions, according to Teshale. It still becomes a critical issue whether it was truly impossible to acquire more than one critical view among 19 persons interviewed in public arenas. To this end, the present research has encountered one person who claims to have been interviewed by the ETV team for this section, expressing critical views of the documentary, but whose opinion was not included in the final package broadcast in programmes 7–10. The reason for not including his view is not known. Regardless of the complications involved in retrieving the public interviews, the four programmes with audience responses in the end appear as an overwhelming acclaim of the documentary. For the most part, the respondents are critical to the defections of the private press and accordingly commend ETV for providing the documentation for this. This impression is to some extent balanced by a few selected critical voices, but these voices are sequentially circumscribed by the positive responses and they are presented as the less representational view. 8.7. Programmes 11–14: Debating the documentary The last section of the documentary series consists of a studio debate of 2 hours 20 minutes where invited persons from the Ethiopian media environment discuss issues raised in the initial six programmes. The studio debate (or ‘talk show’, as it is called by the ETV producers) was not part of the initially planned documentary series, but came as a result of the huge public interest in the documentary, according to executive producer Teshale Bekele (personal communication, 6 September 2011). The programmes had been widely discussed in the Amharic press, and ETV seized the opportunity for a follow-up by preparing a platform where different stakeholders in the Ethiopian media could discuss pertinent issues. The 114

Teshale Bekele has recently served as deputy head of the Good Governance and Documentary Department, and was at the time of the interview (September 2011) head of the Division for Educational Programmes.

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station faced the issue once again that several persons turned down the request to participate; this concerned the editors of two major private newspapers (Addis Admas and The Reporter) as well as representatives of certain professional journalist associations and the academic community (stated in the introduction to programme 11). The final composition of the panel does however reflect a diversity of stakeholders in the media environment and include 10 persons: three from the private media (Addis Tesfa, Goggle; Samson Mamo, EthioChannel; Tamrat Gebregiorgis, Fortune); three from professional journalist associations (Anteneh Abraham, ENJU; Tsegaleul Woldekidan, EJA; Wondwosen Mekonnen, EFJA); two from the government/regulator (Shimelis Kemal, OGCA; Desta Tesfaw, EBA); and two from the academic community (Amanuel Gebru and Shimelis Bejiga, both AAU). The debate was recorded and broadcast in four different segments approximately two weeks after the final documentary programme (late December 2009/early January 2010). The

debate

takes

place in ETV’s spacious main studio, with the panellists situated on small podiums in a wide half-circle (figure 8.10). The talk is led by two hosts from ETV who take a rather detached position in the conversation, asking broad questions and avoiding interruptions in the lengthy argumentation of the panellists. The debate could not at all be described as heated. To the contrary, Figure 8.10: Screenshot, panellists in ETV studio the

panellists

are

given

ample time to elaborate on their arguments, with monologue rather than dialogue being the chosen style. Each argument typically endures for three to four minutes, though sometimes longer, as in one case where the monologue goes on for more than nine minutes without interruption (Samson Mamo in programme 13). The panellists do not debate each other directly, but mostly elaborate on issues posed by the programme hosts. The tone is polite, as epitomized when Tsegaleul Woldekidan attributes Shimelis Kemal as ‘His Excellency Ato Shimelis’ (programme 11, 23:00). The debaters do however refer to each other’s arguments and announce differing viewpoints on certain issues, for example on the distinction between legal and ethical obligations of the media. Tamrat Gebregiorgis, editor-in-chief of the weekly Fortune, maintains that while the private media have an absolute obligation to abide by formal legislation, they are free to neglect ethical standards like balance and impartiality – 168

though it is not advisable. He is contested by official representatives Desta Tesfaw and Shimelis Kemal who emphasize that ethical standards are as binding as legal principles for the media, thus violation of media ethics could for example infer the revoking of a broadcasting license as there is only space for a limited number of actors on the transmission spectrum (programme 11, 33:30). Though indicating a noticeable degree of tension, this disagreement over a professional issue remains a minor point of friction in relation to the overall theme of the documentary, which is the quality of the previous private press. In this respect, the panellists, including those representing the private media, appear to be in consensus that at least parts of the private press in the past were irresponsible and had a sloppy relationship with recognized journalism ethics. A recorded programme, the studio discussion mostly appears to be broadcast without editing. However, the research has detected at least one case where a quote was edited. In programme 14 (13:15), after AAU lecturer Amanuel Gebru had argued that the government should tolerate diverse views of journalism, Fortune editor Tamrat Gebregiorgis introduced his speech by giving acclaim to the lecturer: «I like it when this view is coming from the university». However, this was heard only in the studio and the quote is cut in the final programme. A possible interpretation of the incident, in the view of one discussant, is that ETV felt that the quote could convey an impression that the academic community and the private press unite against the government. The main tension emanating from the studio debate, nonetheless, does not appear as a disagreement over the performances of the private press, but over the quality of the ETV documentary itself. This becomes evident with the introduction of programme 12, when the programme hosts shift the emphasis of the debate from one focusing on the quality of the private press (programme 11) to one focusing on the quality of the ETV documentary. By means of introduction to the debate in programme 12, the host summarizes the audience reactions in two groups: those asserting that the documentary was educational, and those arguing it was simply a campaign package by the government-run media meant to narrow the press freedom sphere. Now he wants to know what the panellists think of this issue. The panellists, however, start to talk about the problems of the private press rather than about the quality of the documentary, and the host and his co-host must repeatedly direct the discussion back on track so that the debate concentrates on the documentary production instead. As an illustration, one of the hosts makes the following interruption in the midst of an argument by Anteneh Abraham: «We can agree on the usefulness of the private press. But now we discuss the documentary, whether it threatens the private press or is educational so that the private press can correct its mistakes» (ETV host, programme 12, 04:30). The argument here is that this observation is significant because it demonstrates the way in which ETV implicitly assumes an active position in the complicated terrain evoked by the documentary. By attempting to reorient the studio discussion to the documentary itself, the talk show hosts actually turn the focus on themselves and their institution rather than on the 169

independent press. By implication, ETV thereby confronts its own conception as a detached observer who accommodates the Ethiopian public with balanced media reports. The incognito position of the state media which characterized the free press documentary itself (cf. 8.5.5) is now replaced with positive acknowledgement of ETV’s role in writing and shaping Ethiopian media history, if only implicitly. The two streams arising from the televised debate could be read as two contesting frames. There is, one the one hand, the perspective of the panellists that could be described as a ‘debating the free press’ frame, focusing on the previous record of the private press as well as critical comments on the conditions under which it currently operates. This perspective is particularly evident in the first part of the debate (programme 11). However, as the discussion unfolds, the hosts are more successful in turning the focus to the documentary production instead. Thus, the initial ‘debating the free press’ frame is rebutted and eventually replaced by a ‘debating the free press documentary’ frame (programme 12 onwards). The ‘debating the free press documentary’ frame thus emerges as the predominant frame and eventually prevails over the ‘debating the free press’ frame, which becomes the subordinate frame. However, drawing further on framing theory, we could also describe the contestation between the two frames as a tension between an issue-specific frame and a strategic frame. Whereas issue-specific frames are applied to particular media stories, such as the coverage of specific international issues (De Vreese, 2005; Entman, 1991), strategic frames, as a sub-type of generic frames (De Vreese, 2003), are used to identify media attention on strategies and the political ‘game’ which surround the issues, exemplified by election reporting (De Vreese and Elenbaas, 2008; Lawrence, 2000). The strategic frame is often used interchangeably with the game frame, which is associated with so-called horse-race journalism that focuses particularly on opinion polls and the like, but there are also scholars who maintain that the two types of frames should be kept apart because strategic frames are more directed towards speculation of motives and justifications for political actions (Aalberg et al., 2012). As for the ETV documentary, issue-specific frames were identified in the sections emphasizing liberal government policy (programmes 1–3) and irresponsible press behaviour (programmes 4–6), while a strategic frame emerges from the last two sections where the producers shift footing and turn the discussion back onto the documentary itself (programmes 7–10 and 11–14). It should be noted that this reference to strategic frame represents a different application than the most common use of the term in frame studies. Whereas the detection of strategic frames is overwhelmingly associated with elections and reporting on political tactics, the current analysis applies the concept in describing strategies which are much less interlinked with direct appeals to the voting constituency. More than that, the strategic frame in this case becomes further complicated because the television station itself has shares in the strategy. This challenges common use of framing theory which implicitly assumes that frames can be studied within a framework that treats political actors and journalists as belonging to different 170

realms, where political actors are regarded as players, operating in a strategic game, and journalists are regarded as reporters, observing and interpreting the game. The use of strategic frames in the analysis of the ETV documentary, by contrast, suggests that the role of the television station itself ought to be part of the assessment. Additionally, the erstwhile discussion implies that there is no absolute distinction between issue-specific frames and generic frames (e.g. strategic or game frames). An issuespecific frame like the ‘responsible government frame’, for example, also contains strategic elements when seen in conjunction with the overall impact of the documentary. Thus, in the studio discussion, the panellists vacillate between discussing the performance of the private press and discussing the role of ETV in the making of the documentary. For example, when Tamrat Gebregiorgis (Fortune) introduces his first argument, he declares that the panellists are in actuality held captive because ETV has already announced a conclusive verdict on the private press, but he nonetheless continues by discussing principal conditions for the independent media (programme 11, 06:30). In this way, the debate fluctuates between an issuespecific frame and a strategic frame in which ETV fills a dual role. 8.8. The making of the documentary Having analysed dominant frames and the use of rhetorical strategies in the documentary, we will turn to an inquiry into the making of the documentary. The purpose of this section, as stated earlier, is to bridge the gap between analyses of media content, which are often subject to scholarly analysis, and the production phase, which is usually far less considered (Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011). Drawing on Scheufele’s (1999, p. 115) process model of framing research and De Vreese’s (2003) integrated process model of framing, the production phase is identified as the stage at which frame-building takes place (cf. figure 8.1). Both internal and external factors come into play in the frame-building process. Internal factors are those which are directly controlled by the newsroom environment, such as the selection of sources and journalistic editing. External factors are those which affect the frame-building processes indirectly, such as directives from policy-makers and compulsion by elites. As argued by De Vreese (2003, p. 44), frame-building is understudied and there is a need to «explore the frame-building process in its totality» (De Vreese, 2005, p. 59), for example with the view to investigate how political elites exert influence on media content. This, at least in part, is the aim of the present inquiry. However, the assessment has certain limitations that make it short of a full and comprehensive analysis. First, it is based on post-production interviews only, as I was not present in the newsroom during the production of the documentary. Second, the range of interviewees is limited. Although I have interviewed as many as nine persons appearing in the documentary series, in addition to three persons who operated behind the scenes, there are others whom I have not been able to meet. There is particularly one potentially valuable source who was engaged in the production but who resolutely declined any offer to talk 171

about details of the documentary making or his/her involvement in it. Another would only speak if promised full anonymity (which I granted). Third, and accordingly, there is an immanent risk that the information provided in the interviews is deficient due to the felt sensitivity of the subject. These limitations aside, the interviews are still beneficial as they give valuable insights into manufacturing processes of a contentious production of ETV and, not least, an understanding of in-house perceptions of ETV’s dual role as a public media institution and a government-friendly broadcaster. The informants convey differing accounts of the strategies behind and the production processes of the documentary. There are, broadly speaking, two versions. The first emphasizes that the production was fully independent and reflected sound journalistic standards, while the second claims that the programme was politically motivated and suffered from interference by governing powers. This schism is detectable already at the level of explaining where the whole idea of the documentary came from. According to Teshale Bekele, the executive producer of the documentary, he himself got the idea of making a documentary series which focused on the history of the private press. He then presented the idea to the general manager of ERTA together with his team, and with institutional backing, they decided to embark on the concept. No one outside of ERTA was involved in the planning at this stage, according to Teshale (personal communication, 6 September 2011). However, one of the journalists who was engaged in the production has a different account, claiming that the idea, or rather: command, for the documentary came from a certain higher official outside of ERTA. The journalist locates the person to the central government communications office. «I know that OGCA was involved in giving the idea,» the source insists (personal communication, date concealed). This claim is in turn refuted by the head of OGCA, government minister Bereket Simon, who asserts that the documentary production was «initiated by ERTA» (personal communication, 10 May 2010). A similar discrepancy of perception is evident from the accounts of how the production itself took place. The executive producer maintains that the production was independent and unaffected by external influence. He explains that the purpose of the investigation was to prepare a solid programme based on facts and documentary evidence. He mentions three sources in particular which contributed in the documentation process: Addis Ababa University, Walta Information Center and Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority. According to the producer, the documentary team did not generate new findings; it simply drew on material available from these three institutions in particular, such as academic articles and printed newspaper issues, and presented it in an accessible manner for the audience. All journalistic decisions, however, were made by the documentary team on professional grounds, according to Teshale. Asked about OGCA’s role in the process, he is open for the possibility that persons in OGCA may have been aware of the production («The general manager may have communicated it; I’m not sure»), but the officials purportedly did not interact in the process nor comment on the documentary until after it was aired. After the broadcasting, Teshale 172

could observe that «most government officials were happy with the documentary» (personal communication, 6 September 2011). Even the Prime Minister gave acclaim to the production at a press conference upon a request from reporters, although he admitted he had not watched the documentary himself.115 Journalists who worked with the documentary, however, cannot entirely testify to the claimed journalistic independence of the production. One of the journalists shares how the documentary team was instructed by the top management of ETV on a day-to-day basis: We had meetings with higher officials every day. We showed them the footage we had collected, then they selected the clips. They told us what to say, then we wrote the script. When we showed them the script, they edited it and added information, and then gave us new directions. They told us who we had to interview. We showed them the final product also. They commented on it and told us what to cut. (ETV journalist, personal communication, date concealed) At the same time, the journalist denies that higher officials of OGCA were involved in the daily decisions of the production. The process he/she describes is rather one in which the view of OGCA and the government is safeguarded by loyal supporters in ERTA’s management. On an average day, the top management would not intervene in ETV’s news production, but because the documentary on the free press carried such grave political significance, it was subject to interference. That is at least how the concerned journalist describes the organizational operations of ETV (personal communication, date concealed). Finally, the diverging accounts of the documentary production are noticeable in the different views regarding the timing of the series. Broadcast a few months before the national elections in 2010, the documentary could be interpreted as a warning to the private press not to repeat the misdeeds of 2005. Several ETV journalists express that this rationale is just obvious. «It was intentionally broadcast before the elections to give a warning,» one of the members of the documentary team asserts (personal communication, date concealed). Once again, the management side has a different story. The executive producer maintains that even though the 2005 elections saw «a lot of unethical reporting», the scheduling of the documentary in front of the 2010 elections only came as a coincidence. «We had no intention of relating it to the elections,» Teshale explains (personal communication, 6 September 2011). However, regardless of whether the scheduling was intentional or not, the documentary develops a strong argument against the performance of the private press in election coverage which may easily be connected to the upcoming election by the audience. Concurrently, the documentary coincided with growing constraints for the private press in the months September to December 2009. The official media, especially Addis Zemen, had published several 115

‘Meles is wrong about ETV, commentary, staff writer, Capital, 18 January 2010. Available at: http://www.capitalethiopia.com/index.php?view=article&id=12181%3Ameles-is-wrong-aboutetv&option=com_content&Itemid=17

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unsigned letters which were interpreted as a sign of warning to the private press. Addis Neger was especially targeted, and the newspaper eventually folded on 28 November 2009. Broadcast two weeks later, the second section of the documentary series was in its final editing phase when Addis Neger closed116. These circumstances do not appear to have affected the final documentary much, as programme 6 culminates in a critique of exactly Addis Neger for being bound by oppositional propaganda, illustrated in the programme by the negligence of reporting on Ethiopia’s economic progress. The assessment of Addis Neger is given in present tense, as if the newspaper was still operational at the time of the airing of the programme. Press freedom organizations thus saw the documentary as part of an on-going smear campaign against the free press, orchestrated by the authorities117. What emerges from this review of the production process of the documentary is two factions within ERTA who have different perceptions of their role vis-à-vis the media owner and the public. Both factions will concur that they have commitments in both directions (towards the owner and the public), but the bonds are expressed rather differently in actual newsroom and organizational practice. The first faction – implicitly – puts main emphasis on ownership obligations. In the case of the documentary, this faction is made up by the executive producer and the ERTA management. However, the faction extends beyond the media organization and has linkages to other official institutions, such as EBA and OGCA, as well as organizations outside of the official establishment, like the government-friendly news agency Walta Information Center. These linkages materialize in the way the executive producer speaks about the making of the documentary, as well as in the formation of constellations in the studio discussion (programmes 7–10). When Teshale explicates the production processes of the documentary, especially in relation to the second section (programmes 4–6), he alludes to the private press as an ‘other’ by distancing his team (and ETV) from the ‘irresponsible’ parts of the media industry and explains that the purpose of the documentary was to expose the ills of the private press which is after all «not a free press, but a political tool» (personal communication, 6 September 2011). The allies in making this exposure possible are the government-friendly organizations in various sectors. Furthermore, in the studio discussion (programmes 11–14) it becomes clear that the ones who are being held accountable for the documentary are the representatives of EBA (Desta Tesfaw) and OGCA (Shimelis Kemal), and to a lesser degree Shimelis Bejiga of AAU who played a key role in the documentary as media analyst. The assumed responsibility is epitomized by Shimelis Kemal when he reflects on the objectives of the documentary: 116

However, the decision to close Addis Neger only became publicly known a few days later, after three of its editors had left the country and subsequently issued a press release on 4 December 2009. See http://www.tecolahagos.com/Addis_neger.htm 117 E.g. a) ‘Weekly forced to stop publishing, its journalists flee abroad’, Reporters Without Borders, 4 December 2009. Available at: http://en.rsf.org/ethiopia-weekly-forced-to-stop-publishing-04-122009,35258.html b) ‘Half-yearly caselist’, International PEN, Writers in Prison Committee, 31 December 2009. Available at: http://www.internationalpen.org.uk/files/dmfile/CaselistJul09.pdf

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In my view, it was not the intention of the programme to induce a predetermined conclusion and propagate that. The aim was to raise social inquiries regarding a social institution that has a significant place in the democratic transition. (Shimelis Kemal, programme 12, 24:30). However, if Shimelis classified himself as strictly detached from ERTA and the programme production, it would be awkward to embark on a definition of the intention of the documentary as if he carries any responsibility for it. For the audience, then, OGCA and EBA appear to be accountable for the documentary production on equal footing with ETV. That said, in assuming responsibility, both Shimelis, Desta and Teshale take a humble approach and accept certain criticisms of the documentary. Teshale admits: I don’t think we made a perfect documentary, neither in its presentation nor in any other way. But we created an agenda in which people can discuss the positive and negative sides of the private press. In terms of this, we were successful. Not including voices of the private press in the second part was perhaps a shortcoming. (Teshale Bekele, personal communication, 6 September 2011) The second faction which emerges from the making of the documentary comprises of journalists who appear to emphasize the public commitment more than the ownership commitment. However, they appear to stay loyal to the media owner in their daily duties, even though it means some compromises with professional standards. This faction conveys the impression of a situation in which they perform work operations as an effect of felt expectations from above rather than in accordance with genuine journalistic considerations. One of the journalists involved in the documentary production elucidates how he/she experiences the general professional situation in ETV by declaring: «You write as your editor wants. You produce somebody else’s work, not your own» (ETV journalist, personal communication, date concealed). In relation to the documentary, this means that the end product came to be a political propaganda programme rather than a serious and balanced treatment of the private press, in the journalist’s opinion. However, this does not imply that he/she believes the private press should be handled in a softer way than it came to be in the documentary. On the contrary, the journalist upholds that, «There are so many disgusting things with the private press. They don’t care about people sometimes. They only care about money» (ETV journalist, personal communication, date concealed). The journalist imparts that the problem with the documentary is not as such the critical focus on the private press, but the corresponding lack of critical focus on the official media and the appending partnership between ERTA and the political leadership. This journalist and others miss a work culture in ERTA which is committed to the public and to professional journalistic standards more than to the formal owner. To what extent, then, are conventional approaches to framing research compatible with the production environment of ETV? Frame-building theory as expounded by Scheufele 175

(1999) puts main emphasis on two different aspects that supposedly impact on the framing of news content: factors related to the structure and organization of the media system, and factors related to the characteristics of individual journalists. Inspired by results of previous media research, Scheufele (2000, p. 307) subsequently defines five areas which have shares in the frame-building processes: social norms and values; organizational pressures and constraints; pressure from interest groups; journalistic routines; and the ideological or political orientation of journalists. The first three of these areas pertain to structural/organizational factors, while the last two reside with journalists and the newsroom. However, even in structural and organizational influences, the journalists’ power is commonly recognized. De Vreese (2005, p. 52), for example, expounding on factors external to journalism, maintains that «the frame-building process takes place in a continuous interaction between journalists and elites (Gans, 1979; Tuchman 1978b) and social movements (e.g. Cooper, 2002; Snow and Benford, 1992)». On the basis of the current analysis of an ETV documentary production, however, there are grounds to question a universal applicability of this approach to framebuilding theory. The approach assumes an on-going mediation between journalists and elites, in addition to notable impact by social movements, interest groups and so forth. Though this description may be illustrative of the situation in liberal media environments, it does not fit the Ethiopian situation very well. The analysis of the documentary production does not point to any influence of note by social movements or other independent parties, nor does it indicate that journalists would have the actual opportunity to entertain such interaction, or ‘negotiation between journalists and sources’, as it is sometimes described as (e.g. Nisbet et al., 2003). On the contrary, the journalists involved in the documentary production describe a situation where the influences in the production are vigorously confined to the news organization with support from selected external institutions marked by official approval. This situation calls for particular emphasis on structure and organization in the framing analysis, while individual characteristics of journalists are less significant (Scheufele, 1999). This is of course not to say that journalistic influence is non-existent in Ethiopian state media production, but the basic premise of conventional framing theory which assumes that journalists are free to make independent decisions on an exclusively professional basis, emerges as an unfamiliar conception in the Ethiopian media context. 8.9. Is it propaganda? In the public debate that followed after its broadcasting, the free press documentary was labelled as propaganda by various debaters118. However, from an analytic point of view, the question arises whether the term ‘propaganda’ is an appropriate description of the documentary’s style and content.

118

For an example in English, see ‘Fighting the ghosts of the Ethiopian private press’, commentary, Hindessa Abdul, 6 January 2010. Available at: http://www.abbaymedia.com/News/?p=3355

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In a systematic examination of media argumentation, Walton (2007) proposes ten characteristics that must be met for a mediated text to qualify as propaganda. Seven of these traits are more or less clearly present in the ETV documentary production, while the remaining three need closer discussion. To begin with the most evident characteristics, the communication must (1) contain a dialogue structure which aims to alter the audience’s convictions or actions; (2) forward an argumentative message; (3) have a goal-directed structure; (4) be aimed at a mass audience; (5) be characterized by one-sided argumentation; and (6) contain an eristic aspect which postulates a dichotomy for the audience (cf. 8.5.1) (Walton, 2007, p. 109ff; numerical order not identical with the original). A seventh attribute, use of emotive language and persuasive definitions, is also manifest in the documentary, though not as marked as some of the classic examples in the propaganda literature concerning for example rhetoric on race (Downing and Husband, 2005) and the global war on terrorism (Jackson, 2005). Nonetheless, the increasingly active voice of the narrators throughout the documentary is accompanied by gradually more indicative labels attached to the private media, exemplified by loaded expressions such as ‘distractive’, ‘de-motivating’ and ‘they have chosen side’. Emotive language is thus featured in the narrative choices. Less immediately visible in the ETV documentary is Walton’s eighth characteristic, which prescribes that propaganda is more than simply changing the beliefs of the audience, but aims to «move the masses to action […], to comply with action, or to accept and not oppose a certain line of action» (Walton, 2007, p. 111). It is unclear what action the ETV documentary was intended to trigger in relation to audience behaviour. Although the documentary could be seen in conjunction with the forthcoming 2010 elections, it does not appear as a campaign message to the voters as such, nor does it stand out as a forceful message to stop buying private newspapers. However, the documentary could be interpreted as support for the on-going shadowy operation against private newspapers. In this regard, even if the documentary does not compel the audience to make any direct action, it encounters the public indirectly by urging them to accept the enduring intimidation of private newspapers. This way, the documentary contains an «involvement of persuasion dialogue», which Walton (2007, p. 111) describes as a prerequisite for propaganda. In his ninth criterion, Walton (2007) maintains that propaganda is justified by its intended results and therefore may neglect moral obligations underway, such as keeping the facts straight. Thus, propaganda is commonly associated with the presence of falsehood and manipulation (Marlin, 2002; Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012). At first sight, however, the concerned ETV documentary is not overtly characterized by deceitful information. On the contrary, the mission of the documentary (particularly episodes 4–6) is precisely to uncover fabricated stories and propaganda in the media. It does this at great lengths, providing massive documentation along the way. There are nonetheless a few significant cases throughout the series where the documentary team manifestly transgresses the norms of factual presen-

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tation. In the beginning of programme 6, the documentary shows

footage

of

a

huge

demonstration in downtown Addis Ababa in 1994 where protesters

wanted

to

take

certain private publications to the court for misconduct (figure 8.11). The narrator encapsulates the demonstration in a segment which comments on the public’s attitudes towards the private media in the early 1990s. The particular demon- Figure 8.11: Screenshot, 1994 protests against private magazines at Meskel Square stration, however, was aimed at Enkoy and a few other magazines which carried pornographic content and cannot be taken as valid evidence of the public’s general opinion about the private press at the time. Another example of factual misrepresentation surfaces in a later segment in the same episode where the documentary displays a series of crisis headlines to demonstrate the negligence of national progress in the private media. A headline derived from Addis Admas reads «Telkom in turmoil» (programme 6, 18:00), while the article itself reveals a focused story on the failed billing system of the national telecompany and is as such not a compelling example of unjust campaigning by the private media. Both of these cases are examples of seemingly compelling documentary evidence that does not stand a closer test because they are used outside of their original context. The justification for using these examples in the documentary is necessarily found in the end goal rather than in the journalistic research ethics. Critical viewers accordingly used these cases as evidence of ETV ‘propaganda’119. Walton’s (2007) tenth and final characteristic of propaganda is that it is marked by indifference to logical reasoning. This is not to say that all propaganda rejects rational evidence, but rather that it uses whatever means would better serve its end goal, be it appeals to emotion, rational evidence, or any other rhetorical vehicle. Among Walton’s ten characteristics, this is arguably the one which matches the ETV documentary least. The documentary presents vast amounts of evidentia in a way that appears to sharpen logical reasoning rather than suppress it. The allegations of irresponsible journalism in the former private press are 119

a) ‘Meles is wrong about ETV, commentary, staff writer, Capital, 18 January 2010. Available at: http://www.capitalethiopia.com/index.php?view=article&id=12181%3Ameles-is-wrong-aboutetv&option=com_content&Itemid=17 b) ‘Fighting the ghosts of the Ethiopian private press’, commentary, Hindessa Abdul, 6 January 2010. Available at: http://www.abbaymedia.com/News/?p=3355

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indeed very well substantiated. Not only that; the documentary series as a whole opens up for counter-arguments and alternative perspectives by inviting representatives of the private media sector in a follow-up discussion lasting more than two hours. This seems to contradict the «closed type of discourse» that characterizes propaganda (Walton, 2007, p. 118). Of course, the inclusion of contrary evidence could be interpreted as an attempt to fabricate an impression of balance and impartiality, but the opportunity to confront the arguments of the documentary still remains. I would therefore argue that in spite of dubious flaws in its overall portrayal of the private press and the general media situation, the documentary does not promote an uncritical attitude to logical reasoning. Judged against Walton’s (2007) ten essential characteristics of propaganda, the ETV documentary thus complies to a large degree with the criteria, yet it does not subscribe to indifference to logical reasoning. Before concluding, however, I will argue that two additional perspectives need to be brought in when assessing whether the documentary could be described as propaganda; specifically the societal context and the public’s reception. I hence argue that a mediated text does not constitute propaganda in and of itself, but only in relation to its societal context and the audience. An advertisement campaign, for example, may fulfil all of Walton’s (2007) ten criteria, but would still not be regarded as propaganda simply because everybody knows that the information is utterly biased and targeted. We therefore need to take into consideration the situation in which the communication occurs, though this perspective tends to be less emphasized in conventional rhetorical analysis. There is no room for a comprehensive exploration of the context and reception of the ETV documentary at this point, but some pointers may be offered. A noteworthy consideration is the debate that followed the broadcast of the documentary, both in ETV and in the private media. The debate shows that the question of whether the documentary constituted propaganda became a topic in itself. One of ETV’s studio hosts, for example, directly quotes persons who claim that the documentary is equal to ‘state propaganda’ (programme 12, 18:20). The private newspaper The Reporter on its part published a cartoon on its editorial pages which hinted that ETV’s documentary urges the government to repeat the Red Terror of the Derg, but this time against the media (The Reporter, Amharic edition, December 2009, exact date and page unknown). Websites, both local and diasporic, engaged in similar debate concerning the alleged anti-free press mission of the documentary. What these examples illustrate is the extent to which the media and the public did not take the documentary’s historical account for granted, but rather engaged in a critical discussion about the official media report and the government’s communication policy. In this discussion, the ETV documentary was repeatedly designated a piece of propaganda. In the popular understanding of ‘propaganda’, signifying one-sided arguments, disinformation and indoctrination, the use of the label makes sense. However, from an analytic perceptive, as explicated above, the documentary does not entirely match the definition of propaganda, although the content and style could be said to be of propagandistic character. 179

In addition, the heated debate surrounding the documentary shows that the production generated critical reflection among the audience, which in itself is an indication that an allegedly propagandistic purpose was not accomplished. 8.10. Summary The chapter has put a documentary series on ETV under scrutiny by means of framing and rhetorical analysis. The purpose has been twofold: firstly, to examine the programme content; and secondly, to get an understanding of the preceding production processes. In relation to the content, the documentary is found to start off moderately by offering a frame which emphasizes the press freedoms introduced by EPRDF in the 1990s (programmes 1–3), but turns more aggressive in the second section where the dominant frame circumscribes the private press as an irresponsible receiver of the freedoms and therefore deserves no confidence (programmes 4–6). In a similar development, the narrative voice is characterized by a gentle and facts-oriented posture in the first part of the documentary, but gradually imposes an authoritative interpretation in the second section, singling out the private press as an adversary. Five rhetorical strategies emerge from a close reading of the second section: tactical use of rhetorical questions; massive use of evidentia; foregrounding of expert voices; equation of past with present; and incognito positioning of the government and the state media. The last of these strategies calls for a closer examination of the production processes and the strategic role of ETV/ERTA therein. On the basis of interviews with different stakeholders and persons engaged in the making of the documentary, the research points to two conflicting accounts of the production phase. One side, comprising persons in management positions, emphasizes ETV’s professional independence and claims that the production was guided by sound journalistic standards, while the other side, comprising journalists involved in the production, asserts that the production was marked by political interference. In any event, ETV’s own position becomes an issue in the public response (programmes 7–10) as well as in the station’s own televised debate following the documentary series (i.e. programmes 11–14). The documentary’s portrayal of the state media as an incognito in the overall media situation in the country is thus challenged by both the public and ETV’s own debate programme. Furthermore, the discussion has pointed to various methodological challenges in the application of framing and rhetorical theory in an Ethiopian context. I will point to two concerns in particular at this juncture. With regard to frame-building, i.e. the processes that lead to the emergence of specific frames, established framing theory postulates a double-edged focus on media structure and characteristics of individual journalists when analysing factors that affect media production (Scheufele, 1999, 2000). However, an examination of the ETV series on the private press suggests that the impact of journalists and the professional environment is significantly minimized in comparison with structural and organizational factors. This calls for a reconsideration of professional autonomy and appended restraints in 180

light of the local media context. These remarks are analogous to Magdalena E. Wojcieszak’s (2007) criticism of traditional framing research when applied in a study of the Arab satellite network Al Jazeera. A transnational venture, Al Jazeera does not easily fit in with framing theory’s common assumptions concerning domestic power relations in a Western society, particularly as seen from the US. Secondly, the analysis of the documentary’s rhetoric demonstrates that its role and function as a mediated text must not be expounded in isolation, as is sometimes the case in frame studies, but towards the societal surroundings and the public perception. Even though the documentary series was found to contain propagandistic features when judged against common criteria (Walton, 2007), it stirred critical debate among media leaders and the general public alike. This epitomizes the importance of evaluating the argumentative function of a media text in relation to the conditions of the particular media society in which it operates rather than solely considering it on the basis of textual analysis. Paradoxically, the recurring charges claiming that the ETV documentary series was a product of propaganda demonstrate that it did not entirely fulfil a propaganda purpose. As pointed out previously, the ETV documentary series on the history of the private press should not be taken as representational of current affairs programming on ETV. It treated a politically sensitive issue, contrasting the uncontroversial character of most news reports and general programmes on ETV. Nonetheless, the documentary illustrates preferences in media framing and rhetoric in an ETV production; the station’s self-positioning; and the differences that exist in the media organization with regard to perceptions of professional standards and journalistic practice. The analysis of the documentary production thus constitutes an entry point to the next chapter, which goes into qualitative depth concerning professional perceptions and dilemmas among journalists in Ethiopian state media institutions.

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Chapter 9 Journalism culture

9.1. Introduction This chapter discusses the empirical findings from the research interviews, with a view to describing journalism culture in the Ethiopian state media. The organization of the chapter largely corresponds with the topics covered by the interview guide (appendix 3), reviewing journalist profiles (9.2), the work environment (9.3), professional values (9.4), work routines (9.5), and treatment of sensitive issues (9.6). While the aim of the chapter is to present the research findings in their own right, the section ultimately points ahead to the ensuing theoretical reflection in chapter 10. The underlying main theme of the chapter is thus the handling of competing commitments that journalists experience to the profession, to the owner, to the nation, and possibly to other parties. 9.2. Journalist profiles 9.2.1. Increasingly educated It is commonly believed that Ethiopian journalists are poorly educated. Tamrat Gebregiorgis (2005), editor-in-chief of Fortune, maintains that «most journalists in Ethiopia stumbled into this craft without formal training, possessing only their courage and dedication» (p. 19). This research, however, indicates that the situation is rapidly changing. Overall, journalists in the Ethiopian state media are in fact well educated, increasingly in the area of journalism as well. All informants were found to have completed degrees or certificates in higher education. Of the 67 informants, 26 (39%) have education on a higher level in journalism, and the remainder in other subject areas. However, among informants who have studied other subjects, 183

most have been enrolled in programmes which bear direct relevance for journalistic work, such as language and literature (17 informants) and political science (three informants). In his profile survey of 100 journalists in the private and state media, Birhanu Olana (2006) similarly found that degrees in language studies and literature were vastly overrepresented among Ethiopian journalists with 48% of the research population. An additional 27% had journalism degrees (Birhanu, 2006, p. 81). The increase to 39% in the present study, although it should not be taken as a fully representative population, testifies to the remarkable expansion in Ethiopian journalism education since the early/mid 2000s. It is evident that more and more journalists are formally educated in the profession. Through quota enrolments, state media institutions have gained access to the recently opened journalism programmes (3.3.4). Addis Ababa University, with 400 students in the undergraduate programme in journalism and 70 in the graduate programme (Skjerdal, 2011d), is by far the most important institution in this regard. In addition, regional universities which offer programmes in journalism (20 at present) have begun to recruit candidates for the state media, some of whom end up in the larger federal media houses in the capital city. Along with the expansion in university programmes, it has become increasingly common for journalists to have first (BA) and second (MA) degrees. Of the overall population in the present study (N=67), only four (6%) have a diploma as their highest qualification, 38 (57%) hold a BA degree, and 22 (33%) hold an MA degree120 (plus three informants whose education remains unknown). This contrasts with Amanuel Gebru’s survey of 134 journalists in four state media institutions from 2006 which found that the majority, 51%, had college diplomas or certificates, 44% BA degrees, and only 1.5% MA degrees121 (Amanuel, 2006, p. 64). The vast increase in journalists with MA degrees over the past five years or so should be explained with the opening of the MA programme in journalism at Addis Ababa University in 2004 and the overall drive towards achieving relevant higher education for employees in federal government institutions. However, it must be pointed out that MA candidates are overrepresented in the present study, partly because of the intention to include various editorial positions, where educational levels are relatively higher. Of the institutions in the study, educational levels are highest in ETV (almost half of the informants from ETV had finished or were enrolled in an MA programme). This reflects the position of ETV as a media institution traditionally recruiting personnel from other institutions, particularly from Ethiopian Radio. 9.2.2. Diverse professional background Although state media institutions are increasingly staffed with workers who are journalistically qualified, the main recruitment is still from other professions. The educational

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Some informants finished their study after the interview took place. Cf. Birhanu’s (2006) study: 44% diploma/certificate, 48% BA degree, 5.4% MA degree (p. 80). The first candidates with MA degrees in journalism graduated from Addis Ababa University in 2006.

121

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sector in particular constitutes an important pool in this regard. At least 17 of the informants have a vocational past as teachers in the public or private school system. It appears that this career background, often combined with a first degree in language and literature, makes them competitive in the application process when seeking a position in the media. That was the case for one informant who served as school teacher when he applied for a reporter position in ENA. «There were 236 candidates, I finished as number six,» he tells. Successfully completing the second round of exams at ENA, he got the job. Both he and other journalists regard it as an advancement to move from the educational sector to the media sector because it means an increase in income and better exposure to new opportunities, for example to go abroad and meet important people. Apart from the educational sector, there is no specific occupation that stands out as a typical recruitment base for the state media. Journalists who come from other disciplines represent a diversity of backgrounds ranging from forestry to museum work. With the exception of one person, who used to work for the Ministry of Culture, there are no journalists in the research population who have experience from the civil service at federal level. As such, there is no evidence in the study pointing to strategic rotation of servants between the federal administration and the media institutions on the production level. Political appointments on managerial level, however, are another issue and will be discussed in subchapter 9.3.4. Internal recruitment within and between media institutions is common. At least 12 of the informants used to work for another state media institution before they joined the current one. More noteworthy, at least seven have a past in the private media, either in commercial newspapers or radio. This serves to illustrate that the polarization between the private media and the state media is not absolute (cf. 3.2). There is an exchange of journalistic forces in both directions between the private and the state media (cf. 9.3.7). 9.2.3. A young and fairly inexperienced work force The manpower in the state media is a mixed bag of journalists with both long and limited experience, although there are few with more than 10 years in the profession, and very few with more than 15 years. The least experienced journalist interviewed in the research had worked in the institution for only one week, while the most experienced worker (a news department head in ENA) had served for 25 years at the time of the interview. Overall, 80% of the informants had less than 10 years experience in journalism at the time of the interview (figures include experience from both the present and previous media organizations). This is comparable with Amanuel’s (2006) and Birhanu’s (2006) surveys, both of which concluded that 70% of the respondents had been in the profession for less than 10 years. A breakdown of the statistics (figure 9.2) shows that the experience is significantly lower in The Ethiopian Herald than in ENA and ETV with a median service of only four years.

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Figure 9.1: Length of journalistic experience of informants ETV

ENA

Herald

Sum

Per cent

0–5 ys

8

11

10

29

43%

5–10 ys

15

4

6

25

37%

10–15 ys

7

2

1

10

15%

15–20 ys

1

1

0

2

3%

20–25 ys

0

1

0

1

1.5%

31

19

17

67

99.5%

Sum

Figure 9.2: Average and median years of journalistic experience of informants Average

Median

ETV

7 ys 6 months

6 ys 5 months

ENA

4 ys 2 months

4 ys 0 months

Herald

6 ys 11 months

6 ys 0 months

Considering that I have interviewed most practicing journalists in the newspaper, the numbers might in this case be viewed as representative. The finding corresponds with the version given by the informants. Many of the newspaper’s reporters are young and describe The Ethiopian Herald as a stepping stone to other work, though not necessarily in the media industry. One reporter, for example, who has only worked in the newspaper for seven months and likes her job very much, reveals that she intends to leave the organization a few months later with the view to pursue studies in either sociology or gender studies and then change career path away from journalism. The paradox is that the work satisfaction among reporters at The Ethiopian Herald seems to be generally better than at ENA and ETV (and the communication between the reporters’ level and editors’ level is clearly more open as well), but the turnover is still higher than in the larger organizations. This indicates that the prospects for staying in the media organization are not only determined by cohesion in the work place. However, there are also journalists in The Ethiopian Herald – particularly at the level of editor – who have fairly long journalistic experience (around ten years). All informants except one became engaged in the state media after EPRDF came to power in 1991. Although this could be explained as a result of the major reshuffling that took place in the state media in 1992 after the fall of the Derg regime (Teferra, 2008, p. 21), it is also a consequence of the generally low age of media professionals in Ethiopia. To this end, Amanuel (2006, p. 63) found that only 17% of the surveyed journalists were above 40 years of age (of whom 3% were above 50), whereas Birhanu (2006, p. 79), incorporating the private media in his survey, similarly found that barely 21% of the journalists were in their 40s or be186

yond122. Today’s journalist fraternity is therefore largely a new breed, although it should be added that some of the media practitioners from the previous era are still on the scene, both inside and outside of the country. The Ethiopian diaspora in Europe and North America includes some of the key media personalities who served in the official media during the time of the Derg (cf. 2.3.3.2). Conversely, some of the ‘freedom’ or ‘guerrilla’123 fighters who contributed to TPLF’s oppositional media channels in the 1980’s, such as Reporter’s Amare Aregawi, have become important figures in the media landscape of contemporary Ethiopia, both in the state and private sector. Some representatives of these groups have been consulted in the research, formally or informally. The main research focus, however, remains on journalists in the contemporary media. 9.2.4. Salary levels The monthly salary levels in the three media institutions were quite similar at the time when the interviews were conducted. A typical starting wage for a newcomer with a diploma or a BA degree at the time was around ETB 1000 (USD 65; from which around 20% tax is deducted124). A senior reporter could earn around ETB 1500 (however, in 2012, after salary increase and inflation, the estimate would be ETB 2000; cf. 3.3.3). The editors’ level usually ranged between ETB 1500 and 2500, with managers and bosses earning slightly more. All amounts are fixed rates depending on the position. There appears to be little or no room for negotiation after the formal title has been set. As expected, the salary levels in the research are somewhat higher than those of the previous ‘benchmark’ studies of Amanuel (2006) and Birhanu (2006) since the present data collection took place some years later. Amanuel (2006, p. 64) and Birhanu (2006, p. 80) found that 70% and 57% earned less than ETB 1500 respectively, while the present research came to 35%. As a result of inflation, the media profession – like other professions – has recently been subject to considerable salary increases. The first organization to introduce a new salary scheme in the state-owned media companies was ENA, where many journalists had their salaries almost doubled in mid-2010. To illustrate, a veteran editor experienced that overnight, his paycheck rose from ETB 2211 to ETB 4081 (USD 300). The raise came after the BPR reform and the take-over of ENA by the Office for Government Communication Affairs, and could thus be interpreted as a strategic move to raise the status of the official news agency. Salary increases have subsequently occurred in the other state-owned media institutions as well, though not quite as radically as in ENA125. A 2011 survey estimates the average monthly income for a journalist in ERTA after the increase as ETB 2500 (Ward, 2011, p. 12).

122

Age was not queried in the present research. Depending on the view of TPLF 124 All amounts in this section are gross salaries (before tax deduction). 125 For the sake of comparison, the wages quoted in this section generally refer to levels before the latest raise in 2010–11, and before the devaluation of the birr in September 2010. 123

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Figure 9.3: Monthly salary brackets of informants before tax ETV

ENA

Herald

Sum

Per cent

ETB 500–1000

1

4

1

6

13%

ETB 1000–1500

4

4

3

11

22%

ETB 1500–2000

6

3

4

13

26%

ETB 2000–2500

8

3

1

12

24%

ETB 2500–3000

3

0

4

7

14%

ETB 3000–3500

1

0

0

1

2%

Unknown

8

5

4

17

31

19

17

67

Sum

101%

Note: The amounts mostly refer to salary levels before the general raise in 2010–11.

Figure 9.4: Monthly salary levels of informants before tax Lowest

Average

126

Median

Highest

ETV

950

1971

1935

3251

ENA

871

1892

1853

2600

Herald

970

1496

1478

2211

Note: All amounts in ETB. The amounts mostly refer to salary levels before the general raise in 2010–11.

Salary emerges as an important issue for Ethiopian journalists. Upon being queried about their monthly income, nearly every informant is able to quote the amount down to the single birr without hesitation. The implication is that there is a high degree of consciousness around issues of pay and subsistence. However, the journalists experience that it is hard to make ends meet. City life is expensive. A senior reporter in ETV shares the typical story: His gross salary is ETB 1476 (USD 100), which leaves him with 1200 after paying tax. Schooling for his little girl costs 400 a month. Transport to and from work costs him 300 birr a month (6 birr each direction, 25 days a month). He is then left with 500 birr, and he has not yet had something to eat, nor has he paid his house rent. A cheap house rent in Addis, another informant tells me, is around ETB 1500. It becomes a mystery how one can possibly survive. Even so, salaries in the media are generally higher than those in other jobs which require higher education. Amanuel (2006, p. 45) reports that the pay in the state media is slightly higher than in many other government functions. This is still not enough to satisfy the journalists. Low pay is a contributing factor to the dissatisfaction levels in the state media, concludes Amanuel (2006), referring to a 30% proportion of the journalists who say they are 126

Corresponding with African Media Barometer’s 2010 report, which quotes the average salary level of a reporter in the state media as ETB 1700 (FES, 2010, p. 57).

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‘very dissatisfied’ with the salary (compared with 58% ‘dissatisfied’ and 12% ‘satisfied’; p. 65)127. Adding to the dissatisfaction is the premise that journalists can be called in for additional work hours without compensation. «I even have to work on holidays and Sundays for no extra pay,» a senior reporter in ETV complains. «We work until midnight sometimes,» says an editor in The Ethiopian Herald. None of them has ever seen any economic compensation for these extra efforts. 9.2.5. Moonlighting A demanding personal economy leads journalists to make compensation through other types of income. The phenomenon of moonlighting (i.e. having additional – usually informal and concealed – income besides their formal work) is well-known among African journalists (Mabweazara, 2010; Mare and Brand, 2010; Oloruntola, 2007; cf. Limor and Himelboim, 2006). It is also a phenomenon in Ethiopia. During the fieldwork, I noticed that a top editor in one of the news organizations was working late hours during the weekend. It turned out that actually, he was not at work, but was doing private translation for an external organization – and it was fully legal, he emphasized (with colleagues present). Translation in fact emerges as a major moonlighting activity for Ethiopian journalists, particularly for those working in the English language. With many international organizations present in Addis Ababa, and a demand for expertise in local Ethiopian languages (particularly Amharic), journalists have become an attractive work force. They are educated, they are in need of additional income, and, visible in the public arena, they are easily accessible for the organizations. «As a reporter, you create contacts. One of the benefits of ETV is that you get contacts,» imparts an ETV editor who does translations and editing for NGOs when he has extra time. Doing translation work can indeed prove quite lucrative. A standard rate for written translations for international organizations, which pay well, is ETB 120–170 a page. A journalism graduate who currently has no permanent job informs that he recently earned 22,000 birr (USD 1,500) on translation in just one month in addition to his low-paid teaching job. The task consisted of translating documents for an international NGO from English to Amharic. In other words, he earned a journalist’s yearly salary in just one month through moonlighting. Though this is the most extreme case recorded in the research, it serves to illustrate what potential there is in supplementary work. Moonlighting activities are often directly related to professional media work. It is rather common for Ethiopian state media journalists to engage in various types of media consultancy for local and international organizations. Assignments consist for example of script-writing, editing and production of informational films – in other words tasks which demand specialized competence which is difficult to find outside of established media houses or private production companies. Some journalists are used as ‘fixers’ for international 127

The figures must be assessed critically as this is a question type where respondents typically answer with a degree of complaint.

189

news organizations; that is, they assist visiting journalists with information about current affairs in Ethiopia and connect them with local sources. One informant quotes Al Jazeera as a media organization which relies on fixers on the ground, but the likelihood is that several other international news organizations pay local informants as well, as this is a common working method in ‘parachute’ journalism (Andresen, 2009). For local journalists, this means not only an opportunity to earn extra income, but a chance to realize a sense of belonging to a larger journalistic community. Some of the journalists also have additional income by serving as stringers for foreign media outlets. For example, two journalists share that they write for Kenyan publications, while another does freelance reporting for CNN International. As to whether it constitutes a conflict of interests to work for other media organizations, the journalists have a laidback attitude. There are several convincing explanations for this. One is that the foreign media institutions are not in a competitive position with local companies. Another compelling explanation is that additional work is so common in the Ethiopian society that changing work roles is part of the expected occupational functioning. One could also imagine that a potentially weak commitment to the state media organization makes it easier for Ethiopian state media journalists to allow dual commitments on the work arena. However, in other areas of their work, for example undertaking assignments for the local private media, journalists express a sensitive attitude to conflict of interests. Equating moonlighting with a weak professional mindset therefore emerges as an insufficient deduction. On the contrary, some journalists maintain that their extra work is beneficial to their overall journalistic competence. To this end, a chief editor admits that he encourages his staff members to do extra work because it adds to their professional competence and could assist them in their future career, even if it is against the formal policy of the media organization. However, he is unequivocal when it comes to the question of conflict of interests. He would not allow any extra work for an organization which competes with his own media outlet, but he has of course little control with what his employees do in their spare time128. The main motivation for engaging in moonlighting, however, is not the search for additional professional competence, but «simply the money», as one editor bluntly puts it. Another editor rhetorically says, «Should I let them starve?» when asked if he allows his subordinates to engage in supplementary work, well aware that he speaks against the rules and regulations of his organization. 9.2.6. Brown envelopes Another way of seeking extra income, which is more obscured than regular moonlighting but still familiar to most journalists, is so-called brown envelope practice. A ‘brown envelope’ is an informal payment given from sources to journalists, sometimes concealed in a brown envelope. It is common practice in all journalism cultures across Africa except South Africa, and Ethiopia is no exception (Skjerdal, 2010c). The brown envelope is known in 128

On a research note, no informants were paid to do assistance in this project.

190

Amharic as buche, derived from bucheka, literally meaning ‘snatching something’. The local newsroom has developed a fine-tuned nomenclature around the practice, so as to indicate the prevalence of the behaviour in Ethiopian journalism. A place where one is not offered a brown envelope, for example, is known as derek tabiya (‘dry location’). The envelope comes in different forms, and the two most common ones are surplus money from travel and per diem, and allowances offered by conference organizers as compensation for the participants to sit through the event. As an illustration of the extent to which brown envelopes have invaded Ethiopian journalism, at the official Press Freedom Day event on 3 May 2011, all participants were offered a 100 birr bill at the end of the conference. It suffices to say that the conference was organized by various important local press organizations, public and private, and sponsored by Unesco (Skjerdal, 2011a, p. 137). The brown envelope phenomenon represents a valuable entry point to inspect perceptions of professional ethics in Ethiopian journalism. It is clear that even if the practice is widespread (Berhanu, 2009; Berhanu and Skjerdal, 2009, 2011), there is a veil of concealment surrounding it. The journalists do not readily speak about taking brown envelopes, although they may refer to others who engage in the practice. This indicates that the practice is not seen as upright journalistic behaviour. The reason is obvious; brown envelopes are prone to affect reporting in that journalists will ‘repay’ the envelope with positive coverage. For the state media, the practice is highly unwanted, and the management has introduced campaigns to fight buche and other practices defined as corruption (figure 9.5). For journalists too, brown envelopes are seen as infecting professional ethics, and some reject any kind of hidden envelopes. Other journalists – perhaps most – take envelopes on certain occasions (if it is small and looks like contribution towards transport or similar) while rejecting the big money where corruption is palpable. What could make brown envelopes more acceptable in the state media is the perceived unprofessional nature of the organization, aggravating a thinking along the line that, ‘When the organization is not fair, why should I be?’. However, this explanation is not enough insofar as brown envelopes abound in the private media as well. The phenomenon might even be more widespread in private outlets, where taking support from external actors is encouraged because the media com-

Figure 9.5: Anti-corruption poster in the ENA newsroom

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pany customarily does not cover transport. Among informants, brown envelopes are interchangeably blamed on personal misconduct and the theory that «the system creates this practice» (The Ethiopian Herald editor). The more likely explanation is nevertheless a combination of the two. Belonging to an institution where ‘everybody’ takes brown envelopes and being exposed to organizers who readily place benefits at the reporter’s nose make it easier to give in to the practice. However, it is still the individual journalist’s decision to depart from the general feeling that the practice is ‘wrong’, as confirmed by both private and state media codes of ethics (EFJA Code of Ethics article 15; see EFJA, 1998; ERTA/EPA/ENA Codes of Ethics article 7.1; see ETV, 2004). 9.3. The work environment 9.3.1. Social satisfaction, professional dissatisfaction By and large, the work environment in the Ethiopian state media could be said to be characterized by social satisfaction and professional dissatisfaction. Socially speaking, the journalists commend a friendly atmosphere and positive collegiality. The particular nature of the journalistic work also gives them satisfaction. «The profession helps me know all the world,» an ETV editor imparts. Through his work, he gains knowledge of areas as diverse as history, economics, geography and physics. «For these reasons I like it,» the journalist says. Others emphasize the opportunity to learn English, develop writing skills, meet resourceful persons and travel to foreign countries, besides generally having a chance to broaden their mind. Some respondents express the idea that getting a job in the nation’s state media is a great chance that few fellow citizens will ever get. On the downside, the journalists complain about professional limitations. Both lack of resources and political interference are a concern. Resource-wise, the three C’s of journalistic production (cameras, cars and computers) are a reason for many complaints, especially in ETV (cf. 6.4). Several informants suggest that the resource situation seriously hampers journalistic production, forcing them to wait for long until transport is available, for instance. At the same time, there have been major improvements since 2000 when neither ENA nor The Ethiopian Herald had computers in the newsroom. The major source of dissatisfaction, nevertheless, is lack of journalistic freedom. Reporters come to the state media anticipating that they will follow personal journalistic ambitions, but soon feel curtailed by the organization’s expectations in the daily news production. An editor in ETV explains: Before you come there, you have a big picture in your mind about what it is like to work in ETV. But in reality it’s not like that. You do as they want, not as you want. You write the way your editor wants. You produce someone else’s work, not your own. (ETV editor, personal communication, date concealed)

192

The lack of opportunities to follow one’s own journalistic aspirations demotivates many newcomers. The routine production, writing stories according to a standard formula, becomes a dull and uninteresting exercise. «I’m not using my capacity,» says a young reporter in one of the media organizations. He has worked there for less than two and a half years, but is already looking for another job now that he «has experience». The reporters see a clear connection between monotonous work routines and political inclination in the media organizations. Because political controversy is avoided, the news reports follow standard formulas which keep the content under control and allow little room for deviance. For many reporters, this goes against one of the basic motives for choosing a journalistic career path in the first place, which was to be creative and cover the unexpected. Now they produce protocol news which has little to do with journalistic freedom. Symptomatically, Fitsum Asmerom (2012) observes that most newscasters on ETV have a pen in their hand, «but none of them are given any right to edit what they read» (p. 71). It is nevertheless a paradox that despite constraints in reporting practice, the staff enjoys an open discussion climate in the newsroom. Discussing professional and contemporary issues with colleagues is part of the working day, and disagreements are common. Political issues are on the table too, although with some degree of sensitivity as to who is present. Even in ENA, the most government-loyal institution, there is an open atmosphere for disagreeing with official policy. An editor with previous experience from another media outlet informs that: Compared with other media and other agencies, there is kind of good freedom here. Daily we discuss with each other – not formally, but informally – in the cafeteria and in the newsroom. We even criticize government actions, or appreciate them. […] Sometimes the editors or the general manager arrange meetings where we share ideas without fear. (ENA editor, personal communication, date concealed) The editor adds that there is also room for criticizing colleagues on a professional basis. As part of the restructuring process, the media organizations have introduced systematic peer review mechanisms with the view to improve individual journalistic standards. In ETV, every journalist is evaluated twice a year in an organized meeting with senior editors and colleagues present. Journalistic ethics is one of the issues to be discussed. From the management’s side, one of the intentions of the evaluation sessions is to reduce brown envelope practices (cf. 9.2.6). Journalists also experience that the evaluations form the basis for promotions. They find the sessions professionally rewarding too. However, overall, they experience that the chances for professional stimulation are curbed by tedious routine procedures in the news organization.

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9.3.2. ‘UNMEEs’ and ‘al-Shabaabs’ in the newsroom Despite generally open dialogue in the newsroom, there is one group which is excluded when political topics come to the table, namely the ‘UNMEEs’. This is a group of reporters who, according to informants, were brought in by the political leadership to calm the atmosphere between the journalists and the management prior to the 2005 elections. They were given the name ‘UNMEEs’ by the journalists as an allusion to the peacekeeping force on the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea; the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Now a peacekeeping force had been established in the newsroom to iron out tensions that may arise. It has never been doubted, however, that the UNMEEs are supporters of the ruling party. «They are extremely pro-government,» one reporter in ENA imparts. The appearance of the UNMEEs in ENA and ETV, as well as in Ethiopian Radio, caused much speculation among the journalists. They feared that the newcomers who suddenly became part of the news environment would share sensitive information with the leadership. The anxiety is apparent in an editor’s account: There are new people coming in. I just don’t know what they’re doing. They come from the regional states. I don’t talk to them because I don’t know what they’re doing here. I heard there are nine people assigned to the Amharic desk. I heard 30 people in total or something. (ETV editor, personal communication, date concealed) A colleague of the editor estimates the UNMEEs in ETV to number a little less than 20 persons in total. 6–7 persons were supposedly placed in the Amharic section, 4–5 in the Tigrinya section, and 5–6 in the Oromo section. In ENA, a reporter is able to name at least seven suspected UNMEEs. Soon after their arrival, rumours began to spread that the UNMEEs shared sensitive information about colleagues with the management. A journalist in the Tigrinya department who asked a critical question about the newcomers allegedly lost her job as a consequence of the query. Others complained about the lack of journalistic experience of the UNMEEs, causing editors to describe them as a ‘headache’ as they needed to be trained from scratch. «Nobody knows their educational background, […] but I think their mission is to check whether people are members of a political party,» an editor construes. The obscurity surrounding the UNMEEs was never entirely settled until a new concern arouse a few years later. By 2010, a new contingent of political appointees had allegedly arrived in the state media institutions, more aggressive than the preceding UNMEEs. They came to be called ‘al-Shabaabs’ after the Somali terrorist organization. According to informants, they were not only meant for the media, but came in large groups from the regions to fill various positions in the entire civil service. An editor contends that the alShabaabs are part of a deliberate infiltration strategy by the central government where the Office for Government Communication Affairs plays a central role:

194

Al-Shabaabs were brought in from the regions to regional mass media offices, government ministries, ENA and ERTA in big numbers. They were instructed by Bereket himself in a 3-month training programme at the Civil Service College. Bereket baptized them and sent them to the government communication agencies. (Journalist in The Ethiopian Herald; date concealed) Another name used for the al-Shabaabs is the ‘tsunamis’, so as to describe how they flood the civil service. One source quotes the number of tsunamis in various public organizations as around 3,000. For the present analysis, the interest in the UNMEEs and al-Shabaabs lies not primarily in the evidence of political interference in the state media, but in the way in which the phenomenon demonstrates tensions between the journalists and the proprietor. The essence of the account is reliable enough, although the latter description of the al-Shabaabs and tsunamis gets somewhat out of proportion. When describing the phenomenon, the journalists are clearly aware that they are overstating, insofar as the derogatory labels used for the newcomers are an indication in themselves of a caricatured portrayal. The narrative of the UNMEEs and the al-Shabaabs thus becomes a good inside story which serves to fortify a common identity for the journalists vis-à-vis the owner. Indeed, it also functions as a demarcation of the professional field (‘we are professionals, they are not’). 9.3.3. Rumours about party membership UNMEEs and al-Shabaabs aside, there are also rumours that several other persons in the news organizations are ruling party members. Among outsiders, it is commonly assumed that many or most employees in the state media are EPRDF members or ‘cadres’, but the media workers themselves are more moderate when describing internal political affiliations. They do however acknowledge that there are government supporters among the staff. As explained in the methodology section (5.3.2), the study has avoided asking direct personal questions about political affiliation in the interviews, but informants were prompted to describe prevailing political sympathies in the newsroom. The responses tend to support the theory that political affiliation is less than outsiders assume. Some informants even suggest that the state media institutions entertain a political diversity not found in the private institutions. To this end, an informant in ENA imparts: If you ask people out there, they think all journalists of the government media are members of the ruling party, but that is not the fact. There are members, there are supporters, and there are people who oppose the ruling party. […] There are also neutral people. This tradition is not only prevalent in television. If you go to the private media, all in all, they are supporters of the opposition. There are some newspapers which support the ruling party, but most private papers support the opposition. In the government media it is better because you find both people who are pro-government, neutral and against the government. There is no such tradition in the private media. (ETV editor, personal communication, date concealed) 195

In the newsroom, however, journalists rarely flag their possible party affiliation directly. Party membership – be it within the government party or not – is considered a sensitive issue even if discussion otherwise thrives in the newsroom. As a result, rumours about party affiliation abound. Informants in the study could single out specific persons in the organizations whom they claim to be EPRDF members. Upon meeting the persons, however, I learnt that they all denied party affiliation – on their own initiative. I gathered that they sensed that colleagues and others believe they are government supporters and they therefore felt a need to clear the allegations. However, several respondents emphasize that information about party membership should not be trusted. Characteristically, one editor who acknowledges that everybody thinks of him as a ruling party member although he claims not to be, has a warning message to the researcher immediately after the recorder is switched off: «People will not tell you, you know, whether they are party-affiliated. So you have to be careful.» The reasons for not wanting to admit ruling party membership are twofold. Firstly, being associated with the ruling party generally carries negative connotations. It suggests that you are potentially favoured with regard to career opportunities and public benefits at the cost of others. Secondly, and important for this analysis, political affiliation is also considered to be at odds with professional journalistic ideals. The conflict is epitomized by a journalist who declares in binary terms, «I am free from political affiliation, I work for the profession.» Another contends that it is not good for journalists to be member of a political party because «knowingly or unknowingly, you will serve the interests of that party». These quotes point to a normative ideal which entails that the media, even the state-owned, ought to be autonomous from political interests. Moreover, the ideal is not only framed as a responsibility of the media institution at large, but of the individual journalist. To this end, the two journalists express a sense of professional pride which suggests that even if they do not agree with the political disposition of the state media, they still propagate a personal ethical standard which holds that professional journalists should stay out of politics. 9.3.4. Political appointments It is common knowledge that the top management of the media organizations is politically appointed and hence government-loyal. As explained in chapter 6, all general managers of the three state media organizations (EPA, ERTA and ENA) are picked from trusted government circles. The government itself is open about this condition. When asked about political appointments in the state media, Government Communication Affairs Minister Bereket Simon returns the question by asking if this isn’t the situation anywhere in the world. Managers in the Ethiopian state media are thus expected to back official media policy, in which development journalism is a central tenet. «Anybody who doesn’t have a positive attitude towards bringing development to this country will not be appointed,» Bereket affirms (personal interview, 10 May 2010).

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The next question is how far down in the hierarchy political employment goes. The general managers are entrusted with the responsibility to select persons for key positions in their respective organizations. Among journalists, it is generally assumed that any editor-inchief of the print publications as well as deputy managers and department heads in the broadcasting organizations are political appointees. This creates a hindrance for journalists who have ambitions beyond a senior editor’s position, according to the journalists themselves. An experienced journalist in ETV who has reached the position of senior editor asserts: «This is the highest I can get unless I become member of the party.» Even further down in the system, having the right political attitude is sometimes seen as an asset. An Ethiopian Herald journalist claims that «you get promoted if you write stories that interest the government». It is nevertheless difficult to decide where government interests end and where professional interests begin. From the government’s perspective, official interests and journalistic merits are two sides of the same coin. Within this paradigm, writing about development is regarded a mutual obligation for the nation and the profession, insofar as the massive focus on development in the Ethiopian society should attract attention from the media as well. A professionally-minded journalist may not necessarily reject this idea altogether. With conscientious focus on development and social issues, he/ she might still perform a respectable duty as a reporter within acknowledged parameters of the profession. In this way, the reporter builds a favourable reputation with the bosses first and foremost because of professional competence, though also in keeping with official policy. Thus, promotion within the organizational hierarchy should not automatically be interpreted as politically motivated. On the contrary, advancement below management level (i.e. from junior reporter to senior editor) is primarily considered merit-based. A simple reason for this, according to editors, is that the organization is in constant need of competent people who can produce quality content, although the content tends to be confined within a development framework. However, in addition to professional competence, journalists describe an indeterminate factor in promotions that could be interpreted in different directions. The personal dimension, in particular, comes out as important. One informant claims to have a genuine chance of promotion because «the general manager has a good look on me». Thus, it is commonplace to explain promotions in terms of personal friendship with bosses. In other cases, reporters just can’t understand why they do not get a promotion. Overall, the promotional system is portrayed as having a sense of obscurity, especially in ETV. There are ‘hidden criteria’ involved which are not exposed to the staff, one senior editor suggests. According to informants, what counts at the end of the day is to have achieved a favourable reputation with the right people, professionally as well as personally.

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9.3.5. Ethnicity When it comes to appointments on top management level, informants maintain that belonging to the ‘right’ ethnic group is a great advantage. As in the central government, one group, the Tigray, is believed to dominate the management of the state media (cf. 2.2.2). «General managers and heads, they all come from the same ethnic group – the Tigray,» a journalist in ETV claims. He specifies with named persons from the media management and adds that the situation reflects a general trend in public institutions in Ethiopia: «You see it not only in the media, but all over. Tigrayans are in the important positions.» The ethnic consciousness in the news organizations is striking. When queried about the identity of specific persons in the management, informants are immediately able to decide which ethnic group they belong to. It comes out that ethnicity is one of the primary identity markers that journalists attach to colleagues and bosses. When a newcomer arrives, members of the environment immediately start to speculate about his origin, according to a manager. Some topics are not discussed when persons from certain ethnic groups are present. «A member of the Tigray ethnic group is always considered a supporter of this government. When an issue is discussed, and a Tigrayan comes by, the discussion ends,» a journalist explains. The ethnic sensor is perceptible in the way journalists frame promotional issues as well. For example, in the research interview, a former ETV journalist talks about an incident where he and a colleague were denied a sponsorship letter to pursue further education. The journalist expresses how puzzling they found the situation: «We don’t know why they refused us sponsorship. The manager – I’d known him for a long time – was also Oromo.» The subtext here is that because the journalist belongs to the same ethnic group as his boss, he took for granted that he would be supported. Had he not been Oromo, the denial of scholarship would perhaps be less perplexing. The ethnification of the newsroom is also reflected in the organizational structures, particularly in ERTA. Although the management is viewed as prejudiced towards Tigray interests, the stronger department in the media production is the Amharic section. This is where the government keeps its main attention, as Amharic is the central administrative language and makes up most of the airtime on ETV (6.4). Hence, the Amharic department is considered closest to the government. Together with the Tigray department, this is where one traditionally finds the largest constituency of government supporters, according to informants. The reorganizing that ERTA initiated in 2009, however, had implications for the ethnic representation in the broadcaster’s headquarters in Addis Ababa. The Tigray and Oromo departments are no longer part of the main organization, but have been moved to respective regional locations in Mekelle and Nazret. In one sense, one could argue that the recent reorganizing of the broadcasting media institutions reflects the ethnic federalism policy of the government, where each ethnic group is given self-governance within their geographic area. On the other hand, the reorganizing also implies that the ‘outsourced’ 198

ethnic groups have become less influential in the main media administration in the capital city. Among staff members, especially those with Oromo origin, the situation fuels speculations of ethnic discrimination. «The reorganizing of the languages has its own hidden agenda,» a journalist from the former Oromo department claims, asserting that the staff has never received an explanation as to why Oromo and Tigrinya are treated differently from the other language departments in ERTA. Remaining in Addis Ababa today is the yet more dominant Amharic department, together with two smaller local language departments (Somali and Afar) and three foreign language departments (English, French and Arabic). Apart from the Amharic department, the English department is now the largest unit in ERTA (although the departments today are often addressed as ‘units’, ‘sections’ or ‘teams’). The English department’s ethnic and political inclination, however, is considered far less prevalent than that of the local language departments. Like The Ethiopian Herald, the English department of ERTA has journalists with a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Also, the English programmes on ETV are aimed at the expatriate community, making a specific ethnic orientation less relevant. An experienced journalist with the English desk explains how his section earns certain latitude in the organization: The English desk belongs to none of the groups. The management doesn’t pay any attention to our desk. They don’t take it seriously. I still don’t understand why. Maybe it is because they see the other languages as channels to reach the people they’re ruling. When it comes to English, it’s supposed to be for the international community, for diplomats in Addis. […] But we get almost no feedback from expatriates. (ETV journalist, personal communication, date concealed) The reporters nevertheless maintain that they work the same way with English news as they do with Amharic news. The stories are the same, the same persons are interviewed, and the tone is the same, except that items with peculiar local focus are usually not covered in the English news. It is therefore a puzzle to the journalists that the English production should be viewed as less controversial than the Amharic production. Several journalists also transgress ethnic and departmental division lines by working in multiple languages. It is common to practice two languages (though not necessarily in the same position); some journalists work in three languages; and there is at least one reporter in ETV who reports in four languages (Amharic, Oromo, Tigrinya and English). When sending out reporters to the regions, editors prefer candidates who can report in several languages simultaneously. As such, there is a tendency to downplay the role of ethnic adherence in the daily news production. Concomitantly, the journalists, many of whom are young and urban, prefer to look at ethnic divisions as an issue of the past. To this end, journalists, including those from Tigray, were inclined to soften the role of ethnicity in the interviews. Illustratively, one informant says: «I’m from Mekelle, but I was brought up as an Ethiopian, not as a member of an ethnic group.» A 199

friend of his, however, maintains that it is no wonder that the person has made it far in the organization insofar as he belongs to the same ethnic group as his boss, who also happens to be Tigray. Ethnicity thus comes out as a latent factor in the newsroom, at least when it comes to labelling of colleagues. 9.3.6. Tensions with management Journalists in two of the three researched institutions, ENA and ETV, complain about their management. One source of complaint is ethnic and political disposition of the leadership, as already discussed. However, equally discernible are complaints about professional incompetence. Journalists often make a point that their boss has less journalistic experience than themselves. Lack of familiarity with journalistic work purportedly leads to inefficient newsroom management, with the possible consequence that promotions are made on false grounds. Additionally, journalists describe a situation where bosses and managers find their position threatened by professional improvements. With the expansion of formal journalism programmes (3.3.4), journalists return to the media organizations with higher formal education than their superiors, presumably causing protectiveness within the management. Journalists still feel compelled to follow the decisions of their superior. An ETV journalist explains: The boss of yours may not have had any exposure to journalism. If he says ‘don’t do it’, you are not doing it. If he says ‘don’t air it’, and you air it, the next day you will be in trouble. They will take it as a personal thing. (ETV editor, personal communication, date concealed) The immediate boss, however, is often appreciated by the journalists. They find him/her to be sympathetic when it comes to professional concerns, in contrast to the top management which is seen as a protector of government policy. In this regard, The Ethiopian Herald differs from the other institutions. The journalists describe Herald as a transparent organization with short distance to the management. The editor-in-chief, Dejene Tesemma, is esteemed by the journalists. Staff members describe him as ‘neutral’, ‘friendly’ and ‘good’. He has defended individual journalists when in conflict with government ministries and the higher management of EPA (the state publisher). He is also referred to by first name by the journalists, which is unusual for persons in the higher management. Thus, one editor imparts, «You can discuss with Dejene, but not with the general manager because he is far away and member of the ruling party.» Broadly speaking, on the basis of the research interviews, one can define two opposing work contingents in the media organizations: the journalists and the management. The journalists are employed (on merit, that is), while the managers are appointed (politically, that is). In the daily news production, the journalists view themselves as those who defend professional interests, while they see the management as safeguarding political concerns. In 200

this terrain, ERTA’s programme department heads come forth as a bridge between the journalists and the top management. They maintain a dual role as supervisors of the journalistic production and guards of government policy. This is indirectly demonstrated by ETV’s free press documentary (chapter 8), where the top management had clear political ambitions. The producer of the documentary, Teshale Bekele, served at the time as senior editor, but was soon thereafter promoted to deputy head of the Good Governance and Documentary Department (2010), and later became department head for Educational Programmes (2011). Teshale is a person with substantive journalistic experience, so one cannot claim that his eventual advancement was a result of political promotion alone. At the same time, he is trusted by the management for having the right policy attitude, thus making a leading position tenable. Teshale’s dual commitment to professional journalism and government policy makes him a capable programme department head in the dialogue between the journalists and the management. Other journalists who were involved in the documentary production, however, were unhappy with what they saw as political interference (8.8). They describe a work situation where they see reporters and editors on the one side, and management on the other. They thus identify with the journalists and put the management at a distance. 9.3.7. Fellowship with private media journalists Having located professional cohesion among reporters and editors in the three state media institutions, the next probe is to discover to what extent the journalists identify with their counterparts in the private media. In this regard, state media journalists generally express kinship with colleagues in the private media, but they are also critical to certain aspects of the private media industry. As earlier informed, at least seven (probably more) of the interviewed state media journalists used to work for a private media outlet. A reason for joining the state media is instead job security. Thus, an ENA journalist who previously worked for a private media company says he would never go back because of financial instability in the company. On the other hand, the private media generally pay better than the state media (3.3.3), which could be a reason for preferring a commercial employer, at least in the short term. To this end, some of the informants are known to have defected to the private media after the interview took place. Thus, the crossover between private and state media goes in both directions. Socializing across different media ownership types is common, and increasingly so. At conventions and workshops, private and state media journalists are seen to be conversing and dining together. The socializing touches on work-related issues as well. One of the editors in The Ethiopian Herald explains how private journalists occasionally ask for assistance to obtain government information which is hard for non-government journalists to get. Workers in the state media are happy to assist their colleagues in the private media, according to the editor. They also share ideas. «I get story ideas from government journalists all the time because it’s difficult for them to publish the stories,» a journalist in a leading private publi201

cation says. However, informants stress that the exchange of information is on the journalist level only. There is never any contact between journalists in the state media and owners in the private media, according to the Herald editor quoted above. Despite acknowledging that the private media earn a relatively freer position vis-àvis the political authorities, state media journalists are critical to tendencies in the private media too. In particular, they maintain that the private media industry is not as politically independent as it claims to be. Thus, an ETV journalist imparts: «The government manipulates their media, and the private media do the same.» The journalists note polarization not just between the state media and the private media, but within the private media as well. A few private media outlets are staunch supporters of the government, while most are regarded as exponents for the opposition. Among the journalists, it is common knowledge that many reporters in the private media are allies of the political opposition. A journalist in ENA explains the troubles that this entails when it comes to professional reporting: Some of my friends in the private media belong to an opposition party. They hide facts. We sometimes go to the same event, and we write a totally different story. I ask them: Where does the truth lie? (ENA reporter, personal interview, date concealed) Reporters thus find themselves in an uncomfortable situation where they are left to choose between serving either the ‘pro-government’ or the ‘anti-government’ media, neither of which fits their idea of true journalism. Professionalism is lacking in both camps, in the view of informants. The commercial side of the private media is also a problem, according to some. «There are so many disgusting things with the private press too. They don’t care about people. They only care about money,» says an ETV editor who is similarly very unhappy with the work situation in the state media. Furthermore, journalists in the state media blame the private media for being sensational, unethical, irresponsible, one-sided, prone to using anonymous sources, and not caring about national interest. At the same time, several informants acknowledge improvements in the private press. An editor in The Ethiopian Herald remarks that even though the private press, like the state press, is not neutral, «these days there are those who are not fanatic». From an analytic point of view, the Ethiopian print landscape is less characterized by extremism in 2012 than during the 2005 elections, and even more so if compared with the situation in the mid-1990s when elements of the private press were beyond any journalistic standard (2.3.3.2). Today’s private publications are marked by a more moderate reporting style, being less direct campaigners for the political opposition. This is also apparent from the choice of words and terminology. For example, the private press has stopped using the term ‘woyane’129 to denote the government, which is considered an offensive label (opposition-linked diaspora websites continue to use the term). One could thus argue that there is more of a common ground bet129

Originally denoting a peasant uprising in the Tigray province.

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ween the private and the state media today than there was previously. This could perhaps partly explain the increased overlap in membership by private and state media journalists in professional associations as well. 9.3.8. Dual attitude to professional associations The interviewed journalists are largely critical to traditional journalist associations, but quite a few are members of special interest organizations. As explicated earlier (3.3.5), the traditional (union-like) associations comprise of the government-affiliated Ethiopian Journalist Association (EJA), the opposition-linked Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association (EFJA), and the bridging though still purportedly government-friendly Ethiopian National Journalists’ Union (ENJU). Journalists in the state media, especially Ethiopian Television, were previously assumed to support EJA en masse, but only a modest eight of the main informants of this study admit they are members, and in those cases mostly passive. One journalist informs of membership in the currently idle EFJA network (a Herald reporter), and two are members of ENJU. There is nevertheless a possibility that some informants did not want to inform of membership in a professional association for fear that it could be interpreted politically, but these would not be many. The journalists are critical to the traditional journalist associations because they view them as politicized. Characteristically, an ENA reporter explains that he is not affiliated because if he were, people would think of him as a member of a political party. The associations care little about professional journalism, according to informants. Even if the traditional associations arrange professional seminars and training sessions, journalists commonly assume there is a hidden political motive behind, if only to fortify either ‘government’ or ‘opposition’ support. At the same time, the journalists expose a ‘what’s in it for me’ attitude towards the associations. Several of them respond that they are not members because they ‘see no benefit in it’, even if the membership fee is very low (ETB 5 monthly fee in EJA; equalling 25 US cents or two cups of coffee). By contrast, a range of new interest groups for journalists have drawn many members. More than ten such associations have been established over the past few years, covering areas as diverse as gender, sports, science and environmental journalism (the known ones are listed in subchapter 3.3.5). Journalists prefer these associations exactly for the reason that they are less politicized and more focused on professional issues. Some associations are so popular that the boards have introduced stricter membership criteria. The Ethiopian Environment Journalists’ Association (EEJA), for example, requires that candidates must have worked specifically with environmental stories, which has resulted in many membership applications being rejected. To become a full member of EEJA, one also needs to have been enrolled for one year as an associate member. The great demand for such affiliations should nevertheless be explained along a ‘what’s in it for me’ framework as well. Associations experience a heightened interest when training and scholarships are offered, especially when it 203

entails going abroad. To this end, EEJA received a huge number of membership applications ahead of the Copenhagen Climate Summit in December 2009 when the association announced travel scholarships (personal interview with EEJA president Argaw Ashine, 29 April 2011). The motives for joining a journalist association are therefore usually a combination of personal and professional. The special interest associations represent important avenues for journalistic conversation in the country. The associations arrange regular meetings for their members, typically on a monthly basis; weekly even. Some gatherings are also open for non-members. Notably, these initiatives draw participants from both the private and the state media, thereby beginning to straighten out a longstanding condition of polarization between the two camps when it comes to professional affiliation (cf. Ellene et al., 2003, p. 46). In addition to the registered local associations, there have been various initiatives spurred by foreign organizations aiming to gather representatives of the private and state media in joint conversation. One such initiative which has gained much attention in press circles is the Media Forum, an open assembly backed by the US-funded organization Pact Ethiopia. It began in late 2007 as a forum for discussing the draft media law (promulgated December 2008), and one of its chief aims was to break down the barriers between the private and the state media. A high number of participants from both the private and the state media joined the forum, which for a long time met on a weekly basis with more than 150 journalists and stakeholders participating in one or more of the gatherings. Several of the informants of this study were key persons in the Media Forum’s steering committee. In addition to the pending media law, two other important topics were on the table: the establishment of a media council and the writing of a national code of conduct for all media. International experts were flown in to lecture at the meetings, covered by Pact Ethiopia and its German partner organization Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. By late 2009, however, the Media Forum ‘disappeared into thin air’, as one of the steering committee members puts it. The reason for this was twofold, according to informants. Firstly, there was no genuine will on behalf of some of the leading participants who represented the government and the private sides respectively to bridge the two interest groups. «Some journalists from the associations are impossible,» complains one of the leaders of the Media Forum. Secondly, the forum came to be associated with personal benefits which resulted in people questioning whether the engagement from its participants was genuine. The Media Forum’s gatherings were known as a place where one could get free food and entertainment, and a select few got the chance to go abroad on generous excursions. The ultimate judgement was passed in a pro-government newspaper commentary which claimed that the Media Forum was merely a place where «USAID is seen splashing out cash to a number of opposition parties and to a number of journalists from the private

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media»130. The state media followed up with critical discussion of the Media Forum on Ethiopian Television and Ethiopian Radio «in highly inflammatory manner» (Mitchell, 2010, p. 5). This in turn provoked Pact Ethiopia to put its support to the forum on hold, which eventually led to the Media Forum’s disappearance in late 2009/early 2010. Talks about an independent media council and a code of conduct for the media have however continued on other arenas, although tangible results are yet to be seen. There are several lessons to be drawn from the experiences of the Media Forum which also serve to characterize the general challenges of association along professional lines in Ethiopia. Firstly, the local media environment houses several strong personalities both on the private and government side who make any joint effort between the two groups a serious challenge. These personalities usually belong to the older generation of journalists and have a past which includes political fighting within or outside of the government alliance. The Reporter’s owner Amare Aregawi, for one, arguably the most prominent character in the private press (2.3.3.4), is described as a fighter whom press people believe will never get along with media representatives from the government. Illustratively, the Press Freedom Day conference at Hilton Hotel on 3 May 2011, which was planned as a joint event between various stakeholders, ended with Amare and his delegation walking out of the conference hall after he refused to speak as long as a journalist from Radio Fana (a government-friendly radio station) served as moderator and State Minister Shimelis Kemal sat on the podium (figure 9.6). Part of the backdrop here is that Shimelis and Amare for a period in the 1990s worked together in the leadership of the same media company (The Reporter), a working relationship which ended in enmity. Shimelis later composed the new media law which introduced ownership limitations in the Ethiopian media and thus effectively restricts any ambitions that Amare might have of expansion of his otherwise successful media company. Both men would maintain that they work purely for the betterment of the profession, but anybody else with knowledge of the inside mechanisms of the Ethiopian media will claim that it is necessary to take into consideration personal antagonism both in this case and in other cases in order to understanding the dynamics of the local media scene. Secondly, the collapse of the Media Forum points to the degree to which opportunism plays a role in professional organizing in the Ethiopian media environment. Not long after the establishment of the Media Forum, rumours started to spread that «somebody tries to benefit from it personally» (ENA reporter). This concurs with the aforementioned observation that journalists turn down an association if it does not benefit them personally. Thus, personal motives and aspirations come forth as important influences in the professional development.

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‘USAID’s embarrassing meddling in the Ethiopian media’, commentary, Nessibu Taye, 29 August 2009. Available at: http://www.aigaforum.com/articles/embarrasing_meddling.htm (translated from Amharic; originally published in Addis Zemen)

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Figure 9.6: Front page of The Reporter, Amharic version, 4 May 2011 The facsimile shows The Reporter’s own account of the incident that took place at Hilton Hotel on Press Freedom Day 3 May 2011. The headline reads: ‘Press Freedom Day crashed’. Newspaper owner Amare Aregawi (standing to the right) is rebuking the organizers while state minister Shimelis Kemal sits in the front row, listening. The small photo shows the conference room after Amare and his newspaper’s delegation left.

Thirdly, however, there is still an important lesson to be drawn from the Media Forum’s realization of a common ground between the private media and the state media. Despite prevailing personal conflicts between media veterans, most younger journalists see no problem of fellowship across media types. «We were sitting together and developing trust,» a member of the Media Forum’s steering committee explains. She anticipates that the polarization between private and state media will fade as a new generation of journalists comes in. «The old guys were politically affiliated. The new breed of journalists is independent,» she claims. 9.3.9. Defections Sudden defections are a problem in all the three studied media institutions. Speaking generally of the fragile work situation in the Ethiopian media, a president of a professional association claims that «a journalist may leave for another profession in 30 minutes». If not quite 206

that sudden, the present research has seen several of its informants defecting abroad after the interview was conducted. Seifu Seyoum, a key official in ETV serving as head of the programme department, defected to the US in 2009, about a year after the interview took place. His boss Haileraguel Tadesse, serving as general manager of ERTA, defected to the US in January 2008 just before I managed to arrange an interview with him. Another key official in the government’s communication apparatus, State Minister of Government Communication Affairs Ermias Legesse (Shimelis Kemal’s equal), deserted to the same country a month after I met him in May 2009. In all three cases, the defections occurred while the officials were on work-related missions abroad. Also, the incidents appear to have caught everybody around them by surprise, and very few persons in the media organizations seem to know much about their whereabouts after they left. Of a slightly different type are journalists who defect from the private media. Four prominent journalists with long service in the private press have left Ethiopia after the research interview took place: Mesfin Negash (Addis Neger), Sisay Agena (Ethop), Argaw Ashine (Nation Group correspondent) and Dawit Kebede (Awramba Times). In contrast to the abovementioned top officials from the state media, these four independent journalists have actively resumed their journalistic activities abroad, now serving the diaspora media. However, defections from the state media and the private media may have more in common than it first seems. Both instances are usually better explained by a combination of push and pull factors, where the push factors consist of professional reasons and the pull factors are more of a personal nature. Professionally speaking, both private and state media journalists are concerned with the lack of journalistic freedom in the Ethiopian media. On the personal side, both groups are appealed by a better life abroad. This is not often talked about, but journalists, especially when referring to others, acknowledge that material conditions are important when considering future options. To most journalists, however, going abroad is not an option. Changing to a different job in Ethiopia, on the other hand, is a realistic possibility. Several informants disclose that they are ready to change work at any time. Poor salary is the main reason given together with professional dissatisfaction. An ENA reporter who has already left the organization says the reason for his resignation is that «the government’s hand was getting stronger». However, he adds that an accompanying reason is that his new job pays him more than twice as much as ENA did (ETB 1480 vs. ETB 3200), plus the new employer even gives benefits on top of that. Again, professional and personal reasons should be seen in conjunction. Journalists are especially prone to find new jobs in the public relations sector, where they might get twice the salary they did as journalists if employed by civil society. Most lucrative is getting a job in one of the many international organizations that reside in Addis Ababa. To exemplify, a senior reporter who earned ETB 1300 in The Ethiopian Herald multiplied his salary many times when he got a job in an international health NGO where he now earns ETB 8600. An editor in the same newspaper went from ETB 1853 to ETB 12,000 when 207

he became a communication officer in the World Food Programme (WFP). The most extreme example is that of an ETV editor who went from ETB 2000 in the broadcasting company to ETB 18,000 when she joined UNICEF in 2011. This serves to illustrate the extent to which NGOs and international organizations are a threat to the already vulnerable media sector in Ethiopia. The competence that journalists possess – especially if working in the English language media – is often a close match with the qualifications a communication office in an NGO is searching for. And surely, with the salary levels available, it is no wonder that journalists are tempted to leave their profession for alternative jobs. It is still striking that journalists express that the profession is more important than the salary. Upon being asked whether he would consider changing his work if he were offered twice his current salary in an NGO, an ETV editor responds clearly: «No. Two times the salary is still not big money. It is not the money that matters. If the working environment is good, that is where I would like to work.» Several other journalists express the same. They could get lucrative jobs in the communication sector, but remain loyal to the media company because journalism is what they feel for. At the same time, many of them are able to do double duty as they engage in moonlighting for external organizations in their spare time (9.2.5). Paradoxically, advanced journalism training and education is a threat to the professional work force as well. With a completed second degree, a journalist becomes even more attractive for the better off organizations in Addis Ababa. Thus, a journalist in ETV who was on leave when the research interview took place to do an MA degree abroad, disclosed that she was considering not coming back to ETV after finishing her study. And eventually, the journalist defected to one of the international organizations in Addis Ababa upon receiving her certificate. To prevent such desertions, the media institutions have introduced contractual agreements demanding that candidates serve for a certain number of years when returning if they want the organization to sponsor their education. However, journalists appear to be poorly committed to these contracts. For example, an ETV editor who has just finished an MA degree in journalism with sponsorship from the media organization reveals that he has signed a contract with ETV requiring him to stay in the company for at least four years after graduation. A breach of the terms means that he has to repay ETB 40,000 to the media organization. A few weeks after returning, however, the editor has already left ETV (although still in the journalism business). The 40,000 birr were never repaid. Thus, while the commitment to the profession may be strong, the commitment to the media organization tends to be weak. 9.3.10. Facing a suspicious public Public confidence in the state media is very low, according to the journalists. They believe most people have long since given up the state media as impartial information channels. An ETV journalist regrets to say that «the public has turned against us». The situation sup208

posedly got worse after the 2005 elections, when the state media came out as protective of the government once the riots broke out. The broadcasting media appear to be particularly distrusted. To this end, an ETV editor claims: «Everybody hates Ethiopian Television and Ethiopian Radio. Nobody wants to listen or watch unless there is something big taking place, like an important speech by the Prime Minister.» The negative perception is a realization that the public keeps itself informed of current events by other sources than just the official media. «If you only listened to ETV and Ethiopian Radio, you would know nothing negative about the government. But the people know everything, each and every thing,» a journalist maintains. Along this line of thought, the journalists suggest that the bias of the state media has an adverse effect. Instead of making the public supportive of government policy, the state media make them more critical because they have learnt by experience that any information coming through the official channels should be met with suspicion. In the view of some journalists, this is a sad condition because it means that even commendable efforts by the government are dismissed as dishonest if reported by the state media. Negative perceptions about the state media affect individual journalists as well. «People take you as someone belonging to the system. It is really depressing,» an editor complains. When gathering information, reporters frequently face disparaging attitudes from the public. As demonstrated by the ETV documentary on the private press, it is sometimes difficult to get people to speak to journalists because they do not want to be associated with the state media (8.6). Other incidents are more dramatic, such as during the 2005 election campaign when journalists from the state media were thrown stones at when trying to cover election rallies for the opposition. «We were not taken seriously. We had to stay in the car,» an ETV reporter recalls. Even so, the general public appears to differentiate between the state media as an institution and its workers. Although people are reluctant to speak on air, they view the journalists as messengers for the owners. Making harmless jokes about journalists in the state media is therefore common. Illustratively, a hospitalized ETV reporter who had an appointment with a doctor to ask for a 10-day sick leave received great sympathy. When the doctor learnt that the patient worked for ETV, his immediate response was: «I’ll give you 30 days» – so as to empathize with the stress associated with working for the state media. 9.4. Professional values 9.4.1. Autonomy When asked to define ‘good journalism’, the journalists strongly and forcefully emphasize a criterion of autonomy. The understanding is that the current condition of government inclination in the state media is an unfortunate state of affairs for the profession. Good journalism is «not siding with the ruling party, not siding with the opposition parties,» an editor in The Ethiopian Herald suggests. Concomitantly, another editor maintains that an important part of 209

good journalism is «teaching pluralism». The journalists take for granted that ideal journalism treats all political views on an equal basis, which none of them claims to be the situation in the state media today. It is revealing that the journalists speak of autonomy as a condition of good journalism, while it is rather a precondition. That is, the media’s autonomy is supposed to be secured primarily by the policy framework, not by the media practitioners themselves. There is as such as strong critique involved in the journalists’ compelling demand for greater autonomy in the profession. As long as the surroundings are restrictive, it is limited what a journalist can do, according to an editor. He says: Good journalism is to report without bias, without external pressure, without fear. Good journalists have to go beyond the official view. […] Journalists need an enabling environment. […] I want to see journalism which enlightens people, which takes people first instead of the government. That can’t happen in Ethiopia right now. There is no vibrant journalism now. (The Ethiopian Herald editor, personal interview, date concealed) Journalists thus assume a correlation between the extent of media freedom and the possibility to perform good journalism. Reporters see less conducive conditions for such journalism in the official media than in the private media. Workers in the state media may enjoy certain benefits such as easier access to information, but the overall political inclination in the official media edifice leaves them feeling disempowered. 9.4.2. Objectivity Related to the criteria of autonomy is the value of objectivity. However, while autonomy depends on the media environment, objectivity rests more with the individual journalist. The informants are generally very strict on this value, maintaining that journalists should attempt to stay objective even if the work conditions are less conducive. By ‘objective’, they infer the attitude of not taking sides and representing different parties in a fair manner. The journalists connect objectivity to fairness, balance, neutrality and unbiased reporting. Moreover, objectivity is closely associated with a commitment to truth. It appears that the highlighting of truth as a central journalistic value is a result of what the journalists regard as a missing virtue in much Ethiopian journalism, both in the state-owned media and their private counterparts. A senior reporter in The Ethiopian Herald describes truth-seeking in journalism as a practice of «taking away layers of falsehood», so as to transgress the distortions induced by officials, politicians and other stakeholders. A colleague of his defines good journalism as «telling the truth as it is». This is not to be understood as a simplified view of truth, but as a commitment to tell the public how things really are rather than uncritically forwarding the message of political leaders and spin doctors.

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9.4.3. Serving the people The journalists greatly emphasize that the media should serve the people, first and foremost. A veteran journalist in ENA says: Good journalism stands by the people, knows for the people. A journalist is indirectly representing the people. He shall give correct and accurate information to the people. (ENA editor, personal interview, date concealed) This way, the journalistic mandate itself is seen as emanating from the people. The failure of the state media to fulfil its duty, according to the journalists, is a consequence of the government having put itself in a position where the public should be. «Journalists should be closer to the public than to the government,» an editor in ENA says, claiming that the opposite is the situation in the state media today. Standard reporting in the state media does not really focus on people’s genuine concerns, according to informants. An ETV journalist confesses how they fail in this area: Good journalism arises from the needs of the people. For example, people are concerned about the electricity problems. There are a number of scandals causing this problem, but we can’t report on them. […] They’re not allowed to tell you the real reason. If you find out on your own, you are not allowed to transmit it. (ETV editor, personal interview, date concealed) The editor thus puts into question the enactment of ETV’s editorial policy, which specifically emphasizes the public commitment of the broadcaster. The ethical code for journalists in the agency reads: «State media journalists’ primary professional obligation is to stand for and respect people’s common benefit and interest» (cited in ETV’s editorial policy, clause 6.1.5). Informants claim that this principle only comes second in actual reporting practice, where the government emerges as the main beneficiary. Some journalists suggest that the media should fill a mediation role between the people and the government. The state media serve as a ‘buffer’ between the government and the public, according to a journalist in The Ethiopian Herald. A senior reporter employs the bridge metaphor to explain further: A good journalist is a bridge between government and society. He brings something from the government to the people, and from the people to the government sometimes. But he is not siding with anyone. (Question) – Do you feel that you are a good bridge? No. There are no favourable conditions for that. (ETV reporter, personal interview, date concealed) It is striking that the journalists in this way portray the government and the people as operating on two separate arenas. Characteristically, one informant argues that it is the journalist’s duty to «stand on the side of the public» and «promote the view of the public», as if nego211

tiations are taking place between the authorities and the public. This is far from the outward impression created by the last national elections (May 2010) when more than 90% of the votes went to the government. The journalists, however, do not view the general public as wholeheartedly supportive of the government, but as a mixed population where many citizens are in fact critical of official policy. 9.4.4. Development journalism A number of journalists suggest that in the condition of being a developing country, Ethiopia demands a type of journalism different from that of a Western society. This involves giving development issues a special priority. «Conveying the message of poor people» is a key duty for Ethiopian journalists, an editor in The Ethiopian Herald contends. Others emphasize a general commitment to «create a better country» and to «mobilize for development» through journalistic endeavours. Officially, this orientation in the media is known as ‘development journalism’. While for many years constituting an emphasis in the Ethiopian state media, in 2008, development journalism became formalized through a draft policy document emanating from the Ethiopian Press Agency (EPA, 2008131). Although the final version of the policy document is yet to be published, development journalism has been introduced as an official reporting philosophy for all state media institutions. Numerous seminars have been conducted for journalists on the policy. The policy document itself is an impressive, nearly 50-pages long booklet which discusses the principles and philosophy of development journalism at great length. It is one of the most, if not the most, sincere treatments of development journalism from an official point of view in any country where the framework has been introduced as formal policy (Skjerdal, 2011b, 2013a). Potential shortcomings of development journalism are discussed as well, notably its «high potential to serve as a given regime’s mere propaganda tool» (EPA, 2008, clause 4.2.3.4). Ultimately, according to Kefyalew Azeze, who is one of the drafters of the policy document, development journalism is meant to «serve the will of the people, which is a will out of poverty. Journalists should share this intention» (personal interview, 17 November 2009). The journalists, nevertheless, are critical to the way development journalism is being practised in the state media. Characteristically, a broadcasting editor maintains that «development journalism doesn’t allow critical coverage». In the name of development, the government is praised and criticism is suppressed, according to informants. They claim that this has become the style in all media genres. For instance, when describing ETV’s newscast, a former editor of the broadcaster characteristically states: «They call it development news, but it only promotes government activity.» At the same time, journalists typically have a dual attitude towards development journalism. They reject the type of sunshine journalism often seen in today’s state media out131

The development journalism policy document was translated from Amharic to English for this project.

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lets (cf. analysis of ENA and The Ethiopian Herald content in chapter 7). But they simultaneously support the principles behind development journalism and argue that the nation’s media should be committed to growth and development and lifting people out of poverty. Several informants emphasize that this is about more than just giving space to development stories; the journalists themselves have to carry a supportive attitude to development. «A journalist has to stand for peace and stability,» an ENA editor proclaims. The informants generally do not see this attitude as incompatible with a professional mindset built on liberal standards. That is exactly the thesis of one of the editors in The Ethiopian Herald who argues for an amalgamation of two journalistic traditions which are sometimes portrayed as mutually exclusive. Says the editor: «I’m hoping that development journalism will be combined with another type of journalism; liberal journalism. I want development journalism to be more liberal.» He thus expresses the double duty felt by many journalists in the Ethiopian state media; a dual commitment to the nation and to the profession. 9.4.5. Watchdog journalism Despite being a common analogy in the well-known fourth estate model of the press, referring to the media as a ‘watchdog’ is less common among the interviewed journalists. One journalist emphasizes that the media should «watch the judiciary, the Parliament and the legislative»; another says journalists should act as a watchdog by «exposing the failures of the government», but most informants do not apply the watchdog metaphor as such. A few do highlight the importance of ‘standing up for society’ against the authorities, which could be interpreted as an adversarial analogy, but the role of the media as a critical investigator is not the first that comes to mind when journalists are urged to define ‘good journalism’. I would still suggest that the moderate use of the watchdog metaphor in the interviews should not be read as a dismissal of investigative journalism ideals. To the contrary, journalists would like to engage in more critical-analytical reporting. To this end, the return of the weekly investigative programme ‘Aynachin’ on ETV in 2011 after several years of disruption was met with acclaim in the newsroom. However, there are few exemplars to look to in terms of investigative journalism in Ethiopia. The private media tend to be critical without being investigative. They are valued for writing critical commentaries, but rarely engage in thorough journalistic investigation. What is known as critical journalism in Ethiopia is therefore often associated with politicized, opposition-minded reporting practice. To the extent that this is the type of journalism that informants associate with ‘watchdog’ journalism, it is not the preferred reporting style in their view. That the watchdog metaphor is little used does not imply a neglect of investigative journalism ideals, but is rather a result of the journalists’ opinion that before engaging in investigative reporting, the media needs to be autonomous. The primary request of the journalists is therefore the removal of the state media’s political clothing, after which critical reporting can begin to prosper. 213

9.5. Work routines 9.5.1. The working day Most journalists in the state media begin work at 8/8.30 am and end the working day at 5/5.30 pm. It is still not uncommon to stay longer, sometimes as long as until midnight on extraordinary occasions, although no extra pay is offered for overtime. However, the working day tends to be relatively flexible, with reporters being free to leave work for a few hours during the day as long as they finish their assignments as planned. Journalists work half day on Saturday and are sometimes assigned to work on Sundays. ENA on its part has introduced two daily shifts, where the first goes from 8 am to 2 pm and the second from 2 pm to 8 pm. Likewise, ETV has a night team taking care of afternoon and evening broadcasts. The bulk of the news production, however, takes place during the day. The working day is organized around two editorial meetings, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Though slightly differently organized in the three news organizations, the most important editorial meetings are formalized as ‘editorial conferences’ according to guidelines specified in the editorial policy for each institution. Present at the main editorial conference are key editors and managers. For example, in ETV/ERTA, the department heads are present, together with the main editor of each language section and representatives of the news centre and the production section. The general manager is occasionally present, or else represented by his deputy. As for The Ethiopian Herald, the main editorial conference at 2 pm is held together with the three other state-owned newspapers (Addis Zemen, Bariisaa and alAlem), where the editor-in-chief of each publication meets together with the press department head of Ethiopian Press Agency (EPA); alternatively the general manager of EPA himself. The organizations also arrange lesser editorial meetings once or twice a day without top managers. Reporters and ‘regular’ editors, however, are not present in the editorial meetings. The editorial conferences play a key role for the state media’s news agenda. This is where the profile of news and other media content is determined. The conference goes into detail about which news items to cover, and hence, implicitly about which areas not to cover. In the conference, the chief editors gain information about issues which the authorities regard as important for the public to know about. Press briefings from government offices and NGOs are circulated, and information about seminars and new policies is shared. However, it is important to note that it is not as if the central government has a direct hand in the editorial conference’s daily dealings. The editorial conferences of ERTA and EPA are on their own, and more so after the implementation of the media restructuring scheme which seeks to make state broadcasting and state publications more independent from the government in the daily news production (6.6). The editorial conferences are led, however, by persons appointed and trusted by the central government. The editorial conference is also entrusted with other tasks, including long-term planning and allocation of human resources. The conference shall evaluate each journalist’s 214

performance and report workers who ought to be «rewarded, given support and penalized according to their performance» (ERTA, 2004, clause 5.2.2.10). Thus, the conference comes close to functioning as an acting board for the organization, making decisions and giving advice which have implications not only for the daily media production but for the work situation for individual journalists as well. However, the formal power to penalize workers is given to the editor-in-chief, the general manager and the board (the use of sanctions are discussed in subchapter 9.6.3). The editorial conference only has an advisory function in this regard. 9.5.2. Pursuing own ideas It follows from the status of the editorial meetings that the news organization is a less conducive environment for fostering story ideas from the journalists. For the most part, the topics covered emanate from the editorial meeting, which gives an editor the task to assign a reporter to follow up the story. Within this system, pursuing own ideas often becomes cumbersome because the story as a general rule has to be approved by the editorial meeting before the reporter can embark on it. An ETV editor who left the organization in 2007 explains how he found the situation at that time: It is possible to come with your own ideas, but you have to plan it, then give it to the editors, and they have to approve it. They’re in meetings all the time. […] If you come up with your own ideas, your bosses will discourage you. It is only accepted if they lack news. The station usually doesn’t care about stories coming from its own journalists. (ETV editor, personal interview, date concealed) However, journalists assert that the situation is changing. One of the aims of the current restructuring scheme is to make journalists more personally committed to the production, which involves the fostering of own story ideas. This is inspired even in ENA, where an editor assures that «we also encourage initiatives from journalists» – thereby inferring that the general rule is that assignments come from the editors. Editors do also complain, however, that the story ideas coming from reporters are not always good; not because the ideas are politically improper, but because they lack substance according to professional criteria. The journalists on their part learn to know which stories are acceptable and which ones are not. In social reporting, they can propose just about anything. When it comes to political reporting, for all practical purposes, they can only initiate topics which will not put the nation’s governance in a negative light. 9.5.3. Doing protocol news After the editorial meeting has decided which stories to cover, the assigned reporters go out and gather information. The information is usually collected from planned events (conferences) or government offices. The way journalists describe the news-gathering process, it 215

emerges as a peculiar exercise in professional performance. In the first place, the editorial conference learns about the topic from an event organizer or a government office through a press release, occasionally with a report or other type of information attached. Out in the field, if the occasion is a conference, the event habitually begins with an official address which may very well be printed out and shared with the reporter in advance. It is then the reporter’s job to highlight one or two quotes from the opening speech and summarize the conference message in positive manner, which usually happens to have been done already by the convener in a press kit or in the introduction to the report released. If the occasion is a press conference, the reporter may already have been equipped with questions from the editors who initially received a list of questions from the convener together with the press release. Thus, there are very small chances that the final news story will be anything else than what the convener had prepared in advance. Deviating from the expected norms of protocol news reporting (7.3.2.3) is not readily tolerated. That came to be the lesson learnt by an Ethiopian Herald reporter who was assigned to cover a press conference with the Minister of Transport concerning changes in the postal service. He had been given a list of questions in advance which he was supposed to ask, only to find that a journalist from ETV began the press conference by posing exactly the same questions that he had on his list, one by one. In lack of any more prepared questions, the Herald journalist made up his own questions which he posed to the Minister. This came as a surprise to the top government person. «I could read from his face that he was not happy. What I had done was improper behaviour,» the journalist imparts. Protocol reporting entails a set of norms which tells the reporter how to frame an issue, what to emphasize, who to interview, and which types of questions to ask. The practice might be illustrated by the account of an ENA reporter who, when coming to the research interview, has just returned to the newsroom after attending the opening session of an important agricultural workshop in Addis Ababa. The workshop will last for three days, but the reporter has only been present at the opening session, as is the custom for state media journalists. The person to give the opening address was the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development. Asked why the reporter only attended the opening session, he says: This is the way most journalists here do. What I need very much is the speech of the Minister or other government officials. From this speech I pick my lead. This is the way the government media cover events. We only report from the opening ceremony. (ENA reporter, personal interview, date concealed) Surely, I intervene, something interesting could happen at the rest of the workshop, and there could be other participants who have news to tell besides his prominence the Minister. The reporter agrees, but he is primarily expected to report «the things that the government has done in good respects», and those things are encapsulated by the government represen-

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tative in the opening speech. Besides, even if he wanted to stay for the rest of the workshop, there is no way the reporter could do so as he has another conference to cover the day after. After the opening address, the reporter gets an opportunity to ask the Minister a few questions. This is customary, and government officials and Ministers are most of the time willing to save a few minutes for the journalists. Asked whether he ever poses critical questions to the top officials, the reporter answers favourably: Of course, but I’m not supported to ask these questions. My chief may not accept it. Questions should be framed in a positive way. I have no support to ask them such questions. (ENA reporter, personal interview, date concealed) Back in the newsroom, the reporter writes out the article from the workshop. It is a short news brief, just 6–7 paragraphs. It contains all the elements of a good protocol news report: quotes from prominent persons, some facts about achievements in the agricultural sector, a few more details about the conference, and a headline which is unmistakably supportive of the on-going developments in the sector. After more than two years with the government news agency, the reporter is proficient in writing such stories. Editors no longer have to rewrite his articles like they did before, they just check the grammar, and the article can be uploaded to ENA’s online wire service. During his initial period in ENA, however, the reporter realized that he did not have the right attitude for writing protocol news. He recalls an incident where he was sent to UN’s conference centre in Addis Ababa to report on the release of the 2009 LDC report (least developed countries), commissioned by UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). It turned out that the report of 2009 had not only positive things to say about the development in Ethiopia but offered some critical remarks as well. The young reporter found this to be newsworthy, and focused on it in his report. The article, however, was dismissed by the editors and was never disseminated by the news agency. «It was such a big story, and it was not covered by ENA,» the reporter recalls with regret. Observation of news production routines thus reconfirms and complements the content analysis of printed media material in chapter 7. All aspects of the daily routines, from the editorial meetings via reporting procedures and through to the final copy editing, support a protocol news practice. It is a practice which in several ways contradicts conventional journalistic criteria. It lets the source decide the news focus instead of the media outlet. It diminishes the critical role of the journalist. And it shifts the nature of news from being an account of the unexpected to becoming a recitation of the predictable. 9.5.4. Staying on the safe side of the editorial policy A great deal of the resources in the state media are allocated to editing articles and programmes, and editors in different positions make up a considerable portion of the work force in each media institution (editors in fact constitute the largest group of informants in this 217

study). The editors sometimes write articles, produce programmes and go out to assist in the reporting, but most of their time is spent inside the newsroom, organizing the work day, attending meetings, and editing news and other media content. The editors view themselves as a combination of copyeditors and gatekeepers. In many cases, the only thing to edit is language, grammar and style. Additionally, the editors secure that the articles and programmes are in line with the organization’s general policy. «As an editor, I have to work for the interest of the country,» an ETV worker says when explaining what she sees as her main duty as an editor. The guidelines for editing are laid down in the editorial policy for each media institution, but the editors portray the application of the principles more as a gut feeling. An ETV worker explains that there are no rules for editing, «but clearly there are criteria», thus pointing to the unwritten rules which define what is acceptable and not. A colleague expounds on how policy is learnt in the institution: There is no defined thing in ETV. On the first day at the station, they don’t tell you how ETV works, you just learn from seniors. When you do something wrong, they say it’s against the editorial policy. (ETV department head, personal interview, date concealed) The editorial policy, then, is referred to as an objective standard which defines the parameters of reporting in the state media. Like the development journalism policy document, the editorial policy for each institution is an extensive document, around a hundred pages long132. It outlines the main objectives of the state media, gives directions for coverage, and in the second half it provides detailed instructions of the running of each media institution. Like many other regulations, however, the editorial policy does not go into detail about correct behaviour in each situation. Editors are therefore left with the duty to do value judgements in many situations throughout the day. The editorial policy itself becomes more of a general reference which serves to defend various actions (‘it’s in the editorial policy’). In order to avoid the risk of transgressing the editorial policy, editors choose the safe route. «I always have to stay on the safe side,» an ETV editor imparts. Likewise, a Herald editor who says most of his editing consists of improving the language, sometimes has to adjust phrases that could be perceived as politically offensive. «If there are words and expressions that could offend our big bosses, I just cut them out,» he says. Paradoxically, the ‘big bosses’ say they would like to see more courageous reporting in the state media. «The government is not interested in not being criticized. […] Weaknesses and imperfections have to be reported as well,» Government Communication Affairs Minister Bereket Simon asserts (personal interview, 10 May 2010). Most journalists on their part see the room for criticism as limited, especially when it comes to the central government administration. An experienced editor in the state broadcaster maintains that criticism of lower levels of the state administration is tolerated, for example putting the Addis Ababa 132

The ETV editorial policy document was translated from Amharic to English for this study (ETV, 2004).

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city administration under scrutiny since 35% of the inhabitants have no access to toilet facilities. The editor maintains that the media can even criticize the Minister of Health on certain issues. However, «you definitely can’t criticize the grand development projects of the government,» he insists. These areas he calls the ‘red buttons’. It is not always easy for the editors to know exactly where the red buttons are, however. Many therefore choose the safer route, which means suppressing information which could be perceived as a breach with the editorial policy or which otherwise could upset a higher official. The red buttons therefore easily get multiplied as the policy trickles down in the institutional hierarchy. A journalist vividly explains the logic: There are some things the government doesn’t want us to touch, but sometimes we overdo it. The government tells us ‘don’t do this, this and this’. The editor tells us ‘don’t do this, this, this, this and this’. It’s because the editor wants to be on the safe side. (ETV editor, personal interview, date concealed) This attitude of double caution is a known phenomenon in the Ethiopian bureaucracy. It testifies to a powerful hierarchical structure where subordinates on each level avoid negative repercussions by pleasing the boss a little extra than expected, thereby also increasing the chances of promotion and other benefits. An Amharic expression forcefully captures this tendency: ‘kÔÔሱ ቂ@ሱ’ – literally meaning a priest who assumes higher position than the patriarch. This ‘holier than the pope’ attitude is prevalent in state media institutions, where workers on lower levels sometimes become the highest guardians of government policy because they do not want to be perceived as disloyal. Symptomatically, an editor in The Ethiopian Herald reports that articles coming from junior reporters occasionally need adjustment in a critical direction because they openly praise government efforts. «If that kind of article comes to me, I will take proper action. I don’t have tolerance for such material. I have to follow my own standards,» the editor explains. The end result, then, is media content which is not too critical, and not too sycophantic. 9.6. Dealing with sensitive issues 9.6.1. Self-censorship The processes described above are commonly known in journalism research as self-censorship, i.e. the active withholding of journalistic information from publication due to felt external pressure (cf. Skjerdal, 2010b, p. 99). Although self-censorship is most often associated with the private media where journalists put constraints on themselves to avoid severe reactions from authorities, it is also a phenomenon in the state media (cf. Nebiyu, 2009). The assumed reactions in the official media may not be as strong as in the private media, but journalists fear that not complying with the expected norms could have other consequences, such as lost chances for promotion and general distress in the work situation. 219

Journalists in the state media therefore continuously make judgements about what information to publish and not. As the Amharic saying goes, ‘እናውቃለን: ብንናገር እናልቃለን’ (‘We know a lot, but we vanish if we speak’), the fact that something is known, does not at all mean it should be shared. Self-censorship thus becomes an intuitive practice occurring on many levels in the news production. Firstly, it is a matter of which stories to embark on. Certain issues, such as those concerning ethnic contestation, are simply ruled out as potential reporting areas in the state media. Secondly, it is a matter of which sources to choose. «You use people who say the right thing as interviewees,» an ETV journalist explains. Persons who are likely to be strongly critical to government policy will not be asked for interviews, or will simply be used as window-dressing to prove that the state media also allow critical voices, as seen in the case of the selective responses to the ETV documentary on the private press (8.6). Thirdly, self-censorship is applied in the final writing and editing process when journalists decide which information to include in the article or programme. At that stage, it is not enough to argue that as long as a government official uttered something, it could be broadcast. Journalists are also expected to serve as a safety net which prevents potentially harmful information from publication. This was at least the lesson learnt by a young reporter in The Ethiopian Herald who interviewed a public relations (PR) officer about budget constraints in the government administration. In the interview, the PR officer gave information which upset his boss when it came out in print. The furious boss contacted the newspaper’s management and got to speak to the reporter. The message to the reporter was clear: «You’re inexperienced! Simply that the PR officer told you doesn’t mean you should write it!» The official expected The Ethiopian Herald to give a corrected version of the interview according to government policy. «Fearing such reactions, we self-censor,» the reporter concludes (personal interview, date concealed). Some topics are particularly prone to self-censorship. Besides ethnic contestation, regional relations on the Horn of Africa represent a highly sensitive area. The editors in The Ethiopian Herald, despite feeling free to report on almost any issue, confirm this. When it comes to special events like Eritrea and Somalia, we’re completely powerless. Our hands are tied. We say more or less what the government wants. (Editor, The Ethiopian Herald, personal interview, date concealed) Concurrently, an ENA editor imparts that stories concerning Eritrea will never be disseminated without consultation with senior authorities, who could be the general manager of ENA. The news agency actually opts to treat regional tensions with a degree of negligence, as demonstrated by the analysis of news content in chapter 7 where Eritrea was only mentioned 11 times in a full year’s news coverage by ENA (7.2.2). Furthermore, when ENA brought out a book focusing on the Ethio-Eritrean war 1998–2000, it chose to only include dispatches from international news agencies and left its own coverage aside (Zekeriya and Mesai, 2002). In this way, the news agency effectively demonstrated that the Ethiopian 220

government’s framing of the conflict is not that different from the international community’s. Indirectly, however, the exclusion of ENA’s own dispatches is also a confession that its own reports are regarded as biased to one of the two parties in the conflict. Similarly, self-censorship is demanded in stories concerning Somalia. An ETV worker who reported from Mogadishu in June 2007 after the intervention by Ethiopian troops explains that his reports were supposed to favour the military intervention. An ‘embedded’ journalist with the Ethiopian military, he was allowed to speak to anyone on the street through a translator. Most locals were found to praise the presence of Ethiopian troops, except a few who were critical. However, representing ETV, it was obvious for the journalist that he would only air those views which gave acclaim to the Ethiopian presence. Exercising self-censorship when reporting on Somalia and Eritrea does not actually appear to be a grave dilemma for the journalists. They argue that both as professionals and citizens it is their duty to ‘stand for peace and stability’ (cf. 9.4.4). In situations like an armed conflict, and when a country’s security is under threat, they regard it as their duty to stand by national interests. This would apply even if they served a private media channel. However, at the same time, even when national stability is threatened, they would not leave certain journalistic standards behind. Reporting outright lies, for example, would be intolerable. The ETV reporter who went to Mogadishu maintains that the Ethiopian state broadcaster was better in this regard than some of the international news channels. Covering the peace and reconciliation conference in the Somali capital in June 2007, the reporter experienced how an acclaimed international news channel, Al Jazeera, failed in its reporting: Al Jazeera, CNN, Reuters – we were all there working together, sitting in the same place trying to report. Then there was a big bomb blast, not at the peace and reconciliation conference, but very far from where we were. Do you know what the Al Jazeera reporter said? Let me tell you: He reported that the conference was cancelled because of the bomb blast. It was a very simple fact, and it was totally wrong! I was there! You can check Al Jazeera’s archives from about 20 June 2007. Everyone heard about the bomb blast, but the conference continued. (ETV journalist, personal interview, date concealed) To the journalist, it is clear that reporting falsehood is totally unacceptable, even in the case of war. Exercising self-censorship within the elasticity of journalistic decision-making, however, appears to be tolerable. 9.6.2. Interference Despite rumours to the contrary, direct government interference in the news production is uncommon. The editors-in-chief of each state media outlet are trusted with the responsibility to lead their institution according to journalistic criteria and the editorial policy. That said, there are ample accounts of higher officials and government representatives who have contacted journalists directly to complain about their work. «If you criticize a minister, the 221

minister will call immediately,» an Ethiopian Herald journalist says, although direct criticism of government ministers is unusual. A long-time editor with ENA informs that «there are times when news, especially political news, is read through the telephone directly and edited by officials themselves, sometimes by party officials». However, although this might have been common practice earlier, it is no longer the order of the day. This might indicate that officials and government persons have become more mindful of the distinction between the political environment and the media, at least when it comes to regular news coverage. More pervasive is the indirect pressure imposed by higher officials and government persons. To this end, journalists possess an incessant feeling of what ‘the government’ believes is acceptable coverage and not. Exactly where the feeling comes from is somewhat indeterminate, insofar as there are in fact few direct encounters between government officials and media people where they discuss media policy and practice. Illustratively, the editor-in-chief of The Ethiopian Herald, Dejene Tesemma, informs that he has met the Minister of Government Communication Affairs, Bereket Simon, only once for critical dialogue concerning the newspaper’s profile. This serves to demonstrate that direct government guidance of media production, such as the ETV documentary discussed in chapter 8 where some producers claimed that the Office for Government Communication Affairs gave instructions, belongs to the extraordinary domain. There are nevertheless occasions where the government admits intervention. Apart from coverage of armed conflicts (9.6.1), elections represent one such area. The 2005 postelection turmoil, in particular, spurred interference from top officials. Thus, to the question of whether the general manager will ever change decisions made by his editors-in-chief, Kefyalew Azeze, former general manager of Ethiopian Press Agency (EPA), responds: It is not the usual duty, but during the 2005 elections aftermath we had to intervene. The information that journalists got was very limited. The general manager had better access to the information. (Kefyalew Azeze, former general manager of EPA, personal interview, 17 November 2009) The understanding is that the general manager of each of the three media agencies is very close to the central government and has access to the latest policy, as well as information that might not be intended for public sharing. The 2010 elections, on the other hand, were better prepared from the government’s side and interference in the state media became unnecessary. In fact, the fieldwork for this project reveals how government representatives wanted to see more coverage of the opposition in the media before the elections. As I followed a few editorial meetings in The Ethiopian Herald in the final weeks towards 23 May 2010, I was urged to stay out of one of the meetings because the general manager (GM) of EPA was going to attend (which is unusual for the morning editorial meeting). When recapitulating the general manager’s viewpoints during the next day’s meeting (where I was present), the editors expressed that the GM wanted to see less partisan coverage and more independent 222

reporting in The Ethiopian Herald. The newspaper tried to follow up with equal presentation of party candidates and less weight on EPRDF. In this particular situation, however, the aspiration for less pro-government reporting might be explained by the electoral context where international observers were present, doing media analysis as well (e.g. Ward, 2010). In addition, the risk of giving greater media access to the opposition was small in the 2010 elections as the indicators pointed towards a major victory to the government coalition anyway. 9.6.3. Sanctions and rumours of sanctions One of the controlling influences in the state media is the fear of sanctions among workers. The worst of these is fear of losing their job, or even having to go to prison. In typical terms, an ENA journalist declares that «definitely you will lose your job if you do something harmful». However, closer scrutiny reveals a different story. When asked to be concrete, journalists have difficulties mentioning names and incidents about job loss. This might be exemplified by the interview with an ENA worker who initially proclaims that he could never publish any negative material about the government, because if he did, «the reaction will be bad for me; they will fire me, send me to jail». Asked how he knows that this will happen, he says with confidence that «there are lots of journalists who have been fired for their beliefs». However, he suddenly becomes much less confident when urged to give specific examples of ENA workers who have been fired: Uhm … In terms of journalists, the organization doesn’t react like that. Sometimes they penalize a few; I think one or two during the elections. When it comes to firing, it doesn’t apply directly. (ENA editor, personal interview, date concealed) It is revealing that the editor, who has served ENA for more than ten years, is unable to specify a single case of firing despite forcefully claiming so in the first place. The quote glaringly expresses how it is not the firing, but the fear of being fired, which is the real controlling influence in the media organization. One might speak of discourses of fear which begin to lead a life on their own in the organization. Stories, true or not, about journalists being sacked and receiving other types of retribution grow among the journalists and become a source of anxiety, thus motivating self-censorship. True accounts of sanctions that did take place tend to get twisted and inflated when rearticulated in the newsroom. For example, several informants mention the cases of two or three ETV journalists who supposedly were fired in the tense period a few months after the May 2005 elections. However, having successfully traced two of the journalists, this study exposes a different first-hand version. It is correct to say that the two journalists defected from ETV after having experienced what they describe as conflict with the management, but they left at their own will and in retrospect give diverse reasons for their resignation: public distrust in ETV, lack of 223

professionalism in the organization, and increasingly one-sided political reporting in the post-election period. They felt there was no longer room to practise the independent journalism style they believed in, and finally handed in letters of resignation. Although they eventually felt that they had no other option than to leave, they were not fired, although one of them was given a forced annual leave for no specific reason. State media journalists understand such cases of forced annual leave and other messages coming from the management as warnings that firing or other sanctions are imminent. A couple informants have even received warning letters accusing them of unacceptable behaviour, although potential reactions are not specified in the letters. In most cases, however, journalists have not received warning letters themselves, although stories of other (usually unnamed) persons who have received such letters abound. The oral warning, on the other hand, is more common. «They will tell you don’t do this again, be careful,» an ETV senior editor explains. Again, the possible consequences are not stated but are left to the journalist’s speculation. This results in a chilling effect which prompts the journalist to be ‘careful’, which may not be a bad strategy as seen from the top management’s side. This way, the management could not be blamed for legal transgressions or political interference, while the sentiment of uncertainty on subordinate levels leads the organization to induce a selfsustained culture of caution. 9.7. Professional integrity 9.7.1. Personal dilemmas The many complications described in this chapter inevitably point to the fact that many journalists experience the practice in the state media as a personal dilemma. They believe in professional journalism ideals while experiencing that the media organization contravenes these ideals. «There is an internal conflict,» one of the editors-in-chief imparts, «so you compromise». It is a compromise between following ideal professional standards and framing stories in pro-government manner. The urge to compromise surfaces particularly in sensitive political issues. Negative stories about the government, for instance, will not be published. «It makes me feel bad,» an editor in The Ethiopian Herald admits, thus pointing to a journalistic conscience where the professional meets the personal. In similar vein, an ETV journalist admits: «What I’m doing is not genuine.» When going on air, she typically reports that life in Ethiopia is good – while ignoring the downsides. In extreme situations, ETV might even transmit falsehood, the journalist claims. She uses an incident after the 2005 elections to illustrate this, when the tense situation led all shops in Addis Ababa to close and all taxi services to stop. The streets were deserted. ETV, however, falsely reported that transport was available so as to entice taxi owners to resume their operation. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy; taxis began to operate again. «In a sense, they were right, although they were lying,» the journalist deduces. Over time, however, 224

constantly reporting only half the picture comes out as a personal conflict for the journalist. Having been employed by ETV for several years, she fears that her professional integrity eventually will be absorbed by bad practices in the organization. She aspires to become a senior editor, but is afraid it would suppress her professional integrity even further. «I’d rather not get such a promotion now. The more you’re promoted, the more you’re formed to do what you don’t want to do. It’s just like a trap,» the ETV journalist says. The feeling of personal distress is evident with many informants, especially those with a pronounced view of journalistic professionalism. In this regard, it appears that increased journalism education coincides with higher levels of professional distress. Several journalists who return to their organization after receiving a degree are prone to leave because of professional dissatisfaction (although better economic opportunities are an additional reason for defection in such cases). At the same time, the feeling of professional conflict is also expressed by reporters who have not been exposed to formal journalism education. In retrospect, a former reporter with The Ethiopian Herald explains that during his four years at the newspaper, even if he was not trained in the profession, «felt I did something wrong». He had a feeling that reporters, himself included, bowed to indirect pressure, and that this was against proper journalism ethics. Later, he obtained a journalism degree with the result that he left The Ethiopian Herald some time after he returned to his position. Today he describes the professional distress that he felt as such: «There is always a conflict between what you think and what you write.» This captures, in short, the personal dilemma that many journalists in the state media struggle with. 9.7.2. Rescuing professional identity While several journalists have chosen defection as a way out of the professional/personal integrity dilemma, this research is more interested in identifying the strategies of the journalists who decide to stay. These strategies could be read as a method to ‘rescue’ professional identity in a media setting where threats to journalistic professionalism abound. Three strategies stand out. The first is the tendency to take advantage of the ethical leeway in journalistic production. That is to say, the nature of journalistic work greatly relies on the journalists’ own decision-making power, for example when it comes to selection of sources and story angle. As demonstrated earlier, the editorial policy of the Ethiopian state media does not go into detail about correct practice in each situation (9.5.4), which means that the journalists themselves have to make the decision. Concurrently, conventional journalism ethics assumes fairly broad freedom in journalistic decision-making as a means to secure professional autonomy and prevent mechanical work processes. Paradoxically, professional principles could therefore become a justification for biased reporting. By exploiting the area where there is no explicit right or wrong (which will be introduced as the ‘journalistic adiaphoron’ in the next chapter; 10.3.1), journalists could choose to emphasize some voices (e.g. the official ones) more than others (e.g. the opposition) and still be defined within the 225

parameters of responsible reporting. An important condition in this regard is that each journalist (or news team) is only responsible for a single story, while the organization at large is responsible for the overall tendency in the media channel’s coverage. In a single story, it is much easier to get away with one-sided reporting insofar as conventional journalism ethics holds that it is the total presentation which is supposed to secure balance. The difficulty, nonetheless, is that the organization at large can hardly be considered as a genuine caretaker of journalistic balance in the case of the Ethiopian state media, but for the individual journalist, this is outside of their personal ethical responsibility. At the same time, it is vital to emphasize that beyond acceptable journalistic elasticity there are situations which the journalists consider to be no-go areas. A pertinent example is that of telling lies. While reporters regard it as acceptable to omit some information in a story (after all it is impossible to include all details anyway), they will typically detest any falsehood. Characteristically, an ETV editor says: «We don’t lie. But we hide facts.» A colleague adds: «ETV may not be lying, but we’re not uncovering the truth.» To each of them, it would be unthinkable to report a lie or straight propaganda on ETV. Thus, though admitting inadequacy in a various ethical issues of lesser importance, the journalists retain integrity by upholding certain principles as non-negotiable. Secondly, state media journalists save professionalism by putting confidence in the critical public. In short, the fact that everyone considers the state media as biased (9.3.10) makes it easier for journalists to endure in the organization. The pretext here is that the public is able to differentiate between the media organization, which is pro-government, and the journalists, who might not share the political view of the organization. Although some journalists describe the public as hostile («they hate us»; ENA editor), for the most part, they sense that the anger is directed at the media institution rather than at the journalists personally. In the Ethiopian mindset, the state media have since their inception during the empire (2.3.1) been regarded as mouthpieces for the incumbent, much the same way as the entire civil service is regarded as pro-government. Thus, the public, at least in today’s situation with exposure to foreign news channels, assumes that the journalistic style practised in the state media may not fulfil common professional standards, especially when it comes to journalistic independence. Hence, the general perception of the state media as per definition inclined towards the government makes it easier for journalists to continue working in the organization. This is a way to rescue a professional mindset following the argument that ‘genuine’ journalism could happen if only the conditions were different. Thirdly, journalists sustain professionalism by holding that the media in Ethiopia must meet the peculiar needs of a developing society. This involves for example giving space to development efforts and sharing a supportive attitude to national progress. There is as such an empathetic posture towards the development journalism ideology among the media workers, though not in the way it is practised in the state media today (9.4.4). On a principal level, nevertheless, journalists experience in this area a commonality with the potentially unifying role of the state media. This could in several ways be described as a developing 226

society’s counterpart to the public service philosophy recognizable in North European media contexts. Contrary to a wholesome libertarian media philosophy, both public service and development journalism philosophies hold that the media are not only accountable to the public but also identifying with the public. Like journalists working for the public service media in Western countries, journalists in the Ethiopian state media maintain that professional autonomy could be sustained even if they identify and empathize with the audiences served. This double loyalty to the nation and the profession, however, is complicated by government ties in the media organizations, as compellingly demonstrated by the research interviews. 9.8. Summary Journalism culture in the Ethiopian state media is influenced by a combination of aspiring professionalism, vague control and personal opportunism. Aspiring professionalism is perceptible in the remarkable increase in formal journalism qualification, and not least in the strong adherence to recognized professional values like autonomy, objectivity and public orientation up against ownership allegiance. Additionally, an increased blurring of the boundaries between the previously opposing journalist fraternities of the private and state media points additionally towards aspiring professionalism. Vague control is perceptible in work methods which exacerbate the official framing of news and events despite little direct interference from the authorities in the daily news production. Through a culture of self-censorship and discourses of fear in the newsroom, journalists induce and reproduce a subservient reporting style. Lastly, personal opportunism is perceptible in sudden defections and practices which satisfy private demands, demonstrated by brown envelope journalism. The interviews with the journalists expose a dual commitment to the profession and the nation. Generally, the journalists are found to be committed to professional standards within the limits allowed by the media institution, and are furthermore willing to stand up for certain standards even if it means a conflict with the felt expectations of the management. Most journalists simultaneously express allegiance to national interests in their work, for example by giving prominence to development issues in reporting. However, they detest the notion that the political leadership should decide journalistic priorities, even in the stateowned media.

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Chapter 10 Towards a model of competing loyalties

10.1 Introduction The overall aim of the research has been to interrogate how journalists negotiate the conflict of working as media professionals while serving a state media institution (cf. problem statement outlined in subchapter 4.5). The conundrum has been sought to be illuminated by means of content analysis (chs. 7–8) and, especially, through in-depth interviews with journalists (ch. 9). The research culminates with the present analysis, aiming to connect the empirical findings with broader theoretical frameworks. In so doing, the intention is not only to be informed by acknowledged theory, but to bring some perspectives back to the scholarly community which might contribute to further theorizing in the field of global media research. The particular contribution of the current research project is a proposed model of competing loyalties, seeking to elucidate a situation where journalists endure a conflict between different commitments. This new model contests various previous frameworks, notably the model of ‘journalists as members of contradicting communities’ (Zandberg and Neiger, 2005), which propounds the idea that journalists maintain professionalism by shifting between different loyalties when a crisis situation occurs. However, before discussing specific theory, it is necessary to reconnect the project to the broader research paradigms on journalism culture according to the exposition in chapter 4. Hence, the chapter begins with a short review of the two broader paradigms of journalism culture in light of the research findings, arguing for a return to the professionalization paradigm (10.2). On this basis, the chapter continues by identifying three strategies which the interviewed journalists deploy in order to rescue professionalism in a pressurized media 229

context (10.3). Three relevant loyalties are subsequently discussed; two sustained (professional and national) and one broken (loyalty to the government) (10.4). Lastly, I will suggest a new model for understanding the multifaceted nature of journalism culture in a transitional society; labelled a model of ‘competing loyalties’ (10.5). 10.2. The two paradigms on journalism culture revisited Chapter 4 argued for a twofold reading of the research literature within journalism culture, comprising of the professionalization paradigm and the interpretive community paradigm. While the professionalization paradigm defines journalistic identity mainly out of professional markers, the interpretive community paradigm takes a more inclusive approach and defines journalistic belonging primarily from discourses in the concerned community. As earlier argued, within a transitional society, there are reasons for both a professionalization and an interpretive community interpretation. An emphasis on professionalization concurs with agendas for democratic development, whereas an interpretive community reading assigns a more flexible role to the media, as often seen in transitional societies (4.1). Thus, the purpose of the following discussion is to assess the two paradigms in view of the research findings, though in reverse order from the chronological presentation of chapter 4. In accord with the open-ended approach taken in the interviews, the discussion begins with the more inclusive framework, the interpretive community paradigm, before reconsidering the professionalization paradigm. Although aspects of the research findings reverberate with both paradigms, the discussion will maintain that the informants by and large express an understanding of journalism culture concurrent with the classic professionalization paradigm. 10.2.1. Ethiopian journalism seen through the interpretive community lens What constitutes journalism culture according to the interpretive community model is the discourses established by media practitioners when recapitulating past achievements and reproaching less successful accomplishments. In her seminal contribution about ‘journalists as interpretive communities’, Barbie Zelizer (1993b) argues that the journalistic community is «united by its shared discourse and collective interpretations of key public events» (p. 219). The two events which Zelizer uses as exemplars of formation of journalistic identity in the American media are the Watergate scandal in the 1970s and the McCarthy affair in the 1950s, the latter of which has been dubbed a ‘journalistic failure’ (Zelizer, 1993b, p. 230). This research concludes that it is harder to find similar landmark events which have informed Ethiopian journalism. Although journalists occasionally refer to past and present media veterans who function as role models (e.g. Anchinesh Mekonnen, Fiseha Gabriel, Habtamu Bekele, Solomon Tekesta and Zekeriya Mohammed), there is hardly any milestone event of the Watergate kind locally which serves as an epitome of journalistic bravery. In terms of antitheses of good journalism, however, informants occasionally frame the propaganda media during the Derg regime as the worst of its kind, thereby outlining a discursive model 230

for what journalism should not be. To this end, an informant who served in the state media during the previous regime pronounces that there is a «miracle difference» between the media during the Derg and the EPRDF. In a sense, the stories about how bad things were during the Derg regime form a general discourse about malicious journalistic practice paralleling the McCarthy affair, but in contrast to journalistic performance during McCarthyism, where the media themselves were to blame, the bad reporting during the Derg was rather a result of the regime’s stranglehold on the media and their journalists. This indeed points to a significant difference between a liberal media environment such as the US and a controlled media environment like Ethiopia when it comes to interpretations of journalism culture. In a liberal society, it is presupposed that the journalists themselves are the drivers in shaping journalism culture, while in a controlled society, journalists describe a situation where the occupational identity is formed by external, uncontrollable influences as well (cf. Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 490). Major events aside, there are other types of affairs which produce a shared discourse among journalists in the Ethiopian state media and as such support an interpretive community reading. A pertinent example is the accounts surrounding presumed infiltrators in the newsroom, the so-called UNMEEs and al-Shabaabs (9.3.2). These accounts have a cohesive function for the journalistic community, as they determine who is a ‘true’ practitioner and who is not. Notably, a genuine practitioner is negatively defined as someone who is not a servant for the government. This epitomizes the ideal of the autonomous journalist (9.4.1). Similarly, portrayals of the hierarchical structure in state media organizations constitute a discourse which isolates the management as politicized, hence outside of the ‘genuine’ journalistic realm. In this regard, informants often refer to the management by the unspecified personal pronoun ‘they’, which appears to be a common technique in Ethiopian conversation as a way to dismiss persons from inclusion. For example, when describing counter-productive forces in the organization, an interviewed reporter in ENA never uses names or titles of specific persons but says, «They only promote government issues»; «They’re not interested in people’s issues»; «They don’t communicate with journalists in a good way», etc. The ‘they’ object, however, is not specified but appears as an intangible force which exerts control in the organization. The only personification of this force is eventually ‘Bereket’ (Simon), who has for a long time symbolized government influence in the media sector in the view of the journalists133. Overall, the indeterminate references to persons purportedly controlling the media organization emerge as a discourse which pretends to sanitize the professional identity of the reporters and editors from that of the management. Lastly, the decisive role of discourses is also evident in stories about sanctions in the newsroom. As demonstrated by the fieldwork (9.6.3), narratives about firing and other types 133

Even when Bereket Simon was away from the Ministry of Information to serve as advisor to the prime minister 2005–08 and became replaced by Berhanu Hailu, Bereket was still referred to by journalists as the brain behind the regime’s media governance.

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of sanctions abound in the media organizations, but it is much harder to document these cases in real life. Thus, I have argued that it is the discourses about sanctions, rather than the sanctions themselves, which become the primary controlling influence in the organizations. Identifying these ‘discourses of fear’ (9.6.3) is therefore essential to assessing journalism culture in the concerned institutions. There are nevertheless indicators which challenge an interpretive community reading of journalism culture in the Ethiopian state media. First and foremost, in contrast to the interpretive community model’s downplaying of the ‘profession’, the interviewed journalists resort exactly to professional ideals when circumscribing their identity as media practitioners. This is not just about using the correct professional terminology; it is an expression of the raison d’être of journalistic practice and a portrayal of the archetype of journalistic identity. Especially noteworthy is the finding that informants invoke a view of the media practitioner which presumes professional demarcation up against other occupations and disciplines. For example, the journalists resist the idea that they should serve as information workers for the government – even if that might to a great extent be the case in actual practice. Equally significant, they are critical to the notion that any citizen could participate in media work, which is another typical manifestation of professional demarcation (Black, 2010; Davis, 2010). This stands in contrast to the interpretive community model, which, by breaking down professional boundaries, favours an inclusive view of the media practitioner. As indicated in the opening theory chapter, new media technology stimulates wider participation from the public in media practice, implying a less defined boundary between the professional journalist and the public (cf. Deuze, 2005, 2008). In a transitional media context, this could be paralleled with various types of journalism for social change, advocating an inclusive view of the media practitioner (Skjerdal, 2013b). Fackson Banda (2007), for example, suggests major involvement of citizens through an amalgamation of development journalism and public journalism as a new model for African journalism practice. In this perspective, it is a paradox that Ethiopian journalists move in the other direction. Instead of inviting public participation, they claim that ordinary people should stay out of the production because journalists are better equipped to do media work. One informant goes to the extent to claim that «it is impossible to tell ordinary people about ethical journalism» (ENA reporter, personal communication, date concealed). To him, the journalist must take the chair and do what he/she thinks is better according to professional ideals and national interests. Involving people in these decisions would only mess things up, the reporter propounds. Overall, the informants advocate a journalism for the people, not with the people, thereby expressing adherence to a professionalization discourse. 10.2.2. A return to the professionalization paradigm This research argues, then, that journalists in the Ethiopian state media, despite prevalent limitations, define themselves within the traditional professionalization paradigm. This is of 232

course not to say that they perceive their work practices or organization as professional, but is rather a reflection of normative preferences. In this regard, the research has located three values which the informants regard as essential in journalistic practice: autonomy (9.4.1), objectivity (9.4.2) and serving the people (9.4.3). There is a striking similarity between these values and those identified in journalism sociology research in the West. Drawing on major contributions such as Golding and Elliot (1979), Merritt (1995) and Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001), Mark Deuze (2005, p. 447) posts five ideal-type values of conventional journalism ideology: public service, objectivity, autonomy, immediacy and ethics. The first three are a match with the values emphasized by Ethiopian journalists. The fourth, immediacy, is not as such stressed by the informants, but this is most likely because they regard journalism as news-making almost by definition. The fifth criteria, ethics, is indeed mentioned by a great number of the informants, although not specifically addressed in the previous discussion of journalistic values (9.4). To illustrate, when describing ‘good journalism’, an editor in The Ethiopian Herald maintains that a journalist should «be ethical and follow the code of ethics; for example, he has to be free from corruption and free from bias». In this regard, a recent study of perceptions of journalism ethics among practitioners in all parts of the Ethiopian media concludes that the journalists widely connect to ‘universal’ ethical discourses (Hailemarkos, 2011). In the present research, adherence to professional ethics therefore emerges as an important component of the journalistic archetype for the informants. The discussion of journalistic values in chapter 9 also included two areas where journalism culture in the Ethiopian state media possibly deviates from a common Western model. One is the relative lack of references to the watchdog metaphor. However, as argued earlier (9.4.5), this should not be interpreted as a rejection of investigative reporting ideals. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Deuze’s (2005) typology of journalistic values does not have a distinct category for investigative or adversarial journalism, but assumes this to be part of the public service mandate (p. 447). This is in keeping with Ethiopian journalists who maintain that it is important for journalists to «stand up for society» (ENA reporter) against the authorities, although hard-hitting adversarial reporting in the meaning ‘antigovernment’ may not be a first priority, neither in practice nor on the normative level. The other area represents a more realistic deviance from common Western journalism ideology, namely development journalism. Journalists in the state media, although highly critical of development journalism when used as cover for politicized reporting, express support to the principles behind the policy (9.4.4). However, they maintain that development journalism must operate within acknowledged parameters of the profession. It does not as such represent a rejection of the professionalization discourse, although there are potentially conflicting areas which will be addressed below (10.5). Overall, the research corroborates other studies which have investigated occupational values among media practitioners in Sub-Saharan Africa. This includes the two previously discussed research undertakings from Uganda (Mwesige, 2004) and Tanzania (Ramaprasad, 233

2001), which both conclude that the role conceptions among local journalists by and large resonate with Western journalism norms (4.4.1). Interestingly, both studies also found some support among respondents to the thesis that the media should facilitate development efforts, especially among state media journalists; which again is confirmed by the first phase of the Worlds of Journalism Study (WJS) where Africa is represented by Uganda (Hanitzsch, 2011). WJS suggests the term ‘opportunist facilitator’ to describe the dominant mindset of Ugandan journalists, a mentality prevalent among Chinese and Indonesian journalists as well. The opportunist facilitator is defined as someone who supports a developmental agenda through journalistic activity, with media practitioners finding themselves in a «constructive role as conveyors, ‘partners’ or even supporters of executive powers» (Hanitzsch, 2011, p. 488). Comparing this with Ethiopia, it is important to note that even if state media journalists seem to identify with aspects of an opportunist facilitator role, they can hardly be considered as ‘supporters of executive powers’. Their demand for professional detachment from the government is unmistakable, as pertinently demonstrated by the research interviews. A possible explanation for this is that the felt coercion in the state media has simply gone too far, and that the journalists, even if some of them might privately be government supporters, are convinced that the profession is better aided if the role of a journalist is clearly differentiated from that of a government official. What emerges as the main impetus in the present research is a reapplication of the professionalization paradigm as a vehicle to assess journalism culture. The informants from the Ethiopian state media define their occupational identity in relation to acknowledged professional norms – not because of, but in spite of, the situation in their media organizations. At the same time, viewing the journalist constituency as an interpretive community is valuable for understanding the imperative role of discourses in the production and reproduction of alternative norms and practices which function as a substitute for professional journalism in the daily routines. Thus, in the case of Ethiopia, it could be suggested that the interpretive community paradigm to a certain degree provides a useful tool for assessing journalistic practice on the descriptive level, while the professionalization paradigm emerges as the appropriate framework when considering the more profound journalistic identity, as expressed on the normative level. 10.3. Three strategies for maintaining professionalism When there is such a great gap between the ideal norms (dubbed ‘professional’) and the actual circumstances (dubbed ‘unprofessional’) in the Ethiopian state media, the crucial issue becomes whether it is at all possible to retain a sense of professionalism in the concerned journalism culture. It appears that the journalists respond differently to this situation. Categorically speaking, three solutions are imaginable: physical defection, professional resignation, and maintaining a notion of professionalism on the normative level while acknowledging limitations in actual practice. All three responses are palpable in the research, though 234

not in equal proportion. Defections from the media organizations are commonplace, although the discussion has proposed that the reasons for leaving the organizations are composite and professional distress may not always emerge as the main reason (9.3.9). Professional resignation is detectable as well, referring to journalists who, albeit remaining in the media organization, give up a professional mindset altogether and give in to a submissive reporting practice. This group also includes workers who do not have professional ambitions, although that number is small. Thus, some informants describe their function along the lines of the civil service rather than in concordance with the norms of a professional media institution. Similar neglect of professional ideals has been observed in other state-controlled media contexts too, for example in Lesotho, where a study of journalistic identities in a government-controlled newspaper found that the degree of submission was so pervasive that journalists could more appropriately be described as civil servants than professional news workers (Kotele, 2010). Notably, however, the current study additionally finds room for the third response to the professional dilemma, whereby journalists retain a sense of professionalism while realizing actual limitations. The largest proportion of interviewed journalists appears to belong to this group. The study has unearthed three strategies which these journalists deploy as a way to tackle the contradictions arising from this situation, as discussed in subchapter 9.7.2. The intention of the following section is to recapitulate these three strategies with further theoretical discussion. 10.3.1. Exploiting the journalistic adiaphoron The first of the three strategies journalists make use of to save a sense of professionalism is the elasticity entailed in journalistic editing and decision-making. In many instances in journalistic practice, there is no explicit right or wrong, for example when it comes to who to interview and what to emphasize in a story. As argued earlier (9.7.2), this gives journalists an ethical leeway which could explain why single stories are not entirely balanced. This room for ethical flexibility is an important principle in journalism ideology because it secures professional authority and prevents mechanical work routines. It will be proposed here that the space allowing for journalistic decision-making may be defined as the journalistic adiaphoron. In ethical terminology, ‘adiaphora’ (pl.) designates morally neutral actions, or, in the words of Immanuel Kant, the ‘morally indifferent’ (Gregor, 1996; original text published by Kant in 1797). The notion stems from Stoic philosophy, which differentiated between morally good and bad values (such as temperance vs. anger) and the morally indifferent (such as wealth), labelled ‘adiaphora’ (Engberg-Pedersen, 2004). The term is applicable to deeds as well. To use an everyday example, eating a chocolate may be considered an adiaphoron, although consuming chocolate in huge amounts over a long time becomes unhealthy and could turn into an immoral deed. The same logic applies to the journalistic adiaphoron. Cases of imbalance in single stories are tolerable; necessary even, when the journalist wants to emphasize specific aspects of an issue. However, if the imbalance persists over time and becomes a pat235

tern, it runs into conflict with the wider journalistic obligation, especially if there is no other outlet which could balance the dominant media in the given society. This obligation of overall fairness and balance, however, is primarily associated with the medium at large and not with the single journalist. This is where, according to some media ethics scholars, press complaint commissions fail because they confine their mandate to investigating singular breaches of ethical codes and thereby lack a tool to deal with wider ethical responsibilities such as an outlet’s general balance and fairness (e.g. Brurås, 2009). Reporters are also careful to express the limits of the journalistic adiaphoron. As demonstrated earlier, informants consider for example falsehood to be beyond the adiaphoric permission. An ETV editor recapitulates an incident from the 2005 elections which pinpoints these limits. On 8 May 2005, CUD arranged a massive rally on Meskel Square which, according to an available estimate at the time, gathered 2 million persons. However, ENA and ETV reported the figure as between 1 and 1.5 million134. This was deliberately done, according to the ETV editor, to reduce the impact of the CUD rally vis-à-vis an EPRDF rally arranged the day before. The point here is not to pay attention to apparently false figures reported by the state media135, but to note the high degree of discomfort the editor felt when his television station quoted an estimate which everybody at the time thought was false. The editor calls the reporting ‘a lie’, though simultaneously stressing that such incidents are very rare in ETV. The editor is representative of a group of journalists in the state media who feels very uncomfortable when their reporting involves breaches of ethical no-go areas such as communicating falsehood and misrepresenting sources, but who at the same time tries to operate within the parameters of ethically acceptable behaviour by exploiting the journalistic adiaphoron. 10.3.2. Trusting the critical public Putting confidence in a critical public is another way to save a sense of professionalism. As argued earlier (9.3.10), the strong government inclination in the state media may have an adverse effect if, as the journalists believe, the public becomes suspicious of any news information emanating from the official media outlets. To this end, case studies indicate low audience satisfaction with state-operated newspapers and television, especially in relation to news and current affairs, partly because «the programs are unfair, partial and blindly biased for the government» (audience response quoted in Abel, 2009, p. 57; cf. Sahilu, 2008; Zewge, 2007). This research does not investigate public perceptions in any way, but if the journalists’ assumption of a critical public holds water, it could bring an interesting perspective on issues 134

See ‘Power failure during Ethiopia’s opposition rally technical’, Xinhua, 9 May 2005. Available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/Power-failure-during-Ethiopia-s,9463 135 After all, estimates from large public gatherings tend to be highly uncertain, as illustrated by the fact that the CUD demonstration on Meskel Square has been claimed as attracting everything from 250,000 persons (US congressional record, 28 September 2005, vol. 151, pt. 16, p. 21588) to 3 million persons (‘The contenders, the showdown and the rally’, 19 May 2005. Available at: http://egoportal.blogspot.no/2005/05/contendersshowdown-and-rally.html).

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related to successes and failures of information control in a restrained media society. Along this line of thought, Ellen Mickiewicz (2006, 2008), for one, argues that Russian audiences, through many years of exposure to government-inclined broadcasts, have acquired skills to see through politicized media content. Related mechanisms may be valid for Ethiopian audiences, but this will have to be the subject of another study. The emphasis here is rather on how assumptions about a critical public help sustain a professional will within the journalistic community. It is clear to the journalists that the public has a low opinion of the state media. This is confirmed by the many troubling encounters reporters have had with citizens while on assignments (9.3.10). Paradoxically, the negative audience attitudes make it easier for the journalists to remain in the organization because ‘everybody’ sees them as part of a predetermined system. This might even justify self-censorship along the argument that the unwritten contract between the media and the audience holds that journalists within the state media inevitably have to put restraints on themselves. Self-censorship is therefore anticipated by the audience. If the media organizations were freer, it would be more ethically problematic for journalists to execute self-censorship because it could mean that they misled the public to believe their reporting was honest while it was not (cf. Skjerdal, 2010b, p. 114). In today’s situation, trusting the critical public is rather a way for the journalists to rescue an ideal standard of professionalism, even if the daily media production is beset with professional compromises. 10.3.3. Adhering to national interest Lastly, the journalists express adherence to professionalism by seeing their activity as a commitment to national interests rather than to government interests. This is indeed an important distinction in the minds of the informants. Overall, they are enthusiastic about development reporting, but critical to the way it is executed in the state media where it comes out as promotion of the government. For example, one of the most passionate advocates of development journalism among the informants, a reporter in the official news agency, maintains that the biggest hindrance for good journalism in the state media is the government itself. This contradicts the stance of government policy makers, who describe a model where the government and the media share the same goals and therefore ought to work in partnership. For the journalists, this is an uneasy relationship, especially when it comes to political reporting. Some journalists express that they rescue professionalism by focusing on social stories instead of hard news. This is an area where they experience little or no interference from management. «When it comes to social issues, they [the managers] don’t care,» an Ethiopian Herald journalist says, characteristically. Likewise, social stories typically come to mind first when journalists are asked to describe an assignment they were really satisfied with. Social reporting thus appears as a space where journalists can work professionally without being curbed by political pressure. 237

Adherence to national interest is commonly associated with an interventionist ideal in journalism practice, as propounded by several cross-national studies. Notably, the aforementioned Worlds of Journalism Study (WJS) makes use of the interventionist dimension to differentiate non-Western countries in the study from Western ones. Researching 18 journalist populations on five continents, WJS describes interventionist journalists as being «involved, socially committed, assertive and motivated», set up against non-interventionist journalists who are «detached and uninvolved, dedicated to objectivity, neutrality, fairness and impartiality» (Hanitzsch et al., 2011, p. 275). The study finds that interventionist ideals do not get much backing from Western journalists, in contrast to journalist populations in Brazil, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Romania, Turkey and Uganda, who are more prone to support the idea that journalism should advocate social change. Although Ethiopia was not part of the first phase of the Worlds of Journalism Study136, the present research indicates that Ethiopian journalists, at least those working for the state media, support the idea that the media should promote social change. However, the research simultaneously detects strong adherence to objectivity ideals among the informants (9.4.2). This would at first seem to contradict the framework proposed by the WJS study, where interventionist ideals are contrasted with ideals of objectivity, neutrality, fairness and impartiality. However, Ethiopian journalists pretend to combines these duties. They both express loyalty to the profession (expressed by the objectivity ideal) to the nation (expressed by ideals of social change). This apparent conflict of interest between different loyalties needs closer treatment and will form the closing discussion of the dissertation. 10.4. Three loyalties – two sustained and one broken The empirical research compellingly demonstrates that journalists in the Ethiopian state media are not subject to one commitment alone. They face a number of commitments, attesting to the multifaceted character of their work. The research has touched on several of these commitments, though not in equal proportion. To begin with one of the least treated areas, journalists are committed to their ethnic group. This is palpable for example in perceived favouritism in the newsroom (9.3.5). However, the research has not been able to ascertain to what extent ethnic belonging has an impact on actual reporting practice, though loosely suggesting it is a latent factor in the newsroom. Another influence is personal commitment, which includes obligations to one’s career, personal economy and family. In this regard, the research has highlighted the importance of salary and promotions for the media workers (3.3.3 and 9.2.4), as well as pointed to the impact of moonlighting (9.2.5), brown envelopes (9.2.6) and defections (9.3.9). It is clear that these factors play a decisive role in the daily work practices as well as in long-term professional formation. However, there is a looming element of opportunism in personal commitments which makes them difficult to systematize from a scholarly point of view. Some rewards, like achieving a work promotion, could entail 136

It will be in the second phase, beginning in 2012 (www.worldsofjournalism.org).

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a substantial degree of professional motivation, while others, such as taking a brown envelope, might better be explained as an expression of self-interest. Like in-depth studies of Cameroonian (Ndangam, 2006, 2009), Ghanaian (Hasty, 2005, 2006) and Zimbabwean (Mabweazara, 2010, 2011) journalism cultures, the present research acknowledges that journalism culture in the Ethiopian state media has a multidimensional character where personal commitments and rewards affect professional practice, perhaps more than in established Western media cultures where the professional and private spheres are less integrated. These influences notwithstanding, on the basis of the qualitative interviews, the research finds three other commitments to be all the more crucial for the discussion of profound attachments in the news organizations. These are the commitments to the profession, the nation, and the government. The research is particularly interested in the point at which the commitments turn into a loyalty, earlier defined as a profounder form of commitment; ‘tolerable to discomfort’ (5.5.5). Each of the three commitments could potentially qualify as a loyalty. Of the three identified loyalties, I will argue that two emerge as sustained (professional and national loyalties), while the third, government loyalty, appears broken. 10.4.1. Professional loyalty Overall, the journalists express a clear sense of loyalty to the profession. This is apparent both from articulation of professional values (9.4); increased interest in professional education (9.2.1); and identification with local and global journalistic communities across media ownership types (9.3.7, 9.3.8). It is also indicated by discussion of professional ethics in the newsroom, forcefully demonstrated by the uneasiness felt during the production of the politicized ETV documentary on the free press (8.8). Not least, it is evident from the informants’ portrayal of the current state of journalistic practice in the state media as a professional failure. Making the allegiance to the profession a loyalty and not just an ordinary commitment implies that the journalists are willing to stand up for professional values even if it means discomfort. Examples of this are in fact not difficult to find. The research has observed several accounts of journalists having argued with superiors on professional issues. An ETV journalist even tells of an incident where he encountered the Minister of Information in the lift in the ERTA building and had to defend a critical story he made the day before about the pending press law. For the most part, however, the journalists choose a less confrontational style in their reporting and find ways to maintain a professional aptitude within the parameters of the journalistic adiaphoron (10.3.1). In everyday work, professional loyalty is sustained by upholding non-negotiable standards such as sticking to facts and treating interviewees fairly. In the long run, professional loyalty is maintained by retaining an ‘unchanging’ journalistic identity despite less favourable policy frameworks.

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10.4.2. National loyalty Additionally, the journalists express loyalty to the nation. This includes both a commitment to national interests and to the people, particularly when it comes to social and economic development. The journalists believe the state media have a special obligation in this regard since they are instituted by a public mandate (cf. editorial policies). Informants are likely to support the interventionist stance associated with development journalism (9.4.4), where reporters ultimately are revealed as agents of change. To some degree, emphasizing success stories is regarded as a legitimate method within this journalistic framework. Thus, an experienced ETV journalist claims that one of the best assignments he has ever accomplished is a series of investment programmes which focused positively on the rapidly expanding horticulture industry in the country. The programmes were broadcast on satellite and received several responses from abroad. From what the producer heard, «about ten investors» contacted the local investment office as a result of the documentary. The ‘facilitating role’ (Hanitzsch, 2011) is thus evident among practitioners in the Ethiopian state media, holding that journalists, if not directly partaking in development, ought to encourage productive efforts through positive reporting. The informants express that their framing of national loyalty is dependent on Ethiopia’s social and economic condition. A different society might have required a different stance on this issue. Characteristically, one informant proposes that the media in a developing society like Ethiopia should realize that their mandate is different from the media in a Western society: «In our developing situation, we can’t have the kind of media you have in Europe or America.» The informant continues by suggesting that a major obligation for the Ethiopian media is to promote peace, tolerance and development; this is indeed more important than voicing the views of the diaspora. The same person, however, argues that the state media should engage much more strongly in investigative reporting, particularly when it comes to exposing corruption in the public administration. Once again, this is a manifestation of the dual obligation expressed by state media journalists; a double duty to the profession and the nation, although, notably, the government is not regarded as part of the national commitment, as will be shown in the next section. 10.4.3. Government loyalty This research submits that the journalists’ loyalty to the government is broken. While the public might perceive the journalists as government servants (9.3.10), and while the state media might be perceived as government property (6.7), the journalists distance themselves from being perceived as loyal towards the government. This is expressed through strong adherence to autonomy as a journalistic value (9.4.1); reluctance to speak about party affiliation (9.3.3); and hostility towards assumed cadres in the newsroom (9.3.2). That said, in all likelihood, there are government supporters among the informants. It is all the more striking to note that informants advocate a differentiation between the political and the professional 240

spheres, and their possible loyalty to the party does not appear to extend into the work space. At the same time, while government loyalty is not found to be prevalent among the journalists, a commitment might be detectable. There is an important distinction here, insofar as a mainstream commitment does not require a personal motivation, in contrast to the basic condition of a loyalty where personal conviction is essential (cf. 4.3; Royce, 1908). Thus, the study observes that journalists sometimes frame themselves as government workers, although their profounder identity as professionals, lies, significantly, somewhere else. This is illustrated by a reporter who used to work in the private media but now reports for the state media. He captures his idea of duty for the state media as such: «I must serve the government, that’s the whole idea.» For him, changing work place from a private media institution to a state media institution is equal to changing work clothes, insofar as his fundamental identity as a journalist professional remains unchanged. Interestingly enough, he did not find that his loyalty to the profession could prosper fully in the private media either. When serving the private newspaper, he constantly had to come up with exciting stories to make the business profitable, which meant habitual suppression of professional aspirations. Nevertheless, all things considered, from a professional point of view, he prefers the private media industry to the state-owned because it gives him greater challenges as a reporter. These findings eventually culminate in a disturbing query: When there is such a compelling hostility to government loyalty in the newsroom, how come the media keep reproducing official policy? (confirmed by the analysis of media content in chapters 7 and 8). Interestingly, such discrepancy between official policy and journalist attitudes is a conundrum not just in suppressive media contexts, but in liberal societies as well. This is essentially the probe which led Warren Breed (1952, 1955) to formulate the theory of ‘social control in the newsroom’. Breed proposed several factors which kept journalists from opposing policy in the media organization, including risk of sanctions; esteem for superiors; concern about future career; dormant journalist associations; and passion for professional work (the factors are more fully described in subchapter 4.3.1). The present fieldwork suggests similar mechanisms to prevail in the Ethiopian state media; however, the project’s main contribution to research in the area is to emphasize the role of the journalistic adiaphoron; the function of critical audiences; and the adherence to national interest. These three areas in a particular way reflect influences of journalism culture in a government-controlled media society like Ethiopia. It should nonetheless be noted that both ‘social control in the newsroom’ and the present framework share an emphasis on newsroom socialization in the analysis, hence stressing the professional community’s own responsibility for reproducing policy in the media organizations. Thus, even though journalists on the normative level express a broken loyalty to the owner (Breed’s study) or the government (the current study), they reproduce policy through socialization and commitments in everyday work practice.

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10.5. A model of competing loyalties In the end, Ethiopian state media journalists are found to be left with two prevailing loyalties, one to the profession and one to the nation. This condition feeds into a recognized discussion in journalism sociology research, where the focus has particularly been on potential friction between the two loyalties. A common premise is that in order for professionalism to be sustained, journalists must resolve situations where a conflict arises between the professional and the national loyalty, or any other type of loyalty for that matter. This is precisely the foundation for Eyal Zandberg and Motti Neiger’s (2005) theory of ‘journalists as members of contradicting communities’. The theory, described in detail in subchapter 4.3.2, suggests that any loyalty conflict that might arise in the newsroom is avoided because journalists «are never in a situation of being loyal to the two communities at the same time» (Zandberg and Neiger, 2005, p. 138). According to the theory, in a ‘normal’ situation, journalists are committed to the professional community, while if a crisis situation occurs they shift loyalty to the national community and leave their professional mindset behind. After a few days of distress, the journalists shift back to their proper professional identity, restored through a process of ‘paradigm repair’ (Bennett et al., 1975; Berkowitz, 2000; Hindman, 2005). Grounded in classic journalism sociology, this approach may be portrayed as a model of ‘shifting loyalties’. The shifting loyalties model does not convincingly describe the situation for journalists in the Ethiopian state media. The interviewed journalists do not portray an environment where they normally stay professional and occasionally swop to national loyalty. Instead, both loyalties are present at the same time, persistently and forcefully. The professional loyalty is evident in a profound identification with the professional community, even if it means discomfort (10.4.1). The national loyalty is evident in persistent commitment to society and national development, to the extent that the journalists view themselves as an integral part of the society they report on (10.4.2). Thus, the research argues that these two loyalties can hardly be treated separately as if the journalists subscribe to one identity the one day and another the next. In place of a model of shifting loyalties, the research therefore proposes a model of competing loyalties. The competing loyalties model acknowledges that journalists are bound by several commitments simultaneously. The essential commitments identified in the current research are of two types, professional and national, but one could imagine loyalties in other directions as well, depending on the research focus and context. The argument here is that even though the professional and national loyalty may appear uneven in different situations, they are not mutually exclusive. This is demonstrated by the case of an ETV worker who has been on reporting missions to Somalia to cover the regional security situation. As earlier noted (9.6.1), the Somali question is regarded as one of the most sensitive topics to be dealt with by the Ethiopian state media, and loyalty to national interests is mandatory. Self-censorship is expected. Even so, the concerned reporter will not let national interests overrule professional 242

absolutes. All stories should be based on the truth, for instance. At the same time, the reporter’s adherence to national interests is unambiguous. For the ETV journalist, this double duty comes out as the only viable route to maintaining personal integrity. While he admits that «we’re usually reporting in such a way that we [the Ethiopian people] are the winners», he also maintains that «we actually try to balance the news» (ETV journalist, personal interview, date concealed). He specifically distances himself from the type of propaganda coverage which he claims to have seen in some other armed conflicts. Clearly, the Somali case stands out as one of the most extreme examples of an area where national loyalty is detectable in journalistic work. It is all the more noteworthy that even in this situation, the reporters do not altogether put their professional ideals on hold, but seek to combine a commitment to the nation with a commitment to the profession. Thus, a situation of competing loyalties is perceptible. Furthermore, it is evident that coexisting loyalties are prevalent in ordinary journalistic tasks as well. As earlier argued, the professional commitment is strong among Ethiopian state media journalists, normatively speaking; and so is the national commitment (9.4). Hence, in everyday reporting, both commitments are prevalent. This observation concurs with the previously mentioned study concerning African journalists’ coverage of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). While state leaders and politicians expect all community members, including journalists, to be committed to the pan-African cause, journalists themselves rescue professionalism by subscribing to a «detached neutral-objectivist professional model of journalism» (Kanyegirire, 2011, p. 139). However, paradoxically, the same journalists also identify with a «collective sense of Africanness» (Kanyegirire, 2006, p. 159). Kanyegirire does not pretend to fully resolve this apparent paradox in African journalism culture, but sees indications of a ‘hybrid identity’ (a concept drawn from post-colonial theory) where journalistic belonging, like journalism itself, is «fluid and prone to change» (Kanyegirire, 2006, p. 175). This interpretation comes close to that of Nyamnjoh (2005), who emphasizes that journalism on the continent should build on the premise that Africanness is a «dynamic identity» (p. 91). My own conclusion regarding the apparent paradox in local journalism culture is somewhat less fascinating, perhaps. I concur with Nyamnjoh and Kanyegirire that an investigation of personal and collective identities appears to be a viable route to assessing African journalism culture(s), but I would contest the idea that identities are constantly being defined and redefined as if the essential trait of identity is its fluidity. Instead, with reference to the research findings, I propose that the journalists’ occupational identity has different expressions, some of which appear to be fluctuating, while others are considerably more enduring. I claim to see this in Ethiopian journalism culture. On the one hand, a shifting character is perceptible for example in changing allegiances according to ownership type. On the other hand, a durable character is evident in profounder commitments to for example the profession and the nation. In this regard, it is in my view pertinent to note that many empirical studies conclude that normative values in various African journalism cultures, by and large, 243

are similar to those of established journalism cultures elsewhere around the globe (e.g. Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Kanyegirire, 2007; Mwesige, 2004; Ramaprasad, 2001). The current study supports this tendency, while having pointed to some peculiar traits of Ethiopian journalism practice as well. Additionally, national commitments are perceptible in all the abovementioned journalism cultures, as they are in Ethiopian state media journalism. The question of how to interpret the pending conflict of loyalties remains a topic for discussion, and this research will not pretend to entirely resolve the issue. However, the contribution of the current study is to de-emphasize the possibility that journalists are able to swop entirely between different loyalties, as if they traded between different identities. For the mindful journalist who acknowledges a profound identification with both the profession and the nation, the constant changing of identities appears to remain a theoretical imagination at best. This attitude of a more stable identity is underscored by a reporter who, when asked if it wouldn’t be a better option for her to change profession considering all the distress in today’s journalistic environment in Ethiopia, responded: «I think of myself as a born journalist. I don’t know where else to go.» 10.6. Recommendations In this final section of the dissertation, I will take the opportunity to put forth some recommendations for agents who are directly or indirectly involved in Ethiopian media work. I should emphasize that these recommendations do not necessarily follow directly from the research findings, but due to the lack of in-depth studies in the area, stakeholders make the most of what is available and tend to extend a broader mandate to the relatively few researchers who have engaged in local media research. Thus I offer these recommendations, where I try to emphasize that which I regard as a realistic approach to local media development. As will become evident, I argue that the realistic approach is one of sensible reform rather than sudden transformation. 10.6.1. The journalists It is my view that journalists in the state media should be more courageous when it comes to defending professional standards. As the research shows, there is a strong sense of consciousness of these standards at the normative level, but at the operational level, journalists resort to self-censorship and engage in protocol reporting. This is somewhat paradoxical, as official policy documents demand a professional aptitude. The practitioners blame the submissive attitude on coercion from above, but, as propounded in the previous discussion (9.6.3), the journalists themselves must take their share of the responsibility for reproducing and reinforcing discourses of fear in the newsroom. Moreover, the professional community needs to counter tendencies of personal opportunism among its members. Explaining unprofessionalism as resulting from an authoritarian system alone is not sufficient as long as journalists themselves foster unethical prac244

tices in the newsroom. On the positive side, the growing cross-socialization between private and state media journalists is an encouraging sign of a rising professional journalism culture in the Ethiopian media. In this regard, I concur with informants who emphasize differences between an old and a new generation in Ethiopian journalism. Less trapped by past dichotomies, the new generation appears to be more concerned with keeping journalism and politics apart, which is in my view important for the professionalization of the entire Ethiopian media. 10.6.2. The authorities Intentionally or not, a culture of self-censorship and anxiety has manifested itself in the Ethiopian media environment. Even if the culture is sustained and reinforced by the journalists; in the first place, it is incited by repressive tendencies in general media governance. As demonstrated earlier (2.5), the weaknesses do not lie primarily in formal media regulation, but in the authorities’ selective interpretation of the legislation and the pervasive use of informal coercion. In many cases, it is not the assigned communication agencies and offices which carry out coercion, but external structures such as the security police who take pride in executing their duties forcefully and diligently. Ultimately, however, the central authority must take the main responsibility for the looming pressure felt by media practitioners, both in the private and the state-owned media. In particular, the authorities should be urged to specify what they regard as the differentiation between critical expressions and security threats. In principle, the government claims to be open for criticism, but in actuality, experience shows that any substantial political criticism runs the risk of being dubbed as a security threat. This is observed, not least, in the court proceedings against journalists since mid-2011 where the new anti-terrorism proclamation has been applied. The government’s media spokespersons claim these cases have nothing to do with media freedom as they belong to the security domain, but surely, even a cursory look at the individual cases reveals that they are vastly different, some of which appear to be very remotely associated with any type of terrorist activity. If the government, through the public prosecutor, still asserts that terrorism is imminent through these media activities, it should make due effort to communicate clearly to the public why this is the case. If no such communication materializes, then the public has good reason to speculate that the real purpose behind the prosecutions are political, with the result that the media themselves shun critical political reporting for fear that it could invoke intimidation. If, on the other hand, the government successfully communicates legitimate reasons for the persecutions, it could also bring support to other parts of the official media strategy. 10.6.3. The private media Although the empirical research has not focused on the private media, it has of necessity included a number of references to this part of the media landscape as well. On this basis, I 245

will post a few recommendations for the private media sector. Similar to the situation in the state media, the key duty of the private media should be to support upward tendencies to professionalization. While the Ethiopian private media industry initially emerged as politicized outlets attached to various opposition groups (2.3.3.2), the sector today leans more towards balanced and responsible journalism, though it must be added that the institutions are still generally weak in terms of journalistic quality, manpower capacity and audience reach. In terms of content, it is my opinion that the media should strengthen their emphasis on news and current affairs, especially in the area bordering to investigative reporting. Unfortunately, critical reporting in Ethiopia has tended to be confused with opinionated reporting, which in reality has led to a suppression of professionally driven investigative journalism. To rectify this, the country’s media should foster a style of journalism committed to classic standards within the objectivity paradigm, including fairness, balance and impartiality. On the claim of being ‘independent’, the private media outlets have a particular responsibility in this regard. 10.6.4. The donor community There has been a range of initiatives from the international donor community focusing on local media development in Ethiopia, but little collaboration exists between the different initiatives (Skjerdal, 2011d). Better coordination could prevent work duplication and secure shared objectives for the parties involved. In terms of strategic priorities, I would maintain that the potential of the official media channels has been largely ignored by donors. The donor community, especially the Western-based groups, inclines to prioritize the private media sector on the rationale that only the ‘independent’ outlets can rectify the imbalance in the media landscape and ensure equal access to the public sphere for all citizens. The argument is understandable from a liberal point of view, but drawing on experiences from various African contexts, the lesson learnt is that state channels continue to dominate the media landscape even in an era of multiparty democracy. In Ethiopia, it is unlikely that any other media venture than the stateowned will be able to lead the national media in the foreseeable future, especially in the broadcasting sector. The potential for a genuine public broadcaster in Ethiopia lies in the state media; a condition which the donor community should take into greater consideration. 10.6.5. The research community Aside from the obvious demand for more in-depth studies of Ethiopian journalism practice, the research specifically calls for further studies on professional loyalty in relation to personal identity. A main question in this regard is how journalists, regardless of geographical affiliation or work attachment, combine professional aspirations with personal beliefs. Such an approach would go a step further than the present study, which has concentrated 246

primarily on collective identities (professional and national). A closer study of personal identity would necessarily involve fewer participants and a more thorough mapping of each participant’s belonging and attachments. 10.7. Summary and conclusion While the research acknowledges that, from an analytic perspective, the Ethiopian state journalism fraternity could be treated as an interpretive community, it ultimately concludes that the journalists’ own portrayal of themselves favours a professionalization interpretation. This is perceptible from the journalists’ emphasis on professional codes; their identification with a wider journalistic community; their view of the journalistic voice as authoritative; and their preferred model of the media as autonomous from other societal agents. The research has identified three strategies which the journalists adopt in order to save a professional journalism culture amidst severe constraints. These strategies include exploitation of the journalistic adiaphoron; confidence in a critical public; and adherence to national interest. When it comes to expressions of loyalty, the study concludes that the researched journalists, by and large, sustain a twofold loyalty to the profession and to the nation, whereas a potentially third loyalty to the government is observed as broken. Ultimately, the research contests an accepted approach within journalism studies which maintains that practitioners uphold professionalism by performing a shift between professional and national loyalties on certain occasions. On the basis of the empirical findings, the research proposes an alternative model which acknowledges that journalists face multiple commitments simultaneously, and that they cannot readily put a profound commitment aside, even if momentarily. Thus, as an alternative to the shifting loyalties model, the research arrives at a proposed model of competing loyalties.

247

248

Chapter 11 Epilogue

11.1. Kristiansand, Norway, May 2012 When I embarked on the empirical research in late 2007, it was important for me to once again meet up with the ENA editor whom I had encountered in the news agency’s headquarters in Addis Ababa five years earlier (described in chapter 1). After all, this was the person who had provoked the research in the first place. I wanted to see him to get his full story and to allow his experiences to inform the study. However, from what colleagues in ENA told me, it emerged that the editor had left the institution and now worked for a communication office in a civil society organization. I sent him an e-mail, but he only replied briefly to tell me that he had changed work place to a different institution. He didn’t seem interested in meeting me, and we lost contact. In September 2011, on one of my final field trips to Ethiopia, I made a last attempt to contact the former editor-in-chief via e-mail with a view to arranging a meeting. This time he replied. He explained that he was in a very difficult situation, currently staying in a refugee camp abroad after having fled his home country where people purportedly are forced to live «under subjugation and fear». He asked for assistance. I realized that I would not be able to meet the journalist again, but responded with contact details to two international rights organizations, a favour I found to be ethically acceptable within the commitments of a researcher. In May 2012 he wrote to me, this time to tell me that he had successfully made contact with an international rights organization that was willing to assist him for resettlement in exile. He needed a reference person who could confirm that he had worked as a journalist in Ethiopia, and I agreed that he could use my details. The thought crossed my mind: What a pity that this person is no longer in Ethiopian journalism. 249

250

Appendix 1 Informants, main interviews

Note: A number of informants were encountered several times. The dates listed below refer only to the main interview sessions. For discussion of interview confidentiality, subchapter 5.3.2 refers. All interviews were conducted in Addis Ababa.

The Ethiopian Herald 1

Amanuel Hadera

Assistant editor

24 Nov 2008

2

Aregu Balleh

Deputy editor-in-chief

11 May 2010

3

Beletu Bulbula

Editor

26 Nov 2008

4

Berhanu Gemechu

Senior reporter

24 Nov 2008

5

Biniyam Wubshet

Senior reporter

16 Nov 2007

6

Dagne Biazen

Deputy editor-in-chief

21 Nov 2007 24 Nov 2008

7

Dejene Sakoume

Senior reporter

25 Nov 2008

8

Dejene Tesemma

Editor-in-chief

16 Nov 2007 16 Dec 2011

9

Eyob Tadelle

Reporter

24 Nov 2008

10

Getachew Dibada

Senior editor

16 Nov 2007

11

Getahun Amogne

Editor

17 Nov 2007 18 Nov 2009

12

Hailemelekot Agizew

Editor

24 Nov 2008

13

Mekonnen Teshome

Editor

4 May 2011

14

Meseret Wodaje

Reporter

26 Nov 2008

15

Mesfin Zegeye

Deputy editor-in-chief

21 Nov 2007 24 Nov 2008

16

Setotaw Girma

Assistant editor

24 Nov 2008

17

Tesfaye Fite

Reporter

25 Nov 2008

251

Ethiopian Television 18

Aklile Tsige

Deputy editor-in-chief

19

Asfawesen Mekonen

Senior reporter

29 April 2008

20

Ashenafi Berihun

Editor

24 Nov 2008

21

Benti Ejeta

Senior reporter

4 May 2011

22

Blen Fitsum

News presenter

2 Dec 2008

23

Daniel Bekele

Director, Education and Training Centre

29 Nov 2008

24

Elias Amare

Reporter

22 Nov 2007

25

Etsegenet Yilma

Reporter

6 May 2011

26

Eyob Getahun

Senior editor

17 Nov 2007

27

Fasika Kebede

Editor

30 April 2008

28

Fikir Yilkal

Assistant editor

22 Nov 2007

29

Haileyesus Worku

Deputy editor-in-chief

24 Nov 2007 15 Dec 2011

30

Helen Yosef

Acting department head

31

Hinsene Mekuria

Senior programme producer

13 May 2010

32

Jemal Ahmed

Editor

30 April 2008

33

Kejela Kena

Deputy editor-in-chief

28 Nov 2008

34

Meseret Atalay

Senior editor

3 Dec 2008 4 May 2009

35

Metasebiya Legesse

Editor

6 May 2011

36

Moges Baraki

Senior reporter

30 April 2008

37

Mulatu Alemayehu

Senior editor

13 Nov 2009 5 May 2011

38

Nesru Jemal

Editor

21 Nov 2007

39

Samuel Kebede

Senior editor

24 Nov 2007

40

Seifu Seyoum

Programme department head

22 Nov 2007

41

Sisay Gebretsadik

Assistant editor-in-chief

24 Nov 2007

42

Solomon Alemu

Editor

15 Nov 2007

43

Solomon Kebede

Programme department head

23 Nov 2007

44

Solomon Kibret

Senior editor

2 May 2008 18 Nov 2009

45

Tefera Ghedamu

Programme producer

11 May 2010

46

Teshale Bekele

Programme department head

47

Tewodros Negash

Acting head of newsroom

21 Nov 2007 6 Sept 2011

48

Anonymous

Editor

12 May 2010

252

2 Dec 2008

1 May 2009 2 May 2011

6 Sept 2011

Ethiopian News Agency 49

Abel Solomon

Editor

3 Dec 2008

50

Alemayehu Takele

Deputy editor-in-chief

51

Ayenew Addis

Reporter

4 Dec 2008

52

Berihun Mekonnen

Reporter

17 Nov 2009

53

Dawit Berhanu

Editor

4 Dec 2008 17 Nov 2009

54

Dereje Mekonnen

Editor

31 Jan 2008

55

Fitsum Kelilie

Junior reporter

17 Nov 2009

56

Getachew Yalew

Deputy editor

17 Nov 2009

57

Habiba Faris

Senior reporter

17 Nov 2009

58

Hailegebriel Biniyam

Assistant editor

4 Dec 2008

59

Henok Tadele

Reporter

3 Dec 2008

60

Massresha Tadesse

Senior reporter

29 April 2008

61

Melaku Berhanu

Editor

21 Nov 2008

62

Minassie Teshome

Reporter

27 Nov 2008

63

Teshome Negatu

Editor

1 May 2008 12 May 2010

64

Yared Tesfaye

Editor

20 Nov 2007

65

Yetnayet Kebede

Reporter

4 Dec 2008

66

Anonymous

Reporter

1 May 2008

67

Anonymous

Reporter

1 May 2008

253

22 Nov 2007

Appendix 2 Informants, support interviews

1

Abebe Aynete Ago

Editor, Addis Zemen magazine

4 May 2009

2

Abenet Tamrat

Reporter, EthioChannel

6 Dec 2008

3

Abyi Ephrem

Editor, Walta Information Center

2 Dec 2008

4

Alemayehu Iyasu

Media coordinator, Pact Ethiopia

4 May 2009 6 May 2009

5

Amanuel Gebru

Associate professor, Addis Ababa University

14 May 2010 16 Dec 2011

6

Amare Aregawi

Editor-in-chief, Reporter

16 Nov 2009

7

Anteneh Abraham

President, Ethiopian National Journalists’ Union

8

Argaw Ashine

Ethiopia correspondent, Nation Media Group

1 May 2008 29 April 2011

9

Bereket Simon

Minister of Government Communication Affairs

10 May 2010

10

Berhanu Lodamo

Deputy head, Addis Ababa City Communication Affairs Bureau

8 Aug 2009 5 Sept 2011

11

Biruk Mekonnen

Editor-in-chief, EthioChannel

3 Dec 2008

12

Dawit Kebede

Editor-in-chief, Awramba Times (closed Nov 2011)

13

Desta Tesfaw

Director, Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority

6 Aug 2009

14

Elizabeth Equbay

Senior reporter, Addis Admas

5 May 2009

15

Esayas Biru Gebre-Meskel

Freelance journalist, Sub-Saharan Informer

4 May 2009

16

Eskinder Nega

Columnist for various diaspora outlets

7 May 2009

17

Haile-Gebriel Endeshaw

Deputy editor-in-chief, Walta Information Center

13 Nov 2007

18

Hallelujah Lule

Researcher, Institute for Security Studies

4 May 2009 14 May 2010

19

Kefyalew Azeze

General manager, Ethiopian Press Agency; Deputy mayor, city of Addis Ababa

17 Nov 2009

20

Mengistu Abebe

Editor, Addis Admas

21

Mesfin Negash

Editor-in-chief, Addis Neger (closed Nov 2009)

254

4 May 2011

29 Nov 2008 6 Sept 2011

7 May 2009 20 Nov 2008 5 May 2009

22

Samson Mamo

Managing director, EthioChannel

3 Dec 2008

23

Shimelis Kemal

State Minister of Government Communication Affairs

6 May 2009 7 May 2009

24

Sisay Agena

Editor-in-chief, Ethop (closed Oct 2005)

14 May 2010

25

Solomon Hailemariam

Director, Panos Ethiopia

1 May 2009 14 Dec 2011

26

Tamrat Gebregiorgis

Editor-in-chief, Fortune

18 May 2010

27

Tsion Girma

Editor-in-chief, Enbilta (closed Feb 2009); Editor, Addis Admas

255

6 May 2009

Appendix 3 Interview guide for main interviews (semi-structured)

1. Profile Position, years of experience, previous work, education, training/courses, salary, working languages 2. The journalist role Why did you become a journalist? If not a journalist, what would you do? What makes you a good journalist? Who do you look up to as a journalist/reporter/editor? What would make you change your profession? Where did you actually learn journalism? Could you ever work for the private media? 3. Professional values How would you describe ‘good journalism’? (What do you mean by ‘objective’, ‘independent’ etc.?) Tell me about a story that you did that really satisfied you. How would you describe the quality of journalism performed in your organization? 4. The organization Why ETV/ENA/Ethiopian Herald? How would you describe your institution, professionally speaking? What is good about your organization? What are the constraints? Tell me about the relationship with your superiors/subordinates. Explain the lines of authority in your organization. How does promotion happen in your organization? Is there a particular relationship between your organization and government organizations/offices? How does that affect your working procedures? Do you find it easy to access information?

256

Do you know who are the board members for your organization? What is the public’s opinion about your institution? What kind of feedback do you get from the audience? How do people react when you present yourself as a journalist from the particular organization? Would you say that your organization is politicized? 5. The journalism fraternity Who are your closest friends – journalists or other people? Do you have regular contact with journalists from the private media? What type of contact do you have with international journalists/correspondents? Are you member of a journalist association? Would you say that there are different groups of journalists in your organization? Who do you go to lunch with? Do you discuss professional issues among yourselves? Is ethnicity an issue in the newsroom? 6. Work routines Describe a typical workday. How much influence do you have on finding ideas, shaping the story, editing? Have you ever experienced that a good idea that you had for a journalistic story was scrapped? That your collected material was abandoned or censored in any way? Is your story usually much changed from you leave it to it is aired/published? Who is involved in the editing of your material? If you supervise subordinates, what are some of the typical advice you give them? What is the most crazy thing you have done in your organization? Tell me about a story you could not report on in your organization. Have you received any type of penalty or reprimands as a journalist? Do you know of colleagues who have received penalties? (From the organization, outside environment, public or others.) Was reporting during the elections any different from the usual reporting? Are there any words or expressions you must avoid? Are all sources acceptable? Where do you actually get the news from? Tell me about the time when you first came to the organization. Were you taught how to do journalism in the organization? Were you introduced to the editorial policy? Ethical codes? Did you get any training? Have you had any training at a later stage? Has the way of doing journalism changed since you came to the organization? 7. The future Where will you be five or ten years from now? What will your organization look like ten years from now?

257

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Index

Agence Direcsione .............................................. 101 agenda-building theory ...................................... 146 Ageri ................................................................... 158 Akinfeleye, Ralph ............................................... 119 Al Jazeera ..................................... 43; 181; 190; 221 Al-Aksa intifada .................................................... 66 al-Alem ........................................... 14; 46; 109; 214 Al-Amoudi, Mohammed ....................................... 48 Alemayehu W. Mariam ........................................ 30 All India Radio .................................................... 112 Almaz Abera ....................................................... 148 al-Shabaabs ................................................ 194; 231 Amanuel Gebru ............................ 72; 168; 169; 254 Amare Aregawi....................... 23; 39; 187; 205; 254 Amhara/Amharic ....7; 8; 13; 15; 28; 46; 78; 85; 103; 107; 117; 189; 198; 199 Amnesty International ................................... 27; 30 Anadolu .............................................................. 102 ANC Radio Freedom ............................................. 16 Anchinesh Mekonnen ........................................ 230 annihilating framing ........................................... 163 anonymous sources ..................................... 46; 129 Antara ................................................................ 102 Anteneh Abraham ........................ 42; 168; 169; 254 anti-terrorism proclamation ...... 27; 28; 31; 33; 245 Arabsat ........................................................... 28; 43 Aregu Balleh ....................................................... 251 Argaw Ashine ....................................... 30; 207; 254 Article 19 .............................................................. 30 audience perceptions ......... 108; 165; 208; 226; 236 authoritarianism ................................................ 3; 8 autonomy ................................................... 209; 233 Awramba Times ............................... 27; 30; 36; 254 Aynachin............................................................. 213 Ayub Abubakar ..................................................... 13

A Abal .................................................................... 158 Abebe Aynete ............................................. 159; 254 Abebe Belew ........................................................ 30 Abebe Gellaw ....................................................... 30 Abenet Tamrat ................................................... 254 Abera Beyera ...................................................... 148 Abiye Teklemariam .............................................. 30 abyotawi demokrasi ............................................... 8 access to information ................... 18; 26; 31; 37; 72 Adama ................................................................ 107 Adamu Haile ....................................................... 148 Addis Ababa City Administration ......... 43; 107; 110 Addis Ababa University ................................ 40; 172 Addis Ababa Voice of Ethiopia ............................. 11 Addis Admas ............................... 23; 27; 36; 45; 149 Addis Dimts .......................................................... 30 Addis Neger ...... 27; 32; 35; 123; 142; 149; 153; 174 Addis Neger Online ........................................ 30; 49 Addis Television ................................................. 107 Addis Tesfa ......................................................... 168 Addis Voice ........................................................... 30 Addis Zemen 11; 12; 15; 27; 45; 100; 109; 124; 142; 173; 214 Addis Zena ............................................................ 25 adiaphoron ......................................................... 235 Aemero ................................................................. 10 Afar ............................................................... 13; 107 Afghanistanism..................................................... 68 AFP ..................................................................... 102 African Futures Project .......................................... 5 African Union ............................. 6; 7; 118; 119; 121 Africanity/Africanness ...................... 68; 69; 71; 243 Afriethics .............................................................. 69 Afro FM ................................................................ 44

289

B

Desta Tesfaw ........................ 43; 148; 168; 174; 254 Deutsche Welle ................................ 25; 28; 45; 161 development journalism 56; 68; 212; 226; 233; 237 developmental capitalism ...................................... 8 diaspora ........................................... 22; 28; 48; 187 Dimtsi Woyane Tigray .......................................... 44 distribution ............................... 22; 43; 46; 103; 111 doxa................................................................ 58; 60 DPA..................................................................... 102 drought .................................................. 12; 14; 122

Baalu Girma .................................................. 16; 148 Bahrain ................................................................. 39 Bariisaa .......................................... 15; 46; 109; 214 BBC ......................................................... 43; 48; 112 Bereket Simon ... 108; 111; 113; 172; 196; 222; 231; 254 Berhanena Selam ......................................... 10; 148 Berhanu Hailu..................................................... 231 Birhanu Olana .............................................. 71; 184 Biruk Mekonnen ................................................. 254 Blen Fitsum......................................................... 252 Breed, Warren .............................................. 63; 241 broadcasting proclamation 1999/2007.. 21; 27; 112 brown envelopes .................................... 39; 68; 190 buche .................................................................. 191 business process reengineering ......... 111; 114; 187

E East African high-speed submarine cable ............ 48 East Germany ....................................................... 39 economic growth ................................................... 3 editorial meeting .................... 46; 82; 214; 215; 222 editorial policy........................................ 46; 73; 217 Eftin ...................................................................... 37 Egypt ............................................ 5; 6; 39; 119; 134 elections, 2005 ........... 8; 23; 92; 116; 151; 209; 224 elections, 2008 ....................................................... 9 elections, 2010 ....................... 9; 142; 173; 212; 222 electoral authoritarianism ..................................... 9 Elias Kifle ........................................................ 30; 48 Elizabeth Equbay ........................................ 148; 254 emancipatory journalism ..................................... 69 emic ................................................................ 84; 87 Enbilta ................................................................ 255 Entman, Robert M .............................................. 144 equipment .......................................................... 106 Eritrea....................................... 6; 22; 119; 194; 220 Ermias Legesse ................................................... 207 Eskinder Nega .............................................. 30; 254 essentialism.......................................................... 69 ethics .................................................. 226; 233; 235 Ethio Telecom ...................................................... 49 EthioChannel ........................................ 37; 254; 255 Ethio-Eritrean war .................................. 22; 37; 220 Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority .. 26; 32; 148; 172 Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation .................. 112 Ethiopian Democratic Party ............................... 138 Ethiopian Empire ................................................ 7; 9 Ethiopian Environment Journalists’ Association . 41; 203 Ethiopian Environmental Journalists’ Association 30 Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association ..... 42; 159; 203 Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association in Exile...................................................... 20; 30; 42 Ethiopian Herald, The ....... 11; 15; 45; 108; 122; 251 Ethiopian Journalism Review.............................. 102 Ethiopian Journalist Association .................. 41; 203 Ethiopian Mass Media Training Institute 38; 40; 104 Ethiopian Media Women’s Association ............... 41 Ethiopian National Journalists’ Union .. 42; 203; 254 Ethiopian News Agency .......... 11; 47; 101; 116; 253

C Cameroon ........................................................... 239 Capital .......................................................... 23; 124 Carter, Kevin ....................................................... 162 censorship .............................. 11; 73; 150; 151; 156 China .................................. 28; 39; 59; 67; 118; 119 Chinese Communist Party .................................... 28 circulation .................................. 19; 23; 25; 45; 111 civil society organization proclamation.... 32; 33; 41 Climate and Environmental Journalists’ Association ......................................................................... 41 CNN ............................................................ 190; 221 Coalition for Unity and Democracy 24; 92; 158; 236 Coalition of Media Against Malaria in Ethiopia .... 41 code of ethics ............................................. 192; 233 coding ................................................................... 95 coercion........ 17; 21; 24; 27; 32; 172; 234; 244; 245 Committee to Protect Journalists .................... 4; 30 competing loyalties .................................... 229; 242 Constitution, 1995........................ 7; 18; 21; 25; 155 content analysis ................................... 82; 115; 141 criminal code ............................................ 12; 27; 34 critical journalism ............................................... 213 cultural capital...................................................... 59 cultural dimensions .............................................. 83 cultural leap ......................................................... 83 D Dagne Biazen ...................................................... 251 Daily Monitor ......................................... 45; 48; 122 Daniel Bekele.............................................. 111; 252 Dawit Kebede ....................................... 30; 207; 254 defamation ......................................... 19; 20; 21; 26 defection ...................................................... 30; 206 Dejene Tesemma ............... 110; 132; 200; 222; 251 demographics ........................................... 5; 37; 183 Derg regime.................................... 14; 39; 152; 230

290

Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front ........................... 28; 33; 108; 120; 128; 231; 236 Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front ................................................................. 3; 8; 17 Ethiopian Press Agency ................ 46; 109; 212; 214 Ethiopian Radio .............................................. 44; 47 Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency . 38; 99; 105 Ethiopian Review............................................ 30; 48 Ethiopian Satellite Television ................... 28; 30; 43 Ethiopian Sports Journalists’ Association ............. 41 Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation . 24; 49 Ethiopian Television ..................... 13; 105; 141; 252 Ethiopian Volunteer Media Professionals Against AIDS ................................................................. 41 ethnic federalism ..................................... 7; 19; 198 ethnicity ............................. 8; 79; 91; 198; 220; 238 ethnographic method .......................................... 84 Ethop ........................................ 23; 25; 36; 158; 255 etic.................................................................. 84; 87 ETV1 ..................................................................... 43 ETV2 ............................................................. 43; 107 exile .................................................. 22; 30; 42; 249 Eyeta .................................................................... 19

Girma Woldegiorgis ........................................... 118 glasnost ................................................................ 16 Goggle ................................................................ 161 Gorbachev, Mikhail .............................................. 16 Goshu Mogus ....................................................... 19 Grand Renaissance Dam ................ 6; 132; 134; 138 H habitus ................................................................. 60 Habtamu Bekele ................................................. 230 Haile Selassie ........................................ 7; 10; 13; 14 Haileraguel Tadesse ........................................... 207 Hallelujah Lule .................................... 148; 159; 254 Hammer, Frank .................................................... 39 Harar Radio .......................................................... 13 Hasty, Jennifer .............................................. 70; 239 hierarchy ............................................ 106; 197; 231 Human Development Index ................................... 5 Human Rights Watch ........................................... 30 hybrid journalism ........................................... 49; 71 I identity ....................... 57; 60; 66; 68; 225; 230; 243 imprisonment ......................................... 21; 93; 223 India ..................................................................... 39 inflation .................................................... 5; 12; 187 informed consent ................................................. 89 Institute for Security Studies .................................. 5 integrity ........................................ 49; 164; 224; 243 interference ..... 12; 72; 91; 101; 172; 192; 201; 221 International Monetary Fund................................. 6 Internet ........................................................ 48; 109 Internet filtering ............................................. 28; 32 interpretive community ......................... 51; 57; 230 interview confidence............................................ 88 investigative reporting ................................. 73; 213 Iran ................................................................. 30; 39 Iraq ....................................................................... 48 IRNA ................................................................... 102 Italian occupation................................................. 11

F Facebook ........................................................ 48; 81 Faculty of Journalism and Communication, AAU 40; 159 famine ...................................... 12; 14; 16; 122; 163 Fana Broadcasting Corporate ............................... 43 Fasil Yenealem...................................................... 30 fear ................................................. 32; 80; 219; 223 field research........................................................ 77 field theory ..................................................... 58; 59 Finch ................................................................... 158 Fiseha Gabriel ..................................................... 230 Fiteh ......................................................... 27; 30; 36 FM Addis 97.1 ...................................................... 37 foreign correspondents ...................... 15; 16; 18; 25 Foreign Correspondents’ Association of Ethiopia 41 Fortune ................................... 23; 36; 124; 168; 183 fourth estate ................................................ 69; 213 frame-building .................................................... 146 framing analysis ........................................... 83; 143 Freedom House .............................................. 25; 30 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung ..................................... 204 functionalism........................................................ 64

J jamming ......................................................... 28; 45 journalism culture .................................. 53; 56; 183 journalism education ......... 31; 38; 39; 71; 183; 208 journalism sociology ............................................ 53 journalist associations ...................... 26; 31; 41; 203 journalists as members of contradicting communities ............................................ 66; 242

G Gambella .............................................................. 44 Gamora .............................................................. 157 Gebre Egziabher ................................................... 10 gender .................................................... 38; 79; 129 Genete Leul .......................................................... 10 Ghana ................................................................... 70 Gilgel Gibe III Dam .................................................. 6

K Kadhi, Joe ............................................................. 69 Kahsay Gebreigziabher ....................................... 148 Kaliti prison .......................................................... 93 Kant, Immanuel .................................................. 235

291

Kanyegirire, Andrew ..................................... 71; 243 Kasoma, Francis.................................................... 69 Kefyalew Azeze .......................... 110; 212; 222; 254 Kenya...................................................... 22; 39; 190 Kifle Mulat ...................................................... 19; 42

Ministry of the Pen....................................... 11; 101 Mogadishu ................................................... 13; 221 Moged ................................................................ 157 moonlighting ........................................ 39; 189; 208 Mulugeta Lule ...................................................... 19 Mushe Semu ...................................................... 138

L N

language ................. 12; 15; 46; 78; 82; 85; 107; 199 lapdog journalism................................................. 68 layout ................................................................. 124 Le docteur nouvellement venu ............................. 12 Le Semaine d’Ethiopie ............................................ 9 lematawi habt ........................................................ 8 Lesotho ............................................................... 235 liberalism .......................................................... 8; 70 liberalization................................................... 17; 31 liberation journalism ............................................ 69 Liberia................................................................... 48 licence .................................... 19; 21; 26; 27; 31; 43 licence fee .......................................................... 112 literati reporting style .......................................... 68 loyalty ......................................... 61; 62; 68; 97; 238

National Photojournalist Association Ethiopia..... 41 Nazret ................................................................. 107 Nebrek ................................................................ 157 Neiger, Motti ................................................ 66; 242 Netsanet ............................................................... 25 Network of Journalists Against Female Genital Mutilation ........................................................ 41 neutralist-objectivist paradigm ............................ 71 New Partnership for Africa’s Development . 71; 243 news agencies ........................ 15; 47; 101; 116; 220 newspapers ................................................ 9; 18; 45 newsroom observation ........................................ 81 Nigeria ............................................................ 5; 119 Nile Media Network Ethiopia Chapter ................. 41 Nishan .................................................................. 93 Nyamnjoh, Francis B .................................... 69; 243

M Mabweazara, Hayes M ................................. 71; 239 magazines ...................................................... 18; 37 Mal Goode............................................................ 39 McCarthyism ................................................ 58; 230 media council ....................................... 31; 204; 205 Media Forum .............................................. 204; 205 media law, 2008 ................... 4; 26; 33; 37; 204; 205 MegaNet Corporation .................................... 20; 47 Mekasha Abera .................................................. 159 Mekelle ................................................ 44; 107; 199 Mekuria Mekasha .............................................. 159 Melaku Tegegne ................................................... 16 Meles Zenawi 8; 18; 28; 31; 118; 119; 128; 153; 158 memory studies ................................................... 59 Menelik........................................................... 25; 36 Menelik II ....................................................... 10; 12 mengist................................................................. 87 Mengistu Abebe ................................................. 254 Mengistu Haile Mariam .................... 7; 16; 150; 157 Mesenazeria ....................................................... 162 Meseret Atalay ..................................................... 42 Mesfin Negash ........... 30; 35; 49; 92; 148; 207; 254 Mesfin Zegeye .................................................... 251 Meskel Square .................................................... 236 methodology ........................................................ 75 Meyisaw ............................................................... 25 Meznagna ............................................................ 25 Millennium Dam (see also Grand Renaissance Dam) ........................................................................... 6 Ministry of Information .......... 18; 47; 101; 105; 111 Ministry of Information and Culture .............. 18; 22 Ministry of Information and National Guidance .. 15

O objectivity....................... 59; 70; 210; 233; 238; 246 Office for Government Communication Affairs .. 28; 47; 101; 111; 172 Ogaden ........................................................... 30; 40 Ogaden National Liberation Front ..................... 134 Organization of African Unity ........................... 7; 13 Oromay ................................................................ 16 Oromia Mass Media Agency .............................. 107 Oromo .....................8; 13; 15; 46; 85; 107; 158; 198 Oromo Liberation Front ....................................... 15 Oromo Television ............................................... 107 P Pact Ethiopia .............................................. 204; 254 Pan-African News Agency .................................. 103 Panos Ethiopia.................................................... 255 paradigm repair............................................ 66; 242 party membership .............................................. 195 Paulos Publishing House ...................................... 19 peace journalism .................................................. 56 PEN Ethiopia ................................................. 41; 110 perestroika ........................................................... 16 Persson, Johan ..................................................... 30 polarization .............................................. 22; 35; 92 political appointments ....................................... 196 Prensa Latina ........................................................ 15 press council (see also media council) ................. 26 Press Freedom Day ............................ 138; 191; 205 press law, 1992 .............................. 4; 18; 19; 21; 25

292

private press ..................................... 19; 23; 45; 151 private radio ............................................. 27; 37; 44 problem statement .............................................. 73 professional imagination ...................................... 61 professionalization ....................... 55; 225; 232; 239 propaganda ..... 11; 14; 28; 162; 176; 212; 226; 230; 243 protocol journalism .... 119; 130; 135; 193; 215; 244 public journalism .......................................... 56; 232

Sebsibe Kebede .................................................. 110 security ............................................... 103; 105; 108 Seed, William H. ................................................... 12 Seife Nebelbal ................................ 25; 36; 157; 158 Seifu Seyoum.............................................. 207; 252 selective liberalization.......................................... 32 self-censorship ......................... 32; 68; 73; 219; 223 Sendek Alemachin ................................................ 14 sensationalism ..................................... 20; 156; 202 Serto Ader ............................................................ 19 Shabia ................................................................. 162 Sheger FM .......................................... 27; 36; 37; 44 Shimelis Bejiga ................................... 159; 168; 174 Shimelis Kemal ...... 28; 93; 110; 113; 150; 168; 174; 205; 255 Sisay Agena .............................. 23; 42; 93; 207; 255 SMS service .......................................................... 24 social control in the newsroom .................... 63; 241 socializing ........................................................... 201 Solomon Endale ................................................. 148 Solomon Hailemariam ........................................ 255 Solomon Kebede ................................................ 252 Solomon Tekesta ................................................ 230 Somali....................................................... 8; 13; 107 Somalia ....................... 6; 30; 46; 119; 121; 221; 242 South Africa ............................ 5; 16; 20; 26; 59; 101 South African Broadcasting Corporation ........... 112 South African Press Association ......................... 101 Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples ........ 8 Soviet Union ....................................... 15; 16; 39; 68 Stoicism .............................................................. 235 strain theory ......................................................... 64 structured absences ........................................... 164 student demonstrations ...................................... 12 Sub-Saharan Informer ........................................ 254 Sudan ............................................. 6; 119; 134; 162 surveillance .................................................. 82; 105 symbolic annihilation ......................................... 163

Q qualitative interviews ........................................... 77 qualitative method ............................................... 76 quantitative method ............................................ 82 Qunta, Christine ................................................... 69 R Raadiyoo Afaan Qottu.......................................... 13 Radaei Baraki...................................................... 159 radical journalism ................................................. 69 radio ......................................................... 11; 31; 44 Radio Cairo ........................................................... 45 Radio Ethiopia .......................................... 13; 16; 44 Radio Fana ............................ 20; 27; 36; 43; 44; 102 Radio Mille Collines .............................................. 28 Radio Mogadishu ................................................. 13 Radio Vatican ....................................................... 45 Radio Voice of the Gospel .................................... 12 ras Tafari .............................................................. 10 readership ............................................................ 45 Red Terror .............................................................. 7 Reeyot Alemu ....................................................... 30 relativism.............................................................. 69 Reporter, The ...................... 23; 24; 36; 45; 179; 205 Reporters Without Borders ............................ 25; 30 representativeness ............................................... 78 research subjectivity ...................................... 76; 80 resources .................................................... 106; 192 restructuring ...................................... 111; 137; 198 Reuters ................................. 48; 102; 116; 161; 221 revolutionary democracy ....................................... 8 rhetoric....................................................... 152; 154 risk theory ............................................................ 67

T Tadesse Zinaye ................................................... 104 Taitu ..................................................................... 12 Tam Asmar ........................................................... 47 Tamrat Gebregiorgis .................. 148; 168; 183; 255 Tamrat Haile ....................................................... 148 Tamrat Negera ........................... 148; 153; 158; 159 Tanzania ........................................... 39; 46; 70; 233 Tarik ................................................................... 158 Tefera Ghedamu ................................................ 252 television ................................................ 12; 43; 105 Teshale Bekele ................... 166; 167; 172; 201; 252 Teshome Negatu ........................................ 122; 253 Tewodros Negash ............................................... 252 Tigray Mass Media Agency................................. 107 Tigray People's Liberation Front ............ 8; 108; 152 Tigray/Tigrinya ..................... 8; 13; 15; 85; 107; 198

S Saba .................................................................... 102 salary .................................................... 38; 187; 207 sampling ............................................................... 77 Samson Mamo ........................................... 168; 255 satellite television ........................................ 43; 108 Satenaw ............................................................... 25 Saudi Arabia ......................................................... 39 Scheufele, Dietram A.................................. 144; 175 Schibbye, Martin .................................................. 30 Science Journalists’ Association ........................... 41

293

Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front ........................ 7 Tigre ..................................................................... 13 Tobiya ............................................................. 19; 22 transcription ......................................................... 95 Transitional Government of Ethiopia ..................... 7 Transitional Period Charter .................................. 17 triangulation ......................................................... 76 Tsegaleul Woldekidan ........................................ 168 Tsion Girma ........................................................ 255 tsunamis ............................................................. 195

Welde Giyorgis Wolde Yohannes ......................... 11 WikiLeaks ....................................................... 30; 45 Wondwosen Mekonnen ............... 42; 153; 159; 168 work routines ..................................................... 214 Workers’ Party of Ethiopia ................................... 16 World Bank............................................................. 5 Worlds of Journalism Study ........... 56; 70; 234; 238 Woubshet Taye .................................................... 30 woyane ......................................................... 92; 202 X

U

Xinhua ................................................................ 102

Uganda ......................................................... 70; 233 ujamaa journalism ............................................... 70 Unesco ............................................................... 191 United Ethiopian Democratic Forces ................... 92 UNMEEs ..................................................... 194; 231

Y yehizb media .................................................. 87; 95 yemengist media .................................................. 87 Z

V

Zambia.................................................................. 32 Zami FM ......................................................... 27; 44 Zandberg, Eyal .............................................. 66; 242 Zekeriya Mohammed ......................................... 230 Zelizer, Barbie .............................................. 58; 230 Zemen Magazine ........................................ 110; 159 Zeray Asgedom................................................... 108 Zimbabwe..................................................... 71; 239

Voice of America .............................. 25; 28; 45; 161 Voice of the Tigray Revolution ............................. 20 Voice of Zimbabwe ............................................... 16 W Walta Information Center 20; 36; 47; 102; 172; 254 watchdog journalism ............................ 70; 213; 233 Watergate .................................................... 58; 230

294